Contemporary South Asia

Vol. 19, No. 2, June 2011, 137–152

Critical elections and democratic consolidation: the 2008 parliamentary

elections in Bangladesh
Nizam Ahmed*

University of Chittagong, Chittagong, Bangladesh

This article explores the significance of the ninth parliamentary election, held in
December 2008, for democratic consolidation in Bangladesh. Three factors have
made the ninth election important: first, it was held after two years of military-
backed civilian caretaker rule when the government had adopted several measures
for electoral and political reforms; second, the main parties formed pre-election
alliances to face each other, rather than contesting the election on an individual
basis, as was the practice in the past; and third, the composition of the electorate
changed significantly, with nearly one-third of the voters casting votes for the first
time. The use of a foolproof electoral roll also made the election results credible.
Unlike the past, no major case of election rigging has been reported to the
Election Commission after the elections. Nor did those losing the elections reject
the results outright. The government also initially adopted a policy of inclusion,
creating some space for the opposition to be proactive, and the opposition
reciprocated by attending the inaugural session of the ninth parliament and
pledging to make the parliament effective. The article explores the significance of
this change in attitude as well as different electoral reforms for democratic
consolidation in the country.
Keywords: elections; democracy; consolidation; non-party caretaker government,
Bangladesh

Elections occupy a central place in all modern political systems. They are the most
ubiquitous of contemporary political institutions designed to determine the will of
the people and compute public opinion. Elections provide the means for the
routinised succession of government in a democracy. They bring politics within the
sphere of the citizen, and the citizen into the political arena (Palmer 1978). Elections,
however, do not perform similar functions in all political systems. Nor do their
effects remain uniform. As Palmer observes: ‘[i]n some [systems], they are central, in
others, peripheral; in some, they have definitely stabilizing effects, in others,
definitely destabilizing; in some, they seem clearly to contribute to political
development, in others, to decay’. The extent to which elections can have one or
the other effect(s) will depend upon a number of factors, the most important of
which is the nature of elections. All elections are not equally critical, to borrow V.O.
Key’s term (1955). Critical elections, as Key (4) observes, are those in which the

*Email: nijamuddin_ahmed@yahoo.com

ISSN 0958-4935 print/ISSN 1469-364X online

Ó 2011 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/09584935.2011.563282
http://www.informaworld.com
138 N. Ahmed

depth and intensity of electoral involvement is high, in which more or less profound
readjustments occur in the relations of power within the community, and in which
new and durable electoral groupings are formed. Some elections are more critical
than others; hence, they are likely to have unequal influence and political
significance. Critical elections can produce serious dysfunctional consequences; at
the extreme, they can disrupt the working of a political system and may even lead to
its breakdown. Alternatively, critical elections can provide an important means of
transition from authoritarianism to democracy and help consolidate democratic
norms and practices in a particular society. History is replete with examples of both
variants of critical elections.
Bangladesh has had familiarity with elections (and parliament) much longer than
many other developing countries. Nine parliamentary elections have been held
between 1973 and 2008, averaging one election every four years. Most of these
elections, in one way or another, can be termed as critical.1 But the ninth elections
can be considered as extremely important for several reasons. The ninth elections,
initially scheduled to be held on 22nd January 2007, were finally held nearly two
years later – on 29th December 2008. During the interregnum, the country remained
under emergency rule when attempts were made to radically reform the party system
and the electoral process in order to ensure a free, fair and credible election. Most of
these reforms, which were long overdue, were likely to have considerable impact on
the outcome of elections. Besides, nearly one-third of the electorate in 2008 were
first-time voters who had better access to modern means of information and
communication, and thus had more opportunity to make independent judgements
and decisions about who to vote for than the first time voters in the past who
remained disadvantaged in several ways. Party polarisation was also more noticeable
in the ninth elections than it was in the past. The main parties, having mostly
contested the earlier elections on an individual basis, formed alliances in 2008,
thereby making the elections more competitive. Similarities in ideologies as well as
mutuality of interests contributed to a great extent to the formation of political
alliances. In short, the ninth elections were expected to cause some fundamental
changes in the electoral landscape, which in turn could influence the process of
democratic consolidation in the country.
This article explores a range of issues related to the ninth elections, such as the
nature of electoral competition and participation, the issue orientation of different
parties, inter-party relations and the performance of parties. The article examines the
strategies adopted by different parties to mobilise the voters, and evaluates the
factors that influenced the electoral outcome. It also explains the significance of the
ninth elections for democratic consolidation in the country. The article begins by
providing a background to the ninth elections.

Non-party caretaker government and electoral reforms

The Constitution of Bangladesh now requires that a non-party caretaker
government (NPCG), headed by the immediate past chief justice,2 assume
responsibility for administering the country during the interim between the
dissolution of parliament and the commencement of the next one. The outgoing
government is not allowed to act as the caretaker administration as it often uses state
power to manipulate the electoral process to its advantage. Since the members of the
NPCG cannot belong to any political party or contest the elections, they are unlikely
 Contemporary South Asia 139

to have any stake in the outcome of elections. The main responsibility of the NPCG
is to perform routine functions of government, especially to provide whatever
support the Election Commission (EC) needs to hold parliamentary elections in a
credible manner. The NPCG is not empowered to take any policy decision unless it is
absolutely necessary. It stands dissolved on the date on which a new prime minister
(PM) enters upon his/her office after the constitution of a new parliament (Ahmed
2004).
However, unlike the past when the appointment of the head of the NPCG,
known as the chief adviser (CA), did not arouse any controversy, the two successive
ruling parties – the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Awami League
(AL) – and their allies initially failed to agree on who was to head the NPCG after
the BNP-led four-party government completed its five-year tenure in October 2006.
The AL and its allies objected to the appointment of the immediate past chief
justice – K.M. Hasan – as the CA on the ground that he was a BNP activist before
joining the bar as a lawyer. On the other hand, the BNP and its allies argued that
there was no alternative to making Hasan the CA; to do otherwise was to violate the
Constitution. In the context of the controversy surrounding his appointment, Justice
Hasan declined to accept the position of CA. However, the subsequent decision of
President Iajuddin Ahmed to assume the position of CA as an additional
responsibility on 29th October 2006, without exploring the constitutionally required
alternatives (such as the suitability for the post of any former chief justice, a former
judge of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, or a citizen) aggravated the
crisis. The president-cum-CA failed to bridge the gap between the AL and the BNP.
The two parties differed on almost every important issue confronting the NPCG,
such as preparing a new voter list, reconstituting the EC and depoliticising the
election administration.
When the two main parties and their allies failed to agree on these vital issues, and
violent conflicts followed these disagreements, the military intervened, forcing
President Iajuddin to resign as CA, declaring a state of emergency on 11th January
2007 – just 11 days before the ninth elections were due to be held on 22nd January –
and constituting a new NPCG with Fakhruddin Ahmed, a former central bank
governor, as CA. The new army-backed interim government, which had enjoyed
widespread public support, at least in its initial months, apparently found two major
hurdles – widespread corruption and lack of party and electoral reforms – to the
holding of credible elections, and so initiated a series of measures to overcome both
problems. As a first step towards what it called cleansing politics, the Fakhruddin
emergency NPCG interned a large number of corruption suspects including the two
former prime ministers – AL president Sheikh Hasina and BNP chairperson Khaleda
Zia – and their close relatives. Most of the corruption suspects were politicians. Many
of them were convicted and given punishment by special summary courts. Those
convicted for more than two years were deprived of the right to contest the elections.
The High Court Division (HCD) of the Supreme Court, however, stayed the lower
court judgement in many corruption cases. As a result, many politicians, who were
earlier convicted, ultimately contested the elections and some actually got elected.
The NPCG continued its ‘cleansing’ process by reconstituting the EC and
making it independent of the executive. The EC was also given the power to make
rules, which it lacked previously. The Army helped the EC in preparing a flawless
photo-based voter list. The revised voter list had about 12 million voters less than the
list prepared by the EC before the declaration of the emergency. The NPCG also
140 N. Ahmed

agreed to accept the recommendations made by the EC to amend the Representation

of People Order (RPO), the basic election law. In August 2008, the government
amended the RPO, making some fundamental changes in it. Perhaps the most
important was the requirement for the political parties to register with the EC in
order to be eligible to contest the elections. Those parties interested to register with
the EC were required to make some fundamental changes in their constitution, such
as making provision for holding council elections at regular intervals and allowing
grassroots units of different parties to make initial selection of parliamentary
candidates, which until then had been made by the central party. Parliamentary
candidates were also required to disclose some vital information such as their
educational qualifications, criminal record, sources of income and sources of election
funds. The amended RPO also provided for the casting of ‘no’ votes, thereby giving
voters the option to express ‘no confidence’ in candidates. It also empowered the EC
to revoke the membership of Parliament of those who failed to follow the election
rules. Parties/candidates were also allowed to object to the nomination of candidates
declared valid by election officials.
The political/electoral reforms undertaken by the Fakhruddin government could
be considered as revolutionary. No other NPCG or party government had
contemplated making such fundamental changes in the basic election law. Although
the government subsequently had to make some compromises with the political
parties in order to induce them to take part in the elections, such as releasing Sheikh
Hasina and Khaleda Zia (and her two sons) on bail, changing the election schedules
more than once, and allowing the parties to register on the condition that they would
make the necessary amendment to their constitutions within six months of the
inauguration of the ninth parliament, the basic contour of the reforms remained in
tact. These were intended to reduce the influence of money and mastans (‘those who
use muscle power to get things done’) in the elections, and to encourage the election of
honest and competent candidates. Although the mainstream parties occasionally
attempted to flout the election rules in some cases, there was nevertheless a general
realisation that any major deviation would result in punishment. Hence, most of the
actors decided to abide by the rules of the game.

Nature of electoral competition

The 2008 parliamentary elections were significantly different from previous polls in a
number of respects, of which two deserve to be mentioned here. First, the seat–
candidate ratio was much lower in 2008 than it had been in the past (Table 1). Only
1407 candidates belonging to 39 parties and 148 independents (in total, 1555
candidates) contested the elections. Second, most of the major parties contested the
elections as part of political alliances rather as independent entities. Several factors
accounted for a decrease in the number of candidates. First, as indicated earlier, the
RPO required that parties interested in contesting the ninth elections must register
with the EC and set a number of conditions to qualify for registration. Only a few
parties could satisfy those conditions. As a result, the number of parties contesting
the elections decreased substantially. Similarly, those wishing to contest the elections
as independent candidates had to provide an affidavit along with the nomination
papers, providing evidence of the support of at least 1% of the voters in the
constituency. Only a few independents could claim any such support (former MPs
contesting as independent candidates were, however, exempted of this requirement).
 Contemporary South Asia 141

Table 1. Nature of electoral competition and participation.

No. of candidates Seat– No. of

Election candidate parties % of
Elections year Partisans Independents Total ratio contesting turnout

Ninth 2008 1407 148 1555 1:5.3 39 86.3

Eighth 2001 1444 489 1933 1:6.4 52 74.8
Seventh 1996 2291 285 2576 1:8.6 81 74.9
Fifth 1991 2360 424 2784 1:9.3 75 55.4
Fourth 1988 n/a n/a 764 1:2.5 8 52.5
Third 1986 1074 453 1527 1:5.1 28 61.1
Second 1979 1703 422 2125 1:7.1 30 51.3
First 1973 958 120 1078 1:3.6 13 54.9

Source: Ahmed and Ahmad (2003); Daily Star (Dhaka), 30th–31st December 2008.

Second, the decision of the main parties to form pre-election alliances and to
contest the elections as nominees of the alliance rather than of the party to which
they belonged also led to a substantial decrease in the number of candidates. Thus,
rather than nominating candidates on an individual basis as was the case in 1996 or
2001, the AL formed a grand alliance with 14 other parties including a former ruling
party – the Jatiya Party (JP). The BNP formed an alliance with Bangladesh Jamaat-
i-Islami (BJI) and two other ‘rightist’ parties and nominated candidates to different
constituencies on a consensual basis. The AL nominated candidates in 242
constituencies, and supported the candidates of different alliance partners in other
constituencies. Similarly, the BNP nominated candidates in 260 constituencies and
agreed to support the BJI candidates in 34 constituencies, Bangladesh Jatiya Party
(BJP) candidates in two constituencies, Islamic Oikkya Jote (IOJ) candidates in two
constituencies and another Islamic party in two constituencies. Ideologically,
different components in the AL-led grand alliance were oriented to left, left of
centre and centrist politics; those in the BNP-led four-party alliance were mostly
engaged in centrist and rightist politics.
Third, as the process of democratisation was gradually taking root, many small
parties that had mushroomed during the autocratic years in the 1980s, or even in the
1990s, lost their credibility and began to disappear. Parties constituting the two main
alliances secured nearly 95% of the total votes cast in 2008; there is thus no real
scope for small parties to survive in such a competitive political environment.

Nomination and background of candidates

The main parties in Bangladesh have traditionally followed a top-down strategy of
nominating candidates. The RPO, amended by the NPCG, provided for a major
change (bottom-up) in the process of nomination. It set a mandatory requirement for
the parties to consult their grassroots units before finalising the parliamentary
candidates. None of the major parties, however, actually followed the rules. What
most parties did was to follow the past practice of nominating candidates in an
arbitrary manner. Even the AL did not remain an exception. It was found that rather
than selecting candidates from the panel of five nominees sent to the central
parliamentary board by different constituency units, the AL parliamentary board
nominated candidates of its own choice in many constituencies. In some cases, those
142 N. Ahmed

who were on top of the list were denied nomination, and those who were at the
bottom of the list were selected. The process of nomination of candidates was more
difficult in 2008 than it had been in the past. The decision of each of the main parties
to contest the elections as part of an alliance restricted its freedom in choosing the
candidates, as some seats had to be allotted to small alliance partners. Although the
logic of forming alliances was straight-forward – that is, to maximise potential for
capturing state power – many party aspirants refused to abide by the party decision
to work for candidates belonging to other parties. Many candidates thus defied their
party decisions and contested the elections as independent candidates. Some also
contested against official party candidates.
Theoretically, politics in Bangladesh is an open market process, and not a
restrained black market operation. Anyone who can satisfy a number of conditions
is eligible to contest an election. In practice, the so-called ‘open politics’ has certain
inherent limitations. In particular, electoral politics mostly remains a ‘male’ and
‘Muslim’ domain. Women and minorities do not have adequate representation; nor
do the economically disadvantaged have any realistic prospect of winning
nomination. Although women constituted more than half of the electorate in
2008, only 50 women contested from 53 constituencies (Prothom Alo, 31st December
2008). Minorities also do not have much prospect of contesting elections. The AL
nominated the highest number of candidates (14) belonging to minority commu-
nities; the BNP nominated only six minority candidates. Fourteen other parties
nominated 26 candidates, and 11 minority candidates contested the elections as
independents. However, compared with the past, more women and minority
candidates contested the 2008 elections. Their success rate was also much higher in
2008 than in the past.
Those who are economically strong and socially influential have a better chance
of winning nomination than others. In their bid to recruit the support of the nouveau
riche, the two main parties denied nomination to many dedicated party workers. In
fact, before the last parliamentary elections, the AL and BNP were apparently
engaged in competition to attract as many wealthy people as possible to their own
fold. According to one estimate, more than 60% of the candidates belonging to the
BNP and nearly 56% of AL candidates were businessmen. Although the number of
businessmen contesting the ninth elections decreased to some extent, as a group they
still dominate electoral and party politics in the country. In fact, business and politics
in Bangladesh have become closely intertwined. As Kochanek (1993, 230) argues:
‘[u]nlike in India where businessmen function behind the scenes to protect their
interests, the Bangladesh politicians are often businessmen. Most top business
houses in Bangladesh have had a very close relation to politicians and politics.
Businessmen support their favourite political party, contribute to party election
coffers, run for public office and sometimes even become ministers.’

Parties and manifestos

The main parties, as observed earlier, contested the elections as part of different
alliances, but each declared its own manifesto and also used its own election symbol.
Thus, although BJI contested the elections as a component of the four-party alliance,
it used its own election symbol – a scale – rather than using the symbol of the main
alliance partner, the BNP (a sheaf of paddy). Similarly, candidates belonging to JP
popularised its election symbol – a plough – rather than using a boat, the election
 Contemporary South Asia 143

symbol of AL – the main partner in the grand alliance. Some of the smaller parties in
the grand alliance, for example, the Workers Party (WP) and Jatiya Samajtantrik
Dal (JSD), used the election symbol of their main partner (AL); the Bangladesh
Jatiya Party (BJP), a component of the four-party alliance, used the election symbol
of the BNP. Most parties thus sought to popularise their own party ideologies along
with the ideologies of the alliances to which they belonged.
The nature of issues raised by different parties during the elections had
similarities as well as differences. In particular, the two main contenders for power –
AL and BNP – agreed on most of the important problems confronting the nation:
corruption, the electricity crisis and the food crisis. Both parties pledged to give the
top-most priority to the eradication of corruption, and to ensure food and energy
security. Both also stressed the importance of making the country self-sufficient in
food, and to achieve this goal both pledged to allocate more resources to agriculture.
Both also promised to make the administration accountable and transparent and,
the parliament effective. Neither the AL nor the BNP manifestos, however, referred
to issues of decentralisation and democratisation of local government, significant
themes for the promotion of good governance, which both parties promised to
ensure. Nor did any party commit measures to further democratise the party system.
In fact, both main parties remained silent on issues related to party reforms and
party strengthening.
No major difference between the AL and the BNP could be noticed in their
economic policies. Both emphasised industrialisation and, in particular, making the
maximum use of information technology (IT). Both parties also remained
ambivalent in their attitude towards some important economic policies/pro-
grammes, such as privatisation, public sector expenditure and financial sector
reform. The AL manifesto, however, differed from the BNP document in several
respects. In particular, it prioritised issues and specified the time-frame for the
implementation of its major elections pledges. It also proposed to set up a regional
task force to fight terrorism in the region. The AL promised to make Bangladesh
digital by 2021, thereby making the country capable of competing with the outside
world. In general, the AL manifesto identified the issues to be dealt with in a
specified manner, in contrast to the BNP manifesto which remained general about
all the issues, sometimes even self-contradictory and uninventive (Zaman and
Ahamed 2008, 7).
The Ershad-led JP pledged among others, to make Bangladesh a federal
country by dividing it into eight provinces, with each (province) having a
provincial assembly and a provincial cabinet. Like the AL, the JP also pledged to
guarantee food security and energy security. The Bangladesh Jamaat-i-Islami (BJI)
deviated from its traditional election goals, at least to some extent. Rather than
proposing to establish the ‘Allah’s Law’, the BJI had agreed to abide by the
constitution, which considers the people as the main source of law. It, however,
proposed to introduce blasphemy law which was criticised by many people,
especially the liberals, and pledged to undertake a number of constitutional, legal
and administrative reforms.
None of the major parties, however, referred to the way(s) the various lofty
promises they made would be materialised. Nor was there any reference to the
manner resources would to be raised. In particular, there was no reference to
taxation policies, which usually find prominence in election campaigns in democratic
countries. This important lapse was noticeable not only in the 2008 elections; parties
144 N. Ahmed

had also remained silent on this issue in the past. None of the manifestos, however,
mentioned anything about qualitative change in future politics, particularly about
hartals (general strikes) and blockades that had virtually cost the nation seriously in
the past. Notwithstanding these drawbacks, the main manifestos appeared to be an
improvement over those popularised by the parties in the past.

Styles of electioneering
The two main parties – AL and BNP – adopted a number of strategies to mobilise
the voters, perhaps the most important being the ‘door-to-door’ campaign by
candidates. The onerous task of leading the two alliances to victory depended mostly
on the two ‘supreme’ alliance leaders – Khaleda Zia – the chairperson of BNP, and
Sheikh Hasina – the president of AL. Both (who were former prime ministers) made
extensive visits throughout the country begging votes for their party and alliance
candidates by promising a better future. The BNP leader, however, travelled further
(about 8000 kilometres) and visited more constituencies (around 200) than Hasina –
her arch rival. Unlike the past when the two main parties, especially the ‘supreme’
leaders, were routinely engaged in mud slinging and questioning each other’s
patriotism, the two ran a more ‘civilised’ campaign in 2008. Both accorded less
emphasis on emotive issues and concentrated on those issues that directly concerned
the electorate. None of the parties referred to their past achievements or failures of
the opponent to any significant extent; instead both focused on the future. This could
be considered as a major departure from the past when personal attacks and
counterattacks very often featured election campaigns. The extent to which this
could be seen as a change in attitude of the two ‘supreme’ leaders towards each other
is difficult to ascertain.
What is, however, evident is that the extremely short time limit available for
election campaign might have dissuaded the two leaders from highlighting personal
issues and encouraged them to focus on substantive issues of national concern. The
tendency to use force to influence the voters decreased considerably in 2008. In
general, the 2008 parliamentary polls were conducted in a relatively peaceful
atmosphere. The stringent measures taken by the EC and its decision to apply them
uniformly also discouraged any use of force in the elections. For example, the use of
the photo-based voter list reduced the scope for ‘false’ voting to a considerable
extent, and the introduction of transparent ballot boxes limited the scope for any
wrongdoing in voting. The EC also succeeded in influencing the main parties to
behave according to law, especially in organising meetings and processions, using
posters and microphones, and establishing contact with the voters. The use of money
and mastans, which was widespread in earlier elections, could rarely be noticed in
2008. Candidates and their supporters provided a strong vigil on the use of money to
buy votes, especially in the slum areas.

The results
Held on schedule on 29th December, the 2008 parliamentary polls were conducted in
a relatively peaceful atmosphere. Whatever violence took place in different places did
not have any major impact on the outcome of the vote,3 and adherence to the rules
was by and large satisfactory. The results of the election were accepted universally as
free, fair and credible.
 Contemporary South Asia 145

Voter turnout
The rate of voter turnout in 2008 surpassed all previous records. Of the total
81,058,698 voters, 69,945,550 (86.3%) turned out to exercise their franchise.
Compared with the past, women voters showed greater enthusiasm to vote in
2008. The first time voters, accounting for more than one-third of the total
electorate, also turned out in large numbers to exercise their franchise. They also
behaved in a similar manner as in 2001. One of the important reasons accounting for
a high rate of turnout was the massive measure taken by the NPCG and the EC to
ensure the safety and security of the voters. People were informed in advance of the
security measures taken; these were intended to boost their confidence. Besides,
different political parties made hectic efforts to ensure the presence of as many voters
as possible with the objective of securing more votes for their candidates. The
promise for a better future, which found special prominence in the AL manifesto,
induced the women and young voters to rush in large number to the election centres
on election day. In particular, the pledge by AL to reduce the price of essential
commodities greatly influenced women voters to make decisions, as they are better
able to assess the burden of price hike than men, and the promise of a digital
Bangladesh by 2021 appealed to new voters.

Performance of parties and candidates

It was widely assumed from the beginning of the campaign that the main contest
would be between the AL-led grand alliance and the BNP-led four-party alliance.
The results partially validated the predictions; in most of the constituencies there was
straightaway contest between candidates belonging to the grand alliance and the
four-party alliance. The results also falsified most of the earlier predictions that no
party would be able to secure an absolute majority of seats;4 many also predicted
that there would be a hung parliament. Election results show that the grand alliance
secured 87.5% of the total seats, a victory unparalleled in the recent election history
of Bangladesh. The BNP-led alliance won only 32 seats (10.7%). Among the parties,
the AL won the maximum number of seats. It secured 230 seats, much more than
necessary to form a single-party government. The AL was followed by the BNP,
which secured 29 seats. The JP candidates won in 27 constituencies, whereas the
BJI won only 2 seats. Four independents – three of them AL ‘rebels’ and one BNP
‘rebel’ – also won the elections. All ministers in the Khaleda Zia’s Cabinet except one
were defeated in the elections by a huge margin. Women candidates fared extremely
well in 2008. All except two of the 16 women candidates nominated by the AL won
the elections, and three of 12 BNP women candidates passed the tsunami test. All 14
‘minority’ candidates contesting the elections as the AL nominees won the elections.
Women and minorities, who fared badly in earlier elections, now constitute more
than 10% of the total members in the new parliament. This implies that the attitude
of the electorate towards women and minorities is changing, albeit slowly.
The BNP not only lost most of its seats to the AL-led alliance; its share of the
vote also decreased considerably: from 42.3% in 2001 to 32.4% in 2008. In the last
three elections (fifth, seventh and eighth), the share of votes of BNP steadily
increased, but it got a serious jolt in 2008. On the other hand, the AL, which had
trailed behind the BNP in enlisting the support of the people in 2001, actually
succeeded in increasing its share of vote in 2008. Its share of popular votes increased
146 N. Ahmed

from 40.2% in 2001 to 48.1% in 2008. The AL polled 10.08 million votes more than
the BNP (Daily Ittefaq, 2nd January 2009), a spectacular victory by any standard.
The share of JP votes increased slightly, and the BJI’s support has remained steady.
The grand alliance candidates comprehensively defeated the four-party candidates in
more than 100 seats. In 24 seats, the alliance candidates won by more than 100,000
votes, and in another 78 seats, by more than 50,000 votes (Daily Jugantar, 2nd
January 2009). The newly introduced option of casting ‘no’ votes failed to exert any
impact on the national election, as only 0.55% voters went for the alternative of
ignoring the candidates (Daily Star, 2nd January 2009).

Explaining the results

The results of the elections surprised most election observers including the policy-
makers of both the AL and the BNP. The former, which was confident of winning
the elections, probably did not expect such an overwhelming victory. Nor could the
BNP, which was less confident of winning the elections, easily withstand such a
tsunami-type shock. The results were, in fact, a devastating blow to the BNP and its
allies, especially the BJI. Several factors such as the nomination of controversial and
well-known corrupt elements, the growing influence of the fundamentalists within
the party, especially while it was in power, unbridled corruption centring the
infamous Hawa Bhaban and organisational weaknesses largely accounted for the
failure of the BNP to win the elections (Zaman 2009). Other reasons causing the
BNP debacle included: over-dependence of the high command on non-political
people, ‘irresponsible’ statements made against the caretaker government as well as
the media, inefficient handling of election-related matters, and negative opinion of
the young voters about the role of the BNP and its main ally, BJI (Daily Jugantar,
31st December 2008).
The success of the AL-led alliance, however, cannot be attributed to the failures
of the BNP. Many factors accounted for the victory of the alliance, perhaps the most
important being a faithful casting of votes by (its) supporters and sympathisers of the
grand alliance in favour of its candidates. Besides, Sheikh Hasina, the main architect
of the alliance victory, apparently succeeded in effectively publicising the adverse
effects of the BNP-BJI rule (2001–6). Her campaign was also better-planned and
more effective than that of her arch rival, Khaleda. One of the most important
factors accounting for the AL victory was its major success in attracting the new
voters to its fold by promising, among others, a digital Bangladesh. The BNP-led
alliance’s slogan, ‘save the country, save people’, did not appeal to the young voters
who, because of their access to modern means of communication, were interested to
hear more about the future than about what happened in the past. The AL was more
successful than the BNP in anticipating the mindset of the new voters. It thus
rejected many of its corrupt leaders and nominated a cohort of young candidates
against many senior BNP candidates. This augured well with the first time voters
(Ahamed 2009, 24). Moreover, the AL campaign was also more techno-oriented,
where the campaign used video conferences, text messages, websites, email etc. to
outreach the voters. In contrast, BNP could not even produce their manifesto in a
second language (24). The categorical promise by the AL to reduce the price of rice
and essential commodities appealed to those hard hit by continued price rise over the
last few years. The re-demarcation of constituencies also contributed to a large
extent to the fall of the alliance candidates in many places. After the re-districting,
 Contemporary South Asia 147

cleaner image of the candidates became more effective than the segregated networks
of well-established candidates (25).
An important reason accounting for the debacle of the BJI was the successful
campaign by the sector commanders’ forum against the war criminals, some of
whom allegedly held leadership roles in the party. The forum organised effective
programmes and popularised public campaign against the party which had opposed
the liberation war in 1971. Its campaign appears to have influenced the new voters to
a great extent. Another reason for the debacle of the BJI was that like the BNP, it
also had to take part of the blame for the failure of the BNP-led alliance government
to meet the expectation of the general public. Its alleged connection with a militant
organisation carrying out terrorist activities in different places also made the voters,
especially the new voters, sceptical about the intentions of the party (Chowdhury
2009). The overconfidence of the party, to some extent, accounted for its failure in
many constituencies. It is to be mentioned here that the BNP decision to take part in
the election was largely influenced by the BJI. Another important reason was that
the supporters of the four-party alliance did not faithfully vote for its (alliance)
candidates in 2008 as they did in 2001. In particular, the BNP and BJI candidates
and their supporters sought to prosper at each other’s expense in many cases,
resulting in the defeat of may BJI candidates, especially in the western region of the
country (Jugantar, 31st December 2009). On the other hand, the success of the JP
can be attributed to its becoming a part of the grand alliance. In fact, without the
support of the AL, JP candidates would have lost most of the constituencies where
they actually won. As in the past, General Ershad’s personal popularity contributed
to the victory of the JP candidates in the Rangpur region.
On the whole, the superior performance of the AL was mainly due to its effective
planning in every respect, ranging from the selection of candidates and preparation of
the manifesto, to the conduct of the campaign and the mobilisation of the voters. It
adopted several new ways of reaching the voters. The BNP was not a match for the AL
in any respect. It trailed behind the AL both in adopting a forward-looking approach
to election management and in studying the significance of the metamorphosis that had
already taken place in the attitude and behaviour of the electorate. Many of those
associated with the BNP’s election campaign and management did not have much of a
link with the electorate. It thus failed to grasp the electorate’s urge for change, whereas
the AL appeared to have clearly comprehended the rationale for change and prepared
the party well to respond to it. Herein lies perhaps the main and fundamental difference
between the AL and the BNP.

Ninth elections and democratic consolidation

It has already been reiterated that the ninth election was significant for a number of
reasons, the most important being that it was considered critical for democratic
transition and consolidation. Nowhere, however, is it observed that elections are a
sufficient condition of consolidation; in fact, consolidation requires much more than
elections. Yet, as O’Donnell (1996, 45) argues, ‘fair elections are the main, if not the
only, characteristic that certifies countries as democratic before other governments
and international opinion. This certification has important advantages for countries
and for those who govern them.’ The institutionalisation of elections is thus an
important condition of consolidation. Consolidation also involves behavioural and
institutional changes that normalise democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty
148 N. Ahmed

(Diamond 1994, 15). In particular, as Przeworski observes (cited in Schneider 1995,

3), consolidation basically means that political actors agree to abide by democratic
rules. At the minimum, the rules require that while the victors in an election must be
allowed to govern – to get their programmes passed – the vanquished must be given
all reasonable opportunities to air their views. These also require that certain
fundamental questions, such as the regime and the form of government, remain
outside the party fight. The rules further require that the conflicting actors recognise
elections as the only mode of the succession of government and also agree to make
the legislature/parliament the central site of conflict resolution.
Many of these conditions, which were virtually absent in the past, can now be
observed in Bangladesh. For example, there now exists widespread consensus on the
system of government as well as the method of regime change. The parliamentary
system of government was restored in 1991 on the basis of political consensus. The
main parties also recognise elections as the only mode of the succession of
government. No major difference can be noticed in the economic, administrative and
social policies of the two parties. The AL and BNP, which adopted a deviant strategy
of boycotting the sessions of the Parliament while in opposition to realise their
demands, pledged on the eve of the ninth elections that, if voted to power, they
would frame new laws, if necessary, to end the pervasive culture of parliament
boycott. The two main parties also made some other specific commitments such as
the sharing of parliamentary power to strengthen the Parliament. The way they
behaved in the initial days of the ninth parliament heightened public expectation
about the prospect of democratic consolidation in the country.
For example, unlike the past when those losing elections rarely accepted the
results voluntarily, the 2008 elections were somewhat different. The BNP, which had
lost the elections, did not reject the results outright. Notwithstanding its strong
reservation about the way the elections were held, the BNP MPs pledged to take the
oath and to help the parliament become effective. The opposition led by its leader
Khaleda Zia attended the inaugural session of the ninth parliament, a rare example
not seen in the past. The leader of the opposition responded positively to the request
of the prime minister to extend cooperation to make the parliament effective and the
government responsible (Daily Star, 6th January 2009). The BNP-led opposition
also attended the oath-taking ceremony of the newly elected President Zillur
Rahman, a presidium member of the AL. Previously, the opposition, as a general
rule, usually boycotted presidential ceremonies. The majority party (AL) also
initially expressed its readiness to follow a policy of inclusion, pledging to make an
opposition MP deputy speaker of the House and to allocate the chairmanship of
different parliamentary standing committees to different parties according to the
proportional principle. Although it backtracked from its earlier pledge of making an
opposition MP the deputy speaker, the AL nevertheless subsequently allocated
chairmanship of two parliamentary standing committees to the BNP.
The extent to which these steps represented a change in attitude of the governing
party and the main opposition party towards each other, or could be considered as a
tactic to score political gains is difficult to ascertain. Initial indications suggest that
the latter is probably more important than the former. The government has
essentially followed a ‘majoritarian’ policy even in those areas where there are strong
cases for a bipartisan approach. As an example, reference can be made to the refusal
of the government to accede to the BNP demand for the formation of an all-party
parliamentary committee to probe into the killing of a large number of unarmed
 Contemporary South Asia 149

military officers by the paramilitary Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) on 25th– 26th February
2009. The failure of the government and the opposition to form a ‘united’ team to visit
the Tipaimukh area in India to check the extent to which the decision by the Indian
government to build a dam there would harm Bangladesh provides another case
example. The government has recently decided to withdraw cases against its own leaders
and workers and not those against the opposition leaders filed during the caretaker rule,
which is likely to antagonise the opposition. These policies contrasted with the policy of
‘inclusion’ that the AL initially wanted to pursue. The BNP, which initially expressed its
willingness to make the ninth parliament effective, has now adopted the ‘old’ strategy of
boycotting its proceedings as a means to realise its ‘political’ demands. If this kind of
attitude of the government and the opposition towards each other persists, which
appears to be quite likely, the nascent Bangladesh democracy may take a much longer
period of time to consolidate than what is necessary. The ‘over-winning’ of the elections
by the AL may turn out to be its worst enemy in the long run. It risks discouraging
consensus; hence, it is a threat to consolidation.
It is, however, to be observed here that the government–opposition collaboration
may be considered as a necessary but not a sufficient condition of consolidation. The
type(s) of people who inhabit the institution of parliament is also crucially
important. Their ability and willingness to become proactive in parliament will
largely determine its effectiveness. Unlike in western democracies where professional
politicians dominate parliament, the majority of members of the ninth parliament
are businesspeople. According to one estimate, only 3.3% of the newly elected MPs
consider themselves as professional politicians; whereas 56% are businesspeople.
Nearly 44% are millionaires (Daily Ittefaq, 2nd January 2009). Rarely can one
expect these wealthy law-makers to spend much time in parliamentary business. As a
natural rule, they will remain busy with their own business; the parliament is likely to
suffer. About one-third of the members of the ninth parliament have been accused in
criminal and/or corruption cases. They are thus unlikely to set examples of any
strong moral standard, which is considered necessary for democratic consolidation.
The economic preconditions for consolidation need to be met if democracy is to be
sustainable. The AL made a number of specific commitments to upgrade the standard
of living of the people, especially the poorer section. If the government can deliver, at
least up to a certain extent, what it had promised, the task of consolidation will be
easier. It will increase the public stake in the maintenance of the democratic system
and discourage the constitutional opposition or anti-system parties to pose any threat
to democratic stability. However, any major failure on the part of the government
may cause public resentment against it and encourage the political opposition to turn
to the street, thereby posing some kind of threat to the process of governing.
Although the BNP has lost a large number of seats it secured in the past elections, it
still claims the support of a substantial number of voters – about one-third of the
total. Any major failure on the part of the government may induce the opposition
supporters to adopt a strategy to destabilise the government. This will also cause
disillusionment among some voters, especially the young and women who voted
overwhelmingly for the AL-led alliance candidates.

Conclusion
This article has explored different dimensions of the ninth parliamentary elections,
which represent a transition from emergency rule to a new democratic beginning.
150 N. Ahmed

They also appear to have had widespread consequences for the political system,
making explicit the behavioural orientation and preferences of new voters, and also
influencing the realignment of political forces. The extremely high rate of
involvement of the electorate provides evidence, at least up to a point, of the
restoration of public faith in elections as a means for governmental succession.
Electoral reforms implemented before the elections have the potential to make the
parties more democratic, and the election process more efficient and effective. Some
change in the attitude of the government and the opposition towards each other
may also be noted as contributing to the strengthening of the democratic base of
the country.
The significance of the elections can be explained from some other standpoints.
There now exists better scope for the resolution of a large number of issues that have
divided the nation for a long time. For example, the trial of the killers of the Father
of the Nation – Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman – and other national leaders
can now be held with relative ease, as the government has both the mandate and the
‘will’ to do it. In fact, the trial of Bangabandhu’s killers has now been completed
without any political uproar. Following the highest court verdict, a number of killers
have been executed. Similarly, the process of resolving the war crime issue, which the
ruling AL had highlighted in its election manifesto, has also started with the setting
up of the International Crimes Tribunal on 25th March 2010. A number of senior
leaders of the BJI have already been charged with war crimes and taken into
custody. The government has declared that the trial will be transparent and the
accused will be extended support, including the privilege of hiring lawyers from
abroad. The decision to set up the Tribunal has created a dilemma for the BNP,
the BJI’s main ally. It cannot publicly oppose the issue of war crimes as the party
claims that its founder – General Ziaur Rahman (Zia) – declared the war of
independence in 1971, although the High Court Division has ruled that it was
Bangabandhu, and not Zia, who made the proclamation of independence. To
oppose the trial is to risk losing the credibility of its founder as a war hero, and
also cause disenchantment among many of its members who supported the
liberation war in 1971 and/or participated in it. On the other hand, to accept the
trial without any opposition is to antagonise the BJI, which helped the BNP
acquire state power in the past. To overcome the dilemma, the BNP has apparently
adopted a ‘no support, no opposition’ policy, which, in the long run, may cause
more problems for the party than it can solve.
The rejection of the BJI and other religion-oriented parties by the electorate is
likely to have some long-term consequences. In particular, the use of religion
(Islam) as a legitimising tool in politics may not appeal to the electorate to the
same extent as previously. It is also unlikely to produce any major political
dividend in the future. The ‘religious right’ will probably have to reconsider their
strategies to survive in electoral politics because, as Ahamed (2009, 25) observes,
the people have rejected extremism. The recent decision by the highest court
declaring the fifth amendment to the constitution illegal and therefore void is also
likely to seriously affect all parties using religion as a legitimising tool. The fifth
amendment allowed the revival of religion-based parties such as the BJI and the
Muslim League, which had been banned during the Awami League’s first tenure
in government in the early years of independence (1972–5). The ruling by the
Election Commission that parties applying for registration must accept the
Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic will disadvantage the BJI and
 Contemporary South Asia 151

others which have long demanded that Divine Law should have precedence over
any other legislation in Bangladesh. It is also likely that following the declaration
of the fifth amendment as unconstitutional, Article 13 of the original Constitution
restricting the operation of religion-based parties will be revived.5 If that happens,
the BJI and many other parties shall be required to redraft their party
constitutions and modify their dominant polices/purposes to be considered as
legal entities.
However, although the court has made the task of the new government easier by
settling some contentious issues as already described, the BNP-led opposition, which
enjoys a much wider base of support than its Parliamentary share suggests, is
unlikely to allow the government a ‘free hand’ in running the country. It has the
capacity to immobilise the administration, as had the AL while it was in opposition.
The BNP is, however, aware of the lack of any strong public support for hartal
(strike action), which the political opposition in Bangladesh has traditionally used to
put pressure on the government. Nevertheless, any failure on the part of the
government to deliver what it had promised before the elections is likely to cause
strong disenchantment, especially among first-time voters. Part of the reason, as
Sobhan (2009, 11) has argued, is that ‘the [new] generation has no sentimental
attachment to AL and its history as do the traditional voters who have voted for
generations for the party. This new generation will go by results and will vote against
the [AL-led] grand alliance in 2013 as readily as they voted for it in 2008’. The re-
alignment of political forces is also likely to polarise the electorate, and any inept
handling of social or political issues may widen the gap between the parties in
government and those in opposition, and encourage the re-introduction of
confrontational politics.6 What is needed most is to pursue a policy of
accommodation. The landslide victory of the AL in the ninth elections may work
as a disincentive for it to adopt such a policy. However, the more the government
seeks to follow a policy of exclusion, the greater is the danger of further polarisation
of political forces, thereby making confrontation and instability inevitable.

Notes
1. For example, the first election, held on 7th March 1973, was considered to be a
referendum on the new constitution that was adopted by the Constituent Assembly a few
months earlier. The second, third and fourth elections, held respectively in 1979, 1986 and
1988, were considered to be critical, especially by the military regimes, to civilianise their
rule. It is to be mentioned here that Bangladesh remained under direct or indirect military
rule between 1975 and 1990. Elections held since the early 1990s are often seen as
important not only to provide a means for the regular succession of government but also
to strengthen the democratic base of the country. For example, the fifth elections, held in
February 1991, provided a means for transition from authoritarianism to democracy;
elections held in subsequent years are considered to be critical for democratic
consolidation.
2. The Constitution provides for different options for the appointment of the Chief Adviser.
For details, see Government of Bangladesh (2006).
3. For details of election-related violence, see Akhter (2009).
4. For a succinct account of predictions by different national dailies, see Akhter (2009, 350).
5. Article 13 states: ‘[e]very citizen shall have the right to form associations or unions . . .
Provided that no person shall have the right to form or be a member or otherwise take
part in the activities of, any communal or other association or union which in the name of
or on the basis of any religion has or its object, or pursues, a political purpose.’
6. For detailed accounts of the causes and consequences of confrontational politics in
Bangladesh, see Ahmed (2009), Islam (2006) and Osman (2009).
152 N. Ahmed

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