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es ph Leoberna YhbeL
177 DECEMBER, 2024. OG
HIS EXCELLENCY, l cf / repet ay
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA,
48s
JUBILEE HOUSE,
ACCRA.
m .
Dear Mr. President: Kec mish
SAH U (FIC te ZL
PETITION FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE HONOURABLE (IEF JUSTICE OF THE
REPUBLIC OF GHANA [HER LADYSHIP GERTRUDE SACKEY TORKORNOO CJ
PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 146 OF THE 1992
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF GHANA.
I. INTRODUCTION.
1. I, Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare, a citizen of the Republic of Ghana,
respectfully submits this petition to your Excellency the President of the
Republic of Ghana, secking the removal of Her Ladyship Gertrude Sackey
Torkornoo, the Chief Justice [CJ] of the Republic of Ghana, on grounds of:
i, stated misbehavior; and
ii, incompetence.
2. The legal basis of my petition is article 146(1) of the 1992 Constitution of the
Republic of Ghana [the Constitution]. For the avoidance of doubt, my petition
focuses on stated misbehavior and incompetence related to the Chief Justice's
administrative functions as head of the judiciary responsible for its
supervision and administration under article 125(4) of the Constitution.
3. My petition does not arise from the Chief Justice’s exercise of her judicial
functions. Accordingly, the petition does not challenge any decisions, orders
or directives issued by the Chief Justice in the performance of her duties as
a Justice of the Supreme Court, including those made to enforce judgments,
decrees or orders in cases she has adjudicated. | fully understand, respect,
and value the importance of decisional independence.
4. It is my understanding that upon the receipt of this petition, your Excellency
shall, acting in consultation with the Council of State, appoint a committee
consisting of two Justices of the Supreme Court, one of whom you shall
appoint as chairman, and three other persons who are not members of the
Council of State, nor members of Parliament, nor lawyers. See article 146(6)
of the Constitution.
5. It is my further understanding that the committee shall inquire into the
petition and recommend to you whether the Chief Justice ought to be removed
from office on the grounds maintained in this petition. 1 affirm my
understanding that all proceedings herein shall be held in camera, and the
Chief Justice is entitled to be heard in her defense by herself or by a lawyer
or other expert of her choice.
Page 1 of 1910.
11.
It is therefore my understanding that your Excellency the President of the
Republic of Ghana [your Excellency] shall act in accordance with the
recommendations of the committee (see article 146(6)-(9)).
BACKGROUND.
Request for the appointment of five (5) Justices of Appeal to the Supreme
Court.
By a letter dated 30% May 2024, the Honourable Chief Justice of the Republic
of Ghana formally wrote to your Excellency, specifically requesting the
appointment of the following five Judges of the Court of Appeal to the Supreme
Court of Ghana:
i, His Lordship Justice Edward Amoako Asante, JA.
ii, Her Ladyship Justice Angelina Mensah Homiah, JA.
iii, His Lordship Justice Eric Kyei Baffuor, JA.
iv. Her Ladyship Justice Cyra Pamela C.A. Koranteng, JA.
vy. Her Ladyship Justice Afia Asare Botwe, JA.
Regarding His Lordship Edward Amoako Asante, the Honourable Chief
Justice wrote that:
“Justice Asante’s term of office at the ECOWAS Court ended on
31% July, 2022. He was requested to remain at post on account
of the withdrawal of Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso from the
community. His current tenure is expected to end in 2026 or
earlier when he is expected to return to Ghana's judiciary.”
‘The letter goes on to say that:
“His Lordship has provided excellent leadership as President of
the ECOWAS Court and will undoubtedly be an invaluable asset
on the Supreme Court of Ghana.”
Regarding His Lordship Justice ~—«Eric = Kyci_—Baffuor
and their Ladyships Angelina Mensah Homiah, Cyra Pamela Koranteng, and
‘Afua Asare Botwe, however, her Ladyship the Chief Justice wrote that they:
«.., are currently working as Judges of the Court of Appeal. Their
work has been distinguished by outstanding service, courage
and competence.”
‘The grave nature of the Chief Justice’s role in requesting the appointment of
the said Justices to the Supreme Court became evident when subsequently
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14,
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social media published another letter dated 7 February, 2024 from the Chief
Justice to your Excellency.
The letter of 7% February 2024 is captioned “Brief on the need for the
minimum number of twenty judges on Ghana's Supreme Court Bench.” In
the said letter, the Chief Justice states that
“(I] write in reference to our previous discussion on the Chief
Justice’s proposal for an increase in the number of Justices of
the Supreme Court of Ghana. Kindly find attached a paper
justifying the need for the request. Thank you very much.”
‘The above quotation suggests that there has been a previous discussion on
the subject between the Chief Justice and the President.
Of concern to your Petitioner is the fact that both letters — one proposing an
increase in the minimum number of Justices on the Supreme court of Ghana
and the other requesting five specific Judges to be appointed to the Supreme
Court — were written on the letterhead of the Chief Justice and clearly
expressed itself as the Chief Justice’s personal request on the matter. The
letter did not refer to any consultation or involvement of the Judicial Council
{the Council] of which the Chief Justice is a member and within whose
constitutional mandate it lies to deal with matters relating to the appointment
of Justices of the Supreme Court.
Your petitioner is further concerned by the reference to an earlier discussion
between the Chief Justice and Your Excellency the President on the proposal
to increase the number of Justices on the Supreme Court. Your petitioner
also notes that the question of minimum number of Justices on the Supreme
Court is settled by article 128(1) of the Constitution, which provides that
“the Supreme Court shall consist of the Chief Justice and not
less than nine other Justices of the Supreme Court.”
‘The plain meaning of article 128(1) is that the minimum number of Justices
for the Supreme Court is ten (10), Thus, an amendment of the Constitution
is the lawful way to change the minimum, not by a private discussion or
communications between the Chief Justice and the President. It is Parliament
that has the power to amend the Constitution (article 289 of the 1992
Constitution).
Further, your Petitioner has reliable information that at a meeting of the
Judicial Council held on 14% June 2024, the Chief Justice expressed her
desire to increase the number of Supreme Court Justices, whereupon the
Council advised Her Ladyship to pursue broader consultations with other
institutions on the matter, especially the Parliament of the Republic of Ghana.
At the said Council meeting, the Chief Justice did not disclose the fact that
her desire to increase the number of Supreme Judges had been the subject
of a previous discussion and a communication with Your Excellency. This fact
became evident only after the letter dated 7% February 2024 from the Chief
Justice to your Excellency appeared on social media. It follows from these
Page 3 of 1919,
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22;
28,
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25),
facts that the Council had no knowledge of or involvement in the attempt to
increase the minimum number of Justices beyond the constitutional specified
number.
In any event, your Petitioner has reliable information that on the 24% of June
2024 the Council met once again, and Her Ladyship then presented the
names of the five Justices for the Council’s approval. In so doing, Her
Ladyship gave the impression that the names presented to the Council for
approval emanated from your Excellency which then would mask her role in
requesting for the appointment of the Judges.
The Constitution requires the President to act on the advice of the Council, in
consultation with the Council of State when nominating Supreme Court
Judges for parliamentary approval. The Chief's Justice elaborate scheme of
requesting the President to appoint specific Judges and later presenting these
names for the Council’s approval subverts the constitutional scheme and
converts both the Council and the President into rubber stamping her
preferred Judges. As it turned out, this scheme was fortuitously undone by
the Council’s concern about the timing of the nominations. When the
petition is being considered at any stage members of the Judicial Council
will be subpoenaed to testify on the matter.
‘The Chief Justice’s request for the appointment of the aforementioned judges
to the Supreme Court was done in brazen violation of the constitutional rules
for the appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court, amounted to abuse of
her office, and was done without fair and/or reasonable criteria.
‘The Chief Justice’s request for the appointment of the aforementioned judges
to the Supreme Court also points to her incompetence as Chief Justice of the
Republic of Ghana as she is completely ignorant of or utterly disregards the
constitutional and administrative rules which deal with such matters.
‘The Chief Justice, as the head of the judiciary, must understand that she has
no direct role in recommending individuals for appointment or promotion to
the Supreme court. If the Chief Justice makes recommendations for
promotion or appointment to the Supreme Court, it strongly indicates either
a shocking lack of understanding or utter disregard for the constitutional
process and established promotion procedures. Further, the Chief Justice
ought to know that she cannot have a side deal with the President to raise the
minimum number of Justices to the Supreme Court, side-stepping the
minimum that is specified by the Constitution.
Arbitrary reconstitution of panels and transfer of Justices.
‘There have been reported incidences of the Chief Justice’s direct interference
with duly constituted panels with no explanations or public interest reasons
for so doing, We consider the reconstitution of panels to be beyond the Chief
Justice's administrative power and amounts to a direct interference with the
impartiality and independence of duly constituted judicial panels.
‘The Chief Justice’s constitutional and/or legal authority to constitute and
reconstitute panels for the hearing of cases must be guided by the
Page 4 of 1926.
27
28.
29.
30.
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2)
constitutional and common law principles which regulate the exercise of such
power, and so is the power to transfer judges and other officials of the service.
‘The fundamental inability to distinguish between the exercise of her
administrative power and interference with a panel’s judicial work confirms
her incompetence, quiet apart from the dangers that it poses to the integrity
and independence of the judiciary. Inability to understand or perform the
duties of an office adequately constitutes incompetence.
It is my contention that reconstitution of judicial panels is the ultimate way
to interfere with or control the impartiality and independence a panel’s
judicial work guaranteed by article 127(2) and 19(13) of the Constitution
{1992}.
‘The Constitution is clear that no person, including the President, Parliament,
and the Chief Justice, shall interfere with Judges or judicial officers or other
persons exercising judicial power, in the exercise of their judicial functions
(see article 127(2)). Thus, the reconstitution, under the guise of exercising
administrative power, is a glaring abuse of her office and a fundamental
misunderstanding of the boundaries of the Chief Justice’s administrative
authority. The abuse of her administrative power to interfere with panels’
judicial function meets the threshold of stated misbehavior.
‘The instances listed below are illustrative of how the Chief Justice has
interfered with the judicial power of duly constituted court panels that are
seized with a case.
i, The Opuni trial.
The ongoing case involving Mr. Opuni (The Republic v. Stephen Kwabena
Opuni, Seidu Agongo, Agricult Ghana Ltd) is a glaring example of the Chief
Justice abusing his administrative powers to reconstitute a duly constituted
Supreme Court panel that is seized of matter on the judicial side. In this case,
Justice Honyenuga, who presided over the matter at the trial level, proceeded
on retirement.
‘The trial was reassigned to Justice Kwasi Anokye Gyimah, who at the time
presided over the Division of the High Court, in Accra before which the case
was placed. The Court presided over by Anokye Gyimah J ruled on April 4,
2023, that the trial should start afresh (de novo), considering the need to
observe witness demeanor and the fairness concerns raised by the defense.
This has always been the practice in criminal trials, in contrast to civil trials
where the parties had the option to adopt the proceedings or start the trial de
novo. This common law position is reiterated in The Republic v High Court
(Criminal Division): Ex Parte Stephen Kwabena Opuni et al., (Civil Motion No
J5/87/2023, judgment delivered on 24% January 2023). The judge’s ruling
therefore fell within the expectations of many legal practitioners and judges.
‘The Attorney General appealed this ruling at the Court of Appeal. On July 3,
2023, a three-member Court of Appeal panel led by Justice Philip Bright
Mensah, with Justices Jennifer Abena Dadzie and Ernest Owusu Dapaah,
Page 5 of 1933.
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37.
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39,
overturned Justice Gyimah's ruling. The Court of Appeal directed that the
High Court should adopt the proceedings from the trial conducted by Justice
Honyenuga, emphasizing that the High Court’s decision to start the case
afresh was a misdirection.
In the meantime, the Chief Justice transferred Justice Anokye Gyimah to
Kumasi and moved Justice Aboagye Tandoh from the High Court in Winneba
to replace him, Several commentators linked the sudden transfer of Justice
Anokye Gyimah to his disagreement with the Attorney-General on
commencing the trial de novo. They publicly questioned whether Justice
Anokye’s was transferred because he could not be trusted to conduct the trial
in a manner pleasing to the Attorney-General.
It is submitted that the Chief Justice’s failure to provide any reason for the
transfer fueled the public perception that the transfer was actuated by malice.
Itis well established that the arbitrary power to transfer judges is as damaging
to judicial independence as the arbitrary power to appoint and dismiss them.
Sound administrative practice requires that judicial transfers be based on
objective and verifiable criteria to protect independent and impartial judges.
Further fueling the perception that the Chief Justice is abusing her power to
attain a predetermined outcome in the Dr. Opuni case, the Chief Justice again
abused her administrative powers to interfere with the judicial function of
another judicial panel involving the Dr. Opuni case.
ii, Reconstitution of panel for the hearing of Dr. Opuni’s appeal.
Dr. Opuni’s legal team, led by lawyer Samuel Codjoe, filed an interlocutory
appeal at the Supreme Court on July 7, 2023, arguing that the Court of
Appeal erred in its judgment. Several months after the appeal was filed,
parties appeared before the Supreme Court on January 17, 2024, for a
hearing, The Court presided over by Justice Mariama Owusu, along with
Justices Yaw Darko Asare, Emmanuel Yonny Kulendi, George Kingsley
Koomson, and Henry A. Kwofie ordered the parties to file written submissions.
On May 8, 2024, the Chief Justice controversially reconstituted the panel
hearing Dr. Opuni’s appeal, presiding over the new panel, which included
Justices Mariama Owusu, Henrietta Mensa-Bonsu, Yaw Darko Asare, and
Ernest Gaewu. Only two of the original five justices remained. Lawyer Samuel
Codjoe objected to the new panel, citing Article 157(3) of the Constitution,
which stipulates that a judge or panel cannot withdraw from a case after
hearing arguments until judgment is delivered.
Despite his objection, the Chief Justice-led panel overruled him, and the case
proceeded with the new panel. On June 19, 2024, the Supreme Court
dismissed Dr, Opuni's appeal, ruling that the Court of Appeal was correct in
directing the High Court to adopt the previous proceedings.
There was no administrative authority for the Chief Justice to reconstitute
the panel in the Opuni case without assigning any justifiable reasons. It once
again generated public and adverse discussions on the judiciary led by the
Page 6 of 1940.
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43.
44,
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Chief Justice. The Chief Justice literally run a one-person show by exercising
unconstitutional powers to interfere with the judicial functions of a duly
constituted court panel that had previously issued directives to the parties.
The power to dispense with court panels at will is not only unknown to the
Constitution but it is also anachronistic, antithetical to judicial norms, makes
the judicial system susceptible to the abuse of power, and erodes public
confidence in the judiciary as an independent arbiter of disputes.
iii, The Ablakwa case.
On 25t June, 2024 lawyers for the Honourable Member of Parliament for
North Tongu objected to a reconstituted panel of the Court of Appeal. They
contended that to the best of their knowledge the panel to which the case was
assigned are: Senyo Dzamefe (Presiding), Afia Serwaa Asare-Botwe, and
Archer JJA. They however observed that the panel had been reconstituted by
the substitution of Dzamefe and Archer JJA for Pamela Koranteng (Presiding)
and Kweku Ackaah Boafo JJS leaving Asare-Botwe JA as the only Justice of
the original panel. The reconstituted panel dismissed the objection holding
that there was no evidence to suggest bias as the basis for the reconstitution.
Subsequently, however, evidence emerged that Justice Dzamefe was initially
empanelled to preside over the matter but was written to, to return the docket
to the Chief Justice. Justice Senyo Dzamefe will be subpoenaed to testify
in the matter.
iv. Republic v Elisha Mahama & 2 others.
On Wednesday the 22" of May 2024 the prosecution in a case numbered
UW/WA/DC/B1/10/2024, —intituled Republic v Elisha Mahama
Akpannyiche é 2 Others appeared in the High Court, sitting in Wa for the
hearing of the case. It was announced in Court that the Chief Justice had
directed that on the completion of the committal proceedings before the
Wa district court “any further proceedings shall be transferred to
Kumasi.” This directive to transfer the matter to be heard in Kumasi
justifiably outraged many indigenes of the Upper West because of the venue
of the crime and the residence of the parties.
The Chief Justice’s decision was questioned on grounds of reasonableness
given the fact that the hearing of the matter in Wa was proper, more
convenient and understandable having regard to the High Court Wa’s
proximity to the place where the crime was committed, the residence of many
of the witnesses and also the prosecution.
Although the Chief Justice subsequently rescinded her decision, her exercise
of administrative power to transfer the case to Kumasi was in this instance
exposed as arbitrary.
v. Usurping the functions of the rules of Court Committee.
Page 7 of 1946.
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53.
In April this year [2024] the Chief Justice issued about ten [10] Practice
Directions to regulate some aspects of practice and procedure of certain
Courts in Ghana. This function is by article 157 of the Constitution reserved
exclusively to the Rules of Court Committee.
In the exercise of such function by the Rules of Court Committee, the said
Committee is required to make the rules by constitutional instrument but not
by any other instrument.
‘The Practice Directions issued by the Chief Justice to regulate practice and
procedure in certain matters in some of the courts were neither issued by the
Rules of Court Committee nor by constitutional instrument as prescribed by
the Constitution. In issuing the said directions, the Chief Justice usurped a
function constitutionally reserved to the Rules of Court Committee,
It is important to add that the Chief Justice issued the directions at a
ceremony to which several persons were invited, and state resources
expended to launch them. In so doing, the Chief Justice willfully caused
financial loss to the State as the said directions have no force of law. The
disregard of the Constitution’s clearly laid out process for issuing Practice
Directions fits into the pattern of the Chief Justice’s utter contempt for due
process, rule of law, and the Constitution that she is enjoined to protect,
preserve, and defend.
Notwithstanding her attention having been drawn to the unconstitutionality
of her actions by discussions in the media and publications on the subject,
Her Ladyship has issued a circular to all Justices dated 10% July 2024 by
which she has directed all Judges and Magistrates to implement the
directions.
vi. Making of administrative guidelines unconstitutionally.
By article 159 of the Constitution, the Chief Justice is empowered to make
Regulations for the efficient performance of the functions of the Judicial
Service and the Judicial Council.
The constitutional provision however says that such Regulations must be
made by the Chief Justice:
a. acting in accordance with the advice of the Judicial
Council, and
b. with the approval of the President, and
c. _ by constitutional instrument.
Further by article 157, the Rules of Court Committee is empowered to make
rules and regulations for regulating the practice and procedure of all courts
in Ghana by constitutional instrument. In May 2024, when the Chief Justice
launched her Practice Directions, they were launched with administrative
guidelines. These directions were made contrary to the constitutional
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provisions which regulate the making of such guidelines. Those practice
directives that were related to the practice and procedure of the courts were
not only to be made by constitutional instrument but also by the Rules of Court
Committee. ‘The failure to use a constitutional instrument shows a disdain for
collaborative rulemaking and a preference for running a one-person show. So
too is the usurpation of the functions of the Rules of Court Committee. The
Constitution and our history clearly frown upon a judiciary that depends on
the solitary decision of one person.
In the circular dated 10% July 2024, Her Ladyship has directed, unlawfully,
that the administrative guidelines be implemented.
vii. Daniel Ofori v Ecobank.
In July 2018 Daniel Ofori won a case against Ecobank Ghana Limited. The
judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court. The bank made several
applications to the Supreme Court to have the judgment set aside on grounds
of fraud, The Supreme Court dismissed all of them. In one such application,
the Chief Justice was empanelled to hear the application but Daniel Ofori’s
lawyers objected on the ground that the Chief Justice had virtually made
pronouncements in an earlier judgment against Daniel Ofori and which were
reflected in some of the depositions the bank relied on to pray the Supreme
Court to set aside its judgment. The Chief Justice refused to recuse herself
resulting in a judgment of the Supreme Court disqualifying her from sitting
with the panel to determine the bank’s application.
Undaunted, the bank then commenced fresh proceedings in the High Court
[General Jurisdiction 6] to set aside the judgment of the Supreme Court based
on the very facts rejected by the Supreme Court in the several applications
filed by the bank. The High Court presided over by..... dismissed the bank’s
application on grounds of abuse of the process. The bank appealed to the
Court of Appeal and applied to the High Court for stay of execution.
When the Chief Justice took office, she transferred from the High Court
[General Jurisdiction 6] to General Jurisdiction-8 of the High Court. The High
Court now differently constituted, granted an application by the bank for stay
of execution and in its ruling suggested the stay granted applied not only to
the ruling of the High Court but also that of the Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court later clarified that the stay ruling of the High Court could not extend to
the Supreme Court decision.
The Chief Justice also transferred garnishee proceedings pending in respect
of Daniel Ofori and the bank and in respect of which the Commercial Division
of the Court had made an order nisi, to the High Court General Jurisdiction
8.
After the decision of the Supreme Court, the bank returned to the same High
Court General Jurisdiction 8 presided over by the same judge who granted
the bank’s first application which was blunted by the Supreme Court decision
and made the same application. The High Court completely oblivious of the
Supreme Court ruling to which its attention was drawn, granted the bank’s
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application for stay of execution and in it reiterated expressly that the High
Court had stayed the judgment of the Supreme Court and also the garnishee
proceedings transferred from the Commercial Division of the court.
‘There can be no doubt whatsoever that the Chief Justice is the reason for the
seeming boldness of the High Court Judge whose attention having been
drawn to the Supreme Court’s ruling that the High Court’s earlier ruling could
not affect the Supreme Court ruling still went ahead to brazenly and
purportedly stay the Supreme Court ruling. If the Chief Justice’s intervention
was merely suspected, it is reasonably well established by her transfer of the
case involving the same parties from the Judge in Commercial Division of the
High Court-7 where the garnishee proceedings were pending to the Judge in
General Jurisdiction 8 who was willing to stall Mr. Daniel Ofori’s right to enjoy
the judgment of the High Court.
GROUNDS FOR REMOVAL OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE - ARTICLE 146.
The Constitution.
Article 146 (1) of the 1992 Constitution provides that, a Justice of the Superior
Court or a Chairman of a Regional Tribunal shall not be removed from office
except for:
i, stated misbehavior, or
ii, incompetence, or
iii, on ground of inability to perform the functions of his office
arising from infirmity of body or mind.
‘As already stated, your Petitioners’ instant petition is grounded on the first
two which are stated misbehaviour and incompetence. The two words are not
defined by the Constitution. In discerning their meanings however, recourse
will be had to their literal, ordinary, and grammatical meanings.
‘The reason for the recourse to the literal meaning of the words used in the
Constitution is that the courts have repeatedly held that regard be paid first
to the literal rule of the words used in a statute, unless recourse to such
meaning leads to absurdity.
Further, the principle of removing judges for misbehavior and incompetence
has roots in English common law, where it was established to protect the
judiciary's integrity and independence. Their definitions may therefore be
discerned from common law sources under article 11 of the Constitution.
Meaning of stated misbehavior.
1 See the Hon Geoffrey Nettle AC QC Removal of Judges from Office. Melbourne University Law Review Vol
45(1): 241-276.
Page 10 of 1965
66.
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The definition of misbehavior has evolved over time, but it typically includes:
i. Abuse of Office: using administrative powers in a manner
which brings the administration of justice into disrepute.
Incompetence: demonstrating a lack of ability or capacity
to perform judicial duties in accordance with the
standards required and/or expected of the office.
Unreasonableness: behaving in a manner that
undermines public confidence in the judiciary, such as
making decisions that are irrational, arbitrary, or
engaging in inappropriate relationships.
iv. Corruption: engaging in bribery or other forms of
corruption,
Moral Turpitude: engaging in conduct that is morally
unacceptable, such as fraud or dishonesty.
Misbehavior is to be interpreted from a constitutional context that involves
the separation of powers; the role of judges as persons vested with judicial
power and subject to restrictions flowing from the investiture of judicial
power; the institutional integrity of the courts; and public confidence in the
administration of justice.
From this perspective, misbehavior is concerned with conduct that materially
undermines either independence or impartiality or that otherwise impairs the
institutional integrity of the courts.
We reiterate that that the subject of this petition has arisen in the context of
the Chief Justice’s administrative duties under article 125 (4) of the
Constitution, which vests in her the responsibility for the supervision and
administration of the judiciary. The allegation of stated misbehavior will
therefore be discussed in this context.
Meaning of Incompetence.
Although not defined in the Constitution, there can be no dispute at all
regarding its meaning. Incompetence refers to the inability to perform the
duties of the office adequately. This can include a lack of understanding of
legal procedures, poor administrative skills, or consistent failure to adhere to
judicii
From a common law perspective, incompetence has historically been grounds
for the removal of judges, emphasizing the importance of maintaining high
administrative and judicial standards. The word is properly applicable to
situations where a person in office or a particular situation discharges their
duty in a manner that exposes their incapacity to discharge the functions of
office arising from:
Page 11 of 19Ti.
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i, superintending over the matters pertaining to their office
oblivious to the rules which regulate the institution
inclusive of practice and convention, or
ii, abuse of their office, or
iii, acting in a manner contrary to the Wednesbury principles
of measuring administrative discretion.
Article 125(4) of the Constitution assigns the Chief Justice the role of
administering and supervising the judiciary, and any failure in these duties
can be considered incompetence. As the head of the judiciary, the Chief
Justice must exhibit a high level of competence in several key areas:
i, Knowledge [or lack thereof] of Promotion Procedures:
a. The Chief Justice must understand the
procedures for judicial promotions, ensuring they
are conducted fairly and in accordance with
established rules.
b. The Chief Justice has no direct role in
recommending individuals for promotion to the
Supreme Court, which should be done by the
Judicial Council, in collaboration with the
Council of State, the President, and subject to the
approval of Parliament.
Adherence [nonadherence] to Rules and Regulations:
‘The Chief Justice must be well-versed in the rules
regulating the making of court rules and guiding
judicial officers.
b. Any breach of these rules undermines the
administration of justice and can be seen as
incompetence.
EXPLANATION OF GROUNDS OF THE PETITION.
Stated Misbehavior
i, Brazen constitutional violations.
During her short tenure, the Honourable Chief Justice has exhibited clear
disregard for the Constitution and the fundamental principles of due process,
the exercise of discretion, and administrative Justice. Specifically, the Chief
Justice has acted in violation of articles 144(2), 157, and 159 of the
Constitution by directly requesting the appointment of specific Justices of the
Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court, making rules to regulate practice and
Page 12 of 1973.
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procedure in the courts, and issuing administrative guidelines without proper
constitutional authority.
In the instances earlier enumerated as basis for this petition, the Chief Justice
acted oblivious of the constitutional requirements which regulate the manner
for dealing with the specific matters in which she got involved.
In the first place, the Chief Justice has no power to directly recommend to
Your Excellency to appoint specific Justices of the Court of Appeal to the
Supreme Court. The appointment of Justices of the Supreme Court is directly
regulated by the provisions of article 144(2) of the Constitution. The
constitutional provision requires that Your Excellency exercise the power
acting on the advice of the Judicial Council of which the Chief Justice is a
member and in consultation with the Council of State. The Chief Justice’s
decision to act outside the constitutional provision not only constitutes a
violation of the Constitution but undermines the existence and functions of
the Judicial council.
‘The Chief Justice also acted in violation of the provisions of article 157(2)
when she singularly made rules “for regulating the practice and procedure of
all Courts in Ghana.” The function is constitutionally reserved to the Rules of
Court Committee. The Chief Justice’s launch of what she called Practice
Directions in breach of the constitutional provision just referred to at state
expense to guide practice and procedure in the courts breached the
constitutional provisions just referred to with impunity. It also undermined
the existence and functions of the Rules of Court Committee.
Finally, the Honourable Chief Justice breached the provisions of article 159
when she suo moto launched administrative guidelines for some officials of
the Judicial Service.
By virtue of the article 159 of the Constitution, regulations for the efficient
performance of the functions of the Judicial Service and the Judicial Council
under this Chapter are made only by constitutional instrument in accordance
with the advice of the Judicial Council and with the approval of Your
Excellency.
The Chief Justice breached this constitutional provision by making
administrative guidelines to guide the performance of some officials of the
Judicial Service without any advice of the Judicial Council or the approval of
Your Excellency the President and without laying it in Parliament to ripen into
a constitutional instrument. This clearly suggests a pattern of undermining
the institutions meant to safeguard judicial integrity and independence.
It is our contention that the Chief Justice’s violation of articles 144(2), 157(2),
and 159 of the Constitution demonstrate a clear and consistent disregard for
the supreme law of the land, rising to the level of stated misbehavior that
warrants her removal from office. While a single violation might be construed
as an oversight, a pattern of violating multiple constitutional provisions
indicates a willful disregard of the supreme law. This pattern suggests
intentional misconduct rather than inadvertent mistakes.
Page 13 of 1980.
81.
82.
83.
84,
85.
86.
ii, Abuse of office.
In respect of the letter requesting the appointment of specific Justices to the
Supreme Court, the Honourable Chief Justice acted completely oblivious of
and ultra vires the constitutional provisions of article 144(2) of the 1992
Constitution which provides the procedure for the appointment of Supreme
Court Justices.
‘The Honourable Chief Justice’s letter was written on her letterhead and not
the Judicial Council’s letterhead. The letter was not expressed to have
emanated from the Judicial Council which she is head of. The Chief Justice
did not indicate that she was expressing or conveying the views of the Council.
The Chief Justice’s direct request to Your Excellency completely undermines
the role of the Judicial Council in respect of which she is head and defeats
the consultative and the collaborative requirements of article 144(2) of the
Constitution because it essentially bypasses the Judicial Council's advice and
the constitutionally mandated process, thereby compromising the
constitutional framework designed to prevent undue influence and maintain
judicial impartiality.
‘The reasons stated in the Chief Justice’s letter for requesting that your
Excellency appoint the specific Justices to the Supreme Court will reveal that
the stated reasons are necessarily arbitrary, unreasonable, and devoid of
candor. The grounds for recommending Justice Amoako Asante are quite
different from the other four, who have been described by the Chief Justice
as Judges of the Court of Appeal, whose work has been distinguished by
outstanding, service, courage and competence.
A test of the factors relied on by the Chief Justice to recommend to Your
Excellency the appointment of the specific Justices against the true state of
affairs among the other Judges of the Court of Appeal will reveal that if fairly
applied, the said four Justices will not outrank longer serving Justices on the
Court of Appeal and others which on the basis of merit can demonstrate that
their work in the same Court is deserving of higher commendation, than those
recommended by the Chief Justice.
‘The Chief Justice’s request for the appointment of the said Justices therefore
carries with it a real likelihood of bias or vested interests influencing her
recommendations, raising serious questions about the Chief Justice’s misuse
of her power in the discharge of her administrative functions relative to the
constitutional principles on the exercise of discretion and administrative
justice. It can reasonably be argued that the request, whether by design or
effect, undermines the nominees’ independence and impartiality.
‘The actions of the Chief Justice in nominating judges based on criteria that
deviate from the established constitutional procedures and conventions can
send a concerning signal to other Justices and Judges. Specifically, it can
imply that loyalty to the Chief Justice, rather than merit or adherence to
judicial principles, can result in favorable recommendations for
Page 14 of 1987.
88.
89.
90.
91.
appointments. When recommendations for appointments appear to be based
on loyalty, rather than merit, it can fuel the perception that professional
competence and judicial integrity are less important than personal allegiance.
Further, if judges believe that their career advancement is tied to the loyalty
to the Chief Justice, they may feel pressured to make decisions that align with
the Chief Justice's preferences. This compromises their independence and the
impartiality of their rulings.
Perceptions of favoritism or bias in judicial appointments erode public trust
in the judicial system, undermining its legitimacy and authority. A pattern of
appointments based on loyalty can create a culture of patronage within the
judiciary, where judges seek to curry favor with higher authorities rather than
focus on their judicial duties and ethical obligations. This can lead to a decline
in overall judicial standards and effectiveness.
I contend that the Chief Justice’s reasons for requesting the appointment of
the five judges to the Supreme Court constitute an abuse of power, as they
bypassed established constitutional procedures, reflect favoritism or lack of
transparency, disregard the merit and qualifications of other equally eligible
judges, and undermine judicial independence. Such unprecedented
recommendations compromise the integrity, impartiality, and independence
of the judiciary, representing a serious departure from constitutional
principles and fostering a toxic culture within the judicial system.
iii, Reconstitution of Panels and transfer of Judges.
Reconstitution of court panels violates the provisions of articles 128(2) and
136(2) of the Constitution. Under these constitutional provisions, the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are duly constituted when the full
complement of Judges constitutional quorate to hear a matter has been
empaneled. A subsequent reconstitution of the panel, without any reasonable
or public interest ground for so doing, undermines public confidence in the
justice system. Such reconstitutions also violate article 157(3), which specify
that no person sitting in a Superior Court for the determination of any cause
or matter shall, having heard the arguments of the parties to that cause or
matter and before judgment is delivered, withdraw as a member of the court
or tribunal, or as a member of the panel determining that cause or matter,
nor shalll that person become functus officio in respect of that cause or matter,
until judgment is delivered.
Once a court panel is formed, the cause list is issued, and hearings begin, the
Chief Justice (CJ) no longer has administrative authority over the panel’s
composition. This authority transfers to the judicial domain of the panel. Any
panel member can recuse themselves for personal reasons or be unavailable
due to prior commitments or illness. This principle is clear and must not be
crossed. The subsequent arbitrary removal of Justices by the CJ and the re-
constitution of the panels constitutes abuse of power and is inconsistent with
the provisions of article 296 (a) and (b) of the Constitution as to what is
expected of holders of discretionary power “in this Constitution or in any other
law.”
Page 15 of 1992.
93.
94,
95.
96.
97.
98.
99,
100.
101.
The CJ traversed this sacred principle when she reconstituted duly
constituted court panels and, in the Opuni case, inserted herself as the
President of the reconstituted panel, and in the Ablakwa case, inserted Her
Ladyship Pamela Addo, who also serves as the judicial secretary, as the
President of the reconstituted panel.
iv. Disrepute.
‘The Chief Justice’s acts so far discussed have endangered the level of respect
accorded to the judiciary as the seat to which the ordinary Ghanaian citizen
must resort to for justice.
Compromising of Judicial Independence: A panel, and for that matter the
bench, must remain independent from administrative interference to ensure
fairness and impartiality. The Chief Justice's reconstitution of the panel,
without cause or explanation, undermines this independence and erodes
public trust in the judicial process.
Compromising of Procedural Integrity: Adhering to established legal
procedures is essential for upholding the rule of law. By reconstituting the
panel after hearings had begun, the CJ violated procedural norms, setting a
dangerous precedent that could lead to arbitrary decision-making.
Compromising of Judicial Integrity: Allowing such an overreach irreparably
compromises the integrity of the judicial system. Judges must be able to
deliberate and decide cases free from administrative manipulation.
Compromising Right to Fair Trial: The parties involved in a case have the
right to a fair trial by a duly constituted bench. Changing the composition of
the panel mid-trial can be seen as prejudicial and may affect the outcome of
the case.
Compromising Legal Consistency: Judicial decisions must be based on
consistent and predictable application of the law. Administrative interference
disrupts this consistency, potentially leading to erratic legal precedents.
Compromising Checks and Balances: The judiciary functions as a check on
the other branches of government, including administrative actions. If the
CJ's overreach is allowed to stand, it weakens this critical system of checks
and balances.
Compromising Public Confidence: The public’s confidence in the judicial
system depends on its transparency and adherence to legal norms.
Administrative overreach and opacity damage this credibility, leading to a loss
of faith in our legal institutions.
Compromising Due Process: Legal procedures exist to protect the rights of
all parties involved. Bypassing these procedures through administrative
actions undermines due process and can lead to unjust outcomes.
Page 16 of 19102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
Separation of Powers: The Chief Justice’s actions blur the lines between
administrative and judicial functions, undermining the judiciary’s role as an
independent arbiter. The communications with the President, in an attempt,
to consummate side deals on the minimum number of Justices and
requesting certain appointments severely undermine separation of powers
and seriously affronts the checks and balances needed to ensure the rule of
law.
v. Judicial Oath.
Compromising the Constitution: Article 127(2) of the Constitution protects
judges from interference by providing that “Neither the President nor
Parliament nor any person acting under the authority of the President or
Parliament nor any other person whatsoever shall interfere with Judges or
judicial officers or other persons exercising judicial power.
Reconstituting panels are per se interference with the panel's exercise of
judicial power. Article 157(3) of the Constitution clearly prohibits a judge or
‘panel from withdrawing from a case after hearing arguments until judgment
is delivered. It stands to reason that no person can remove a judge from a
case that they are hearing without cause. The CJ's actions are
unconstitutional and is a willful violation of her judicial oath to preserve,
uphold, and defend the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana [1992]
vi. Conflict of interest.
Article 284 of the Constitution prohibits public officers from placing
themselves in positions where their personal interests conflict, or are likely to
conflict, with their official functions. By using her personal preferences to
make appointment requests to the President, contrary to the well-established
constitutional scheme for such appointments, the Chief Justice put herself in
an inextricable conflict-of-interest situation.
By virtue of article 144(2) of the Constitution, appointments to the Supreme
Court are made by Your Excellency the President acting on the advice of the
Judicial Council, in consultation with the Council of State and with the
approval of Parliament. This process ensures a collaborative and impartial
selection of Supreme Court Justices, involving multiple stakeholders to
preserve the judiciary’s independence and integrity.
The Chief Justice’s constitutional role in the appointment process is
delineated clearly in article 144(4), which provides that “panel members of
regional tribunals other than the chairmen shall be appointed by the Chief
Justice in consultation with the Reginal Coordinating Council for the region
and on the advice of the Judicial Council.”
The Chief Justice’s failure to understand the boundaries of her administrative
authority, lack of understanding of appointment procedures, and consistent
failure to adhere to the Constitution, judicial norms, and rules are evidence
of incompetence and meet the threshold for removal as specified in the
Constitution.
Page 17 of 19110.
a,
112.
113.
114,
Acts of Incompetence.
‘As the head of the Judiciary, the elementary breaches of the Constitution and
the statutory provisions on the Judiciary and the basic rules on the exercise
of administrative discretion undermine her competence as head of the
Judiciary in charge of its administration and supervision within the meaning
of article 125(4) of the Constitution.
The Honourable Chief Justice is or should be aware of the constitutional
provisions referred to by reason of the procedure by which she was herself
appointed as a Justice of the same Court, her over a decade service in the
Judicial Service, and her several years of experience as a lawyer. The actions
of the Chief Justice in nominating judges based on extra constitutional
criteria send a troubling signal that can negatively impact the judiciary in
several ways. It can erode the meritocratic basis of judicial appointments,
compromise judicial independence, undermine public confidence, and foster
a culture of patronage. Such implications highlight the importance of
adhering to constitutional norms and principles in judicial appointments to
maintain the integrity and credibility of the judicial system.
In so doing the Honourable Chief Justice has acted in violation of her Judicial
Oath provided for in the Second Schedule of the 1992 Constitution “to truly
and faithfully perform the functions of my office without fear or favour,
affection or ill-will; and to uphold, preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution and the Laws of the Republic of Ghana.” Further, these
deliberate violations meet the threshold of misbehavior stipulated in article
146(1) of the Constitution and under the definitions at supra.
CONCLUSION.
‘The Chief Justice’s actions discussed herein not only breach constitutional
provisions but also constitute stated misbehaviour and confirm acts of
incompetence. These actions undermine judicial independence and
impartiality, represent an abuse of power, and create a conflict of interest.
Such actions meet the threshold of “stated misbehavior” and “incompetence”
as outlined in Article 146(1) and therefore constitute grounds for removal.
‘The Chief Justice's role is to interpret and uphold the law, not to influence
the selection process of other justices of the Supreme Court or to interfere in
the operations of duly constituted panels. Her overreach is contemptuous of
the power of the judicial council, which she chairs. Her involvement in the
appointment process could unduly influence the President's decision,
undermining the objectivity of the nomination process. Her attempts to make
side deals with the President puts her in a position where the President can
make reciprocal demands. She is therefore fatally compromised. The
Constitution and established protocols dictate the process for judicial
nominations, and any deviation from these procedures is unlawful.
Similarly, her reconstitution of panels impairs parties’ right to a fair trial, and
could unduly influence the panel’s decision, undermining the impartiality of
Page 18 of 19115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
the adjudication process. It strikes at the core of article 157(3), which is
intended to prevent any interruptions in the judicial process and ensure
continuity and accountability until a final decision is made. Her
reconstitution of panels is an abuse of power, in violation of the constitutional
benchmark for the exercise of discretion power. The Chief Justice has no
administrative role once a panel is formed and cannot interfere with the
judicial function of a panel by changing members of the panel.
Public confidence in the judicial system relies on the perception of fairness
and impartiality. The Chief Justice’ actions described supra would further
erode this confidence, suggesting favoritism or partiality and introducing
needless friction within the judiciary.
Judicial ethics require judges to avoid actions compromising their
independence or the judiciary's independence. Proposing nominees could be
seen as engaging in political activities, generally discouraged, if not barred,
for judges
Professor Gyandoh warned us of the dangers of an unrestrained Chief Justice
when he opined that “if we were so unfortunate as to get for our Chief Justice
a cynical, mischievous, and obstinate individual who also had the ear of the
President, at least a sizeable section of the judiciary could be subject to
mayhem, with a not too remote consequence of bediam.”? The mayhem is
already upon the judiciary and the bedlam will follow unless swift actions are
taken to remove the Chief Justice from office on the grounds prayed and in
accordance to article 146 of the Constitution [1992].
1, therefore, petition the President to initiate proceedings to remove the Chief
Justice from office to uphold the Constitution, maintain the integrity of the
judiciary, and restore public confidence in our judicial system.
Please do not hesitate to contact me for any further information or
clarification.
rene submitted.
Professor Stephen Kwaku Asare
P. O, Box 12889
Accra North
Tel: 0263529907
Email: Kwakuasare@gmail.com
2 Gyandoh, S. O, The Role of the Judiciary under the Constitutional Proposals for Ghana, 5 U. Ghana Lud.
133 (1968).
Page 19 of 19
Leina Konchellah others v Chief Justice President of Supreme Court of Kenya others Speaker of National Assembly others (Interested Parties) (Petition E291 E300of2020) 2021KEHC12609(KLR) (Judicial Review) (18Febru