NEURAL DARWINISM AND A CONCEPTUAL CRISIS

IN PSYCHOANALYSIS

Arnold H. Modell
Howard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138

My introduction to Edelman’s theory of neuronal group selection

(TNGS) was quite fortuitous, as it was purely by chance that I happened
to read “Neural Darwinism” (1987). At that time I was preparing a book
on the theory of psychoanalytic treatment and was excited to discover
that Edelman’s concept that memory as recategorization was very similar
to a theory of memory that Freud had proposed in 1896. T h e similarity
between Edelman’s and Freud’s theory of memory may be no coincidence
in that Freud was also constructing a global theory of the brain. In the
previous year, 1895, Freud wrote “The Project for A Scientific Psychol-
ogy,” his failed attempt to describe psychological phenomena as a neuro-
physiological process. His insight was as follows: memory, as Edelrnan
also claims, is not isomorphic with experience; memory is not laid down
once but several times over, at the boundary of successive developmental
epochs (see Freud’s letter to Fleiss, December 6 1896; Masson, 1985).
At these boundaries a new transcription or translation takes place. Re-
pression leads to psychopathology because of a failure of retranscription.
I have retained Freud’s term Nachtraglichkeit to describe his theory of
memory. Nachtraglichkeit may be roughly translated as a retranscription
or, more awkwardly, as subsequentiality. T h e etymological roots of this
German word are of some interest because there is a connection with
the verb “to carry” as well as the Greek verb metaphorein, “to transport,”
from which we derive the noun “metaphor.”
T h e psychoanalyst has frequent opportunity to observe that affective
memories are categorical. I use the term “affects” to describe what we
ordinarily refer to as feelings. These categorical memories, encountered
in the multileveled intersubjective relationship between analyst and pa-
tient, are the memories of experiences that remain unassimilated. A
patient of mine reported the following incident (see Modell, 1990): Due
to the fact that his airline went out on strike, my patient was stranded
in a distant city and was unable to return home. He did everything
possible to obtain passage on another airline: he cajoled and pleaded
with the functionaries of other airlines, all to no avail. Although my
patient was usually not unduly anxious and was in fact a highly experi-

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336 ARNOLD H. MODELL

enced traveler, who, in the past remained calm under circumstances that
would frighten many people, in this particular situation he experienced
an overwhelming and generalized panic. He felt as if the unyielding
airline representatives were like Nazis and that the underground pas-
sages of the airline terminal resembled a concentration camp. T h e help-
lessness of not being able to return home, combined with the institutional
intransigence of the authorities, evoked the following categorical mem-
ory. When this man was 3 years old he and his parents were residents
of a central European country and, as Jews, were desperately attempting
to escape from the Nazis. They did in fact manage to obtain an airline
passage to freedom, but until that point the outcome was very much in
doubt. Although my patient did not recall his affective state at that time,
his parents reported that he seemed cheerful and unaffected by their
great anxiety. In this example, his helpless inability to leave a foreign
city triggered or evoked an unassimilated categorical memory from age
3 years. It is not unreasonable to infer that the specific events in current
time, his inability to find an airline passage, triggered a conceptual match
with a salient memory from age 3 years, the affects of which were then
experienced in current time. T h e events were remembered but the af-
fects associated with those events were repressed. It can be said that a
translation had not occurred subsequently; a recategorization had not
taken place.
The idea of memory as a retranscription is central to a theory of the
therapeutic action of psychoanalysis (this topic is reviewed in Modell,
1990). Through the retranscription of memory, the present can alter
the past. One of the means through which psychoanalysis alleviates psy-
chic pain is the recreation of old traumatic experiences within the context
of the new relationship with the analyst in current time. By this process,
old affective memories of traumatic experiences are retranscribed. This
recategorization is also consistent with a procedural aspect of TNGS in
its emphasis on motor activity that seeks a match between past and
present salient memory categories. Psychoanalysts have long observed a
parallel process in that patients are unconsciously driven to test whether
their perception of the analyst in current time corresponds to their
memories of those persons in the past with whom they have had traumatic
experiences. It is not uncommon for patients unconsciously to provoke
the analyst to act a similar part as the person with whom they have had
a traumatic experience. This familiar repetition within the transference,
Freud attributed to the repetition compulsion, which he had mistakenly
understood as a fundamental quality of instinct. According to TNGS,
repetition is a fundamental quality, not of instinct but of memory.
Categorical memory is a potential memory awaiting activation. I find
that this idea clarifies the seemingly incongruous notion of unconscious
 NEURAL DARWINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 337

affects. Some authors have attempted to deal with this problem by distin-
guishing unconscious affects from conscious affects by referring to the
latter as feeling (Sandler and Joffe, 1969). Psychoanalysts speak of psy-
chic structure in many different contexts. In one such context, psychic
structures are equivalent to the long-term memory of affective experi-
ences. For example, a repeated traumatic interaction with a caretaker
may be internalized as an identification in which subject and object are
represented. That is to say, the traumatic relationship is memorialized
so that the affective components of both self and other become part of
the self. T h e affects associated with this experience can be said to be
unconscious in that they exist only as a potential awaiting activation. The
following clinical vignette may make this clear (reported in Modell, 1990).
One if my patients had a traumatic relationship with her father in
that he was subject to unexpected, violent, and totally irrational rage
reactions. When her father lost control of his temper, my patient, under-
standably, experienced herself as the innocent victim because she be-
lieved that her father’s rage was totally unprovoked-it came totally out
of the blue. My casual use of the words “out of the blue” triggered the
following episode. During our session I experienced the patient to be
very withdrawn and almost completely silent and yet she complained
that I was not making any useful comments or interpretations. I replied,
probably with a slight edge of irritation, that she wanted me to produce
something “out of the blue.” This comment resulted in a violent rage
reaction, which I then experienced as unprovoked, as coming “out of
the blue.” This categorical memory of the attacker and the attacked was
recreated in current time with a reversal of roles. I experienced the
affects that I believe my patient experienced when being attacked by her
father-I felt a sense of surprise, of bewilderment, and overall a sense
of the unfairness of being attacked when I, as far as I knew, had done
nothing wrong. I became the “innocent” victim. What is also of interest
is that when we discussed this episode some days later, my patient was
unaware that she was angry o r provocative. Her rage was dissociated; it
could be described as unconscious.
I wish now to consider a somewhat different subject, the possible
relevance for psychoanalysis of the concept of value, and the theory of
consciousness presented in “The Remembered Present” (Edelman, 1989).
For those animals who posses a higher order consciousness, the adaptive
function of ccinsciousness is fairly explicit, in that consciousness enables
the organism to have a coherent model of present, past, and future that
frees it from the tyranny of current inputs. This higher order conscious-
ness can be said to imply a concept of self in that current perceptual
events are recategorized in accordance with past value category matched
would speculate that in humans this process results in a sense of continu-
338 ARNOLD H. MODELL

ity and coherence. T h e fact that value will exercise a selective preference
o r bias on perception and consciousness requires a discrimination be-
tween self and non-self. T o quote from “The Remembered Present” (p.
98): “Current perceptual events are recategorized in terms of past value-
category matches. It is the contrast of the special linkage of value and
past categories with currently arriving categories, and the dominance of
the self-related special memory systems in this memorial linkage, that
generate the self-referential aspect of consciousness.” According to
TNGS the organism is a creator of those criteria that lead to information.
If I were to extend this theory to the psychology of the self, the self can
be seen as creator of meaning. From the perspective of the self, meaning
is created through the memories of salient affective experiences. I firmly
believe that the need to maintain the sense of the continuity and coher-
ence of the self is an evolutionary given [this point is discussed further
in Model1 (1993)l. It is a homeostatic function that occurs outside of
consciousness in the same sense that we are not usually aware of our
breathing except when it is imperilled.
It seems to me that it is necessary to include affects in the sequence
between value, consciousness, and meaning, inasmuch as affects are the
internal value-generated signals that ensure survival. Affects can be
thought of as amplifiers of value [for a discussion of affects as amplifiers,
see Tomkins (1988)l. Our motives are most directly influenced by our
feelings. We are motivated by our feelings in both a positive and negative
sense. Such feelings would include not only pleasurable and painful
affects but also specific unlearned anxieties that provide the individual
with an adaptive advantage. An obvious example is separation anxiety.
I believe that this linkage between value and affects is a necessary
element for any future construction of a biology of meaning. This view
encompasses ever-increasing levels of complexity. If one accepts the
hypothesis that affects are internal value-related signals essential for
survival, there is a clear progression between value as an evolutionary
property, and affects and meaning in the psychological domain. It is
affect that defines meaning as personal significance.
It is apparent that I have chosen one definition of meaning among
many. T h e psychoanalyst spends his days asking patients: “What does
this mean to you?” Meaning here is defined as personal significance o r
private meaning. There is a tautology, for what is of personal significance
is to some extent invested with feeling. This definition of meaning as
personal significance refers essentially to private meaning or meanings.
If we define meaning as personal significance, it exists prior to language;
gestures and thoughts are endowed with meaning prior to their commu-
nication through a shared language. Meaning as personal significance
 NEURAL DARWINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 339

is not the subject that interests most philosophers of language, who study
the communal aspect of meanings (for contrary views, see Lakoff, 1987;
Johnson, 1987; Rommetveit, 1985).
What I am attempting to portray is a loop between value, affects,
meaning, and a psychoanalytic conception of the self. I ask your indul-
gence, for the moment, to be able to move back and forth from the level
of the brain to psychoanalytic observation without being troubled by the
ever-present mindlbrain problem. Meaning is generated through the
scanning function of the self, where past (salient) categorical memories
are matched with current perceptual inputs. This process presupposes
a certain intactness or coherence of the self. When psychopathology
interferes with this coherence, there will be a constriction in the extent
to which events are endowed with meaning. There is a considerable body
of clinical evidence that indicates that traumatic experiences may result
in a dissociative split within the self (Fairbairn, 1952; Kernberg, 1976).
What may remain dissociated and unconscious are the affects andlor
the ideational contents of those traumatic experiences. This dissociation
or splitting of the self prevents the recontextualization of memories that
would normally occur, as Freud predicted. This splitting or dissociation
of the self also entails an altered relation to time and an alteration of
the self’s historical dimension. As Freud indicated, there is a failure of
translation of the memories from one developmental stage to the next.
The failure of retranscription interferes with the experience of cyclic
time, that is, with the capacity to create a coherent model of past, present,
and future. I would describe the continuity and coherence of the self as
a value that generates further emergent interpersonal motives, such as the need
to maintain the privacy of the self.
When someone remains estranged from their affective core, there is
a resultant sense of emptiness and futility-experiences become less
meaningful and ultimately life may become meaningless. This profound
sense of emptiness can be observed in its most extreme forms in the so-
called narcissistic disorders. These personality disorders are different
from depression, although in severe depression there is an analogous
disturbance of the self, for in cases of depressive psychomotor retardation
there is also an inability to generate meaning. There is ample clinical
observation to suggest that in disturbances of the sense of self there is
some interference in the capacity to generate meaning.
This loss of contact with the deeper structures of the self can be
observed in its most severe form in the so-called borderline case, a very
severe personality disturbance, on the border between neurosis and psy-
chosis. When there is a profound dissociation from this inner, affective
core of the self, this may be experienced as a form of psychic death.
340 ARNOLD H. MODELL

Total dissociation from the deep structures of the self is an unparalleled

psychic catastrophe, because one loses contact with this inner core of
the self-there is an inability to attribute meaning to experience. Some
borderline and schizophrenic patients describe this catastrophe as a
“black hole.” For defensive reasons the self has compressed itself into
nonexistence. Like the astronomer’s black hole, an implosion has oc-
curred. T h e term ‘‘black hole” is an attempt to name the ineffable, to give
a name to an absence that results in chaos, nothingness, and meaning-
lessness.
I have been attempting to demonstrate the congruence of TNGS
with certain psychoanalytic observations. Some of my psychoanalytic col-
leagues would reject this application of a neurobiological model to psy-
choanalysis on the grounds that it is reductionistic. They would claim
that the concepts and theories of any science o r academic discipline are
bound to the context of the particular methods employed in observation
(for example, see Edelson, 1988). Therefore neurobiological concepts
cannot have relevance for psychoanalytic observation. They might fur-
ther argue that in a certain sense the human species, in its capacity
for language and culture, is disjunctive with other animals so that a
neurobiologic theory would not apply to what is a cultural or humanistic
discipline.
There is within psychoanalysis today a complete absence of consensus
regarding the relation of psychoanalysis to biology in general and to
neuroscience in particular. Some view the mind and brain as a seamless
web, whereas others believe that a psychology of the mind is an autono-
mous, free-standing science such as economics, or possibly no science
at all.
It can be said of contemporary psychoanalytic theory that it has lost
its central organizing principle; in Kuhn’s sense it has lost its paradigm.
There is little agreement regarding basic assumptions and accordingly
psychoanalysts have segregated within a variety of schools. It is evident
that Freud’s theoretical edifice has lost its conceptual glue. I would sug-
gest that one of the root causes of this conceptual anarchy is that psycho-
analysis has lost its tie to biology. Freud had no doubt that psychoanalysis
needed to borrow certain crucial concepts, such as instinct, from evolu-
tionary biology. But, unfortunately, for psychoanalysis, he backed the
wrong horse. For, as you know, the concept of instinct has virtually
disappeared from biology. To consider distinct instinctual entities or
categories, in my opinion, is a vestige of thinking of Platonic essences,
which Mayr (1988) has shown to be incompatible with selectionism.
In order to place this problem in some historical context I wish to
refer to the origins of psychoanalysis, to consider, in greater detail,
 NEURAL DARWINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 34 1

Freud’s relation to neuroscience and evolutionary biology. This bit of

intellectual history has been subject to very different interpretations.
There are those who would claim that Freud, in the “Project for a Scien-
tific Psychology” and in his book “On Aphasia,” used the language of
neurophysiology to clothe his essentially psychological theories, that his
theories were not primarily neurophysiological in the first place, and
that he used neurophysiology only as a metaphor to shape his essentially
psychological model of the mind (Grossman, 1992). I believe that the
truth is otherwise. Although Freud appeared at times to accept a conven-
tional mind/brain parallelism or dualism, a case can be made that he
remained essentially a monist. This is an interpretation of Freud’s neuro-
logical theory of mind offered by the philosopher Robert Solomon
(1974). There is, I believe, convincing evidence that a significant portion
of psychoanalytic theory remains, as Freud intended it to be, a theory
of the brain. Whether it is an acceptable theory of the brain is another
question. Considering the embryonic state of neuroscience at the close
of the nineteenth century, Freud had to practically invent his own brain
physiology. It is perhaps for this reason he never published “The Project”
but nevertheless he did preserve much of it within his later theory of
psychoanalysis.
As I have noted, it is unfortunate for psychoanalysis that biology can
no longer consider instincts to be entities. Freud considered the instinct
concept as the foundation on which his theory rested. For Freud, the
“elementary” instincts were analogous to the physicist’s elementary parti-
cles. Freud said (1923, p.255) “Psychoanalysis early became aware that
all mental occurrences must be regarded as built on the basis of an interplay of
forces of the elementary instincts. Freud borrowed a classification of instinct
”

from his interpretation of evolutionary biology. His original classification

proceeded along conventional lines in that he divided instincts into what
he called the ego instincts, the instinct for self-preservation, which in-
cluded aggression and the sexual instinct. However, this classification
was soon replaced with a less conventional duality, that of eros and
thanatos. This later transcendent classificationof instinct is perhaps more
philosophy than science. Freud believed that eros represented a unifying
force whereas thanatos, the death instinct, represented the tendency of
all living things to revert back to an inanimate state. In this he was
expressing a kind of Goethe-like romantic biological theorizing. Today,
few psychoanalysts believe in Freud’s death instinct, they dismiss it as
metaphysics, but many psychoanalysts accept, what is in effect, a bowdler-
ized version of Freud’s dual instinct theory. That is, they believe that
sexuality and aggression are instinctual entities, the overriding elements
of all human motivation.
342 ARNOLD H. MODELL

But the problem does not rest here, for, as you know, there were
on Freud’s part additional erroneous beliefs and misunderstanding of
Darwinian evolution that have contributed to the estrangement of psy-
choanalysis from contemporary evolutionary biology. Freud believed
in a Lamarckian theory of evolution and did not understand Darwin’s
population theory. Furthermore, he uncritically accepted Haeckel’s law
that ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny. Freud asserted that experience
over long periods of time could be inherited and that evolutionary pro-
cesses effected primarily the fitness of the group rather than the individ-
ual. Freud said (1915, p.120) “There is naturally nothing to prevent our
supposing that the instincts themselves are, at least in part, precipitates
of the effect of external stimulation, which in the course of phylogenesis
have brought about modifications in the living substance.” I should add,
as you also know, that Darwin had similar beliefs. For example in “The
Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals,” Darwin (1872, p.103)
believed that gestures and the expression of specific emotions can become
habitual and after repeated generations can alter the nervous system
and become innate. In some respects Freud’s errors reflect the fact that
he was a child of his time. His belief in Lamarckianism, his misunder-
standing of Darwin’s theory, and his uncritical acceptance of Haeckel’s
law were all commonplace in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century.
It is not surprising that Freud’s instinct theory or drive theory, as it
has come to be called, is the most divisive conceptual issue in psychoana-
lytic theory today. Those psychoanalysts who wish to preserve the Freud-
ian instinct paradigm must do so by declaring that psychoanalysis is free
standing and has no relation to evolutionary biology. For example, a
very respected psychoanalytic theorist, Hans Loewald, asserted that the
instinct concept in psychoanalysis is a psychological concept, and as such
is a different concept entirely as compared to the biologic concept of
instinct(Loewald, 1980). This was not Freud‘s view. Freud spoke of in-
stincts as well as affects as concepts on the frontier between the mind
and the body (Freud, 1915). There is in psychoanalysis as well as in
cognitive science a strong impetus to remove biology from the mind.
I am not suggesting that TNGS can resolve the mind/brain problem
o r that the concept of value can be used as a substitute for a psychoanalytic
theory of instincts. But value combined with reentry is a basic concept of
the highest generality and as such it is not too far fetched to suggest that
TNGS may assist in generating a theory of motivation based on selection.
I have already tried to indicate how we can move from the concept of
value to a concept of meaning that is relevant for psychoanalysis. Inas-
much as value plus reentry exerts a selective process on consciousness,
 NEURAL DARWINISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 343

it selects what is of interest to the animal, which is another way of referring

to motivation. William James also spoke of interests as exerting as selec-
tive influence on consciousness. “Millions of items of the outward order
are present to my senses which never properly enter into my experience.
Why? Because they have no interest for me. My experience is what I agree
to attend to. Only such items which I notice shape my mind-without
selective interest, experience is an utter chaos” (James, 1890, p.402).
James also referred to interests as a hot place in a man’s consciousness;
such interests can take the form of ideas or ideals, to which the individual
is devoted and which become the habitual center of his personal energy.
What I am suggesting is that at the highest level of generality there
is a congruence between TNGS as a global theory of brain function and
psychoanalysis as a global theory of mind. If we move away from this
highest level of generality into the domain of particularities, we should
expect that this congruence will no longer pertain. For example, I am
told that noninvasive scanning techniques make it possible to observe
that the visual cortex will light up when a subject is asked to imagine
that he is seeing an object. Such techniques will record the simultaneity
of brain states and experience but it would not be possible to claim that
such brain states are identical to experience. TNGS would not predict an
identity between brain states and experience, for, as Edelman indicated
in “The Remembered Present,” the fact of degeneracy would argue
against it.
Despite the congruence that I believe exists between TNGS and psycho-
analytic theory and observation, the leap we take between the brain and
the mind remains mysterious. I suspect that most of us here are monists
with regard to the mind and brain and that we are not too troubled by
what philosophers label as a problem of ontology: do brain and mind
occupy identical or separate modes of existence? But nevertheless a
problem remains. T h e philosopher John Searle argues in his paper “Con-
sciousness, Unconsciousness and Intentionality” (1989) that some but
not all unconscious neurophysiological processes are mental. As an expe-
rienced psychoanalyst I know of nothing that would counter Searle’s
claim that unconscious mental processes are neurophysiological. But if
such processes are neurophysiological and outside of experience, by what
right d o we label them as mental? William James believed it to be illogical
to refer to the unconscious as mental and preferred the term “subcon-
scious.” But Freud as well as Searle postulated that the unconscious con-
tains latent meaning; it contains a potentiality to generate meaning.
As you know, philosophers have, for centuries, puzzled over the
problem of the privacy of mental events. Some would claim that it is
illogical to think that can I show you my sense data. A patient cannot
344 ARNOLD H. MODELL

show you their pain but some aspect of their pain can be communicated.
If this were not true psychoanalysis and psychotherapy could not be
possible. Searle asks the question what is meant when something is desig-
nated as mental? His answer is that to be designated as mental, an uncon-
scious state must be a possible candidate for consciousness and must
have a certain “aspectual shape.” Searle’s use of the term “aspectual”
indicates that in defining subjective experience there are a multiplicity
of aspects, a multiplicity of private meanings. Searle has, I believe, offered
a solution to this problem of private mental states. He uses the example
that an individual’s desire for water is different from a desire for H,O
and that this difference cannot be exhaustively known to an outside ob-
server. T h e term “exhaustively” is pertinent; experience is private, but
aspects of experience can be known to an outside observer. Acounterques-
tion would be “Can brain events be exhaustively known?” Paradoxically,
the unconscious may turn out to be a less private domain compared to
consciousness. This is something that Freud would not have predicted.
T h e philosopher Herbert Feigl (1958), in the paper “The ‘Mental’ and
the ‘Physical’,” raised a question for which there are still no answers.
Can we move from states of the brain to states of experience by means
of a translation, or should we resign ourselves to a twofold source of
knowledge?

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