Case 71.

Motion to Quash Information

ARIEL M. LOS BANOS, ON BEGALF OF P/SUPT. VICTOR AREVALO ET AL.,

PETITIONERS VS. JOEL R. PEDRO, RESPONDENT, GR. No. 173588, April 22, 2009

Facts:

Joel R. Pedro, respondent, faced criminal complaint for violating the election gun ban of the
Election Omnibus Code after being caught illegally carrying his firearm at the checkpoint in Boac,
Marinduque. The Boac checkpoint was composed of P. Senior Inspector, Victor V. Aravelo, et.al.
herein petitioners.

Pedro filed a motion for preliminary investigation which the RTC granted, however it had not
materialized. He then filed a motion to quash on the ground that the information “contains
averments, which if true which constitute a legal excuse or justification,” attaching a Comelec
Certification that he was exempted from the gun ban. RTC granted the motion and ordered the
return of seized articles to Pedro.

After a year, petitioners moved to reopen the case, alleging that the certification was falsified.
Pedro moved for consideration based on Section 8 of Rule 117, arguing that the case was now
permanently dismissed for it had lapsed from the prescriptive period.

RTC rejected Pedro’s argument. CA initially denied his appeal, but has reversed their decision
with the ruling that Sec. 8 of Rule 117 is applicable because Pedro was able to manifest that the
motion to reopen the case was filed after the lapse of more than one year from the time the notice
of dismissal was served.

Issues:

• Whether or not the RTC erred in quashing the information filed against Pedro; and
• Whether or not Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules in Criminal Procedure is
applicable on the case at bar.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the RTC erred in quashing the information. Pedro’s attachment is a matter of
aliunde (from another source) and cannot support a motion to quash grounded on legal excuse and
justification alleged in the information. Pedro also misapppreciated the true function of motion to
quash as it is distinct to the provisional dismissal stated in, Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules in Criminal Procedure. Said rule does not apply in the case.

The case is remanded to the RTC as the information filed stands valid. Pedro shall then be arraigned
and be put on trial.
Case 72. Demurrer to evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, AND LAURO L. BAJA,

GR No. 233437, April 26, 2021

Facts:

Baja, former Philippine permanent representative to the United Nations and Chief of Mission and
herein respondent, faced a violation of Republic Act No. 9184, RA No. 3019, and Article 220 of
the RPC for his undocumented reimbursements, unsupported expenses, and other irregularities
found by the COA.

The prosecution presented the Audit team as witnesses. Baja then moved for leave to file the
demurer of evidence but the Sandiganbayan denied the motion without prejudice.

Baja then filed a demurrer to evidence citing that the prosecution failed to present evidence to
sustain the Information. He also argued that the reimbursement claims and undocumented
expenses were not proven to be inexistent. He further claimed that there is no basis of charging
him with a violation of RA No. 3019 as there was no notice of disallowance issued and the failure
to properly document expenses was not a crime under the said law.

Sandiganbayan then issued a resolution granting his Demurrer to Evidence, citing that the
prosecutor failed to prove all the elements of the violation and to present other corroborating
evidence. His case was dismissed.

The prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan dismissed. The
Ombudsman represented them in filing a petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court.

The Court ordered Baja to file a comment and he claimed that his rights against double jeopardy
is being violated, pointing out that when a criminal case is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence,
it results in the accused’s acquittal.

Issue:

• Whether or not Baja’s grant of the Demurrer to Evidence by the Sandiganbayan is proper;

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the grant of demurer to evidence is proper. The Sandiganbayan did not
misapprehend the facts of the case as its findings were based on the evidence presented by the
prosecutor. It was the prosecutor who failed to present enough evidence to substantiate their
conclusion that Baja’s expenses were fictitious and non-existent. Reversing said grant would also
reverse the dismissal of the case which would violate Baja’s right against double jeopardy.
Case 73. Provisional Dismissal

SALDARIEGA, PETITIONER VS. HON. PANGANIBAN, PRESIDING JUDGE,

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION, QUEZON CITY, AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS, GR. No. 211933 and 211960, April 15,
2015

Facts:

The Office of the City Prosecutor filed two Informations against Roberta S. Saldariega, petitioner,
for violation of RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The case was
assigned to Branch 227 of RTC Quezon City where Judge Elvira Panganiban, respondent, was the
presiding officer.

The case was provisionally dismissed with the expressed consent of the accused and the counsel
for the failure of the prosecutor’s principal witnesses to appear despite court notice on May 16,
2013.

On June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas, one of the witnesses, moved to reopen the case which the judge
granted. Petitioner moved for reconsideration invoking that the provisional dismissal considered
as an acquittal and that Villas had no legal personality to open the case.

Issue:

Whether or not the provisional dismissal of Criminal Case is equivalent to the accused’s acquittal.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the provisional dismissal with the express consent of the accused may be
revived within the periods provided under Sec.8 of Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Such provisional dismissal is not considered as acquittal and there was no violation to due process
as the revival of a provisionally dismissed complaint was made within the time-bar provided under
the law.
Case 74.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER VS. DOMINGO ARCEGA Y

SIGUENZA, RESPONDENT, GR No. 237489, August 27, 2020

Facts:

Domingo Arcega, respondent, was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of attempted
rape by the RTC of Iriga City. Dissatisfied with the judgment, he appealed before CA which
modified the sentence to guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as
the testimony of the victim failed to show that the accused-appellant “introduced his organ to her
vagina” and the absence of intent to have sexual intercourse was evident in the information.

Respondent applied for probation which the RTC granted. His sentence was then suspended and
fixed the period of probation for two years.

The People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, filed an instant petition for review on
Certiorari, invoking that the CA committed grave error of finding him guilty of the crime of Acts
of Lasciviousness instead of Rape despite the established findings of the prosecutor beyond
reasonable doubt.

In his comment, the respondent claimed that he had been acquitted from the crime of rape since
CA modified his conviction to acts of lasciviousness. Assailing the decision through a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 violates his rights against double-jeopardy.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner may assail through petition for review on certiorari the CA decision.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the petitioner cannot assail through petition for review on certiorari the CA
decision which modified the RTC judgement convicting the respondent from rape to acts of
lasciviousness. A judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial court or the appellate court is
final, unappealable and immediately executory upon its promulgation.

The CA’s modification of the respondent’s conviction from attempted rape to acts of lasciviousness
has already acquitted the respondent of attempted rape. The petitioner is already barred from filing
the present petition for review on certiorari assailing respondents’ acquittal on such ground.
Case 75. Demurrer to evidence

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONERS VS. JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA

ROSA, AND FELICITAS D. NECOMEDES, RESPONDENTS, GR. No. 191015, August 06,
2014

Facts:

The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) filed a complaint for two counts of Estafa
through Falsification of Commercial Documents against Jose C. Go, Aida C. Dela Rosa, and
Felicitas D. Necomedes, private respondents. The Prosecutor then filed two Informations against
them.

After the presentation of the prosecutor’s evidence during the trial, private respondents filed
Motion for Leave of Court. The RTC judge then granted their motion. After which, they filed their
Demurrer to Evidence praying for the dismissal of the Criminal Case for failure of the prosecutor
to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The RTC judge dismissed the cases acquitting
them from criminal liability.

Complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration without the approval of the public prosecutor. But
the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General filed an original petition for certiorari
before CA assailing the order of the RTC. Said petition was denied.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled in favor of the RTC
judge who granted the demurrer of the evidence of the respondents.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the CA grossly erred in affirming with the RTC’s order to grant the
respondents’ demurrer to the evidence. Said order was null and void for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion which manifested irregularity causing substantial injury to the banking
industry.

The Court found that the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain their indictment
of Estafa through falsification of commercial documents. The RTC failed to weigh the
prosecution’s evidence against respondents considering that the case involved hundreds of millions
of pesos and with the banking industry impressed with public interest.
Case 76. Demurrer to Evidence

ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ, PETITIONER VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT, GR No. 210266, June 07, 2017

Facts:

Anthony De Silva Cruz faced criminal complaints for violation of RA No. 8484 or the Access
Devices Regulation Act of 1998. He pleaded guilty during the arraignment.

When the prosecutor formally offered their evidence at the trial, Cruz filed a Demurrer to Evidence
asserting that the credit card was inadmissible since it was offered by the prosecutor in violation
of A.M. 03-1-09-SC. The RTC denied said Demurrer to Evidence citing that the credit card
receipts were properly identified by the witnesses and that the alleged counterfeit credit card was
offered in evidence by the prosecution. The RTC then rendered judgement finding Cruz guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

He appealed before CA but it was denied. He filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied. He then filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not the counterfeit access device can still be presented in trial despite not having been
presented and marked during pre-trial.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the counterfeit access device can still be presented in trial despite not having
been presented and marked during pre-trial.

Though the rule states that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and
pre-marked during pre-trial, it carries an exception and can be allowed by the court when a good
cause is shown. The prosecution was able to present and mark during the Pre-trial a certification
that the access device used is a counterfeit. Through this, the access device could still be presented
since it is formed part of an exhibit that had already been presented and marked during the pre-
trial.
Case 77.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER VS. HON JUDGE JOSE R.

HERNANDEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, BR. 158, RTC-PASIG CITY,
ATTY. LOGAYA P. SALAYON AND ATTY. ANTONIO M. LLORIENTE, GR No. 154218
and 154372, August 28, 2006

Facts:

COMELEC filed a total of 321 Informations against Ligaya Salayon and Antonio Llorente, private
respondents, for violation of RA 6646 or the Election Reform Laws of 1987.

Private respondents filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Consolidation and three Omnibus Motions asking
to consolidate all cases into one violation and to allow them to post bail to only one violation. Said
motions were granted.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the judge denied. The arraignment and pre-trial was
then set. During the arraignment, private respondents pleaded not guilty. Petitioner subsequently
filed an Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for Reconsideration asking the court to nullify
the arraignment for lack of notice to the prosecutor. The hearing was reset but the state prosecutor
did not appear causing it to be reset again.

The court issued an order denying the prosecution’s Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for
Reconsideration. After several postponement, the arraignment proceeded. The prosecutor then
manifested that it was appealing to the higher court, hence, it was once again postponed.

The hearing was again set but it did not proceed due to the state prosecutor’s absence. Private
respondents then filed a motion to dismiss which the court granted.

Petitioner then filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus praying that the order of
dismissal of the RTC be declared null and void. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred in upholding the dismissal of the 321 Criminal cases against private
respondents.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the CA did not err in the dismissal of the 321 criminal cases against private
respondents.

The cancellation of the hearings by the prosecution without a valid ground is certainly oppressive
and capricious especially taking into account the 80 day-period in Rule 119 explicitly provided.
Further, the circumstances which prevented them were not covered by the exclusion provided in
Section 3(a) (3) and (f) of Rule 119.
Case 78.

JEFFREY RESO DAYAP, PETITIONER VS. PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA

SENDIONG, ELVIE SY AND DEXIE DURAN, RESPONDENT, GR No. 177960, January
29, 2009

Facts:

Jeffrey Reso Dayap, petitioner, was charged with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to
Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. During the arraignment, he
pleaded not guilty.

Respondents then filed a motion for leave of court to amend information seeking to add an
allegation of abandonment of victims by petitioner but the Office of the Prosecutor filed an
Omnibus Motion to withdraw said amendment. MTC granted the withdrawal.

During the trial, petitioner sought leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted.
He filed his demurer to evidence citing the prosecutor’s failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he was criminally liable. It was granted and the accused was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence.

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 alleging that the MTC’s
dismissal was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecutor. They also alleged
that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec.
11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and they also failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused.
The Court affirmed on the questioned order and it was remanded on its court of origin.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the CA under Rule 42 where it ruled that there
was no proof of the total value of the properties damaged and that the case falls within the RTC’s
jurisdiction and the proceedings before MTC is null and void;

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the CA’s decision arguing that the jurisdiction of the case
is determined in the information but it was denied as CA iterated that RTC has the proper
jurisdiction.

Issue:

• Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the jurisdiction over the offense charged falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC;
Ruling:

The Court ruled that the CA erred in its ruling as the jurisdiction of the case falls within the MTC
as the penalty imposed is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its medium
period. The jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC who has the original
jurisdiction.
Case 79.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. TIMOTEO

TAMAYO, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT, GR No. L-2233, April 25, 1950

Facts:

Timoteo Tamayo, defendant and appellant, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. He pleaded guilty and the fiscal
recommended a fine of 100 PHP which he will pay for one month.

Nine days after, the fiscal moved the court to reconsider its decision as the imposable penalty for
the said crime was superseded with Republic Act No. 4, modifying the penalty to imprisonment.
The court amended its decision after seven months imposing a penalty of imprisonment for five
years for the accused.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of First Instance can modify its decision after the lapse of seven months
from the date of the promulgation based on the new Republic Act.

Ruling:

The Court of First Instance cannot modify its decision after the lapse of seven months from the
date of the promulgation based on the new Republic Act. The Court believed that, without the
consent of the defendant, a judgement may not anytime be altered beyond the correction of clerical
or inadvertent errors as provided in Section 1 of Rule 117.

Modification at any time of a judgement is prejudicial to the accused as he would be put twice in
jeopardy.
Case 80. Motion to Reopen a Case

CECILIA RIIVAC, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT,

GR No. 224673, January 22, 2018

Facts:

Cecilia Rivac, petitioner, was charged with the crime of Estafa filed before the RTC of Laoag City,
Ilocos Sur.

During the arraignment, she pleaded not guilty invoking that her liability is only civil. But the RTC
found her guilty beyond reasonable doubt. After the promulgation of judgement and before it
lapsed into finality, petitioner moved to reopen the case on the ground that she intends to present
the testimonies of Fariñas, complainant, and a certain Atty. Blando. The RTC partly granted the
motion but denied the same when Rivac could not present Atty. Blando during the trial. The RTC
then affirmed its judgment.

The CA affirmed Rivac’s conviction. It also held that the RTC erred in allowing the reopening of
the case since the ruling had promulgated therein.

Rivac moved for reconsideration before the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether the CA correctly ruled that it was improper for the RTC to reopen its proceedings.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the CA erred in holding that it was improper for the RTC to reopen its
proceedings because it had already promulgated its judgment.

A motion to reopen the case may be filed even after the promulgation of a judgment and before
the same lapse into finality, with the guiding parameter, “to avoid miscarriage of justice.” The RTC
correctly allowed the reopening of the proceeding to accept Fariñas’s subsequent testimony to shed
light on the true nature of their transaction.