European Parliament

Effects of migration on economic and

socio-cultural dynamics
Institutions within the European Union have acknowledged the advantages of proactive and realistic
immigration policies. They are also aware that these won't be effective without the socioeconomic,
civic, and political integration of immigrants. After decades of settlement, some migrants experience
economic and social disadvantages, are barred from civic and political life, and experience racism
and prejudice as well as xenophobia. Because of their marginalization, far-right parties find them to
be convenient scapegoats. which have increased in popularity across Europe by stirring up hatred and
taking advantage of anxieties.People's perceptions of immigrants often deteriorate, particularly when
social aid programs are implemented. return and isolation becomes a genuine danger for a lot of
people. Population group polarization that follows indicates a pattern of societal fragmentation. The
challenges of managing differences and appreciating variety seem especially great when economic,
social, and even bodily fears are present. European policymakers are under growing pressure to
embrace more successful strategies for safe and secure inclusion, but they are unsure of how to unite
people in order to make this happen. In light of this, the European Commission has urged political
leadership to foster acceptance of diversity and bridge societal divides. It has emphasized that, in
order to maintain social cohesion, integration policies that uphold equality and diversity must be put
into place. These policies must be founded in the understanding that European society is pluralistic.
The rich diversity of unique religious, cultural, and social traditions that each of the Member States
of the European Union has to offer serves as the foundation for this union. People from a wide
variety of racial, ethnic, religious, and national backgrounds live there, and the contributions of
immigrants from all over the world have enhanced both its economy and cultures. Migration flows
will continue to influence European society and create connections with sending communities around
the globe in an increasingly globalized environment. Alongside these advancements, Europe's
languages, cultural norms, and demography will change, and its citizens will constantly need to
adapt.The majority of adaptation has already been accomplished by migrants themselves, who
established businesses, grew roots, and constructed houses in EU member states that haven't always
welcomed them with open arms.

Key Vocabulary

● Push and Pull Factors: Reasons driving emigration from sending countries and immigration to receiving
countries.
● Demographic Transition: Changes in population growth, fertility, and mortality rates as affected by
migration.
● Labor Market: Impact of migration on wages, unemployment, skills gaps, and sectoral shifts.
● Fiscal Impact: Costs and benefits of migration on public finances, including social security, education,
and healthcare.
● Economic Growth: Contribution of migrants to GDP, innovation, and entrepreneurship.
● Brain Drain: Potential loss of skilled professionals from developing countries due to migration.
● Informal Economy: Participation of migrants in the informal sector and its implications for tax revenue
and labor rights.
● Integration and Assimilation: Processes of migrants adapting to the host society and their cultural
characteristics.
● Social Cohesion: Sense of unity and solidarity within a society, potentially challenged by large-scale
migration.
● Multiculturalism and Interculturalism: Approaches to managing cultural diversity in diverse societies.
● Xenophobia and Anti-immigrant Sentiment: Negative attitudes towards migrants and potential
discrimination.
● Social Capital: Networks of trust and reciprocity within communities, impacted by migration flows.
● Cultural Exchange and Innovation: Cross-cultural sharing of traditions, customs, and ideas leading to
societal enrichment.
● Religious Diversity and Secularism: Challenges of accommodating diverse religious practices in
secular societies.
● Identity and Belonging: Feeling of belonging to a particular group or society, affected by migration
experiences.
● EU Migration Policy: Schengen Agreement, Dublin Regulation, Common European Asylum System,
resettlement quotas.
● Integration Policies: Language training, education, employment support, anti-discrimination measures.
● Border Control and Security: Measures to manage irregular migration and ensure national security.
● Development Cooperation: Addressing root causes of migration through cooperation with sending
countries.
● Externalization of Borders: Cooperation with third countries to control migration flows before reaching
EU borders.
● Return and Readmission Agreements: Agreements with third countries for the return of irregular
migrants.
● Human Rights and Rule of Law: Importance of upholding human rights and the rule of law in migration
governance.
● Migrant: A person who moves away from their place of usual residence, either within a country or
across an international border, temporarily or permanently, and for a variety of reasons (see subcategories
below).
● Refugee: A person fleeing persecution, war, or violence who seeks refuge in another country and meets
the definition of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
● Asylum Seeker: An individual claiming a well-founded fear of persecution in their home country and
seeking international protection through a formal asylum process.

Focused Overview
The EU's economies and cultures are facing more and more issues as a result of the growing number
of forced migrants from Middle Eastern civil conflict zones. For the first time since World War II, the
number of asylum seekers in the EU topped one million annually in 2015 and 2016. Receiving
nations face increasing issues as a result of these massive refugee arrivals. The goal of the current
study is to evaluate the anticipated long-term social, economic, and budgetary impacts of the rapidly
rising immigration of forced civil war refugees into the EU and to determine what part active policy
may play in facilitating the integration of refugees into the workforce. The humanitarian argument is
most frequently made when discussing refugees. However, forced migration from civil wars also
presents significant social and financial issues and may present business opportunities for EU
economies. On the one hand, the social-beneficiary status quo of asylum seekers, which offers them
welfare benefits and the required access to language, education, and social infrastructure, may, in the
short term, raise the expenses of Member States' budgets. However, integrating authorized asylum
seekers into the EU labor market may eventually lead to financial and economic benefits in addition
to social ones. Furthermore, integrated refugees can be crucial in addressing Europe's grave
demographic issues, increasing employment and growth within the EU, improving the ratio of
economically active to inactive people—a ratio that is declining in many Member States—and filling
positions requiring specialized skill sets. Numerous recent studies have looked into the possible
effects of migrant integration into the labor markets of destination countries. The literature generally
agrees that there are compelling reasons to predict positive impacts on labor markets when
immigrants bring talents that are in short supply in recipient countries. For instance, Ottaviano and
Peri (2012) demonstrate that the general equilibrium effects of immigration on the labor markets of
receiving countries heavily rely on the degree to which immigrants and foreign workers are
complementary or substitutable.In keeping with this, Peri (2016) also affirms that considerations
such as the complementarity and substitutability of native-born workers and immigrants in the
workforce, as well as the receiving economies' response through technological choices and
specialization, are critical in determining the overall equilibrium effects of immigration.

Immigration under duress in the EU

Asylum Seekers Flow into the EU

Asylum seekers have traditionally been welcomed into EU member states. Although the number of
applications for asylum seekers in the EU has increased on several occasions in the past—for
instance, a relatively high number of applications (672 thousand) were received in 1992, mostly from
the former Yugoslavia—2015 marked the first year that the total number of applications for asylum
in the EU exceeded one million in a single year (see Figure 1). Furthermore, a large number of
asylum seekers and refugees may arrive in Europe in the upcoming years, according to IOM (2017).

Figure 1: Dynamics of asylum applications in the EU-28 Member States during 2008-2016,
thousands. Source: Eurostat

Figure 1 shows that, up until 2013, the number of first-time asylum seekers in the EU was less than
500,000 a year, averaging roughly 300,000 between 2009 and 2016. In the EU, the number of people
applying for asylum for the first time more than doubled, from 563 thousand in 2014 to nearly 1.26
million in 2015. Additionally, in 2016, there were far more asylum seekers in the EU than there were
in 2015 (Figure 1) Finland (about ten times higher in 2015 compared to 2014), Hungary (about five
times higher), and Austria (more than three times higher) saw the biggest increases in the number of
first-time asylum applicants, expressed as a share of the total population. According to Eurostat
(2016), the number of German citizens applying for asylum for the first time jumped from 173,000 in
2014 to 442,000 in 2015. Additionally, between 2014 and 2015, there were notable increases in first-
time asylum applications in Hungary, Sweden, and Austria. Conversely, very few asylum seekers
were recorded in 2014 or 2015 in the majority of EU member states in Central and Eastern Europe,
such as the Czech Republic, Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, and Romania. This suggests that
there are considerable disparities throughout EU Member States in terms of population share and the
number of people applying for asylum for the first time. As a result, we account for these differences
in our calculations of country-specific costs and labor supply increases.

Socio-Economic Situation of Migrants in the EU

Although refugees are accepted to live in almost all EU member states, their standard of life is lower
than that of the native-born people. The European Union (2015) reports that immigrants'
socioeconomic circumstances in EU Member States are poorer than those of native-born people in a
number of areas, most notably work and education. The most urgent issues surrounding the
integration of immigrants into the EU are summed up in the European Agenda for the Integration of
Third-Country Nationals (European Commission, 2011):

Gaps in educational attainment

Low employment rates among migrants, particularly among women
"Brain waste" and high rates of "over-qualification"
High risks of poverty and social marginalization

Evidence from previous studies (EU, 2015, for example) indicates that students from third countries
still encounter more obstacles in the educational system than those who were born there. Therefore,
low levels of education not only contribute to the poverty and social marginalization of refugees but
also pose a serious risk to the economy of Member States. The latter has frequently been disregarded
in political discourse due to a lack of adequate scientific data. Social fairness is the most frequently
used justification by policy makers for increasing funding for immigrant children's education. On the
other hand, there can be a sound financial justification for this investment as well. Furthermore,
compared to native-born people, immigrants with higher education degrees have more difficulty
obtaining high-skill occupations. Because of this, a large number of immigrants work in low-skilled
occupations in spite of holding professional degrees, are overqualified for low-skilled professions, or
have less favorable working conditions than workers who are native-born. Lastly, compared to
native-born people, immigrants have greater income disparity. There are more disparities in wealth
between citizens of third countries and those of the host country than there are between native-born
people and foreign-born people. Additionally, compared to native households in the host nation, the
poverty rate among immigrant households is significantly higher—roughly twice as high.
Furthermore, even when they are employed, immigrants are more likely to experience poverty or
social exclusion than citizens of the host country, and migrant children are especially vulnerable to
poverty, according to the European Union (2015).

A better use of the skills that are available can be supported by international
migration, which can make up for the EU's low mobility rate and boost
human capital overall by improving the skill mix.

Migration can help alleviate labor shortages in certain nations, areas, industries, or professions when
the EU records relatively low internal labor mobility. According to some research, immigrants can
increase the ability of local differences to be adjusted to. For example, they can do this by working in
fields where native-born people might not be willing to, and by being more aware of local variations
in economic prospects. Migration may be a means of labor market adjustment, according to a meta-
study on the effects of immigration on European labor markets. In this situation, immigrants fill labor
shortages and provide valuable skills to their new nation.Numerous studies claim that immigrants
bring significant abilities with them, but they also caution that their potential is frequently unrealized.
Lastly, research from the US and the EU suggests that immigrants are as responsive as or more
responsive than natives of their destination countries to shortages across sectors, occupations, and
regions, despite the fact that empirical data on the responsiveness of migrants to labor or skill
shortages is sparse. Migration is just a partial solution to Europe's demographic problems, as the
following section reports. Additional elements like making greater use of the human resources on
hand might also be beneficial. Different industries have varying skill requirements, and they both
grow and decline faster than the population. Furthermore, a number of business surveys have also
shown significant micro-level discrepancies in the supply and demand of labor. In light of future
expansion, maintaining and increasing labor productivity depends heavily on the quality of new
entrants, both in terms of education and skill sets. According to the European experience in the first
ten years of the twenty-first century, migrants were responsible for 70% of the rise in the labor force
overall, but only 14% of the increase in the highly educated category. Approximately 50% of low-
skilled employment in the EU are held by immigrants. Consequently, there's a chance of developing
a labor market that is divided, with immigrants monopolizing low-skilled jobs.Furthermore, new
research reveals that the potential contribution of migrants is primarily below potential for the group
of higher educated individuals, leading to overqualification or reduced employment rates for these
highly educated foreign migrants. A joint OECD-EC research from 2014 made clear that, in the long
run, skill mismatches will probably be more significant for potential growth than labor shortages.
Within this framework, migration has the potential to positively impact productivity drivers through
enhanced skill utilization, improved skill mix, and increased net accumulation of human capital.
However, to do this, it will be necessary to make more use of the abilities of already-established
migrants in addition to creating and managing channels for attracting new migrant workers who
possess the necessary skill set.

Europe's population is aging quickly; no single factor can stop this trend, and
this phenomenon affects every nation equally. Europe would have far worse
demographics if there was no international migration.

Every EU member state has challenges as a result of demographic change. Overall, the population of
the EU-28 is predicted to rise from 508 to 526 million by 2050 and fall to about 520 million by 2080
under the primary forecast scenario published by the EU Commission. The many scenarios presented
in Figure 2 demonstrate the significant influence of life expectancy, migration, and fertility estimates
on these projections. For example, if there was no net immigration from outside the EU, the
population of the EU would decrease by more than 20% by the year 2080.
 Figure 2: Total population (EU-28, million people) Source : Eurostat

The population of Europe will be older overall and greater. Undoubtedly, this poses a problem to the
sustainability of welfare and health systems. It also poses a challenge to potential growth, as it
restrains the rise of employment. Europe is not alone in facing this challenge: Japan has seen
extremely low birth rates, relatively small migrant arrivals, and a sharp rise in the ratios of economic
and demographic dependence during the past 20 years. Rather, a phenomenon known as the
"demographic dividend" helps nations with falling fertility rates and expanding working-age
populations (WAPs, or those aged 16 to 64), most of which are in developing nations . Typically
lasting 20 to 30 years, this window of opportunity accelerates the economic progress of the
participating nations. Life expectancy is still rising in the EU, and fewer babies are being born than
are needed to replenish the population. The natural replacement rate, or fertility rate, which is
required to maintain population stability over time is 2.1. The average for Europe right now is about
1.6, and only two nations—France and Ireland—record levels that are nearly at replacement level.In
the past ten years, fertility has stabilized after decades of fall, and in certain nations, it has even
climbed. Finding broad economic or cultural causes for this resurgence is challenging, though.
Fertility rates are predicted by the EUROPOP 2013 model to climb from 1.59 in 2013 to 1.68 by
2030 and then to 1.76 in 2060, which is higher than the prior 2008 estimates. But even if fertility
were to rise more, this element by itself would not be enough to reverse Europe's aging trend unless
it were maintained at a rate higher than 2.0 for a few decades. Age dependency as a whole is
predicted to double by 2060, while the working-age population (those between the ages of 16 and 64)
is predicted to shrink by 0.3% year. The working-age population will account for 44% of the overall
population by 2060, down from 64% in the EUROPOP2013 prediction. This is especially important
in terms of prospective growth, since the proportion of the population that is working age shows how
much labor is available in relation to the whole population.
Consequences for the Population's Racial Makeup

The increase in populations of foreign descent, both European and particularly non-European, to
hitherto unheard-of levels is another significant effect. Particularly with regard to non-European
communities, there has been a newfound diversity of culture, language, and religion. Perceptions of
distinct identities have endured among numerous minority groups well beyond the immigrant
generation, in addition to residential segregation and challenges with education and workforce
integration (OECD 2003, 2008). One such group is the Turks in Germany (Liebig 2007). Receiving
societies must deal with issues related to politics, the constitution, education, interpersonal
relationships, trust, and solidarity. It is difficult to reconcile disparities in expectations and values
because the newcomers' frequently strong traditions arrived at the same time that European values—
such as those pertaining to sexual equality—were developing quickly. At the same time, traditional
ideas of national identity and religious faith weakened and declined for reasons unrelated to
immigration. Considering all of this, certain national statistical offices have projected the size and
distribution of populations of "foreign background" or "foreign origin" in the future (i.e., immigrants
and those born in the country but having one or both parents born abroad). These are condensed in
another place (Coleman 2006). In order to depict significant disparities, major populations classified
by national origin are projected separately and additionally clustered into larger "western" and "non-
western" categories (i.e., "developed country" and "developing country," or high and low Human
Development Index). In the year 2000, between one-third and half of the populations of foreign
descent living in European countries were originally from Europe. Projected increases tend to be
concentrated in the 'non-western' group overall.These forecasts usually include a longer-term
assumption about assimilation and a shorter-term assumption regarding the preservation of ethnic
demographic traits. However, after the second generation, all people of immigrant descent are
considered to merge with the native population, becoming Dutch, Danish, and so on, making them
statistically invisible. It could be a bit ambitious to assume that everyone would eventually be Dutch,
Danish, etc. in the absence of additional immigration. The proportion of white people in the country
has unavoidably decreased as a result of those populations' continuous growth, raising the possibility
that white people may eventually no longer be the majority. The US Census Bureau (2008) projects
that this will happen in 2043 in the US with regard to the white non-Hispanic population. According
to basic demographics, any population with sub-replacement fertility and a consistent net influx of
people from abroad must eventually lose share of its total population and be replaced by that
immigrant population (apart from people of mixed ancestry, who are likely to become numerous).
Due to sub-replacement TFR and positive immigration, almost all western nations will experience
that result until their migration or birth rates alter. The native population will endure due to
replacement fertility, but its proportion of the total population will decrease as a result of ongoing
migration. By the year 2000, the percentage of people in western Europe who were of foreign
descent ranged from 8% to 18%. Given the persistence of recent migrant arrivals, it is predicted that
they will reach 20%–30% in 2050, with significantly larger percentages in younger cohorts and
metropolitan areas. Every one of these projections conveys a similar message. Despite varying
source nations of origin, the rate of increase of the population of foreign descent is linear with a
comparable slope in different countries from different beginning points. According to the projections'
underlying assumptions, the population of foreign descent automatically dissipates after two
generations, while linear growth persists unaltered until the end of the forecast period.

History of Events

Although Europeans make up the majority of immigrant populations in European nations, many
immigrants and their offspring are descended from people who left the continent. The majority of
immigrants and their descendants have ties to previous colonies in Africa, the Americas, and Asia for
the former colonial powers France, Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, and Portugal.
Furthermore, starting in the 1960s, Germany, Austria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Belgium
hired Turkish and Moroccan guest workers; many of the present immigrants in those nations have
connections to these recruitment initiatives. In the 1980s, Moroccan immigrants also started moving
in large numbers to Spain and Italy in search of employment.The majority of non-Western
immigrants in the Scandinavian nations of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Finland are refugees and
asylum seekers from the Middle East, East Africa, and other parts of the world who have been living
there since the 1980s and 1990s.Globalization has resulted in an influx of professionals, workers, and
students into major European cities, particularly London, Paris, and Frankfurt. The number of
competent professionals from outside the continent has expanded even more after the EU Blue Card
was introduced in May 2009. There has been illegal immigration and asylum-seeking from outside of
Europe since at least the 1990s. After years of being relatively low, the number of migrants started to
increase in 2013. A significant surge of asylum seekers entering from outside of Europe occurred in
2015 as a result of the European migration crisis. But the EU-Turkey agreement passed in March
2016 significantly decreased this figure, and the Italian government's anti-immigrant policies that
began in 2017 further decreased illegal immigration via the Mediterranean route. Some academics
contend that worldwide disparities between wealthy and impoverished nations are to blame for the
rise in migratory flows starting in the 1980s. The number of people who become citizens of a
European Union member state decreased to about 825,000 in 2017 from 995,000 in 2016.The biggest
populations were Moroccan, Albanian, Indian, Turkish, and Pakistani nationals. In 2017, 2.4 million
non-EU immigrants joined the EU. Furthermore, migration has benefited from more improved
technology and less expensive transportation. After the Arab Spring, the EU as a whole has seen the
largest refugee crisis since World War II, particularly following the start of the Syrian civil war in
2011 and the emergence of the "Islamic State" in 2013. The majority of the immigrants are Middle
Eastern conflict refugees, particularly those from Syria, who present the EU with previously unseen
difficulties. There are approximately 6.5 million internally displaced people, 4.4 million registered
refugees, and 1.5 million undocumented immigrants since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011.
The whole population of Syria is made up of half of these refugees. As of the end of 2015, there were
4.2 million Syrian refugees straying into neighboring countries and regions, followed by 2.59 million
from Afghanistan and 1.1 million from Somalia. Syria has emerged as the world's largest source of
refugees. In particular, the Middle Eastern nations that ship immigrants to the European Union can be
categorized as transit or country of origin: the former group includes Turkey, Libya, and Morocco,
and the latter group includes mostly Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The Syrian refugee crisis has
increased the demand on surrounding countries to accept refugees. Currently, there are 2.1 million
Syrian refugees officially registered in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon; there are 2.2 million in
Turkey; and there are 0.26 million in North Africa. The largest refugee asylum in the world is now
located in Turkey. Simultaneously, as the immigration destination for Middle Eastern refugees, the
EU received 0.68 million copies of asylum applications between April 2011 and March 2016. Of
these, 60% came from Germany and Sweden, 26% from Hungary, Austria, the Netherlands,
Denmark, and Bulgaria, and 13% from other countries. The two EU nations that received the most
requests for asylum and refugee status were Germany and Sweden. UNHCR statistics show that the
number of refugees entering the European Union area by air increased dramatically from
approximately 60,000 in 2013 to 218,000 in 2014, and then doubled to 500,000 in 2015. It is
anticipated that in the ensuing two years, at least 850,000 refugees will enter the EU countries via the
Mediterranean, adding to the total number of refugees arriving by land, which is expected to exceed
one million. Figure 3: Migratory Routes Map
Major Parties Involved and Their Views

Germany
When the federal government appointed an integration commissioner in 1978, it was recognizing that
more and more short-term guest workers were settling down in Germany long-term. This set the
stage for the government's first significant overhaul of the immigration system in 2005 and the
creation of a methodical integration program at the beginning of the new millennium. The German
governments have established two integration strategies thus far to encourage the assimilation of
migrants. While the National Action Plan on Integration of 2012 developed tools to make the
integration policy's outcomes quantifiable, the National Integration Plan of 2007 concentrated on
education, training, employment, and cultural integration. It contained broad objectives, deadlines,
and indicators to confirm that the predetermined goals were met:

Optimizing the individualized assistance given to recent immigrants

Enhancing the acceptance of foreign degrees raising the proportion of immigrants
Working in federal and state civil services offering medical care and assistance to those who
migrate.

Afterwards, the government's policy was defined by the Meseberg Declaration on Integration, which
was approved by the federal cabinet in May 2016. It was based on the idea of giving foreigners
opportunities for employment, training, and support while also emphasizing their responsibilities and
demanding work in return (Fördern und Fordern). Services are offered in a modular format, with a
focus on different immigrant groups and involving nearly all federal ministries related to
employment, education, and social integration. In addition, the federal government established the
Expert Commission on the Framework Conditions for Integration Capability in 2019–2021, which
will deal with a variety of integration and migration-related issues. As a result, a report is produced
that explains the processes at play in the field of integration, promotes the idea that integration
benefits society as a whole, and offers a plethora of suggestions for how many stakeholders,
including policymakers, might collaborate to better shape the immigrant community.
France
Africa accounted for 46.5% of all immigrants in 2019, followed by Europe (35.3%), Asia (14.7%),
and the Americas and Oceania (5.4%). Non-EU workers' employment rates in 2020 were below 50%
in France's south and southwest, above 65% in the north and northeast, and below 50% in the area of
Burgundy. The percentage of African immigrants and residents in France is rising; by 2022, 48.2% of
all immigrants will have arrived from Africa, followed by 32.3% from Europe, 13.5% from Asia, and
6% from the Americas and Oceania. In 2022, non-European immigrants will make up 61.7% of all
immigrants residing in France. Under the administration of Emmanuel Macron, there was a notable
surge in the number of students, family reunions, and labor migration from African and Asian
nations, bringing the total number of new immigrants to France above 320,000 for the first time.
According to a survey conducted in 2023 by Jean-Paul Gourévitch on behalf of the Contribuables
associés association (also known as Associated Taxpayers), the anticipated annual cost of
immigration to France for French taxpayers was €53.9 billion, which is four times higher than the
annual budget of the Justice ministry.

Italy
The Italian National Institute of Statistics, or Istat, estimates that 8,7% of Italy's population was made
up of foreigners as of the beginning of 2021. Most of them resided in the country's center-north. In
descending order, Emilia-Romagna, Lombardia, Toscana, and Lazio are the four regions with the
largest concentration of foreign nationals. The Italian Government establishes the annual cap on the
number of non-EU foreigners who are permitted to work in the country through the Flow decree
(Decreto flussi). The order also specifies the maximum quantity of resident permits that were first
issued for educational purposes and can subsequently be changed to residence permits for
employment purposes. Various kinds of labor can require various residence permits for the purpose
of working. A quota for the conversion of residence permits intended for seasonal employment into
non-seasonal employee permits is also included in the order.

Spain
Spain has firsthand knowledge of the significant contribution that migration can make to
development. Our nation's progress was greatly aided by migration, as seen by the recent wave of
emigration that thousands of Spaniards experienced in search of better chances for employment and
living abroad that were not available to them back home. Spain can draw several conclusions about
the degree to which migration can aid in development from this profound migratory experience.
Spain has quickly transformed from a nation that sent people away to one that welcomes immigrants
who are looking for the same chances that Spanish emigrants were seeking elsewhere not too long
ago. From a vantage point that is well-versed in the issues at hand, this dual perspective allows us to
approach and comprehend the worries and demands of both sides. Spain has made an effort to turn
migration into a good factor for its transit, destination, and origin nations based on its own
experience. The articulation of the elements of a public, government-led migration strategy that
supports development has been a major focus of Spain's contribution to the Migration and
Development agenda.

Evaluation of Previous Attempts to Resolve the Issue

In EU countries, public discourse on immigration is highly politicized. Divergent viewpoints are

frequently expressed by those participating in this discussion. On the one hand, proponents of more
liberal immigration policies—among them economists—offer compelling justifications for why the
EU requires an increase in immigration. One rationale for this is that pension systems are under
pressure due to the aging of the European population. In this regard, immigration inflows are
advantageous as they could decelerate the rate of aging and, as a result, ease pressures within the
pension system. One more reason in favor of immigration is the low spatial mobility of European
workers inside the EU. As a result of the latter, migrants enter locations where labor is in short
supply, which helps to stabilize the economy after asymmetric shocks. However, there is a strong
anti-immigrant sentiment in many European nations. According to data from the European Social
Survey's immigration module, as documented by Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2005), the
percentage of respondents who support strict immigration laws spans from a low of 17.9% in
Sweden to a high of 86.1% in Greece. Negative attitudes on immigration are mostly linked to the
idea of a fiscal burden, claims Boeri (2009). Some Europeans worry that immigrants waste public
funds because they are the beneficiaries of the large social transfers that were implemented in Europe
to combat social marginalization. As a result, several national governments are restricting migrant
access to welfare in addition to tightening up immigration laws. According to Boeri (2009), this is
paradoxical. The European Union is a major supporter of policies that promote social inclusion and
protection, yet these policies are turning into "weapons of mass exclusion."
There are also other explanations for the large percentage of indigenous who support strict
immigration laws in various nations. Native Americans worry that immigration will affect their jobs
and salaries because it would mean a transfer of wealth among the population's many subgroups. A
different explanation on social capital is put out by Schiff (2002). Migration has an impact on the
culture, customs, and values of the receiving nation, in contrast to the transfer of products. Some
people think immigration threatens shared values, which is why they are against it. Due to the
intricacy of migration, policies must be implemented globally. First, a high degree of cooperation
amongst EU member states is required due to the multiple externalities at play. This notion might be
made clearer with the aid of a basic illustration. Unauthorized immigrants are permitted to travel
between the member states of the Schengen area after they have gained entry. Therefore, in order to
coordinate their policies on irregular immigration, EU member states must work together. The
European Pact on Immigration and Asylum, which was formally adopted in Brussels on October 16,
2008, emphasizes this as well as the significance of bolstering cooperation with transit and origin
nations on a number of fronts, such as managing migrant inflows, combating the trafficking of
people, and opposing international criminal networks Second, as Brady (2008) points out, a
comprehensive examination of every factor influencing migration is necessary for a global
perspective. Policies addressing "push" factors, or the motivations behind migrants' desire to leave
particular countries, include lowering trade barriers and providing official development assistance to
help the countries of origin of immigrants deal with issues of political instability, poverty, or high
unemployment. Immigration strategies ought to consider the pull factors—those that draw migrants
to the country of destination. The state of the labor market in the host nation is one illustration of
such a factor. As per the aforementioned agreement, each member state of the European Union is free
to determine how many applicants it will accept, taking into account each nation's unique labor
needs. Two of the main points of contention in the debate over European immigration policy are the
EU's willingness to draw in more qualified immigrants and to lower the number of undocumented
immigrants, in addition to encouraging cooperation between member states and between the EU and
the countries of origin of migrants.

Questions To Be Answered
What impact does a massive migration wave have on the productivity and general economic growth
of EU member states?
What particular economic sectors are severely impacted by extreme migration, and what effect does
this have on employment rates?
What effects does migration have on salaries, the level of competition for jobs, and the distribution of
skills in the domestic labor market?
How is the demand on social services like housing, healthcare, and education in the host nations
affected by the increasing population resulting from migration?
What regulations are in place to guarantee that both current residents and migrants have fair access to
social services?
What effects does a high migrant population have on the social cohesion and cultural dynamics of
EU member states?
What policies are in place to control and regulate migration, taking sociocultural and economic
factors into account, both at the EU and national levels?
What obstacles to language, education, and cultural assimilation do migrants encounter, and how are
these obstacles being overcome?
How successful are integration programs in assisting migrants in assimilating into the host society,
and to what extent do they exist?
How can governments foster social cohesion and stop conflicts from escalating between various
communities?
What effects does excessive migration have on security, and how do the host nations handle such
issues with crime and public safety? \
Given economic, cultural, and social variables, how sustainable are the existing migration trends in
EU member states over the long run?
Are there any opportunities or difficulties that can be anticipated for the future? If so, what proactive
measures can be taken to handle them?

Further Readings.
Home. The Contribution of Migration to Regional Development | OECD iLibrary. (n.d.).
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/99ac61a3-en/index.html?itemId=%2Fcontent%2Fcompon
ent%2F99ac61a3-en
Immigration in Europe: Trends, policies and empirical evidence. (n.d.-c).
https://ftp.iza.org/dp7778.pdf
Staff background paper for G20 surveillance note -- international ... - IMF. (n.d.-i).
https://www.imf.org/external/np/g20/pdf/2015/111515background.pdf
Parliamentary Assembly. PACE website. (n.d.). https://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-
XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=23745&lang=en
Staff team from the Fiscal Affairs Department and the Legal Department. (n.d.-j).
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1605.pdf
Bibliography
Migration - OECD. (n.d.). https://www.oecd.org/migration/ Long-term social, economic and fiscal
effects of immigration into the ... (n.d.-a).
https://ec.europa.eu/futurium/sites/futurium/files/jrc107441_wp_kancs_and_lecca_2017_4.pd f
The future of migration in the European Union. (n.d.-c).
https://publications.jrc.ec.europa.eu/repository/bitstream/JRC111774/kjnd29060enn.pdf
Migration and its consequences in 21st century Europe - JSTOR. (n.d.-c).
https://www.jstor.org/stable/23025521
An overview of the Middle East immigrants in the EU: Origin ... - dergipark. (n.d.-a).
https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/264397
Migration and development.migration policies - OECD. (n.d.-d).
https://www.oecd.org/dev/38598067.pdf
Migration & Residence. BAMF. (2019, December 11).
https://www.bamf.de/EN/Themen/MigrationAufenthalt/migrationaufenthalt-node.html
French immigration policy - diplomatie. (n.d.-b).
https://ae.ambafrance.org/IMG/immigration_policy.pdf
Governance of migrant integration in Italy. European Website on Integration. (2023, December 5).
https://migrant-integration.ec.europa.eu/country-governance/governance-migrant-integration-italy_
en
Cambridge University Press. (2016, August 17). Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique: Revue
économique d’information Générale Paraissant six fois l’an: Recherches économiques de Louvain/
Louvain Economic Review. Cambridge Core. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/recherches-
economiques-de-louvain-louvain-econo mic-review/article/abs/reflets-et-perspectives-de-la-vie-
economique-revue-economique-dinfo rmation-generale-paraissant-six-fois-
lan/ED494C9A6794E688A3D630C12D16B3CB