Separation of Powers
Separation of Powers
So a Ahmad
LLB-B
Fall 2021
The implementation of laws is the task of the executive and judicial branches
Separation of powers or trias politica is a model of democracy that involves the separation of
political power between the government’s three branches – the executive, the legislature and the
judiciary. In a system where there is a separation of powers, each branch is constrained from
intervening in the area of responsibility of another branch.
The doctrine of separation of powers or checks and balances between independent and co- equal
branches of government, is derived from the work of the French political and social philosopher
Baron de Montesquieu. The latter in his Spirit of Law (1734)1 defined the principle of separation
of powers, based on a system of checks and balances in government.
The phrase check and balance implies that there are competing sovereigns (such as in a federal
system in a political structure). ‘Check’ refers to the ability, right and responsibility of each
power to monitor the activities of the other (s), while ‘balance’ refers to the ability of each entity
to use its authority to limit the power of the other.
In other words, the principle of separation of powers holds that in order to avoid a concentration
of power in the hands of a minority in a political system, the three principal constituents of
government – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary should be separate and enjoy equal
and well-defined powers and independence.
USA UK
1. Doctrine of separations of powers has 1. The Doctrine of separation of power has not
been accepted and strictly adopted in the been accepted in the UK.
US.
2. Integration of power not adopted. 2. Integration of power is adopted.
3.Legislative powers are vested in the 3. In England, all three powers are vested in three
congress. Executive power vested in the separate organs of the government and each one
President. Judiciary power vested to the has its peculiar features but there is “sharing out”
supreme court and its subordinate courts of the powers of the government.
of the US.
4. Separations of Powers. 4. Fusion of Powers.
Throughout its history, Pakistan has been an executive dominated state and this trend is linked to
the Muslim era and to British rule in India .The Muslim sultan (monarch) was the chief
executive, the sole legislator and the chief judge in his dominion. The power of the executive, the
legislature and the judiciary were concentrated in him and he ruled by decrees.26 No written
constitution is known to have existed during the Muslim rule in the period beginning from the
twelfth century till the eighteenth century, when the British became supreme in the subcontinent.
The British came to the sub continent as merchants and slowly held sway of the whole
subcontinent, formally disbanding Muslim rule in 1858.
For governing the sub-continent, the British parliament passed the Government of India Act 1858
and then the Government of India Council Act 1861, the Minto-Morley Reforms of 1909, the
Government of India Act 1919 and finally the Government of India Act 1935. The 1935 Act drew
from previous Acts with some innovations.
• In the 1935 Act, the position of the Governor General (Viceroy) was unique. As the
representative of the British crown in India, he enjoyed final political authority and the widest
The position has been summed up by the Donoughmore Committee in the following words:-
“In the British Constitution there is no such thing as the absolute separation of legislative, executive and judicial
powers. In practice it is inevitable that they overlap. In such Constitutions as those of France and the United
States of America, attempts to keep them rigidly apart have been made, but have proved unsuccessful. The
distinction is nonetheless real and… important. One of the main problems of modern democratic State is how to
preserve the distinction whilst avoiding too rigid an insistence on it, in the wide border land where it is
convenient to entrust minor legislative and judicial functions to executive authorities.”
There is an old adage containing a lot of truth that “power corrupts and absolute power corrupts
absolutely”. To evolve effective control mechanism, man had been looking for devices to contain
the forces of tyranny and authoritarianism. “Separation of Powers” was conceived to be one
such device.
“There are three elements in each constitution in respect of which every serious lawgiver
must look for what is advantageous to it; if these are well arranged, the constitution is
bound to be well arranged, and the differences in constitutions are bound to correspond
to the differences between each of these three elements. The three are, first the
deliberative, which discusses everything of common importance; second, the officials . . .;
and third, the judicial element.”
The English political theorist, JohnLocke (1632-1704), also envisaged a threefold classification
of powers. Writing in The Second Treatise of Government (1689), Locke drew a distinction
between three types of power: legislative, executive and federative. . In Locke’s analysis, the
legislative power was supreme and although the executive and federative powers were distinct,
the one concerned with the execution of domestic law within the state and the other with a state’s
security and external relations, he nevertheless took the view that ‘they are always almost united’
in the hands of the same persons.
The principle, 'separation of powers' has the purpose to protect the citizens of the state
from rash, tyrannical and unrestraint powers of the rulers. Democracies all over world
consider that tyranny and arbitrary rule of the Government can be minimized by
implementing the separation of powers in its proper context. In Pakistan, the concept
'Separation of Powers' could not find its place accurately. Since the establishment of
Pakistan (1947), executive branch managed to possess judicial and legislative powers
with themselves. This practice fashioned the fragile political system and instable
democracy in Pakistan. Resultantly, civilian's governments had been removed from
power by Military on several times. Courts were ready to justify the military takeover on
the grounds, such as 'law of necessity'. It was only after the restoration of chief justice
Chaudhry in 2009 that judicial branch started functioning on the line of real independent
institution in the country. This was considered the commencing of the separation of
powers for the first time in the political history of Pakistan. This article examines four
cases during the above mentioned era to understand whether or not separation of powers
practically exists in Pakistan.
The liberal democracies in world have the tradition of power sharing among the
state institutions. People's liberty is ensured when powers of the government are
divided between executive, judicial and legislative branches. It is hard fact that
political managers of Pakistan could not decide to establish and implement any of
the government system. Theoretically, they announced to run the state under
Islamic democracy but, practically they adopted neither democracy nor Islam.
They shaped their own system to manage the affairs of state.
• Montesquieu states that “when the legislature and the executive powers are united in the
same persons or in the same body of magistrates there can be no liberty , because
apprehensions may arise , lest the same monarch or separate should enact tyrannical
laws.” • There is no liberty if the judicial power is not separated from the legislative and
executive.
• No concentration of powers. • Diffusion of power is needed. • In short, the theory of
separation of powers merely means that a different body of persons is to administer each
of of the three departments of government and that no one of them is to have a controlling
power over either of them. • Such a separation is necessary for the purpose of preserving
the liberty of the individual and for avoiding tyranny. PRINCIPLES OF THEORY OF
SEPARATION OF POWERS
• It aims at individual liberty. It is a safeguard against despotism. • Its basic principle that
concentration of power s leads to dictatorship is true for all time and ages. • The
separation of powers saves the people from arbitrary rule of executive •
2. Its Basic principle that concentration of powers lead to dictatorship is true for all
time and ages.
4. This theory lays down the principle that governments should act according to
well established rules or laws,
The judicialization of politics and the politicization of judiciary have been on the rise
over the past few years. In order to understand the complexity of the above statement,
let’s take the example of the human body where each organ has a definitive purpose to
perform, like the heart is responsible for pumping blood carried by veins after
purification from the kidneys and the brain has to process sensory information. Any
interference by one organ into the affairs of the other will ultimately result in a collapse
of the whole system.
Similarly, the concept of separation of powers or trias politica adheres to strict checks and
balances between the three organs of the state namely the legislature, the executive and
the judiciary. In Pakistan, the powers of two out of three organs (except for the judiciary)
are derived from Article 7 of the Constitution of Pakistan, whereas the role of the
judiciary is mentioned in Part VII of the Constitution (which is to maintain order
between all organs). No authority, except where allowed by law, can encroach on the
jurisdiction of others. The firmer the trichotomy of powers, the stronger the governance
in the state.
Unfortunately, the judiciary has often been seen to step in where the executive has failed
to cope with the expectations or aspirations of the people.[1] In Pakistan, the meddling of
the court into the work of other organs can be traced back to the Tameezuddin case, the
revolution of judicial activism after the lifting of martial law in the 1980s, and the wave
of public interest litigation initiated by former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry through
cases involving hajj corruption, inhumane treatment in jails, missing persons and the
recent decisions in the Panama Papers and Dam Fund cases.
However, the newly appointed Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP), Justice Gulzar Ahmed,
exercising the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, took his first suo
motu action on 10th April 2020 in the awake of the recent COVID-19 outbreak. The
action was taken in light of the federal government’s incompetence and failure to
formulate a proper plan to overcome the pandemic. On the first hearing on Monday,
13th April 2020, the CJP showed reservation towards the appointment of Dr. Zafar Mirza
(Special Assistant to Prime Minister on Health Affairs) for being incompetent and
ordered his removal from the post, mentioning that he had done nothing in his capacity.
In this chaotic situation, it is pertinent to note that one of the two requirements, i.e. the
violation of fundamental rights as set out under article 184(3) for taking suo motu
action, has not been met. None of the fundamental rights given in Chapter 1, Part II of
the Constitution have been breached here. Instead, the matter falls more under
‘principles of policy’ given in Chapter 2, Part II of the Constitution which are clearly
not covered by article 184(3) of the Constitution. While the government, be it federal or
provincial, has indeed failed to provide people with the basic necessities of life covered
under article 38 of the Constitution, if a case has to be made for breach of any right it
would not be for fundamental rights rather for the promotion of social and economic
well-being of the people.
Coming back to the politicization of judiciary owing to the actions of a few who have
misused powers granted by the Constitution and intervened in the domain of other
organs, it is submitted that it is high time for the executive to take charge in the midst of a
pandemic situation. The President could summon an emergency meeting of Parliament
under Article 54 of the Constitution or enact an Ordinance to save the government from
being judicialized.
Suo moto actions are only taken when no petition is listed for hearing in the Supreme
Court and the court is compelled to initiate action on its own. However, it has been
claimed by an advocate named Usama Khawar that he did bring forth a constitutional
petition pertaining to the same matter of reviewing the COVID-19 situation which had
been disregarded and a suo motu action had been taken by the court instead. The entire
matter has now raised serious concerns about the validity of the action taken by the Chief
Justice.
A shrewd analysis of the dynamics of Pakistan’s politics illustrate that since its very
creation institutional clash, though other factors would have also affected, has been a
major hurdle in its progress. A retrospective look reveals that struggle for the
centralization of authority has been at the centre stage in the politics of Pakistan. It
basically emerged from the feudal structure of the society. First, right after partition of
sub-continent Pakistan inherited The Government of India act 1935 and adopted it as its
constitution with slight modifications. This constitution vested strong discretionary
powers in the hands of Governor General. Only Governor General enjoyed absolute
The recent judicial activism is more or less a new challenge for democracy, because it
intervenes in the domains of legislative and executive. Undoubtedly, Judiciary is an
essential element of a state. It bears much importance, also, because it interprets the
constitution of a country. But this important role, in its part, can never be a justification
for intervening in the domain of others- either executive or legislative. In the post-
panama verdict Pakistan judiciary is trolling to tilt the balance of power in its favor.
However, undermining the powers of both legislative and executive the third pillar of
state is creating a mess.
Second, intervention of an institution in the domain of another has dualistic affect. On the
one hand it destabilizes the intervened; while on the other it weakens the aggressor.
Consequently, by initiating an organizational clash and conflict ridden politics, this
institutional power mongering leads to an institutionally incapacitated, politically
destabilized and economically retrogressive country. As, Montesquieu explained, “There
is no greater tyranny than that which is perpetrated under the shield of the law and in the
name of justice”. Therefore, the need is to restrain from political alignments and biases
when deciding the fate of our future generations.
A judiciary separated from the legislative and executive would serve the best national
interest. Whereas, interventionism would only exacerbate the problems not only for
judiciary but also the whole country. Because, this would sabotage the fundamental
liberties of the populace. As Montesquieu says, “There is no liberty, if the judiciary
power be not separated from the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control;
for the judge would then be legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the
judge might behave with violence and oppression”.
In order to conclude, since its inception Pakistan has been facing the menace of political
instability and polarization. At the root lies the problems of institutional clash, power
mongering, and feudalistic structures which have constructed the political culture of the
country. Therefore, the power is not equally distributed amongst different branches of
nation-state. Montesquieu’s separation of powers theory, if applied in letter and spirit,
would create a peaceful environment for the progress and prosperity of this country. For
that, all stakeholders should collaboratively struggle for fusion of power at national level.
Separation of Powers
One of the fundamental maxims of politics is that the legislative, executive
and judicial branches ought to be separate and distinct. The maxim nds its basis in the
concept of liberty. To elaborate — and as the supporters of the theory of separation of
powers advocate — it is believed that the accumulation of all three powers, i.e.
legislative, executive and judiciary, in the same hands, would result in tyranny, or in
other words, a lack of liberty. Brohi identi es two elements of the theory: (i) “that the
same person, or body of persons, should not be the repository of the powers of
the legislature, executive and judiciary or of any two of them”; and (ii) “that
legislation, execution and adjudication, should each be independent of the others
and that there should be, as far as possible, absence of control or interference by
one over the other”. Montesquieu, while talking about the power of adjudication,
stated that “were it joined to the executive power, the judge might behave with all
the violence of an oppressor”.This paper shall focus, in particular, on the separation
of powers between the executive and judiciary.
Section 25 also went through several changes over the years, and nally
became the Section 25 that exists today by virtue of a Federal Statute, the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Third Amendment) Ordinance No.CXXXI of 2002. According to
this section, Sessions and nominated Additional Sessions Judges are deemed to be
justices of peace. This Ordinance also added sub-section (6) to Section 22-A, which
provides for powers of an ex-of cio justice of peace, whereby they can issue
appropriate directions to the police following a complaint regarding non-registration of
a criminal case, transfer of investigation from one police of cer to another, and neglect,
failure or excess committed by the police in relation to its functions and duties.
The ultra vires issue with Section 22-A, and speci cally sub-section (6) arises
not due to Section 22-A itself, but by virtue of Section 25. Section 22-A(6) bestows
upon an ex-of cio justice of peace certain powers. An ex-of cio justice of peace in
plain terms means a person who is given the title of justice of peace by virtue of his
The same issue lies with Section 22. Although one may not necessarily term
the powers under Section 22-A(1) to (5) as “executive” per se, even if we assume that
they are executive powers in the strict sense, then by virtue of Section 22, any person
appointed by the Provincial Government as a justice of peace can exercise those
powers. This can include a judicial of cer as there is no bar in Section 22 that prevents
a judicial of cer from being appointed.
In light of the foregoing, the issue lies not with the powers under Section 22-
A, but to whom those powers are conferred. Declaring Section 22-A, and sub-section
(6) in particular, to be ultra vires the constitution would render the remaining Sections
regarding the justices of peace practically redundant. This is because, although justices
of peace and ex-of cio justices of peace would nevertheless be appointed under
Sections 22 and 25 respectively, the primary powers exercised by them today are those
under Section 22-A, and particularly sub-section (6).
Another point of view is that the theory of separation of powers entails that
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the
whole power of another department. However it certainly does not mean that each
department may not have control over the other. Should we adopt this interpretation of
the theory of separation of powers, then it may be said that none of the Sections of the
Code of Criminal Procedure pertaining to justices of peace are ultra vires the
Constitution, as the justices of peace are not exercising the whole power of the
executive, in addition to the whole power of the judiciary. They are merely exercising a
certain control over the executive — a check and balance mechanism, if one may.
Section 22-A(6) consists only of certain types of directions that an ex-of cio justice of
peace may give to a police of cial with regard to complaints relating to police
investigations, and not actual exercise of investigative powers.
• Conclusion
Whether or not the concept of justices of peace is ultra vires the Constitution
thereby justifying its removal, ultimately depends on the de nition one adopts
regarding the theory of separation of powers as to what extent is the separation
required, between the judiciary and executive. Whether our Constitution contemplates
for, and can accommodate a certain amount of control of one department over another,
is open to interpretation. Which interpretation is adopted by the Supreme Court of
Pakistan remains to be seen: the verdict in Younas Abbas is highly anticipated.
1.https://nation.com.pk/14-Mar-2018/separation-of-powers-and-pakistan\
2.https://www.mytutor.co.uk/answers/56419/A-Level/Politics/Compare-the-powers-
contained-in-the-UK-and-US-constitutions-12/
3.https://courtingthelaw.com/2020/04/28/commentary/the-hypothetical-separation-
of-powers-in-pakistan/
4.https://www.parlament.gv.at/ENGL/PERK/PARL/POL/ParluGewaltenteilung/
index.shtml
5.https://www.pljlawsite.com/2015art51.htm
6.https://pgil.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/An-Article-on-Separation-of-
Powers.pdf
The End