2

States and Statehood

MARK WEBBER

The post-war period has witnessed a remarkable growth in the

number of states, from around fifty in 1945 to more than 180 in
1996. These range from the tiny city states of Monaco and the Holy
See all the way up to the Russian Federation and China, respec-
tively the world's largest and most populous states. During the
twentieth century, there have been several great waves of 'state
creation': in the period after the First World War, again after the
Second World War, and then in the 1960s. Most recently, the
collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s led to claims of
statehood on the part of a large number of formerly subject peoples
such as those of Central Asia, whilst other states such as those in the
Baltic which had been suppressed by their absorption into the
USSR re-emerged on to the international scene. Statehood, to put
it simply, is more popular and sought-after than it has ever been,
but this raises important questions about the changing nature both
of states and of statehood more generally.
Three central questions can be asked, all of which have evoked
considerable disagreement. First, how is the state to be defined in
terms of its constitutive features? Second, what are the purposes of
the state, or, in other words, what is it for? Third, how important is
the state in relation to other actors in world politics?
The first of these questions has in the study of world politics a
rather straightforward answer. The accepted orthodoxy asserts that
a state has common characteristics, of which a territory, a sovereign
government and a subject population are the most important. These
constitute the 'organization' of statehood and will be considered in
greater detail in the next section. Suffice to say here that this rather
legalistic definition is a far from satisfactory one. As we shall

24
B. White et al., Issues in World Politics
© Macmillan Publishers Limited 1997
 Mark Webber 25

discover, most states do not and perhaps have never sustained these
characteristics in full. Furthermore, some would argue that the
definition is incomplete without mention of other allegedly requisite
features of statehood from, depending on the persuasion of the
author, a list that includes the existence of a common culture and
sense of national identity (or, in its more xenophobic formulation,
the possession of an exclusive ethnicity), a minimum level of
political stability and order, and a modicum of social and economic
welfare (Jackson and James, 1993, p. 18; Del Rosso Jr., 1995,
p. 178).
As for our second question, here opinion is particularly divided.
In a far from exhaustive list, Mervyn Frost has identified four
separate schools of thought. States can be conceived of as being
motivated by either: (i) the promotion of international order; (ii)
their own survival, with a consequent emphasis on security; (iii) the
protection of a particular form of political rule, democratic or
otherwise; or (iv) the defence of dominant class interests and thus
the regulation of a dominant economic form - capitalism. Yet as
Frost points out, despite their differences, these four approaches
share a crucial common assumption: the state is important. It is
conceived of as a piece of machinery geared to the achievement of
certain ends. It is rational, powerful and pre-eminent (Frost, 1991,
pp. 186-7).
As a cursory glance at any quality newspaper will confirm, this is
a popular image. Headlines that focus on state action and pro-
nouncement in the form of phrases such as 'the United States issues
a warning to Cuba' or 'Russian-Chinese relations are improving'
certainly suggest that the state is paramount in world politics. Yet a
more careful examination of our chosen newspaper can also reveal a
slightly different image. References to the actions of say the
European Union (EU) (with regard to British beef exports) and
of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (in relation to the terms
and conditions of loans made to Russia) reflect the fact that the
state is by no means alone in world politics. It is accompanied by a
host of other actors that include: international inter-governmental
organizations (IGOs) of which the United Nations (UN) and the
EU are familiar examples; international non-governmental organi-
zations (INGOs) such as Greenpeace and Amnesty International;
and multinational companies (MNCs) such as General Motors and
British Petroleum. It is the existence of these so-called 'non-state
26 States and Statehood

actors' that provides the context to our third question: how

important is the state in relation to other actors in world politics?
To this, there is no simple answer. Few, however, would argue
that the state enjoys an untrammelled supremacy. It interacts with
other actors in myriad relationships. On certain issues this may
affirm state dominance, but on others the role of the state is far less
assured. To illustrate this take the two examples cited above. The
power of the EU to ban British beef exports is at odds with the
desire of the British state to maximize its sales. Similarly, the ability
of the IMF to link the provision of loans to the monthly perfor-
mance of the Russian economy reflects a presumption of authority
on the part of this financial body that detracts from that of Russia.
The variety of answers to the three questions posed above
indicates that the state is a contested concept (Navari, 1991). Its
very meaning and purpose are the subjects of dispute and little
approximating a consensus of views is apparent. This renders
exploration of the nature of statehood especially problematic. In
order to alleviate this problem some narrowing of the focus of
enquiry will be necessary. We make a start in this direction in the
following section by examining further the orthodox definition of
statehood noted above.

The Nature of Statehood: Organization and Practice

For all their great diversity, states, if they are to qualify for the title,
must possess the three common characteristics noted above: a
territory, a sovereign government and a subject population. All
three are important, yet it is the second that is crucial. The
possession of sovereignty - commonly understood to mean the
absence of any higher authority above the state both in domestic
and external affairs - confers upon states a privileged position as
the principal actor in international life. In numerous ways, it is a
'source of vitality' for the state, providing guarantees of formal
equality and political independence, access to resources and con-
nections, and an international identity or capacity that is un-
matched (Miller, 1986). Sovereignty, however, requires practical
organization; this is provided by governments. It is the personnel of
government that represent the state and, by means of foreign
policies, claim to act in defence of its interests.
 Mark Webber 27

To outline the three features of statehood is not, however, to

suggest that states enjoy a placid or unchallenged life. Since the very
inception of the international system of states (usually dated from
the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648), these features have been the
subject of regular violation and infringement.
Take first the quality of territoriality, the assumption that a
delimited geographic area is the responsibility of a single state only.
The obvious point to be made here is that historically speaking,
territory has been the source of fierce dispute, precisely because it
has been claimed by more than one state. This may result in legal
dispute conducted at a diplomatic level, state-sponsored subversion
and, in certain cases, inter-state war. Both the First World War and
the Second World War were precipitated at least partly by unre-
solved claims for territory on the part of major powers. The latter
route to acquisition, it is true, has become something of a rarity, not
least because of the expansion of legal restrictions on the use of
force since 1945 and because the costs of war often outweigh any
presumed benefits. This has, however, only changed the methods by
which claims might be pursued, not the abundancy and potency of
the claims themselves.
Even when the territorial integrity of a state is unchallenged (and
this is a luxury that European states, at least, have come to expect
and enjoy since the end of the Second World War), territoriality can
nonetheless be infringed in other ways. Stephen Krasner has high-
lighted the importance of 'authority structures that are not coter-
minous with geographic borders'. Examples include condominiums
(for instance, that of Andorra, a co-principality of Spain and
France); supranational organizations, notably the EU, which in-
volve member states' submission to the binding decisions of extra-
territorial bodies; and international regimes such as the Exclusive
Economic Zone, which limits the jurisdiction of states over com-
mercial shipping even within their own territorial waters (Krasner,
1995-6, p. 116).
Encroachments upon territoriality also entail a violation of
sovereignty, the second core feature of statehood. In fact, sover-
eignty can be compromised in a number of different ways: through
processes of domination, imposition, delegation, and intrusion.
The first of these arises from imbalances of power between states.
Here the legal equality embodied in the principle of sovereignty is
not reflected in the possession of state capabilities (military struc-
28 States and Statehood

tures, economic prowess, resource endowments and so on). Such an

uneven distribution results in relationships between states that are
far from equal and, in certain cases, the imposition by one state of
limits upon another's freedom of action. Soviet influence over
Eastern Europe during the period of communist rule and American
oversight of much of the Caribbean and Central America are clear
examples of such a pattern.
The second, imposition, involves situations where a coalition of
states forces conditions upon a third party as a result either of the
latter's defeat in war, or its transgression of accepted norms of
behaviour. The peace treaties that Germany and Japan were forced
to accept in 1945 are examples of the former, and economic
sanctions directed against pariah states (for instance, apartheid
South Africa) of the latter. In both cases, actions are taken from
outside that either have a direct and obvious effect upon sovereignty
(for instance, the supervision of Berlin by the Allied powers) or
influence the domestic political developments of a state to such a
degree that sovereignty is severely dented (as in the impact of
sanctions on the removal of white-minority rule in South Africa).
Delegation is a less coercive form of infringement upon sover-
eignty. It is, however, no less important for that. Delegation has two
dimensions. It can involve, first, states transferring sovereignty
'upward' to supranational organizations (as in the case of the EU
noted above). This is a rare occurrence, but has, in Western Europe
at least, progressed to a point where the sovereign status of the EU's
member states has been questioned and the impression created that
they are being absorbed into a larger, 'multi-level polity', an entity
which itself has some of the features of a state (Caporaso, 1996).
Second, delegation occurs 'downward', to regions within the state
by means of granting them degrees of autonomy. In its more
familiar guise this process is known as federalism and is the practice
of states as diverse as the US, Switzerland and Brazil. While the
scope for action open to the component parts of federal states is
constitutionally delimited, their powers are nonetheless often fairly
extensive. Moreover, federalism itself often presents real problems
for state cohesion in that the internal administrative borders of a
federated state can provide the basis of powerful claims of seces-
sion. As we shall note below, in the cases of the communist
federations such claims have ultimately proven fatal to state
survival.
 Mark Webber 29

As for intrusion, this entails challenges to sovereignty that arise

from 'issues and ... (and) relationships ... that dissolve the
national-international divide' (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, p. 39).
Take, for instance, economic issues. Here the ability of the sover-
eign state to pursue policies of its choosing has been fundamentally
challenged in recent decades by the 'globalization' of trade, produc-
tion and finance (see also Chapter 3). The subjection of national
economies has occurred in several ways. The deepening of global
markets results in borders that are more porous to unregulated
economic activity, multinational companies that are increasingly
free of state control, and economically-oriented international orga-
nizations (for instance, the IMF, the World Bank and the World
Trade Organization [WTO]) that are capable of an awesome
influence (Camilleri and Falk, 1992, pp. 69-77).
Turning to the third feature of statehood, that of a subject
population, here too qualification is necessary. This is not to say,
of course, that states are without peoples over whom they rule;
rather, that some populations have often felt compelled to escape
the state in which they are contained. This is a problem that is at its
most profound in states that are multi-ethnic and which simulta-
neously display a poor sense of overarching national identity. In
these cases, an ethnic minority views its usually subordinate posi-
tion as demeaning and the only proper course of action that of self-
determination - the construction of its own statehood. Such a
situation is commonplace in the Third World. Here, decolonization
created a large number of states whose borders, based on former
lines of colonial administration, failed to conform to the patterns of
population distributed both within and among them. This mis-
match has not led to the creation of a large number of new states
(Bangladesh and Eritrea being rare cases in point). It has, however,
resulted in battles for self-determination pursued with a force
sufficient to render whole areas effectively beyond state jurisdiction.
This is a condition especially marked in Africa, where large swathes
of Angola, Sudan and Zaire have been lost to central rule for much
of the last two decades. Moving away from the Third World, the
problem of self-determination has been no less acute. It has reared
its head in Western Europe in the violence perpetrated by the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and by Euskadi ta
Askatasuna (ETA) in the Basque region of Spain. More destruc-
tively, it has been apparent in the inability of non-democratic
30 States and Statehood

communist federations to offer sufficient voice to captured mino-

rities, resulting as in the cases of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
in dissolution and the proliferation of a raft of new successor states.

Statehood as a Problem in World Politics

In reality, challenges, both domestic and external, are by now the

familiar experience of all states. In some instances, however, this
need not be perceived as detrimental. Sovereignty may be willingly
surrendered if some lasting benefit can be obtained. Hence, to
return to an example cited above, Russia's readiness to submit to
the strictures of the IMF has been motivated by the realization that
the huge finances offered by that organization are a price worth
paying for a partial loss of domestic economic jurisdiction. More-
over, there are many functions that the state can best achieve
through collective action and this too requires a relinquishing of
sovereignty. While the act of surrender is never stated in so many
words - for purely political reasons the governments of most states
will rarely admit to presiding over a loss of sovereignty - in practice
there is often no alternative. Few states, for instance, are capable of
guaranteeing their own military defence and many consequently
enter into alliances. Such an arrangement may involve a state
binding itself to commitments that infringe upon its foreign policy
and, in certain instances (the case of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization [NATO]) the subordination of its armed forces to a
higher command structure. The resulting limitations to freedom of
action are seen as tolerable if, through the acquisition of allies and
arms, it offers a greater guarantee of the state's security. A similar
logic can also apply in other areas, be this trade, transportation,
communication or environmental protection, all of which have led
states to recognize that constraint on individual action is a neces-
sary cost of pursuing an otherwise unobtainable objective.
Many states, then, will tolerate under certain circumstances some
constraints on their own particular statehood. They are, however,
extremely cautious when it comes to any revision of the concept of
statehood in general and the norms of international behaviour
which follow from it. States that for instance indulge in wilful acts
of conquest are not just guilty of a resort to force but, equally
important, of violating the territorial dimension of statehood. As
 Mark Webber 31

such they are the subject of condemnation and often find themselves
up against a powerful coalition of states keen to restore the
international order. Such was the fate of Nazi Germany and, more
recently, Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Of a slightly lesser order of
gravity, there is a general predisposition against the notion of
spheres of influence, owing to the gross undermining of the
principle of sovereignty that it entails. Even those states that
endeavour to dominate in such an arrangement have consequently
felt the need to excuse their actions in some way. The Soviet-led
military interventions in Hungary (1956) and in Czechoslovakia
(1968), for example, were justified by reference to dubiously-based
'invitations' issued by the government of the violated state. More
generally, despite Moscow's obvious oversight of the east European
states at this time, it was still considered necessary to place inter-
state relations within treaties of 'Friendship and Cooperation' that
made ritualistic reference to mutual respect for sovereignty. The
sham of this claim was, however, abundantly clear, such that when
the Soviet Union under its last leader Mikhail Gorbachev reversed
the policies of his predecessors this was trumpeted as amounting, in
effect, to a welcome restoration of sovereignty for the subject states.
The bias of the international system toward respect for statehood
can have perverse effects. True, respect for a principle may some-
times be the stimulus for action that is at once heroic and decisive
(as in the case of the reaction to Nazism noted above), but it can
also be a recipe for inertia and prevarication, and, at worse, a
passive acceptance of the intolerable. Take for instance the case of
what Robert Jackson refers to as 'quasi-states'. These enjoy the
attributes of formal 'juridical' statehood (most importantly, exter-
nal recognition) but lack its 'empirical' qualities; their governments
are 'deficient in ... political will, institutional authority, and
organised power'. Such states would seem unviable entities. They
were created as a consequence of the recognized right of self-
determination of ex-colonial territories. They have endured because
of, first, the reluctance of established states to modify this recogni-
tion (fearful of an unmanageable proliferation of new states) and,
second, the existence of various forms of development assistance
directed at improving their capacity for self-government. As a
result, quasi-states that are often blighted by economic under-
development, political instability and even civil war have enjoyed
a charmed existence, surviving when in a previous age the absence
32 States and Statehood

of a credible basis for statehood would have denied them member-

ship of international society (R. H. Jackson, 1990, pp. 21, 31, 42).
In some cases respect for statehood takes a far more ambiguous
form. It is widely accepted that sovereignty precludes outside
interference in a state's domestic affairs (this is spelled out notably
in Article II of the UN Charter). Even so, it has been argued that
there are grounds on which the norm of non-intervention may be
overridden (Berridge, 1992, pp. 164----5). These are:

• Self-defence. This can take two forms: the launch of a pre-

emptive strike by one state upon another to forestall an attack,
and a retaliatory strike against a state charged with aggression.
An example of the former is the Israeli assault on the Arab states
in 1967 (an operation welcomed in the West, but criticized by the
Soviet bloc and many Third World states). An example of the
latter is the American bombing of the Libyan capital Tripoli in
1986 (an event fully supported only by Britain and Israel).
• Humanitarian intervention. This may involve actions to rescue
one's own nationals in a foreign country, as in the case of Israel's
operation at Entebbe airport (Uganda) in 1976, and intercession
to end human rights abuses. Examples of the latter include
Tanzania's 1979 overthrow of Idi Amin in Uganda and, more
controversially, Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in 1978-9.
While the intervening state in both cases claimed a humanitarian
motive, its actions were nonetheless seen by many as illegal
encroachments upon the domestic affairs of others. Furthermore,
as well as infringing upon sovereignty, the cause of humanitarian
intervention has proven controversial because of inconsistent
application. Intervention has not been forthcoming in cases of
sustained human rights abuses if the offending state is powerful
enough to resist or precious enough to be treated with sympathy
by the international community. (Witness in this regard the
absence of decisive action to correct Chinese abuses in Tibet or
Indonesian abuses in East Timor.)
• Civil war. In this case intervention is considered justified if it is a
response to a previous intervention by another state. Thus, the
US felt justified in arming anti-Marxist insurgents in Afghani-
stan, Nicaragua and Angola in the 1980s in opposition to what
they saw as the seizure of power by Soviet-supported revolution-
aries.
 Mark Webber 33

These examples nothwithstanding, there is still no generally

agreed right of intervention. Indeed, controversy arises precisely
because the norm of non-intervention survives. To understand why
this is so, simply consider what would happen if the norm did not
exist at all. 'If it were regarded as normal that states should meddle
in each other's domestic affairs the points of friction (already ample
enough) would multiply hugely, all trust would dissolve, and
civilised international relations would become impossible' (Ber-
ridge, 1992, p. 163).

The politics of statehood

As well as generating controversy at the level of general principles,

issues pertaining to statehood can also stimulate debates of a more
expressly political nature. The existence of a perceived threat to
statehood is a common charge in politics. Republicans in the US
complain of the threats posed by unregulated immigration from
Mexico; Conservatives in Britain warn of the dilution of sovereign
powers that flow from encroachments by the EU; while the parlia-
ment in the Soviet successor state of Belarus deplores the potential
loss of statehood that would result from a possible merger with
neighbouring Russia. Such protests are not just the outcome of
cynical political calculations. The outlook of politicians, and indeed
the world's public, is rooted in a traditional perception of the
qualities of statehood and consequently of the primacy of the state
in international affairs (Miller, 1994, p. 61). In the conduct of
foreign affairs, this results in an unwillingness on the part of
national leaders to be seen to be pursuing anything other than the
interests of the state that they serve. It is a rare politician who
justifies a foreign policy in anything other than the 'national
(meaning state) interest'. And even in those exceptional cases -
for instance, the Soviet Union's pursuit of the apparently altruistic
cause of 'proletarian internationalism' - a more selfish interest is
never far behind.
Not surprisingly a preoccupation with the national interest has
great political consequence, both domestically and internationally.
Two illustrative examples show to just what degree.
Consider first the case of British membership of the EU. Since the
1960s this has proven to be one of the more divisive issues in British
political life. Successive Prime Ministers from Harold Macmillan to
34 States and Statehood

John Major have been forced to juggle dual demands. On the one
hand, they have tried to keep sweet a British public and sections of
their own parties appreciative of the unique features of the British
system, while, on the other, they have been sensitive to the
imperative of integrating Britain carefully into a continental struc-
ture, absence from which is seen as economically and politically
untenable. Managing this delicate balance has not been easy. The
Conservative Party, the party of government during the 1980s and
much of the 1990s, found itself at times paralyzed over the issue of
Europe, split between a leadership resigned to the inevitability of
European involvement and a 'Euro-sceptic' wing, implacable in its
opposition to the integrationist tendencies of the EU. The foreign
policy consequences of this stance are also considerable. The
championing of a specifically British interest has resulted in isola-
tion within the EU on issues ranging from monetary union to social
protection.
The second example is provided by Russia. Unlike the British
case, where debates are conducted within a fairly stable political
framework, here they occur against a far more painful backdrop,
that of state collapse. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the
consequent emergence of an independent Russia, was at first the
cause for some considerable jubilation, not only because it meant a
restoration of an explicitly Russian (as opposed to a Soviet) state
identity, but also because it was part and parcel of a parallel process
of removing unpopular communist rule. Russia's subsequent poli-
tical development, however, has been adversely affected by the
legacy of this profound transition. As economic collapse and a loss
of superpower status attended the Soviet Union's dissolution, the
new Russian state has been viewed by many as a poor cousin of its
Soviet, and indeed even its Tsarist, predecessor. This has resulted in
the poisoning of political debate as virtually all major issues have
tended to be overwhelmed by the question 'who was to blame?' It
has also led communist and nationalist parties to join forces in
calling for the territorial enlargement of the modern Russian state
to include those lands historically occupied by the Russian nation.
In foreign policy the debates have been no less vitriolic. The
attenuated power of post-Soviet Russia meant its first President,
Boris Yeltsin, was forced to give priority initially to improved
relations with the West. This course, however, elicited from his
political opponents repeated charges of weakness and of wilful
 Mark Webber 35

neglect of Russia's state interests. These proved so powerful as to

result, from the end of 1992, in a major turnaround in favour of a
foreign policy which, in Yeltsin's own words, would not 'shy away
from defending our own interests'.

Statehood and the Post-Cold War World

The end of the Cold War has had mixed consequences for state-
hood. To begin on a positive note, one of its more visible effects has
been a massive proliferation in the number of states, a process,
which for some, marks a 'springtime of nations' (Howard, 1989-
90), or a 'renaissance of the nation state'(Brown, 1995, p. 2). The
breakup of Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia into
their constituent, usually ethnically defined parts, and the due
recognition granted to these nascent states by the international
community, seemingly reinvigorated the idea of statehood based
upon a defined population or nation. To this process has been
coupled a revival in the sovereign powers of previously dominated
states. Client states which had formerly been subjected to the
imposing influence of the superpowers suddenly lost their utility
to Washington and Moscow as the imperatives of East-West global
competition diminished. Amongst the former Soviet satellites in
Eastern Europe, the consequent re-animation of sovereignty has not
only seen the introduction of democratic political structures (and
ironically in some cases the free election to office of former
communist parties), but a wholesale reorientation of foreign poli-
cies. States such as Poland, Hungary and the new Czech Republic,
once firmly and forcibly contained within a Soviet sphere of
influence, are now at the front of the queue for membership of
the historically Western-oriented NATO and the EU.
The end of the Cold War has also had less welcome conse-
quences. The legitimacy given to nationalism has proven a poisoned
chalice in some new states which are themselves multi-ethnic. The
vicious wars in Bosnia, the secessionist struggle by the Chechens in
Russia, and the demands for greater autonomy on the part of
Russian minorities in the Soviet successor states of Moldova,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan are all testimony to this fact. Moreover,
many of the new state entities are strongly redolent of the quasi-
states described above. In the former Soviet Union, for instance, the
36 States and Statehood

successor states emerged at the end of 1991 with little preparation

for self-government and, in the case of the five new states of Central
Asia, no historical memory of statehood. All, moreover, had been
weakened as a consequence of their removal from the once cen-
tralized Soviet economy, military and governmental administration.
Some, it is true, have compensated for this by means of nationaliz-
ing those structures within their borders, but this has itself pre-
sented additional problems. In many cases, military and economic
assets have been useless outside the context of the integrated Soviet
system or have been the subject of rival claims on the part of Russia,
the self-declared 'continuing' state of the Soviet Union. In such
circumstances only a few of the successor states have proven
capable of developing 'empirical' statehood (Ukraine, Latvia,
Lithuania and Estonia). The remainder have either succumbed to
civil war (Azerbaijan and Moldova), Russian tutelage (Armenia,
Belarus) or both (Tajikistan and Georgia).
As for the more familiar quasi-states in the Third World, here too
the end of the Cold War has had its effect as states once propped up
by superpower patronage have been forced to cope in a new austere
climate. Central governments once reliant on an abundance of aid
to prop up their economies and on free military hardware to fight
their internal battles have found themselves cast adrift. The re-
source-rich, for instance Angola, have sought compensation in
international arms markets. The poor, however, have gone to the
wall, resulting in one case in state partition (Eritrea formally
seceded from Ethiopia in 1993) and in others in the further
crumbling of empirical statehood (Afghanistan has been engulfed
in a near total lawlessness since the fall in 1992 of once Soviet
favourite President Najibullah). In fact, the plight of some in the
Third World has become so catastrophic that they are now de-
scribed as 'failed states' - entities totally deficient in internal order
and 'utterly incapable of sustaining [themselves] as ... member[s] of
the international community' (Helman and Ratner, 1992-3, p. 3).
More ambiguous than the rise and fall of states have been the
apparent modifications of principle that have accompanied the end
of the Cold War. An important shift has concerned the notion of
non-interference derived from sovereignty. Matters previously ex-
cused as the purely domestic affair of a state have in the post-Cold
War world been the subject of increased international concern
where they involve destabilizing external repercussions or gross
 Mark Webber 37

human suffering. Recent humanitarian operations of the UN inside

Iraq, Somalia and Rwanda have been conducted without the clear
consent of the state concerned and thus, strictly speaking, amount
to infringements upon sovereignty. These actions are all the more
notable in that they are multilateral, endorsed by the UN and,
therefore, quite different from both the violations of sovereignty
perpetrated by the superpowers during the Cold War and earlier
cases of humanitarian intervention noted above, which were uni-
lateral in nature (see also Chapter 7).
This shift has implications that take us back to the core qualities
of statehood. The incidence of cases of humanitarian intervention in
the post-Cold War period reflect two profound changes: a political
one and, closely linked to this, a normative one. The first of these
relates to the nature of the 'winning coalition' that emerged
victorious at the end of the Cold War. Composed at its heart of
the states of the West, this meant a victory ofliberal democracy and
ipso facto a discrediting of communism as a political force (Buzan,
1995, p. 394; Barkin and Cronin, 1994, p. 126). In that the domi-
nant values within the international system have come to be
increasingly associated with democracy, a normative context has
been formed that renders intervention legitimate when it can be
shown that certain states are in clear violation of its principles,
specifically those that relate to human rights. In this sense sover-
eignty is a limited asset. To quote Stanley Hoffmann, 'the state that
claims sovereignty deserves respect only as long as it protects the
basic rights of its subjects ... When it violates them ... the state's
claim to full sovereignty falls' (Hoffmann, 1995-6, p. 35).
Yet the degree to which these political and normative changes
have resulted in a fairer, more just world can be far from gainsaid.
In the first place, some would argue that actions based on a moral
claim continue to disguise a less worthy intent. That recent inter-
ventions have occurred in the Third World and have been at the
initiative of powerful states, notably the US, has led to charges that
humanitarian intervention is nothing more than a justification for
the pursuit of American and, more broadly, Western interests.
Moreover, recent UN-endorsed operations (both humanitarian
and otherwise) have tended to be selective and temporary in nature,
something that has a clear implication for the failed states noted
above. Saving these either through prolonged involvement or
massive resource transfers is not top of the foreign policy agendas
38 States and Statehood

of either the European states, the US or Russia. Only in rare cases

(Bosnia is a case in point) have determined efforts been undertaken.
Take away the lucky coincidence of strategic interests, geographic
importance and political prominence that motivated action there,
and little or nothing will be forthcoming. Liberia, Afghanistan and
Somalia are all cases where in the 1990s international efforts at a
restitution of political order have proven to be both unconvincing
and short-lived.
More neutral in effect, but no less sweeping has been change
flowing from economic forces. As well as a victory for liberal
democracy, the end of the Cold War also witnessed the apparent
triumph of market economics (Buzan, 1995, p. 393). The commu-
nist alternatives to the market in the form of central planning and
state ownership were by the late 1980s thoroughly discredited and
have since given way to market-oriented economies of varying
forms throughout both the former communist countries and in
China and Vietnam where communist parties remain in power.
While this has not meant an unprecedented exposure to the global
economy (the east Europeans, for instance, were heavy borrowers
during the 1970s and 1980s and the Soviet Union and China had
become increasingly entwined in world markets), the extent of that
involvement has undoubtedly deepened. The increased need for
sources of external finance (to fund reform), coupled with trade
reorientation, and the encroachment of foreign equity has opened
up states formerly on the margins of the international capitalist
system to those forces of economic globalization that intrude upon
statehood.
Economics has made an impact in another sense: it has partly
usurped military power as the crucial variable of status. The rise of
economic powers, notably Germany and Japan, did, of course, occur
while the Cold War was in progress. Yet there is a sense in which the
order of priorities has now fundamentally altered. The premium
attached to military capability has been downgraded with the end of
the Cold War, at least amongst the states of the West (including
Japan) in that the territorial defence of territory has become a less
pressing concern. Consequently, to use a phrase of Ken Booth,
'(p)ower in world affairs is increasingly determined by economic
success rather than military statistics' (Booth, 1991, p. 8). Statehood
itself has not been altered by this change, but the relative importance
of the indices that rank states one against the other certainly has.
 Mark Webber 39

States and international organizations

One further and much commented upon consequence of the Cold

War's demise has been a process of adaptation on the part of
international organizations. The dramatic political changes in East-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union, coupled with the more
amicable spirit of East-West relations, has forced a rethink in the
scope and rationale of some major organizations. The UN and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for
instance, have taken on board large numbers of new members from
the successor states. The EU and NATO have outlined routes to
possible future membership among these states and in the interim
have begun programmes of association and partnership. Other
bodies, meanwhile, have simply fallen by the wayside. The Warsaw
Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance were wound
up in 1991, their purpose at an end with the disappearance of
communist rule.
Organizational development of this kind is part and parcel of a
trend that has a far longer historical trajectory - a 'move to
institutions' that has in the twentieth century seen a proliferation
and increase in the scope of international organizations and, linked
to this, in the evolution of other areas of institutionalized behaviour
-international law and international regimes.
The growing prominence of this dimension of international life
has had significant consequences for states. At a surface level, it has
actually reaffirmed statehood. International organizations, with
rare exception, have only states as members, adhere in their
documentation to the principles of sovereign domestic jurisdiction,
and generally are reliant on voluntary, as opposed to binding
compliance on the part of their members. Controversy arises over
two major issues: first, the relative importance of international
organizations as non-state actors (something alluded to above)
and second, the issue considered here - the degree to which
international organizations can moderate state behaviour and en-
courage cooperation.
On the one hand are those, usually referred to as 'neo-realists',
who claim that organizations are empty vessels, existing only to the
degree that they affirm state interests. Cooperation is not ruled out,
but it occurs within a clearly delimited framework. Owing to the
existence of a condition of anarchy (the absence of a world
40 States and Statehood

government above states), the international system is seen as

insecure and characterized by distrust. Self-help becomes the order
of the day and cooperation is inhibited by fears of cheating,
dependency and 'relative gains' (the suspicion on the part of one
state that collaboration benefits other states more than itself)
(Grieco, 1988). This is clearly not a propitious environment for
the operation of international organizations. Indeed, to the extent
that they do carry out important roles, these are largely derivative
of the international distribution of power between states. The more
powerful create and shape organizations so that they might pursue
selfish objectives, a state of affairs at its most obvious in the
privileges enjoyed by the Permanent Five members of the UN
Security Council. In short, organizations, of whatever type, will
only reflect the balance of interests of their constituent parts (that is,
states). When states are not in harmony, organizations will have to
engage in negotiated compromise. When states disagree fundamen-
tally, organizations will be rendered ineffective (Meirsheimer, 1994--
5). Hence, the somewhat limited success of internally divided bodies
like the Organization of African Unity and the Arab League, and
the frequent impotence of the UN.
Ranked against this rather pessimistic position are the arguments
of the so-called 'neo-liberal institutionalists'. This view is willing to
accept certain core neo-realist tenets (the position of states in a
condition of anarchy and the subsequent pursuit of self-interest),
but asserts that even the self-interested state will recognize the
lasting benefits of cooperation. Following arguments derived from
game theory models such as the Prisoners' Dilemma, it is argued
that cooperation avoids outcomes which are 'suboptimal', that is
situations in which states will be worse off owing to their neglect of
mutual agreement. Organizations offer the means to formalize and
facilitate such cooperation in world politics.
International organizations also address structural obstacles to
cooperation. With regard to the problem of cheating, for instance,
this can be deterred by, first, establishing punishment regimes for
transgressors and rewards for cooperative states, and second, by
creating expectations that the benefits of future cooperation will be
jeopardized if a state seeks unilateral advantage. As for the relative
gains dilemma, organizations help overcome this by facilitating an
environment of security among states which encourages them to
focus on 'absolute gains'. In such a setting, states measure success in
 Mark Webber 41

terms of their own returns, and not whether their gains are greater
or less than those of other states. This allows them to cooperate
even in the knowledge that they will not be the only or the greatest
beneficiary of cooperation (Stein, 1990, pp. 115-17). Moreover, in a
world which has become increasingly interconnected, states are
thrown together in a ever greater number of institutional arrange-
ments. Some are entirely without controversy (the Universal Postal
Union), while some are slightly more contentious (the IMF and the
WTO). Whatever, membership creates a habit of institutionalized
contact between states that leads to an awareness that their own
interests need not be at odds with those of others. International
organizations thus become the vehicles for the pursuit of common
concerns and states learn to take the interests of others into account
when framing their own policies; they become 'joint-maximizers
rather than self-maximizers' (Stein, 1990, p. 53). In sum, states
recognize the utility of international organizations and are prepared
to invest substantial material resources in them. If not, how else
would one explain the longevity and indeed the strengthening of
bodies such as the EU, NATO and the WTO? (Keohane and
Anderson, 1995, p. 40).
Despite the divergences of opinion within the debate on interna-
tional organizations, both the neo-realist and the neo-liberal ac-
counts are premised on a core assumption: that the state has an
inherent usefulness, either as the vehicle of a self-defining interest or
as the basic unit of international cooperation. The same cannot be
said for a third, more radical view, the so-called 'global governance'
perspective. This confronts the state head on, arguing that it is an
inadequate and even counter-productive tool for tackling the
plethora of problems- ranging from AIDS, ecological catastrophe
and mass poverty to nuclear proliferation and the population
explosion- that face the globe at the end of the twentieth century.
Since these problems cut across states, they can only be resolved
through more directed international cooperation and a fundamental
reallocation of state sovereignty and responsibilities. An effective
structure of global governance is consequently seen as necessary.
This should be anchored in international law and a strengthened
United Nations system and ought gradually to 'displac(e) the state as
central actor on the world political stage' (Falk, 1995, pp. 79-103).
Many have discounted the claims of global governance. States
have proven extremely reluctant to hand over sovereignty under any
42 States and Statehood

guise. When it has occurred- for instance, in a limited form within

the EU - it has been a luxury of the established, wealthy states.
Governments of the weaker states by contrast regard sovereignty as
virtually the only protection of their status and would be loath to
surrender it to some remotely accountable global structure domi-
nated by the established Western states (Jackson, 1990, pp. 175-6).
Such criticisms are not to say that structures of global governance
are totally absent (as well as the UN, one could point to other
bodies with a global role such as the IMF and the WTO), but these
are deficient in the greater legitimacy that still attaches to the state.

Statehood and Contemporary World Politics

At a time of considerable turbulence in the international system it is

hardly surprising that the state should be an object of some
controversy. In this final section we will consider two perspectives
on the future of the state.
First, many have claimed that the state, if not dead, has at least
reached the age of retirement (Mann, 1993, p. 115). In the face of
urgent global problems and the influence of non-state actors, the
state is seen as increasingly anachronistic and insufficient. In much
of the Third World, statehood has either a 'quasi' nature or has
failed entirely, while in the more economically developed areas of
the globe, it is becoming an increasingly irrelevant concept amidst
the interconnectedness of economic, cultural and political life, and
the consequent drive toward tighter organized international coop-
eration. While none of these developments is entirely new, and the
demise of the state has been heralded more than once before
(Dyson, 1980, pp. 282-7) there is a perception that in recent years
something of a different order has occurred. Rapid changes in the
structure of the international economy, the dramatic pace of
advances in technology and communication, the rise of nationalism,
and the end of the Cold War- all have challenged the pre-eminence
of the state (Horsman and Marshall, 1995, pp. ix-xx).
Yet amidst this turmoil, the state continues to survive and even
prosper. In contrast to a view of an embattled state, others have
argued the case that it remains both a vital and essential part of the
international system. Barry Buzan for one has claimed that '(f)or all
its limitations, the sovereign territorial state seems to have no
 Mark Webber 43

serious challengers as the organizing principle for the political life of

humankind. Decolonization has made it virtually universal, and it
remains the aspiration of almost every remaining group that is
rebelling against the existing structure of power and authority'(Bu-
zan, 1995, p. 392). Robert Jackson and Alan James have suggested
similarly that sovereign statehood remains 'the fundamental way in
which the world is politically organised' (Jackson and James, 1993,
p. 6).
This more sanguine view is rooted in a perception that there exists
no real alternative to the state, both as the ordering unit of the
international system and as the framework for domestic govern-
ance. Most issues around the world tend to be conceived of in state
terms. Granted, many do elicit an international involvement, but
for every instance of this type there are many, many more in which
the state concerned is considered to be the primary agent for action.
Squatter camps around Soweto are South Africa's problem, the
pollution of Lake Baikal is Russia's problem, and the congestion on
Britain's roads is Britain's problem (Murphy, 1994, p. 212).
The state, moreover, can be seen as something more than simply
a passive onlooker of global transformation. States, it is argued,
have proven adept at channelling many of the forces noted above.
Take for instance one of the more pervasive, that of economic
globalization. While it would be true to say that in this regard the
responsiveness of states may vary (there is a world of difference
between the capacity of, say, the US and the poor states of Africa),
all are nonetheless privileged to some degree by virtue of the right to
sovereign jurisdiction over their domestic sphere. This is not to
argue that a state can totally resist the world outside or that it can
operate with a limitless menu of policy choices. However, some
scope for action still exists. States can tax, regulate, deny access,
license; in sum, they 'set the basic rules and define the environment'
(Krasner, 1995, p. 279) in which transnational economic forces
must operate. Indeed, when properly harnessed many states can
actually benefit from these forces. Consider two rather different
examples. First, Angola, a state that has been able to finance a civil
war of some two decades' duration, partly as a result of tax
revenues collected from Western oil companies. And second, Japan,
a state that has exploited the desire of foreign companies to win
access to its markets by requiring that they transfer valuable
technologies to home firms, a stipulation that has helped in the
44 States and Statehood

development of world-beating, technologically advanced industries

(Krasner, 1995, pp. 273-4).
The true picture of contemporary statehood is probably less
clear-cut than the two alternatives outlined in this section suggest.
Indeed, to juxtapose them in this rather bald fashion underplays the
complexity of the processes at work. It is entirely feasible to argue
that the state, in James Rosenau's phrase, is both 'widening and
withering' simultaneously (Rosenau, 1988, p. 32). Its competencies
have been fatally weakened in some areas, but in others it remains
pre-eminent. To observe a diminution of state power in certain
instances need not lead to the conclusion that the state in general is
in decline. Similarly, one should not extrapolate a general crisis of
statehood from specific cases of state failure and collapse. States
rise and fall, but nowhere has the form itself been placed in
abeyance as a preferred means of political organization. In sum,
then, what appears crucial is the remarkable ability of the state as
an institution to adapt and to survive (Jackson and James, 1993,
p. 25).

Guide to Further Reading

Owing to its centrality in discussions of world politics, the concept of the

state has given rise to an enormous and diverse literature. A good starting
point is the collections edited by Navari (1991) and Jackson and James
(1993). On the state system in international relations, the classic text is
Hedley Hull's (1977). Berridge (1992, chapters 1--4) and Hocking and Smith
(1995, chapters 4-5) meanwhile provide useful outlines. Discussions of
statehood and sovereignty can be found in Hinsley (1966) and James
(1987).
An issue that has given rise to much recent debate is the position of the
state in the post-Cold War order. This is treated at length in an eclectic
collection edited by Sakamoto (1995). The book by Horsman and Marshall
(1995) is also worth reading. The state's relationship to international
organizations is also the subject of controversy. The articles by Meirshei-
mer, (1994-5), and Keohane and Anderson (1995) provide a flavour of the
debate.