COMMON INTENTION, COMMON
OBJECT AND JOINT LIABILITY
(This Project work has been submitted towards the fulfilment of 1st semester
LLB 3year Law)
SUBMITTED TO: MS SIVASHRITA BHARADWAJ
SUBMITTED BY: SOUVIK CHATTERJEE, ANKIT MOHANTY, ATRI
KARMAKAR, KUMAR HARSHIT
BATCH: LLB (H) [1ST SEMESTER]
Siksha ‘O ’Anusandhan National Institute of Law (SNIL)
SIKSHA O ANUSANDHAN (Deemed to be university),
DECLARATION
We , SOUVIK CHATTERJEE, ANKIT MOHANTY, ATRI KARMAKAR, KUMAR
HARSHIT, hereby declare that the project report “COMMON INTENTION,
COMMON OBJECT AND JOINT LIABILITY” prepared by me under the guidance
of MS SIVASHRITA BHARADWAJ, Faculty of SOA National Institute of Law (SNIL)
work is towards the partial fulfilment of the university examination. I have undergone
research various kind of magazines and new paper and online website I further declare
that this report is based on the original study undertaken by me and has not been submitted
for the award of any degree/diploma from any other university/institution.
NAME:- SOUVIK CHATTERJEE, ANKIT MOHANTY, ATRI KARMAKAR,
KUMAR HARSHIT
ROLL NO:-
DATE:-
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I express my sincere gratitude to MS SIVASHRITA BHARADWAJ whose guidance and
support were invaluable throughout the duration of this project. I am also thankful to SOA
National Institute of Law (SNIL) for providing me with the necessary resources and
environment conducive to research. Furthermore, I extend my appreciation to all those who
contributed their insights and expertise, directly or indirectly, towards the completion of this
project. Their assistance has been instrumental in shaping this report.
NAME:- SOUVIK CHATTERJEE, ANKIT MOHANTY, ATRI KARMAKAR,
KUMAR HARSHIT
ROLL NO:-
TABLE OF CONTENTS
JOINT LIABILITY .................................................................................................................... 5
COMMON OBJECT ................................................................................................................. 8
COMMON INTENTION......................................................................................................... 13
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................... 17
JOINT LIABILITY
Section 3(5) of BNS establishes joint criminal liability when two or more individuals act with
a common intention. This means that if two or more persons collaboratively engage in a
criminal act with a shared goal, each person is equally responsible for the crime.
Key Elements:
• Common Intention: The individuals must share a specific intent to commit the crime.
• Multiple Persons: At least two individuals must be involved.
• Criminal Act: There must be a criminal act executed as a result of the shared intention.
Example: If two individuals plan and execute a robbery together, both are equally liable for
the crime, regardless of who physically carried out the act.
Case Laws Under Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS):
1. Birendra Kumar Ghosh V. King Emperor:
• Background: Known as the “postman case,” involving a postman’s murder.
• Observation: Liability for those signaling to accomplices outside the post office.
• Implication: Common intention is key, not just physical presence.
The case of Barendra Kumar Ghose v. King-Emperor [1] was a landmark judgment delivered
by the Privy Council in 1925 that dealt with the concept of common intention under Section
34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Barendra Kumar Ghose was accused of participating in a robbery and murder at a post office.
While he did not directly kill the victim, the prosecution argued that he shared a common
intention with his accomplices to rob and, if necessary, kill the postmaster.
The key legal issue was whether Ghose could be held liable for murder even if he didn't fire
the fatal shot, based on the principle of common intention. The Privy Council upheld the
conviction, stating that when several individuals share a common intention to commit a crime,
each person is liable for the acts of others undertaken in furtherance of that shared plan.
This established the principle that vicarious liability can arise under Section 34 of the IPC,
making each participant responsible for the consequences of their collective actions. This case
has had a significant impact on Indian criminal law, clarifying the application of Section 34
and expanding the scope of criminal liability.
1. AIR 1925 PC 1
2. Mehboob Shah V. Emperor:
• Background: Criminal act in furtherance of common intention.
• Observation: The act must pursue a shared intention.
• Implication: Joint liability requires shared intent.
Mahboob Shah vs Emperor Judgment
The Privy Council in Mahboob Shah vs Emperor acquitted Mahboob Shah, ruling that the
requirements for applying Section 34 (common intention) were not met.
The council in Mahboob Shah vs Emperor highlighted that although Mahboob Shah and Wali
Shah acted with the ‘same intention’ to rescue Ghulam Shah, there was no ‘common intention’
to murder Allahabad. Thus, Mahboob Shah was acquitted of all charges, including the murder
of Allahabad.
Elements of Section 34 Explained
• Criminal Act: The act must be inherently criminal.
• Two or more persons: The criminal act should be executed by two or more persons.
• Common Intention: There must be a shared intention among the participants at the
time of committing the crime.
• In Furtherance of: The criminal act should be performed in the advancement of the
common intention.
The judgement in Mahboob Shah vs Emperor is pivotal in distinguishing between ‘same
intention’ and ‘common intention’. This distinction is crucial for determining liability in crimes
involving multiple actors.
The ruling underscores the necessity for a clear, shared intent to jointly execute a criminal act,
as mere similarity of intentions among individuals does not suffice to meet the threshold of
common intention under Section 34 of the IPC. This case remains significant in the
jurisprudence relating to collective criminal actions.
3. Kirpal Singh V. State of U.P.:
• Background: Common intention developing on the spot.
• Observation: Intent can form spontaneously.
• Implication: Joint liability can evolve during the act.
4. Pandurang V. Hyderabad:
• Background: Scope of common intention.
• Observation: Requires pre-arranged plan or meeting of minds.
• Implication: Emphasizes premeditation and coordination.
COMMON OBJECT
Section 149 of IPC mentions the concept of the Common Object.
Section 149 Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in
prosecution of common object — If an offence is committed by any member of an
unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as
the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that
object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of
the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.
In, State of Maharashtra v. Kashirao and Ors. (2003), SC defined Common Object
as the word ‘object’ means the purpose and, in order to make it ‘common’, it must be
shared by all.
Common Object is based upon the principle of Vicarious Liability which means that
a person can be held responsible for the actions committed by others.
o Every person who joins an unlawful assembly having the common object is held
liable as he is accounted to have consented to furthering the object of such
assembly.
Common Object
The offence dealing with Group Liability or Vicarious Liability of members comes under
Chapter XI of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita. This chapter deals with offences against Public
Tranquility from s.189 to s.197. The first section of this chapter, s.189, defines Unlawful
Assembly, for which there should be five or more persons and some common objects for which
they have made that assembly.
Section 189. Unlawful assembly-An assembly of five or more persons is designated an
“unlawful assembly” if the common object of the persons composing that assembly is-
First- To overawe by criminal force, or show of criminal force, the Central or any State
Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State, or any public servant in the exercise
of the lawful power of such public servant; or
Second - To resist the execution of any law, or of any legal process; or
Third -To commit any mischief or criminal trespass, or other offence; or
Fourth- By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to any person, to take or obtain
possession of any property, or to deprive any person of the enjoyment of a right of way, or of
the use of water or other incorporeal rights of which he is in possession or enjoyment, or to
enforce any right or supposed right; or
Fifth- By means of criminal force, or show of criminal force, to compel any person to do what
he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do what he is legally entitled to do.
Explanation – An assembly which was not unlawful when it assembled, may subsequently
become an unlawful assembly.
Ingredients of Unlawful Assembly-
(i) Commission of an offence:
The first importance essential of this section is the commission of an offence by any member
of an unlawful assembly. S. 190 can only be applied if a person of an unlawful assembly
committed a crime.
(ii) five or more person member of unlawful assembly:
According to the essential of S. 190, the offence must be committed by five or more members
of unlawful assembly. Here, we understand the meaning of unlawful assembly which as under:
(a) According to Black’s Law Dictionary: ‘A meeting of three or more persons who intend
either to commit a crime or to carry out some act, lawful and unlawful that will constitution a
breach of the peace”.
(b) According to S.189 I.P.C.; According to that section, unlawful assembly means the
assembly must consist of five or more persons having one of the five specified objects as their
common object.
When the number of the persons reduces from five for trial for the reason that some were
acquitted for the charges then the s. 189 will become inapplicable. But if there is a clear
indication that some other unidentified persons are involved in the crime then this section can
be applied.
In Ram Bilas Singh v. State of Bihar [2], Supreme Court held that:
“it is competent to a court to come to the conclusion that there was an unlawful assembly of
five or more persons, even if less than that number have been convicted by it if:
i. the charge states that apart from the persons named, several other unidentified persons were
also members of the unlawful assembly whose common object was to commit an unlawful act.
ii. or that the first information report and evidence show such to be the case even though the
charge does not state so.
iii. or that though the charge and prosecution witnesses named only the acquitted and the
convicted accused persons there is other evidence which discloses the existence of named or
other persons”
(iii) In Prosecution of Common Object:
Some offences must be committed by any member of unlawful assembly in prosecution of the
common object of that assembly. Object means the purpose, and it will be common when it is
shared by the members of the unlawful assembly. A common object may be formed at any stage
by all or a few members of the assembly. The explanation of this section shows it clearly.
However, the common object is entertained in the human mind, so there can be no evidence to
prove directly about this. It is a question of the facts and can be culled out on the basis of the
facts and circumstances of each case. It can be determined from the nature of the assembly, the
kinds of arms and their uses by it, behaviour and the language of the members of the assembly
used before and after the incident. If only four out of the five assembled persons have a
common object and not a fifth, then that assembly is not an unlawful assembly. Simple onlooker
or family of the parties cannot become a member of unlawful assembly unless they actively
participated or encouraged the violence.
In Moti Das v. Bihar [3] Supreme Court held that pre-concert is not necessary. An assembly may
be lawful in beginning but may turn into unlawful later.
Being a member of Unlawful assembly is itself a crime and s.191 prescribes the punishment of
six months, or fine, or both for being a member of that assembly.
2. AIR 1963 SC
3. AIR 1954 SC
In Bhudeo Mandal v. State of Bihar[4], the Apex Court held that before convicting any person
with the aid of s.149 (now 190 BNS), the evidence must clearly establish not only the common
object but also show that the common object was unlawful.
In Ram Dhani v. State[5], there was a dispute over land and the complainant party resorted to
cutting crop grown by the accused party. The later were more than five in number and
assembled to prevent the cutting. The court held that the persons acting in self-defence of the
property cannot be members of an unlawful assembly. And so they could not be said to form
an unlawful assembly.
(iv) Knowledge of Happening of an Offence:
The member of an unlawful assembly is also liable where the offence was committed such as
the member of the assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object.
The word ‘knew’ is used in the second part of the s. 190, which implies more than a possibility
but less than might have known. An offence committed in prosecution of common object would
generally be an offence which the members of the assembly knew was likely to be committed.
This phrase means that the offence committed was immediately connected with the common
object of the unlawful assembly, of which the accused were members. The word ‘in the
prosecution of common object’ means that the offence committed was immediately connected
with the common object of the assembly or in order to attain a common object.
Principle:
S. 190 BNS deals with the doctrine of vicarious liability and recognize the doctrine of vicarious
liability and recognize the principle of joint in the doing of a criminal act and is an exception
to the general rule that a person is liable only for his own acts”. Once an assembly has become
unlawful then all things done in the prosecution of the common unlawful object of that
assembly are chargeable against every member thereof. The liability of every member extends
not only to the acts intended by all to be done but also to those offences which are likely to be
committed to achieving the common object.
4. AIR 2019 Patna High Court
5. AIR 2024 Allahabad High Court
Difference between Section 3(5) & 190:
Section 3(5) does not create any specific offence but only lays down the principle of joint
criminal liability.
Whereas s.190 creates specific offence and being a member of an unlawful assembly is itself a
crime, which is punishable under s.191.
2. ‘Common intention’ used in s.3 (5) is not defined anywhere in BNS,
while ‘common object’ in s.190 must be one of the five ingredients defined in s. 191 of BNS.
3. Common intention requires a prior meeting of mind and unity of intention and overt act has
been done in furtherance of the common intention of all.
A common object may be formed without a prior meeting of mind when the common object of
the members of the unlawful assembly is one but the intention of participants is different. It
only requires that criminal act has been done in furtherance of the common object.
4. For invoking s.3(5) it is sufficient that two or more persons were involved.
However, there has to be a minimum of five persons to impose s.190.
5. The crucial factor of s.3(5) is ‘participation’
while there is no need of active participation in s.190 of BNS.
COMMON INTENTION
Introduction
The concept of common intention is a fundamental principle in Indian criminal jurisprudence.
It embodies the notion of shared culpability, wherein multiple individuals engage in a criminal
act with a unified intent. The doctrine ensures that individuals who actively participate in a
crime cannot escape liability by claiming ignorance or a lesser role.
The Indian Penal Code (IPC), 1860, addresses the idea of common intention under Section 34,
which states:
"When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all,
each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone."
This provision establishes joint liability and ensures collective responsibility for criminal acts.
It underscores the collaborative nature of certain offenses and upholds the principle that "the
act of one is the act of all."
1. Historical Evolution and Background
The concept of common intention has its roots in British common law and was introduced to
India during colonial rule. While rooted in common law, Section 34 reflects the unique socio-
cultural fabric of India, adapting to the complexities of collective criminal behavior often
witnessed in rural and urban settings.
Historically, criminal liability in ancient Indian texts like the Manusmriti and Yajnavalkya
Smriti recognized the importance of intention (mens rea) and group accountability. The
evolution of Indian jurisprudence post-independence has refined the doctrine, ensuring its
applicability to modern-day legal challenges.
2. Key Elements of Common Intention
To invoke Section 34 of the IPC, the prosecution must establish the following elements:
i) Criminal Act by Multiple Persons:
The offense must involve more than one individual acting together. A solitary act
cannot invoke Section 34 unless there is evidence of prior agreement with others.
ii) Presence of Common Intention:
A pre-arranged plan or meeting of minds must exist between the co-accused. This
implies a conscious and shared decision to engage in the criminal act.
iii) Participation in the Act:
Active participation or facilitation is required, but direct physical involvement in
every aspect of the crime is not necessary.
iv) Execution in Furtherance of Common Intention:
The act must be executed in alignment with the shared intention. Even if the act
slightly diverges, liability under Section 34 may still apply if the ultimate goal
aligns with the initial intent.
3. Legal Interpretations and Judicial Precedents
Indian courts have consistently interpreted Section 34 to emphasize joint liability, even if the
contributions of the accused differ in degree. A few landmark judgments provide clarity on the
application of common intention:
1. Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor (1925)
This case laid the foundation for interpreting Section 34. The accused was convicted despite
not firing the fatal shot, as his presence and role were deemed crucial to the crime's execution.
2. Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra (1963)
The Supreme Court reiterated that common intention must precede the criminal act,
distinguishing it from similar intention under Section 35.
3. Pandurang, Tukia, and Bhillia v. State of Hyderabad (1955)
This judgment clarified that mere presence at the scene without evidence of pre-arranged intent
does not suffice for conviction under Section 34.
4. Gopi Nath v. State of U.P. (2001)
The Supreme Court emphasized that the prosecution must establish a clear and unambiguous
meeting of minds to invoke common intention.
Role of Intention and Participation
In Indian jurisprudence, intention plays a crucial role in distinguishing between accidental or
negligent acts and deliberate crimes. Common intention reflects the principle that collective
engagement in crime diminishes the possibility of individual defenses like lack of involvement.
Active participation can take various forms, such as:
• Providing logistical support.
• Preventing intervention or aiding the primary offender.
• Encouraging or directing the offense.
Contemporary Relevance
The principle of common intention continues to hold immense significance in addressing
modern criminal activities, such as:
• Gang-related crimes.
• Mob violence and lynching.
• Terrorism and organized crime.
• Corporate criminal liability.
Challenges and Criticisms
Despite its importance, Section 34 has faced several criticisms:
1. Ambiguity in Proof:
Proving the existence of common intention often relies on circumstantial evidence, leading to
subjective interpretation
2. Possibility of Misuse:
Law enforcement agencies sometimes misuse Section 34 to implicate innocent bystanders or
family members.
Reforms and Recommendations
To enhance the efficacy of Section 34, several reforms have been proposed:
• Stronger evidentiary standards to establish common intention.
• Judicial training to ensure consistent interpretation.
• Clear legislative guidelines distinguishing between Sections 34 and 149.
Conclusion
In the legal framework, particularly under Indian law, the concepts of common object, common
intention, and joint liability play a crucial role in determining the liability of individuals
involved in criminal activities or offenses. These principles, primarily discussed under Sections
34, 149, and related provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), help in attributing liability to
individuals who participate in a criminal act, even if their roles are different or the specific act
was not directly carried out by each one.
1. Common Intention (Section 34 IPC) refers to the shared mental state or intent among
individuals when committing a criminal act. It means that all individuals involved had
the same purpose or objective in mind, and acted together to achieve it. In a case where
a crime is committed by multiple individuals with a pre-conceived common goal, all of
them can be held equally responsible for the offense, even if the actual commission of
the crime was carried out by only one or a few members of the group.
2. Common Object (Section 149 IPC), on the other hand, deals with groups acting with a
shared objective during the commission of unlawful activities. The presence of a
"common object" does not require that all individuals share the same specific intention.
Instead, if the group acts with a collective purpose (whether or not every individual is
aware of every aspect of the plan), all members of the group can be held liable for any
unlawful act committed by any one of them in furtherance of the group's objective.
3. Joint Liability refers to the legal principle that holds individuals collectively responsible
for an act or liability. It plays a central role when multiple individuals commit a crime
together, and they are all liable for the full extent of the offense. This concept applies
not only to criminal law but also to civil cases, especially in situations involving debts,
contracts, or financial obligations where all parties are jointly responsible for fulfilling
the duty.
The interrelationship between these concepts ensures that the law does not allow individuals to
escape liability merely because they did not perform the criminal act directly. If individuals act
in concert with a common intention or object, they are collectively responsible for the criminal
consequences.
In conclusion, the principles of common intention, common object, and joint liability are vital
tools in criminal law to ensure that all individuals involved in a criminal act are held
accountable for their roles, irrespective of the specific acts they personally committed. These
doctrines prevent individuals from evading justice by exploiting technicalities about their exact
role in the crime and reinforce the importance of collective responsibility in maintaining law
and order.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 34, 149, and related provisions.
2. V.D. Sharma, "Law of Crimes: A Commentary on Indian Penal Code" (5th ed., 2020).
3. K.D. Gaur, "Indian Penal Code" (9th ed., 2018).
4. "Legal Principles: Joint Liability and Common Intention" by Shreya Sharma, Journal
of Indian Law, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2021), pp. 45-58.
5. "The Concept of Joint Liability: Legal Perspectives", Indian Journal of Legal Studies,
Vol. 24, No. 2 (2020), pp. 110-124.
