Environment

Images &
Environment
Roger M. Downs
David Stea
editors

Cognitive Mapping and Spatial Behavior

With a foreword by Kenneth E. Boulding

Ο Routledge
Taylor & Francis Croup

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 1973 by Transaction Publishers

Published 2017 by Routledge

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Library of Congress Catalog Number: 2004062014

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Image and environment : cognitive mapping and spatial behavior / Roger M.
Downs and David Stea, editors,
p. cm.
Originally published: Chicago : Aldine Pub. Co., 1973.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-202-30766-2 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Space perception. 2. Spatial behavior. 3. Cognition. I. Downs,
Roger M. II. Stea, David.

BF469.D68 2005
153.7*52—dc22 2004062014

ISBN 13: 978-0-202-30766-4 (pbk)

 Contents

FOREWORD BY KENNETH BOULDING vii

PREFACE XIII

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS XIX

CONTRIBUTORS XXI

I . THEORY 1

1. Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior: Process and Products

Roger M. Downs and David Stea 8
2. Cognitive Maps in Rats and Men
Edward C. Tolman 27
3. Notes Toward a Developmental Theory of Spatial Learning
David Stea and James M. Blaut 51
4. Cognitive Maps in Perception and Thought
Stephen Kaplan 63

I I . COGNITIVE REPRESENTATIONS 79

5. Psychology and Living Space

Terence R. Lee 87
6. Notes on Urban Perception and Knowledge
Donald A ppleyard 109
7. Differential Cognition of Urban Residents: Effects of Social
Scale on Mapping
Peter Orleans 115
8. How Citizens View Two Great Cities: Milan and Rome
Donata Francescato and William Mebane 131
9. Student Views of the World
Thomas F. Saarinen 148
vi Contents
10. Designative Perceptions of Macro-Spaces: Concepts, a Method-
ology, and Applications
Kevin JR. Cox and Georgia Zannaras 162
I I I . SPATIAL P R E F E R E N C E 179

11. On Mental Maps

Peter R.Gould 182
I V . T H E D E V E L O P M E N T OF SPATIAL COGNITION 221

12. Some Preliminary Observations on Spatial Learning in School

Children
David Stea and James M. Blaut 226
13. The Black Boxes of Jônkôping; Spatial Information and
Preference
Peter R. Gould 235
14. The Development of Spatial Cognition: A Review
Roger A. Hart and Gary T. Moore 246
V . GEOGRAPHICAL AND SPATIAL ORIENTATION 289

15. Topographical Orientation

Donald R. Griffin 296
16. Some References to Orientation
Kevin Lynch 300
V I . COGNITIVE DISTANCE 317

17. Emotional and Geographical Phenomena in Psychophysical

Research
Ulf Lundberg 322
18. A Method for Analyzing Distance Concepts of Urban Residents
Robert A. Lowrey 338
19. Urban Cognitive Distance
Ronald Briggs 361
EPILOGUE 389

BIBLIOGRAPHY 391

NAME INDEX 425

INDEX OF PLACE NAMES 430

SUBJECT INDEX 432

 Foreword

I have read these papers with very great interest. They are interesting in
their own right as an expression of an "invisible college" which represents
almost a new discipline, cutting across the old disciplines of geography and
psychology, with a considerable dash of other social sciences, and even a
tantalizing flavor of history, as we move from space into space-time. They
represent, furthermore, a significant contribution towards filling the biggest
hole in the sciences, the missing science of human learning. In this con-
nection the importance of any contribution can hardly be overestimated,
for it may well be that in the present extraordinary period in the history
of this planet a science of human learning is the only thing which can save
us from disaster. All social problems, whether war, population control, the
structure of authority, the distribution of income, or whatever we would
like to mention, can only be solved by a dynamics which includes human
learning as its most essential element.
The plain fact is, however, that up to now we know very little about
human learning in an explicit model-building sense. Education is still a craft
industry. Most of us teach the way we do because it is the way we
were taught. The production of human beings in the family is also a craft
industry. People raise children, on the whole, in the way that they them-
selves were raised. The few onslaughts from the scientific subculture
in the way of learning theory, in the one case, and Drs. Gesell and Spock
in the other, have made only marginal changes. Not, of course, that craft
industries should be despised; they often produce very elegant and delight-
ful articles. We must be doing something right both in childrearing in the
family and in formal education; otherwise we would not have survived as
long as we have. In what I have elsewhere called the "crisis of closure,"
however, in which our terrified spatial imagination perceives the all-too-
near wall of the niche into which the human race has been expanding for

vii
viii Foreword

so long, the craft production of human adults may not be enough, and any
move towards a more systematic and specific knowledge of human learning
is a big step towards survival.
My little book The Image propounded the then somewhat heretical
notion that learning essentially consisted of a growth of knowledge, and that
behavior was a function of knowledge; that is, the cognitive structure, which
I called the "image," including the valuations which were placed over the
structure. On this view most behavior cauld not be explained in terms of a
response to any immediate stimulus. This is, of course, the sort of psy-
chological doctrine one would expect from a simple-minded economist,
who thinks mainly in terms of the theory of choice, for choice must be
between alternative images of the future. There is nothing else to choose,
and though immediate stimuli, like seeing something in a shop window,
may affect our images of the future, the stimulus clearly is merely a trigger
and the act depends on the whole cognitive-valuation structure, that is, on
the image. We are not going to find any stimulus-response regularities,
therefore, except in extremely simple cases, any more than we should expect
to find regularities between a trigger and its consequences if we knew
nothing about the system as a whole. The stimulus-response theory, there-
fore, seems to take us only a very little way into the system which we are
really investigating, simply because between the stimulus and the response
lies an image which simply cannot be dismissed by calling it an intervening
variable. It is not a variable; it is a vast and complex set of parameters to
which we also have some kind of access, even though an imperfect one.
It is one thing to postulate a cognitive-valuative structure as a necessity,
almost indeed an evolutionary necessity, as Kaplan points out. It is quite
another thing to be able to perceive it as a system and to understand its
structure. It is indeed a very real question as to whether this is possible,
that is, whether the knower can understand not only what he knows, but
also what the systematic structure of that knowing is. Whether we can go
all the way with this, however, does not concern us. The important thing
is that we can go part way, and we should go as far as we can. In this
connection, the study of spatial images is of peculiar importance, not only
because they are of themselves perhaps the most significant part of the total
structure, but also because they seem to be accessible in a way that other
parts of the image are not. Indeed, if we think about other elements of the
image, we have a strong tendency to structure this in spatial terms. Thus,
an economist thinks of valuation in terms of the utility function, which is a
kind of "mountain." We think of personal relationships in such terms as
near and far, obscure and clear, devious and direct, exalted and common-
place, all of which have strong spatial connotations and are in fact spatial
metaphors. It is a challenge indeed to try to think of a metaphor that is not
in some sense spatial. We can perhaps rank the senses, in terms of the
spatial quality of information which they give us; in the order of vision,
Foreword ix
hearing, touch, smell, and taste, with taste metaphors, such as bitter and
sweet, salty and bland, having the least spatial connotations.
The spatial connotations of language indeed is a subject which does not
seem to be included in this volume, perhaps because it does not yet exist,
but it is clearly a fascinating field in which the geographer and the linguist
might well get together. One thinks, for instance, of the spatial aspects of
grammar. The comparative and the superlative are clearly spatial met-
aphors. Classificatory structures, like gender, have less direct spatial ref-
erence, but always involve spatial metaphors like pigeonholes and represent
an extension of the spatial metaphor "here" and "there." Word order,
which is of overwhelming importance in some languages, is very clearly
spatial. Any ordinal ranking has a spatial referent and is indeed a spatial
metaphor. It is hard to believe that this overwhelming importance of the
spatial metaphor is not related to some as yet unknown spatial pattern of
the human nervous system, which enables us to perceive the four-dimen-
sional space-time world in which we live because of some kind of corre-
sponding structure "inside," this structure coloring all our other perceptions.
How startling it is, however, to find one's use of the word "color," which
is a non-spatial metaphor, to describe the expansion of the internal spatial
structure into a more complex image.
Perhaps the reason why the study of "inner space," or internal spatial
structures, is so immediately rewarding is that we now have external "maps"
which we believe are very accurate representations of the real world,
derived from processes of surveying, the application of trigonometry and
geometry, and so on, about which there is virtually no dispute, mainly
because there is an extraordinarily powerful and effective feedback of map-
ping error from anyone who uses maps. It is significant that the error here
is the failure of correspondence between an external map and an internal
map, in which it is the failure of the external map which produces correction
as a function of the social system. In the individual learning process, it is
correction of error by the comparing of our internal maps with "maps of
maps," internal maps of external maps. The map, therefore, in all its
possible forms represents a unique contribution towards error detection and
its use, not only in the form of geographical maps but in the form of
chemical formulas, physical laws, and so on. The map concept is perhaps
the real key to the development of science. This is an aspect of the theory
of scientific epistemology which has not been sufficiently explored.
I cannot resist the temptation to conclude with a personal note on the
curious nature of what might be called scientific space. The organization
of science into disciplines sets up a series of ghettos with remarkable dis-
tances of artificial social space between them. I have been interested in
establishing communications among the disciplines ever since I went to
Iowa State College (as it was then called) at Ames, Iowa in 1943, to con-
vert myself into a labor economist. Until that time I had been an extremely
χ Foreword
pure economist, believing indeed that the other social sciences either did
not exist, or at least could make no contribution to economics. Getting into
the study of the labor movement convinced me that without sizeable inputs,
certainly of sociology and political science, and more doubtfully of psy-
chology, the phenomenon of the labor movement could not possibly be
understood. This got me interested in the problem of developing a general
social science.
When I went to the University of Michigan in 1949 it was with the
intention of developing a seminar in the integration of the social sciences,
and this I carried on for a number of years. It attracted a very diverse group
of people—engineers, architects, biologists, sociologists, anthropologists,
and political scientists. I cannot recall that I was able at any time to find a
psychologist interested in it, but I have to confess that my cognitive map of
psychology looks remarkably like the interior of Greenland. The seminar,
however, did have a curious indirect by-product. As a result of it, I got into
correspondence with the late Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who was approaching
general systems from the side of biology as I was approaching general
systems from the side of economics. We spent a year together in 1954-55
at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford,
and out of conversations begun there between Bertalanffy, Anatol Rapo-
port, Ralph Gerard and myself, we founded what eventually became the
Society for General Systems Research. Even in this enterprise, psychologists
played an extremely minor role. In that golden year at the Behavioral
Sciences Center I recall very few fruitful contacts with psychologists with
one exception, Elsa Frenkel-Brunswick. Her husband Egon's famous "lens
model" is an important contribution to cognitive theory, and I am a little
surprised that no use seems to have been made of it in this volume. The
work of my colleague Kenneth Hammond, which follows very closely that
of Frenkel-Brunswick, on computer graphic representations of conflictual
positions, seems to me very close to the general problems of cognitive map-
ping, using spatial analogies rather than space itself.
It was a real surprise to me, therefore, to learn from the papers in this
volume that my little book The Image, which emerged from an intense
nine days of solitary dictating at the end of my time at the Center for
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, should have figured in the
history of cognitive mapping in the way it seems to have done. In The
Image I did make a somewhat half-hearted suggestion that perhaps a new
science might emerge out of these concepts, which I dubbed "eiconics."
However, after writing The Image I became interested in other things—in
the theory of conflict, general systems, and so on—and my general im-
pression was that The Image had fallen on fairly stony intellectual ground.
It aroused interest in surprising quarters—among business executives,
among the people who teach humanities in engineering schools, and in
departments of communications—but as far as I knew it had never pen-
Foreword xi
etrated the boundary of the behavioral sciences, for whose benefit it was
ostensibly written. These boundaries obstruct traffic both ways. I did not
even run across the book by Miller, Galanter and Pribram until long after
it was published. I have to confess to my deep embarrassment, especially as
I have been a map lover since childhood and incapable of resting content
at any new location until I have provided myself with topographical maps
of the area, that the exciting development of cognitive mapping, as revealed
in this volume, came to me as an almost complete surprise. Cognitive map-
ping must certainly be Part One of any textbook of "eiconics," so the
surprise had a strong mixture of sheer delight along with the personal
embarrassment. It is hard, therefore, for me to avoid looking on this volume,
as delightful as it is in its own right, as a prelude to something larger, nothing
less indeed than a general theory of the cognitive-valuative structure and
the learning processes by which it is created. 1 One returns again, however,
to the nagging question, how can the intellectual community be organized
to reduce the social space between the disciplines? Walls, no doubt, there
should be. Otherwise the interdisciplinary all too easily becomes the un-
disciplined. On the other hand, there surely doesn't have to be a Sahara
desert between the economists and the psychologists. Volumes of this kind
are an oasis, but one longs for a time when the oasis will expand and emerge
in an uninterrupted fertile and traversable republic of the mind.

KENNETH E. BOULDING

1. In this connection the book Culture and Cognition, edited by James P. Spradley,
should be noted as another step toward "eiconics." This is an expression of what
might almost be called the "eiconics movement" in anthropology. But it is remarkable,
and perhaps another symbol of the spatial isolation of the disciplines, that I am the
only one out of forty-five authors contributing to both this volume and the Spradley
volume.
 Preface

Aims of the Book

The genesis of this book was an invitation to edit a special issue of the
journal, Environment and Behavior, in which we brought together some of
the emerging work on environmental cognition. After that task was com-
pleted, we embarked on the preparation of this book. It would be a fiction
to claim that we had fixed aims—we can more easily postdict a set of aims.
Primary among these is to introduce and give coherence to a recent ap-
proach to studying human environmental behavior. A concern with the link
between human behavior and the environment has always been at least an
implicit concern of the social sciences, but never before has this concern
been manifested so vocally and forcibly as in the recent past—in fact, dis-
play of such concern is now demanded by the general public.
As a result, many disciplines have responded to the call, and in true
academic fashion, have generated a series of "-ologies," "-istics," and
"-isms." Foremost among these is the attempt to relate human behavior
to the physical environment, the latter including both "natural" and man-
made components. Hastily joining this effort have been a host of disciplines.
Consequently, we are faced with a bewildering list of descriptive names for
this sub-field: behavioral geography, environmental perception, environ-
mental psychology, ecological psychology, and human ecology are among
those proposed. Some clarification has been made in an edited collection
of papers on environmental psychology by Proshansky, Ittelson, and Rivlin
(1970), and in the reviews by Craik (1970a) and Wohlwill (1970). Even
so, in an area where the geometric law of publication applies, we need
overviews and critiques of the scattered and often conflicting work on en-
vironmental behavior.

xiii
xiv Preface
In particular, this book represents a collection of papers on the topics
of cognitive mapping and cognitive maps. Cognitive mapping is a construct
which encompasses those cognitive processes which enable people to
acquire, code, store, recall, and manipulate information about the nature
of their spatial environment. This information refers to the attributes and
relative locations of people and objects in the environment, and is an es-
sential component in the adaptive process of spatial decision making. Thus,
for example, cognitive mapping helps us to solve such diverse spatial prob-
lems as finding a supermarket, choosing a safe and quick route to and from
our workplace, locating potential sites for a new house or a business, and
deciding where to travel on a vacation trip. The cognitive processes are not
constant but undergo change with age (or development) and use (or learn-
ing). Similarly, a cognitive map is an abstraction which refers to a cross-
section, at one point in time, of the environment as people believe it to be.
In presenting this structured overview of cognitive mapping, we are not
trying to force legitimacy on a field which has yet to earn it. The principal
aim is the introduction of a new research area to a wider public, with the
hope of encouraging further efforts in research and application. Linked
with this aim is the presentation of some categories within cognitive map-
ping based upon what has been done rather than what ought to have been
done. In achieving these goals, many compromises must be made. We had
to temper the desire to include as much as possible with the economics of
publishing; we balanced the desire to sample a bit of everything with the
need to make the sections into meaningful, related collections of ideas and
empirical data. Above all, we have allowed the weight and scope of pub-
lished material to suggest the nature of the sections and define the bound-
aries. Nothing could be more inimical to the future of this interdisciplinary
effort than premature fossilization.
Obviously, with so many pitfalls available, we could not attain perfection;
but, given space limitations and our personal biases, we hope that the six
sections—Theory, Cognitive Representations, Spatial Preference, the De-
velopment of Spatial Cognition, Geographical and Spatial Orientation, and
Cognitive Distance represent a fruitful breakdown of cognitive mapping
studies. Other breakdowns of the material are undoubtedly possible, given
the overlap among the papers in the different categories we have chosen,
though any other scheme would have generated as much or more overlap.
We might have taken the suggestion of one reviewer and organized the book
in accordance with a three-fold scheme consisting of ( 1 ) papers taking a
theoretical position; ( 2 ) papers dealing with a general empirical overview
of the field, and ( 3 ) papers dealing with specific experimental studies. We
rejected this approach because our experience as teachers of this subject
matter convinced us that students, at least at this stage, were more con-
cerned with content areas than with the presence or absence of a theoretical
statement. The breakdown of the material we have chosen is that which made
Preface XV

most sense to us, our colleagues, and our students. N o overall theoretical
rationale is intended or, at this stage, probably even necessary. Application
of the criterion of "aesthetic balance" would have led us to arrange things
so that equal numbers of contributions appeared in each section, but would
have accomplished little else.
We expect, however—and in fact hope—that readers will question both
the number of sections and the overall coverage of material. We recognize
the omission of work on environmental learning: the process of the acquisi-
tion of spatial information and its effects on existing cognitive structures.
There is a lack of material dealing with pragmatics : the use of cognitive
mapping concepts in improving the quality and process of environmental
design. However, we were constrained by the paucity either of work in
certain areas or of workers currently researching such areas. The omissions
are a reflection of the current state of cognitive mapping studies.
We tried to depart from the normal format of a book of readings by
providing some genuine integration among dispersed ideas from diverse
philosophical backgrounds. This was realized in two ways: first, by our
summary paper in the Theory section and by the section introductions;
second, by the solicitation and editing of papers designed to fill existing
gaps in cognitive mapping research. Thus, our objective is the coherent dis-
cussion of a research area and not merely the presentation of disparate views
of academics bound and linked only by the covers of a book.
A book aims not only at meaningful content but also at a potential
audience. In the choice of material and the mode of its presentation, we
focused on three interest groups. The first was the individual social scientist
attracted to the problems of relating behavior to the spatial environment.
We have tried to present a comprehensive overview of cognitive mapping
allowing him to grasp basic concepts, methods, and existing bodies of
empirical data. Thus, the book is intended as an introduction to a field.
However, we wanted to produce a book satisfying a second reader—the
would-be or current researcher in cognitive mapping. To this end, we
solicited a wide range of new material, locationally and disciplinarily, in-
dicating the current state of the art. Approximately 80 percent of the book
consists of original contributions. In some instances, such as the paper by
Kaplan (chap. 4 ) , we sought contributions from outstanding researchers
to cover the existing field. We also encouraged contributors to reference
heavily and collated these references to form an extensive bibliography for
research use.
Our third interest group consisted of students. We wanted to produce a
book which could be used as a text or source book in courses dealing with
man and his spatial environment. To this end, the sections are relatively
autonomous, each having its own brief introduction; thus, the book can be
read selectively and in an order suggested by a teacher.
Obviously, these three needs conflict and we have recognized this by
xvi Preface
not satisfying one exclusively, at the expense of the others. We felt that a
state of the art book was required at this time to present the reader with
the origins, achievements, and future of cognitive mapping research.

Scope of the Book

In selecting contributions for the book, we aimed at a representative
coverage of the content areas being studied by researchers in cognitive map-
ping. Consequently, the selection in no way indicates the relative volume
of research either on an author or area basis. Within this guideline, we
employed a set of criteria to select from the "classic" works and new con-
tributions available. Obviously, in a new area, recency itself was an im-
portant consideration of our aim toward an up-to-date review of cognitive
mapping.
One major criterion was the desire to make a sample of historical mile-
stone papers available (such as chaps. 2 and 16), particularly if they were
otherwise inaccessible (chaps. 5, 11, and 15). Second, we sought con-
tributions with a theoretical component since we believe that pragmatic
solutions depend upon the development of coherent and tested theory. The
papers by Kaplan (chap. 4) and Stea and Blaut (chaps. 3 and 12) show
how some of the disparate concepts and data can be meaningfully and
productively related. Third, heavy empirical content was stressed because
we are as much lacking in "hard" data as in developed theory. In this re-
spect, we feel that the papers by Briggs, Lowrey, and Lundberg (chaps.
1 7 - 1 9 ) provide the foundations out of which speculations, then hypotheses,
and eventually theories will emerge.
Fourth, we sought papers with good reviews of the literature relevant to
cognitive mapping studies. Selection on this basis was difficult because so
many reviews have touched peripherally on cognitive mapping. We avoided
overlap with the works of Proshansky, Ittelson, and Rivlin ( 1 9 7 0 ) , and
Craik (1970a) mentioned earlier. We felt that the present state of work on
geographical and spatial orientation could be covered by the reviews in the
papers by Griffin, and Lynch (chaps. 15 and 16).
Whenever we detected a gap which could not be filled in accordance with
the above criteria, we solicited contributions from experts in the area.
Hence, at a later stage in the compilation of the book, the papers by Fran-
cescato and Mebane, and Orleans were obtained (chaps. 7 and 8 ) .
Editing is as much a task of exclusion as inclusion, and so we must
indicate the decision rules for excluding papers. First, linguistic bias favored
works authored in English and representing the U.S., British, and Swedish
orbits. The only serious omissions appear to be the Russian studies of spatial
orientation (Angyal, 1965 and Shemyakin, 1962), and some writings of the
Piagetian School, which are represented in the paper by Hart and Moore
(chap. 14).
Preface xvii
Second, we gathered little material from outside the spectrum formed by
geography, psychology, and planning. This is a reflection both of editorial
competence and of the major interest in cognitive mapping within these
disciplines. We were aware of studies in cultural anthropology and sociology
which touched upon the topic of cognitive mapping, but whose prime ob-
jective, however, is different from that of this book; introductions to this
other area are to be found in Brookfield (1969) and Campbell ( 1 9 6 8 ) . In
addition, Lynch's bibliography (chap. 16) is an excellent primer for cul-
tural and anthropological studies.
Three peripherally related types of work are excluded. First, studies of
cartographic perception or psychophysics, though dealing with environment,
perception, and behavior, have objectives different from our own. Studies
such as Wood's (1968) attempt to relate the graphic map presentation
mode to the amount and type of information perceived and abstracted by
the map reader. They are oriented more to studying perception (for ex-
ample, the discriminability of various color shading systems) than to a
subject's cognitive grasp of his environment.
Second, we excluded studies of spatial mapping which are not cognitively
oriented except by inference. Although the studies by Chapin and Brail
(1969) or Moore and Brown (1970) show the mapped spatial pattern of
human activities, the cognitive component is present by inference only. This
comment should not be interpreted as a criticism of this valuable work,
since it affords evidence of human spatial behavior regularities which can
be investigated via cognitive methodologies.
Finally, we must stress that although we have not explicitly included the
work of such cognitive psychologists as Bruner and Werner, we subscribe
to the view expressed in chap. 4 by Kaplan. We believe that spatial cognitive
mapping processes are part of a general cognitive process whereby an in-
dividual copes with information from his total environment. Although
spatial cognitive mapping processes are a sub-set of this general process,
studies have reached a stage where they are beginning to generate some
higher level concepts and hypotheses : this is apparent in part II on cognitive
representations. But again, space and our general theme limited our range
of choice, and hence we were forced largely to exclude the non-spatial
cognitive mapping processes.
The recently expanded interest in cognitive mapping is the result of many
complementary factors. Among the more general ones are closer links
among geography, planning, environmental design disciplines, and the social
sciences. The more specific factors include the apparent bankruptcy of the
regional descriptive approach and emergence of the so-called behavioral
approach in the spatial sciences, as well as the rejection of economic for-
mulations which relied heavily upon the concept of "rational" or "eco-
nomic" man. As this book indicates, studies of cognitive mapping encompass
a wide range of phenomena at a variety of spatial scales. Our present ability
xviii Preface

to explain and predict spatial behavior using the approach of cognitive

mapping is limited, but the potential for future success is widely recognized.
The six sections that follow should assist the reader in understanding what
has transpired, and the probable nature of future directions.
 Acknowledgments

We have been fortunate in being able to call upon a wide range of help in
preparing this book. Hopefully, we have not overlooked anyone, but, if we
have, our grateful acknowledgments extend to them, in addition to: the
U.S. Office of Education for grant #OE4493 which supported the work
reported in the papers by Hart and Moore, and Stea and Blaut (a,b);
Ronald Abler, James Blaut, Roger Hart, David Hodge, Greg Knight,
Leonard Mark, George McCleary, Gary Moore, David Seamon, Milton
Wend, and Anthony Williams who have all read and commented upon
various bits and pieces of the book; Peter Bamford and Suzanne Downs for
bibliographic labors; David Hodge for cartographic assistance; and finally,
but not least, to Anne Bates, Gloria Graves, Bill Loomis, Nina McNeal,
Linda McGovern, and Kathy Yakich for typing, and retyping!

xix
 Contributors

Donald Appleyard Departments of City and Regional Planning, and

Landscape Architecture, University of California,
Berkeley.

James Blaut Department of Geography, University of Illinois,

Chicago Circle.

Ronald Briggs Department of Geography, University of Texas at

Austin.

Kevin R. Cox Department of Geography, Ohio State University.

Roger M. Downs Department of Geography, The Pennsylvania State

University.

Donata Francescato Department of Psychology, University of Houston.

Peter R. Gould Department of Geography, The Pennsylvania State

University.

Donald R. Griffin The Rockefeller University and the New York

Zoological Society.

Roger A. Hart Graduate School of Geography, Clark University.

Stephen Kaplan Department of Psychology, University of Michigan.

XXI
XXll Contributors

Terence R. Lee Department of Psychology, University of St. An-

drews.

Robert A. Lowrey CONSAD Research Corporation, Pittsburgh.

Ulf Lundberg Psychological Laboratories, University of Stock-

holm.

Kevin Lynch Department of Urban Studies and Planning, Massa-

chusetts Institute of Technology.

William Mebane Graduate School of Business, Harvard University.

Gary T. Moore Department of Psychology, Clark University.

Peter Orleans School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Uni-

versity of California, Los Angeles.

Thomas F. Saarinen Department of Geography, University of Arizona.

David Stea School of Architecture and Urban Planning, Uni-

versity of California, Los Angeles.

Edward C. Tolman Department of Psychology, University of California.

(deceased)

Georgia Zannaras Department of Geography, Ohio State University.

Image and
Environment
 I

Theory

Introduction
There is no generally accepted "party line" by which we can understand
and explain cognitive maps or mapping. In this interdisciplinary area,
writers bring disciplinary biases with them: thus, Orleans relies on insights
from sociology, Briggs from geography, and Appleyard from planning.
Each writer ultimately turns to psychology for "the answer," yet apart from
Tolman's contributions (chap. 2) and the work of Piaget and Werner
(summarized in chap. 14), little theoretical effort per se has been directed
specifically to cognitive spatial representations.
The theorists cited in this introduction have contributed only peripherally
to the question of cognitive mapping. Most of the research that they orig-
inally inspired was concerned with other problems. The recent empirical
explorations of cognitive representation draw heavily upon the "classic"
psychological theorists. However, even this apparently unified source has
led to a divergence of emphasis—Kaplan and Lee both draw inspiration
from physiological psychology; Lundberg and the Swedish investigators
rely upon psychophysics, a reliance shared by Briggs and Lowrey; Apple-
yard has employed cognitive, learning, and perceptual psychology. Recent
work into how environmental cognition develops has considered theoretical
views in developmental psychology and ethnoscience (see chap. 14).
Thus, there is no unified theoretical framework upon which we can base
our understanding of cognitive mapping. The initial paper attempts to
develop such a framework. Kaplan (chap. 4) also offers the beginnings of
1
2 Theory
a fruitful move in this direction but his argument, although attractive and
intuitively plausible, remains an untested speculation.
The lack of a tested theoretical framework is a serious problem with
many significant consequences. We find, for example, that there are ter-
minological difficulties affecting not only our formulation of problems but
also our methods of tackling them: are we concerned with perception or
cognition, attitude or preference? There are obstacles in the context of
research design: where are our a priori hypotheses, our standardized and
validated measuring procedures? The result of these problems can be sum-
marized as follows: work on the cognitive representation of man's spatial
environment has identified interesting consistencies among phenomena, but
has not developed any theoretical frameworks providing the necessary ex-
planation or prediction.
However, we must temper this gloomy assessment by recognizing that
such a stage is inevitable and normal. The difficulties faced in this inter-
disciplinary work are no greater than those portrayed by Watson in The
Double Helix: Rome was not built in a day nor D N A explained overnight.
Hence, it is neither the fact of nor the need for interdisciplinary work and
cross-fertilization which is at issue, but rather the nature of the material
under study, the method by which it is treated, and the basic theoretical
underpinnings. This introduction cannot solve these problems, but it can
discuss some of the significant issues. Accordingly, it touches upon three
theoretical and methodological points :
1. Models of Man. Any behavioral theory makes assumptions about the
nature of "human nature," and several of the major viewpoints are
reviewed.
2. Psychological Theory: Toward a Gestalt. Because the works of Koffka
and Lewin are not represented in the book, and because they provided
an impetus for the theoretical and empirical work of others concerned
with spatial behavior (Barker, 1963; 1968; Barker and Gump, 1964;
Tolman, chap. 2 ) , some of their relevant positions are summarized.
3. Methodology. The research methods used in the various studies re-
ported here are as numerous as the contributors; as yet no single
"acceptable" method or body of methods has emerged, and so a basic
framework is established.
Theory and data are inseparable. Theoretical ideas are sprinkled through-
out this book and, similarly, data is liberally sprinkled through the papers
that follow. Stea and Blaut's (chap. 3) is a developmental paper, as is that
of Hart and Moore. Either might have been appropriate to this section or
to part IV, The Development of Spatial Cognition: similarly, the papers by
Appleyard and Orleans have theoretical overtones. Thus, for a more com-
plete outlook, the reader is urged to obtain a "theoretical gestalt" by com-
bining the ideas that follow with those in succeeding sections of this book.
Introduction 3

Models of Man

Implicit or explicit in the writing of thinkers over the past several hundred
years have been models of human behavior, incorporating assumed internal
determinants as well as patterns of interpersonal influence, social interaction
processes, motivation for group membership, and decision-making (Simon,
1957). Many writers of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth Cen-
turies, from Descartes through La Mettzie, Darwin, Spencer, and Huxley,
were concerned with models based upon theological and biological deter-
minants of behavior. The early twentieth Century saw the emergence of
models for human decision-making incorporating or specifically neglecting
the psychological component. Because our concern is with cognitive factors
affecting one aspect of decision-making—vis-à-vis the spatial environment
— w e will review the crucial models, illustrating the conceptual extremes.
Psychoanalytic man, as delineated by Freud and Jung, was totally non-
rational. His adult behavior was determined in large part by the (probably
unconscious) resolution of psychological conflicts experienced earlier in
life, and was influenced by biologically transmitted traces of earlier ex-
periences in human evolution ("collective unconscious" or "racial mem-
ory"). External factors were assumed to play a small role in adult patterns
of decision-making: social influence was secondary, and environmental
influence negligible. The only exception to this latter statement is the work
of Searles (1960) who incorporated influences from the physical (and
spatial) environment into psychoanalytic thinking.
Classical economic theory proposed an opposite model : man was, for the
purposes of economic exchange, considered totally rational and influenced
in his decision-making only by objective factors external to himself, of which
he had total knowledge. All constraints were completely known and all were
considered:

There are two principal species of economic man: the consumer and the
entrepreneur. Classical economics assumes the goals of both to be given: the
former wishes to maximize his utility, which is a known function of the
goods and services he consumes; the latter wishes to maximize his profit. The
theory then assumes both of them to be rational. Confronted with a pair of
alternatives, they will select that one which yields the larger utility or profit,
respectively. (Simon, 1957, p. 197)

Like the psychoanalytic model, economic man failed to account for much
of the variation in human behavior: for an empirical investigation of the
degree of this failure in terms of human spatial behavior, see the paper on
Swedish farming systems by Wolpert ( 1 9 6 4 ) .
Attempts to consider the finiteness of human rationality in a changing
4 Theory
and complex world, the empirical limits upon cognition, and the "objective"
weighing of alternative decision criteria led to the principle of bounded
rationality:

The capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex prob-
lems is very small compared with the size of the problems whose solution is
required for objectively rational behavior in the real world—or even for a
reasonable approximation to such objective rationality. (Simon, 1957, p. 198)

Behavior based on bounded rationality may seem "irrational" and may be

characterized as such, but the resemblance is only apparent. Rather, the
essential characteristics of the cognitive process are its limited ability to
cope with and store information and its attempt to form impressions of and
tentative decisions about the environment on the basis of limited, frag-
mentary information under severe time constraints. In the economic model,
man maximizes his utility or profit. In Simon's boundedly rational model,
he satisfices, finding a course of action which is "good enough" for the
situation as he comprehends it. Psychological models based upon observa-
tion of human and animal learning (e.g. Estes, 1954) that postulate limita-
tions in the complexity of the choice mechanisms and the capacity of
organisms for obtaining and processing information account for observed
behavior better than do models of rational choice:

However adaptive the behavior of organisms in learning and choice situa-

tions, this adaptiveness falls far short of the ideal of "maximizing" postulated
in economic theory. Evidently, organisms adapt well enough to "satisfice";
they do not, in general, "optimize." (Simon, 1957, p. 261)

Simon's interest in building computer models of man was not new as a

philosophic ideal. La Mettzie's idea of L'Homme Machine had been pro-
mulgated two centuries earlier, and basic computer theory had existed for a
century and a half. Newall, Shaw, and Simon (see Gruber, Terrell, and
Wertheimer, 1962) extended these ideas to the construction of a program
for a "thinking machine" called the "logic theorist," which was set the
problem of deriving the axioms of mathematics from the axioms of logic
à la Russell and Whitehead. The success of this modeling attempt is less
well known than that of the many chess-playing programs which have been
written. Simon and others have cautioned that the fact that a machine can
play chess in much the same way that a man does (albeit more efficiently)
does not imply that the internal hookup of the cerebral cortex must be like
the innards of the computer—but the warning, in people's frantic search for
the "lugram" of rational thought, has often gone unheeded. A parallel prob-
lem is discussed in chapter 1 in terms of representations of the spatial en-
vironment. Although the input source is identical, a city-dweller, a camera,
a cartographer, and a tape-recorder all employ different signatures to arrive
at a representation (or form) of a city; yet all of these forms have the same
Introduction 5
function. Parallel functions do not necessarily imply parallelism of form,
but our understanding of cognitive representation has been hampered by
overlooking this vital point.

Psychological Theory: Toward a Gestalt

Among theorists in psychology, Koffka ( 1 9 3 5 ) may have been the first to

distinguish between the geographical environment (or absolute space) and
the behavioral environment (or relative space), although he acknowledges
borrowing some concepts from Tolman. Koffka held that the geographical
environment is not a stimulus or set of stimuli in itself, but is "stimulus-
providing," and that the mediation of the behavioral environment clarifies
the relationship between the geographical environment and behavior:

Behavior takes place in a behavioral environment, by which it is regulated.

The behavioral environment depends upon two sets of conditions, one in-
herent in the geographical environment, one in the organism. But it is also
meaningful to say that behavior takes place in a geographical environment
. . . (1) Since the behavioral environment depends upon the geographical, our
proposition connects behavior with a remote instead of an immediate
cause . . . (2) the results of the animal's behavior depends not only upon his
behavioral but also on his geographical environment. . . . The geographical
environment, not only the behavioral, is changed through all behavior. (1935,
p. 31)

Lewin, whose association with Tolman was closer, stressed the relation-
ship of and distinctions among mathematical space, physical space, and
psychological life space, concepts which resemble those of Koffka. Lewin
developed a "topological" or "hodological" psychology, stressing the con-
nection and paths between psychological regions : "There is a certain topol-
ogical structuring of the environment in nearly all situations with which
psychology deals, and no doubt there is always some structuring of the
person" (1936, p. 6 2 ) . For Lewin, the contrast between physical and psy-
chological space stemmed from the laws appropriate to the two, with the
determination of spatial relations in psychology dependent upon psychol-
ogical processes and, hence, upon the nature and laws of psychological
dynamics. While psychological life space was considered potentially "metri-
cisable" in the same sense that physical space is metric, Lewin also clarified
distinctions between physical and psychological worlds via differing notions
of connectedness and closure. The single connected space in which all
physical reality is included does not exist within topological psychology,
each life space being viewed as dynamically unique and equivalent to the
totality of the physical world. The notion of "dynamic closure" entered here
as well, the physical world being considered as a "dynamically closed" unity
and the psychological world a dynamically enclosed unity.
6 Theory

Tolman (1932, p. 158) acknowledges a greater debt to Lewin than to

Koffka. But it was Koffka who foreshadowed the spatial nature of the con-
troversy between the yet-to-emerge Hullian and Tolmanian camps in
learning :
We observe three rats in the same maze, each starting at one end and finally
emerging at the other. Then in a way we could say the three rats have run
through the maze, a geographical statement. But our observation has con-
vinced us that there were obvious differences in their behavior . . . the be-
havior within the behavioral environment. A rat running for food does not
do so only from the moment when it is near enough to see or smell it, but
from the very beginning. Tolman's book gives ample evidence for this state-
ment. But the first part of the geographical maze does not contain the food,
nor any stimulation emanating from the food. . . . Behavior in the geograph-
ical environment is (thus) the activity as it really is, in the behavioral as the
animal thinks it is. (1935, pp. 36-37)

Methodology
There is no single correct path to understanding and explanation: hence it
is impossible to specify an optimal research methodology. Consequently, we
will not comment so much upon the specific methodologies (or tactics) used
in studies of cognitive mapping as upon the overall research strategies
utilized. Stea and Downs (1970) identified two basic strategies: system
identification and system analysis. The former, a holistic approach con-
cerned with the identification and description of the overall system, isolates
relationships (and interactions) between segments of the spatial environ-
ment, types of people, and cognitive response typologies.
On this level, a major concern is the establishment of purely functional
relationships between, for example, socioeconomic status variables and the
cognition of different segments of the environment. One main outcome is a
classification or typology of cognitive responses, where such responses are
the product of essentially unknown process interactions. (1970, p. 7)
The second strategy, employed once system interactions have been iden-
tified, described, and isolated, is a searching analysis of the system:
The focus is on the interactions between sets of variables, together with a
specification of the system parameters. Knowledge of relationships and of
parameters can lead directly to casual models indicating, for example, the
process by which information is coded to form part of cognitive representa-
tions. . . . An additional factor associated with the second strategy . . . is the
use of quantitative methods of data analysis. The questions asked in the
second strategy cannot be answered satisfactorily without mathematical and
statistical analysis. Thus, for example . . . factor analytic, multiple regression,
and analysis of variance models lhave been used]. This is not to decry the
first strategy as being weaker or less powerful that the second—rather their
objectives differ and hence so do the means of attaining them. The relation-
Introduction 7
ship between the two strategies represents an overlap between two distinct
stages of growth in studies of environmental cognition. The descriptive first
strategy identifies general patterns of interaction between variables and serves
to generate hypotheses which can be tested by the adoption of the second
strategy. . . . [But] quantification and power are not synonymous. The ad-
vantages of a quantitative approach to environmental cognition should not
obscure the need for care in its use nor the need for an adequate, preexisting
conceptual structure. (Stea and Downs, 1970, pp. 7-8)
Within the literature, the distinction between these two strategies is not
as clear cut as the preceding would suggest. Just as we lack an overall
theoretical framework, so too we lack a consensus as to what constitutes a
"good" or "bad" research design. The dangers inherent in this lack are
obvious. The current ad hoc posture towards methodological questions is
acceptable and even necessary in the exploratory stage of any research
effort. However, it also runs the risk of producing incompatible results and
delaying the development of cumulative scientific knowledge. There are
disciplinary orientations in our approaches to research design, with geog-
raphers tending to favor the search for relationship via variance compound-
ing (i.e. correlational methods), while psychologists favor variance
splitting via analysis of variance methods. Linked with the previous ob-
servation is the problem of control and inference. We are faced with four
sets of variables^—the spatial environment itself, the information or stimulus
set, the intervening cognitive processes, and the group and individual dif-
ferences in the operation of these processes—yet we lack the research design
capability to cope with this type of complexity. Thus, although we have
overlooked methodological questions until now in our efforts to understand
cognitive maps, we cannot afford to continue to do so because theory and
data (and therefore methodology) are inextricably linked.
 I

Cognitive Maps and Spatial

Behavior: Process and
Products
R O G E R M. DOWNS AND DAVID STEA

Introduction

A surprising fact is associated with studies of cognitive mapping: although

the emergence of this vigorously developing research area has been recent,
we are not discussing something newly discovered such as a subatomic
particle or a cell protein structure. Instead we are concerned with phenom-
ena so much part of our everyday lives and normal behavior that we
naturally overlook them and take them for granted.
A series of examples indicate the pervasive influence of cognitive maps
and mapping processes. Newsweek (June 15, 1970) quoted a London cab
driver: "It's crazy, . . . How do they expect anyone to find their way around
here?" This plea resulted from an ingenious planning experiment in which
sidewalks were widened and streets narrowed and turned into a system of
mazes, dead-ends, and one-way routes. The objective was to create a con-
fusing obstacle to drivers, forcing them to abandon habitual short cuts in
favor of main streets, or, better still, to give up driving and use public
transportation. That the drivers have well-developed cognitive maps is
implied in one planner's claim: "You can't make it just difficult. You have
to make it nearly impossible or you won't win."
As a graphic example of the value of cognitive maps consider the 1970
Apollo 14 moon walk. Astronauts Shepard and Mitchell were within 75 feet
of their objective, the rim of Cone Crater, but returned to "Antares" without
completing their mission. The reason? They had become confused and dis-
oriented by the lack of distinctive lunar landscape features and the endless
sequence of gullies. It was only later that they realized just how close they
had been to their objective.
We are all aware of the image evoked when the news media use a locat-
ion al term such as "the South" in the U . S A . or "the Midlands" in England.
We share common reactions when told that "it" happened in the South:
8
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 9

images of the climate, the prevailing social system, the attitudes of the
people, the food they eat, readily "spring to mind." We rely on these images
for understanding and explaining the event (it) because "you would expect
that sort of thing to happen there." Cognitive maps are convenient sets of
shorthand symbols that we all subscribe to, recognize, and employ: these
symbols vary from group to group, and individual to individual, resulting
from our biases, prejudices, and personal experiences. In the same way, we
respond to an advertisement's exhortation to "come to sunny Florida" or,
on the other side of the Atlantic, to "come to sunny Brighton." We associate
images of beaches, sun-bathing, amusement parks, golf courses with such
simple locational terms; our cognitive mapping processes fill in the necessary
details. Thus an advertisement offering ice cream store franchises in the
New York Times made the following appeal:
Tired of snow? Tired of crowded city life?
BE A CONTENTED SOUTHWESTERNER!
Enjoy life the way it should be; among neighborly congenial folks on the
balmy Gulf Coast, or the dry Texas "Hill Country;" or the scenic "Piney
Woods" of East Texas. (February 21, 1971, Section 5, p. 2)
So we find that planners try to alter cognitive maps, astronauts need them,
the news media use them, and advertisers tempt us with them: they are part
of our everyday lives. But for research designed to understand and explain
them, definitions by example are necessary but not sufficient. Consequently,
we offer a formal definition : Cognitive mapping is a process composed of a
series of psychological transformations by which an individual acquires,
codes, stores, recalls, and decodes information about the relative locations
and attributes of phenomena in his everyday spatial environment.
In this paper, we will expand this definition and examine the conceptual
frameworks which are subsumed within it.

An Analysis of Cognitive Mapping Processes

COGNITIVE MAPS AND ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR

Underlying our definition is a view of behavior which, although variously

expressed, can be reduced to the statement that human spatial behavior is
dependent on the individual's cognitive map of the spatial environment.
That this formulation is necessary is indicated by a comparison of the
characteristics of the individual with those of the spatial environment.
The environment is a large-scale surface, complex in both the categories
of information present and in the number of instances of each category.
Things are neither uniformly distributed over this surface, nor ubiquitous:
they have a "whereness" quality. In contrast, the individual is a relatively
small organism with limited mobility, stimulus-sensing capabilities, infor-
mation processing ability, storage capacity, and available time. The in-
10 Theory
dividual receives information from a complex, uncertain, changing, and un-
predictable source via a series of imperfect sensory modalities operating
over varying time spans and intervals between time spans. From such
diversity the individual must aggregate information to form a comprehensive
representation of the environment. This process of acquisition, amalga-
mation, and storage is cognitive mapping, and the product of this process at
any point in time can be considered as a cognitive map.
Given a cognitive map, the individual can formulate the basis for a
strategy of environmental behavior. We view cognitive mapping as a basic
component in human adaptation, and the cognitive map as a requisite both
for human survival and for everyday environmental behavior. It is a coping
mechanism through which the individual answers two basic questions
quickly and efficiently: ( 1 ) Where certain valued things are; ( 2 ) How to
get to where they are from where he is.

COGNITIVE MAPS AND SPATIAL BEHAVIOR

Although the cognitive map represents a set of processes of unknown phys-

iological and controversial psychological nature, its effect and function are
clear. We believe that a cognitive map exists if an individual behaves as if
a cognitive map exists (Stea and Downs, 1970). Above we cited anecdotal
examples of the relationship between behavior and the cognitive mapping
process. Normal everyday behavior such as a journey to work, a trip to a
recreation area, or giving directions to a lost stranger would all be impos-
sible without some form of cognitive map. These ubiquitous examples are
overlooked and relegated to "second nature" status. Admittedly, much
spatial behavior is repetitious and habitual—in travelling, you get the feeling
that "you could do the trip blindfolded" or "do it with your eyes shut." But
even this apparent "stimulus-response" sequence is not so simple: you must
be ready for the cue that tells you to "turn here" or prepare for the traffic
light that tells you to "stop now" or evaluate the rush hour traffic that tells
you to "take the other way home tonight." Even in these situations you are
thinking ahead (in both a literal and metaphorical sense) and using your
cognitive map. In human spatial behavior, we consider even a series of
stimulus-response connections as a "simple" (or "impoverished") form of
cognitive map, in which the general aspects of spatial relationship implicit
in cognitive mapping play a minimal role. In terms of the two basic ques-
tions raised earlier, the person knows that an object is valued and one way
of getting to it, but knowledge of the "whereness" in relation to the location
of other objects is absent. The goal is always a part of the cognitive map,
however primitive the map might be, even when the degrees of closeness of
approach to the goal cannot be articulated. Thus, someone "who knows only
one route" knows more about that route than just the appropriate responses
at certain choice points, and because he "thinks ahead," is also engaging
in cognitive mapping. We are postulating the cognitive map as the basis for
deciding upon and implementing any strategy of spatial behavior.
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 11
However, we must make it perfectly clear that a cognitive map is not
necessarily a "map." This apparently paradoxical statement focuses on a
misconception which has emerged in research in this area over the past ten
years and which our definition might exacerbate. We are using the term map
to designate a functional analogue. The focus of attention is on a cognitive
representation which has the junctions of the familiar cartographic map but
not necessarily the physical properties of such a pictorial graphic model
(Blaut, McCleary, and Blaut, 1970). Consequently, it is an analogy to be
used, not believed. The problem of the map analogy is particularly acute
for geographers, a group with a distinctive viewpoint or "spatial style"
(Beck, 1967). In fact, if we are to believe Beck, geographers are strangely
ambivalent as to whether they prefer features to be "up" versus "down" or
"horizontal" versus "vertical". This ambivalence may result from their way
of approaching the world, based on concepts of relative location, proximity,
and distance, and especially geared to the use of cartographic maps. Boul-
ding ( 1 9 5 6 ) argued that "the map itself . . . has a profound effect on our
spatial images (p. 6 5 ) . " More particularly, drawing upon Lynch's (1960)
attractive and appealing series of cognitive maps of U.S. cities portrayed as
cartographic maps, we might paraphrase Boulding's statement to read:
"The cartographic map has had a profound effect on our concept of a cog-
nitive map."
Spatial information can be represented in a variety of ways. Consider, for
example, a street directory in which streets are ordered alphabetically and
people ordered spatially (by residences and apartments) and contrast it
with a telephone directory listing exchange areas spatially and people alpha-
betically. Further representations include tape-recorded walking tours for
museums or European cities, rail and bus route schedules, and electronic
media such as radar and laser holograms. All of these media share the same
function, not structure; and thus cognitive maps are derived from analogies
of process, not product.

COGNITIVE MAPPING SIGNATURES AND COGNITIVE REPRESENTATIONS

As Blaut, McCleary, and Blaut (1970) indicate, the basic functional

identity among the media exemplified above can be subsumed under a
general "black box" model. All of the media rely upon the same sort of
spatial information, and all are employed in the same sorts of spatial be-
havior: thus, the inputs and outputs are specified while the intervening
storage system (the black box) is not. The way in which spatial information
is encoded (map making) and decoded (map reading or interpreting) gives
rise to a set of operations called the signature of a given mapping code.
Thus, a cartographic map signature is dependent upon three operations:
rotation of point of view to a vertical perspective, change in scale, and ab-
straction to a set of symbols (for example, red dots for towns, blue lines for
rivers). These operations are more general than the specific signatures,
however. Thus, many other signatures are feasible; we have no reason to
12 Theory
anticipate that cognitive maps should necessarily have the same form of
signature as cartographic maps. Above all, we should avoid getting "locked"
into a form of thinking through which we, as investigators, force a subject
to "produce" a cartographic cognitive map and which we then "verify"
against an objective cartographic map. It is significant, therefore, that Lynch
( 1 9 6 0 ) used several input signatures (verbal and graphic) in his original
study and a single, graphic output signature to produce his now famous
maps of Boston, Jersey City, and Los Angeles.
The issue of mapping signatures involves some fundamental theoretical
and methodological issues in the study of cognitive mapping processes.
Underlying the whole approach is the basic question: How is information,
derived from the absolute space of the environment in which we live, trans-
formed into the relative spaces that determine our behavior? The trans-
formation can be viewed as a general mapping process involving any or all
three fundamental operations: change in scale, rotation of perspective, and
a two stage operation of abstraction and symbolization, all of which result
in a representation in relative space.
We are interested in the class of cognitive representations which result
from the transformation of information about spatial phenomena from one
set of absolute space relationships into a set which is adaptive or useful in
terms of human spatial behavior.
Thus, we should be interested in developing theoretical statements about
the cognitive signatures that are employed in dealing with information from
the spatial environment. We have given these signatures a seemingly be-
wildering series of labels (cognitive maps, mental maps, images, and sche-
mata) without applying the necessary critical scrutiny. For example, the
only differences between Lynch's "images" (1960) and the city maps of
cartographers lie in the degree of abstraction employed and in the type of
symbols chosen to depict information. The research procedure is the result
of a series of transformations: each individual constructs his own relative
space based upon approximately the same absolute space. Lynch aggregates
and summarizes these relative spaces reconverting the information by using
another signature—conventional cartography with associated scale change
and rotation to a vertical perspective. Such representations may be heavily
content-loaded—that is, they may stress what is being represented and not
the way in which it is being represented. Instead, we should be concerned
with the nature or signature of relative space as it is construed and con-
structed by the individual. Only if we do this can we ask how relative and
absolute spaces compare and differ. Speculatively, it seems likely that cog-
nitive representations may employ a variety of signatures simultaneously;
some aspects of our composite cognitive maps may resemble a cartographic
map; others will depend upon linguistic signatures (in which scale and rota-
tion operations are irrelevant), and still others upon visual imagery signa-
tures derived from eye-level viewpoints (in which the scale transformations
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 13
may be disjointed or convoluted). These remain speculations because we
have not yet fully understood what we should be looking for—in our view
we must regard cognitive maps as the result of these mapping signatures and
try to understand the nature of such signatures.
We have defined cognitive mapping as the process of acquiring, amalga-
mating, and storing spatial information. We have tried to specify more
clearly the meaning of a cognitive map. However, before considering the
nature and functions of cognitive maps in more detail, we must discuss some
basic definitions and attempt to clarify a few misconceptions which currently
prevail.

The Concepts of Perception, Cognition, Attitude, and Preference

PERCEPTION AND COGNITION." DISTINCTIONS

Unfortunately, perception and cognition have been employed in a confusing

variety of contexts by psychologists and other social scientists. Frequently,
the context itself is ambiguous, since the word falls into the "process-
product" category (Rudner, 1966, p. 7 ) . When such a word is used it is
difficult to determine whether the process of perceiving is being discussed or
whether the concern is with the product of the perception process. Both
aspects are of importance in our studies of cognitive mapping, but if we are
to develop cumulative scientific knowledge, an explicit statement of the
focus of interest must be included. Such a statement is notably lacking in
geographic studies. In addition, perception has been used in a variety of
ways: to experimental psychologists, it involves the awareness of stimuli
through the physiological excitation of sensory receptors; to some social
psychologists, it implies both the recognition of social objects present in
one's immediate sensory field and the impressions formed of persons or
groups experienced at an earlier time. To many geographers, perception is
an all-encompassing term for the sum total of perceptions, memories, at-
titudes, preferences, and other psychological factors which contribute to the
formation of what might better be called environmental cognition.
The complex interrelationship between perception and cognition is
illustrated by the definition of a perceptual-conceptual repertory as:
The stable, recognized patterns of perceptions into which sensory complexes
are organized. Species differ radically in their capacity to organize sensory
complexes into such patterns. The confirmed city dweller does not see the
browning wheatfield as ready for harvest; the country dweller may find the
directions in the subway confusing rather than patterned. (English and
English, 1958, p. 379)
Given the varied uses of the terms, it is difficult to distinguish between
perception and cognition, but we will make a "distinction of convenience,"
the necessity for which is indicated not so much by the responses of in-
dividuals to "stimuli," but by their responses to "labels." Environmental
 14 Theory
designers and geographers have identified some of the issues in human re-
sponse to natural and designed environments as "perceptual problems," but,
to their dismay, often found that studies of single-neuron preparations and
autokinetic effects have little to say about human "perception" of the land-
scape.
Thus we reserve the term perception for the process that occurs because
of the presence of an object, and that results in the immediate apprehension
of that object by one or more of the senses. Temporally, it is closely con-
nected with events in the immediate surroundings and is (in general) linked
with immediate behavior. This accords with the view of perception delin-
eated by experimental psychology. Environmental cognition is thus the
subject matter of interest to geographers, physical planners, and environ-
mental designers working on behavior issues. Cognition need not be linked
with immediate behavior and therefore need not be directly related to any-
thing occurring in the proximate environment. Consequently, it may be
connected with what has passed (or is past) or what is going to happen in
the future.
However, this distinction falls short of establishing a clear dichotomy.
We agree with Levy that the difference between perception and cognition is
one of degree and focus (1970, p. 2 5 1 ) . Both refer to inferred processes
responsible for the organization and interpretation of information, but per-
ception has a more direct sensory referent than cognition. Cognition is the
more general term and includes perception as well as thinking, problem
solving, and the organization of information and ideas. A more useful dis-
tinction from a spatial point of view is offered by Stea ( 1 9 6 9 ) . He suggests
that cognition occurs in a spatial context when the spaces of interest are so
extensive that they cannot be perceived or apprehended either at once or in
a series of brief glances. These large-scale spaces must be cognitively or-
ganized and committed to memory, and contain objects and events which
are outside of the immediate sensory field of the individual. This scale-
dependent distinction, intuitively acceptable to a geographer, also suggests
that we are concerned with the nature and formation of environmental cog-
nitions rather than with briefer spatial perceptions.
ATTITUDES, PREDICTIONS, PREFERENCES, AND COGNITIVE MAPS

The processes of perception and cognition that lead to predispositions to

behave in certain ways toward object classes as they are conceived to be are
termed attitudes. The parallels between the concepts of cognitive map and
attitude are marked. For example, we assume that knowledge of an indi-
vidual's cognitive map is necessary to predict his spatial behavior: a similar
claim has been made in psychology with respect to attitudes. Yet as Fishbein
says:
After more than seventy-five years of attitude research, there is still little, if
any, consistent evidence supporting the hypothesis that knowledge of an
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 15
individual's attitude towards some object will allow one to predict the way
he will behave with respect to the object. (1967b, p. 477)

He rejects the argument that the lack of confirmation of the hypothesis is

due to an incorrect operational definition of the terms involved, since con-
tinual revisions of measuring instruments have brought no success. Instead,
he suggests that the conceptualization of an attitude and its hypothesized
links with behavior are faulty, and replaces the holistic concept of an at-
titude with a formulation containing three components: cognitions or
beliefs, affect or attitude, and conations or behavioral intentions.
Fishbein claims that the fact that affect, cognition, and action are not
always highly correlated necessitates this more complex typology (1967a,
p. 2 5 7 ) . The belief component of Fishbein's model is relevant to our defini-
tion of a cognitive map. He distinguishes between beliefs concerning the
existence of an object and about the nature of an object, both of which are
expressed in probability-improbability dimensions. Significantly, Boulding
refers to the image (or cognitive map) as being subjective knowledge which
"largely governs my behavior ( 1956, pp. 5 - 6 ) . "
However, this governing relationship may be both indirect and highly
complex. In such a light, work on the perception of environmental hazard
and individual locational behavior must be reevaluated. For example, the
questions that Kates (1967, pp. 7 2 - 7 3 ) developed in his study of storm
hazard on the Eastern seaboard of the U.S.A. measure the structure and
content of belief systems. Through the verbal content of people's responses,
Kates attempts to infer the reasons for people choosing to locate in poten-
tially hazardous areas. However, Fishbein points out that attitudes, beliefs,
and expressed behavioral intentions are frequently brought into line with
actual behavior. Consequently, Kates' approach contains problems of causal
relations and inference, since the perception of the hazard may have been
adjusted, or rationalized, so that it conforms with past behavior (i.e., the
decision to locate). In other words, if a behavior can be specified, an atti-
tude can usually be postdicted.
Finally, we must distinguish among attitudes, preferences, and traits. In
comparison with attitudes, preferences are usually considered to be: ( 1 )
less global—often directed to a specific object rather than a class of objects;
and ( 2 ) less enduring over time—more subject to change than relatively
stable, permanent attitudes. When a given attitude pervades a wide variety
of objects over a considerable period of time, it becomes a personality trait.
Craik has suggested the existence of environmental traits:

Individuals not only exhibit characteristic styles of relating to other persons,

such as "dominant," "assertive," "deferent," and so on, they also display
enduring orientation toward the physical environment. Designed to identify
the individual's conception of himself in reference to the natural and man-
made physical environment, an inventory of environmental traits would
16 Theory
permit the declaration: "I am the sort of person who reacts in these ways to
the molar (large scale) physical environment." (1970a, p. 86)
Hypothetically, one could construct a scale from preference through
attitude to trait, increasing in both inclusiveness and duration of the cog-
nitive, conative, and affective components.
These discussions indicate the depth of confusion that exists concerning
the key concepts of perception, cognition, and attitude. Part of the confusion
is due to obvious interrelationships; for example, cognition is assumed by
many to be the major component of perception (Langer, 1969) although
affective and conative characteristics are present as well. Similarly, there
is interplay between an attitude and the way an object is perceived. Boulding
argues that "for any individual organism . . ., there are no such things as
'facts.' There are only messages filtered through a changeable value system
(1956, p. 1 4 ) . " This lack of conceptual clarity is a major problem in an
area already overburdened with tentative and unrelated conceptual in-
frastructures.

The Nature and Functions of Cognitive Maps

To understand more fully what cognitive maps are, how they are formed,
and how they work, we need answers to three basic questions: ( 1 ) What do
people need to know? ( 2 ) What do people know? ( 3 ) How do people get
their knowledge?
WHAT DO PEOPLE NEED TO KNOW?

Given an individual with the limitations specified earlier and a spatial

environment with complex characteristics, there are two basic and com-
plementary types of information that he must have for survival and everyday
spatial behavior: the locations and the attributes of phenomena. Cognitive
maps consist of a mixture of both. Since location and attribution are pro-
perties of objects as well as of phenomena, we must also know what an
"object" is.
Locational information is designed to answer the question, Where are
these phenomena? and leads to a subjective geometry of space. There are two
major components to this geometry, distance and direction. Distance can
be measured in a variety of ways, and we are surprisingly sensitive to dis-
tance in our everyday behavior. The claim that "it takes you only half an
hour to go and get it" will perhaps receive the reply that "it's too far to go."
We think of distance in terms of time cost, money cost, and the more tradi-
tional measures, kilometers and miles. Knowledge of distance—the amount
of separation between pairs of places and pairs of phenomena—is essential
for planning any strategy of spatial behavior. Geography, for example, has
developed a series of models of human spatial behavior which depend upon
the individual's sensitivity to distance variations and upon his assumed goal
of minimizing the distance traveled either by himself or by his products.
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 17
Direction is no less important in the geometry of space, although we are
less conscious of directional information. We take direction more for
granted than we perhaps should. It is only when we cannot find a map in
the glove compartment of the car and become lost that the need for direct-
ional information becomes acute. The person who "gives" directions by
pointing vaguely and saying "it's over there" is no more helpful than one
who says "it's on the left"—we need to know whose left.
By combining distance and direction we can arrive at locational informa-
tion about phenomena, but not necessarily the same as that provided by the
Cartesian coordinates of cartographic maps. For example, suppose that we
wish to visit a drive-in movie theater—what do we need to know? First, we
need to know where we are—this means "keying" our cognitive map to
our current location. We need to know where the movie theater is, which,
at this spatial scale can be accomplished in two ways. Either we know where
the theater is in relation to where we are now and consequently can select
the easiest route to get there, or we know its location relative to some other
place whose location is known—thus it may be "about five minutes' drive
past the Suburbsville Shopping Center." Second, we need to know how far
away it is, how to get there, and how long it will take to get there.
Thus, locational information is not as simple as it might appear. We must
store many bits of distance and direction data to operate efficiently in a
spatial environment, a process involving relatively accurate encoding,
storage, and decoding. Use of locational information in formulating a
strategy of spatial behavior, however, requires a second type of information:
that concerning the attributes of phenomena.
Attributive information tells us what kinds of phenomena are "out there,"
and is complementary to locational information, indicating what is at a
particular location and why anybody would want to go there.
An attribute is derived from a characteristic pattern of stimulation
regularly associated with a particular phenomenon which, in combination
with other attributes, signals the presence of the phenomenon. A concrete
example will clarify this definition. Imagine that at the end of the search pro-
cess specified in the drive-in theater example you are confronted with some-
thing that you "recognize" consisting of a large open space surrounded by a
wall with an enormous screen at its far end, a small building at a break in
the wall, and lots of teenagers driving in and out in cars. Obviously, it is the
drive-in movie theater that you were searching for, and the screen and
teenagers can be considered attributes of the phenomenon "movie theater."
You can interpret the pattern of stimulation (visual in this instance) as in-
dicating a series of attributes that, in this combination, signal the presence
of a drive-in theater.
We can divide attributes of phenomena into two major classes : ( 1 ) des-
criptive, quasi-objective, or denotative; and ( 2 ) evaluative or connotative.
The attributes listed as signaling the presence of the drive-in all belong to
the first type, while attributes such as "reasonable prices," "good shows,"
18 Theory
or "easy to get to" are evaluative or connotative. Here, we are separating
attributes which are affectively neutral (descriptive) from those which are
affectively charged (evaluative). This process of evaluation involves a
relationship between a phenomenon and its potential role in the behavior
of the experiencing individual.
What is the relationship between an attribute and an object? An object is
identified and defined by a set of attributes and bits of locational informa-
tion. However, what is an object at one spatial scale can become an attribute
at another. Consider the following sequence: at an interurban scale we
might view cities as objects with population density, built-up area, and level
of industrial growth as examples of attributes; at an intraurban scale, we
could consider shopping centers as objects with number of stores and num-
ber of different types of retail functions as attributes; at an intracenter scale,
the stores become the objects; and finally, at the intrastore scale, the
offerings of the store become attributes. The scale of analysis of the problem
at hand defines what is an object and what is attributive and locational in-
formation.

WHAT DO PEOPLE KNOW?

If we compare a cognitive map with a base map of the real world (whether
it be an aerial photograph, a cartographic map, or a scale model), we find
that cognitive mapping does not lead to a duplicative photographic process
with three-dimensional color pictures somehow "tucked away in the mind's
eye," nor does it give us an elaborately filed series of conventional carto-
graphic maps at varying spatial scales. Instead, cognitive maps are complex,
highly selective, abstract, generalized representations in various forms. As
Kates and Wohlwill (1966) argue, we must realize that "the individual does
not passively react or adapt to the environmental forces impinging on him,
but brings a variety of cognitive activities to bear—expectancies, attitudes,
even symbolic elaboration and transformation of the world of reality—
which come to mediate and modulate the impact of the environment on
him (pp. 1 7 - 1 8 ) . " We can characterize cognitive maps as incomplete, dis-
torted, schematized, and augmented, and we find that both group similarities
and idiosyncratic individual differences exist.

The Incompleteness oj Cognitive Maps. The physical space of the real

world is a continuous surface which we have come to understand through a
classic geometrical framework, that of Euclid. Even though the amount of
the earth's surface within our immediate visual range is limited, we are told
that the surface is one of approximately continuous curvature. There are no
gaps or bottomless voids, and the Flat Earth Society to the contrary, we
cannot fall off the edge. There is always something at the "back of the
beyond." Yet all cognitive maps depict discontinuous surfaces. Seemingly,
some areas of the earth's surface do not "exist" when existence is defined
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 19
by the presence of phenomena in the subject's cognitive representation.
Carr and Schissler (1969) show how the knowledge of approach routes to
a city extends only as far as the visual range attainable from the highway
in the journey to work, a finding also apparent in the work of Appleyard,
Lynch, and Myer ( 1 9 6 4 ) . On a smaller scale, Ladd (1970, pp. 9 0 - 9 4 )
indicates that black children do not represent certain sections of the
neighborhood environment in their cognitive maps.
However, before we accept the discontinuous nature of cognitive maps,
we must question the nature of our evidence, particularly negative evidence.
As Crane (1961) observes in a provocative review, Lynch's (1960) maps
of Boston omitted the city's then most prominent feature, the John Hancock
Building. Yet it is difficult to accept that residents did not know of its
existence; they chose not to represent it externally on their drawn cognitive
maps. The reason for this omission may be related to the distinction between
denotative and connotative meaning. Although the phenomenon may denote
something to the individual, it may have no connotative meaning; that is,
it may play no significant or valued role in the person's behavior. In addi-
tion, we frequently find that cognitive maps are distorted so that the size
(scale) of represented phenomena, especially in the drawings of young
children, indicates relative connotative significance. Therefore, we must be
careful in interpreting the absence of phenomena from cognitive maps as
reflecting cognitive discontinuity of space.

Distortion and Schematization. By the distortion of cognitive maps, we

mean the cognitive transformations of both distance and direction, such
that an individual's subjective geometry deviates from the Euclidean view
of the real world. Such deviations can have major effects upon the patterns
of spatial use of the environment. In terms of distance distortions, Lee
(1962; 1970) has indicated that, given two urban facilities equidistant from
an urban resident, one located on the downtown side is considered closer
than the one which is away from the city center. If people are sensitive to
distance, consequent spatial behavior patterns will be dependent upon such
distance distortions.
Far more significant, and as yet little understood, are the results of
schematization. By schematization we mean the use of cognitive categories
into which we code environmental information and by which we interpret
such information. We are, as Carr (1970, p. 518) suggests, victims of con-
ventionality. This conventionality may be expressed in two ways. The first
involves the use of those spatial symbols to which we all subscribe and
which we use both as denotative and connotative shorthand ways of coping
with the spatial environment. Thus, we all understand (or think we under-
stand) the intended, value-loaded meanings of "Africa the Dark Con-
tinent," "Europe the Center of Culture," "Behind the Iron Curtain," and
"The Midwest as the Heartland." Symbols (often mythological), such as
20 Theory
the Western route to India and the search for the Northwest Passage, have
had major effects upon the course of history. In general, such symbols deal
with large spatial areas and are subscribed to by a large part of the popula-
tion.
However, there are other symbols dealing with geographic entities at
many scales; geographic entities which owe their cogency and importance to
their mere existence—even to rumored existence. In the aggregate, such
entities have been termed the "invisible landscape" (Stea, 1967). As
images, these elements are perhaps the most purely symbolic. Included are
certain National Parks and Wilderness Areas (of importance to many
people who never have and perhaps never will see them); national land-
marks such as the Statue of Liberty, once (and perhaps still) the symbol
of the United States; New York's theater district, for those inhabitants of
"The City" who never have gone there and never will go; and even, for
some, New York City itself. It could be argued that even though many
people do not want to go into New York, it is still important for New York
to maintain its image because the same people want to locate around it.
"Suburb of what?" is perhaps not an insignificant question.
A second aspect of schematization or conventionality involves the very
limited set of cognitive categories or concepts that we have developed in
order to cope with information derived from the spatial environment. As we
were recently told, "Once you've seen one slum, you've seen them all." Are
all older center-city areas "slums" to middle-class whites or do they have
more sophisticated cognitive categories? Our understanding of the semantics
(or the vocabulary) of cognitive maps is remarkably limited.
The controversy over linguistic relativity suggests that there are cross-
cultural differences in the ways in which spatial information is coded. Such
barriers are not only cross-cultural. Burrill ( 1 9 6 8 ) , a geographer studying
an Atlantic coast swamp area, found that "swamp" meant a complex, multi-
attribute feature to local residents; to Burrill it was a simple, single attribute
feature. Communication using the term "swamp" was impossible because
of this difference in meaning. Similarly, Downs (1970) assumed that a
neighborhood shopping center would be a clearly defined and commonly
agreed upon spatial unit, with the edge of the commercial area defining the
shopping center boundary. However, residents of the area recognized four
distinct subcenters.
A modern counterpart of Dick Whittington's belief that the streets of
London were paved with gold may have been the belief of Blacks, Puerto
Ricans, Appalachian Whites, and other disadvantaged people that they
could find "a piece of the action" in the cities of the Northeastern United
States, their desire to share in "the good things of modern society," and
their trust in the willingness of those who had "made it" to help them. The
gap between such beliefs and reality is almost painful (Brody, 1970). Yet
another example of the ways in which people cope with spatial information
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 21

comes from studies of environmental hazard evaluation: Burton and Kates

( 1 9 6 4 ) indicate the unrealistic nature of people's estimates of the proba-
bilities of hazards. Thus, the Los Angeles earthquake of 1971 has not
served as a warning to Californians. Building continues, house sales con-
tinue—apparently the "lightning will not strike twice" mechanism is
operating in spite of warnings that even more severe earthquakes can be
expected in the near future.

Augmentation. Another characteristic of cognitive maps is augmenta-

tion. There is some indication that cognitive maps have nonexistent
phenomena added as embroidery. Ancient cartographers abhorred voids
and filled blank spaces with fictitious rivers, mountain ranges, sea monsters,
and possible locations of Atlantis. A respondent in Appleyard's (1970)
study of Ciudad Guayana drew in a railway line on his map of the city
because he felt that one must exist between a particular pair of points. Such
distortions may be highly significant, but we know little about their causes,
and nothing about their eradication.

Intergroup and Individual Differences in Cognitive Maps and Mapping.

Superimposed upon the overall relationship between cognitive maps and
the real world are significant intergroup differences in the specific ways in
which identical or similar spatial environments are construed. The under-
lying group perspectives are the result of a combination of three factors.
First, the spatial environment contains many regular and recurrent features.
Second, people share common information-processing capabilities and
strategies. The capabilities are associated with the innate, physiological
parameters of human information processing while the common strategies
are learned methods of coping with the environment. Third, spatial behavior
patterns display similar origins, destinations, and frequencies. These factors
in combination yield intergroup differences in cognitive maps. Lucas
(1963) indicated that the perceived spatial extent of a wilderness recre-
ation area in the Northeastern United States was defined differently by
various subgroups of users and by those who were responsible for its ad-
ministration. Tindal (1971) studied the spatial extents of home ranges
among black children in urban and suburban contexts, and found the
spatial extent to be correlated with age and sex.
The individual differences among cognitive maps emerge primarily from
subtle variations in spatial activity patterns, variations which can have
striking effects on such maps. Ladd (1970) cites the case of two brothers
who produced surprisingly different cognitive maps of their neighborhood.
Such idiosyncracies are particularly notable in verbal descriptions of cog-
nitive maps—the choice of visual details shows tremendous variation from
subject to subject.
In answer, therefore, to the question "What do we know?" we can con-
22 Theory

elude that we see the world in the way that we do because it pays us to see
it in that way. Our view accords with our plans for use of the environment.
In other words, differences between the "real world" and cognitive maps
based on it serve a useful purpose in spatial behavior. Koffka (1935, pp.
28; 33) expressed this idea well:

Let us therefore distinguish between a geographical and a behavioral en-

vironment. Do we all live in the same town? Yes, when we mean the geo-
graphical, no, when we mean the behavioral ."in". . . . Our difference between
the geographical and the behavioral environments coincides with the differ-
ence between things as they "really" are and things as they look to us,
between reality and appearance. And we see also that appearances may
deceive, that behavior well adapted to the behavioral environment may be
united to the geographical.

People behave in a world "as they see it"—whatever the flaws and
imperfections of cognitive maps, they are the basis for spatial behavior.

HOW DO PEOPLE GET THEIR KNOWLEDGE?

We have postulated a set of basic characteristics that our knowledge of

the spatial environment should possess, and we have indicated the charac-
teristics that our knowledge (or cognitive map) actually possesses. Some
of the differences between these two sets of characteristics can be attributed
to the ways in which we acquire spatial information. What are the various
information processing (or sensory) modalities? What are the basic sources
and types of spatial information? How does our knowledge (or stored in-
formation) change through time? How do we know that cognitive maps
exist?

Sensory Modalities. In our studies of cognitive maps, we have over-

looked the range and number of sensory modalities through which spatial
information is acquired, and have ignored the integrative nature of cognitive
processes related to spatial information. The visual, tactile, olfactory, and
kinaesthetic sense modalities combine to give an integrated representation
of any spatial environment. The modalities are complementary despite our
intuitive belief (and linguistic bias) that visual information is predominant.
For example, Manhattan tower-dwellers often know the local Horn and
Hardart or Chock-Full-O'Nuts restaurants through the smell of their famous
coffee being brewed. Dock areas of cities are memorable because of the
distinctive sounds they emit; the sea has a distinctive smell; certain streets,
because of cobblestones or frequent railway line crossings, have a certain
texture. Thus, the quality of distinctiveness or memorableness is not solely
the result of the way the environment looks. Some blind people (Shemyakin,
1962) remember the various paths they traverse through the city by the
different feel of each path. Held andRekosh (1963) have demonstrated that
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 23
sensory-motor interaction with the spatial environment is necessary for cor-
rect perception, for experiencing the world "as it really is."

Direct and Vicarious Sources of Information. Sources have differing

degrees of validity, reliability, utility, and flexibility. Direct sources involve
face-to-face contact between the individual and, for example, a city and
information literally floods the person from all of his sensory modes. He
must be selective in what he attends to, but can choose to repeat certain
experiences, with such variations as making a given trip in the opposite
direction or at a different time of day. Above all, he is "learning by doing"
via a trial and error process. Reinforcement and checking are continuous:
erroneous beliefs about locational and attribute information are rapidly
corrected by feedback from spatial behavior.
Vicarious information about the city is by definition secondhand. It is
literally and metaphorically "s^en through someone else's eyes." This is
true of a verbal description, a cartographic street map, a T.V. film, a written
description, a color photograph, or a painting. In the mapping context these
modes of representation, though similar in function, are different in form
because they display different signatures. In each case, the information is
selected by and transmitted through a set of filters that necessarily distort
the information, generally in a way useful to the individual in his present
context—for example, a travel brochure for a potential vacationer or a
street map for a newcomer to an area. The result of this filtering is an in-
complete representation which varies with both the individual and his group
membership, especially since the individual is also comparing this new data
with more familiar information and with a set of expectations.
We are all aware of the difference between image and reality when the
travel brochure and the vacation resort do not match, or when a friend's
color slides and the place he has photographed appear to bear little re-
semblance to each other. Many paintings are notably "impressionistic,"
selecting and highlighting some characteristics of a scene over others. A
street map may be useful to a local resident or to someone who can "read"
maps; but map reading is a learned skill, and we may not be able to trans-
late from the signature of the street map back to the spatial environment.
However, although we can distinguish between active and passive in-
formation processing, they are only typological descriptions of a continuum.
The two information-processing strategies operate simultaneously and con-
tinuously. Steinitz ( 1 9 6 8 ) , in discussing how an individual derives mean-
ing from his spatial environment, makes it obvious that meaning develops
as a result of both active and passive modes of information processing.
Both modes share a characteristic which distinguishes them from
inferential information. Both active and passive information processing are
tied to stimuli coming from the spatial environment. Inferential information
is indirectly tied to the spatial environment, and results from symbolic
24 Theory

elaboration, embroidery, and augmentation. Two examples will indicate

how an initial stimulus or set of stimuli can trigger a chain of prior as-
sociative processes in the individual's memory, resulting in inferential in-
formation. Consider a person driving past a city block of poorly-maintained
houses, their paint peeling and streets littered with paper and garbage.
Frequently, these stimuli are sufficient to set off a stereotyped chain of
thought that conjures up lower class people, probably black, on welfare,
with a high crime rate. These inferred characteristics are transferred or
generalized to encompass not just the particular block but the whole sur-
rounding area. A second example of the same inferential process is the
advertisement advising us "to come to sunny Florida." At this point our
cognitive representation (or stored and processed information) comes into
play, and we associate (or infer) a whole set of characteristics about
vacations (or living) in Florida.
Thus, we have three types of information available to us at any point
in time. Each has distinct characteristics, validity, and utility. For example,
first impressions based upon what "hits you between the eyes" are notori-
ously incorrect, especially if they are accentuated by invalid chains of in-
ferences. We all know that "things are not what they seem to be" and that
we "should always look twice." We recognize the roles of the foregoing
three information types in our everyday language and wisdom—they are
also crucial in understanding the bases of cognitive maps.

A Terminology for Change

To this point, our whole discussion of cognitive mapping has been static
—concepts of learning, time, and change have been omitted. In our ap-
proach to the question "How do we get our knowledge?" we can no longer
avoid a thorny philosophical and theoretical issue. First, we must clarify
the terminology and concepts necessary to tackle the issue, and second,
suggest a typology of change.
We acquire the ability to know things about the environment through the
process of development. Development must be distinguished from ( 1 )
change, which represents any alteration in structure, process, or events; (2)
simple accretion, or growth by addition (typical of nonorganic structures);
and ( 3 ) progress, implying change directed toward a given goal or set of
goals, usually positively valued, such that the resultant change is regarded as
an improvement. Development clearly includes change taking place over a
considerable period of time; such change is assumed to be irreversible in
the normally functioning individual, and, to the extent that it results in
increased differentiation and complexity, is also regarded as progressive.
Development encompasses both growth (the organic equivalent of accre-
tion) and maturation. Maturation is sometimes used to refer to develop-
mental changes due to hereditary factors, or to those changes that inevitably
Cognitive Maps and Spatial Behavior 25
occur in normal individuals living in a suitable environment. Maturation
and learning are to some degree interrelated in behavioral development;
some maturation appears to be a necessary though not sufficient prereq-
uisite for learning to commence, while further maturation, in certain
respects, is dependent upon the successful acquisition of capability for
learning.
What effects (or learned changes) can spatial information induce?
Boulding ( 1 9 5 6 ) suggests three possibilities: no effect, simple accretion,
and complete reorganization. The "no effect" case is the most frequent in
the normal adult: the information simply confirms what he already knows
(i.e., the cognitive m a p ) . Thus, for example, the necessary turns on the
way to the Suburbsville Shopping Center have 110 effect on his cognitive
map because he knows the route. The successful shopping trip to the Center
has no effect on his attribute information because he already knows that it
is a good place for shopping. Most of the spatial information that we
receive, although essential for the successful use of the environment at any
point in time, has no effect on the stored knowledge or cognitive map.

A Typology of Change: Accretion, Diminution, Reorganization

The simple accretion case relates to minor changes in the cognitive map.
Thus, for example, the route to the drive-in movie theater is learned during
the trip there and back. Also the individual begins to form an evaluation of
the movie-theater—is it good or bad, cheap or expensive, easy or difficult
to get to? Both locational and attribute information are added to the cog-
nitive map: a simple additive change has occurred through learning. As an
example of the alternate change, deletion, consider what happens when
a street previously used becomes one way: an alteration in route selection
is required. If a store previously used in the Suburbsville Shopping Center
closes down, an alternative outlet for purchasing those goods once supplied
by that store becomes necessary.
Diminution develops directly from deletion. There is no need to assume
that cognitive maps undergo only progressive change such that we in-
creasingly approximate the asymptote of economic man's perfect knowledge
(or accurate representation). Either through the passage of time or through
maturation, we forget—the amount of information available through the
cognitive mapping process diminishes. If a long period of time elapses before
we try to drive to the movie theater again, we may have forgotten the route
and where to make the appropriate turns. All stored knowledge is subject
to this time decay: we need to repeat a spatial experience in order to
"remember" the route in the future. This is in line with our earlier argu-
ment that "learning by doing," with its associated processes of feedback
and reinforcement, is vitally important.
Diminution may also be an adaptive process. Appleyard (1969a and b;
26 Theory
1970), in his study of adjustment to the new Venezuelan city of Ciudad
Guayana, found that people initially enriched their cognitive maps with a
mass of detailed information about the city. However, over time their cog-
nitive maps lost detail (became "improvised") as they required less in-
formation to use accustomed paths and to "live" in the city. We must not
lose sight of the limitations upon the human capacity to cope with in-
formation, as discussed by Miller ( 1 9 5 6 ) in his now famous "magic
number 7 ± 2" paper. Given our limited capacity to store and handle
information, diminution may be an adaptive process ensuring that "excess"
information is lost but important information retained.
Maturation can also lead to diminution and forgetting: as the person
ages, the capacity to remember and perform certain tasks diminishes
(Pastalan and Carson, 1969). Whether this is an inability to retrieve the
stored information or decay of the storage mechanism is irrelevant to our
argument: the effect is the same. Thus, diminution is a parallel but op-
posite process to simple accretion.
The most dramatic changes in cognitive maps are the result of total
reorganization. Boulding (1956) suggests that images are relatively
resistpnt to change in their overall nature. It requires an accumulation of
contrary evidence before a complete reorganization can occur. For example,
the realization that the Earth is spherical among those people who initially
considered it to be flat came slowly and only as the result of a massive
accumulation of evidence. The most frequent spatial example of such a
complete reorganization is to be found in long-distance human migration
and subsequent residential site selection, largely the result of vicariously
received information. Even the latter is often of doubtful utility, since
having been once installed in a new environment, one's expectations and
hopes can be markedly altered by new spatial information inputs (see
Brody, 1970).
We have examined some aspects of our cognitive maps and how they
came to be. We know that they are modes of structuring the physical en-
vironment, that "blooming, buzzing confusion" which surrounds us at birth
and that we must later sort out in order to survive. Much of the support in
contentions concerning their existence is behavioral, stemming from intro-
spection and anecdotal evidence, but the "harder" experimental data is
beginning to emerge, even, quite recently, within neurophysiology. Thus,
the face of cognitive mapping is growing clearer—only the features have
yet to be fully filled in.
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