[G.R. No. 109166. July 6, 1995.
HERNAN R. LOPEZ, JR., Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSIONS, FOURTH DIVISION,
CEBU CITY, and DOMINADOR AMANTE, Respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner impugns the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fourth Division,
Cebu City, granting the appeal of private respondent which prayed for reinstatement, backwages,
separation pay, and wage differentials. 1
The facts in brief.
Starting 1966, private respondent Dominador Amante worked as driver for Hacienda Colisap managed
by petitioner Hernan Lopez, Jr. Sometime in 1987, he transferred to Bea Agricultural Corporation
managed by Javier Lopez Tanjanco, a nephew of petitioner. Tanjanco dismissed him on April 25, 1990
and paid his separation pay. 2 He worked again with Hacienda Colisap. His work was, however, short-
lived. He was also dismissed by petitioner without a valid reason on July 5, 1990. 3
On December 27, 1990, private respondent filed a complainant against petitioner before the Regional
Arbitration Branch No. VI, Cebu City for illegal dismissal, reinstatement with backwages or separation
pay, and wage differentials.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner resisted the complainant. He alleged that it was Bea Agricultural Corporation that terminated
the employment of private Respondent. He likewise contended that he was abroad when private
respondent was dismissed and could not be responsible for the same.
In a Decision dated June 23, 1992, the labor arbiter dismissed the complainant for lack of cause of action
against the petitioner. 4 Private respondent appealed to the NLRC.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
On December 10, 1992, the NLRC reversed the appealed decision and granted private respondent’s
prayer for reinstatement and payment of backwages, separation pay, and wage differentials’ all
computed at P19,542.50. 5 It found that private respondent was illegally dismissed, thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
"All conspicuously absent from the records is any evidence to show that complainant appellant was
dismissed in July 1990 for a just or authorized cause and upon compliance with due process of law. It is
thus clear under the above circumstances that complainant-appellant was illegally dismissed. As a
matter of fact the Labor Arbiter had previously ordered the complainant to return to work and for the
respondent to accept him back to work . . ." 6
As broken down, the awards consists of the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, hence, this petition.
Petitioner now contends:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
FIRST
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE RESPONDENT
COMMISSION THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY RE-EMPLOYED RESPONDENT AMANTE CONSIDERING THAT
THE PAYROLLS WHERE IT BASED ITS FINDINGS WERE ONLY PRESENTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL
AND THEREFORE NOT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT SAID FINDING.
SECOND
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER RE-EMPLOYED
AND DISMISSED RESPONDENT AMANTE WHEN IT HAS BEEN CLEARLY ADMITTED BY RESPONDENT
AMANTE IN ALL HIS PLEADINGS THAT PETITIONER WAS OUT OF THE COUNTRY WHEN HE WAS
ALLEGEDLY DISMISSED AND THEREFORE SAID ADMISSION CANNOT BE CONTRADICTED BY THE
RESPONDENT COMMISSION.
THIRD
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT AMANTE IS
ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES EQUIVALENT TO SIX (6) MONTHS WHEN IF HAD
ALREADY ESTABLISHED A FINDING THAT THE PERIOD OF EMPLOYMENT OF SAID RESPONDENT WAS
WITHIN THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD AND THEREFORE ITS HOLDING IS CONTRARY TO ITS ESTABLISHED
FACTS AND LAW.
FOURTH
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT AMANTE IS
ENTITLED TO BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY WHEN UNDER SEVERAL RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF
LABOR. THESE AWARDS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH EACH OTHER, AND THEREFORE RESPONDENT
COMMISSION CANNOT AWARD BOTH.
FIFTH
THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING BACKWAGES TO RESPONDENT
AMANTE WHEN HE HAD ALREADY WAIVED IT FOR HIS REFUSAL TO COMPLY THE ORDER DATED MARCH
31, 1992 (ANNEX "E").
SIXTH
THERE IS NO SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT WOULD SUPPORT THE FINDING OF THE RESPONDENT
COMMISSION THAT RESPONDENT AMANTE IS ENTITLED TO WAGE DIFFERENTIAL.
There is no merit in the petition.
We sustain the finding that petitioner re-hired but later dismissed private respondent without any just
cause and without following due process. There was nothing wrong when public respondent admitted
the May 1990 payrolls of Hacienda Colisap proving the re-employment of private respondent although
they were presented only on appeal. Article 221 of the Labor Code provides that "in any proceeding
before the Commission or any of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling." It further mandates the NLRC to use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law of
procedure. Thus, in Bristol Laboratories Employees’ Association v. NLRC, 8 we upheld the NLRC when it
considered additional documentary evidence submitted by the parties on appeal to prove their
contentions. Too long settled is the rule that technicality should not be permitted to stand in the way of
equitably and completely resolving the rights and obligations of the parties. 9
We now to the rights of private respondent as a probationary employee at the time of his illegal
dismissal.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Article 281 of the Labor Code provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working,
unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. The services of an
employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when
he fails to quantity as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. An employee who is allowed to work after a
probationary period shall be considered a regular employee."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is true that probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status but they can only be removed
from their work during their probationary period for a valid reason. 10 In the case at bench, private
respondent was re-employed with Hacienda Colisap for barely two (2) months when he was dismissed
without a just cause and without due process. The evidence of private respondent proving this fact
cannot be overturned by the flimsy contention of petitioner that he did not cause the former’s dismissal
as he was abroad at that time.
In Pines City Educational Center v. NLRC, 11 the Court en banc ordered the reinstatement of unlawfully
dismissed probationary employees and payment of their full backwages viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
x x x
"With respect to private respondent Richard Picart and Lucia Chan, both of whom did not sign
employment nor to have knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon fixed periods of employment,
petitioners had the burden of proving that the termination of their services was legal. As probationary
employees, they are likewise protected by the security of tenure provision of the Constitution.
Consequently, they cannot be removed from their positions unless for cause. . . . We concur with these
factual findings, there being no showing with that they were resolved arbitrarily. Thus, the order for
their reinstatement and payment of full backwages and other benefits and privileges from the time they
were, dismissed up to their actual reinstatement is proper, conformably with Article 279 of the Labor
Code, as amended by Section 34 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on March 21, 1989. It
should be noted that private respondent Roland Picart and Lucia Chan were dismissed illegally on March
31, 1989, or after the effectivity of said amendatory law." (Citations omitted)
In accord with Article 281 of the Labor Code and existing case law, the public respondent correctly
ordered the reinstatement of private respondent and the payment of his backwages and other benefits
and privileges due him from the time of his dismissal up to his actual reinstatement. We take notice that
the controversy arose on July 5, 1990 after the effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, amending section 279 of the
Labor Code on March 21, 1989.
We will next resolve whether public respondent erred in additionally granting backwages and separation
pay to private Respondent.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Backwages and separation pay are distinct reliefs given to alleviate the economic damage suffered by an
illegally dismissed employee. Payment of backwages is specifically designed to restore an employee’s
income that was lost because of his unjust dismissal. 12 On the other hand, payment of separation pay is
intended to provide the employee money during the period in which he will be looking for another
employment. 13 Considering the purpose behind the grant of separation pay, it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of public respondent to order the payment of separation pay as it is inconsistent
with its ruling reinstating the private Respondent. Their inherent inconsistency is self-evident and needs
no further elaboration.
Finally, we reject petitioner’s submission that there is no substantial evidence to support the public
respondent’s award of wage differentials to private Respondent. The ruling of the public respondent
clearly repudiates petitioner’s charge and we quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
"Lastly, on the award of differential pay, We find no merit in the respondent’s submission that there is
no showing that the complainant-appellant was underpaid, or that the payrolls show that the
complainant was receiving P183.75 daily.
The complainant clearly alleged that the complainant was only receiving P73.50 a day upon his
termination on July 5, 1989. With respect to the payrolls there is nothing therefrom that can clearly
convince Us that the amount of P183.75 was the complainant’s daily wage as the period covered for
such payroll is not indicated. It merely states that for the period ended May 10, 1990 and May 17, 1990,
it did not reflect the number of days worked by the complainant-appellant." 14
We are bound by this appraisal of evidence made by the public respondent considering its support by
the records of the case.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award for
separation pay is deleted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193756 April 10, 2013
VENANCIO S. REYES, EDGARDO C. DABBAY, WALTER A. VIGILIA, NEMECIO M. CALANNO, ROGELIO A.
SUPE, JR., ROLAND R. TRINIDAD, and AURELIO A. DULDULAO, Petitioners,
vs.
RP GUARDIANS SECURITY AGENCY, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the May 18, 2010
Amended Decision1 and the September 13, 2010 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in C.A.-GR.
SP No. 106643, which modified the April 9, 2008 Decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in NLRC LAC Case No. 11-002990-07, insofar as the award of backwages, the computation of
separation pay, and the refund for the trust fund contributions are concerned.
The Facts:
Petitioners Venancio S. Reyes, Edgardo C. Dabbay, Walter A. Vigilia, Nemesio M. Calanno, Rogelio A.
Supe, Jr., Roland R. Trinidad, and Aurelio A. Duldulao (petitioners) were hired by respondent RP
Guardians Security Agency, Inc. (respondent) as security guards. They were deployed to various clients
of respondent, the last of which were the different branches of Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage
Bank (Banco Filipino).
In September 2006, respondent’s security contract with Banco Filipino was terminated. In separate
letters,4 petitioners were individually informed of the termination of the security contract with Banco de
Oro. In two (2) memoranda, dated September 21, 20065 and September 29, 2006,6 petitioners were
directed to turnover their duties and responsibilities to the incoming security agency and were advised
that they would be placed on floating status while waiting for available post. Petitioners waited for their
next assignment, but several months lapsed and they were not given new assignments.
Consequently, on April 10, 2007, petitioners filed a complaint7 for constructive dismissal.
In its position paper,8 respondent claimed that there was no dismissal, of petitioners, constructive or
otherwise, and asserted that their termination was due to the expiration of the service contract which
was coterminus with their contract of employment.
On August 20, 2007, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a decision9 in favor of petitioners ordering
respondent to pay petitioners separation pay, backwages, refund of trust fund, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.
Aggrieved, respondent appealed to the NLRC.
On April 9, 2008, the NLRC promulgated its decision10 sustaining the finding of constructive dismissal by
the LA, and the awards she made in the decision. The award of moral and exemplary damages, however,
were deleted.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration,11 respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
On February 26, 2010, the CA rendered a decision12 dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed
NLRC decision and resolution.
On motion for reconsideration, the CA issued the Amended Decision13 dated May 18, 2010, modifying
its earlier decision. Citing Section 6.5 (4) of Department Order No. 14 of the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE D.O. No. 14), otherwise known as Guidelines Governing the Employment and
Working Conditions of Security Guards and Similar Personnel in the Private Security Industry, the CA
reduced the computation of the separation pay from one month pay per year of service to one-half
month pay for every year of service; reduced the refund of trust fund contribution from Sixty (₱60.00)
Pesos to Thirty (₱30.00)Pesos; and deleted the award of backwages and attorney’s fees.
Hence, this petition anchored on the following:
GROUNDS FOR THE PETITION
8.0 The Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance in a way that is not in accord with law and
with applicable decisions of the Supreme Court concerning the Petitioner’s basic right to fair play, justice
and due process, with more reason that a conclusion of law cannot be made in the motion for
reconsideration.
8.1 The first decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on February 26, 2010 affirming the decision
of the NLRC awarding both backwages and separation pay of one month pay for every year of service
can only be set aside upon proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
8.2 Petitioners are entitled to backwages for the period covered from the time the Labor Arbiter
rendered the decision in their favor on August 20, 2007 until said decision was reversed by the Court of
Appeals in its Amended Decision promulgated on May 18, 2010.14
There is no doubt that petitioners were constructively dismissed. The LA, the NLRC and the CA were one
in their conclusion that respondent was guilty of illegal dismissal when it placed petitioners on floating
status beyond the reasonable six-month period after the termination of their service contract with
Banco de Oro. Temporary displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally, allowed in
a situation where a security agency’s client decided not to renew their service contract with the agency
and no post is available for the relieved security guard.15 Such situation does not normally result in a
constructive dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six (6) months, the
employee may be considered to have been constructively dismissed.16 No less than the
Constitution17 guarantees the right of workers to security of tenure, thus, employees can only be
dismissed for just or authorized causes and after they have been afforded the due process of law.18
Settled is the rule that that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.19 If reinstatement is not possible,
however, the award of separation pay is proper.20
Backwages and reinstatement are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee
in order to alleviate the economic damage brought about by the employee’s
dismissal.21 "Reinstatement is a restoration to a state from which one has been removed or separated"
while "the payment of backwages is a form of relief that restores the income that was lost by reason of
the unlawful dismissal." Therefore, the award of one does not bar the other.22
In the case of Aliling v. Feliciano,23 citing Golden Ace Builders v. Talde,24 the Court explained:
Thus, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. The two
reliefs provided are separate and distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible
because of strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay is granted. In
effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if
reinstatement is no longer viable, and backwages.
The normal consequences of respondents’ illegal dismissal, then, are reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights, and payment of backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to
the date of actual reinstatement. Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative. The
payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages. [Emphasis Supplied]
Furthermore, the entitlement of the dismissed employee to separation pay of one month for every year
of service should not be confused with Section 6.5 (4) of DOLE D.O. No. 14 which grants a separation pay
of one-half month for every year service, to wit:
6.5 Other Mandatory Benefits. In appropriate cases, security guards/similar personnel are entitled to the
mandatory benefits as listed below, although the same may not be included in the monthly cost
distribution in the contracts, except the required premiums for their coverage:
a. Maternity benefit as provided under the SSS Law;
b. Separation pay if the termination of employment is for authorized cause as provided by law and as
enumerated below:
Half-Month Pay Per Year of Service, but in no case less than One Month Pay, if separation is due to:
1. Retrenchment or reduction of personnel effected by management to prevent serious losses;
2. Closure or cessation of operation of an establishment not due to serious losses or financial reverses;
3. Illness or disease not curable within a period of 6 months and continued employment is prohibited by
law or prejudicial to the employee's health or that of co-employees; or
4. Lack of service assignment for a continuous period of 6 months.The said provision contemplates a
situation where a security guard is removed for authorized causes such as when the security agency
experiences a surplus of security guards brought about by lack of clients. In such a case, the security
agency has the option to resort to retrenchment upon compliance with the procedural requirements of
"two-notice rule" set forth in the Labor Code and to pay separation pay of one-half month for every year
of service.
In this case, respondent would have been liable for reinstatement and payment of backwages.
Reinstatement, however, was no longer feasible because, as found by the LA, respondent had already
ceased operation of its business.25 Thus, backwages and separation pay, in the amount of one month
for every year of service, should be paid in lieu of reinstatement.
As to their claim of attorney's fees, petitioners were compelled to file an action for the recovery of their
lawful wages and other benefits and, in the process, incurred expenses. Hence, petitioners are entitled
to attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the monetary award.26
Finally, as to the refund of the trust fund contribution, a perusal of the records shows that the amount
deducted for the trust fund contribution from each petitioner varies. Some petitioners were deducted
the amount of ₱15.00 every payday while others were deducted ₱30.00 every payday. Thus, the Court
deems it proper to refer the computation of the same to the LA.
WHEREFORE, the pet1t10n is GRANTED. The May 18, 2010 Amended Decision and the September 13,
2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 106643 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
April 9, 2008 Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, modifying the August 20, 2007
Decision of the Labor Arbiter, is REINSTATED.
The case is REMANDED to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings to make a detailed computation of
the exact amount of monetary benefits due petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
