Chapter Five

PUBLIC DISORDERS

Art. 153. Tumults and other disturbance of public orders; Tumultuous disturbance or interruption
liable to cause disturbance. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional
in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall
cause any serious disturbance in a public place, office, or establishment, or shall interrupt or disturb
public performances, functions or gatherings, or peaceful meetings, if the act is not included in the
provisions of Articles 131 and 132.
The penalty next higher in degree shall be imposed upon persons causing any disturbance or interruption
of a tumultuous character.chanrobles virtual law library

The disturbance or interruption shall be deemed to be tumultuous if caused by more than three persons
who are armed or provided with means of violence.chanrobles virtual law library

The penalty of arresto mayor shall be imposed upon any person who in any meeting, association, or
public place, shall make any outcry tending to incite rebellion or sedition or in such place shall display
placards or emblems which provoke a disturbance of the public order.chanrobles virtual law library

The penalty of arresto menor and a fine not to exceed P200 pesos shall be imposed upon these persons
who in violation of the provisions contained in the last clause of Article 85, shall bury with pomp the body
of a person who has been legally executed.

VILLANUEVA, vs. ORTIZ

G.R. No. L-15344
1960-05-30
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.

Facts:
Narciso Medrano served as one of the inspectors and poll clerk in Precinct 36-A
in the last general election held on November 10, 1953. While he was in session
perfroming his duties, Antonio Mordeno and Malaquias Fortun entered one of the rooms
of Ba-an Elementary School where Precinct 36-A was then located and where
inspectors and poll clerk of said precinct were then holding their meeting to canvass the
result of the election in said precinct. Afterwards, the accused Antonio Mondeno attack,
assault and use personal violence against Medrano.
Meanwhile, accused Fortun attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of Apolinario Lupos while performing his duties as watcher .The accused caused
serious disturbance and interruption or disturbance of public performance and functions
of said precinct 36-A and 35-A which was then in the adjacent room in the same
building.

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded "not guilty", and after a joint trial, during
which evidence was adduced by the parties, the cases were submitted for decision. On
September 30, 1958,the Court of First Instance issued a resolution remanding them to
the Municipal Court for lack of jurisdiction. For the reason that the accused by boxing
the election inspectors and watchers as charged in the information committed the crime
of assault without intent to kill. Motion for reconsideration have been denied. The City
Attorney alleging that the
lower court acted in excess of its jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be charged with the complex crime of assault
upon a person in authority with disturbance of public order.

Ruling:
The lower court in remanding the cases to the Municipal Court has taken the
position that there is only one crime charged, that of direct assault, or, more specifically,
assault upon a person in authority. Granting that only the crime of assault upon a
person in authority is charged, still the Court of First Instance would have jurisdiction
over the cases.

THE UNITED STATES vs. MARTIN DOMINGO, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 6219
1911-03-16
CARSON, J.:

Facts:

On Municipality of Santa Maria, Province of Ilocos Sur, one of the candidates for
the office of president held a public meeting for the purpose of furthering his candidacy
on the evening of the day before the election. 150 to 250 persons attended the meeting,
most of whom were partisans of the candidate who organized it. There were various
speakers, including the candidate himself. When the last speaker was about to end his
speech, a party of 100 persons marched down the street to the inspiring airs of a guitar.

No attempt were made by the party outside to enter the house or to disturb the
meeting inside by any concerted action, other than by standing in a large crowd about
the doors of the house in such a way as to necessarily distract the attention of those
attending the meeting inside by the mere fact that they were doing so. The single
exception to the peaceable dispersal of the crowd on that occasion was an altercation
which arose between two individuals, members respectively of the different parties, both
of whom were arrested by the police and taken to jail. Their arrest seems to have been
occasioned by their individual misconduct and not to have been in any way the result of
a conflict between the parties as a whole; and it does not clearly appear from the
evidence which of the two was the original aggressor.

Issue:
Whether or not members of the party who stopped outside of the house where
the meeting was being held guilty of that crime of "gravely" disturbing the public order
on the occassion of a largely attended reunion or meeting.

Ruling:
 Under the provisions of Chapter VI [Title III, Book II] of the Penal Code we would
be entirely agreed with the trial judge in his characterization of the disturbance of which
the defendants were guilty, as a "grave" or a "gross" disturbance of public order, had it
taken place in connection with the actual holding of an election; for instance, in or about
a voting booth, or the place where the votes were being counted, or, perhaps on the
public highway along which voters on their way to exercise their right to vote must
necessarily pass. But we think that under all the circumstances of this case, the fact that
numerous
meetings were being held at which the citizens and voters called together in public by
contending candidates and their partisans for the purpose of inducing or persuading
them to support one candidate or the other at the forthcoming election, tends to justify a
lenient rather than a severe judgment of the nature, object, and conduct of the gathering
of which the defendants formed a part.
Art. 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances. — The penalty of arresto
mayor and a fine ranging from P200 to P1,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any person who by means of printing, lithography, or any other means of publication shall publish or
cause to be published as news any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to
the interest or credit of the State;
2. Any person who by the same means, or by words, utterances or speeches shall encourage
disobedience to the law or to the constituted authorities or praise, justify, or extol any act punished by law;

3. Any person who shall maliciously publish or cause to be published any official resolution or document
without proper authority, or before they have been published officially; or

4. Any person who shall print, publish, or distribute or cause to be printed, published, or distributed books,
pamphlets, periodicals, or leaflets which do not bear the real printer's name, or which are classified as
anonymous.

PEOPLE vs. PEREZ

G.R. No. 21049
1923-12-22
MALCOLM, J:

Facts:

Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice,
a citizen of that municipality meet on April 1922. They engaged in a discussion
regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood. Perez repeatedly shouted
"The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having
recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." He was
charged with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of
ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has
appealed the case to the court. Cresencio, one of the witnesses, understood that Perez
invited the Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-
General Wood and throw it into the sea.

Perez's utterances were unlawful because he encouraged disobedience to the

law by suggesting to cut off Wood's head. By his utterances,he showed lack of respect
to the duly constituted authority. But witnesses endeavored to explain that the
discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the
fault was due to the Nacionalista Party,while Perez argued that the Governor-General
was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful
manner.Moreover, Perez only wished to say
was that the Governor-General should be removed and substitued by another.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused should be charged with unlawful utterances or
sedition
Ruling:
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet together
for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and
incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended
to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done
an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community and the safety or order of the
Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and
may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE COLUMNS OF MR.

AMADO P. MACASAET PUBLISHED IN MALAYA DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, 20
AND 21, 2007
A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
2008-08-08
REYES, R.T., J.:

Facts:
The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the "Business Circuit"
column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general circulation of
which he is the publisher. The articles, containing statements and innuendoes about an
alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, came out in four (4) issues of the
newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007. Similarly, in his September 20, 2007
article, respondent said that Cecilia had "a duty to save the sagging reputation of the
Supreme Court." Justice Ynares-Santiago respond to the allegations and said that she
had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never reversed herself,
that she never received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a
gift-wrapped box containing money.

Macasaet can be held liable for unlawful meeans of publication, by publishing as

news as any false news which may endanger the public order, or cause damage to the
interest or credit of the State. By publishing such malicious article, Macasaet endanger
the reputation of a member of the Highest Court and on the Court itself.Investigating
Committee observed that Macasaet's story about the bribery and of Cecilia's role in
supposedly discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions, indicating
that he did not exercise due diligence, patience, and care in checking the veracity of the
information fed to him, before giving it publicity in his columns. Committee believes
there exist valid grounds for this Honorable Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P.
Macasaet for indirect contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.

Issue:
Whether or not Macasaet should be held liable for unlawful use of means of
publication or for indirect contempt.
Ruling:
Given the gravity of respondent Macasaet's improper conduct, coupled with the
recalcitrant manner in which he responded when confronted with the reality of his
wrongdoing, a penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 would be right and
reasonable.

Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of

"thieves" and a "basket of rotten apples." These publications directly undermine the
integrity of the justices and render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without
bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and "fishing expeditions" in
the hope of striking - or creating - a story, with utter disregard for the institutional
integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts that degrade and impede the
orderly administration of justice.
Art. 155. Alarms and scandals. — The penalty of arresto menor or a fine not
exceeding P200 pesos shall be imposed upon:
1. Any person who within any town or public place, shall discharge any firearm, rocket,
firecracker, or other explosives calculated to cause alarm or danger;
2. Any person who shall instigate or take an active part in any charivari or other
disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public tranquility;
3. Any person who, while wandering about at night or while engaged in any other
nocturnal amusements, shall disturb the public peace; or
4. Any person who, while intoxicated or otherwise, shall cause any disturbance or
scandal in public places, provided that the circumstances of the case shall not make the
provisions of Article 153 applicable.

GABRIEL v. RAMOS
A.M. No. P-06-2256 [Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-2374-P]
April 10, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Facts:
On August 22, 2005, PO2 Patrick Mejia Gabriel claimed that William Jose R.
Ramos destroyed personal belongings inside the house of Consolacion Dela Cruz
Favillar (Consolacion), the mother of his common-law-wife, Jenelita Dela Cruz
(Jenelita). Afterwards, Ramos indiscriminately fired a gun outside the said house. Thus,
Ramos was charged with Alarms and Scandals and Violation of Domicile. PO2 Gabriel
Complainant also alleged that Jenelita is Ramos’s mistress for 15 years already and
that they have two children. He emphasized that Ramos’s illicit relationship with Jenelita
offends the morality and sense of decency of the people in the locality.
Ramos agreed with his common-law relationship with Jenelita but denied living
under scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock common decency. He claimed
that he have children with Jenelita and they been living together as husband and wife
for fifteen (15) years. He also asserted that these charges are harassment suits
calculated to cow him to desist from pursuing the criminal actions he filed against PO2
Gabriel and his cohorts before the Office of the Prosecutor of Calapan, Oriental
Mindoro. Ramos prayed for the dismissal of the instant administrative case.
Issue:
Whether or not the accused caused any distrubances or scandal under Article
156

Ruling:
 The Court sustains the finding of the OCA that Ramos is guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct. His barefaced admission and justification of his relationship with
another woman despite his subsisting marriage to another is proof of his immoral
conduct.
Concededly, the case for Alarms and Scandals had already been dismissed by the trial
court. However, it is also settled that the dismissal of the criminal complaint does not
affect the administrative case arising from the same incident which gave rise to said
criminal case. The quantum of proof necessary to sustain a finding of guilt in the
administrative complaint is only substantial evidence, while in criminal cases proof
beyond reasonable doubt must be established to sustain the culpability of the accused.
In sum, given the confluence of events as borne out by the records, this Court finds that
Ramos is administratively liable for indiscriminately discharging a firearm even if the
same does not pertain to his official functions.

PEOPLE vs. BACOLOD

G.R. No. L-2578
July 31, 1951
BENGZON, J.:

Facts:

On 21st day of February,1948, in the municipality of Santa Fe, province of Cebu,

Philippines, Ladislao Bacolod fired a sub-machine gun. It was done on the occasion of
a dance held in the municipal tennis. He wounded Consorcia Pasinio and caused a
panic among numerous people present in the said dance who ran and scampered in all
directions. He was first charged with serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence
by firing a sub-machine gun thereby hitting Pasinio at the back of right side of her body
which physical injury required or will require medical attendance for more than 30 days
but less than 90. The said physical injury capacitated or will incapacitate her from
performing her customary labor for the same period of time.

On the other hand the second information accuses him of having deliberately
fired the machine gun to cause a disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby
producing panic among the people present therein. It is not only offense against public
peace and order but can also fall under Article 155. Discharging any firearm, rocket,
firecracker, or other explosives within any town or public place, calculated to cause
alarm or danger is one of the acts punished as alarms and scandals. The act of
Ladislao firing a sub-mahcine gun trully produce alarm or danger. It was evident when
people ran and scampered in all directions after he wounded Pasinio.

Issue:
 Whether or not firing a sub-machine gun classified as tumults and other
disturbances of public order or alarms and scandal.

Ruling:
It will be observed that both informations have one common element: defendant's
having fired a sub-machine gun. The first, however, charged him with physical injuries
inflicted on Consorcia Pasinio thru reckless imprudence. On the other hand the second
information accuses him of having deliberately fired the machine gun to cause a
disturbance in the festivity or gathering, thereby producing panic among the people
present therein. The two informations do not describe the same offense. One is a crime
against persons; but the other is an offense against public peace and order.The first is
punished under article 263 of the Revised Penal Code and the latter under article 153
referring to individuals disturbing public gatherings or peaceful meetings. The proof
establishing the first would not establish the second, it being necessary to show,
besides the willful discharge of firearm, that there was a dance in the tennis court in
connection with the town fiesta, and that the people in attendance became panicky and
terrified. The offenses are not the same although they arose from same act of Ladislao
Bacolod. Consequently conviction for the first does not bar trial for the second
Art. 156. Delivery of prisoners from jails. — The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period of
prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any person who shall remove from any
jail or penal establishment any person confined therein or shall help the escape of such person, by means
of violence, intimidation, or bribery. If other means are used, the penalty of arresto mayor shall be
imposed.

If the escape of the prisoner shall take place outside of said establishments by taking the guards by
surprise, the same penalties shall be imposed in their minimum period.

ALBERTO vs. DE LA CRUZ

G.R. No. L-31839
1980-06-30
CONCEPCION JR., J

Facts:

On or about the 12th day of September, 1968, in the province of Camarines Sur,
Philippines, the said accused was a member of the Provincial Guard of Camarines Sur
and he was charged with the duty of keeping under custody and vigilance detention
prisoners. Petitionner did then and there with great carelessness and unjustifiable
negligence leave the latter unguarded while in said barrio, thereby giving prisoners the
opportunity to run away and escape, as in fact said detention prisoner Pablo Denaque
did run away and escape from the custody of the said accused.

Believing that the escape of Pablo Denaque was made possible by the note of and that
Cledera and Esmeralda are equally guilty of the offense for which the accused Eligio
Orbita had been charged, the defense counsel filed a motion in court seeking the
amendment of the information so as to include Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda as
defendants therein.

Issue:

Whether or not Gov. Cledera, and Jose Esmeralda Lorenzo Padua were
responsible for the failure to deliver prisoner from jail.

Ruling:
We held that there is no sufficient evidence in the record to show a prima facie
case against Gov. Cledera and Jose Esmeralda. Moreover, judge committed an error in
ordering the fiscal to amend the information so as to include Armando Cledera and Jose
Esmeralda as defendants in Criminal Case No. 9414 of the Court of First Instance of
Camarines Sur.

People vs. Del Barrio, et al.,

C.A.,O.G.3908

A policeman serving as a guard to a city jail substitute a recently released

prisoner to a detention prisoner, he did it while he's off-duty. He brought the latter
prisoner outside for 5 hours and returned him. It is a clear example of crime of delivering
prisoners from jail as defined and penalized under Article 156.
"any jail or penal establishment any person confined therein or shall help the escape of
such person, by means of violence, intimidation, or bribery."
 Chapter Six
EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE

Art. 157. Evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall evade service of his sentence by
escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. However, if such evasion or
escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors, windows, gates, walls,
roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, deceit, violence or intimidation, or through connivance
with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, the penalty shall be prision correccional in its
maximum period.

PANGAN vs GATBALITE
G.R. No. 141718
2005-01-21
AZCUNA, J.

Facts:
The petitioner was indicted for simple seduction in Criminal Case No. 85-816, at
the Municipal Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch 3. His case was called for
promulgation of the decision in the court of origin but he and his counsel did not appear.
The court of origin issued an order directing the recording of the
decision in the criminal docket of the court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.
Pursuant to the order of arrest, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended
and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell.

Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds
that the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five
years under No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code, and having been able to
continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years, his criminal liability has
long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 [of the] Revised Penal Code. Also,
Petitioner claims that the period for the computation of penalties under Article 93 of the
Revised Penal Code begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction
becomes final and the convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to
serve sentence.

Issue:
 Whether or not evasion of service of sentence is necessary for the prescription of
penalty of imprisonment (by final sentence) commences to run

Ruling:
We, therefore, rule that for prescription of penalty of imprisonment imposed by
final sentence to commence to run, the culprit should escape during the term of such
imprisonment. Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence
can be committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by
escaping during the term of his sentence. Petitioner, however, has by this time fully
served his sentence of two months and one day of arresto mayor and should forthwith
be released unless he is being detained for another offense or charge.

DEL CASTILLO vs. TORRECAMPO,

G.R. No. 139033
2002-12-18
CORONA, J.:

Facts:
On May 17, 1982, (Barangay Election Day), at around 8:15 P.M. in Barangay
Ombao, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, the said accused
striked the electric bulb and two (2) kerosene petromax lamps lighting the room where
voting center no. 24 is located, during the counting of the votes in said voting center
plunging the room in complete darkness, thereby interrupting and disrupting the
proceedings of the Board of Election Tellers.
Trial court rendered judgment and declared petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violating Section 178 (nn) of PD 1296, otherwise known as the 1978 Election
Code, as amended, and sentenced petitioner to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 1 year as minimum to 3 years as maximum.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals but the said decision
was final and executory. When the day for the execution of judgment came, petitioner
failed to appear which prompted the presiding judge to issue
an order of arrest of petitioner and the confiscation of his bond. However, petitioner was
never apprehended. After ten years, petitioner filed before the trial court a motion to
quash the warrant issued for his arrest on the ground of prescription of the penalty
imposed upon him.

Issue:
Whether or not the penalty imposed prescribed during the ten years that
accused evade the service of his sentence

Ruling:
Pursuant to Article 157 of the same Code, evasion of service of sentence can be
committed only by those who have been convicted by final judgment by escaping during
the term of his sentence. As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in
legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC means unlawful
departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been
committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

PEOPLE vs. ABILONG

G.R. No. L-1960
1948-11-26
MONTEMAYOR, J:

Facts:
On or about the 17th day of September, 1947, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused, being then a convict sentenced and ordered to serve two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of destierro during which he should not enter any place
within the radius of 100 kilometers from the City of Manila, by virtue of final judgment
rendered by the municipal court on April 5, 1946, in criminal case No.B-4795 for
attempted robbery. He unlawfully and feloniously evade the service of said sentence by
going beyond the limits made against him and commit vagrancy

Issue:
Whether or not the accused evading a sentence of destierro is not criminally
liable under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly article 157 of the said
Code for the reason that said article 157 refers only to persons who are imprisoned in a
penal institution and completely deprived of their liberty.

Ruling:
In conclusion we find and hold that the appellant is guilty of evasion of service of
sentence under article 157 of the Revised Penal Code (Spanish text), in that during the
period of his sentence of destierro by virtue of final judgment wherein he was prohibited
from entering the City of Manila, he entered said City.
Finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the same is hereby
affirmed with costs againstthe appellant. So ordered.
Art. 158. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of disorder, conflagrations, earthquakes,
or other calamities. — A convict who shall evade the service of his sentence, by leaving the penal
institution where he shall have been confined, on the occasion of disorder resulting from a conflagration,
earthquake, explosion, or similar catastrophe, or during a mutiny in which he has not participated, shall
suffer an increase of one-fifth of the time still remaining to be served under the original sentence, which in
no case shall exceed six months, if he shall fail to give himself up to the authorities within forty-eight hours
following the issuance of a proclamation by the Chief Executive announcing the passing away of such
calamity.

Convicts who, under the circumstances mentioned in the preceding paragraph, shall give themselves up
to the authorities within the above mentioned period of 48 hours, shall be entitled to the deduction
provided in Article 98.

LOSADA vs. ACENAS

G.R. No. L-810
March 31, 1947
BENGZON, J.:

Facts:

Manuel Artigas Losada is undergoing a maximum sentence of 15 years, 2

months and 2 days for estafa, and estafa through falsification. Such term is due to
expire, with good conduct allowance, on July 16, 1947. However, justice of the peace of
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, who, in the absence of the judge of first instance (Act No.
2131), directed the release of Losada on July 20, 1946. He earned a special time
allowance in the form of a deduction of one-fifth of his sentences under articles 98 and
158 of the Revised Penal Code. Also, a deduction of two-fifths of the period of his
sentence shall be granted in case said prisoner chose to stay in the place of his
confinement notwithstanding the existence of a calamity or catatrophe enumerated in
Article 158.

Convicts who, under the circumstance mentioned in Article 158, shall give
themselves up to the authorities within the above mentioned period of 48 hours, shall be
entitled to the deduction provided in Article 98.On the occassion of disorder resulting
from a conflagration, earthquake, explosion or similar catastrophe or during a mutiny, a
prisoner who did not escaped during these circumstances deserve a reward. If the
offender gives himself up he is entitled to a deduction of 1/5 of his sentence. However, If
the offender fails to give himself up, he gets an increased penalty. What is punished is
not leaving of the penal institution, but the failure of the convict to give himself up to the
authorities within 48 hours after the proclamation announcing the passing away of the
calamity.

Issue:
Whether or not the accused is entitled to 1/5 deduction under Article 158 given
the fact that they did not escaped.

Ruling:

The special allowance for loyalty authorized by articles 98 and 158 of the
Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having evaded the service of their
sentences by leaving the penal institution, give themselves up within two days. As these
petitioners are not in that class, because they have not escaped, they have no claim to
that allowance. For one thing there is no showing that they ever had the opportunity to
escape, or that having such opportunity they had the mettle to take advantage of it or to
brave the perils in connection with a jailbreak. And there is no assurance that had they
successfully run away and regained their precious liberty they would have,
nevertheless, voluntarily exchanged it later with privations of prison life impelled by that
sense of right and loyalty to the Government, which is sought to be rewarded with the
special allowance. Wherefore, it is not plain that their case comes within the spirit of the
law they have invoked. It must be observed in this connection that the only
circumstance favorable to petitioners is the admission of the respondent that they
"remained in the penal colony and did not try to escape during the war."

DANAO vs. ACENAS

G.R. No. L-813
March 31, 1947
BENGZON, J.:

Facts:
Francisco Danao was jailed for abduction with rape and he willcomplete the
service of his sentence, with good conduct allowance, on June 19, 1948. Same situation
with Losada, justice of the peace of Puerto Princesa, Palawan, directed his release on
July 20, 1946. Also, he earned special time allowance in the form of a deduction of one-
fifth of his sentences under articles 98 and 158 of the Revised Penal Code. Also, a
deduction of two-fifths of the period of his sentence shall be granted in case said
prisoner chose to stay in the place of his confinement notwithstanding the existence of a
calamity or catatrophe enumerated in Article 158.

On the occassion of disorder resulting from a conflagration, earthquake,

explosion or similar catastrophe or during a mutiny, a prisoner who did not escaped
during these circumstances deserve a reward. If the offender gives himself up he is
entitled to a deduction of 1/5 of his sentence. The Court believes that those prisoners
who, having all the chances to escape and did not escape but remained in their prison
cell during the disorder caused by war have shown more convincingly their loyalty than
those who escaped under the circumstances specifically enumerated in article 158 and
give themselves up within 48 hours. However, If the offender fails to give himself up, he
gets an increased penalty. What is punished is not leaving of the penal institution, but
the failure of the convict to give himself up to the authorities within 48 hours after the
proclamation announcing the passing away of the calamity.

Issue:
Whether or not Article 158 is applicable to the convict who did not escaped

Ruling:
The special allowance for loyalty authorized by articles 98 and 158 of the
Revised Penal Code refers to those convicts who, having evaded the service of their
sentences by leaving the penal institution, give themselves up within two days. As these
petitioners are not in that class, because they have not escaped, they have no claim to
that allowance. For one thing there is no showing that they ever had the opportunity to
escape, or that having such opportunity they had the mettle to take advantage of it or to
brave the perils in connection with a jailbreak. And there is no assurance that had they
successfully run away and regained their precious liberty they would have,
nevertheless, voluntarily exchanged it later with privations of prison life impelled by that
sense of right and loyalty to the Government, which is sought to be rewarded with the
special allowance. Wherefore, it is not plain that their case comes within the spirit of the
law they have invoked. It must be observed in this connection that the only
circumstance favorable to petitioners is the admission of the respondent that they
"remained in the penal colony and did not try to escape during the war."
Art. 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence. — The penalty of prision correccional in its
minimum period shall be imposed upon the convict who, having been granted conditional pardon by the
Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon. However, if the penalty remitted by the
granting of such pardon be higher than six years, the convict shall then suffer the unexpired portion of his
original sentence.

TORRES vs. GONZALES

G.R. No. 76872
1987-07-23
FELICIANO, J.:

Facts:

In 1978, Torres was convicted of two counts of Estafa. A year later he was
pardoned by President Aquino with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws
again. However, in 1982 Torres was charged with twenty counts of Estafa and was
convicted of the crime of Sedition. The Board of Pardons and Parole resolved to
recommend to the President the cancellation of the
conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
He then appealed the issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive
Department erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon because
the Estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory as they were still on
appeal and that he was deprived of his rights under the due process clause of the
Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary
before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms
of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.

Ruling:
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is
alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has
two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him under Article 159 of the Revised
Penal Code which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a
convict who "having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall
violate any of the conditions of such pardon." Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code.
That choice is an exercise of the President's executive prerogative and is not subject to
judicial scrutiny.

FLOREÑA SALES, on behalf of her stepfather Fidel Ariston, petitioner,

vs.THE DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-3972
October 13, 1950
OZAETA, J.:

Facts of the case:

On August 31, 1939, Fidel Ariston was convicted of frustrated murder by the Court of
First Instance of Camarines Sur and sentenced to suffer from 1 years and 8 months
of prision correccional to 7 years of prision mayor. After serving 2 years, 3 months, and
1 day of that sentence, he was released on January 6, 1942, by virtue of a conditional
pardon granted him by the President of the Philippines, the condition being that he shall
not again violated any of the penal laws of Philippines and that, should this condition be
violated, he shall be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law.
On February 1, 1950, said prisoner was recommitted to the custody of the Director of
the Prisons after having been convicted of estafa and he will serve the remaining
unexpired portion of the sentence for which he was originally committed to prison. The
present petition for habeas corpus is premised upon the contention that the President
has no authority to order the prisoner's recommitment to serve the unexpired portion of
his original sentence, because violation of a conditional pardon is an offense penalized
by virtue article 159 of the Revised Penal Code, and that, unless the prisoner is
prosecuted for and convicted of that offense, he cannot be compelled to serve the
unexpired portion of his original sentence. Petitioner contended by that the power
vested in the President by section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize
the arrest and reincarceration of a violator of a conditional pardon is repugnant to the
due process of law granted by the Constitution (sec. 1, Article III).

Issue:
Whether or not whether the section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code has been
repealed by section 159 of the Revised Penal Code.

Ruling:
We are of opinion that article 159 of Revised Penal Code, which penalizes violation of a
conditional pardon as an offense, and the power vested in the President by section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code to authorize the recommitment to prison of a
violator of a conditional pardon to serve the unexpired portion of his original sentence,
can stand together and that the proceeding under one provision does not necessarily
prelude action under the other. There is no dispute in the case as to the identity of the
prisoner and as to the violation by him of his conditional pardon.

ART. 160

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MELCHOR

TAGASA,defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. 46177
1939-05-23
PER CURIAM, p:

Facts of the case:

Melchor Tagasa was in Bilibid Prisons and serving three sentences imposed on him by
final judgment, the first being for homicide, the second for less serious physical injuries,
and the third for slight physical injuries. On or about the 27th day of February,1937,
defendant and Policarpio Santos were with other prisoners of the same grade in the
carpentry shop of Bilibid. Defendant attacked Santos with a chisel, inflicting on him a
stab wound seven inches long in the right post-axillary region, which penetrated the
right lung and caused his instant death. Afterwards, Amando Fidel, one of the prisoner-
employees commanded him to put down the chisel and he refused. Prisoners tried to
stop him and he wounded two of them: Ines and Mangutara.

Defendant claimed that while he was performing his work with a chisel, Emiliano Ramos
passed by and gave him a blow on the nape of the neck and he accidentally swing the
chisel in his left hand while the deceased was passing by and that he unintentionally
wounded the latter on the back. This was denied by the witness Guillermo Tadina who
saw the act of aggression, it was impossible that he could have caused on the
deceased a wound so large and deep as that which resulted in the death of Policarpio
Santos. Also, defendant desire to attack was evident when he refused to put down the
chisel and instead, attacked his fellow prisoners. Finally, Emiliano Ramos also claimed
that he didn't leave his work station at the time of or before the occurence of the
accident.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is quasi-recidivist when the defendant's motive in
committing the crime has not been established.

Ruling:
The defense finally contends that, at least, the mitigating circumstance of lack of
instruction should be considered in favor of the defendant. This cannot be done, first,
because the evidence of record this point shows that the defendant is sufficiently literate
as he completed the third grade; and, secondly, because he sufficiently demonstrated
during the trial that he is not ignorant, as he was able to trace and explain intelligently
the sketch of the place where, he said, the incident took place. Nevertheless, even if
said mitigating circumstance were considered in his favor, the outcome would at all
events be the same, because the provision of the abovementioned article 160 of the
Revised Penal Code is clear that the murder committed under the circumstances in
which that in questions was perpetrated, is penalized with death, this being the
maximum of the penalty prescribed by law.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOLAS LAYSON,

CEZAR RAGUB, CEZAR FUGOSO and JOVENTINO GARCES,
defendants-appellants.
G.R. No. L-25177
1969-10-31
PER CURIAM:

Facts of the case:

Nicolas Layson, Cezar Ragub, Cezar Fugoso and Joventino Garces were serving their
sentences of conviction at Davao Penal Colony. On January 17, 1964, these four
accused stabbed Regino Gasang to death. Layson, Ragub and Fugoso admitted that
they killed Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups a number of times.
Garces stated that he killed Gasang because the latter spat on him a week before. The
four plotted to kill Gasang a few days prior to the actual slaying. They were indicted for
the crime of murder.

Upon arraignment, all the four accused, assisted by counsel de officio, freely and
spontaneously pleaded guilty. Three of the accused admitted that they harbored ill-
feeling against Gasang because the latter urinated on their coffee cups several times,
all these taking place at least ten days before the actual slaying. Gasang spat on
Garces a week before the day of the killing. All of the accused plotted to kill Gasang a
few days before January 17, 1964. In the light of these circumstances, it is evident that
sufficient time had elapsed during which the accused regained their equanimity.
Moreover, treachery attended the commission of the crime.

Issue:

Whether or not all the four accused were quasi-recidivists given the mitigating
circumstance of plea of guilty.

Ruling:
The special aggravating circumstance of quasi-recidivism (art. 160, Rev. Penal Code)
was correctly considered against all the accused, who, at the time of the commission of
the offense, were undoubtedly serving their respective sentences for previous
convictions. Quasi-recidivism has for its effect the punishment of the accused with the
maximum period of the penalty prescribed by law for the new felony, and cannot be
offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance. When they pleaded guilty to the charge of
murder, all the accused admitted all the material facts and circumstances alleged in the
information. The crime of murder is punished with reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. Because of the attendance of the special aggravating circumstance of
quasi-recidivism, this Court is left with no alternative to affirming the death penalty
imposed by the court a quo.