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Realist conceptualisations of
power and the nation-state

Konstantinos Kostagiannis

PhD Politics
The University of Edinburgh
2014
THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH

THESIS DECLARATION

See the Postgraduate Assessment Regulations for Research Degrees available via:
www.ed.ac.uk/schools-departments/academic-services/policies-
regulations/regulations/assessment

Name of Candidate: Konstantinos Kostagiannis UUN S0897388

University email: K.Kostagiannis@sms.ed.ac.uk
Address : 10/1 Howden Street
Edinburgh
Post Code: EH8 9HL

Degree Sought: PhD in Politics No. of words in the main 72000

text of Thesis:
Title of Thesis: Realist conceptualisations of power and the nation-state

I certify:

(a) that the thesis has been composed by me, and

(b) either that the work is my own, or, where I have been a member of a
research group, that I have made a substantial contribution to the work,
such contribution being clearly indicated, and

(c) that the work has not been submitted for any other degree or
professional qualification except as specified

(d) that parts of Chapters I and II of this work have been used in the
following publications: Kenealy, D and Kostagiannis, K. “Realist
Visions of European Union: E.H. Carr and Integration” in Millennium -
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2013, pp. 221-246;
Kostagiannis, K. “Mind the gap between nationalism and international
relations: Power and the nation-state in E.H. Carr’s realism” in
International Politics, Vol. 50, No. 6, 2013, pp. 830-845; Kostagiannis,
K. “Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State” in
International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2014, pp. 513-529

Signature:

2
ABSTRACT

This thesis is a project of intellectual history which focuses on the development of

notions of power and the nation-state in realist thought. The main aim of the thesis is
to offer a comprehensive account of how different conceptions of power in the work
of various realist thinkers influence their perceptions of the nation-state. Although
both power and the state are considered as central to realism, their connection has not
been adequately discussed and remains largely implicit. The thesis aims at
illuminating such a connection.
The authors under examination are both key realist thinkers and representative of the
diversity of realist thought as well as of the development from classical to structural
realism. As such, the thesis focuses on the works of E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau (as
classical realists), J. Herz (as a transitional figure) and J. Mearsheimer (as a structural
realist). The thesis engages with each realist’s theory in a three-step process. First, it
analyses their conceptualisation of power and the role it plays in their ontological and
epistemological assumptions. Then, using that conceptualisation of power as a
starting point, it discusses its impact on the way the realist under examination
understood the nation-state. Finally, the way the aforementioned realists engaged
with the foreign policies of given nation-states is employed as an illustration of their
theoretical framework.
The thesis identifies a close interplay between power and the nation-state in all
realists examined. Power plays a central role in each realist’s ontology and as such
influences profoundly the way they conceptualised the nation-state. The latter can
thus be approached as a manifestation of power which is unfixed in time. The realists
examined approach the state as a historically conditioned entity. As such, it is argued
that it is power that constitutes the core analytical category of realism rather than the
state whose very conception is dependent upon that of power. In terms of the
development of realism, a process of gradual narrowing down of the concept of
power from classical to structural approaches is observed. The multifaceted
conception of power advanced by early realists is abandoned in favour of an
approach which understands power as material capabilities. While this approach is
compatible with a scientific vision of politics as manifested after the second debate it

3
reduces significantly realism’s analytical purchase both in understanding power and
the nation-state. This is evident in the precarious balance that neorealists have to
attain when theorising nationalism, the ideological corollary of the nation-state,
which can more fully be accounted for by classical realists. Finally, by removing
power from the field of epistemology, structural variants of realism lack the
reflexivity of earlier realists and as such find it difficult to engage in foreign policy
debates without compromising the core assumptions of their theory.
The thesis is structured as follows: In the introduction, the thesis is put in the context
of existing literature on realism and the way questions of power and the nation-state
have been addressed in the past. Questions of methodology and selection of authors
are also addressed in the introduction. The following four chapters are dedicated to
analysing the theories of the selected realists. The concluding section summarises the
findings and main argument of the thesis.

4
CONTENTS

Table of contents 5

Acknowledgements 9

Introduction 12
I. Realism, power and the state: the gap in the literature and the 13
research question
Preliminary remarks: Approaching realism(s) 13
Power and the nation-state in the literature about realism 17
The present project: research question and approach to realism 21
II. Methodology and structure of the thesis 26
On intellectual history: methodological issues 26
The selection of authors under examination 29
Structure of the argument and thesis outline 32

Chapter I
E.H. Carr and the resilience of flexibility: the three facets of power 35
and the nation-state
Introduction 35
I. Carr’s theory of International Relations 37
The philosophical foundations of Carr’s approach 37
Power in Carr’s epistemology and ontology 40
II. Carr’s conceptualisation of power 42
The multifaceted nature of power 42
Power, morality and change 46
III. Power and the nation-state 49
Power and the transformations of the nation-state 49
Moving beyond the nation-state 53
IV. Carr’s ‘showcase’ of realism: The Soviet Union 56
Carr and the History of the Soviet Union: some preliminary 56

5
 remarks
Utopia and Reality: The Soviet Union and the World 58
Ideologies and power: communism and nationalism 60
Concluding remarks 63

Chapter II
Hans Morgenthau and the tragedy of the nation-state 66
Introduction 66
I. Morgenthau’s theory of international relations 68
The critique of rationalist philosophy 68
The return to pre-modern verities: Politics as tragedy 70
Ontology, epistemology and power 74
II. Morgenthau’s conceptualisation of power 77
Power in International Politics: its nature and role 77
Order and chaos: limitations of power 80
III. Power, the nation-state and nationalism 82
The nation-state as the current mode of political organisation 82
Power, morality and nationalism 84
Power as the nemesis of the nation-state 88
IV. Tragedies that were and tragedies that might be 91
The tragedy of Germany and self-defeating nationalism 91
A tragedy in the waiting room: American foreign policy and the 94
hubris of idealism
Concluding remarks 100

Chapter III
John Herz and realism’s moment of transition 101
Introduction 101
I. Herz’s theory of International Relations 104
Herz and international relations: intellectual curiosity and 104
methodological pluralism
Survival in an irrational world: the ontology of the ‘security and 104

6
 power dilemma’
On epistemology: The ‘security dilemma’ and political thought 110
II. Herz’s conceptualisation of power 112
Power and international relations: its protean nature 112
The role of power in politics and its limits 117
III. Power and the nation-state 120
The nation-state as the unit of power 120
The ‘demise’ of the territorial state? 125
IV. Realist Liberalism and foreign affairs: Nazi Germany and the 130
United States
Concluding remarks 134

Chapter IV
John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism 136
Introduction 136
I. Mearsheimer’s theory of international relations 138
Foundations of Offensive Realism 138
Power vacuum: Mearsheimer’s epistemology 141
On power and ontology: a currency for international relations? 143
II. Mearsheimer’s conceptualisation of power 146
The nature of power 146
Limits of power 149
III. Power and the nation-state 152
The nation-state in offensive realism 152
Nationalism and power politics 154
Taming the nation-state? 158
IV. Mearsheimer and American Foreign Policy 161
US Foreign policy until 1989: a poster child for offensive 161
realism?
After the Cold War: The conflict between prediction and 164
prescription
Concluding remarks 168

7
Conclusion 170
Introduction 170
I. Findings of the thesis 170
II. Theoretical contribution of the thesis 174
The role of power in realist thought 174
The interplay between power and the nation-state 177
Implications of research on the study of realism 180
Concluding remarks 182

Bibliography 184

8
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The successful completion of this thesis would have been impossible without the
support of my supervisors. Dr Seán Molloy has been a knowledgeable supervisor
whose encouragement and support has been essential not only for the completion of
this thesis but also for my overall academic development. His advice and friendship
throughout those years have been invaluable. Dr Andrew Neal has provided me with
insightful comments and fresh ideas and was a great help in my effort to achieve
clarity for my argument. I am thankful for his support and patience during the final
stages of the thesis and the related administrative challenges.
I am also thankful to my thesis examiners, Dr Juliet Kaarbo and Prof Richard Ned
Lebow for engaging in-depth with my work and providing me with extensive and
thought-provoking commentary. I would also like to thank the editors and
anonymous reviewers of Millennium, International Politics and International History
Review for their comments on parts of this work that I submitted for publication as
well as the participants of various conferences where I presented parts of this thesis.
Several colleagues and friends from the University of Edinburgh and beyond have,
on various occasions, provided me with useful advice both on the thesis and on my
professional development more broadly. I am thus indebted to Prof Lucian
Ashworth, Dr Xavier Guillaume, Dr Vassilis Paipais, Dr Adham Saouli and Dr Nur
Abdelkhaliq. Speaking of professional development, I believe this is the place to
thank all the course conveners who offered me the opportunity to tutor for their
courses as well as my students at the University of Edinburgh.
The process of starting and finishing a PhD would undoubtedly have been far more
difficult without the friendship and support of fellow graduate students, several of
whom have by now obtained their doctorate degrees. Special mention should go to
two of my oldest acquaintances in Edinburgh. Dan Kenealy and Jan Eichhorn have
shared most –if not all- moments, good or bad, of my life as a PhD student. Dan and
Jan, thank you for your friendship and for working with me on various projects, past
and ongoing. I was lucky to have met people such as Victoria Loughlan, Lorenzo
Ranalli, Jaakko Kuosmanen, Eleftherios Antonopoulos and many others who made
the writing of the thesis a tolerable and even enjoyable process. I am thankful to all

9
the fellow inhabitants of 4.16 CMB for sharing that space with me and creating a
pleasant working environment. Shruti Chaudhry has been a delight and alongside
Katka Ockova should be thanked specially for the company they kept me in the final
long days of writing up. Inȇs Sofia de Oliveira should be commended for her bravery
in sharing a flat with a PhD student so close to submitting his thesis as well as for her
ample provision of port and cakes.
The beginning and completion of this project would have been impossible without
the moral and financial support of my family. My parents, Thanassis and Roula, to
whom this work is dedicated, have always been there for me and supported me in all
my choices. They have my deepest gratitude for all the patience they have shown in
the last three decades. I would also like to thank my brother Panagiotis for being a
refreshing influence and for taking interest in my work. Last but not least, I would
like to express my heartfelt thankfulness to Pigi Chroni, whom I met in the second
year of this PhD and who endured a relationship with this occasionally odd creature
that a graduate student can be. I am grateful for all the kindness that you have shown
me in these years and feel especially privileged to have you by my side.

10
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11
INTRODUCTION

In his defence of realism against emerging tendencies in international theory in the

1990s, Colin Gray made special reference to the enduring legacy of the realist
tradition. Such a tradition, and more specifically classical realism, he claimed, might
look unattractive in the wake of the Cold War but this does not necessarily make it
less accurate: “much that is apparently boring and old-fashioned happens also to be
true, or true enough”.1 It is the eternal truths of realism, he claimed, that can aid the
student of international relations to avoid confusing what is ephemeral for what is
lasting.2 It is the interrelation of two concepts central to realism, one of them
ephemeral and the other one lasting that this thesis seeks to elucidate. The lasting
concept is that of power, while the ephemeral one is the nation-state.3 Of course the
question of what is lasting and what is ephemeral does not necessarily have a
straightforward answer, especially within the context of a diverse tradition like that
of realism.
In the first part of this chapter, I will focus on the different ways that scholars in the
field have tried to tackle the diversity of the realist tradition. I identify two broad
approaches, one focusing on distilling a set of core assumptions common to all
realists and one emphasising the complexity of the school and the contrasts between
its different strands. While I do not aim to resolve the question of “what is realism”
the discussion of such approaches is essential for answering the key question of the
thesis. It is in the framework set by those two distinct attitudes that the discussion on
realism and its core concepts currently happens. As such, the role of power and the
nation-state in realism has been examined in the literature under both of the different
lenses outlined. In the second section of the part I examine the different ways power

1
C. Gray, “Clausewitz Rules, OK? The Future Is the past: With GPS” in Review of International
Studies, Vol. 25, Special Issue, Dec 1999, pp. 161-182: p. 182
2
Ibid. p. 164
3
The nation-state is for the purpose of this thesis understood as a distinctly modern manifestation of
the sovereign state, one that is associated with nationalism. The differentiation between the nation and
the state is essential since the two are distinct. Indeed, as Connor suggests, the very coining of the
term ‘nation-state’ “illustrated an appreciation of the vital differences” between the two. As such the
term ‘nation-state’ “was designed to describe a territorial-political unit (a state) whose borders
coincided or nearly coincided with the territorial distribution of a national group”. W. Connor, “A
nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group is a…” in Ethnic and Racial Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4,
1978, pp. 377-400: p. 382.

12
and the nation-state have been conceptualised in literature on realism. In the third
section, I identify the gap in the literature that I will try to address in the thesis and
explain my approach to realism. I claim that rather than trying to fit realism within
the narrow confines of a paradigm, it is more fruitful to approach it as a ‘family
resemblance’.
The second part addresses issues of methodology and provides an outline of the
thesis. More specifically, in the first section I explain my approach to intellectual
history and the way it is applied in this thesis. I claim that an approach that focuses
both on the text itself and its context is the most balanced way to address the
question. In the second section I justify the selection of the key realist authors under
examination, namely E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau, J. Herz and J. Mearsheimer. The
three criteria employed are that the authors under examination should be important
for the realist tradition; representative of its development; and that said realists were
willing to apply their theories to foreign policies pursued by specific states. Finally,
in the third section, I will explain the structure of the thesis and offer an outline of
the argument.

I. Realism, power and the state: the gap in the literature and
the research question

Preliminary remarks: Approaching realism(s)

When John Mearsheimer responded to his critics in an article titled “the more –isms
the better” he most probably did not have in mind more real-isms.4 Recent
scholarship by and about realists abounds and there is a marked proliferation of
realisms. Apart from the traditional categories of ‘classical’ and ‘structural’ realisms,
the debate between ‘defensive’ and ‘offensive’ realists within the latter camp, or the
introduction of ‘neoclassical’ realism, there is a continuing process of invention and

4
Mearsheimer was referring to –isms such as institutionalism and constructivism: J. Mearsheimer,
“The more isms the better” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 354-359

13
re-invention of new categories of realism.5 As a result, the same realist can be now
classified under several, often overlapping, subcategories of realism.6 Fortunately the
number of realist labels has not so far exceeded the number of realists available for
categorisation, but the literature on realism has become vast. The necessity to
somehow deal with what Gilpin, rather modestly, described as the ‘richness’ of
realist tradition has triggered two main responses.7
Both reactions can be traced back to the period following the publication of Waltz’s
seminal Theory of International Politics and his self-professed break with ‘classical
realism’.8 One response was to try and distil a set of core assumptions, common to all
realists, which can form the basis of a coherent realist tradition while glossing over
the existing tensions.9 Various efforts to approach realism as a paradigm fall within
this category. The number of core assumptions identified might vary from just one,
namely power optimisation in the model forwarded by Fozouni, to several as
displayed in the efforts of Vasquez, Legro and Moravcsik, Keohane and others.10

5
Writing in 2006, S. Molloy, counted a few realisms that could be added to the 49 already identified
by J. Der Derian in an earlier work. Der Derian’s realisms were not all related to international
relations, but given recent developments in the effort to recover older variants of realism the overall
number has most likely further increased. S. Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism: a Genealogy of
Power Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 149-150. The term ‘neoclassical realism’
was introduced by G. Rose in a review of works by R. Schweller, F. Zakaria, W. Wohlforth and others
to describe a variant of structural realism which integrates intervening variables at the domestic level.
G. Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” in World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1,
1998, pp. 144-172; for a summary of offensive vs defensive realism see: J. Taliaferro, “Security
Seeking under Anarchy” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2000, pp. 128-161. Brooks
attempted to introduce the label of ‘postclassical realism’ in 1997 which, however, has not gained
significant traction. S. Brooks “Dueling Realisms” in International Organisation, Vol. 51, no. 3,
1997, pp. 445-477.
6
Indicatively, Carr apart from a ‘classical’ realist is also a ‘critical realist’ for Babik and Falk, a
‘progressive realist’ for Scheuerman, and a ‘utopian realist’ for Howe.
7
R. Gilpin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and
its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 301-321
8
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979. For the differences
between his variant of realism and classical realism see: K. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist
Theory” in Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, pp. 21-37, passim
9
B. Buzan, C. Jones and R, Little, The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism, New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 2-5
10
For Fozouni, the key tenet of realism as derived from Morgenthau’s work is the claim that “power
optimisation is the only (i.e. a necessary and sufficient) determinant of international political
behaviour”: B. Fozouni, “Confutation of Political Realism” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol.
39, No. 4, 1995, pp. 479-510: p. 481. Vasquez, based also on Morgenthau, identifies nation-state
centrism, distinction between domestic and international politics, and the identification of
international politics as the domain of struggle for power and peace as the three main assumptions of
the realist paradigm: J. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics: From Classical Realism to
Neotraditionalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 52-59; J. Vasquez, “The
Realist Paradigm and Degenerative Vs Progressive Research Programs: An Appraisal of
Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Proposition” in The American Political Science

14
The second response was originally identified with early criticisms of neorealism
such as the ones coming from R. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, who emphasised the
differences between the two schools and, at least initially, represented a minority
position.11 R. Cox for instance attempted to recover a historicist realist tradition as
represented by E.H. Carr and explore its affinities to critical theory as opposed to the
gradual transformation of American realism to what he called a ‘problem-solving
theory’.12 Walker highlighted the tensions inherent in realism by focusing on the
distinction between historicism and structuralism and in a similar fashion Ashley
advocated a return to some of the insights offered by classical realists as part of a
model that “would more than surpass neorealism”.13
This tendency was continued in the early 2000s perhaps even more successfully than
previously due to the more favourable environment in IR theory by that time, as
Steele claims, by a number of authors he described as “reflexive realists”.14 What
unites authors like Lang, Lebow, Williams is for Steele their attempt to shift focus
from the explanatory theories offered by neorealism or neoclassical realism and
recover “classical realist principles of agency, prudence, and the recognition of
limitations”.15 One could add here the various efforts in recent scholarship that aim
at recovering important aspects of the thought of classical realists, often in direct

Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp. 899-912: p. 899. In response to the latter, despite emphasising the
diversity in realism that Vasquez neglects, Walt also identifies some key assumptions that all realists
subscribe to, namely state-centrism, international anarchy, and the centrality of power. S. Walt, “The
Progressive Power of Realism” in The American Political Science Review, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp.
931-935: pp. 932-933. Keohane’s three realist fundamental assumptions are similar to Walt but he
substitutes anarchy for the rationality assumption. R. Keohane, “Theory of World Politics: Structural
Realism and Beyond” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 158-203: pp. 163-170.
Legro and Moravcsik offer a version of the realist paradigm that comprises of three core assumptions:
rational, unitary political units in anarchy, fixed and conflictual state goals, and primacy of material
capabilities. J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?” in International Security,
Vol. 24, No. 2, 1999, pp. 5-55: pp. 9-18. For a critical evaluation of paradigmatic approaches to
realism see S. Molloy, The Hidden History of Realism, pp. 15-34. For the responses to the argument
proposed by Legro and Moravcsik see P. Feaver et al. “Brother, Can you Spare me a Paradigm? (Or
Was Anybody ever a Realist?)” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, pp. 165-193
11
B. Buzan et al, The Logic of anarchy, pp. 3-5; J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 45
12
R. Cox, “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory” in R.
Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 204-254
13
R. Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 255-
300: p. 297; R. Ashley. “Political Realism and Human Interests” in International Studies Quarterly,
Vol. 24, No. 2, 1981, pp. 204-236; R. B. J. Walker, “Realism, Change, and International Political
Theory” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1987, pp. 65-86
14
B. J. Steele, “‘Eavesdropping on honoured ghosts’: From classical to reflexive realism” in Journal
of International Relations and Development, Vol. 10, No. 3, 2007, pp. 272-300: pp. 291-292
15
Ibid. p. 273

15
opposition to the main premises that are represented by contemporary realists.
Revisionist historiography is not limited to realism but the latter is singled out as its
main beneficiary.16 Some of those efforts concentrated on re-investigating neglected
insights in the works of realists that by now are considered classics. The renewed
interest on realists like Carr, Morgenthau and Herz which was displayed in
monographs or edited volumes is an example of such efforts.17 Others are focused on
recovering the contribution of classical realists in the study of specific themes. Here
Scheuerman’s work on realist visions of global reform and Molloy’s challenge of the
paradigmatic reading of realism come to mind.18 Finally, there are collective efforts
that combine both approaches.19
Revisionist scholarship on realism certainly managed to reinterpret realism as “a
sophisticated, albeit amorphous body of political thought” as Bell claims, but the
recovery of this complexity comes at a cost.20 If realism is indeed as amorphous as
recent efforts have demonstrated and there are “nearly as many realisms as realist
protagonists” as Guzzini claims, then the question arises whether it makes any sense
to continue applying the label at all.21 Indeed some authors seem to believe that
realism is in fact too rich for its own good. The general label ‘realism’, they claim,
obscures so many differences that it would be preferable to abandon it altogether or
use its categories very cautiously and only as starting points.22 In the following
section, I will discuss how the key concepts for this thesis, power and the nation-
state, have been understood by those two broad approaches.

16
D. Bell, “Writing the World: disciplinary history and beyond” in International Affairs, Vol. 85, No.
1, 2009, pp. 3-22: pp. 6-8
17
For works on Carr and Herz, Ibid: p. 7; fn 16. For Morgenthau see indicatively M. Williams (ed),
Realism Reconsidered: The Legacy of Hans Morgenthau in International Relations, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2007; W. E. Scheuerman Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, Cambridge:
Polity Press, 2009
18
W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, Cambridge: Polity, 2011; S. Molloy,
Hidden History of Realism
19
D. Bell (ed), Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2009. For a more recent attempt see the relevant special issue in
International Politics: H. Behr and S. Molloy (eds) “Realism Reconsidered: New Contexts and
Critiques” in International Politics, Vol. 50, No. 6, 2013, pp. 735-894
20
D. Bell, “Writing the World”, p. 7
21
S. Guzzini, Power, Realism and Constructivism, London: Routledge, 2013, p. 111
22
W. Scheuerman, “The (classical) Realist vision of global reform” in International Theory, Vol. 2,
No. 2, 2010, pp. 246-282

16
Power and the nation-state in the literature about realism
As mentioned in the previous section, even within the approach that tries to identify
core elements of realism the identification of such elements varies from author to
author. The examination of the core assumptions collected in paradigmatic readings
of realism reveals that power is central to all of them and state-centrism to most.23 As
such, both concepts are considered central for the realist intellectual agenda for most
of the relevant literature. In this section I offer a summary of the way power and the
state have been approached in the existing literature. I claim that the concepts
themselves are often theorised insufficiently in an effort to fit realism into a
paradigmatic reading and examine how revisionist literature has contributed in
forming a more nuanced approach. First, I examine the notion of power since this is
present in virtually all secondary readings of realism. Second, I examine the
assumption of state-centrism.
The concept of power has been associated with realism in IR for so long that the
former is often interpreted as the exclusive domain of realism.24 For some
commentators it is precisely this centrality of power that accounts for the very
“continuity of the realist tradition”.25 Identifying power as the key element of realism
poses, however, a problem for the coherence of the tradition due to the indeterminacy
of the concept. Power is an essentially contested concept and, while Ringmar’s
insistence that IR scholars are particularly prone to displaying a poor understanding
of it based on intuition might have some merit, it does not imply that other fields of
political science have managed to tackle the elusiveness of power conclusively.26 A

23
From the paradigmatic readings outlined above it is only Fouzouni who singles out power
optimization as the core realist assumption whereas all other views include state-centrism in one form
or another. See, supra fn. 10
24
M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics” in International Organization, Vol. 59,
No. 1, 2005, pp. 39-75: p. 40; F. Berenskoetter, “Thinking about power” in F. Berenskoetter and M. J.
Williams (eds), Power in World Politics, London: Routledge, 2007, pp. 1-22: p. 1
25
B. Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?” in S. Smith, K. Booth, M. Zalewski (eds),
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 47-
65: p. 51; also see S. Molloy’s claim that the emphasis on power is perhaps the only thing that the
paradigmatic reading of realism got right. S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism, pp. 145-147;
Williams too claims that “power is central to any understanding of realism”: M. Williams, The realist
tradition and the limits of international relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 6
26
For power as an essentially contested concept see S. Lukes, “Power and the Battle for Hearts and
Minds: On the Bluntness of Soft Power” in F. Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power in
World Politics, pp. 83-97:p. 83. Since Dahl’s attempt to define power the inadequacy of previous
efforts to capture the elusive character of power is best demonstrated by the continuous addition of

17
second problem arises with placing power alone at the core of realism. Despite some
authors’ lamentations that realism’s monopolisation of power is preventing other
scholars from developing alternative discourses of power, the focus on power is not
exclusive to realism.27 As such, having not only an elusive concept at its core but
also not uniquely so, can bring to question the distinctiveness and coherence of
realism as a tradition.
The elusiveness of the concept of power often goes unnoticed in debates about its
role in realist thought. Most of the debate about realist conceptions of power, and
indeed most paradigmatic representations, focuses on the repetition of the idea that
realists approach power in terms of material capabilities with a particular emphasis
on military capabilities.28 Furthermore, it is often associated with R. Dahl’s famous
formulation that “A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something
that B would not otherwise do”.29 Indeed, if one summarises realist
conceptualisations of power as “the ability of states to use material resources to get
others to do what they otherwise would not”, as Barnett and Duvall do, the
connection between realism and Dahl’s formulation seems natural.30 Whilst the

‘faces’ to the concept. See R. A. Dahl, “The Concept of Power” in Behavioral Science, Vol. 2, No. 3,
1957, pp 201-215; P. Bachrach and M. S. Baratz, “Two Faces of Power” in The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 56, No. 4, 1962, pp. 947-952; S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005; P. Digeser, “The Fourth Face of Power” in The Journal of Politics, Vol.
54, No. 4, 1992, pp. 977-1007. Yet the concept remains controversial and elusive. Lukes attributes the
controversy around power to the fact that it is a ‘primitive’ concept i.e. a concept whose analysis
would involve the utilisation of other also controversial concepts: S. Lukes, “Power and the Battle for
Hearts and Minds”, p. 93. For Ringmar’s claim that IR scholars posses poor understandings of power
see: E. Ringmar, “Empowerment among nations: a sociological perspective” in F. Berenskoetter and
M. J. Williams (eds), Power in World Politics, pp. 189-203: p. 190
27
For the complaint that domination by realist conceptions of power hindered the development of
alternatives see indicatively: F. Berenskoetter, “Thinking about power”, p. 1; M. Barnett and R.
Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, pp. 40-42. There are however other approaches to
international relations that are centred around power. Buzan mentions feminism and Marxism as other
schools that focus on power: B. Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?”, p. 51. Power, albeit in its
productive rather than coercive function, is also of cardinal importance for poststructuralism: A. Neal,
“Michael Foucault” in J. Edkins and N. Vaughan-Williams (eds), Critical theorists and international
relations, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 161-170; J. Sterling-Folker and R. E. Shinko, “Discourses of
power: traversing the realist-postmodern divide” in F. Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power
in World Politics, pp. 244-264
28
M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, p.40; J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik,
“Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp. 16-18; D. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations” in W.
Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B. Simmons (eds) Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage, 2013,
pp. 273-297: passim; S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations” in
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 4, 2004, pp. 533-568: pp. 535-538
29
R. Dahl, “The Concept of Power”, pp. 202-203
30
M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, p. 40, pp. 49-51; F. Berenskoetter,
“Thinking about power”, pp. 47; E. Ringmar, “Empowerment among nations”, pp. 190-191

18
connection of realism to Dahl is somewhat inaccurate and should not be overstated,
the temptation to narrow down the concept of power in realism is understandable.31
In fact, some realists themselves have often contributed to this entrenchment by
favouring conceptualisations of power that focus exclusively on material capabilities
and their accurate measurement.32
The diversity of realist conceptualisations of power, however, has not gone entirely
unnoticed. Schmidt for instance cautioned against conceiving realist
conceptualisations of power in a monolithic way that does not do justice to the
diversity of the tradition.33 Molloy discussed the different conceptualisations of
power in classical realists to demonstrate that they do not fit the paradigmatic reading
of realism and that power is not for all realists analogous to money or synonymous to
coercion.34 And even within the body of literature that claims that the dominant role
of realist conceptualisations of power should be challenged, it is often recognised
that realists’ views on power often transcend the narrow interpretations normally
attributed to them.35
The second commonly associated with realist assumption is state-centrism. Bell
correctly observed that regardless of distinctions between classical or structural
realism, the school “is routinely defined in terms of its state-centrism”.36 Indeed one

31
Baldwin in particular has contrasted the realist “elements-of-power” approach to the relational one
forwarded by Dahl: D. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, passim. While realists such as
Mearsheimer have rejected Dahl’s conceptualisation, there are those who claim contra Baldwin that
realists are in fact attentive to the relational aspects of power. J. Sterling-Folker and R. E. Shinko,
“Discourses of power: traversing the realist-postmodern divide”, p.263: fn. 3; also Schmidt’s claim
that different realists can subscribe to either of the broad approaches Baldwin outlined or both: B.
Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of power” in F. Berenskoetter and M. J. Williams (eds), Power in
World Politics, pp. 43-63. For Mearsheimer’s views on Dahl see infra, Chapter IV.
32
This is revealed by the debate about the fungibility of power between realists and their critics. For a
summary see: S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, pp. 537-
544; for a more detailed overview: D. Baldwin, “Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends
versus Old Tendencies” in World Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2, 1979, pp. 161-194. Realists that are more
prone to emphasise the measurability of power derive the analogy largely from the construction of
neorealism as a theory of international relations based on microeconomics. See: K. Waltz, “Realist
Thought and Neorealist Theory”, passim; and infra Chapter IV, for Mearsheimer who also employs
the analogy.
33
B. Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of power”, pp. 43-63
34
S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 29-34
35
See for instance Barnett and Duvall’s comments on E.H. Carr’s realism and the comment of
Guzzini on classical realists in general: M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics”,
pp. 66-69; S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 544
36
D. Bell, “Introduction: Under an Empty Sky – Realism and Political Theory” in D. Bell (ed),
Political Thought and International Relations, pp. 1-25: p. 10

19
point raised often by critics of realism is its tendency to take states as given.37 This is
not to assume that realists ignore the variety of forms that political units can take
throughout history. As Waltz himself and several commentators of realism
acknowledge, units can take various forms ranging from empires or city-states to
modern states but they are ‘like units’ in that they diachronically perform similar
functions due to the external constraints imposed to them by anarchy.38 As such,
realism’s alleged state-centrism could be better defined as group-centrism as Gilpin
suggests.39 Of course, this preposition can too be challenged to the extent that it
assumes that all units will behave in the same way under a condition (anarchy) that is
presumed to be static. Much of the conversation about realism and the state has thus
been concentrated around questions about the validity of such a generalisation and
whether it is capable of effectively accounting for structural change.40 Under this
light, the criticism of realist state-centrism can be reformulated more realistically to
the criticism that realists tend to anachronistically universalise the experience of the
modern state.
The alleged state-centrism of realism has gained some attention in revisionist
literature. Works by revisionist scholars contributed significantly in recovering
classical realist visions of the state and challenge the dominant approach. Molloy
identified incompatibilities between conceptions of the state as displayed in the
works of Carr and Morgenthau and the paradigmatic reading of state-centrism.41
Scheuerman engaged with a wide range of classical realist authors in order to
demonstrate that not only they were sceptical about the nation-state but also that they
embraced the prospect of global reform.42 Bell observed that even for contemporary

37
See indicatively: M. Griffiths and M. Sullivan, “Nationalism and International Relations Theory” in
Australian Journal of Politics & History, Vol. 43, No. 1, 1997, pp. 53-66; R. Ashley, “The Poverty of
Neorealism”, pp. 268-273. Also, the discussion in: W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global
Reform, p. 39
38
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 93-97; see also J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is
Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp 12-13; for Mearsheimer’s similar take on states see infra Chapter IV
39
R. Giplin, “The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism”, pp. 313-318
40
See the excellent summary in B. Buzan and R. Little, “Waltz and World History: The Paradox of
Parsimony” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2009, pp. 446-463; also G. Sørensen, “‘Big and
Important Things’ in IR: Structural Realism and the Neglect of Changes in Statehood” in
International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009, pp. 223-239; J. Ruggie, “Continuity and Transformation
in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis” in R. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics,
pp. 131-157
41
S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 139-143
42
W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, in particular Chapters 2 and 3

20
realists the state should not be a core concept. What follows from assumptions of
anarchy and power, he claims, is not necessarily state-centrism but, rather,
sovereignty-centrism.43 To these works one can add the pioneering work of J. M.
Hobson who tried to transfer the ‘second state debate’ from sociology to IR. Through
his distinction between the domestic agential power of the state and its international
agential power he managed to offer an alternative angle of the way the state is
approached in realism. More specifically he claimed that there is a sharp distinction
between neorealists, who grant the state very high domestic agential power but no
international; and classical realists, who see domestic agential power as varying and
allow the state sufficient international agential power. This, he claims, allows
classical realism to engage more seriously with the state while neorealism actually
marginalises it.44

The present project: research question and approach to

realism
In the previous sections, I outlined the two broad approaches employed in the
literature to engage with realism and how they have been utilised to understand the
key concepts of power and the nation-state. In this section, I will first identify the gap
in the literature and the research question I seek to address with the present thesis,
namely to spell out the presently largely implicit connection between power and the
nation-state. Second, I will situate the present project within the two broad
approaches discussed. Although I do not purport to offer a concise definition of
realism I claim that the paradigmatic version cannot do full justice to the diversity of
the tradition and thus I situate the thesis within the revisionist literature.
As has been discussed in the previous part, both power and the state have been the
subjects of extensive discussion in the literature about realism both in its
conventional variant and in the efforts of revisionist scholars to challenge the former.
By demonstrating the mostly peripheral importance of state-centrism, revisionist
43
For Bell the state became so important for contemporary realism because of its increased
prominence, which led to its conflation with sovereignty in the relevant literature. D. Bell, “Anarchy,
power and death: contemporary political realism as ideology” in Journal of Political Ideologies, Vol.
7, No. 2, 2002, pp. 221-239: pp. 230-234. He repeated a similar point when addressing state-centrism
in classical realism where he concluded that “realism is not theoretically committed to any particular
type of political association”. D. Bell, “Under an Empry Sky”, pp. 10-11; p. 10
44
J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 1-14, pp. 17-63

21
scholarship has helped demonstrate that Buzan was accurate in claiming that it is
power that is probably the most persistent theme in realism. The precise relationship
between those two concepts however, has not been directly addressed. At the most
basic level, Buzan’s claim that the state is important for realism insofar as it “is the
dominant wielder of power in the international system” summarises the most obvious
connection between the two concepts.45 Power can be understood as something that
states possess and can exercise “over” other states. Supremacy in terms of power
accumulation can lead to state adaptation which mostly accounts for transformations
in the form of political units.46 This view, however, presupposes a conception of
power in terms of capabilities as represented by the conventional view of realism.
The connection becomes much less clear in existing literature when one takes into
account the diversity of realist conceptualisations of power. Hobson’s work, while
persuasively making the case for different levels of international agential power of
the state between classical and structural realism does not focus on the
conceptualisations of power underpinning the theories of the realists under
examination.47 Molloy recovered the complexity of realist visions of both power and
the state but his primary focus is to demonstrate the difficulty of realism to be
accommodated within a paradigm and as such does not deal with the connection
between the two extensively.48 The most detailed account of classical realism and the
nation-state comes from the work of Scheuerman. Not only does he focus on the
nation-state specifically (rather than the ‘state’ in general), but he also identifies the
importance for power both for the successes and for the expected downfall of the
nation-state in the work of classical realist authors.49 Scheuerman is mostly
concerned with demonstrating what classical realism has to offer in terms of
discussions in cosmopolitan theory and the potential of a world state. As such, while
he elucidates aspects of the connection between power and the nation-state, he does
so without focusing on the variety of realist conceptualisations of power. Secondly,
given the focal point of global reformism in his work, he does not examine any

45
B. Buzan, “The timeless wisdom of realism?”, p. 51
46
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 73-78, 127-128
47
J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 17-63
48
S. Molloy, Hidden History, passim
49
W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, passim but in particular pp. 39-97

22
structural realists since their scepticism towards the latter is grounded on a presumed
perpetuality of international anarchy.
In the present thesis, I aim at making explicit the connection between power and the
nation-state, a connection which is largely implicit or unidirectional in existing
literature. For that purpose, I employ as a starting point the diverse
conceptualisations of power found in realist authors. The recovery of realist
conceptualisations of power is, I claim, an essential requirement in order to
understand the different approaches to the nation-state offered by them. As such, I
will build on the insights gained by revisionist scholarship both on the complexity of
realist visions of power and the role of state-centrism in realism and develop them on
a direction that this scholarship has not so far focused on. Before outlying the
methodology of the thesis and the structure of the argument I will position the
present thesis within the two broad approaches outlined in the previous section.
The main argument in support of a paradigmatic reading of realism is that “realism
has become just one box in the typologies of the Inter-Paradigm Debate”.50 As such,
realism must be clearly demarcated in order to be distinct from competing
paradigms.51 I argue that this position is unsatisfactory. Guzzini’s claim that “all
classical realists have travelled on institutionalist or constructivism-inspired terrain”
is indicative of the problems associated with efforts to define realism narrowly.52 The
problem with this statement is not primarily that Guzzini, anachronistically, caught
the classical realists trespassing on ‘enemy territory’. For the classical realists
themselves, given the comparative novelty of constructivism and institutionalism in
IR, the claim would probably mean as much as it would to the ancient Romans if
someone accused them of trespassing on the territory of the Italian Republic. The
main problem is, rather, the implications of such narrow definitions for any
meaningful engagement with international relations’ theory.
Narrowing down realism or any other tradition for that matter, to only a few core
assumptions, can only aggravate the academic tribalism that is deplored by some
authors.53 Lake aptly summarised some of the pathologies associated with such an

50
S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 537
51
Idem. Also in J. W. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp.48-53
52
S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 544
53
See indicatively: D. Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as
Impediments to Understanding and Progress” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011,

23
approach. In their effort to identify “easily recognisable schools”, he claims, IR
scholars have of necessity to reduce subtlety and oversimplify; the need to innovate
encourages them to take more extremist positions; they mistake traditions for
theories and try to pit them against each other; they will be partial to evidence that
supports their own theories; and finally, they will strive for intellectual hegemony.54
While Lake paints a particularly bleak and somewhat exaggerated image, his remark
that such tendencies “transform research traditions into insular ‘sects’ that eschew
explanation in favour of theology” is revealing of the implications of such an over-
simplification for the sake of paradigmatic rigidity.55 The result of such a process is a
division of the discipline into warring tribes that often talk past each other.56
A second and related implication is the encouragement of the tendency to caricature
traditions one is critical of. This applies to all traditions and realists for their part are
not innocent of the practice as revisionist scholarship on the first debate
demonstrated.57 There are of course, practical reasons for the tendency to caricature,
especially given the broad scope of the discipline and the available literature. As
Scheuerman observes, “critics of realism have made things too easy for themselves
by embracing a simplistic and occasionally caricatured interpretation”.58 Given the
amount of existing literature illustrating the diversity of realist tradition, such a
position is untenable. Scheuerman is thus right to claim that, despite its obvious
practical merits, the replication of conventional wisdom is unsatisfactory for “anyone
who is committed to intellectual integrity”.59 For those reasons for the purposes of
this project I will not employ a paradigmatic reading of realism.

pp. 465-480; also K. Booth’s introduction in J. Mearsheimer et. al., “Roundtable: The Battle Rages
On” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 337-360: p. 337
54
D. Lake, “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil”, pp. 467-471
55
Ibid. p. 468
56
J. Mearsheimer et. al., “Roundtable: The Battle Rages On”, p. 337
57
W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 3-4; for the myth of the first debate see
P. Wilson, “The Myth of the ‘First Great Debate’” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24 (special
issue), 1998, pp. 1-15; L. Ashworth, “Did the Realist-Idealist Great Debate Really Happen? a
Revisionist History of International Relations” in International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 2, 2002, pp.
33-51; and more recently B. Schmidt, “Introduction” in B. Schmidt (ed), International Relations and
the First Great Debate, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 1-15 and P. Wilson, “Where are we now in the
debate about the first great debate?” in B. Schmidt (ed), International Relations and the First Great
Debate, pp. 133-151. Guzzini, despite advocating a narrow definition of realism, recognises that such
an approach might be criticised for being “consciously skewed in favour of realism’s critiques”. See
S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”, p. 537
58
W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 4
59
Idem

24
This thesis is a project that is complementary to existing revisionist efforts such as
the ones discussed in the previous parts. As such, particular emphasis will be placed
on the diversity of realism and the authors will be examined on their own merits
rather than subsumed to a pre-conceived set of assumptions. That said I am also
sceptical of the extreme manifestation of this way of approaching realism i.e. the
claim that the label is meaningless and it might be better to dispense of it altogether.
In their paradigmatic manifestation “isms” have been problematic, but as some
authors note, they still facilitated intellectual debate about theoretical assumptions
and commitments.60 One does not need to return to the rigidity of a paradigm in
order to salvage the utility of general labels such as ‘realism’. I rather propose to
approach realism here under a framework that allows for the use of the term but still
keeps intact the diversity of the authors that belong to the school.
As Hellmann notes in his response to Legro and Moravcsik, what realist scholars
share is not a set of assumptions, but family resemblances as defined by
Wittgenstein.61 For Wittgenstein, family resemblance does not require a
predetermined set of similarities since the latter can “crop up and disappear”.
Similarities form a “complicated network” and are “overlapping and criss-crossing”.
If one succumbs to the temptation of drawing a boundary for the term one tries to
define, that can only be valid for “that special purpose” for which the definition was
designed and corresponds to.62 As such, family resemblance can be employed to
signify that “individuality and similarity can be thought of as useful surrogates for
generality and identity”.63 When it comes to realism, the concept has been applied to
it by some authors in an effort to transcend the limits of a paradigmatic version.64

60
Jackson and Nexon for instance observed that “Participants may have overplayed… claims about
incommensurability, but their debates made clear that different theoretical and analytical
commitments can generate different conclusions about world politics” and added that critics of “isms”
often “tend to obscure the degree to which their own commitments are far from neutral when it comes
to studying world politics”. P.T. Jackson and D. Nexon, “International theory in a post-paradigmatic
era: From substantive wagers to scientific ontologies” in European Journal of International Relations,
Vol. 19, No. 3, 2013, pp. 543-565: pp. 545-547. See also H. Nau, “No Alternative to ‘isms’” in
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 55, No. 2, 2011, pp. 487-491
61
D. Feaver et al. “Brother, Can you Spare me a Paradigm?”, p. 173
62
See L. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Blackwell, 1968, paragraphs 65-69
63
D. Feaver et al. “Brother, Can you Spare me a Paradigm?”, p. 173
64
Idem. Also in: D. Bell, “Under an Empty Sky”, p. 3; M. Williams, The realist tradition and the
limits of international relations, p. 16; and particularly Jones’ paraphrase of Wittgenstein’s passage on
games to account for realism: C. Jones, E.H. Carr and International Relations: A Duty to Lie,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 5-6; p.6, fn 8

25
The flexibility inherent in such an approach allows for a study of different realists
that does not try to marginalise aspects of their thought that do not fit with
preconceived sets of assumptions. Furthermore, it allows for the reoccurrence of core
themes without having to limit them conceptually.

II. Methodology and structure of the thesis

On intellectual history: methodological issues

This thesis is a project of intellectual history which aims to examine the development
of the interrelation between the notions of power and the nation-state in realist
thought. In order to trace that development I focus on four realist authors that are
considered important figures in the discourse of realism and representative of the
development from classical to structural realism. Before outlining the structure of the
thesis, there is a series of methodological questions that ought to be addressed. First,
I explain how I approach intellectual history for the purposes of the present thesis.
Second, I discuss some issues faced by interpretative projects such as the present one
and how I will address them in this thesis. Finally, I justify the reason for selecting to
approach the question through individual authors.
In one of his early engagements with the topic, Skinner identified two conflicting
methods for approaching the history of ideas and found them both wanting. On the
one hand, the historian of ideas can focus solely on the text itself in an effort to
identify universal meanings regardless of the historical or social context of its
production. Conversely, the approach that focuses on the context of a text’s
production be it historical, social or cultural is placing more importance in that
context rather than the text itself.65 The problem with intellectual history, as Minogue
observed while criticising Skinner’s work, lies with the dualism inherent in ideas.
Ideas can be “abstract and universal” but at the same time, when uttered by a

65
Q. Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas” in History and Theory, Vol. 8, No
1, 1969, pp. 3-53; for a discussion of the applicability of Skinner’s framework in the study of
international relations see: G. Holden, “Who contextualizes the contextualizers? Disciplinary history
and the discourse about the IR discourse” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 28, No. 2, 2002, pp.
253-270

26
particular thinker they also become “a specific occurrence which has a spatio-
temporal location and a social context”.66 While philosophers are interested in the
first aspect of ideas and historians in the second, the intellectual historian is in the
unenviable position of having to identify the via media between the two.67
Perhaps unsurprisingly, efforts to identify an ideal balance or provide the ‘right’
methodology for engaging with intellectual history, including Skinner’s own
contextualism, have not been conclusive.68 The attempt to adopt the ‘right’
methodology might, as Minogue’s overview of different such methodologies reveals,
be problematic in that it commits the intellectual historian to a philosophical
background that is not necessarily helpful in addressing the question set.69 This,
however, does not mean that the insights gained through such debates should be
ignored. The most honest position seems to be one advocated in recent overviews of
the debate and hints to the direction that “either a pure universalism or a pure
contextualism” should be rejected in favour of the middle ground which allows for a
more pluralistic view of politics.70 As such, any effort to engage in intellectual
history should be able to take into account both the text and its context.71
For the purposes of the present thesis thus, both the intellectual background of each
author examined and the historical context of the period in which they were working
will be taken into account. I do not claim to offer the only valid reading of the
authors I am about to engage with. As Welch’s discussion of text interpretations
revealed, the reader “inevitably contributes something to a text that affects what he
or she gets out of it”.72 The authors examined here can be said to present a less acute
problem than the one discussed by Welch, namely that Thucydides is separated by

66
K. R. Minogue, “Methods in Intellectual History: Quentin Skinner’s Foundations” in Philosophy,
Vol. 56, No 218, 1981, pp. 533-552: p. 544
67
Idem.
68
D. Bell, “International relations: the dawn of a historiographical turn?” in British Journal of Politics
and International Relations, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2001, pp. 115-126: p. 116
69
He summarises his views as follows: “Even if he merely flips a coin in order to choose between
these and other forms of methodological salvation being marketed, the historian will find that he has
taken on board a cargo of philosophical theory on whose validity-not easily testable-his work as a
historian will be dangerously dependent”. K. R. Minogue, “Methods in Intellectual History”, p. 546;
pp. 544-549
70
S. Lawson, “Political Studies and the Contextual Turn: A Methodological/Normative Critique” in
Political Studies, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2008, pp. 584-603: p. 586
71
D. Bell, “The dawn of a historiographical turn?”, p. 116
72
D. A. Welch, “Why International Relations theorists should stop reading Thucydides” in Review of
International Studies, Vol. 29, No. 3, 2003, pp. 301-319: p. 312

27
modern international relations’ scholars not only by time but also by belonging to a
different ‘interpretative community’, but the core of the issue remains. While it is
impossible for the reader to extract the precise meaning of the text they study,
awareness of this limitation can help the reader to at least try and minimise the
projection of their own ideas upon the author under examination.73
The first aspect of the thesis thus entails a close examination of the original writings
and their background in an effort to recover the writers’ take on the question
addressed. Such an examination however does not merely aim to reconstruct
neglected aspects of the realists’ works but also to critically evaluate them in order to
identify their merits but also their limits and what they can contribute to current
debates about power and the nation-state. For that purpose, engagement with the
secondary literature on those authors, whether favourable or critical, is as essential as
the attention placed to the original texts. The approach followed in that context, does
not differ significantly from the “explicit reliance upon the exercise of judgement”
and the “scientifically imperfect process of perception or intuition” that characterised
what Bull described as the ‘classical approach’ some decades ago.74
The last methodological issue to be addressed regards the selection of the appropriate
way to engage with realists. In the first section of this introduction I outlined two
conflicting views about how we are to understand realism and claimed that, given the
limits of paradigmatic approaches, an engagement with a catch-all and
oversimplified version of realism is to be rejected. Other ways to offer a narrative of
the discipline that have been recently identified by Bliddal et al are ‘great debates’
and the study of classic texts. The first, as the authors claim, are problematic in that
they are often historically inaccurate. The second, based as it is on the study of
individual texts, can only offer snapshots of the development of the discipline and is
not applicable to a project of intellectual history that is focused on the development
of the interplay between two key concepts.75 As such the only option left is to follow
the fourth strategy of engaging with individual authors rather than paradigms or

73
Ibid. pp. 308-312
74
H. Bull, “International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach” in World Politics, Vol. 18, No.
3, 1966, pp. 361-377: p. 361
75
H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson, “Introduction” in H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson (eds)
Classics of international relations: essays in criticism and appreciation, Oxon: Routledge, 2013, pp.
1-12: pp. 6-7

28
particular texts. This too, is an imperfect approach since it is “particularly
predisposed to hagiography”.76 It is the only approach, however, that can be followed
if one is to keep both the idea of a realist tradition (even if in the broad sense outlined
in the previous part) and being attentive to the diversity of that tradition.
Furthermore, the problem of bias in favour of the authors examined can be at least
somewhat mitigated through critical engagement with the original texts as well as by
taking into account the work of other authors who often challenge said texts.

The selection of authors under examination

The examination thus of individual authors has been selected as the most appropriate
way to engage with the question of the thesis. In this section I will explain the criteria
for the selection of authors, namely why I restricted my focus to four authors and
why I selected the specific ones from the wide range of high-quality realist sources
available. In that sense, as I will explain in the following paragraphs, this project has
to deal with some problems that are common amongst efforts in the field of
intellectual history and the solutions selected are not dissimilar to those favoured by
other authors engaging in such efforts.
The first problem is the range of authors discussed. Ashworth outlined the limits of a
maximalistic endeavour which would entail the study of a wide range of authors
succinctly. Such an effort, he claims, “would give only a cursory understanding of
the various authors, while leaving no room for discussing the influences on, and the
contexts of, these authors”.77 Since the aim of the thesis is to recover the impact of
different conceptualisations of power on notions of the nation-state as displayed in
the more than 70 years of realist scholarship in IR, the only way of allowing an in-
depth engagement with said concepts is to restrict the number of authors under
examination. Such a restriction would also be compatible with the methodological
premise outlined above, namely that engagement with intellectual history
presupposes that adequate attention is paid to both the texts and their context. Having
established that in-depth engagement with a limited range of authors is preferable to

76
Ibid. p. 6
77
L. Ashworth, Creating international studies: Angell, Mitrany and the liberal tradition, Aldershot:
Ashgate, 1999, p. 7

29
superficial engagement with a wide range of authors, at least for a project of
intellectual history, the question of which authors needs to be addressed.
A set of three criteria was employed to identify the specific authors to engage with.
Similarly to the effort undertaken by Ashworth, the first criterion is that the
combination of their writings can reveal the development of realism.78 As such, the
authors selected should belong to different strands of realism and be representative of
different stages in its development. The second criterion is one of importance. The
realists under examination should be important figures that had considerable
influence on the development of the tradition. Things such as ‘importance’ or
‘influence’ of a certain author, however, are neither self-evident nor static in time.
There are of course, realist authors whose status as seminal is demonstrated by the
profound impact of their work on the discipline as well as from the continuous
engagement with such work and the general acknowledgement of that work as
groundbreaking in the literature. There are, however, others who despite being
neglected in contemporary discussions have been influential in earlier periods or
contributed key ideas that then attained a life of their own in the discipline’s
vernacular.79
A final, third criterion was employed in light of the effort to engage critically with
the realists in question. The way realists applied their theories to empirical cases is
not only indicative of the context in which those theories were developed but also
can help reveal inconsistencies, flaws or strengths of their respective theories that an
engagement with their theoretical premises alone would not take into account. As
such, the third criterion employed was whether the realist in question applied their
theory extensively in order either to understand the policies of specific states or
influence them (or most commonly, both). The selection of the authors to be
examined was based on the combination of all of the above criteria.
The authors selected for this thesis are E.H. Carr, H. Morgenthau, J. Herz and J.
Mearsheimer. The former two need little justification in terms of their importance.
They have been described as “towering figures” in realism and their work still

78
Ibid. p. 8. Ashworth applies this method to liberal internationalism
79
Perhaps the typology of classics developed by Bliddal et al despite being designed for texts has
some applicability to the authors of such texts too. For instance their ‘undisputed classic’ would
describe the first element of the discussion presented here whereas the ‘overlooked classic’
corresponds to the latter. H. Bliddal et al, “Introduction”, pp. 4-5

30
triggers vivid intellectual debates.80 J. Mearsheimer is one of the most important
contemporary realists and his Tragedy of Great Power Politics is already considered
by some as a classic in the field.81 The case of J. Herz is less straightforward. Until
recently, he was a relatively neglected figure who did not get the same attention as
Carr and Morgenthau in the revival of classical realism.82 As such, he is often
described as a secondary figure.83 There is, however, indication of a tendency to re-
consider Herz’s importance for the field and recover his insights as regards various,
and often unexpected, aspects of international politics.84 In addition to the renewed
interest on Herz in recent literature his importance for the purposes of the present
project is two-fold. First, like all aforementioned realists, Herz placed particular
emphasis on understanding the nature of the nation-state as part of one of his most
influential works.85 Second, despite being approached as a classical realist, Herz was
less sceptical than other mid-century realists as regards the turn to systems’ theory
and was willing to embrace some of its aspects. He can thus be understood as
encapsulating a moment of transition between classical and structural realism,
sharing elements with both worlds.
Perhaps the most obvious omission is the exclusion of K. Waltz from the list of
authors to be studied. Booth claimed in 2009 that Waltz was “the discipline’s
commanding theorist of the past half-century” and with this comment he certainly
captured the sentiment of many more IR scholars.86 The reason for this exclusion is
that Waltz subscribed to a strict methodological commitment which presupposed the
analytical separation between a theory of international politics and foreign policy.

80
W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 5
81
B. Schmidt, “A modest realist in a tragic world: John J. Mearsheimer’s Tragedy of Great Power
Politics” in H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson (eds) Classics of international relations, pp. 230-239
82
A notable exception was the special issue dedicated to J. Herz in International Relations: J.
Puglierin (ed), “A Universalist in Dark Times: John H. Herz, 1908-2005” in International Relations,
Vol. 22, No.4, 2008, pp. 403-528
83
As Scheuerman put it, Herz is a “relatively neglected today but widely respected at mid century
figure”. W.E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 6
84
See for example Scheuerman’s emphasis on Herz’s work on technology and social acceleration: W.
E. Scheuerman, “Realism and the critique of technology” in Cambridge Review of International
Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2009, pp. 563-584
85
C. Sylvest, “The conditions and consequences of globality: John H. Herz’s International Politics in
the Atomic Age” in H. Bliddal, C. Sylvest and P. Wilson (eds) Classics of international relations, pp.
89-98
86
The statement belongs to the introduction of a two-part special issue dedicated to the work of K.
Waltz in International Relations. K. Booth, “Introduction” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2,
2009, pp. 179-181: p. 180

31
This is not to claim, as is often assumed, that he neglected the latter; in fact as
Williams demonstrated, this was not the case.87 It is rather, Waltz’s insistence that
the same theory cannot account for both and therefore that different theories are
necessary that is problematic for the purposes of this project.88 Due to this position,
Waltz self-consciously lacked the unified framework that the other realists examined
here employed in order to examine the policies pursued by certain countries.89 As
such, his inclusion would not fit with the third criterion outlined above. Of course the
fact that Waltz is not the subject of a separate chapter does not imply that he can be
overlooked. His impact on the study of international relations is such that this would
have been impossible. He rather assumes the role that Ashworth assigned to “the
other protagonists” in his own project of intellectual history, namely that they
“appear, but in supporting roles that underscore their connections to both the
background events and the main characters”.90 Waltz is indeed in the background
both in the shift from classical to structural realism discussed in the third chapter, and
even more so in the fourth chapter.

Structure of the argument and thesis outline

In this final section I explain the structure of the thesis and offer an outline of the
argument. First, I provide an overview of the sequence of the four main chapters of
the thesis and why this particular approach was taken. Second, I explain the
organisation followed for each particular chapter. Finally, I offer an outline of the
thesis and the argument.
The thesis is divided into four main chapters, one for each of the authors examined.
The sequence of the chapters is intended to display the development of realism from
its early formulation by Carr to Mearsheimer’s variant of structural realism. The
pattern followed corresponds broadly to the actual sequence in which the most
important works of the authors under examination appeared, with Carr’s Twenty

87
M. Williams, “Waltz, Realism and Democracy” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2009,
pp. 328-340
88
K. Waltz, “International politics is not foreign policy” in Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1996, pp.
54-57
89
A more extensive discussion of this issue is located in the first parts of Chapter IV.
90
L. Ashworth, Creating international studies, p. 8

32
Years’ Crisis appearing in 1939, Morgenthau’s Politics Among Nations in 1948,
Herz’s Political Realism and Political Idealism in 1951 and Mearsheimer’s Tragedy
of Great Power Politics in 2001. It would have been, however, misleading to base
the organisation of the chapters solely on such a periodisation. With the partial
exception of Mearsheimer, who belongs to the present generation of realists, all three
remaining thinkers were intellectually active for roughly the same period i.e. the
middle of the 20th century.91
Even if one excludes Carr, who both made his debut earlier and then shifted his focus
to history, the careers of Morgenthau and Herz were largely overlapping. It is in their
case that the focal point of the thesis as a project of intellectual history plays a crucial
role. While Morgenthau can be solidly placed within the traditional approach to
international politics and opposed vocally the behavioural revolution, Herz was more
open to new approaches. As explained in the previous part, he can be understood as a
transitional figure between classical and structural realism. Consequently, despite
being a contemporary of Morgenthau, his examination follows that of the former and
serves as a bridging point between early realists and the work of Mearsheimer. It
must be clarified here that this order of authors, despite revealing some tendencies,
does not imply a linear progression.92 Despite, for instance a gradual transition from
intuition to more deductive approaches in terms of broad assumptions the same
trajectory is not evident when it comes to the central concepts discussed. As such,
this quasi-chronological ordering of authors does not necessarily imply that in every
aspect of the examined realists’ thought there was a clear progression to a pre-
determined endpoint.
Each of the four substantial chapters of the thesis is organised according to the same
pattern. This was deemed essential in order to make parallels or differences between
different authors more apparent. Each chapter is thus organised into four main parts.
In the first part, I offer some information on the intellectual background and
influences of each author in order to put their work in context. Then I proceed to

91
Mearsheimer is only a ‘partial’ exception because his early career overlapped with the late careers
of Morgenthau and Herz, especially Herz.
92
I am here in agreement with the caveat of Williams in a similar project: “I am most certainly not
arguing that they represent a linear progression in which each successive thinker incorporates and
supersedes preceding ideas” M. Williams, The realist tradition and the limits of international
relations, p. 16

33
examine the role of power in their ontological and epistemological assumptions. The
second part examines their conceptualisations of power, its nature and the role it is
expected to perform in their respective theories as well as its limits. In the third part I
examine the connection of said conceptualisation of power to the concept of the
nation-state. Finally, in the fourth part I demonstrate how the realists under
examination applied their theory in order to analyse past or present policies of
specific nation-states.
In the first chapter, I discuss the multi-faceted and flexible conceptualisation of
power in the works of E.H. Carr and how it led to an account that views the
development of the nation-state through the interplay between domestic and
international factors. I examine how his historical work on the Soviet Union
exemplified the practical application of his theory. In the second chapter, I discuss H.
Morgenthau’s view of power as a psychological relationship and how he projected
the animus dominandi to the collective level to account for the nation-state. The
empirical element comprises of the application of his theory retrospectively to
Germany during the two world wars and to American foreign policy during the
second half of the twentieth century. In the third chapter J. Herz is examined as a
transitional realist between classical and structural realism. I examine his
understanding of power as a protean concept and its interplay with his account of the
territorial state. The empirical aspect focuses on his engagement with the foreign
policies of Germany and the United States. In the fourth chapter, I examine the role
of power and the nation-state in J. Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. His engagement
with the foreign policy of the United States is employed in order to illustrate both the
consistency and the limits of his theory. Finally, a fifth concluding chapter identifies
the main contributions of the thesis to the study of realism, power and the nation-
state.

34
CHAPTER I

E.H. Carr and the resilience of flexibility: the three

facets of power and the nation-state93

Introduction
Carr was once described as a “modern renaissance man” with an immense range of
interests and an enduring legacy as an international relations theorist, a historian, a
biographer and a journalist (and a controversial one for that matter).94 When it comes
to his contribution to international relations theory, the discussion is most often
focused on his Twenty Years’ Crisis or -in the case of more detailed studies- on his
writings until 1951.95 After that, Carr is considered as lost for international relations,
since he then started working on his History of Soviet Russia which occupied him for
the next three decades of his life. The neglect of this –and other relevant- works of
Carr on behalf of international relations scholars is understandable. For the Soviet
Union is no more and Carr’s alleged preoccupation with its study as an agent of
change seems now irrelevant.96 Yet when read with one eye fixed on Carr’s
assumptions on international politics, this later work illuminates a considerable level
of consistency with respect to his understanding of international relations and the
cardinal factor that power is for domestic and international politics alike.97 Themes

93
Parts of this Chapter have been included in the following publications: D. Kenealy and K.
Kostagiannis, “Realist Visions of European Union: E.H. Carr and Integration” in Millennium -
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2013, pp. 221-246 and K. Kostagiannis, “Mind the
gap between nationalism and international relations: Power and the nation-state in E.H. Carr’s
realism” in International Politics, Vol. 50, No. 6, 2013, pp. 830-845
94
M. Cox, “Will the real E.H. Carr Please stand up?” in International Affairs, Vol. 75, No 3, 1999,
pp. 643-653: p. 645
95
The year of the publication of his New Society that marks his shift of interest from international
politics to history. According to Wilson, despite the existence of prior efforts that approached Carr’s
work as a whole, it was Bull’s influential article of 1969 that “did much to compound the view… that
Carr’s contribution to international relations begins and ends with The Twenty Years’ Crisis”. P.
Wilson, “Radicalism for a Conservative Purpose: The Peculiar Realism of E. H. Carr” in Millennium -
Journal of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1, 2001, pp. 123-136: p. 125; H. Bull “The Twenty
Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On” in International Journal, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1969, pp. 625-638
96
M. Cox, “Will the real E.H. Carr Please stand up?” pp. 652-653.
97
The overlap between the Twenty Years’ Crisis and his work as a historian of the Soviet Union has
not gone entirely unnoticed. See D. F. Duke “Edward Hallett Carr: Historical Realism and the Liberal
Tradition” in Past Imperfect, Vol. 2, 1993, pp. 123-136

35
that are so familiar to students of IR such as the dialectics of power and morality and
their uneasy compromise, as well as the role of ideologies and purposeful thinking
underpin Carr’s historical work inasmuch as they underpin his early work in
international relations.
In the first part, I explore the role of power in Carr’s theory of international relations.
First, I discuss the philosophical background of his work. There the figures of Marx
and Mannheim are of prominent importance. Carr embraced the sociology of
knowledge developed by Mannheim and integrated it into his peculiar dialectics of
power and morality. I claim that this move, placed power at the heart of Carr’s
epistemological and ontological assumptions. In the second part I explore Carr’s
conceptualisation of power and its nature and role. I claim that, rather than
representing a weakness of his theory, his fuzzy and multi-faceted conceptualisation
of power allows for considerable flexibility by taking into account both material and
ideational aspects of power. I also explore the role of morality as a factor that
mediates power but is ultimately conditioned upon it.
In the third part I examine the way Carr employed his understanding of power in
order to explain the rise, development and eventual decline, as he saw it, of the
nation-state. The nation-state emerges from this analysis as a political entity which
reflects the interplay of all facets of power both internationally and domestically. I
claim that Carr’s historically nuanced account of the nation-state and its
transformations is solidly based upon his conceptualisation of power and his views
on the conditionality of thought. His views about its political and moral bankruptcy
and the need to transcend it, are also based on that framework. In the fourth part, I
examine the History of Soviet Russia and the other works of Carr on the Soviet
Union under the light of the preceding analysis. I claim that the struggle between the
formal ideology of the Soviet Union and the realities of world politics as well as the
uneasy steps to address the question of nationalism represent for Carr a clear
manifestation of the complexities of politics and the uneasy compromise between the
forces of power and morality.

36
I. Carr’s theory of International Relations

The philosophical foundations of Carr’s approach

E. H. Carr has attained, as Molloy observed, “iconic status” in the discipline of
international relations.98 The devastating onslaught against idealism he supposedly
delivered with the publication of his Twenty Years’ Crisis during the first Great
Debate of the discipline probably played some role in achieving that status. Yet,
despite recent scholarship that questioned both the debate itself and the devastation it
caused on Carr’s targets, his work retains its attraction to scholars of international
relations and is the subject of renewed interest.99 As a result of the continued interest
on Carr, the –somewhat inconspicuous- philosophical foundations of his theory of
international relations have been uncovered to a sufficient extent.100 Carr has been an
eclectic scholar but there are two figures that are prominent in his thought: K.
Mannheim and K. Marx.101
Of crucial importance for understanding Carr’s philosophy, is his indebtedness to the
sociology of knowledge of Mannheim. In more than one instance Carr recognised the
influence of Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia on his own work.102 For Jones Carr’s
debt to Mannheim was great not only with respect to the rhetorical structure of the
Twenty Years’ Crisis but also –and to a greater extent- to methodology. Thus the
conditionality of thought which is prevalent in Carr’s critique of the utopians i.e. the
rationalisation on behalf of the powerful of their own position is a concept borrowed
from Mannheim.103 The critical technique of the sociology of knowledge is then -
Jones continues- twisted and displayed as the ‘realist’ extreme opposite to ‘utopia’,
allowing Carr to create a set of dichotomies to be resolved by his own propositions,

98
S. Molloy, “Dialectics and Transformation: Exploring The International Theory of E. H. Carr” in
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2003, pp. 279-306: p. 279
99
For a summary of recent scholarship on Carr see: D. Kenealy and K. Kostagiannis, “Realist Visions
of European Union”, p. 222: fn 1; for the myth of the first debate see Introduction: supra p. 21: fn 57
100
As regards the inconspicuous character of his foundations, Carr displayed a “powerful, though
unobtrusive, command of modern philosophy”. S. Molloy, “Dialectics and Transformation”, p. 281
101
The first author who identified those influences was, according to Wilson, Johnston back in 1967:
P. Wilson, “Radicalism for a Conservative Purpose”, pp. 125-126; W. Johnston “E.H. Carr’s Theory
of International Relations: A Critique”, The Journal of Politics, Vol. 29, No 4, 1967, pp. 861-884
102
See E.H. Carr “An Autobiography” in M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2000, pp. xiii-xxii: p. xvii and E. H. Carr The Twenty Years’ Crisis: an
Introduction to the Study of International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, p. cvii
103
C. Jones “Carr, Mannheim, and a Post-positivist Science of International Relations” in Political
Studies. XLV, 1997, pp. 232-246: p. 236

37
artificially presented as the middle ground.104 This assessment, however, does not do
full justice to Carr.
Carr indeed identified the sociology of knowledge with consistent realism, as Jones
claims, when he discussed the dead end to which the latter leads. Realism can be
sterile, thus necessitating the uneasy compromise between reality and utopia.105
Similarly, the sociology of thought might be irreplaceable in “unmasking” absolutes,
but unless it proposes a “sort of middle ground” it is at risk of degrading to an
“intolerably negative relativism”.106 If Carr identified the sociology of knowledge
with the one extreme of his theory this does not necessarily imply that it represents
merely part of a rhetorical devise. It rather indicates the acute awareness of Carr to
the further implications of the consistent application of the method i.e. the
omnipresent risk of relativism. The question is thus to find a new “standard of value”
and as Carr examined the two possible answers that Mannheim gave i.e. “a nakedly
pragmatical belief in power” and a “supra-temporal Reason” he ironically echoed the
criticisms his own approach received.107 Carr thus delegated the sociology of
knowledge to the one extreme of his dialectics because he was fully aware of the
implications of its consistent application.
Second, the dialectical scheme Carr used is much more than a rhetorical device
employed to make the moderate reader sympathetic to his view. It is rather a mode of
analysis that Carr utilised consistently regardless of whether he wrote about
international relations, the philosophy of history or about the history of the Soviet
Union. In historical works such as his massive History of Soviet Russia Carr was also
interested in the interaction of reality and utopia and the possible compromises
between them. And it is in What is History? where Carr employed a set of dialectical
opposites in approaching historiography and once more suggested a middle
approach.108 Perhaps unsurprisingly, as when dealing with international relations, he

104
Ibid. pp 236-239.
105
E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 9-10.
106
E.H. Carr, “Karl Mannheim” (1953) in E.H. Carr From Napoleon to Stalin and Other Essays,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 177-183; similar ideas are discussed in E.H. Carr, The
Soviet Impact on the Western World, London: Macmillan, 1947, pp. 92-97
107
E.H. Carr, “Karl Mannheim” pp. 181-183. I discuss Carr’s relativism more extensively in the
following section.
108
Determinism vs free will, society vs individual, circular vs linear history are only some of the pairs
he utilises. E.H. Carr, What is History?, London: Penguin, 1987, passim

38
also evoked the criticism of creating ‘false oppositions’.109 As regards international
relations, as Molloy demonstrated, the dialectics of utopia and reality is not used as
merely ‘camouflage’ but constitutes the basis for a “positive theory of IR”.110 Indeed
Carr’s efforts to make sense of international relations and change in the works that
followed the Twenty Years’ Crisis were constantly informed by his anxiety to
suggest ways of overcoming the antithesis between the forces of morality and
power.111
As such, Carr’s dialectics can be better understood through his preference for an
inductive methodology which allowed him to employ eclectically elements from
different perspectives to tackle concrete problems without having to resort to
deductive reasoning. A dialectical scheme such as the one he employed was an
essential vehicle for that flexibility.112 It must be clarified that given Carr’s
eclecticism, his dialectics is influenced by but not strictly modelled after Marx or
Hegel. Carr might have authored a biography of Marx and he was positively inclined
towards socialism, but was no Marxist.113 His fascination was not grounded on Marx
the prophet of social transformation but on Marx the methodological innovator in the
development of tools to “uncover the sources of social behaviour” and to dissect
historical processes.114 Unlike the dialectics of Marx where thesis and antithesis give
their place to an entirely new synthesis, this is not the case in Carr’s dialectics where
synthesis entails a merger between the two worlds. Consequently, Carr’s dialectics
was a curious construct, rather eclectic in nature, that drew freely on “Hegelian,

109
A. Stephanson “The Lessons of What is History?” in M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal,
pp. 283-303, p. 287.
110
S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 55-57
111
Conditions of Peace (1942), Nationalism and After (1945) and the New Society (1951) were all
works intended both to analyse the international context and to prescribe ways to resolve the
contradiction between the forces of reality and utopia.
112
S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 52-57
113
A good overview is offered by Ticktin. Carr, he claims, was an honest student of Marx but one
whose understanding of Marxism was limited. H. Ticktin, “E.H. Carr, the Cold War and the Soviet
Union” in M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, pp. 145-161: pp. 152-154. Carr published a
biography of Marx in 1934, but he certainly was not happy with the outcome, calling it “a foolish
enterprise”: E. H. Carr, “An Autobiography”, pp. xvii-xviii; as Haslam remarks, the outcome was in
fact less significant than “the impact of the research on the author”: J. Haslam, The Vices of Integrity:
E. H. Carr, 1892-1982, London: Verso, 1999, pp. 53-54
114
E.H. Carr, “The Left Today: An Interview” (1978) in E.H. Carr, From Napoleon to Stalin, pp. 261-
275: pp. 270-271; E.H. Carr, “An Autobiography”, pp. xxi-xxii

39
Marxist, and Jamesian methodologies, with a Freudian twist” and should be read in a
more “non-progressive, Heraclitean” way.115
At the heart thus of Carr’s theory lie on the one hand the application of the sociology
of thought in order to unmask the conditionality of purported absolutes, and on the
other hand a dialectical scheme which attempts to identify compromises to practical
problems in an effort to correct the sterility of the former. Both elements are of
crucial importance for understanding the role power plays in Carr’s ontological and
epistemological assumptions.

Power in Carr’s epistemology and ontology

The sociology of thought Carr borrowed from Mannheim makes power central for
his epistemology. One of the main implications of its application, is that thought
itself is conditioned by the position of the thinker in time and space. As such the
process of thinking is not only relative to the interests of the thinker but also
pragmatic since it forwards his purposes. The duty of the realist when theorising,
does not stop at unveiling the conditional thinking of the utopians. He must go
further as to demolish the whole utopian edifice and reveal that the moral absolutes
are not absolutes at all but instead products of a dominant group that imposes them
on the subordinate groups as a means of perpetuating its predominance.116 In short,
the reality of power conditions not only the process of thinking but also morality as
the product of that process, and the duty of the realist scholar is to reveal that
underlying reality.
This position has important epistemological and ontological ramifications for Carr’s
theory. As Oren demonstrated, Mannheim was worried of the potential of the
sociology of knowledge to transform politics into “a chaotic contest in annihilating
opponents’ utopias” and attempted to insulate its study by attributing a special role of
apolitical detachment to intellectuals.117 Carr, however, was not persuaded since he
believed that analytical impartiality vanishes from the very moment the political

115
S. Molloy, Hidden History, p. 56
116
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 68-75.
117
I. Oren, “The Unrealism of Contemporary Realism: The Tension between Realist Theory and
realists’ Practice” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7, no. 2, 2009, pp. 283-301: p. 294, pp. 294-296

40
theorist decides to actively participate in political debates.118 The political theorist
thus occupies a peculiar role, which is tied to the inseparability of purpose and
analysis. Ultimately, “political thought is itself a form of political action”.119 Given
the inevitably purposive character of political science, the researcher is bound not
only to understand the forces that formulate modern society but also to propose
policies accordingly by anticipating the ideal balance between utopia and reality.
The second implication is that the conditionality of thought and thus morality, of
necessity grant the latter a secondary importance in Carr’s dialectics. His is a
peculiar dialectics of power and morality or reality and utopia and their uneasy but
necessary reconciliation that lies at the heart of sound political thought.120 This
dialectical scheme is central in Carr’s understanding of power, since the weaker side
of the equilibrium i.e. morality plays a mediating role at the functions of power.
Power is for Carr constituting the ‘political’ more than any other factor. Although he
employed a set of opposites in order to better describe the dialectics inherent in
politics –i.e. utopia and reality; ideal and institution; morality and power- it is clear
that power has the principal role. Politics is not solely restricted to power, yet it
entails power nevertheless. What differentiates an administrative from a political
issue is that the latter involves a conflict of power.121 When it comes to morality, the
second element of politics, although it is deemed necessary for any sort of politics to
operate its role is significantly restrained. Morality is conditioned by power but the
equation does not work vice versa. Thus although morality might be essential for
politics the only way for its successful operation is that it is adequately grounded on
reality i.e. the domain of power.122 Morality thus remains the weak part of the
equation in such an understanding of international politics, always dependant upon
power and even more relative in international politics than it is in domestic.123

118
Idem
119
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis pp. 4-6.
120
Carr emphasises the essential compromise between power and morality as the basis of sound
politics repeatedly in the book. See indicatively: E. H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 10, 11, 84-88.
For the dialectics of utopia and reality in Carr see S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism, pp. 55-57
and C. Jones, A duty to lie, pp. 54-60.
121
E. H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p 97.
122
Ibid. pp. 135-153.
123
Molloy observes that Carr recognised the existence of an objective morality but also considered it
to be inconceivable and he rightly reminds us of Carr’s distinction between individual morality and
that of group-persons like the state: S. Molloy, “Hans J. Morgenthau Versus E.H. Carr: Conflicting

41
Power, consequently, plays a central role for both the epistemological and the
ontological foundations of Carr’s work. The unequal relationship between power and
morality in Carr’s dialectics, however, makes his theory vulnerable to charges of
relativism. In the following part, after examining the nature of role and nature of
power in Carr’s theory of international relations I will address the question of its
connection to morality and relativism in more detail.

II. Carr’s conceptualisation of power

The multifaceted nature of power

For Carr the importance of power stems from the “dual character of political society”
which is based on two “conflicting aspects of human nature”, namely self-assertion
and solidarity. As a result, politics is always going to be in flux and the best outcome
one could hope for would be a precarious compromise between power and
morality.124 This part of Carr’s work has often been interpreted as encapsulating
assumptions about human nature that are either informing his “ambivalent realism”
or offering evidence for his predominantly realist orientation similar to other
classical realists like Morgenthau.125 Whilst indeed Carr grounded his approach on
some general observations about how human societies operate, the connection with
Morgenthau for that matter should not be overstated.
In contrast to Morgenthau, Carr was not concerned with exploring the animus
dominandi as an anthropological condition. He would also have been at odds with
Morgenthau’s preference for the insulation of different spheres of human activity for
analytical purposes. For Carr any effort to study man in isolation from society and
the abstraction of the homo politicus as someone who pursues power alone is a
meaningless exercise.126 His insistence to engage with all aspects of politics at the

Conceptions of Ethics in Realism” in D.Bell (ed), Political Thought and International Relations, pp.
83-104: pp. 87-90.
124
E. H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 91-96
125
For the first claim see A. Chong, “Lessons in International Communication: Carr, Angell and
Lippmann on human nature, public opinion and leadership” in Review of International Studies, Vol.
33, No. 4, 2007, pp. 615-635: pp. 620-621. For the second see S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 56-57
126
E. H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 91-92

42
same time and his tendency to favour power over morality in his dialectics certainly
made him vulnerable to Morgenthau’s criticism that he lacked a “transcendent point
of view from which … to appraise the phenomenon of power.127 At the same time
however, his emphasis on the study of man as a social being allowed him to avoid
the determinism often associated with realist visions that are grounded on
assumptions about human nature.
For Carr individual and society are mutually constitutive and this means that such an
“elusive entity” as human nature can only with difficulty be understood in terms
other than “as a historical phenomenon shaped by prevailing social conditions and
conventions”.128 As such, it should be borne in mind that when Carr grounded his
approach to politics on human nature, this represents the bare minimum of empirical
observation about how societies operate diachronically. His is a notion of human
nature that is flexible and unfixed. As such, as Charles Jones observes when
examining his indebtedness to Mannheim, Carr differed significantly from
“continuity realists” like Hans Morgenthau and Herbert Butterfield and their a-
historical perspectives of human nature.129
Carr then grounded power loosely in a human nature which is malleable. His
conceptualisation of power itself is equally flexible. He never offered an explicit
definition of power as such and thus the closest his reader can get to his ideas about
the essence of power is his analysis of its three facets in the Twenty Years’ Crisis.
Drawing from and adapting Bertrand Russell, Carr presented the three facets of
power in international politics.130 Those were military power, economic power and
power over opinion. In the few lines preceding their analysis he offered crucial
information of his understanding of power. First, “power is in its essence an
indivisible whole”: the three manifestations of power are thus employed “for

127
H. Morgenthau, “The Political Science of E.H. Carr” in World Politics, Vol. 1, No 1, 1948, pp 127-
134: p. 134
128
E.H. Carr, What is History?, p. 33
129
C. Jones, A Duty to Lie, pp. 132-133
130
For a recent engagement with Russell and his connection to realism see C. Sylvest, “Russell’s
Realist Radicalism” in The International History Review (forthcoming); the adaptation of Russell’s
conceptualisation of power by E.H. Carr is traced by Hirst: P. Hirst, “The eighty years’ crisis, 1919-
1999— power” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, No. 5, 1998, pp. 133-148, passim

43
purposes of discussion” and are “closely interdependent”.131 As he maintained when
elaborating on each form of power, neither of them can exist without the others.
Carr went to great pains to dispel the identification of power with military might. By
insisting on the indivisibility of power he maintained that it is an illusion to separate
economics from politics.132 So far Carr does not seem to be far from contemporary
realists of the structural variant who tend to conceptualise power in terms of,
preferably measurable, material capabilities.133 It is, however, in the third facet of
power where Carr went beyond his successors and which merits particular attention.
Power over opinion, he claimed, “is not less essential for political purposes” than the
other two forms of power.134 Power over opinion is inextricably woven to the other
two forms of power and follows them closely. An ideology of international character
thus remains ultimately impotent unless connected to national power and therefore
propaganda is ineffective until it establishes clear linkages with national military and
economic power.135
There is, however, a limitation of power over opinion that is of crucial importance. In
contrast to military and economic power, when engaging with ideational power we
have to “remember that we are dealing no longer with purely material factors, but
with the thoughts and feelings of human beings”.136 What limits power over opinion
even more significantly than the discrepancy between facts and propaganda, which
deems any propaganda that does not correspond at least to an extent to reality futile,
is the fact that human beings “in the long run reject the doctrine that might makes
right”.137 The need for national propaganda to be camouflaged in the form of
international ideologies with broader appeal is for Carr the ultimate manifestation of
this limitation.138 In short, power over opinion is the facet of power where it meets,
and is limited by morality.

131
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 102
132
Ibid. pp. 102-120
133
B. Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of power”, pp. 52-60; see for example the discussion about latent
and military power in J. Mearsheimer, infra, Chapter IV
134
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 120
135
Ibid. pp. 120-130
136
Ibid. p. 129; for a more detailed account of the role of emotions in Carr see S. Molloy, “Spinoza,
Carr, and the ethics of The Twenty Years’ Crisis” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 39, No. 2,
2013, pp. 251-271: pp. 264-265
137
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 130
138
Ibid, pp. 128-130

44
It must be clarified here, that given the focus of Carr in the Twenty Years’ Crisis, he
examined primarily the importance of power for international politics. It is not
difficult to imagine that the three forms of power operating at the international level
can also be applied to domestic politics with slight modifications like substituting
military power with the coercive functions of the state. In fact prior to examining
power in the international domain Carr focused on the nature of politics, where his
main theme was the domestic society and the coercion exercised by the state. Even
when dealing with the international level, he easily shifted from examples derived
from domestic politics to similar ones in international affairs.139 As will be shown
subsequently, despite the differences between the domestic and the international
levels and the inapplicability of the domestic analogy, for Carr the two are closely
interrelated and when examined historically their distinction becomes blurry.140
In a generally well-informed review of Carr’s notion of power Hirst claims that the
three facets of power discussed above, are limited in that they solely concentrate on a
“capacity-outcome” conception of power. Such a conception is agent-centric,
quantifies power, identifies capacities post hoc through outcomes and, most
importantly, is largely outdated.141 While it is accurate that in the discussion of the
three facets Carr emphasised the importance of them for national policies, his
understanding of power was far broader than that. For instance his conception of
international law as a meeting point of power and ethics and as a function of the
community of nations, despite anchoring law to politics is not easily reducible to a
capacity-outcome view.142 As Barnett and Duvall have shown in their taxonomy of
power, Carr did not only see the compulsive traits of power. He was also attentive to
the institutional, structural, and even discursive facets of power.143 As will be

139
Ibid. pp. 91-95; pp. 97-102
140
For the inapplicability of the domestic analogy in Carr see G. Evans, “E. H. Carr and international
relations” in British Journal of International Studies, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1975, pp. 77-97: pp. 86-87
141
P. Hirst, “The eighty years’ crisis, 1919-1999— power”, p. 133, pp. 138-148. Interestingly and
tellingly for Carr’s complex views, he raised Fox’s criticism for exactly the opposite reasons i.e. that
his notion of power implies a total disregard of agency forcing states to adapt to external
circumstances. W. Fox, “E. H. Carr and political realism: vision and revision” in Review of
International Studies, Vol. 11, No. 1, 1985, pp. 1-16: p. 6
142
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 159-167
143
While Carr’s “explicit discussion of power was largely limited to its multiple instruments… that
could be used to overcome resistance” for Barnett and Duvall Carr was also aware of the ability of
international institutions to “institutionalise the interests of the powerful and work against those of the
weak”. He also, due to his indebtedness to Marx, identified the role of dominant ideologies in
indoctrinating states who then could more easily “submit to their own domination”. Finally, due to his

45
discussed in the third part, the three facets of power offered by Carr, cannot be
reduced to an agent-centric ‘capacity-outcome’ view that artificially separates
developments in international politics to those at the domestic level.

Power, morality and change

Power might be the most important factor in international relations but, as mentioned
already, Carr was acutely aware of the problems associated with the consistent
application of realism. Thus in his Twenty Years’ Crisis after demolishing the
utopian structure, Carr turned against the realist sterility which contradicts the very
nature of politics as the field of the struggle and uneasy reconciliation of the forces of
realism and utopia.144 Given, however, the primacy of power in his theory, there
remains the question of where Carr could look for the utopian element that can
complement realism. For several of his commentators, Carr had nowhere to turn to
because of his moral relativism.
The unequal relation between power and morality has been debated ever since the
Twenty Years’ Crisis was published. This was an issue that occupied several of the
first responses to the book raised by some of the ‘utopians’ Carr offended.145 The
main characteristics, however, of much of the discussion to follow Carr and his
notion of power were foreshadowed by Morgenthau with his review of the former’s
works on international politics. Morgenthau, after celebrating Carr’s efficacy in
demolishing the utopian structure of the nineteenth century, described his effort to
synthesise power and morality as the “Odyssey of a mind which has discovered the
phenomenon of power and longs to transcend it”.146 For Morgenthau, Carr failed to
offer a satisfactory synthesis due to his relativistic conception of morality, which led
him back to power. Lacking a transcendent moral standard, Carr ultimately becomes
a “utopian of power”.147 Much of the ensuing debate which surrounded Carr’s
approach to power has been exhausted to examining whether Carr was a relativist.

indebtedness to Mannheim, he was aware of discursive aspects of power in the establishment of

“acceptable practices and goals”. M. Barnett and R. Duvall, “Power in International Politics”, pp. 68-
69
144
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 87-88
145
P. Wilson, “Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to the Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1939-46” in M. Cox
(ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, pp. 165-197: pp. 181-193
146
H. Morgenthau, “The Political Science of E.H. Carr”, p. 129
147
Ibid. 133-134

46
Favourably disposed scholars tend to advocate that Carr never fully succumbed to
relativism, whereas less-favourably disposed scholars tend to repeat the verdict of
relativism.148
According to Wilson, even in this more realistic of his works, The Twenty Years’
Crisis, Carr compromised his relativism by accepting that on occasion the interests of
the dominant group do coincide with those of the community as a whole and that,
although never being too elaborate about it, he did “smuggle ethical foundations” in
his work.149 This view is partially supported by Carr’s later works on history. When
discussing the role of the historian Carr claimed that “his aims and purpose will
ultimately be derived from values which have their source outside history”.150 There
is then a set of abstract ideas that one can refer to and that may constitute
“indispensable categories of thought”.151 They, however, not only represent the bare
minimum but also -and perhaps more importantly- are empty shells lacking a pre-
determined meaning. Meaning is only given to them through their translation to
concrete policies that are inevitably conditioned by space and time.152 For Carr thus,
rather than looking in vain for extra-historical standards with which to pass
judgement on societies or historical phenomena, it is much more meaningful to
approach them “in their relation to one another”.153 Such views reveal, as
Scheuerman claims, that Carr was perhaps more attentive to the complexities of
modern morality than his critics who were fixed on traditionalist notions of ethics. At
the same time, however, due to this attentiveness he often failed to ask “tough moral
questions”.154

148
For examples of the former see P. Howe “The utopian realism of E.H. Carr” in Review of
International Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 1994, pp. 277-297. For examples of the latter see H. Bull “The
Twenty Years’ Crisis Thirty Years On”, pp.628-630; W. Johnston “E.H. Carr’s Theory of
International Relations”, p. 884. Also M. Smith as quoted in Howe describes Carr’s realism as an
“agnostic relativism of power” in P. Howe, “Utopian Realism”, p. 278
149
In his autobiographical note, Carr described the realism displayed in the Twenty Years’ Crisis as
“harsh”. E.H. Carr, “An Autobiography”, p. xix; P. Wilson, “Carr and his Early Critics”, pp. 187-189
150
E. H. Carr, The New Society, London: Macmillan, 1951, p. 18
151
E.H. Carr, What is History?, p. 82
152
E. H. Carr, The New Society, p. 18; also in E.H. Carr, What is History?, pp. 75-84; E.H. Carr,
Soviet Impact, pp. 92-97
153
E.H. Carr, What is History?, p. 83
154
Scheuerman claims that, despite the “philosophical demerits” of the traditional notions of morality
they embraced, Morgenthau and Niebuhr due to their commitment to transcendental moral standards
were immune “against some of the most disturbing political illusions of the last century” in a way
Carr failed to. Scheuerman has in mind Carr’s advocacy of appeasement and his enthusiasm for the
Soviet Union. W. E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 25-27

47
As such, Carr’s mere recognition of the existence of an objective morality cannot
provide sufficient grounds to conclusively absolve him of relativism.155 When
combined with his views about progress and change, however, it adds credence to the
view that his relativism was at least somewhat qualified. Carr believed firmly in
progress; not in a teleological sense that would imply an uninterrupted line towards
an end outside history but in “the progressive development of human
potentialities”.156 Progress rather involves the “transmission of acquired skills”
through subsequent generations, can face setbacks, and heads “towards goals which
can be defined only as we advance towards them” in a history with no clear end in
sight.157 This belief, that even in times that look desperate, there are always going to
be “new forces and movements” under the surface so that humanity still progresses
was Carr’s own “unverifiable Utopia”.158 It is this optimistic side, as evidenced in
his belief that humanity was gradually moving towards genuine mass democracy
combined with his awareness of the risks of relativism, which according to Howe
signified that far from being a relativist himself, Carr actually possessed an
“evolutionary theory of moral progress”.159
This emancipatory aspect of Carr’s thought has found favour amongst scholars who
often make reference to his moral project in order to display his affinity with critical
theory.160 Such scholars, however, as Babík correctly observed, tend to often
overcorrect towards the direction of critical theory.161 Carr’s pragmatism should not
be overlooked when dealing with his moral project because it is precisely the realist
155
S. Molloy, “Hans J. Morgenthau Versus E.H. Carr”, pp. 89-90
156
E.H. Carr, What is History?, p. 119
157
Ibid. p. 109-132; E.H. Carr, The New Society, pp. 116-118; see also the discussion in A. Heath,
“E.H. Carr: Approaches to Understanding Experience and Knowledge” in Global Discourse: An
Interdisciplinary Journal of Current Affairs and Applied Contemporary Thought, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2010,
pp. 24-46: pp. 43-46
158
E.H. Carr, “An autobiography” p. xxi
159
P. Howe “The utopian realism of E.H. Carr”, pp. 284-287; similarly, Jenkins ascertains that the
epistemological scepticism attributed to Carr with respect to historical studies is ultimately
unattainable due to his belief in progress. K. Jenkins, On ‘What is History?’ From Carr and Elton to
Rorty and White, London: Routledge, 1995, pp. 44-52
160
See A. Linklater, “The transformation of political community: E. H. Carr, critical theory and
international relations” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 23, No. 3, 1997, pp 321 – 338; A.
Linklater, “E.H. Carr, Nationalism and the Future of the Sovereign State” in M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr:
A Critical Appraisal, pp. 234-257; J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 59-61; R.
Falk, “The critical realist tradition and the demystification of interstate power: E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull
and Robert W. Cox” in S. Gill and J. H. Mittelman (eds), Innovation and Transformation in
International Studies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, pp. 39-55
161
M. Babík, “Realism as Critical Theory: The International Thought of E. H. Carr” in International
Studies Review, Vol. 15, No. 4, 2013, pp. 491-514: pp. 499-514

48
side of his approach that can determine which moral purposes are worth pursuing at
any given time. The ends towards which humanity strives arise within history, “not
from some source outside it”.162 As such, the task of the politician lies not only with
identifying which end is “morally or theoretically desirable” but also which part of
this moral purpose is politically feasible through the direction of “the forces which
exist in the world”.163 And, given the purposeful nature of political thought, the task
of the political thinker is to point towards the direction where power and morality
can be uneasily and temporarily reconciled.
This is precisely what Carr set to do with the works that followed the publication of
the Twenty Year’s Crisis. It is in these works, starting with Conditions of Peace that,
as Molloy claimed, the dialectical scheme of Carr fully materialises through the
advocacy of “systemic transformation through power to achieve a moral end”.164
Carr’s complex views about historical development, the interplay between power and
morality, the attempt to strike workable compromises between the two, and the
malleability of values according to conditions of space and time are all on display in
the way he tried to understand, and transcend, the nation-state.

III. Power and the nation-state

Power and the transformations of the nation-state

In the final pages of the Twenty Years’ Crisis Carr reflected on the potential of the
survival of nations as the main units of power in the future.165 There he dealt with
problems such as the optimum size of the units of power, the historically conditioned
162
E.H. Carr, What is History?, p. 119
163
Ibid. p. 128
164
S. Molloy, Hidden History, p. 163; fn. 30
165
Although Carr used the terms ‘nation-state’ and ‘nation’ interchangeably, he was particularly
attentive to their differences. In Conditions of Peace he made special mention to the confusion
between the two. The state, he maintained, is the “unit of political power” while the nation is a
community of people and the view that the two should coincide emerged only at the wake of the
French Revolution. In his later Nationalism and After he repeated a similar observation, while adding
some of the diverse definitions of the ‘nation’ in different parts of the world. He observed, however,
that “since the 16th or 17th century ‘nation’… has been the most natural word throughout western
Europe for the major political unit” and as such he often employed it to mean ‘nation-state’. E. H.
Carr, Conditions of Peace, London: Macmillan, 1942, p. 39; E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After,
London: Macmillan, 1945, pp. 1-2. For purposes of clarity in this chapter I use the term ‘nation-state’
when referring to the political unit.

49
character of national states, and the tendency towards integration; problems which
are clearly anticipating the arguments that followed in his subsequent work.166 In the
preface to the Second Edition Carr suggested that the reader consults his future work
on the subject since, according to his view, he accepted the nation-state as the main
unit “too readily” in this early engagement.167 In the years following the publication
of this first engagement, Carr went on to publish two other major contributions to
international relations, Conditions of Peace and Nationalism and After. A
characteristic of these further works is the gradual shift from a focus solely on
international relations to an account that is also attentive to developments at the
domestic level, or to follow Evans, the transplanting of the same core assumptions in
a different level of analysis.168
Carr’s periodisation of modern international relations into “three partly overlapping
periods, marked by widely differing views of the nation as a political entity”
provided a systematic account of the transformations of the post-medieval state.169
This transformation was displayed in terms of the interplay between the three facets
of power both domestically and internationally but also through the closely
associated prevailing ideas and notions of international morality. In the first period,
the modern nation-state gradually emerged from the ruins of the “medieval unity of
empire and church”.170 Political power was centralised to the person of the monarch
and economic power, in the form of mercantilism, worked alongside it to consolidate
the nation-state through imposing uniformity domestically and expanding its markets
through war externally. The purpose of these policies was “to augment the power of
the state” but at the same time they were consistent national policies, for the nation
was still identified with its rulers.171
The second period, starting from the end of the Congress of Vienna and lasting until
the outbreak of the Great War, was characterised by a remarkable compromise
between political nationalism and economic internationalism. Political power passed
to the middle classes and the tendency of the previous period “in asserting the claim

166
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 209-213
167
Ibid. p. cvi
168
G. Evans, “E. H. Carr and international relations”, pp. 79-87
169
E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After, p. 1
170
Ibid. p. 2
171
Ibid. pp. 2-6

50
of the nation to statehood” was further intensified. At the same time laissez-faire
economics, based on the expansion of the pie associated with industrial production,
replaced mercantilism as the dominant credo. The level of economic interdependence
achieved, however, lay for Carr not with the infallibility of liberalism but with
British economic and political supremacy throughout the 19th century. It was the
opening of the British market and the concentration of financial services in London
that allowed the delicate system to operate in a relatively impartial manner which
obscured the close interconnection between political and economic power.172
It is with this second period that the element of ideational power became increasingly
important. The passing of political power domestically to the middle classes signified
a crucial transition that Carr called the “democratisation” of the nation. At the level
of ideas, the identification of the nation with the “people”, gave nations a “popular
connotation” and the personification of the nation replaced the person of the monarch
in international relations as a necessary convenience. This move according to Carr
was of profound psychological importance since henceforth human traits and
behaviours were to be collectively attributed to nations.173 As long as the fragile
compromise of the nineteenth century persisted, however, the implications of this
move were not fully felt. When British economic and political supremacy crumbled,
the system which was founded upon it started disintegrating.174 The new nationalism
of the twentieth century would operate under an entirely new background.
The nation-state of the second period, serving the aspirations of the middle classes,
could comfortably be accommodated with economic interdependence through its
limited functions and the artificial separation of political from economic
aspirations.175 The transition from middle class democracy to mass democracy, or the
“socialisation” of the nation brought about a radical transformation of its character.
The newly founded political power of the masses meant that their economic
considerations such as social welfare gained in prominence.176 As such, the third
period was characterised by the alliance between nationalism and socialism which re-
established the unity between politics and economics. The main prerogative was now

172
Ibid. pp. 6-17
173
Ibid. pp. 7-11
174
Ibid. 17
175
Ibid. 21
176
Ibid. pp. 16-19

51
the welfare of the members of the nation-state and the augmentation of its power and
the world economy of the second period was replaced by the increasingly
protectionist national economies of the interbellum.177 Internationally, an originally
western European idea expanded globally through the proliferation of independent
nation-states as a result of the application of the principle of self-determination and
the benefits expected in terms of economic nationalism and industrialisation.178
In Carr’s narrative of nationalism thus, the concept of the nation changed to reflect
changing access in political power domestically, but at the same time was in close
interplay with international power as witnessed by the elaborate system maintained
under British supremacy. His analysis also reveals the increasing importance of
ideational power in the form of nationalism and its impact on the international
system and the moral edifice it supported. Any sense of international community that
existed during the first two periods was based on a common framework shared
between sovereigns initially and middle classes later. In the age of socialised nations
and exclusive nationalism, however, this framework vanished. Henceforth the wars
between nation-states were characterised by an unprecedented ferocity since the
target was now the whole nation. The purpose of war was also transformed to a
means of securing economic benefits for the victor and inflicting economic pressure
to the defeated. Finally, the very way modern democratically accountable statesmen
conducted and understood their obligations had changed, the ultimate obligation
being towards one’s own people and not towards an international society.179
What emerged from that ‘climax’ of nationalism then, was an ideology that gradually
became so powerful as to undermine the foundations of international morality and
ultimately determine the way that power itself was understood and employed. This
final phase in the development of nationalism illustrates the implications of both the
indivisibility of power and the continuous interaction between its different facets.
The description of propaganda in the Twenty Years’ Crisis as a modern weapon and
the prerequisites for its effective use bears remarkable resemblance to the social
setting of the third period of nationalism. Although power over opinion itself is old
enough, its impact in modern politics depends upon the increase in political

177
Ibid. pp. 21-24
178
Ibid. pp. 24-26
179
Ibid. pp. 26-34

52
participation that mass democracy allowed.180 Yet this characteristic is only peculiar
to the modern nation-state after its third period, and thus historically conditioned. At
least one manifestation of power, then, is in fact determined in its present and
particularly potent form by nationalism, demonstrating the power that an idea that
becomes entrenched can convey.
This is not to assume that a successful ideology can indeed substitute power in its
complexity. For the particular value of Carr’s insistence on the indivisibility of
power is precisely that the other two forms of power are imposing restraints to the
operation of the third. This allowed him to make the claim that the burdens imposed
on the modern nation-state by developments in the fields of military and economic
power would eventually signal the end of the age of nationalism.

Moving beyond the nation-state

For Carr the political unit is not to be conceived as a category outside history; and
neither are the forms of political organisation. “The structure of society at any given
time and place”, he claimed, “as well as the prevailing theories and beliefs about it,
are largely governed by the way in which the material needs of the society are
met”.181 The question is whether a form of social organisation is able to meet those
needs. In Carr’s view the nation-state was increasingly incapable of doing so. He
believed there was a clear tendency in the fields of military and economic power that
would eventually make the nation-state, and particularly a small one, incapable of
performing its main functions. Matched with the moral bankruptcy of nationalism,
these tendencies created for Carr the necessity to contemplate ways to transcend the
nation-state.
Mechanised warfare demanded the backing of enormous industrial capabilities, in
which small nations could not hope to follow the great powers. Thus while even as
late as the Great War they stood a chance for playing a role in the final outcome, by
1940 their resistance had “no more than a nuisance value”.182 The option of

180
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp. 120-122. Carr added more about the contemporary form of
propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy in his later Soviet Impact. There he maintained that
although propaganda “in the broad sense” is not new, its organised use is a result of the First World
War. E.H. Carr, Soviet Impact, p. 71
181
E.H. Carr, The New Society, p. 19
182
E. H. Carr, Conditions of Peace, p. 53

53
neutrality was also closed, since the great powers realised that it was more
convenient to violate it rather than give their opponents a possible advantage. Small
states in response, tended to surrender voluntarily their neutrality by relying more
and more on the military capabilities of great powers to ensure their defence.183 With
respect to the limitations imposed by economic power Carr claimed it played a more
important role than military power, even though its importance was often neglected
due to the outdated belief that the 19th century division between politics and
economics was natural. He emphasised the point that at a time when modern
industrial conditions in fact deemed concentrations of economic power inevitable,
the world was becoming politically even more fragmented thus accumulating
economic problems and insecurity. Put simply, the small nation-state could no longer
provide the level of prosperity expected by its population.184
Carr here observed a paradox in that the world was becoming even more politically
fragmented while the realities of power rendered the nation-state obsolete, an issue
also raised by other mid-century realists.185 For Carr the problem lay with the
application of Wilsonian principles in the aftermath of the Great War. By applying
the principle of self-determination uncritically, the peacemakers created a whole
number of small independent nation-states at the exact moment when the
independence of small units was becoming more nominal than real. Here the
conditionality of thought that Carr borrowed from Mannheim is of crucial
importance. For the identification of the principle of self-determination with that of
nationality though corresponding to the circumstances prevailing in Western Europe
where the two were identical, was completely irrelevant to the situation where multi-
national empires hitherto ruled. The main error thus of the peacemakers was their
failure to realise that a moral principle becomes inapplicable when regarded as
absolute and isolated from the political context that created it.186

183
Ibid. pp. 50-56
184
Ibid. pp. 56-60. Scheuerman spots an interesting, albeit superficial parallel, with Hayek in Carr’s
criticism of economic nationalism. The similarities stop in this criticism though, since Carr believed
that the resurrection of 19th century liberalism was an illusion and was sympathetic to socialism. W. E.
Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 55-58
185
For similar arguments in this thesis see infra under Chapters II and III. For an overview drawing
from a more extensive sample of realists: W. E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp.
54-66.
186
E.H. Carr, Conditions of Peace, pp. 38-48. Carr’s argument here can help clarify allegations about
his eurocentrism. Hobson for example, claims that the “ultimate irony” for Carr was that by

54
The transplantation of nationalism to “new and unfamiliar soils”, where the
European traditions could not limit it to the same extent, had catastrophic
consequences. For Carr however the moral challenge facing nationalism was not
only restrained to societies outside of its birthplace but a broader one. Insofar as
nationalism in its climax signified the “exaltation of the nation over the individual as
an end in itself” it was morally problematic.187 For Carr rights such as freedom and
equality were meaningful only for individuals and could only be approached as
metaphors, and dangerous ones for that matter, when applied to nation-states.188 As
some commentators have noticed, Carr indeed overlapped with critical theory in his
quest to discover a new moral framework upon which a new international society
could be built.189 Yet to go as far as to claim, as Hobson does, that in his effort to
transcend the nation-state Carr “ascribed a full autonomy to global moral norms” and
that it was the “realities of global morality rather than global power” that would
shape the new international order, is to underplay the significance of both his realism
and the dialectics of power and morality.190
Even in his most ambitious blueprints, Carr’s emphasis on the centrality of power
never vanished. What partially triggered the moral attack on nationalism, he claimed,
was precisely the failure of the nation-state to adequately provide for the security and
welfare of its citizens.191 The forces then, which brought about the nation-state in its
socialised form, were still active; what changed was the capacity of the nation-state
to address their demands.192 In his quest to identify ways to address those demands,

“conflating intra-European politics with the universal” in his account of nationalism, he echoed the
utopians he challenged in his early work. J. M. Hobson, The Eurocentric Conception of World
Politics: Western International Theory, 1760–2010, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, p.
193. There is, however, no irony here. Carr’s account of nationalism was self-consciously Eurocentric
precisely because he considered the phenomenon to be geographically and historically conditioned.
His account of nationalism never purported to lay claims to universality, as Hobson claims, because
he considered it incompatible even to realities in the east of Europe (let alone the rest of the world).
Gellner, who drew on Carr in developing his own theory of nationalism, was aware of that
conditionality and modified it by applying an additional layer of ‘time-zones’ to his own model. E.
Gellner, “Nationalism reconsidered and E. H. Carr” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4,
1992, pp. 285-293
187
E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After, pp. 32-34
188
Ibid. pp. 38-51
189
J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 59-61
190
J. M. Hobson, The State and International Relations, pp. 59-61. Falk’s analysis, despite also
exploring the connections with critical theory, is much more attentive to Carr’s realist side. R. Falk,
“The critical realist tradition and the demystification of interstate power”, pp.45-49
191
E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After, p. 38
192
Ibid. pp. 46-47

55
Carr embraced functionalism as the way forward. But his was not the functionalism
of the world state advocated by Mitrany.193 He cautioned against the “sentimental
and empty universalism” implied in such a solution and gravitated in favour of
regionalism which he deemed more “practical and workable”.194 His preference for
regional integration stemmed from his belief that the realities of power would
ultimately determine the form of the unit of organisation to replace the nation-state in
the same way they previously conditioned the development of the former.195

IV. Carr’s ‘showcase’ of realism: The Soviet Union

Carr and the History of the Soviet Union: some preliminary

remarks
Russia played a cardinal role in Carr’s intellectual development even before he
became interested in the revolution and its impact. It was his involvement with
nineteenth century Russian literature during his career as a diplomat that made him
sensible to the relativity of thought and the challenge towards the liberal moral
framework that originated from those “outside the charmed circle”.196 According to
his own account, his interest shifted to what was happening in Russia with its entry
in the Second World War and the dramatic change from the impotence of 1917.197
The outcome of Carr’s involvement with the Soviet Union was a massive set of
work, not restricted to his 14 volumes of the History but including several other
essays and books.
In a period so polarised as the Cold War, Carr’s mode of thought and his insistence
to avoid moral judgements when writing history gained him several criticisms. A
notable and often repeated criticism was that his determinist view of history resulted

193
On Carr’s functionalism and the European Integration see D. Kenealy and K. Kostagiannis,
“Realist Visions of European Union”, pp. 233-242; a very interesting discussion of Carr’s
functionalism and its connection to Mitrany with whose work he was most likely familiar is offered
in: W. E. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 76-81
194
E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After, pp. 44-45
195
Ibid. p. 51; pp. 51-60
196
E.H. Carr, “An Autobiography”, pp. xvi-xvii; also in K. Nishimura, “E. H. Carr, Dostoevsky, and
the Problem of Irrationality in Modern Europe” in International Relations, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2011,
pp.45-64
197
E.H. Carr, “An Autobiography”, pp. xvi-xx

56
in his siding with the victors.198 Although partially right, since from very early Carr
claimed that “what was, is right”199 this assessment is unfair. Carr was never an
ardent determinist and this is apparent in his handling of determinism in What is
History?.200 What he was sceptical of, was the theoretically conceivable but
unhelpful for a historian engagement with what might have been if things took
another, more favourable course, especially with respect to recent events.201 Haslam
does him more justice when describing this attitude as a “deep-seated fatalism”
closely related to Carr’s brand of realism.202
Carr’s attitude towards the Soviet Union changed through time –naturally according
to his own standards of historiography.203 Davies, who collaborated with him in the
writing of the Foundations of Planned Economy, described the latter’s changing
attitudes towards the Soviet Union until they were crystallised in the general
assessment of “a great achievement and a historical turning-point” from 1941 on.204
This is not to assume, as several critics have done, that Carr viewed the Soviet Union
as offering an alternative to western capitalism. Despite his belief in planned
economy as expressed in The New Society, Carr was aware of the peculiarity of the
Russian case and faced the Soviet achievements rather as a challenge that the western
world ought to answer.205 As some of his commentators already noticed, the motive
behind his interest on the Soviet Union was not the projection of the soviet
experiment as a successful utopia. He rather, and similarly to his previous
endeavours, saw the Soviet Union as a showcase of the necessary blending of utopia
and reality in politics, as demonstrated by a state that gradually abandoned its initial

198
I. Berlin criticised Carr for his “view of history as the story of the big battalions, and of progress as
being whatever those in power will in fact achieve”, a criticism repeated by Trevor-Roper. See J.
Haslam, The Vices of Integrity, pp. 200-204
199
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, p. 64
200
E.H. Carr, What is History?, pp. 91-108
201
He summarised his criticism, especially as regards contemporary history, as follows: “the trouble
about contemporary history is that people remember the time when all the options were still open”.
Ibid, p. 96-98
202
J. Haslam, “E.H. Carr and the History of Soviet Russia” in The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4,
1983, pp. 1021-1027: pp. 1023-1024; see also the excellent discussion by Duke who makes a similar
argument: D. F. Duke, Historical Realism and the Liberal Tradition”, passim
203
See E. H. Carr, What is History? pp. 34-42 whence the quote “two books cannot be written by the
same historian”.
204
R. W. Davies ‘Carr’s changing views of the Soviet Union’ in M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical
Appraisal, pp. 91-107
205
For planned economy see: E.H. Carr, The New Society, pp. 19-39; for the Soviet experience as a
challenge towards the western world to change see the concluding paragraph of: E.H. Carr, Soviet
Impact, pp. 115-116

57
revolutionary rhetoric and became normalised.206 In the following sections I focus on
the traces of Carr’s peculiar realism with respect to the development of the Soviet
Union and its attitude towards nationalism.

Utopia and Reality: The Soviet Union and the World

The initial impulse of the Bolsheviks with respect to foreign affairs was to treat their
condition as the first step to world revolution. Thus their first moves were the issuing
of the ‘peace decree’ and the publication of the secret treaties concluded by the
previous government, both intending to demonstrate their contempt towards
traditional diplomacy and their self-image as a force substituting national divisions
for class ones. Since the decree failed to evoke any reaction in western governments
it gave its way to a foreign policy that Carr described as “dual and in some respects
self-contradictory” i.e. the simultaneous effort to negotiate with capitalist
governments and thus ensure the survival of the soviet state and overthrow them and
spread the revolution.207 The tendency towards normalisation can be traced back to
that first period when the instinct of survival forced the Bolshevik to contemplate a
series of ideological concessions such as maintaining the authority of the state and
behaving as one.208 Yet the adjustment to the realities of international politics was a
very gradual process and at the first stages the Soviet Union suffered the
consequences of its dual policy.
The first test-case appeared within the first year of the establishment of the new
regime. The first priority of the Bolsheviks was to conclude peace with Germany and
although an armistice was signed at Brest-Litovsk from as early as December 1917,
the Soviets stalled while waiting for the German proletariat to rise. After some weeks
of negotiations the German generals, unimpressed by Trotsky’s formula of “no peace
no war”, resumed operations and advanced towards Petrograd. Facing elimination
the new regime finally accepted terms even harsher than those initially proposed and
peace was secured at February 1918. This failure, however, increased the feeling of
vulnerability and helplessness of the new regime and resulted in a hasty rebuilding of

206
M. Cox, “E. H. Carr and Isaac Deutscher: a Very ‘Special Relationship’” in M. Cox (ed.) E.H.
Carr: A Critical Appraisal, pp. 125-144: p 127; also: J. Haslam, Vices of Integrity p 144
207
E.H. Carr, A history of Soviet Russia: The Bolshevik Revolution, Vol. 3, Harmondsworth: Penguin,
1966, pp. 21-33
208
Ibid p. 32

58
a tactical army that ideally ought to have been abolished.209 Relations with Germany
represent a classical example of the dual policy followed by the Soviet Union. In the
aftermath of Brest-Litovsk the Bolsheviks found themselves negotiating with the
German government and at the same time inciting revolutionary activity to
overthrow it, a contradiction only obscured by the increasing ineffectiveness of
German authorities during the collapse of 1918. Bolsheviks saw Germany through a
“haze of ideological preconceptions” and heavily misjudged its politics. Yet only a
year after the failed communist rising of 1919 in Germany, Lenin could speak of a
natural alliance between the latter and Russia.210
A demonstration of that evolution is given by the way Carr understood the
Comintern. In the Twenty Years’ Crisis he briefly mentioned it as an exemplification
of the close association between national power and international propaganda.211 He
later engaged systematically with the institution not only in the volumes of his
History of Soviet Russia but also in two separate works: The Twilight of the
Comintern, 1930-1935 and The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War, published
posthumously. Through those works the reader observes the gradual fading of an
organisation aiming at coordinating the communist parties towards the expected
revolution. As the Soviet Union entered the 1930s with the doctrine of ‘socialism in
one country’ already consolidated, the prospect of world revolution was becoming
not only distant but also annoying for the Soviet leadership. As a result the
Comintern after its seventh congress in 1935 was already simply identifying its aims
with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.212 The way Carr examined the Spanish
Civil War is indicative of the new tendency: a party with marginal if any role before
the war (the Spanish Communist Party) gained gradually in importance and
participation in government because of the increasing dependency of the Spanish

209
All three elements of the sentence constitute ideological concessions. The army as an institution of
the old regime should be abolished in accordance to the Marxist doctrine; the militia that would
replace it should be recruited voluntarily; and finally the recruitment of members of the old officer
corps did not correspond to the ideal of a ‘class army’. Ibid pp. 69-78.
210
E. H. Carr, German – Soviet Relations 1919-1939, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1951, pp.
25-47
211
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis pp. 124-125
212
E.H. Carr, The Twilight of the Cominern, New York: Pantheon Books, 1982, pp 403-427. In a
review covering the topic, Carr claimed that given that the Third International was effectively “a
partnership between a single victorious party and a bevy of unsuccessful… aspirants for power” it was
only a matter of time before the former became identified with Soviet power. E.H. Carr, “The Third
International” (1952) in E.H. Carr, From Napoleon to Stalin, pp. 82-92: p. 90

59
republican government upon soviet aid. This process according to Carr “seemed to
have less and less to do with communism”; communism was now employed as a
façade for the forwarding of the Soviet foreign policy.213
This is not to assume that the Soviet regime ever quit from the aspirations for world
revolution. Carr observed that from such an early stage as the allied intervention the
ideological element of world revolution in soviet foreign policy was intensified, yet
informed by “the interest of national self-preservation”214. For Carr this dual balance
although gradually leaning towards the side of normalisation would never stop
haunting soviet politics. He thus described the dilemma faced by the soviet
leadership during the Sino-soviet schism as the persistent original dilemma between
beliefs in international socialism and national interest, ultimately between the
revolutionary principles and reality.215 Consequently, Carr viewed the Soviet Union
as an exemplification of the constant interaction between the forces of utopia and
reality that is the very “stuff of politics”. The balance between the ideal and the
institution will always be an uneasy one, as the soviet case demonstrated.216

Ideologies and power: communism and nationalism

The leadership of the Soviet Union then, had from quite early to adapt to the realities
of power in order to ensure its survival. What is also of particular interest, given
Carr’s approach to ideational power, is the interplay between the ideologies of
communism and nationalism in soviet policy. The doctrine officially embraced by
the Bolsheviks upon their ascendance to power was that of Marxism whose
programme of international socialism was incompatible with nationalism, the
aphorism of The Communist Manifesto that “the working men have no country”
being quite explicit. It would therefore require a great deal of ideological flexibility
to reconcile the two doctrines. The way that the soviet doctrine of self-determination
was developed by Lenin to reconcile the nationalism emerging from the ruins of a
formerly multi-national empire and the socialism of the Bolshevik programme is an

213
E.H. Carr, The Comintern and the Spanish Civil War, London: Macmillan, 1984, pp. 66-85
214
E.H. Carr, History of Soviet Russia, Vol. 3, p. 98
215
E. H. Carr, “Unfinished Revolution” in E. H. Carr, 1917: Before and After, London: Macmillan,
1969, pp. 174-175
216
E.H. Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, pp 88-95

60
indicative example of the necessary blending of utopia with reality in Carr’s
thought.217
Despite the variety of nationalities it encompassed, in pre-revolutionary Russia the
preconditions for active national agitation were limited: the local elites -as the most
likely bearers of nationalism- not only enjoyed a privileged position in the Russian
administration, but Tsarist authority also protected them from the revolutionary
potential of their respective peoples. The disintegration of this centralised system that
followed the revolution allowed for the removal of the fabric of common interests
that held the periphery anchored to the centre. The case of a permanent break-up like
in Austria-Hungary was averted according to Carr due to two peculiarities of Russia.
The first was the predominance of the Great Russian population vis à vis the other
nationalities; the second was the summoning of nationalism as a force eventually
reinforcing bolshevism. This paradoxical achievement is attributed to Lenin that
“recognised the revolutionary factors in nationalism, and had foreseen that the only
safe course would be to welcome and harness the torrent”.218 Thus by developing a
“conditional and dynamic” doctrine of self-determination allowing for secession, the
Bolsheviks were able to go through the civil war with considerable advantages over
their ‘White’ opponents. Russian patriotism was easily evoked against forces
supported by foreign powers and the connection of nationalism with social reform
resulted in the support of the agricultural population whose nationalism was mainly
characterised by economic grievances. The ‘Whites’ on the contrary represented the
old Russian tradition, not only hostile to social reforms but also to concessions
towards nationalities. Hence the Bolsheviks by way of recognising the right to secede
in a period when no one had the power to keep the state united, proved to be more
flexible and capable of “making a virtue of a necessity” than their opponents.219
The description of the process of disintegration and re-integration of the Russian
Empire is presented by Carr in a way that echoes the assumptions outlined in his
previous works on nationalism. Thus the success of each nationalism is viewed as

217
As regards Lenin’s realism in particular, Deutscher claimed that Carr was somewhat overstating
the case. In an otherwise favourable review of Carr’s work on the Soviet Union, Deutscher observed
that Carr was too eager to appreciate Lenin the statesman rather than Lenin the revolutionary,
reserving only “condescending irony” for the latter. I. Deutscher, Heretics and Renegades, and Other
Essays, London: Cape 1969, pp. 91-110
218
E.H. Carr, History of Soviet Russia, Vol. 1. p. 263
219
Ibid, 259-281

61
dependent upon the roots and social base of said nationalism and, equally
importantly, upon the regional power setting. Poland and Finland are presented as the
only two nations that possessed from the outset a native ruling class capable of both
leading the national movement and to run the nation once independence was gained.
Furthermore they both had substantial German support in their beginnings that
precluded their forceful re-integration into the Soviet Union.220 Ukraine and White
Russia on the contrary accounted for a quite different story. In the first, the
nationalism of the peasantry constituting the majority of the populace maintained
mainly anti-Jewish and anti-Polish characteristics. Furthermore, the economic
interdependence with Russia was much closer than in the cases of Finland or Poland.
As a result, the national movement of Ukraine, mainly evoked by a small group of
intellectuals without broad popular support, was never consolidated. Its leaders,
when faced with pressure from Petrograd, turned first to the French, then to the
Germans and finally to the Poles for support. This final move was to remove any
popular support that remained for the national movement, since it evoked the
hostility towards the Polish landowners. Bolshevik rule was thus re-established by
1921.221 The brief survival of the Transcaucasian Republics until 1920, suggested
Carr, was maintained by the fact that the power vacuum left by Russian collapse was
covered by them only with foreign support. When the latter withdrew, Russia was
ready to recover them.222
What one can infer from Carr’s account is the close interdependence between the
eventual success of a nationalist endeavour and the realities of domestic and
international power. Carr observed that the Bolshevik regimes established in several
of the republics after their secession would not be able to succeed without the
support of Moscow and the case was similar with their opponents. The ultimate issue
was thus not one of independence but whether the dependence would be on Moscow
or on a western capital.223 The underlying argument here is the same as in the
Conditions of Peace and Nationalism and After, although clearer since illuminated

220
German support proved more decisive in the case of Finland -where a civil war erupted between
Bolshevik-backed social-democrats and the government- and helped consolidate “the bourgeois
regime in Finland”. Ibid, pp 292-295
221
Ibid. 295-312
222
Ibid 350
223
Ibid. 273

62
by practical examples. The principle of self-determination had a very limited
applicability in regions east of Vienna, and was contingent upon the existence of a
set of preconditions that were similar to those in Western Europe. Furthermore the
realities of power and its regional distribution imposed limits to the independence of
small units, to such an extent that they could determine their very survival qua
independent units. Even when the Soviet Union developed its own variant of
nationalism, Carr approached it as being qualitatively different from the exclusivist
nationalism of the third period.224

Concluding remarks
Power then, informs crucially Carr’s assumptions about what constitutes the
‘political’ and thus can be traced in almost all his works including those that are
classified as historical. It is the fact that power lies at the core of Carr’s methodology
and his epistemological and ontological assumptions which allows it to underpin
consistently such a diverse set of works. The implicit, multi-faceted and elusive
conceptualization of power that Carr developed in the Twenty Years’ Crisis is an
important factor for this consistency. The three facets of power, distinct from each
other yet inescapably woven to each other, allowed Carr to employ his
conceptualization in order to investigate complicated social phenomena such as
ideologies, whose analysis would not fit in a conventional understanding of power in
terms of material capabilities. This flexibility allowed him to offer a compelling
account of the historical development of the nation-state.
His was an account that saw the nation-state emerging in the wake of the collapse of
the medieval order and transforming gradually to adapt to new political and
economic conditions. The main factor behind the transformations of the nation-state
was the interplay between domestic and international power. The strength of Carr’s

224
See for instance the discussion in Nationalism and After where he claimed that none of the
victorious powers was “nationalist in the old sense”. E.H. Carr, Nationalism and After, p. 36. Soviet
nationalism, he claimed later, always professed to differ “on the ground that it is built up on the
brotherhood of the many nations and races composing the Soviet Union”. Although Carr here seemed
too willing to take the soviets’ word for it, his criticism of western nationalism as resting “on the
unspoken assumption of the superior right of the white man” and his warning for the resonance of the
soviet appeal with anti-colonial movements seems rather fair. E. H. Carr, Soviet Impact, pp. 100-101.
Carr was not entirely consistent on the question of the novelty of Soviet nationalism. Indeed, his
discussion of Stalin after the latter died, credited him with resurrecting “the Russian national
tradition” (emphasis added). E.H. Carr, “Stalin” in Soviet Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1952, pp. 1-7: pp. 3-4

63
approach was that he realised that the nation-state was not a static entity. Its character
changed to reflect the increased access to political power of new social strata until it
encompassed the whole of society. The same was also true of economics with the
nation-state transforming to adapt to new economic conditions and to accommodate
the demands of those that wielded political power. Nationalism, as the ideological
corollary of the nation-state, also transformed to reflect changes in the field of power.
Yet ideas have a power of their own and as long as they keep corresponding to the
underlying social conditions this power is going to be potent.
Carr’s views on the conditionality of thought and morality allowed him to see the
nation-state as a historically and geographically conditioned entity. He, however,
never saw power as the only factor that determines political life, although probably
he saw it as the most important. He approached nationalism as an ideology that
attempted to strike a balance between power and morality, but such a balance can
only be precarious. When realities at the field of international power challenged the
defensibility of the nation-state both economically and politically nationalism too,
Carr thought, would become bankrupt. Its moral bankruptcy had already been
demonstrated when in its third phase it eliminated any surviving notion of
international morality. This belief led Carr, consistently with his insistence that a
compromise between power and morality is an essential condition for sound political
life, to contemplate ways to realistically transcend the nation-state.
Given his belief that sound political thought lay with providing a blueprint for
balancing, temporarily and uneasily, reality and utopia it is of no surprise that Carr
always tried to identify possible solutions. Of course, the diagnosis is always easier
than the prescription of a treatment and as Haslam noted Carr was often “too eager to
prescribe”.225 It is under the lens of the balance between the irreconcilable forces of
utopia and reality that Carr’s History of Soviet Russia remains particularly important
for international relations theory. For it clearly displays the process of normalisation
a revolutionary power has to undergo if it hopes to survive, while struggling to
maintain something from the utopia that gave rise to it. The experiment that Carr
hoped that might suggest possible ways out of the crisis or challenge the western
world to find new ways out might have failed. Carr’s volumes however, remain as an
225
J. Haslam, “Carr’s Search for Meaning” in M. Cox (ed.) E.H. Carr: A Critical Appraisal, pp. 21-
35: p. 26

64
excellent demonstration of his understanding of power and its functions, the
restraints it imposes on ideals, and the compromises reached in order to
accommodate the ideal with reality.

65
CHAPTER II

Hans Morgenthau and the tragedy of the nation-

state226

Introduction
The main focus of this chapter is the role power plays in Morgenthau’s approach to
politics as tragedy and its connection to the nation-state. I begin by putting
Morgenthau’s theory of international relations into the context of a critique of
rationalism that he first launched with Scientific Man vs. Power Politics. There is a
tendency in recent literature to uncover Morgenthau’s hidden motivations and
intellectual roots, which the author apparently camouflaged appropriately to make his
ideas appealing to his new audience after he settled in America.227 While mindful of
the contribution of such approaches, in this chapter I propose to take Morgenthau on
his own terms not the least because hidden motives are rather hard to verify. I thus
argue that Morgenthau’s eclecticism allowed him to draw from a broad range of
sources to create his version of realism. It is particularly the classical tradition, which
Morgenthau himself described as encapsulating the ‘eternal truths’ of politics, which
is of cardinal importance for understanding the core of his theory.
The contribution of the classical tradition on Morgenthau’s theory is twofold. Firstly,
it provides him with a clear distinction between different spheres of human activity,
exemplified by the distinction between the transcendental and the actual that is
central for his moral project. Secondly, that tradition offers Morgenthau the core
assumptions he employed about the nature of man and politics, namely the awareness
of the tragic element in human nature and the recognition that power politics is an
inalienable element of social life. The association of power with human nature,
based on the anthropological assumption of an inescapable lust for power, forms the
core of Morgenthau’s ontology and underpins his proclamation that interest defined
as power is the ‘timeless key concept’ in politics. Power has however a role to play

226
Parts of this chapter are published in a modified version which focuses more on tragedy in: K.
Kostagiannis, “Hans Morgenthau and the Tragedy of the Nation-State” in International History
Review, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2014, pp. 513-529
227
This applies particularly to thinkers like Nietzche and Schmitt that, is assumed, would make
Morgenthau uncomfortable in his new environment, had he admitted his indebtedness to them.

66
in his epistemology too. It is its identification as the ‘central concept’ of politics
which helps delineate the borders of the field and establish the autonomy of politics.
In the second part I focus on Morgenthau’s conceptualisation of power. I argue that
the explicit definition of power as a psychological relationship that stops short of
violence serves the purpose of insulating the political sphere from other social
spheres and at the same time defines the distinction between ends and means in
politics. If, however, the assumption that power constitutes the core of politics is
followed to its logical consequences then an unmitigated anarchy defined by
unlimited power drives would actually materialise. This, according to Morgenthau, is
not only prevented due to the mediating role of forces that oppose power such as
morality but also due to power itself, and particularly the operation of balance of
power. The latter he understood not in solely a mechanistic way but rather as a
concept that constitutes both an element of a pluralistic international society and a
normative prerogative. The common moral framework of the nineteenth century was
thus essential for the effective operation of the balance of power, but for Morgenthau
that framework was dissolved due to the rise of modernity and nationalism.
In the third part I examine the interrelation between power and the nation-state. The
nation-state, as the current mode of political organisation, has a twofold significance
for Morgenthau’s theory. Firstly, it provides the framework through which the
animus dominandi is transferred from the individual to the collective level. Secondly,
it provides Morgenthau the concept around which to anchor the central for his theory
notions of interest and power. The role of nationalism as the ideological corollary of
the nation-state permeates the fields of power and morality. With respect to the
former, nationalism is both an element of national power and the main culprit behind
miscalculations of national power. I claim that despite his criticism of the nation-
state Morgenthau’s theory is on occasion too closely connected to it due to the
important functions the concept is expected to play within the theory. Finally, I
discuss the limits imposed upon the nation-state and nationalism by power in general
and by power in the nuclear age in particular, which led Morgenthau to start
contemplating the idea of a world state.
In the fourth and final part of the chapter I examine the exemplification of
Morgenthau’s approach in the cases of the foreign policies of Germany in the first

67
half of the twentieth century and that of the United States during the Cold War.
Drawing from the themes discussed in the first three parts, I examine Germany as an
exemplification of an actual national tragedy triggered by self-defeating nationalism.
I approach the United States as the potential tragedy of a nation that succumbed to
idealism, a tragedy that Morgenthau sought to avert with his advice. Finally, with the
concluding remarks I bring the chapter in the context of the aims of the thesis and
relate Morgenthau’s views on power with those of E.H. Carr that I covered in the
previous chapter.

I. Morgenthau’s theory of international relations

The critique of rationalist philosophy

With Scientific Man vs. Power Politics Morgenthau launched a fierce critique against
the rationalist philosophy of the last three centuries and its fundamental assumptions.
He claimed rationalism, as the backbone of modern political thought, to be
fundamentally flawed.228 It is flawed ontologically since “rationalism has
misunderstood the nature of man, the nature of the social world, and the nature of
reason itself”.229 It is also flawed epistemologically since its blind belief in the
scientific approach, modelled after the natural sciences, offers neither a full
understanding of nor a remedy for the problems of the social world.
The anthropological assumptions of rationalism suggest that reason can be used to
understand both man and the world and bridge the gap between knowledge and
action.230 This assumption has profound implications. For it presupposes a false
identification of natural and social worlds under reason in the form of causality. The
methodological outcome is to model social sciences after the more advanced natural
sciences and emulate their methods. Morgenthau treated the result as one of utter

228
Morgenthau considered rationalism to underpin both liberalism and Marxism, and thus both camps
of the Cold War, despite their differences, shared -and suffered from- the same flawed philosophical
background. Hence when Morgenthau was referring to the dilemmas facing the scientific man, his
critique did not only aim at the western world but was a universal critique of modernity. This is
particularly apparent in H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, New York: New American
Library, 1972, p. 4
229
H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, Chicago & London: The University of Chicago
Press, 1965, p. 5
230
Ibid. pp. 122-123

68
failure not only because the social world is essentially different from the natural
world, but also because even in natural sciences the hitherto accepted degree of
certainty was gradually undermined.231 Morgenthau’s issue with rationalism was thus
that its “scientific dogmatism” failed to grasp the real attributes of human nature, a
sentiment he shared with contemporary American realists or even with some non-
American non-realists like Oakeshott.232
Liberal international relations’ theory, as the modern embodiment of rationalism,
suffers from the same vices. Liberalism in international relations, by combining the
experience of its domestic success and the philosophy of rationalism sees
international politics in terms of the domestic analogy. Thus international politics as
a domain defined according to pre-rationalist systems of thought by the struggle for
survival and power is essentially altered. Since states are modelled after individuals
in domestic politics, international relations are to be governed by the same rationalist
principles. The predominance of economics and trade over politics and the harmony
of interests over the struggle for power lead to a system of thought that negates
politics and replaces political conflicts with mere technical issues.233
Yet rationalism is not only flawed philosophically. It also suffers from historical
insensitivity. Even if rationalism’s philosophic premises are not flawed per se, they
do not correspond to the experiences of modernity. Taken as they are out of their
original historical context and treated as eternal truths they are utterly irrelevant to
reality. Thus, a philosophy originating in the clash between the rising middle classes
and the feudal state and mirroring the formers’ interests continues to inform a world
that has long since departed from this setting.234 In the resulting question whence
should modernity find inspiration to overcome the deficiencies of rationalism,

231
Ibid. pp. 122-136; In Science: servant or master? Morgenthau added to his critique of modern
science the moral shortcoming of failing to attain a meaning by either of the two historically available
options i.e. relation to transcendental values or immanent justification. H. Morgenthau, Science:
servant or master?, pp. 11-24
232
Interestingly, although Oakeshott agreed with Morgenthau’s verdict of rationalism, he considered
the latter’s views as a mirror image of that rationalism. If rationalism saw erroneously a bright future,
Morgenthau committed a similar error by looking nostalgically backwards: N. Rengger, “Realism,
tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in international political thought” in M. Williams (ed.),
Realism Reconsidered, pp. 118-136. For the common “theologico-political” and anti-rationalist
background of several of the early American realists see N. Guilhot, “American Katechon: When
Political Theology Became International Relations Theory” in Constellations, Vol. 17, No 2, 2010,
pp. 225-253
233
H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 70-121
234
Ibid. pp. 19-40

69
Morgenthau turned to the pre-rational philosophies, which he often invoked as a
sharp contrast to rationalist assumptions.235

The return to pre-modern verities: Politics as tragedy

According to Morgenthau’s verdict the liberals have been “forgetful of the historic
relativity of all political thought”.236 Yet not all political thought he treated as
historically relative.237 For political science presupposes the “existence and
accessibility of objective general truth”; and the continued relevance of classical
texts demonstrates their ability to transcend their historical context and express that
truth.238 Morgenthau thus, while denying universality to liberal values, was anxious
to dispel any notion of relativism such as the one he criticised Carr for displaying.239
Hence in his quest to identify the eternal truths of politics, Morgenthau turned to the
wisdom of the pre-rationalist philosophy, a philosophy he often contrasted to the
rationalist assumptions he was challenging. His attachment to pre-rationalism is
neither superficial nor, as Frei suggests, a mere act of camouflaging his real
philosophical roots.240
Pre-rationalism is on the one hand employed to demonstrate the clear distinction
between different spheres of human activity. Liberalism identifies politics, ethics and
science implying that a political action is ethically justified insofar as it follows a
scientific solution. On the contrary, pre-rational philosophy treats the convergence of

235
Although Morgenthau often invoked the pre-rational tradition in Scientific Man vs. Power Politics
it is in his Science: servant or master? that he employed pre-rationalism and discussed extensively the
“shock of wonderment” which reveals the limits of human experience but can also found the basis for
meaningful science. H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, pp. 24-34
236
H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, p. 20
237
Philosophies representing “eternal verities” are able to guide theory and practice irrespectively of
time and although rationalism is not one of them “there have been philosophies which were at least
partly of this kind”. Ibid. pp. 4-5
238
H. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, p. 36
239
S. Molloy, “Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau and the Political Ethics of the Lesser Evil” in Journal
of International Political Theory, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2009, pp. 94-112: pp. 96-98
240
Frei, perhaps too eager to trace Morgenthau’s thought back to Nietzsche, claims that the use of pre-
rationalism merely cloaks ideas he borrowed from Nietzsche in a language acceptable for the
American audience, given the latter’s hostility to Nietzsche. See C. Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: an
intellectual biography, Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Press, 2001, pp. 189. The same line of
argument is also followed by Neacsu: M. Neacsu, Hans J. Morgenthau’s Theory of International
Relations: Disenchantment and Re-Enchantment, Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 50-56.
Morgenthau’s eclecticism allowed him to accommodate both pre-rationalism and modern critiques to
rationalism in his approach, as will be shown in this section.

70
politics and ethics as a goal to be reached through virtue.241 What is more important,
the moral criticism of politics in pre-rationalism relies on a clearly conceived and
distinct notion of ethics. Thus, it denies the moral value of power politics without
having to deny the existence of power politics altogether as does liberalism.242 This
very distinction between the transcendent and the actual, which can never be
overcome due to human imperfection, is philosophically rooted to Plato and Aristotle
as shown by Pin-Fat.243 Such notions of distinct ethics, along with the moral value of
prudence, are explicit demonstrations of the impact of the pre-rational tradition on
Morgenthau.244
On the other hand, it is with respect to the very nature of both man and politics that
this philosophy offers the eternal verities Morgenthau sought. The first truth of the
pre-rationalist philosophy is the awareness of the tragic element in human nature.
The understanding of the existence of irreconcilable forces like evil and good, reason
and passion, peace and war, and the inconclusive struggle between them; the
experience of transformation of good intentions into evil deeds; and the glaring gap
between man’s understanding and the enigmas of the world are all experiences that
manifest the tragic element in human nature.245 For Frei and Gismondi this

241
H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics pp. 35-40
242
Ibid. pp. 42-46
243
V. Pin-Fat, “The metaphysics of the national interest and the ‘mysticism’ of the nation-state:
reading Hans J. Morgenthau” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 217-236
244
Frei correctly points out that although influenced by the analytical faculties and iconoclasm of
Nietzsche, Morgenthau refused to follow the normative connotations of his philosophy. C. Frei, Hans
J. Morgenthau: an Intellectual biography, pp. 107-108. Morgenthau drew eclectically from a corpus
of classical sources for his ethical projects. Lang demonstrated the Aristotelian implications of his
notion of prudence and the aristocratic universal morality he nostalgically recalled when lamenting
about the collapse of international morality in the age of nationalism. See A. Lang, “Morgenthau,
agency, and Aristotle” in M. Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered, pp. 18-41: pp. 26-33. The
importance of Aristotle is also prominent in Molloy’s analysis: S. Molloy, “Aristotle, Epicurus,
Morgenthau”, passim. For the impact of the Judaeo-Christian tradition see M. B. Mollov, Power and
Transcendence: Hans Morgenthau and the Jewish Experience, Oxford: Lexington Books, 2002, pp.
15-75 and A. J. H. Murray, “The Moral Politics of Hans Morgenthau” in The Review of Politics, Vol.
58, No 1, 1996, pp. 81-107
245
H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 205-208. In his review of the book
Oakeshott challenged Morgenthau’s decision to approach tragedy as a category of life rather than
simply one of art: M. Oakeshott, “Scientific Politics” in Cambridge Journal, Vol. 1, 1948, pp. 347-
358: p. 356. In his reply, Morgenthau refused to concede this “fundamental point”. The gap between
duty and ability is, he insisted, “a quality of existence”: H. Morgenthau, letter to Oakeshott, 22 May
1948. This exchange has gained some attention in the relevant literature: N. Rengger, “Realism,
tragedy, and the anti-Pelagian imagination in international political thought”, passim and R. N.
Lebow, The Tragic Vision of Politics: Ethics, Interests and Orders, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2003, p. 308

71
understanding of politics as tragedy is to be attributed to Nietzsche.246 Nietzsche was
by no means a stranger to tragedy, but his creative approach thereof was alien to
Morgenthau.247 That the latter was familiar with notions of tragedy established in the
pre-modern world, rather than a secondary loan from Nietzsche, becomes apparent
both in terms of form and –perhaps more importantly- of ethics.
Morgenthau’s “self-conscious” link with tragedy, to borrow Lebow’s phrasing, is
most clearly present in the works where he explicitly dealt with the tragic quality of
human existence.248 But the reader of most of his works cannot fail to realise that
Morgenthau’s very language and grammar very often followed the outlook of
tragedy. Hence the same “melancholy of wisdom that is informed by an awareness of
the irremediable folly of mankind, evoking the memory of Thucydides” that
Morgenthau once attributed to Louis Halle, echoes strikingly familiar to the reader of
his own works.249 When it comes to the ethical dimension, here too Morgenthau
differed profoundly from Nietzsche. The Nietzschean “gaiety in the face of the
unhuman”, as aptly put by Steiner, was foreign to Morgenthau’s notion of the tragic,
imbued as it is with a very distinct notion of ethics .250 In describing the tension

246
C. Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: an intellectual biography, p. 187. Gismondi’s examination of realist
notions of tragedy relies heavily on Frei’s claims for the section on Morgenthau. M. Gismondi,
“Tragedy, Realism and Postmodernity: Kulturpessimismus in the Theories of Max Weber, E.H. Carr,
Hans Morgenthau, and Henry Kissinger” in Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 15, No 3, 2004, pp. 435-
463
247
As Lebow noted, Nietzsche’s interpretation of tragedy tells us more about Nietzsche than it does
about tragedy: R. N. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 53-54. On Nietzsche, tragedy and
international relations see B. A. Schupmann, “A Pessimism of Strength? Tragedy and Political
Virtue” in T. Erskine and R. N. Lebow (eds), Tragedy and International Relations, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012, pp. 129-143; T. Strong, “Nietzsche and Questions of Tragedy, Tyranny
and International Relations”, ibid. pp. 144-157
248
R. N. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 48-50. Also, see indicatively Morgenthau’s own works:
H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, pp. 24-34; H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power
Politics, pp. 205-208
249
H. Morgenthau, “Arguing About the Cold War” (1967) in H. Morgenthau, Truth and Power:
Essays of a Decade, 1960-1970, London: Pall Mall Press 1970, pp. 349. As an Athenian born before
the death of Aeschylus and whose education comprised almost exclusively of reading the poets,
Thucydides was no stranger to tragedy. On the contrary, as Cornford demonstrated, the “tragic theory
of human nature” was deeply embedded in his work and his history balances between the quest for
objectivity and the form and psychology of drama. Interestingly the infamous Melian dialogue with its
hubris and tragic irony, is attributed not to Thucydides the historian but to Thucydides the dramatist.
See F.M. Cornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus, London: Edward Arnold, 1907, pp. i-xv; pp. 174-187.
For a more recent and detailed account of the importance of the “tragic vision of politics” in the work
of Thucydides see: R. N. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 40-46; pp. 126-141
250
For the quoted passage see: G. Steiner, In Bluebeard’s Castle: Some Notes Towards the Re-
definition of Culture, London: Faber and Faber, 1971, p. 106. For a discussion of tragedy and ethics in
Morgenthau and the gap with Nietzsche in that respect see W. E. Scheuermann, Hans Morgenthau:
Realism and Beyond, pp. 40-69 and particularly fn 11

72
between the “ethics of our minds and the ethics of our actions” as tragic, Morgenthau
subscribed to the view that tragedy arises from an ethical clash, a moral dilemma that
involves “inescapable wrongdoing”.251 And since in his ethical project political
action necessarily entails doing evil, statesmen must select from a series of options
the one that accounts for the lesser evil.252 Such an approach to political ethics, with
a clear understanding of tragedy in ethical terms and the Aristotelian remedy of
prudence to hubris, can more persuasively be claimed to be a direct influence from
pre-rationalist thought, as Morgenthau himself claimed.253
The second truth, also manifesting the tragic element of human nature and deriving
from this very nature, regards the nature of politics. Power politics is an irreducible
element of social life, rooted in the lust for power, inherent in all human beings.
Therefore power is inseparable from politics, the latter being essentially always
power politics.254 This prevalence of power and its association with human nature
does not only derive from the tragic element of that nature but also reinforces it,
since each human being is both “the exponent and victim of that force”.255 This final
contribution of the pre-rationalist mode of thought is, according to Morgenthau, the
point where the re-interpretation of politics should begin. It also forms the core
around which Morgenhtau’s own assumptions about the nature of politics are
crystallized.

251
H. Morgenthau, “The evil of politics and the ethics of evil” in Ethics, Vol 56, no. 1, 1945, pp. 1-18:
p. 11; For a broad typology of tragedies in international relations which encompasses as many takes
on tragedy as possible and the position of moral dilemmas in that typology see C. Lu, ‘Tragedies and
International Relations’ in T. Erskine and R. N. Lebow (eds) Tragedy and International Relations,
158-171
252
H. Morgenthau, “Evil of politics”, passim; S. Molloy, “Aristotle, Epicurus, Morgenthau”, passim
253
According to Lebow “Morgenthau was intimately familiar with the corpus of ancient and modern
literature and philosophy”. See R. N. Lebow, “The Ancient Greeks and Modern Realism: Ethics,
Persuasion, and Power” in D. Bell (ed.) Political Thought and International Relations, pp. 26-39. The
claim that tragedy is all about moral lessons is met with scepticism by some authors. Euben for
example thinks that tragedy cannot be self-evidently transferred from its original context to modern
politics and be interpreted as representing a clash of ethical commitments. Such an interpretation is for
him “too much the product of Aristotelian and Christian moralising” in which Morgenthau also played
his part: P. Euben, “The Tragedy of Tragedy” in T. Erskine and R. N. Lebow (eds), Tragedy and
International Relations, pp. 86-96: pp. 86-92
254
H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 9-10, 215-219
255
H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, p. 31

73
Ontology, epistemology and power
Inspired thus by the pre-rational tradition Morgenthau understood power in terms of
human nature. The central anthropological assumption that informs this
understanding is that the lust for power or the animus dominandi is an inalienable
element of human nature.256 The lust for power thus, is an existential condition of
human beings, generated by their futile efforts to overcome their loneliness since
love is unable to succeed in that goal. The tragic element of human existence is that
power is equally impotent in accomplishing that goal.257 This inability of the urge to
dominate to be satisfied reflects the limits of the human experience as explained in
the “imperfectability thesis” of Pin-Fat.258 It is this imperfectability, deriving from
what Bell calls Morgenthau’s “metaphysical” and “theological claims” about human
nature, that dooms the power drives of men to frustration.259 As such, the lust for
power stems from a particular vision of human nature rather than constituting a
concept akin to Nietzsche’s ‘Will to Power’ which should be treated as
“ontologically prior to any definition of human nature and self”.260 What reinforces
this tragic element is the evilness of all politics; for every political action is rooted in
the inherent lust for power and selfishness of human beings. Thus, the political man
is eventually trapped in a precarious balance between the opposing but inescapable

256
Of course here Pichler is right to comment that “Morgenthau delivers no proof for his
anthropological statement”. H. K. Pichler, “The godfathers of ‘truth’: Max Weber and Carl Schmitt in
Morgenthau’s theory of power politics” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 24, 1998, pp. 185-
200: p 196. For a recent effort to discuss Morgenthau’s claims about human nature in terms of natural
science see B. A. Thayer, “Bringing in Darwin: Evolutionary Theory, Realism, and International
Politics” in International Security, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2010, pp. 124-151
257
H. Morgenthau, “Love and Power” in Commentary, Vol. 33, No 3, 1962, pp. 247-251: pp. 250-251
258
V. Pin-Fat, “The metaphysics of the national interest”, pp. 221-224
259
D. Bell, “Anarchy, power and death”, pp. 221-239: p. 228
260
For an indicative view that treats Morgenthau’s ‘lust for power’ as identical to Nietzsche’s ‘Will to
Power’ see U. E. Peterson, “Breathing Nietzsche’s air: New reflections on Morgenthau’s concepts of
power and human nature” in Alternatives, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1999, pp. 83-118. Peterson’s view neglects
the pluralistic view Morgenthau has of a human nature that incorporates different and often conflicting
elements. Thus the lust for power might be the central aspect of his vision of ‘political man’ but the
latter is meant to be an abstraction such as the ‘moral man’ that might be meaningful in analytical
terms but does not imply the universality suggested by Peterson. Cozette thus remarks correctly that
Morgenthau’s conception of human nature cannot be “reduced to this [the lust for power] impulse”.
M. Cozette, “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations” in
International Studies Review, Vol. 10, 2008, pp. 667-679

74
“perennial poles” of evil and ethics.261 The inescapability of the urge to dominate
plays in Morgenthau’s theory a significant role with respect both to his ontological
and his epistemological assumptions.
Firstly, he considered power and especially the concept of interest defined in terms
of power to be the main characteristic of domestic and international politics alike.262
The fact that interest defined as power is the timeless key concept of politics, “an
objective category which is universally valid” does not, however, imply that its
meaning is “fixed once and for all”. Different circumstances lead to different
attitudes to power in various periods in history. Political science while demonstrating
the central role of power is to adapt its emphasis accordingly.263 Given his explicit
renunciation of the scientific approach and his agreement with Weber for that matter,
Morgenthau’s claim to objectivity seems paradoxical. He overcame the value-
determinacy problem raised by Weber by means of modifying Schmitt’s notion of
‘the political’ so as to incorporate his anthropological assumption. If the essence of
politics is reduced to a simple, elemental in human nature urge, then there is at least
one value that all statesmen share: the choice between survival or peril.264
Secondly, power offers political science with the “central concept” that is essential to
delineate the borders of the field and establish its independence. Morgenthau
employed the analogy with economics and its central concept of “interest defined as
wealth” to describe the similar functions of “interest defined as power” for political
science.265 The autonomy of the political sphere is an important analytical tool
Morgenthau borrowed from Weber. As such, it serves the methodological purpose of
distinguishing different spheres of human activities as ideal types that can in turn be
analysed in isolation.266
This central concept has, however, profound epistemological implications beyond the
mere independence of the political sphere. It also provides political science with “a

261
H. Morgenthau, “Evil of Politics”, pp. 1-18
262
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1973, p. 35
263
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 4-9; also in H. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, p.
38
264
H. K. Pichler, “The godfathers of ‘truth’”, pp. 190-192
265
H. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, pp. 38-40
266
M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations: Hans Morgenthau, Classical
Realism, and the Moral Construction of Power Politics” in International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 4,
2004, pp. 633-665: p. 641

75
rational outline” of politics, having distinguished the timeless features of politics
apart from the circumstantial. This enables not only the comprehensive
understanding of political action irrespective of historical or geographical conditions
but also offers a stepping stone for meaningful political action.267 Far from thus
being just a mere analytical convenience, the identification of power with the central
concept of an autonomous political sphere fulfils an important role in the normative
side of Morgenthau’s theory. It is thus also a “moral and political project”.268
Finally, power, lying at the core of Morgenthau’s political philosophy, allows for a
better understanding of his notion of rationality. Despite the ferocity of his attack
against rationalism Morgenthau maintained that the faculties of reason are essential
for sound politics. Although Morgenthau’s early writings were influenced by anti-
enlightenment figures, their impact is often exaggerated and the process of his
intellectual development neglected.269 Hence, his attack on rationalism does not
imply an embrace of irrationality.270 For Morgenthau reason is indispensable for
politics insofar as it ameliorates the destructiveness of power, yet this reason is not
the scientific one of rationalism.271 It is reason in the form of political intuition
rather than the deductive reason of positivism that has the primacy. It is this intuition
of the platonic philosopher-king that according to Pin-Fat allows for the re-
introduction of reason into politics by reconnecting the transcendental to the actual in
line with Morgenthau’s metaphysics.272

267
H. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics, pp. 38-39
268
M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations” pp. 650-653
269
W. E. Scheuerman, “A Theoretical Missed Opportunity? Hans J. Morgenthau as Critical Realist” in
D. Bell (ed.) Political Thought and International Relations, pp. 41-57
270
In his final years, however, Morgenthau was disillusioned by the failure of policy makers to pursuit
rationally the national interest. This led him to reconsider his theory and examine the possibilities of
an irrational theory of international relations or a theory of misunderstanding. D. Fromkin,
“Remembering Hans Morgenthau” in World Policy Journal, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1993, pp. 81-88
271
H. Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs. Power Politics, pp. 9-10. In his critique of Scientific Man
Oakeshott identifies the confusion between ‘scientific enquiry’ and ‘scientism’ as well as between
‘reason’ and ‘rationalism’ as “fatal to the argument”, since it conveys the false impression that
Morgenthau opposes reason in general and not merely rationalism. In his letter to Oakeshott
Morgenthau admitted the validity of that critique. M. Oakeshott, “Scientific Politics” in Cambridge
Journal, Vol. 1, 1948, pp. 347-358: pp. 354-355; H. Morgenthau, letter to Oakeshott, 22 May 1948
272
V. Pin-Fat, “The metaphysics of the national interest”, pp. 230-231

76
II. Morgenthau’s conceptualisation of power

Power in International Politics: its nature and role

Morgenthau’s analysis of international politics is founded upon an explicit definition
of power as a form of “psychological relationship”. Power can thus be defined as the
“control over the minds and actions” of others.273 Since the concept of power is
treated as being dependent upon the political and cultural context, it might entail any
social relationship, insofar as it establishes or maintains that control.274 The
spectrum, therefore, of power may cover all the range of possible relationships
between physical violence and love.275 The fact, however, that power might
approximate physical violence does not imply that it can be identified with it. For
political power is essentially a psychological relationship. Armed strength may
indeed be the most important element of political power as long as it remains a
potentiality. When the threat of the use of force in international politics materialises,
we are no longer in the domain of political power but in that of military power as
naked force.276 This emphasis on the psychological character of power helps also to
distinguish the essence of power from its elements. The latter represent merely the
components of national power; and while ideally they should be added up in any
power assessment of relative power such a calculation is impossible.277

273
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.28
274
Ibid. p. 9
275
Although love is considered as the opposite of power, for Morgenthau they both try to address
man’s existential loneliness and contain elements of each other. As a result each relationship may be
corrupted by the other. See H. Morgenthau, “Love and Power”, pp 247-251
276
This statement from Politics Among Nations (see following footnote) is also repeated in “The
Commitments of Political Science” (1958). “Thus, when the times conceive power in military terms, it
[political science] must call attention to the variety of factors (…) and, more particularly, to the subtle
psychological relation…” H. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of
Democratic Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1962, p 47
277
Baldwin classified Morgenthau in the elements-of-power approach according to which “it was
possible to add up the various elements…in order to calculate the power distribution” and which
conflates capabilities to power. D. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, pp. 274-277.
Morgenthau’s list of elements of power indeed includes some elements that are relatively stable such
as geography, resources, level of industrialisation and military preparedness. But he also included
what he called “human factors” such as population, national character, morale, quality of government
and diplomacy. The latter are much more elusive than material capabilities and Morgenthau claimed
that the task of evaluation is ultimately “incapable of achievement”. The best statesmen can hope for
is to commit fewer mistakes in the evaluation than their opponents. As such, Morgenthau did not

77
The way Morgenthau thus approached power presupposes a clear distinction between
political and military power. A further distinction is that between power and
influence, the first being founded upon compulsion and the latter upon persuasion.278
Hence both the psychological element and that of compulsion are central in
Morgenthau’s understanding of power. In contrast to Carr, who whose understanding
of power was implicit, Morgenthau made sure to conceptualise it. This approach is
understandable given the role power is expected to play in his philosophy both with
respect to its analytical and its normative sides. Williams correctly observes that in
Morgenthau’s theory “power and interest are actually remarkably flexible and
indeterminate concepts”.279 This conception of power allows for the establishment of
politics as an “indeterminate sphere”, whose limitless nature encompasses both
destructive and creative possibilities. At the very same time, the clear distinction
between power –as defining the political- and other forms of power help insulate the
political sphere from other social spheres and their respective notions of interest and
power.280 Finally the exclusion of violence from his notion of power is essential for
insulating the political sphere from its most dangerous potential i.e. the intrusion of
physical violence.281
Consequently the struggle for power plays a central role in Morgenthau’s political
theory since its existence is the enabling factor for an action to be considered as
‘political’. Power might be sought after to achieve various objectives and in this
sense it is a “means to the nation’s ends”. Since it is selected as the appropriate
means however, power also becomes an end in itself, at least temporarily.282 Based
on the concept of the struggle of power as defining politics, Morgenthau claimed that
“all political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types”.283 Having
defined the nature of political power and isolated its role in politics Morgenthau then
proceeded to employ this role to support a three-fold typology of policies. It should

assume that elements of power can be add up accurately, let alone substitute for power. H.
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 112-154
278
Other distinctions drawn by Morgenthau but between different forms of power are that between
usable vs. unusable and legitimate vs. illegitimate power. H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.
29-30
279
M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations”, p. 638
280
For the distinction between political and non-political power see H. Morgenthau, Science: servant
or master?, pp. 30-34
281
M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations” pp. 639-649
282
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 27-28
283
Ibid. pp. 40-41

78
be noted that, despite the misleading language in Politics Among Nations,
Morgenthau’s typology is not intended to apply to international politics alone, but
instead encapsulates an independent logic of political power.284
Since a ‘political policy’ that would imply an abdication from power is out of
question, the three patterns of policies are the following. Firstly, a policy of the status
quo is a policy that aims at maintaining power. The part that advocates such a policy
aims at keeping the distribution of power as it is, with only minor adjustments that
are not affecting the relative strength of the parts involved been acceptable.285
Secondly, a policy of imperialism is a policy that aims at increasing power and thus
altering the existing distribution of power. A significant characteristic of
Morgenthau’s notion of imperialism is that it is a catch-all concept that aims at
describing any policy whose purpose is to overthrow the existing balance of power.
Thus this policy includes not only empire-building but also policies that aim at local
preponderance.286 Finally, the policy of prestige is one that aims at displaying power,
a policy that might be pursued in itself but most commonly its objective is to support
either of the two previous policies.287

Order and chaos: limitations of power

The assumption that power constitutes the core of politics has far-reaching
implications. For if it was to be followed without qualifications, it would ultimately
imply that international relations correspond to a state of complete anarchy and
unlimited power drives.288 The aspirations of power are thus restrained in two
partially overlapping ways: the first lies within the domain of power and is the
mechanism of the balance of power, and the second is the role of forces inherently
opposed to power such as morality and law.

284
In Science: servant or master? Morgenthau discussed how science can be manipulated to serve the
“powers that be –public and private” (emphasis added) in acquiring, defending, and demonstrating
power”. H. Morgenthau, Science: servant or master?, p. 14
285
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 40-44
286
Ibid. pp. 45-72
287
Ibid. pp. 73-87
288
Ibid. p. 225

79
The balance of power is for Morgenthau a necessary corollary of any social order
that comprises of a number of autonomous units.289 As such, it is bound to operate in
an international system that comprises of independent political units. The binary
purpose of all equilibria is “to maintain the stability of the system without destroying
the multiplicity of the elements comprising it”.290 The international society cannot
differ since its main elements are multiple and mutually antagonistic nations that
struggle for power.291 The operational principle of the balance of power is that every
time the equilibrium is threatened by a nation or group of nations, other nations
would try to restore it. As a result the system is inherently unstable and precarious,
since the relative power of the parts is not fixed.292 Another feature of the power of
states that jeopardizes the normal functioning of the balance of power is its
immeasurability.293 Statesmen should be able to calculate the power of friends and
foes alike in order for the balance to operate effectively yet this is virtually
impossible.294
Although Morgenthau’s vocabulary gives an occasionally scientific guise to the
balance of power, the concept has an equally important normative aspect.295 For its
cardinal role in most realist approaches cannot be justified in terms of its explanatory
force alone. As Bell argued, the concept is not essential for the “core-determining
structure of realism” and power politics are certainly imaginable without balancing.
He treats the concept instead as a ‘peripheral’ concept, a normative prescription to
avert the “mortal dangers” that an unqualified quest for power would imply.296 As
such, the function of the balance of power is dependent not only upon the capability

289
An interesting point about the function of the balance of power beyond politics can be found in
Williams’ interpretation about the role it plays in maintaining the independence of different social
spheres –including that of politics- in Morgenthau’s theory. See M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter
in International Relations”, pp. 651-652
290
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 167-169
291
Ibid. p. 172. For the process according to which the struggle for power is transferred from the
individuals to the nations see infra: part III.
292
Ibid. pp. 172-177
293
The immeasurability of power also features prominently in Guzzini’s critique as one of the main
weaknesses of realism. S. Guzzini, “The Enduring Dilemmas of Realism in International Relations”,
pp. 533-568
294
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 202-213
295
Besides Bell that is discussed here, Williams persuasively explains how, given Morgenthau’s
philosophical background, the balance of power is only effective if treated as “a principled strategy,
not a mechanistic process”. M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations”, pp. 649-
653
296
D. Bell, “Anarchy, power and death”, p. 229

80
of the parties involved to exercise it but also on whether its normative aspect is
incorporated in the dominant moral system of the given historical period.
Bell’s assumption seemingly contradicts Morgenthau’s mechanistic vocabulary of
the balance of power. Yet this contradiction can be overcome if Little’s interpretation
of the balance of power is taken into account. According to that interpretation,
Morgenthau in fact incorporated two different but interconnected dynamics of
balance of power in his system. The first dynamic is the one which stems from
balance of power as a universal phenomenon that is an inalienable element of a
pluralistic society and includes the aforementioned perils. Even that dynamic cannot
be treated as describing a principle of engineering but rather as an ideal type in the
Weberian sense.297 The second dynamic is related to the “self-conscious attempts to
‘regulate and restrain’ the power drives” thus minimising their potentially
catastrophic escalation.298 It is mainly the latter thus that by embodying a normative
prerogative can limit significantly the dangers of an unlimited quest for power.
Indeed, the fact that the balance of power has been more successful in the previous
centuries than in the twentieth is attributed by Morgenthau to the parallel operation
of a universal moral code that institutionalised the former.299 The moral consensus
between the European states of the eighteenth century and the sense that they
belonged to the same community allowed them to develop restraints and establish
rules in the conduct of politics that preserved “the overall stability of the European
republic”.300 Even the mechanistic vocabulary of the period, borrowed from the
natural sciences and intended to give to the balance of power a rationalist outlook
became internalised. Even though only a “serviceable metaphor”, as Molloy puts it,
the balance of power became associated with qualities it never really possessed thus
obscuring how essential a common moral framework was for its operation.301
Although it should not be overestimated, Morgenthau claimed that morality plays an
important role in international politics, since the revolt of human mind against power

297
Turner rightly mentions that Morgenthau’s theoretical constructions do not predict unconditionally
as scientific laws would, but rather represent causal processes. See S. P. Turner, “Hans J. Morgenthau
and the Legacy of Max Weber” in D. Bell (ed.) Political Thought and International Relations, pp. 63-
82: p. 74
298
R. Little, “The balance of power in Politics Among Nations” in M. Williams (ed.), Realism
Reconsidered, pp. 137-165: pp. 138-141
299
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations pp. 213-217
300
R. Little, “The balance of power in Politics Among Nations”, pp. 140-141
301
S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism, pp. 90-92

81
is “as universal as the aspiration for power itself”.302 Moral values thus limit the
extremities of power politics, since they restrain statesmen from considering some
means and ends as more ethically justifiable than others.303 The model period of
modernity for Morgenthau was that of aristocratic rule in Europe, when the balance
of power operated at its full effectiveness. Then, diplomats and statesmen shared a
universal moral code that imposed rules for political action.304 The dual shift from
aristocratic to democratic responsibility and from universal ethical standards to those
prescribed by nationalism, would have a profound impact on the restraining role of
morality as will be discussed in the following part.

III. Power, the nation-state and nationalism

The nation-state as the current mode of political

organisation

Concepts such as ‘national interest’ or ‘national power’ are central in Morgenthau’s

understanding of international politics. As such, before engaging with the relation
between power and the nation-state in his thought it is important to clarify how he
approached the ‘nation’. Throughout his works Morgenthau used the terms ‘nation’
and ‘nation-state’ interchangeably without always drawing a clear distinction
between the two. This is not to suggest that Morgenthau was negligent of the
differences between a state and a nation, but rather – and similarly to Carr for that
matter – that he conceived the two as identical only insofar as the age of nationalism
is concerned.305 I claim that the nation-state performs two main functions in

302
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 225
303
H. Morgenthau, “The Twilight of International Morality” in Ethics, Vol. 58, No. 2, 1948, pp. 79-
99: pp. 79-80
304
Ibid. pp. 88-99
305
Morgenthau’s account of the ‘nation’ is a rather intuitive one and less sophisticated than the one
offered by Carr. The ‘nation’ is thus understood as “an abstraction from a number of individuals who
have certain characteristics in common”. The ‘state’, as related to the ‘nation’, is understood in
legalistic terms as “a legal organisation… whose agents act as representatives of the nation in
international affairs”. H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 103-104; for the domestic
functions of the state Morgenthau, echoing Weber, claimed that it is “the legal order that determines
the conditions under which society may employ its monopoly of organised violence…”. Ibid. pp. 485-
487

82
Morgenthau’s theory both of which are important in order to connect power to
international relations.
The first important function of the nation-state in Morgenthau’s theory is the
bridging of the central concept of the lust for power with international politics. For
the animus dominandi is an anthropological assumption meant to describe an
inalienable element of human nature, and thus in principle is applicable only to
individuals. It is essential then to identify a process by which the longing for power
is transferred from the individual to the collectivity, in this case the nation-state. As
politics occupy a separate sphere so does morality. Man is a moral being inasmuch as
he is a political being and morality keeps his aspirations of power under check.306
The deplorability of aspirations of power as immoral combined with the capabilities
of society to limit them through institutional and disciplinary measures, result in the
inability of most individuals to satisfy them within the community. This satisfaction
however is to be found through the mechanism of projecting one’s aspiration to the
collective power drive of the ‘nation’.307 The breakdown of the moral order of feudal
and early modern Europe on the eve of modernity intensified this projection. For it
disturbed irreversibly the internal balance of power between social spheres. With the
belief in the power of the divine collapsing, and the modern state asserting an
increasing level of control over its citizens, the individual power drives faced
unprecedented frustration.308 Hence the projection of the power drives collectively is
the only open option. An option facilitated by the ideology of nationalism that not
only undermined the hitherto universal moral values and replaced them with
particular ones, but also sanctified the pursuit of power as long as its aim is the
nation itself.309
The second function is that the nation-state, as the main form of political
organisation, offers Morgenthau the concept to which he can anchor in a
comprehensible way the core for his theory notions of power and interest. Yet the

306
H. Morgenthau, “The evil of politics and the ethics of evil”, pp. 1-18
307
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 103-105. Schuett connected the mechanism of
projection that Morgenthau discussed to the Freudian defence mechanism of “displacement” and
“identification”: R. Schuett, Political realism, Freud, and human nature in international relations: the
resurrection of the realist man. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, pp. 32-34
308
M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations”, pp. 650-651
309
For morality, power and nationalism see also the following subsection of this part. H. Morgenthau,
“The Twilight of International Morality”, passim

83
fact that the nation-state is currently the central political conglomeration around
which power and interest revolve, does not imply that it is either “the last word in
politics” or an eternal category outside history. For Morgenthau interest is indeed the
timeless essence of politics but its connection to the nation is a product of history as
is the nation-state itself. Thus, as long as the nation-state remains the prevalent mode
of political organisation, it is national interest that counts.310 Consequently it is the
notion of “interest defined as power” that occupies the cardinal role in Morgenthau’s
theory, the national character of this interest being historically conditioned.
Notwithstanding Morgenthau’s reservations about the historical character of the
nation-state, the way he chose to employ it as a means for bringing his core concepts
to the foreground reveals a significant shortcoming of his approach. In her
compelling critique of Morgenthau, Pin-Fat argues that his philosophical
commitment to the distinction between the transcendent and the actual led him to
allocate to the national interest the function of giving concrete meaning to
transcendental moral principles. The result is that the nation-state is turned into a
“mystical entity that has alchemical powers of transmuting the transcendent into the
actual”.311 Pin-Fat is well aware of Morgenthau’s reservation about the nation-state
and the risk it poses to international morality but believes that his grammar tragically
leads him to either of the extremes he hoped to avoid i.e. utopianism or nationalistic
universalism.

Power, morality and nationalism

Nationalism, as the ideological corollary of the nation-state, plays a significant role
in modern politics for Morgenthau. Not only does it constitute one of the main
elements of national power but also it has a disintegrating effect on international
morality. The eternal category of politics being power however, even nationalism
and the nation-state are ultimately in peril by modern developments in the domain of
power as I will discuss in this section.

310
H. Morgenthau, “The Problem of the National Interest” (1952) in H. Morgenthau, Politics in the
Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 92-93
311
V. Pin-Fat, “The metaphysics of the national interest”, pp. 232-236

84
When discussing the elements of national power, Morgenthau considered the
“national character” to be one of the qualitative elements that defies the accurate
calculation of power.312 Nationalism is considered as responsible for one of the
single-factor fallacies when trying to evaluate national power. Thus, under its erosive
influence national character is ‘deified’ and the result is an overestimation of its
impact on national power. The converse mistake of underestimating the importance
of national character, results also in an erroneous evaluation of power.313 Nationalism
then distorts the rational faculties of statesmen and might lead them to overestimate
the capabilities of their respective nations while underestimating the capabilities of
their opponents. The most important, however, role nationalism plays in international
politics is to be found in its corruption of universal morality.
Morgenthau’s moral critique of nationalism was concentrated against the
“universalistic nationalism” of the twentieth century rather than the “liberal”
nationalism of the nineteenth.314 For Morgenthau, the emergence of nationalism after
the French Revolution was not problematic per se. Early nationalism was not only
well-suited to address the problems of post-feudal Europe and industrialisation better
than the order that preceded it.315 It also had a progressive quality. The old, liberal
nationalism of the nineteenth century was synonymous with emancipation from
oppression, and despite delegating loyalties to the nation it was limited in the sense
that it recognised that beyond one’s own nation there were “other nationalisms with
similar and equally justifiable goals”.316 There was the hope then, among early
liberal champions of nationalism, that international morality would not be
undermined but rather strengthened by its prevalence. What happened instead was a
gradual disintegration of international morality for the most part of the nineteenth

312
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 128-134
313
Ibid. pp. 160-162
314
H. Morgenthau, “World Politics in the Mid-Twentieth Century” in The Review of Politics, Vol 10,
No 4, 1948, pp 154-173
315
H. Morgenthau, “Nationalism” (1957) in H. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century: The
Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 181-195; For the positive functions of nationalism for Morgenthau
–and other classical realists- see W. Scheuerman, “Realists Against the Nation-State”, Transnational
Law & Contemporary Problems, Vol. 20, 2011, pp. 67-105: pp. 71-82; W. Scheuerman, Hans
Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, pp. 65-69
316
H. Morgenthau, “Nationalism”, p. 187

85
century, which reached its climax when liberal nationalism was replaced by the new,
universalistic nationalism of the twentieth century.317
In sharp contrast to the aristocratic moral code that preceded it, the moral code of the
age of nationalism limits significantly the ethical restraints of statesmen and thus
imposes an important burden on morality’s role as a regulator of power politics.
Hence democratic accountability makes the political actors ultimately responsible
towards their own nation rather than towards a group of similarly trained individuals.
Additionally, the universal moral code of ages past is replaced by the particular
moral code of the nation, which in turn claims universal value triggered by the
inherent need of human beings to obey universal moral standards.318 The culmination
of this process is the transformation of nationalism into a political religion, whose
purpose it is to “impose its own values and standards of action” to other nations.319 In
such a configuration, the struggle for power is no longer limited but is given instead
“a ferociousness and intensity not known to other ages”.320 It follows that
nationalistic universalism is incapable of restraining the foreign policies it is
identified with, since “it is itself in need of restraint”.321 Nationalism has a similar
impact on another safeguard against the struggle for power i.e. public opinion. World
public opinion can only operate under the universal moral standards that nationalism
deprived it of, and as a result when nations appeal to the public opinion they only
appeal to something non-existent.322
This critique which isolates only the modern variant of nationalism as representing a
profound threat for international morality is indicative of Morgenthau’s scepticism
about the role of democracy in the rational formation of national interest. The fact
that Morgenthau was at odds with democracy was spotted early by Oakeshott, but it
was in the case of mass democracy and its close association with nationalism that he
saw the greatest risk.323 The parallels with Carr’s association of nationalism and mass

317
H. Morgenthau, “The Twilight of International Morality”, pp. 93-94
318
Ibid. pp. 88-99
319
H. Morgenthau, “Nationalism”, p. 187
320
H. Morgenthau, “The Twilight of International Morality”, p. 99
321
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 329
322
Ibid. pp. 262-267
323
In his review Oakeshott observed that Morgenthau, influenced by the continental European
experience erroneously believed that “parliamentary institutions were the offspring of rationalist
policies”. M. Oakeshott “Scientific Politics”, p. 357; for a detailed account of the anti-democratic
element in Morgenthau’s thought see W. E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, pp.

86
democracy in the age of the “socialised nation” are clear here. Unlike Carr’s
approach, however, for Morgenthau the rise of universalistic nationalism is not
clearly associated with developments in economic power and the demands for
welfare.
Nationalism thus presented modern man with a formidable challenge since it offered
a distorted view of power, it undermined the functions of the balance of power and it
incapacitated the restrictive role morality had always played to power politics.
Morgenthau’s moral critique of nationalism is compelling and appeared much earlier
than his critique of the viability of the nation-state in terms of power. Yet at the same
time his notion of morality is bound to the state. In a world now devoid of a universal
moral standard the state can be the only place that can guarantee a degree of
existential security to the individual and “thus constitutes the only moral space in an
amoral world”.324 The only other option left for Morgenthau appeared to be nostalgia
for an older, more orderly world.
Indeed for a period in his intellectual life Morgenthau’s attitude, similarly to that of
Schmitt, was one of lamentation for a bygone era and an almost uncompromised
pessimism about its potential for recovery.325 It would appear that for Morgenthau it
was difficult to disassociate himself from that era. As a result the only remedy he
was initially able to produce to the “empty skies” of modern international morality
was a “desperate plea” to re-establish the aristocratic diplomacy and balance of
power of the early modern European system.326 Yet this conventional portrayal of
Morgenthau as “provocative but ultimately conservative” is misleading in that it
neglects the distinct stages of a long career.327 Hence Morgenthau’s insights in the
1960s can hardly be described as backward-looking given his favourable treatment of

176-179. For a different reading of Morgenthau’s critique of modern nationalism as a masked critique
of secularism in the trail of Schmitt see N. Guilhot, “American Katechon”, pp. 240-243
324
H. K. Pichler, “The godfathers of ‘truth’”, p. 198. Pichler, although correctly pointing out that this
claim belongs to early Morgenthau, erroneously describes Morgenthau’s international system as
‘anarchic’ and devoid of morality. This observation appears accurate only with respect to the modern
international system, which of course is for Morgenthau historically conditioned. For the idea of the
state in Morgenthau as “container of domestic values” see also: T. Barkawi, “Strategy as a vocation:
Weber, Morgenthau and modern strategic studies” in Review of International Studies, vol. 24, 1998,
pp. 159-184: p. 176
325
C. Brown, “’The Twilight of International Morality’? Hans J. Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt on the
end of the Jus Publicum Europaeum” in M. Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered, pp. 42-61
326
W. E. Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and beyond” in M. Williams
(ed.) Realism Reconsidered, pp. 62-86: p. 79
327
W. E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond, p.3

87
Mitrany’s functionalism and the “qualified optimism” that characterised his
contemplation of a world state in the time of nuclear warfare as will be discussed in
the following part.328

Power as the nemesis of the nation-state

Notwithstanding the peculiar relation between nationalism and power and the latter’s
glorification by the former, the shifting realities of the second half of the twentieth
century led Morgenthau to the assumption that both nationalism and the nation-state
have had their days. As I will explain in this section, Morgenthau believed that
power checks nationalism in any case; but it is in the nuclear age in particular that
nation-states would become obsolete.
The main problem with nationalism as a principle of political organisation is that
there are no inherent limits to its application. Thus, if taken by its own terms
nationalism is in fact “a principle of disintegration and fragmentation”. The
disintegration of the old European empires in the aftermath of the First World War
offers a first-rate example. If the principle of nationalism has been evoked by the
nations that emerged from that disintegration, nothing could stop populations within
those nations to invoke the principle in turn. The continuous fragmentation is only
halted “not by the logic of nationalism but by the configurations of interest and
power between the rulers and the ruled and between competing nations”.329 Power
thus plays an important role in limiting nationalism’s potential for a chain-reaction
that would lead to continuously shrinking in size states.
Power, moreover, with the essential but unattainable calculation thereof is singled
out by Morgenthau as the main factor that contributed to the decline of nations
diachronically. Since the success or failure of a foreign policy depends upon a
correct evaluation of power, if that evaluation is erroneous the nation that committed
328
C. Brown, “’The Twilight of International Morality’?”, pp. 56-59. Scheuerman attributes
Morgenthau’s inability to address the question of the world state adequately to his intellectual affinity
with Schmitt: W. E. Scheuerman, “Carl Schmitt and Hans Morgenthau: Realism and beyond”, pp. 77-
85. In his illuminating book, Scheuerman examines in detail the different stages in Morgenthau’s
career and is making an excellent case for the latter’s “uneasy realism”. For Scheuerman Morgenthau
would only fit comfortably within the realist paradigm in the 1950s, the decade during which his most
influential works were published. W. E. Scheuerman, Hans Morgenthau: Realism and Beyond. For
Morgenthau’s view of functionalism as the “only rational reply” to the obsolescence of the nation-
state see: H. Morgenthau, “Introduction” in D. Mitrany, A Working Peace System, Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1966, pp. 7-11
329
H. Morgenthau, “Nationalism”, pp. 184-185

88
it might well fall. The belief that power is absolute rather than relative; the failure to
project power in time and thus treat is as permanent; or the fallacies of single-factor
that tend to overstate a particularly advantageous element of national power, are all
errors of evaluation that can lead to the decline of a nation.330 Nationalism itself, as
mentioned already, not only is the main culprit of such a single-factor fallacy but by
distorting the rational faculties of statesmen makes them more prone to
overestimating the power of their own nation-state and thus committing hubris.331
If power in general restrains nationalism’s inclination towards anarchy and can bring
the collapse of certain nations, power in the nuclear age jeopardises the survival of
the nation-state itself. The possibility of an all-out nuclear war would prevent nation-
states from performing even the most elementary of their functions i.e. defend the
life of their citizens and their civilisation.332 The solution according to Morgenthau
would be a political organisation that better reflects the new technological and
economic developments. However the increase in size of the political organisations
would not suffice. As his examination of multiethnic states or regional
conglomerations revealed, the substitution of the nationalism of the nation-state by
the nationalism of the regional unit would change nothing.333 What Morgenthau
deemed appropriate was not only a political organisation of larger size, but also a
supranational principle of order that would replace nationalism and eliminate its
anarchic tendencies.334
To claim that Morgenthau’s attitude with respect to the prospects of a world-state to
replace the obsolete nation-states was consistently held would ignore not only his

330
H. Morgenthau, “Why Nations Decline” (1959) in H. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth
Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 201-211
331
According to Lebow, hubris is a “category error” that results from a disproportional inflation of
traits that normally lead to political success. The outcome is “overconfidence in one’s judgement and
ability”. R. N. Lebow, “Tragedy, Politics, and Political Science” in International Relations, Vol. 19,
No. 3, 2005, pp. 329-336: p. 330. Morgenthau of course, was by no means the first to find in tragedy a
concept that is also applicable to the level of the political unit. Thucydides used a similar approach in
his history and even some of the original playwrights are often interpreted as metaphors that reflect
the political organisation of the days. R. N. Lebow, Tragic Vision of Politics, pp. 128-141. I have
engaged in more detail with how Morgenthau transplanted tragedy as part of the human existential
condition to the level of the nation-state as a metaphor that could provide useful moral guidance in: K.
Kostagiannis, “Morgenthau and the tragedy of the nation-state”, pp. 514-518
332
H. Morgenthau, “Nationalism”, pp. 189-190
333
See H. Morgenthau, “Government and Private Enterprise” (1964) in H. Morgenthau, Truth and
Power, pp. 276-278
334
Ibid. pp 277-278; also see “The Political Problems of Polyethnic states” (1961) in H. Morgenthau,
Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Restoration of American Politics, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1962, pp. 342-347

89
intellectual development but also a series of well researched arguments that suggest
otherwise. Indeed Morgenthau’s initially conservative view that looked nostalgically
to the revival of the old diplomacy of his model period was gradually replaced by an
embrace of the possibility of change.335 That change entailed a more favourable
attitude towards the need for a world-state, directly related to the profound impact of
the possibility of a nuclear war upon his thought. To spot Morgenthau’s
inconsistencies thus with respect to that matter has indeed some merit, as has the
attribution of those inconsistencies to the specific historical context i.e. the rapidly
changing circumstances nuclear warfare brought about.336
Yet to claim that the change was as profound as to “demand a renunciation of
traditional state-centred realism and advocacy of an immediate world state”337 does
not do Morgenthau full justice. For his variant of realism did not revolve around the
nation-state even in its early stages. It is true that Morgenthau’s insights on the
nation-state developed gradually, but he certainly was at odds with the modern state
from quite an early stage in his career.338 His critique of the modern state and the
associated nationalism identifies the former as the main culprit of the horrors of the
twentieth century earlier than the potential of nuclear warfare was apparent. And this
critique was, as was his future amendments to policy prescription, underpinned
consistently by his understanding of politics as a domain inseparable from power but
also not devoid of ethics, even if the latter are only the minimalistic ethics of
necessity.339 It is ultimately the same ethics of necessity that led Morgenthau to
advocate the world state as an ideal worth striving for despite his own scepticism
about its possibilities of realisation.340

335
S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 96-97
336
For a critique of Morgenthau’s views of the world state on philosophical grounds see J. P. Speer II,
“Hans Morgenthau and the World State” in World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 2, 1968, pp. 207-227. For an
examination of the “dilemma between philosophical consistency and public relevance” that
Morgenthau faced under the context of thermonuclear revolution see C. Craig, “Hans Morgenthau and
the world state revisited” in M. Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered, pp. 195-215
337
C. Craig, “Hans Morgenthau and the world state revisited”, p. 195
338
W. E. Scheuermann, “Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics” in
Constellations, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2007, pp. 506-530
339
For a discussion of Morgenthau’s ethics of necessity see S. Molloy, “Hans. J. Morgenthau Versus
E.H. Carr”, pp. 83-104
340
M. Cozette, “What Lies Ahead: Classical Realism on the Future of International Relations”, pp.
673-674

90
IV. Tragedies that were and tragedies that might be

The tragedy of Germany and self-defeating nationalism

The tragedy of Germany during the first half of the twentieth century is an indicative
case of how Morgenthau applied his thoughts about the limits of enlightenment and
the perils that nationalism and the unlimited power drive reserve to nations to a
concrete historical case. As a German Jew Morgenthau was unfortunate enough to
witness the early stages of the rise of Nazism in Germany, an experience that
influenced his intellectual development profoundly.341 In a passage echoing his
Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics Morgenthau discussed the tragedy of the German
Jews.342 With their majority belonging to the middle classes, they embraced not only
the philosophy and institutions of liberalism but also its fundamental flaws.
Consequently they failed to realise –similarly to the liberals in Scientific Man- that
their emancipation was a result of the rise of the middle classes and that the liberal
philosophy did not represent eternal verities but was dependant upon the
predominance of the middle classes. When thus the middle class in Germany
collapsed in the aftermath of the First World War, they could not grasp the profound
social implications of this collapse, namely the rise of National Socialism.343
The rise of Nazism could only be understood according to Morgenthau as a reaction
to the “economic, social and moral collapse of the German middle classes”.344 Yet
the radicalisation of the former middle classes did not follow the Marxist
assumptions that implied an embrace of communism, a political philosophy that
shared the same rational outline with liberalism.345 Instead Nazism demonstrated not
only a repudiation of rationalism but also an explicit embrace of irrationality bearing
the characteristics of a political religion rather than those of a political philosophy.346
As a counter-enlightenment movement, Nazism would demonstrate both the moral

341
See C. Frei, Hans J. Morgenthau: an intellectual biography (part one); also in M. B. Mollov,
Power and Transcendence (chapter three)
342
For the similarities and their background see M. B. Mollov, Power and Transcendence, pp. 92-96
343
H. Morgenthau, “The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism” (1961) in H. Morgenthau, Politics in
the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 247-256
344
Ibid. p. 250
345
H. Morgenthau, “Naziism” (1946) in H. Morgenthau, Politics in the Twentieth Century: The
Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 227-240; p. 227
346
Ibid. p 228

91
bankruptcy of modernity and the extremities of an unrestrained lust for power
revealing thus the dark side of the modern world.
Instead of repudiating power or denying its existence Nazism glorified it, and in thus
doing substituted its own hubris for that of rationalism. Where rationalism lacked
restraint in its belief that science and reason can overcome power politics, Nazism
lacked restraint in the opposite direction. The racial doctrine it embraced provided a
way for the individual, suffocating under the limitations to his aspirations for power
imposed by the increasingly centralised modern state, to actually realise those
aspirations at the expense of the ‘inferior’ races. As a result “the man in the street, by
experiencing his superiority vis-à-vis a Jew by actual deeds, could prove to
himself… that he was actually superior”.347 As such, Nazism made an explicit albeit
extreme point about the paramount moral significance Morgenthau’s views about the
independence and insulation of spheres of social activity. For it demonstrated the
destructive potential of the sphere of politics if left without limits to its own
devices.348 This glorification of power related as it is to the emergence of
universalistic nationalism, has also grave international implications.
For the new nationalism of the twentieth century, in contrast to the liberal
nationalism that preceded it, is unrestrained in its goals and has the traits of a
political religion. It is this nationalistic universalism that gives modern international
relations its ferocious character painted in dark colours in the “Twilight of
International Morality”. Morgenthau considered Nazi Germany to be a distinctive
example of that form of nationalism whereupon one nation not only stands alone
above the rest but also has a mission to transform them into its own image.349 By
translating all social and political conflicts to racial ones Nazism obliterated the
distinction between domestic and international politics.350 By denying the tradition of
Western civilisation as regards the rational pursuit of power limited by a moral code
and substituting it with unlimited aspirations of power, Nazism’s doctrine of world
organisation was no different, Morgenthau claimed, to that of the likes of Xerxes,

347
H. Morgenthau, “The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism”, p. 254
348
M. C. Williams, “Why Ideas Matter in International Relations”, p. 651
349
H. Morgenthau, “The Tragedy of German-Jewish Liberalism”, p. 252
350
H. Morgenthau, “Naziism”, pp. 235-236

92
Alexander, and Napoleon.351 Thus the collective power drives of the nation, are not
only unlimited domestically but also internationally.
As mentioned already, Morgenthau was particularly concerned with the distortion of
the rational faculties of statesmen when evaluating power. Those errors he
considered as the most important factor for the demise of nations and it is with
respect to those that the tragedy of Germany unfolds. Morgenthau’s verdict of
Germany after Bismarck was that her foreign policy was determined by “three fatal
propensities”.352 Both Imperial and Nazi Germany lacked a sense of proportion when
assessing their relative power towards that of their opponents. They also
overemphasised the importance of military strength and through a distorted sense of
mission they identified might with right.353 A typical example of this attitude was the
disregard on behalf of German leadership during the First World War of the impact
an American entry would have for the course of the war.354 For Morgenthau then,
always willing to attribute specific gifts or vices to ‘national character’, Germany had
the sad privilege of possessing “the one fatal weakness” that is most likely to
provoke hubris: lack of moderation.355 Such was his approach when he examined
“The Political Philosophy of Prussianism” and he attributed the last disasters that
befell upon Germany to this tradition.356 These characteristics made Germany a
special case only inasmuch as they accentuated the pre-existing problems of
nationalism.
As happens often in the sequence of tragic cycles, this so characteristic of hubris lack
of moderation was followed by hamartia. The scope of German imperialism
expanded from its localised variant under Bismarck to the continental imperialism of
William II and finally exploded out of proportion with the unlimited imperialism of
Hitler.357 And like any other country that failed both in its appreciation of its own
power as well as that of others and set unattainable goals, Germany undid her own
351
H. Morgenthau, “National Socialist Doctrine of World Organisation” (1941) in H. Morgenthau,
Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 241-246
352
H. Morgenthau, “The Conquest of the United States by Germany” (1950) in H. Morgenthau,
Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Impasse of American Politics, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press 1962, pp. 152-167; p. 152
353
Ibid. p. 152
354
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 134
355
Idem
356
H. Morgenthau, “The Political Philosophy of Prussianism” (1945) in H. Morgenthau, Politics in
the Twentieth Century: The Decline of Democratic Politics, pp. 220-226
357
Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p. 58

93
power.358 The lesson to be drawn for other states is for Morgenthau crystal clear:
overconfidence and the ensuing miscalculation or hubris and hamartia will lead to
nemesis, a lesson Germany learned the hard way twice in a century. Morgenthau’s
examination of the German tragedy incorporates all the main elements of his political
philosophy. Most of all, however, it demonstrates the importance of his moral project
and the paramount moral value of prudence. For to understand the centrality of
power in politics is one thing, to ‘surrender to its immanence’ is quite another, as his
old criticism of Carr demonstrated. The fall of Germany is but another reminder to
the self-destructing possibilities of an unconditional surrender to that immanence.

A tragedy in the waiting room: American foreign policy and

the hubris of idealism
The tragedy of Germany was employed by Morgenthau for ‘pedagogical’ reasons.
His main objective was not to advise German foreign policy makers, for it was
already too late for that, but to make the fall of Germany an example that the United
States ought to avoid. He made sure to make the connection between German
delusions of the past and contemporary American policy explicit as early as 1950 in
an essay tellingly titled “The Conquest of the United States by Germany”.359 Unlike
Carr, Morgenthau never attempted to stay detached from the two opposing camps of
the Cold War or to find a medium ground between them. Even though not a “simple-
minded cold warrior”, Morgenthau’s loyalties lay clearly with his adopted country.360
His intellectual career was thus underpinned by an effort to influence American
foreign policy. He understood realism as a compass that would help that policy
navigate through the perils of idealism and avert a potential tragedy from
materialising.
If in the German case it was mainly the Jewish middle classes that failed to realise
the insufficiency of rationalism to understand the nature of politics, in the American
case, due to its own exceptionality, the danger was equally grave. As Williams
demonstrated, Morgenthau was attentive to the exceptionality of American politics

358
Ibid. p.p. 134, 144
359
H. Morgenthau, “The Conquest of the United States by Germany”, passim
360
M. Cox, “Hans J. Morgenthau, realism, and the rise and fall of the Cold War” in M. Williams (ed.)
Realism Reconsidered, pp. 166-194: pp. 171-176

94
and saw it at least to some extent in a positive light.361 Not only did he appreciate the
greatness of the “national purpose” of America, but he also considered her social
setting to have some redeeming qualities –such as the predominance of the middle
classes- that resembled of the old, benevolent nationalism of the nineteenth century
and made it harder to the nation to succumb to nationalistic universalism.362 At the
same time, however, he demonstrated an acute awareness of the risks inherent in
such exceptionality such as the potential of patriotism to degenerate to
nationalism.363 Furthermore, the fact that the rise of the middle classes was almost
unchallenged in America led to the identification of power politics with aristocracy
and the fallacy of treating power politics as a “historical accident”. For Morgenthau
there was no other country in the western world that held the conviction of the
feasibility of a foreign policy devoid of the struggle for power more than the United
States.364
There was indeed a “historical accident” at play for Morgenthau but that was hardly
the identification of politics with power. That accident was the historical context that
brought about American exceptionalism, namely the geographical isolation from the
European struggles for power and the unopposed continental expansion of the United
States due to the lack of adversaries that could pose a serious threat. The danger thus
for American foreign policy stemmed from the fact that this particular historical
accident was taken out of context and understood as an “endowment of nature”.365
Combined with a “sense of mission”, rooted in American uniqueness, it created the
preconditions for what Morgenthau called the “intellectual errors” of American
foreign policy, namely utopianism, legalism, sentimentalism, or isolationism.366 As a
result, even when the United States actually pursued their national interests, that was
done with the wrong reasoning and thus success was almost accidental.367

361
M. C. Williams, “Morgenthau now: Neoconservatism, national greatness, and realism” in M.
Williams (ed.) Realism Reconsidered, pp. 216-240
362
H. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pp. 110-11
363
M. C. Williams, “Morgenthau now”, pp. 230-235
364
H. Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy: a critical examination, London: Methuen & Co, 1952,
p. 13
365
Ibid. pp. 7-13
366
Ibid. 91-138
367
Examples such as the Truman Doctrine and Wilson’s intervention in the First World War represent
cases that for Morgenthau the United States served their national interests well, but erroneously
associated the selected policy to universal moral principles. Ibid. pp 26, 116-118

95
Such a foreign policy was particularly dangerous in the context of the Cold War
where the United States was faced with a potent opponent. Morgenthau’s critique of
the Soviet Union on philosophical grounds resembles the one he directed against the
United States. Not only its underlying philosophy of Marxism shared the same
flawed foundations as western liberalism but in its bolshevist –and utterly unrelated
to Marxism368- incarnation it attained the traits of a ‘political religion’. As such
Bolshevism, at least in principle, shared the characteristics of nationalistic
universalism and embarked upon a quest to impose its own political philosophy on
the world. In the new international context, however, where the conflict for power
was erroneously identified with that of “ways of life” Bolshevism was met “by
Western democracy at least halfway”.369 Morgenthau dreaded the consequences of
the potential clash between two superpowers that supported mutually incompatible
ideologies. In his effort thus to influence American foreign policy towards a rational
calculation of the national interest, he portrayed the Soviet Union as possessing this
quality to a greater extent than the United States and being able to “coldly calculate”
the issues at stake.370 Indeed Morgenthau for most of his career viewed Soviet
foreign policy as being essentially realist.371
As such the major problem of the United States was to understand the type of
challenge presented by the Soviet Union. For Morgenthau that challenge was clearly
Russian imperialism, using the ideology of communism and world revolution as an
instrument of and as a rationalisation for its policies. The confusion of communism
with Russian imperialism, married with the American peculiarity of viewing politics
in moral terms, not only obscured the real nature of the antagonism but also created
the preconditions for embarking upon a moral crusade.372 What made the situation
really desperate for Morgenthau was that in contrast to most nations that lacked the
power to embark upon such a project, a superpower armed with nuclear weapons
actually had the power to start a moral crusade, provided it succumbed – and indeed

368
H. Morgenthau, “The Fortieth Anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution” (1957) in H. Morgenthau,
Politics in the Twentieth Century: The Impasse of American Politics, pp. 139-142
369
H. Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy, pp. 62-63
370
Ibid. p. 162
371
The exception being a “momentary flirtation with alarmist thinking in the late 1950s” M. Cox,
“Morgenthau and the rise and fall of the Cold War”, pp. 176-177
372
H. Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy, pp. 69-80

96
it seemed to be doing so - to nationalistic universalism.373 In its unqualified anti-
communism thus American foreign policy was negligent of the national interest and
overstretched in its aims. For Morgenthau this ultimately paralysed American power
because “our moral, intellectual and political judgment has gone astray”.374
In addition to the risk of moral crusading, American foreign policy faced a challenge
from the impact of nationalism to the rational faculties of policy makers; a danger
that was aggravated due to American exceptionality. The fact that throughout its
history the United States faced many victories but only a few defeats was according
to Morgenthau misinterpreted as American omnipotence.375 This fallacy did not only
affect perceptions about American power leading to an overestimation thereof, but
also informed a tendency to underestimate the power of the Soviet Union.376
American foreign policy and public discourse during the Cold War was, for
Morgenthau, riddled with examples of such a fallacy. It is in this spirit that he
approached official reactions to the first nuclear explosion of a Soviet device in
1949. What was at stake for Morgenthau was the realisation of the importance of the
development, and the readjustment of a foreign policy hitherto based on a monopoly
of atomic weapons. The fact that not only such a development was not expected but
also that when it happened its significance was underplayed, meant for Morgenthau
that American officials continued to underestimate the Soviet Union by falling
victims to the “fatal propensity” of nationalism.377 Almost two decades later he
similarly criticised Brzezinski’s doctrine of “American paramountcy”. This doctrine
attributed erroneously Soviet restraint to American conventional superiority,
something that for Morgenthau was “an illusion, born of nationalistic blindness”.378
What really restrained the Soviets, he claimed, was fear of escalation to nuclear war.
Instead of being equally afraid -as they ought to have been- the United States were
about to embark on a reckless new doctrine. By assuming the non-usability of

373
H. Morgenthau, “Nationalism” pp. 187-188 and in Politics Among Nations, p. 329.
374
H. Morgenthau, “The impotence of American power” in Commentary, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1963: pp.
384-386
375
H. Morgenthau, American Foreign Policy, pp. 128-132
376
Ibid. pp. 164-189. Also in H. Morgenthau, A new foreign policy for the United States, London: Pall
Mall 1969, pp. 15-19
377
H. Morgenthau, “The Conquest of the United States by Germany”, pp. 152-167
378
H. Morgenthau, A new foreign policy for the United States, p. 22

97
nuclear weapons, the new doctrine denied the risk of escalation altogether and as
such exposed American foreign policy to a fatal danger.379
A combination thus of the negation to recognise power politics as such; the
understanding of politics in moral terms; the ensuing tendency for moral crusading;
and a belief in American omnipotence, constituted what Morgenthau understood as
the hubris of American idealism. This understanding in terms of imminent tragedy
was apparent in Morgenthau’s much discussed opposition towards the war in
Vietnam.380 For Morgenthau the point was not containing communism as such,
especially in cases when it was blurred with nationalism and anti-colonialism like in
the case of Vietnam. Containment should not represent a moral crusade but should
target communism insofar as it was the ideological cloak of Soviet imperialism,
whose balancing was in the American national interest. Morgenthau often invoked
the tragic vision of politics and the par excellence case of hubris i.e. the Athenian
expedition in Sicily to warn the American government about the danger of ‘self-
delusion’.381 A passage from his 1966 “Truth and Power”, reflecting upon the
relations between the Johnson administration and the intellectuals is quite telling:
What the President needs, then, is an intellectual father-confessor, who dares
to remind him of the brittleness of power, of its arrogance and blindness, of
its limits and pitfalls; who tells him how empires rise, decline, and fall, how
power turns to folly, empires to ashes. He ought to listen to that voice and
tremble.382

Here Morgenthau was trying to talk ‘truth to power’ and in so doing he was
reminding the powers that be of the perils arising from the hubris of perceived
omnipotence. Morgenthau’s shift in language after 1965, from a discussion in terms
of national interest to one in terms of morality hardly indicates an abandonment of

379
Ibid. pp. 15-29
380
For Morgenthau and the war in Vietnam see indicatively: W. Bain, “Deconfusing Morgenthau:
moral inquiry and classical realism reconsidered” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 26, No. 3,
2000, pp. 445-464; S. Recchia, “Restraining imperial hubris: The Ethical Bases of Realist
International Relations Theory” in Constellations, Vol. 14, No. 4, 2007, pp. 531-556; E. G. Rafshoon,
“A realist’s moral opposition to war” in Peace & Change, Vol. 26, No. 1, 2001, pp. 55-77; J. W. See,
“A prophet without honor: Hans Morgenthau and the War in Vietnam, 1955–1965” in Pacific
Historical Review, Vol. 70, No. 3, 2001, pp. 419-448; L. B. Zimmer, The Vietnam War Debate: Hans
J. Morgenthau and the Attempt to Halt the Drift into Disaster, Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011; L.
Zambernardi, “The impotence of power: Morgenthau’s critique of American intervention in Vietnam”
in Review of International Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3, 2011, pp. 1335-1356
381
J. W. See, “A prophet without honor”, pp. 434-441
382
H. Morgenthau, “Truth and Power: The Intellectuals and the Johnson Administration” in The New
Republic, Vol. 155, 1966, pp. 8-14: p. 14

98
his realism as Rafshoon suggests.383 For as discussed above, the moral value of
prudence was a persistent element in his engagement with politics and the only
antidote that could help policy makers to avoid the pitfalls of nationalism.

Concluding remarks
The main objective of this chapter was to uncover the importance of power in
Morgenthau’s theory of international relations. The centrality of power in his work is
inseparable from an understanding of politics as tragedy which follows from a
critique of rationalism as being unable to trace the essence of the nature of human
beings or politics. Based on the anthropological assumption of a lust for power and
the tragedy of its inescapability, Morgenthau placed power at the core of his theory.
Drawing thus eclectically from a wide range of both ‘pre-rational’ and anti-
enlightenment sources, Morgenthau developed a conceptualisation of power that is
explicit and narrow and therefore constitutes and insulates the political sphere. As
such, power permeates his theory both ontologically and epistemologically.
Morgenthau formed a strict analytical framework within which he placed power as
the core of politics which is separated by other spheres of human activity like
morality. This approach is in sharp contrast to that of Carr with his different
theoretical background and dialectical understanding of politics.
The different backgrounds of Carr and Morgenthau account largely for their
significant differences in approaching the nation-state as the main ‘unit’ of power in
modernity and nationalism as its ideological corollary. Carr’s wide range of interests
paired with his flexible conceptualisation of power allowed him to offer a nuanced
understanding of the nation-state and its development in terms of shifts in the
domestic and international distribution of power. Morgenthau’s account on the other
hand is less elaborate and mainly intuitive since he never focused on the historical
development of the nation-state or paid attention to its careful conceptualisation for
that matter. Furthermore, the nation-state plays a central role in Morgenthau’s effort
to translate his animus dominandi to international politics meaningfully and in
overcoming the division between the transcendental and the actual. Carr’s flexible
understanding of a power that is disassociated from human nature and his dialectical

383
E. G. Rafshoon, “A realist’s moral opposition to war”, pp. 55 – 72

99
view of politics as opposed to Morgenthau’s distinct spheres of human activity
allowed him to avoid such shortcomings. Yet despite their profound differences there
are also striking similarities to be found in the two realists’ approaches of the nation-
state.
First and foremost, neither of them treated the nation-state as an objective category
outside history. Nor did they see the nation-state as an ossified, eternal ‘power unit’.
Morgenthau’s tragedy was that his intuitive understanding of the nation and his
restrictive methodology did not allow him to elaborate adequately on its historical
development and thus effectively disassociate a historically conditioned notion from
a theory that purported to capture timeless elements of politics. This, however, does
not imply that Morgenthau was not mindful of the limitations power imposed to the
nation-state and nationalism as its ideological corollary. In fact both realists
examined thus far identified the nation-state as an unfixed manifestation of power
conditioned upon the latter, since it is power that lies at the heart of their ontological
assumptions. A further similarity is that, despite their very different assumptions
about morality, both were acutely aware of the risk posed by any notion of
international society anchored morally in the premises of nationalism.

100
CHAPTER III

John Herz and realism’s moment of transition

Introduction
The chapter begins with an examination of the main characteristics of John Herz’s
approach to international politics. I claim that, mindful of the limits of both
traditional and positivist approaches, he favoured the median way of the study of
structures and systems. At the same time, however, his analysis differed significantly
from that of neorealists especially with regard to the most static aspects of their
approach. As such, Herz can be approached as a realist that cannot be placed
comfortably within either classical or structural realism.384 His efforts to make sense
of international politics revolved around the concept for which he is –rightly- most
known, the security dilemma. I then examine the centrality of the security dilemma
for both his ontological and epistemological assumptions.
Ontologically, I claim that the primacy he attributed to the security dilemma allowed
Herz to approach power as rooted to it. By grounding power on a social condition
Herz avoided some of the pitfalls usually associated with a conceptualisation of
power deriving from human nature. This move in turn allowed him to better account
for variations in the centrality of the role of power in different historical periods.
After establishing the centrality of the security dilemma in Herz’s ontology, I
examine the implications of such an approach for his epistemology. Herz’s efforts to
engage with the two ideo-typical reactions of the human mind to the realisation of
the dilemma, namely realism and idealism, led to an attempt to synthesise them
through the advancement of ‘realist liberalism’. The latter, being Herz’s particular
brand of realism, comprises of an effort to utilise the knowledge attained by realism

384
I discuss differences and similarities between Herz and both forms of realism throughout the
chapter. In most of the secondary literature Herz is approached as a classical realist. A point similar to
the one I develop in this chapter is raised by Schuett. He claims that, despite being closer to classical
realism, Herz’s contribution of the concept of the security dilemma which became the “foundational
conceptual framework for subsequent generations of realists” makes him the “perfect entrée into post-
classical realism”. R. Schuett, Political realism, Freud, and human nature, p. 53

101
about the centrality of the security and power dilemma, while avoiding the fatalism
implied in such a realisation.
In the second part, I examine the nature and role of power in his theory. I claim that
Herz, by connecting power to security and by conceiving it broadly as the possession
of means of security or the perception of such a possession, offered an account of
power that is flexible and can accommodate the different needs resulting from
different historical settings. The importance he attributed to the impact of
technological developments is indicative of this malleability since what counted as
strength in the pre-atomic age could become a liability by the development of nuclear
weapons. As such, for Herz power while maintaining its essence is in need of
constant re-evaluation and re-definition. When it comes to the role of power, Herz’s
account is indicative of his effort to forward realist liberalism. He dismissed both the
naivety of idealism’s belief that one can get rid of the struggle for power once and
for all but he equally castigated the extreme realism that degenerates to an apology of
power politics. Herz refused to subscribe to the most pessimistic reading of the
security dilemma as implying an eternal struggle for power and focused on the
importance of the fact that realisation of its existence is the first step for a conscious
effort to mitigate the struggle for power. It is under this light that he examined the
importance of the balance of power in the classical international system as mitigating
power politics.
In the third part I examine the connection between this conceptualisation of power
and the nation-state. The common ground here is the security dilemma and the
efforts to mitigate it. For Herz the form a political unit takes in any given
international system depends on its capacity to perform its protective functions. By
examining the rise of territoriality as the underlying structure of the modern
international system, Herz exposed the relationship between power and the form of
the political unit as a dialogical one. On the one hand, technological developments
make available new weapons that increase the vulnerability of the existing political
units. Herz traced the emergence of the territorial state to the gunpowder revolution
that had such an effect. By their ability to employ their newly-acquired power,
territorial lords managed to establish the new unit of impermeability. On the other

102
hand however, the very way power is understood and employed in international
relations is bound to change as soon as the new structure is established.
Given the importance he attributed to military technology and the nation-state as a
unit of protection it is no surprise that Herz was particularly alarmed by the
development of nuclear weapons. In the second section of the third part I examine
the impact this development had on Herz’s thought and its culmination in his account
of the ‘demise’ of the territorial state. The new developments seemed to be signalling
a radical departure that for the first time in history made the accumulation of power
meaningless and the existing political units vulnerable. For Herz, believing that mere
territorial expansion of the units of defence was useless against the destructiveness of
such weapons the only solution would be first a ‘holding operation’ and secondly, a
universalist approach. His worst fears however had not materialised and the
territorial states seemed to be retrenched despite the unfavourable conditions. In the
concluding sections of this part I thus examine Herz’s revisiting of the nation-state. I
claim that his modified account, by somewhat de-emphasising military power and
integrating more elements in the functions performed by the nation-state, offered a
more accurate image of the condition of the nation-state and was more faithful to his
broad conceptualisation of power.
In the fourth part I examine how the main tenets of Herz’s theory are displayed in his
analysis of Nazi Germany and the United States. I claim that Herz approached
Nazism as the exemplification of the extreme, power-glorifying realism that sound
politics must try to avoid. While such realism is insatiable to efforts of
accommodation, Herz genuinely believed that in the case of the Cold War this was
not the case and that mutual fear could be mitigated by common effort. His approach
to American foreign policy was characterised by an effort to raise awareness of the
security dilemma on the other side so that conscious efforts could be made for it to
be mitigated. The concluding section summarises the main findings of the chapter
and connects them to the thought of the realists examined so far.

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I. Herz’s theory of International Relations

Herz and international relations: intellectual curiosity and

methodological pluralism
One of the most recognisable characteristics of Herz was what Karis described as an
extraordinary breadth and depth of academic interests, indicative of which was his
early habit of attending classes in a variety of faculties thanks to the free tuition of
universities in Germany.385 This example was but an early demonstration of an
intellectual curiosity that was to stay with Herz for the better part of almost half a
century that he remained intellectually active. Most accounts of Herz’s career in the
relevant literature offer vivid illustrations of his intellectual odyssey right from its
beginnings when he studied international law with Kelsen, through his engagement
with international relations and comparative politics, to his plea for establishing an
interdisciplinary field of ‘survival research’ in his final years.386
As a result, in his works on international politics Herz was always willing to take
seriously and engage with fields as diverse as -to name but a few- zoology,
psychology, social anthropology, international law, criminology, and Lorenz’s
studies on aggression. Such a breadth of interests however, was not without its risks.
While reviewing the Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics Thompson
claimed that one of the main reasons that prevented Herz from being considered a
first-rank scholar in international relations was precisely the fact that he did not
“devote himself unreservedly” to the field.387 Yet this diversity is responsible for
both the richness of his insights but also his characteristic methodological pluralism.

385
T. Karis, “A Life of Passionate Scholarship” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008,
pp.405-409: p. 407
386
All following articles contain longer or shorter intellectual biographies of J. Herz: T. Karis “A Life
of Passionate Scholarship”; J. Puglierin “Towards being a ‘Traveler between All Worlds’” in
International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp.419-425; P. Stirk, “John H. Herz: realism and the
fragility of the international order” in Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, 2005, pp. 285-306; C.
Hacke and J. Puglierin, “John H. Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality” in International Relations,
Vol. 21, No. 3, 2007, pp 367-382. For the early Herz, Kelsen and international law see P. Stirk, “John
H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4,
2008, pp. 427-440. For the plea to establish a new field of ‘survival research’ see J. Herz ,“On Human
Survival: reflections on survival research and survival policies” in World Futures, Vol. 59, 2003, pp.
135-143 and K. Graham, “‘Survival Research’ and the ‘Planetary Interest’: Carrying Forward the
Thoughts of John Herz” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 457-472
387
K. Thompson, “Review: The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics” in The American
Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 3, 1979, pp. 941-942

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Given this immense diversity of interests then, it is no wonder that Herz
demonstrated a remarkable openness in his approach to international politics, of
which his methodological pluralism is indicative. A peculiar trait of this pluralism
was Herz’s attempt to synthesise his German intellectual heritage of a theoretical and
historical tradition with the empirical and pragmatic political science that he
encountered in America.388 In formulating his own approach Herz actively sought to
take the best elements from both worlds.389 As such Lebow is right to observe that
although Herz never wrote about the Greeks, he had the mindset of one, at least as
regards his preference for the ‘middle way’.390 Although Lebow here has in mind the
median way in terms of realism and idealism, his comment is also applicable to
Herz’s methodology. His position in the debate between traditionalism and
positivism is indicative of this approach.
In International Politics in the Atomic Age Herz briefly contrasted two opposite
extreme approaches on methodology, clarifying he was dealing with them as ideal-
types that do not appear frequently in their pure form, and found them both
wanting.391 The “abstract” approach, in its effort to generalise and deduce patterns is
at risk of reducing international relations to “typology or phenomenology”.392 Further
risks are associated with its ‘scientific’ incarnation that Herz examined in his later
work. Thus he was also sceptical of the ‘scientific’ approach to international
relations, which in neglecting that political science is problem-oriented expends itself
in accumulating and analysing data for the sake of it. The results of such an approach
are often trivial or irrelevant and often do not add more to our understanding of a
concrete situation than the intuition offered by the traditionalists.393 The recognition
that traditionalists are more appreciative of the special historical, cultural and other
particular characteristics of each concrete case, however, implies that they tend to err
in the opposite direction. In the universe of the “overconcrete” or “historical”
388
J. Puglierin, “Towards being a ‘Traveler between All Worlds’”, pp. 419-423
389
Ibid. p. 422
390
R. N. Lebow, “Identity and International Relations” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4,
2008, pp. 473-492: p. 473. Lebow is not entirely right to claim that Herz never wrote about the
Greeks. See indicatively J. Herz ,“Prologue as Epilogue: Aristotle’s dream” (1973) in J. Herz, The
Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, New York: David McKay, 1976, pp. 303-307
391
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, New York & London: Columbia University
Press, 1962, pp. 5-12
392
Ibid. p. 6
393
J. Herz, “Relevancies and Irrelevancies in the Study of International Relations” in Polity, Vol. 4,
No. 1, 1971, pp. 25-47: pp. 26-37

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approach, generalisation is impossible since international politics are conceived as a
continuous “flux of changing concrete situations” whereupon “everything... is always
new and incomparable, and nothing whatsoever repeats itself”.394 For Herz this
position is unsatisfying since any meaningful study of international politics must be
able to attain at least some level of generalisation.
What for Herz constitutes the ‘middle way’ of engaging theoretically with situations
that might be in flux but are stable enough so as not to represent merely “fleeting
events” is the study of structures and systems.395 He was thus much closer to Waltz’s
structural realism than other classical realists, a point he also made when he claimed
that their approaches are not incompatible in response to Ashley’s interpretation of
his work.396 Yet he was not willing to accept the structural approach unconditionally.
For Herz, theoretical model-building is valid insofar as its models are “distillates
from life” rather than “products of abstract speculation”, an assertion that would
place him at odds with Waltz’s heavily deductive approach.397 A further caveat is the
risk of ossification of the approach, whereupon the student of international relations
views structures and systems as static when they are constantly changing. Apart from
the obvious danger in terms of a theory’s validity, when parallels are drawn between
dissimilar situations and are used to infer standards of action the results can be
“deadly”. Constant re-evaluation of the framework is therefore essential if a
structural approach is to be workable.398
Herz’s methodological pluralism, his openness to interdisciplinary approaches and
his preference for the middle way between different epistemological positions

394
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 6
395
Ibid. p. 7
396
See R. Ashley, “Political Realism and Human Interests”, pp. 204-236; J. Herz, “[Political Realism
and Human Interests]: Comment” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, pp. 237-
241: pp. 239-240. The contrast between this attitude and Morgenthau’s dismissive comments about
similar approaches and their emphasis on methodology is glaring. H. Morgenthau, Politics Among
Nations, pp. ix-x
397
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 8; although induction is not discarded
completely by Waltz, he thinks that it is more suitable for testing hypotheses and laws rather than
theories. In fact he thinks that although both induction and deduction are indispensable for theory
formation, realism was too close to induction whereas neorealism was leaning more towards
deduction. K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 7-11; K. Waltz “Realist Thought and
Neorealist Theory”, p 33
398
Ibid. p. 9. For an illustration of how wrong parallels can be drawn from superficially similar but
essentially different cases see Herz’s own contribution on the discussion about détente in the 1970s: J.
Herz, “Détente and Appeasement from a Political Scientist’s Vantage Point” (1974) in J. Herz The
Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, pp. 279-289

106
informed consistently his efforts to make sense of international relations. More than
every other classical realist perhaps, Herz concentrated his efforts around a
reoccurring problem that he struggled with from early on and was to form the core of
his political philosophy. This problem is, as Karis reminds us, his “obsession” with
survival: “His most influential concept, the ‘security dilemma’, was defined in
answer to the question, ‘why have we been slaughtering each other on end?’” he
notes by quoting Herz’s autobiography, which tellingly is titled Vom Überleben i.e.
“of survival”.399

Survival in an irrational world: the ontology of the ‘security

and power dilemma’
Herz believed we inhabit an irrational world that is home to a fundamental
antagonism between the need of cooperation and the inescapability of conflict.400
Both elements are central to Herz’s ontological assumptions about social life. On the
one hand human beings are fully aware that their survival depends upon fellow
human beings. On the other hand, awareness of their vulnerability vis-à-vis the very
same persons they rely upon for their survival gives rise to mistrust and hostility.401
This paradox of cooperation and conflict, both equally necessary for survival, gives
rise to the security dilemma.
Faced then with a constant threat to their survival, human beings – or groups for that
matter - are locked in a perpetual struggle to attain more power as a means of
security. Where the ‘dilemmatic’ element of the concept enters, is that this effort
creates insecurity to others who in turn embark upon a similar effort to accumulate
power.402 What makes the security dilemma such a core concept for Herz’s ontology
is the perpetual character and the inescapability implied in it once the process is
initiated. For as long as human competition for security begins, a vicious circle is

399
T. Karis, “A Life of Passionate Scholarship” p. 408; Stirk mentions the connection between Herz’s
academic interest and the title of his autobiography and points to a biographical connection too: the
fact that Herz’s own survival as a German Jew was threatened during the Nazi regime. See P. Stirk,
“John H. Herz: realism and the fragility of the international order”, p. 287.
400
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A study in theories and realities, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 16
401
Ibid. pp. 3-5
402
J. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma” in World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2,
1950, pp. 157-180: pp. 157-158

107
entered whereupon full security, while never fully attainable, increases the necessity
for further accumulation of power.403 The centrality then of power in Herz’s ontology
depends upon its role as a means of overcoming the security dilemma.
By competing for and securing power individuals or groups are merely trying to
address this perennial problem. Although representing one of the possible reactions
to the security dilemma, power plays so important a role in Herz’s theory of
international politics, that he often did not distinguish them and instead referred to
them collectively as the “security and power dilemma”. That said, Herz was not
willing to ascribe to power properties of a pass-partout which could unlock all
secrets of social life. Indeed, he was very cautious not to base his theory of
international politics upon such ‘unproved’ and ‘metaphysical’ foundations as
assumptions about human nature.404 Here the contrast with Morgenthau is glaring,
and Herz identified the animus dominandi as one of the main weaknesses of the
former’s theory.405 He for one made sure to clarify his own position time and again:
“The condition that concerns us” he maintained, “is not an anthropological or
biological, but a social one”.406 Consequently there can be no “innate power instinct”
as such: the quest for power simply stems from the instinct of self-preservation that
is activated by the ‘security dilemma’.407
By removing the power drive from the rather flimsy and unverifiable foundations of
human nature and founding it upon a social condition, Herz did not only succeed in
covering his ‘ontological flanks’ so to speak, but also in disassociating realism from
a fatalistic worldview.408 As Sylvest correctly points out, social structures might be
solid but they are not as unchangeable as human nature.409 Such a move then implies

403
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 24
404
J. Herz, “[Political Realism and Human Interests]: Comment”, p. 239.
405
J. Herz, “Reflections on Hans Morgenthau’s Political Realism” in American Foreign Policy
Newsletter, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1984, pp. 1-10: p. 7; Scheuerman, however, notes that “Herz’s allusions to
fundamental psychological propensities occasionally blurred the divide” between his approach and
that of Morgenthau. W. Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 34
406
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 3
407
Ibid. p. 4
408
Scheuerman, however, observes that the divide between Herz and Morgenthau was “occasionally
blurred” by the former’s “allusions to fundamental psychological propensities”. W. E. Scheuerman,
The Realist Case for Global Reform, p. 34. Schuett, quoting Wolfers, claims that Herz’s theory too
included assumptions about human nature, albeit different assumptions that make “people look less
vicious”: R. Schuett, Political realism, Freud, and human nature, p. 57
409
C. Sylvest, “John H. Herz and the Resurrection of Classical Realism” in International Relations,
Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 441-455: p. 448. Indeed, as will be discussed in subsequent parts, Herz often

108
far more increased possibilities of accommodation and understanding between
competing powers.410 It also allows for the occasional prevalence of power-alien
elements such as economic interests or moral and religious circumstances, which
Herz interestingly calls “a-political”, in the formulation and execution of policies
“from time to time”.411 It does not however, imply a complete marginalisation of
power in his theory of international relations.
After the qualification that power does not a priori define international relations for
Herz is taken into account, one must still arrive at the conclusion that its implications
remain paramount for his realism. Thus the fact that “power, in modern international
relations, has been the ultimate means of deciding issues”, becomes an inevitable
outcome from the moment power “has entered the field at all”.412 The account here is
evolutionary: power competition among states marginalises power-alien
considerations in the same way economic motivations marginalised non-economic
ones domestically.413 Herz implied a historical transition whereupon power gained
significantly in importance for international politics. The importance he ascribed to
the specific notion of power that arises from the territorial character of the modern
state i.e. national power, gives a clear indication about when that transition should be
placed. It is national power that enabled nations to assert themselves against the
world and “became the chief instrument of so-called power politics”.414
Hence the centrality of power in Herz’s ontology is conditional upon an
understanding that firstly it stems from the main theme which is the ‘security
dilemma’ and secondly its character and role is shifting according to the historical

contemplated the possibility of either mitigating or overcoming the security dilemma. He was also
well aware about what an approach founded upon a social condition implied when displaying
skepticism about grounding territoriality to a biological instinct. If competition for resources is
conscious –as opposed to instinctive- then political units will not be eternally bound to fight each
other. J. Herz, “The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the Future of the Nation-State” in
Polity, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1968, pp. 11-34: pp. 30-32
410
J. Herz, “Reflections on Hans Morgenthau’s Political Realism”: p. 7
411
J. Herz, “Power Politics and World Organization” in The American Political Science Review”, Vol.
36, No. 6, 1942, pp. 1039-1052: p. 1040
412
Ibid. pp. 1939-1940
413
Ibid. p. 1040.
414
J. Herz, “International Politics and the Nuclear Dilemma” (1962) in J. Herz The Nation-State and
the Crisis of World Politics, pp. 124-147: p. 128 (emphasis is added). Of course that does not imply
that power appeared out of nowhere: “power considerations have always ruled the ‘international’
relationships of whatever units constituted the basic units”. J. Herz, Political Realism and Political
Idealism, p. 76. The transition is one of intensity and not one from power-alien to power-centered
considerations.

109
context. This conditionality by no means reduces its importance however, since for
Herz as long as the international system is based upon territorial units, the
compulsion it exerts upon them means no-one of them can abandon power politics in
favour of other considerations without increasing its vulnerability and thus reducing
its chances of survival.415

On epistemology: The ‘security dilemma’ and political

thought
If power, through its close connection to the security dilemma plays an important
role in Herz’s ontology, through the very same connection it plays an equally
important role in his epistemology. For Herz, it is the very irrationality of the world
and its apparent conflict with human reason that gives rise to all political thought.416
Thus he anchored the two ideo-typical theories of political realism and political
idealism to the reaction of human mind to the realisation of the ‘security and power
dilemma’.
For Herz the conventional distinction between political idealism and political realism
as representative systems of “what ought to be” versus “what is” respectively, is
unsatisfactory.417 Instead, he understands both approaches as two extreme attitudes
towards the security and power dilemma. On the one hand, political realism
recognises the implications of this basic condition and understands politics as
“fundamentally determined by the struggle for power”.418 Although this is an
ontological statement it has important epistemological implications. Having
identified the centrality of power, political realism then often falls prey to a single-
factor fallacy and disregards all other factors that might be at work alongside or
against power.419
Political idealism on the other hand, is ultimately unsatisfied by the mere
examination of the political phenomena that derive from the security and power
dilemma.420 It seeks to transcend them and connect the ideal with reality either by

415
J. Herz, “Power Politics and World Organization”, p. 1040
416
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 16
417
Ibid. pp. 17-18
418
Ibid. pp 24-25
419
Ibid. pp. 24-30
420
Ibid. pp. 31

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claiming the potential of future realisation of the ideal or by claiming that the ideal is
actually being realised at the present.421 In the first case, political idealism fulfils a
revolutionary function whereupon it rationalises the interests of the oppressed
groups. In the latter, it idealises the status-quo and justifies the predominance of the
powers that be.422 Here the similarities with the conditionality of thought discussed
by Carr are striking, and certainly Herz was aware of the work of Mannheim.423
Another commonality with Carr is Herz’s preferred type of political thought which
he called “Realist Liberalism”. Very much like the dialectics of utopia and reality in
Carr, Herz’s own approach is trying to synthesise the best elements of the two
worlds.424 Sound political thought should aim to avoid both the naivety of idealism
and the fatalism of realism. As such, the epistemology of “Realist Liberalism” should
be firmly based on the “utilisation, without compromise or euphemism, of any and
all knowledge of political realism”.425 Realist observations of the security and power
element in human societies constitute the “facts”, the hard ground upon which
political thought can be built. They also delineate the limits of the attainable by
highlighting the restraints imposed by those facts upon human action.426 At the same
time, ethical guidance can only be given by accepting the main advantage of political
idealism, namely the “realisation... that man can act”.427
Realist Liberalism then does not represent a mere combination of elements from
political idealism and political realism. More importantly, it represents the dialectical
synthesis that follows from the ‘thesis’ of the first and its contradiction by the
‘antithesis’ of the second.428 This synthesis lies also at the basis of Herz’s notion of
rationality in a world that is, as already noted, far from rational. Herz understood

421
Ibid. p. 33
422
Ibid. pp. 36-39
423
Ibid. p. 144
424
The similarity has not gone unnoticed in secondary literature. See: C. Hacke and J. Puglierin “John
H. Herz: Balancing Utopia and Reality”, p. 377; W. Scheuerman, Realist Case for Global Reform, pp.
37-38. Jones also spots this similarity and interprets it as an employment of the same rhetorical ‘trick’
by both authors in order to manipulate their readership: C. Jones, A duty to lie, p.12. Booth despite
discussing the commonalities also notes that Herz was less sceptical than Carr as regarded the
prospects of finding a middle way between realism and idealism: K. Booth, “Navigating the ‘Absolute
Novum’: John H. Herz’s Political Realism and Political Idealism” in International Relations, Vol. 22,
No. 4, 2008, pp. 510-526: pp. 520-521
425
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, pp. 132-133
426
Ibid. pp. 131-133
427
Ibid. p. 132
428
Ibid. pp. 132-133, p. 146

111
idealist rationalism not merely as a belief in “reason” but rather as a blind belief in
the possibility of the opposing instincts of pity and survival to be reconciled. Since
however for Herz rationality is not inherent in the world, sound political thought
should begin with the assumption that “rationality is morality to be aimed at”.429 The
recognition of rationalism as a normative rather than epistemological position should
be matched by the acceptance of the ‘realist facts’ as the raw material which creates
the preconditions for whatever rationality can be attainable.430

II. Herz’s conceptualisation of power

Power and international relations: its protean nature

Given the primacy of the security dilemma in Herz’s theory of international relations,
it follows that whatever importance power holds in such a theory can only be
derivative. As such, his conceptualisation of power is anchored to the security
dilemma. Having rejected the assumptions about an innate power drive in human
nature, Herz treated the struggle for power as a means to satisfy the need for security,
paving thus the way for contemporary realism. Power then to begin with, is to be
understood as the possession of means of living and of weapons that can be used to
safeguard one’s own life and secure the possession of said means.431 This intimate
connection between power and security is echoed in his later assessment of the
“power of protection” as the main source of legitimacy for any given political unit.432
The closest then he offered to a notion of the essence of power is its broad
understanding as the possession of means of protection or the perception of such a
possession.
The latter relates to the importance he attributed to the subjective element of power
in line with what Sylvest calls Herz’s “perspectivism” or –anachronistically-
constructivism.433 Writing three decades after the publication of Political Realism

429
Ibid. pp. 127-128
430
Ibid. p. 128
431
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 5
432
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 41
433
C. Sylvest, “Herz and the resurrection of classical realism”, pp 449-451

112
and Political Idealism Herz described power as “the most fundamental but also most
elusive of realist concepts”.434 One element of this elusiveness that concerned Herz
right from the beginning was the importance of non-material forms of power, namely
prestige. He made sure to include the subjective element of prestige alongside the
otherwise brief and basic formulation of power he offered in his earlier work. There,
he described prestige as an equally important to military and economic power
element, since its possession “confers power upon its possessor”, irrespectively of
the fact that it might not reflect actual power.435 Morgenthau too paid attention to the
same element, while cautioning to the perils of not only downplaying but also
overplaying one’s own power through prestige policy.436
Herz’s conceptualisation of power, however, is not exhausted in its understanding as
material capabilities or even in the perception of the existence or lack thereof. For
him the importance of the subjective element goes beyond its role in the calculation -
or miscalculation as the case might be- of power. It affects the very core of our
understanding of power itself. Unlike geography, population or the armed forces of a
nation-state that are verifiable “givens”, its power cannot be treated as such because
its estimation is totally dependent upon the actor’s interpretation of the former. That
power and power relations thus are understood as givens is a result of actors’ or
observers’ perceptions of reality.437 In fact, Herz claimed, power is a metaphor and
as such it is “in the eyes of the beholder”.438 And the vision of the beholder differs
“according to historical memories or cultural or social traditions”.439
This final statement is revealing of one of the main characteristics of Herz’s notion
of power: the components of power cannot be conceived to be independent of
conditions of space and time. This, as stated already, applies to the subjective
element of power. Herz indeed claimed that prestige or image-making gained so
much in importance during the Cold War compared to the past that it came to
account for “half of ‘power politics’”.440 It also applies to the material or objective

434
J. Herz, “Political Realism Revisited” in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981, pp.
182-197: p. 186
435
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, pp 5-6
436
H. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations, pp. 73-87
437
J. Herz, “Realism revisited”, p. 184
438
Ibid. p. 186
439
Ibid. p. 185
440
Ibid. p. 187

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element of power. For Herz the traditional notion of power could be used as a
standard of comparison between different units because it was “measurable, to some
extent, graded, and calculable”.441 The elements of national power in this traditional
understanding could be ‘added up’ to allow for an estimate of the cumulative power
of a nation-state. They do not differ much from those presented by Morgenthau for
the same purpose and include “size, location, configuration of territory, quantitative
and qualitative aspects of population, economic and above all industrial
development, and... military strength, actual as well as potential”.442
This measurability of power however, resulted from the particular historical setting
that gave birth to the classical international system. Power, in its current
understanding as capabilities, is but a derivative concept that takes its meaning from
the underlying structure of territoriality. It is only through this structure which
established the modern state as the main impenetrable unit that “these capabilities
can be made use of in international politics”.443 Once this structure withered away, as
Herz believed to be the case with the rise of bipolarity and the development of
thermonuclear weapons, the very concept of power would be bound to lose its
traditional meaning.444 While before the development of the new weapons it still
seemed reasonable to understand power as “something radiating from one centre…
until it finds an equilibrium with that of similar geographically anchored units” as per
Russell, in the atomic age power could bypass the hard shell of the territorial unit and
destroy power “from centre to centre”.445 As such, the development of the new
weapons represented a far more radical change than the emergence of bipolarity
because at its heart lay a paradoxical condition: power, both traditional and atomic,
would become at the same time both an asset and a liability. Possession of traditional
factors of power such as the level of industrialisation or location, as well as nuclear
weapons themselves, would render their holder more vulnerable than with their

441
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 41-42
442
Ibid. p. 170; for Morgenthau’s elements of power see supra Chapter II, pp. 74-75
443
Ibid. p. 49
444
Here Herz’s concerns run parallel to those of Morgenthau who displayed similar thoughts about the
radical departure signified by the development of nuclear weapons. For the similarities and differences
see W. Scheuerman, “Realists against the nation-state”, pp. 97-103; W. Scheuerman, “Realism and the
critique of technology”, pp. 563-584
445
J. Herz, “Rise and demise of the territorial state” in World Politics, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1957, pp. 473-
493: p. 489

114
absence, and power would become synonymous with impotence.446 The implication
for the concept of power itself, as traditionally understood, would be an urgent need
for its re-definition since it would now be rendered meaningless.
Similarly to Morgenthau, Herz displayed scepticism about the prospects of
humanity’s survival in the face of developments in nuclear warfare. To be fair to
him, however, writing in the late 1950s he was merely trying to capture the
uncertainty of a transitional age and outline prospects for the future. As such, his
assessment that with the development of nuclear weapons power equals impotence
belongs to the sphere not of prediction but of mere identification of tendencies that
might or might not materialise. After reviewing extensively the risks involved in
conceptions of deterrence at the time he concluded that the main characteristic of the
transitional period was an unprecedented uncertainty that rendered any redefinition
of concepts almost impossible. For him the only meaningful way to approach
international structure and politics would be to accept the precarious coexistence of
two contradictory realities: on the one hand the traditional or “preatomic” power
relations whereupon old concepts retain partially their validity and on the other hand
the “constellation in which permeability… is the underlying condition”.447 The
paradoxical outcome is a situation in which power is “’measurable’ and
‘comparable’, and no longer measurable and absolute, all at the same time”.448
Despite being merely the outline of a tendency, Herz’s approach to power in this case
provides with a good indication about his view of the concept as essentially protean
in its character. Nuclear weapons aside, the emergence of bipolarity offered for Herz
a clear example of how historical development calls for a constant re-evaluation of
the central concepts. Paraphrasing Marx, Herz emphasised time and again that
developments at the level of international relations “constitute a superstructure over
the developments of the means of destruction”.449 Herz had always been concerned
with the impact of technological developments on international politics and human

446
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 168-172
447
Ibid. pp. 221-223
448
Ibid. p. 222
449
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 200; also repeated in J. Herz, International
Politics in the Atomic Age, p 233 and J. Herz, “Technology, Ethics and International relations” (1974)
in J. Herz, The nation-state and the crisis of world politics, p 290

115
survival generally, as recent works by Sylvest and Scheuerman demonstrated.450 He
emphasised particularly the role of military technology when accounting for changes
in the international system.451 His analysis on the emergence of the territorial state in
place of the medieval unit thus was centred on the role of gunpowder, and his
assertion that the prospects were bleak for the nation-state was equally based on the
developments that rendered the hard shell of nation-states permeable.452 As a
consequence –and notwithstanding the nuclear weapons that render the measurability
of power “doubtful as such”- the increased complexity and sheer number of power
factors to be taken into account when calculating power has increased so much and
so rapidly during modernity that any effort to calculate power is even more complex
than it used to be. This increasing uncertainty which followed rapid technological
developments, with the addition of the subjective element of power made the
measurability of power in the bipolar world precarious.453
Here Herz’s realism lies somewhere between classical realism and neorealism. For
even though the essence of power as the bare minimum of means of security remains
unchanged in Herz’s theory, the same does not apply to the form of power. The latter
is in constant flux throughout history and reflects changes in the international system.
This fluidity of both power and the international system distinguishes Herz’s
approach from later incarnations of structural realism despite their similarities. For
Herz power cannot be fungible because it does not possess the same external traits at
any given time. Yet for neorealism, trying to model a theory of international relations
after microeconomics, power is expected to play the role of money and thus be

450
Herz prepared in the 1960s a manuscript under the title International Politics in the Technological
Age, and although it never saw publication, some parts of it found their way to a later collection of
articles: J. Herz, “The Civilisational Process and its reversal” in The nation-state and the crisis of
world politics, pp. 195-225. See the excellent discussions in W. Scheuerman, “Realism and the
critique of technology”, pp. 569-582 and C. Sylvest, “Technology and Global Politics: The Modern
Experiences of Bertrand Russell and John H. Herz” in The International History Review, Vol. 35, No.
1, 2013, pp. 121-142. Scheuerman focuses mostly on Herz’s account of social acceleration and its
contemporary relevance. As such the emphasis is mostly on negative aspects of technology. Herz,
however, displayed –on occasion- some optimism too; especially when discussing the prospects of
technology to provide the means of overcoming the perennial security dilemma. See for instance the
concluding remarks in J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism and J. Herz, “Territorial State
Revisited”.
451
“The very nature of the prevailing unit... depended on military technology” J. Herz, “Technology,
Ethics, and international relations”, p 291
452
J. Herz, “Rise and demise of territorial state”, pp 476-489
453
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 143-146

116
fungible, at least to some extent.454 The important difference is not one of degree:
despite the differences between various neorealists they would agree with Herz that
to measure power accurately is a daunting endeavour.455 The main difference is
rather a qualitative one: Herz’s power is in flux and in need of constant re-evaluation,
in line with his warning of the risk of ossification associated with structural
approaches. Hence, whereas for neorealism power is something static, for Herz’s
variant of realism this is not the case.

The role of power in politics and its limits

For Herz then, so long as the security dilemma is not resolved, power is going to lie
at the core of politics. The fatal problem with political idealism is, as mentioned
already, the belief that the struggle for power can be abandoned in favour of a new,
ideal order. The identification of power as a means of overcoming the security
dilemma meant for Herz that those who attempt to abandon the struggle for power
unilaterally increase their vulnerability vis-à-vis others.456 Whenever thus an idealist
project manages to overcome a pre-existing order, its success is going to be short-
lived. For in conditions of insecurity and struggle for power, the only way it can
survive is on a power basis.457 As a result, once new rules and institutions are in
place, they are doomed do be corrupted by those very phenomena they sought to
overcome. This is the tragedy of idealism and Herz noted that history is riddled with
abortive efforts to create a better world, the examples of the French and Russian
revolutions being typical of how an internationalist movement degenerates to self-
serving national policies.458
Realist cynicism is born out of disillusionment for the fate of such efforts, but it does
not fare any better in addressing the problems of social life. While political realism
can understand the constraints the security and power dilemma imposes on human
action better than idealism, it “fails to gain the minds of men for any length of

454
K. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A response to my critics” in R.
Keohane (ed), Neorealism and its Critics, pp. 323-345: p. 333
455
For a brief overview of different conceptions of power in structural realism see B. Schmidt
“Competing Realist Conceptions of Power” in Millennium – Journal of International Studies, Vol. 33,
No. 3, 2005, pp 523-549: pp 536-542. For Mearsheimer’s conceptualization of power as currency see
infra Chapter IV, Parts I and II.
456
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 24
457
Ibid. p. 169
458
Ibid. p. 27 ; pp. 65-102

117
time”.459 At best, realism simply neglects everything apart from power
considerations and becomes fatalistic; at worst it glorifies power and its
paraphernalia such as war, aggressive nationalism and imperialism.460 Herz realised
that in the field of international relations the observations of realism carry more
weight than in domestic politics because of the prevailing conditions of international
anarchy. Here, the refuge of an overarching authority that might control the power of
the dominant members of the group is absent as are the various institutionalised
checks and balances of domestic politics.461 The logical conclusion of such a
realisation would be that the struggle for power in international relations is endless
and unchecked, a conclusion often followed by structural realists of the offensive
variant.462 For Herz however, this view is not justified by historical experience.
Despite differences with domestic politics, international anarchy has not always been
unconditional, the struggle for power has often been limited and the security
dilemma mitigated.463
In his early formulation of realist liberalism Herz opted for the minimalist mediating
factor of the balance of power and its modified variant of collective security. He
recognised the existence of other mitigating factors such as international law or
ideologies of unity but was very sceptical about their potential to inform realist
liberalism in the context of modern international relations.464 A self-conscious
system of balance of power like the one that flourished in Europe until the nineteenth
century, was based on the belief of those participating in it that they shared an

459
Ibid. p. 126
460
Ibid. p. 203, pp. 24-30
461
Ibid. pp. 200-203; J. Herz, “Introduction” in The Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, pp.
1-56: p. 9
462
Wheeler observes that it is such a reading of the security dilemma, for which Herz’s early
formulations are partly responsible, that “led John Mearsheimer to claim Herz as a progenitor of the
theory of offensive realism”. N. Wheeler, “‘To Put Oneself into the Other Fellow’s Place’: John Herz,
the Security Dilemma and the Nuclear Age” in International Relations, Vol. 22, No. 4, 2008, pp. 493-
509: p. 494. For Herz himself however, such a position was representative of the ideo-typical political
realism he was trying to overcome with his realist liberalism. J. Herz, Political Realism and Political
Idealism, p. 203. A similar point is raised by Scheuerman who claims that the mere existence of the
security dilemma is not sufficient reason for Herz to reject outright ‘idealism’. Statesmen who are able
to understand its logic can mitigate the security dilemma. W. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for
Global Reform, pp. 35-37
463
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, pp. 203-204; J. Herz, International Politics in the
Atomic Age, p. 235
464
Ibid. pp. 204-205. For a detailed account of Herz’s gradual disillusionment with international law,
despite him beginning his career as a disciple of Kelsen see C. Sylvest, “Realism and international
law: the challenge of John H. Herz” in International Theory, Vol. 2, no 3, 2010, pp. 410-445

118
interest in maintaining a system comprised by a plurality of political units. Such a
system represented for Herz a middle-way between “individualism” and the “general
interest” of preventing a single power from dominating the system.465 With the
development of bipolarity Herz came to believe this system could no longer perform
its limiting functions as will be discussed in the following section. Yet one particular
aspect of his analysis remained crucial for his understanding of efforts to mitigate
power competition: his treatment of the balance of power as a conscious effort,
informed by an understanding of a general interest.
In periods of history when the balance of power was almost an accidental outcome of
the existence of a system comprising of multiple units like that of the ancient Greek
city-states or of the Hellenistic kingdoms, units succumbed to an “undiluted ‘power
and security dilemma’” and thus failed to “break the vicious circle and to pursue any
policy of mitigation and restraint, relying instead on the pure principles of power
politics in the narrower sense”.466 The lack of realisation that the maintenance of a
pluralist system guaranteed the continued survival of its units eventually led to the
inability to check Rome and avert its hegemony.467 Awareness of the fact that there is
a common interest in sustaining a system that allows for the co-existence of
independent units meant that the security dilemma can at least be alleviated through
conscious effort.
It is this aspect of Herz’s thought that for Wheeler distinguishes his notion of the
security dilemma from the more pessimistic one forwarded by Butterfield, namely
the belief that by comprehending its dynamics, actors “can act upon this knowledge
to promote mutual security”.468 In an era when the two superpowers faced each other
with unprecedented suspicion and with the survival of humanity at risk, his plea to
policy makers to approach the nature of the conflict in a detached way, realise the
true nature of the conflict and the common interests in avoiding nuclear war, and to
“put oneself into the other’s place” aimed at offering a way to mediate the security
dilemma.469 As mentioned in the previous section, the centrality of power for Herz
lay with its importance as a means to addressing the security dilemma. As such, the

465
J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, pp. 207-208
466
Ibid. pp. 208-210
467
Ibid. p. 210
468
N. Wheeler, “‘To Put Oneself into the Other Fellow’s Place’”, p. 495
469
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 249-250

119
limitation of the struggle for power ultimately relies on how successful efforts to
mitigate the security dilemma are going to be. Herz often displayed a “guarded
optimism”, to borrow Stirk’s expression, towards the possibility of somewhat
mitigating the security dilemma through a combination of conscious effort and
technological developments.470

III. Power and the nation-state

The nation-state as the unit of power

In his quasi-autobiographical introduction to the Nation-state and the Crisis of World
politics, Herz reflected on his main objectives in his early engagement with
international politics. One of the issues that troubled him was why the security and
power dilemma played such a prominent role in the relations between units that were
“in their respective historical setting… the highest ones, that is, not subordinate to
any higher authority”.471 The second issue was related to the character of those units:
“What accounts in history for the emergence of the great variety of units which are,
in different periods, the highest ones?”.472 From the very way the questions are
framed some first conclusions about the way he tried to tackle the problem can be
inferred. Herz was going to approach the nation-state as a ‘unit’ of security, and he
was going to approach it as a historical unit.473
For Herz the formation of political units results from the effort to strike a
compromise between the two opposing forces of cooperation and insecurity in
human societies. Human beings, he noted, feel more secure in groups, and
particularly so in groups that appear as ‘natural’. Competition within the group does
not disappear totally but there is at least a degree of solidarity especially when the
security of the group is threatened by other groups. As such, the tendency of human

470
For Herz’s guarded optimism see P. Stirk, “realism and the fragility of the international order”, p.
287; for the help of technology in attenuating the security dilemma by reducing scarcity of resources
through modernization see J. Herz , “Territorial State Revisited”, p. 32
471
J. Herz, “Introduction”, p. 9
472
Ibid. p. 12
473
Despite his affinity with structural realism, Herz was aware of the limits of treating the political
unit as a billiard-ball. He was critical of the variant of realism that advocated the primacy of foreign
policy because it neglected the fact that “’units’ of power… are usually not coherent groups, but units
based on internal power relationships”. J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, p. 28

120
beings to organise themselves in social groups cannot eradicate the struggle for
survival which is now projected at the level of the group.474 Here, despite their
differences in what constitutes the roots of the struggle for power, Herz employed a
similar mechanism of projection to Morgenthau.475 The same condition applies to all
groups but in the particular case of the state it becomes much more acute due to fact
that being the highest unit, it “cannot rely on any higher authority” for purposes of
security.476
The form of the political unit is determined primarily by its capacity to offer
protection to its members, both internally and externally.477 What allowed nation-
states to perform this function, and what thus for Herz constituted the main
underlying structure of the modern international system, was “territoriality”. It is the
organisation of the state on a territorial basis with “impermeable”, defensible
boundaries that turned it into the basic political unit.478 Herz’s account of the
evolution of the territorial unit is a historical one. As when examining power, his
main focus was on technological development and in particular the development of
military technology. In his account, the territorial state emerged at the aftermath of
the “gunpowder revolution” and from the rumbles of the previous “unit of
impermeability”, the medieval castle, which had become vulnerable and unable to
fulfil its protective function any longer.479 Technological progress, then, determines
what sort of political unit will emerge next by rendering previous forms of
organisation indefensible and thus obsolete. This can be illustrated clearly by the
factors that Herz considered more important for explaining the transition to the
modern international system.
In the medieval setting, a combination of a common set of values and the lack of
destructive weapons provided for the minimum of internal and external security
essential for the survival of the system.480 The medieval system however was

474
Ibid. pp. 10-13
475
Roots of the problem are different but the outcome is the same. The condition is projected to the
level of the group. Schuett notices some parallels with Freudian defence mechanisms such as
identification, similar to those he attributed to Morgenthau. R. Schuett, Political realism, Freud, and
human nature, pp. 53-59
476
J. Herz, “Introduction”, p. 10; J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 231-233
477
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 40-41
478
Ibid. pp. 49-75
479
Ibid. pp. 43-48
480
Ibid. p. 45

121
challenged by the collapse of the previous moral order and the emergence of new
weapons. In Herz’s variant of “strategic determinism” major revolutions in military
technology can challenge the whole “’superstructure’ of economic, social, and
political relationships” by undermining the foundations of the “units of protection”,
and certainly the gunpowder revolution was one of them.481 The collapse of medieval
order was followed by a period of insecurity and turmoil which was characterised by
internal and external conflict amongst the various units. The character of the new
units to emerge was not predetermined but would depend on the outcome of this
conflict.
It was thus a question of which of the rulers engaged in the conflict could most
effectively exploit this newly-acquired military power and how far could they extend
their control through the use of such power.482 Here the ability to employ the new
technological means for the dual purpose of internal pacification and external
protection proved crucial. The rulers of the emerging territorial states were able to
accomplish the first task by employing power in order to remove the last remnants of
feudal power and dissolve the obsolete units of impermeability such as castles and
fortified cities domestically.483 At the same time, lining the borders with
fortifications, controlled and manned by the centralised government, formed the new
‘hard shell’ of the territorial unit which afforded it increased protection from external
interference.484 The two processes developed in parallel and reinforced each other:
external forces that would otherwise aid some of the pockets of resistance
increasingly found it hard to do so due to the newly-formed hard shell.485 By the end
of the seventeenth century the territorial unit had been consolidated as the main
political unit. Power then, mostly military but also economic -through the increased
ability of the territorial rulers to fund their efforts through the newly-emerged money
economy instead of relying on their vassals486- played a major role in forging the
territorial unit.

481
Herz mentions that it was not his intention to ‘indulge in a “strategic determinism”’ in J. Herz, The
Nation-State and the Crisis of World Politics, p. 13; J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age,
pp. 45-46
482
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 46
483
Ibid. p.p. 47, 57
484
Ibid. pp. 43-61
485
Ibid. p. 51
486
Ibid. p. 45

122
The relation between power and the nature of the political unit, however, is not one-
directional. In Herz’s approach they exist in a dialogical relationship that is
determined by their close connection to the question of security and how it is best
addressed at a given historical setting. Where the dialogical element becomes
apparent is in the changing conception of power after the territorial unit is
established as the main form of political organisation. Herz observed that the use of
concepts such as “power” or “sovereignty” often obscures the fact that they are
intimately related to territoriality and are in fact derivative of it.487 As mentioned in
the previous part, for his variant of structuralism territoriality is the underlying
structure and once it is consolidated, the form of power and the very way its
functions for international politics are understood is bound to change. The main
change the emergence of the territorial state brought to power was through the
process of centralisation.
In contrast to the pre-modern system where power was “diffused among various
power-holders with jurisdiction over the one and same group of people” power was
now centrally organised and has become measurable.488 This particular
understanding of power could not be employed in international relations without
reference to “something pre-existing, namely, the territorial state itself”.489 In an
international system where international anarchy “has not always been complete” the
establishment of the territorial unit, largely immune from external interference, is the
factor which granted power an increased role.490 For it is only through the purposeful
use of power after the collapse of medieval unity that international anarchy can be
mitigated to some extent. The balance of power as a conscious attempt to prevent
hegemony from materialising, as it was exemplified in the classical modern system,
was significantly different to the coincidental balance of power of bygone ages. What
differentiated it was a combination of material conditions, such as an adequate

487
Ibid. p. 49
488
Ibid. p. 58
489
Ibid. p. 49
490
For Herz international relations, or put more accurately: relations between units national or
otherwise, are characterised by anarchy but very rarely this anarchy is unmitigated and can be
translated to unlimited conflict. The geographical separation of self-sufficient units in the distant past
or the existence of overarching ideologies of unity are used as examples of such mitigation of conflict.
The establishment, however, of “larger and more interrelated” power units will of necessity relegate
law, ideologies or other power-alien considerations to only secondary importance. J. Herz, Political
Realism and Political Idealism, pp. 203-205

123
number of great powers of similar capabilities and the existence of an insular holder
of the balance, and dynastic diplomacy.491 The latter, free from “’power-alien’
influences, could devote itself to balancing policies as to a cool and detached game
of chess”.492
This close interaction between territoriality and the newly-found power of the
territorial state is on display in Herz’s account of the institutions associated with the
modern international system. His account of the development of the concept of
sovereignty is one of conflict between empire and territorial rulers resolved in favour
of the latter due to their ability to employ power to pacify and defend their
domains.493 Similarly, the substitution of modern international law for “natural law”
is examined as an attempt to regulate relations between sovereign nations which
reflected the underlying structure of territoriality.494 The principle of legitimacy and
nationalism that followed it, which further contributed in stabilising the system, both
required the defensible units established by territoriality to flourish.495
Even the community character of the European system with its principles of limited
war and non-conquest was tied to the territorial character of the units. Despite the
fact that this community was restricted to the continent of Europe itself while
allowing European powers to pursue imperialistic goals overseas, its essence was not
merely ideological for Herz. He noticed that the impermissibility of conquest was
extended beyond Europe as soon as territoriality expanded and similar, impermeable
units were formed elsewhere.496
Consequently, in Herz’s theory it is not only power that is in flux due to changing
conditions, as mentioned in the previous part, but also the international system itself
as well as its underlying structure and its units. In the case of the modern
international system, it is the very structure of territoriality that for Herz gave it its
peculiar characteristics. The success of the territorial state lay in its ability to offer a
satisfactory answer to the question of security. Political units however, are always
historical units, replaced by other forms of organisation when they can no longer

491
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 65; J. Herz, Political Realism and Political
Idealism, pp. 207-221
492
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 65
493
Ibid. pp. 51-57
494
Ibid. pp. 58-61
495
Ibid. pp. 73-75
496
Ibid. pp. 66-70

124
perform their basic functions. Herz, often by drawing parallels to how previous
political units gradually disappeared, was sceptical about the potential of the modern
state in the twentieth century.

The ‘demise’ of the territorial state?

When discussing Herz’s account of the challenges facing the nation-state and its
foundation of territoriality it should be borne in mind that Herz returned to the
question of the nation-state several times in the course of his career, often
reconsidering or reframing earlier assertions. As such, a degree of inconsistency is to
be expected, especially given the fact that his area of interests expanded significantly
in the decades that followed to encompass a notion of security that incorporated
environmental factors, welfare, demographics and development. What remained
constant in his analysis of the nation-state however, was its binary conceptualisation
as a unit of protection and cooperation. It is with respect to those closely
interconnected themes that the core of his examination of the limits of the nation-
state can be exposed.
Given the emphasis Herz placed on developments in –mainly military- technology
for the emergence of the territorial state as the unit of protection, it is of no surprise
that in his early engagement with the nation-state it was this particular field that
concentrated his attention. His account of the “demise” of the territorial state was
mainly focused on developments that were undermining its foundations of
territoriality and the impermeability associated with it.497 Similarly to Carr, he
examined a series of factors that from the 19th century on increasingly allowed for
the impermeability of the territorial states to be bypassed. The development of
economic warfare and the increased effectiveness of blockades, ideological
penetration and air warfare were all factors that although not being decisive in the
two world wars, enabled competing units to penetrate each others’ hard-shell in a

497
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 96; J. Herz, “Rise and demise of the territorial
state”, passim; J. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism, pp. 235-238; In his Nation-State and
the Crisis of World Politics Herz discussed his account of the “demise” of the nation-state and he
claimed that it created some confusion in that some readers assumed that with this term he predicted
“the impending disappearance of the nation-state” whereas he did not. J. Herz, “Introduction”, pp. 16-
17

125
way that was impossible under the classical system.498 By the First World War it was
becoming apparent that small nation-states were increasingly incapable of defending
themselves and in the aftermath of the Second World War even some of the great
powers “qua territorial states, were on the way to becoming obsolete”.499
Despite the importance of those challenges however, territoriality could still be
salvaged. Surprisingly for a realist, Herz saw collective security in a positive light
despite the abortive effort of the League of Nations. In an era when the balance of
power was disrupted and territorial states were becoming increasingly vulnerable, a
system of collective security appeared to him a plausible solution and Herz oriented
some of his early efforts in proposing ways to make it workable.500 The organisation
of the post-war world on the basis of bipolarity, characterised by an ideological split
between the two sides and the existence of nuclear weapons signified for Herz the
loss of whatever hopes there might have been for a genuine collective security
system.501 The very rise of bipolarity however, could also be interpreted as an effort
to safeguard territoriality by extending the hard-shell of defensibility to the level of
the bloc. Bipolarity was seen by Herz as representing the culmination of tendencies
of extending the territorial state to ameliorate the effects of economic
interdependence and the increased vulnerability to military technology.502 The most
radical challenge to the territorial system thus lay not with the rise of bipolarity but
with the development of nuclear warfare which happened to coincide with it.
Although initially not too alarmist about the role of nuclear weapons, Herz came by
the late 1950s to believe that their development signified a revolution with
potentially similar consequences for the nation-state that the gunpowder revolution
had for the medieval unit of protection.503 Whereas under bipolarity old concepts of
power and sovereignty needed to be readjusted to be maintained, the nuclear

498
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 96-108
499
Ibid. pp. 98-99; p. 107
500
See for instance his outline in J. Herz, “Power Politics”, pp 1043-1051
501
Collective security’s effectiveness was determined by the existence of a plurality of territorial units
without any commitments towards other powers in the form of alliances. It was thus to be a
refinement of the balance of power, albeit organised on a legalistic basis. For Herz this system was
still workable in the interwar period, but states came to realise its necessity only “when the
preconditions for a genuine collective security system had vanished”. J. Herz, International Politics in
the Atomic Age, p. 93; pp. 76-95
502
Ibid. pp. 111-166
503
For his initial and somehow ambiguous position on nuclear revolution see the conclusions in J.
Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism

126
revolution signalled the need for their radical re-invention since it undermined their
very foundation of territoriality. The problem was not only that the hard-shell of the
states could now be penetrated vertically with much more destructive means than
previously. A much graver implication was that nuclear weapons could potentially
signal the obliteration of the dialogical relationship between power and territoriality
and its replacement by a paradox. Instead from conferring security to its holder,
power in this arrangement created vulnerability.504 The outcome is the transition
from the mitigated security dilemma of the classical system to the unmitigated and
absolute security dilemma of the bipolar world.505
Considering the fact that power, and nuclear power in particular, could no longer
play its protective function, Herz proposed a short-term “holding operation” plan
based on mutual accommodation of the superpowers and advocated a “realistic
universalist” approach as a long-term goal based on the common interest of all
humanity on survival.506 The latter would for the first time override national interests
and power competition which could serve the territorial states well but proved unable
to provide any protection at the face of nuclear annihilation.507 Such an approach
would involve nation-states realising the primacy of their common interest to
survival and either delegating their nuclear weapons to a supranational authority or
dismantling them. This in turn would allow them to regain part of their protective
functions and continue to exist as territorial units, albeit no longer as “ultimate units
of control”.508
For this universalism to stand any chance however, nation-states ought to abandon
particularistic values that traditionally worked against it, namely what Herz called

504
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 167-223
505
Ibid. pp. 231-243
506
Ibid. pp. 244-357
507
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, p. 310; Also when discussing similar notions in
Morgenthau: “The choice is… between various kinds of national destruction, on the one hand, and
survival through temporary accommodation and eventual prevalence of moral-political universalism,
on the other”. Ibid. p. 335
508
Ibid. pp. 338-349; the loss of status as “ultimate units of control” would not only come through the
voluntary abandonment of national nuclear arsenals but also because of the delegation of powers to
supranational functional agencies that would address several of the global issues that the states could
not solve alone any longer. At this point Herz was already concerned with issues such as demographic
explosion, scarcity of resources, and the inability of nations to provide economic welfare to their
populations. Ibid. pp. 314-320; pp. 341-342. For a discussion of Herz’s views on functionalism vis-à-
vis those of other realists see W. Scheuerman , “The (classical) Realist vision of global reform”, pp.
264-268

127
“exclusivist nationalism”.509 The necessity of such a move despite the resistance to
be expected was, at least for Herz, clear and it relied on the way he understood the
connection between allegiance to a political unit and the protective functions this unit
could accomplish.510 Since the nation-state could no longer offer the minimum of
protection required, continued attachment to nationalism was merely an exercise in
futility. Paradoxically, for the nation-state to survive it ought to abandon its
ideological corollary. A decade later, Herz had to return to the question of the nation-
state in an effort to address its apparent resilience and a series of trends that were
moving exactly to the opposite direction of universalism, towards a “new
territoriality”.511
The first factor that contributed to this outcome lay with the “unavailability of force”
in the bipolar world. The superpowers proved to be more interested in maintaining
their spheres of influence and the status quo and, despite not abolishing their nuclear
weapons, they kept them only as a final resort. The result was not only that nuclear
power became “unavailable” but also conventional power due to the risk of
escalation.512 Ironically, this stabilisation was in part due to the fact that some of the
ideas Herz discussed in his earlier plan for a “holding operation” actually
materialised.513 The shortcoming of his long-term outline lay with the fact that
“holding operation” was a necessary but not sufficient condition for universalism. In
reality, when the risk of a nuclear holocaust moved to the background, nation-states
did not feel particularly compelled to contemplate more radical solutions.
Operating parallel to the developments in the field of power were other forces that
contributed to the retrenchment of nation-states. Old-style empires, founded upon

509
Herz’s reading of nationalism was very close to Morgenthau’s. Similarly to the latter’s distinction
between liberal and universalistic nationalism, Herz too distinguished between two types of
nationalism namely idealist and integral nationalism. Here, by “exclusivist nationalism” he refers to
the same “nationalistic universalism” of Morgenthau. J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic
Age, p. 339; for the distinction between idealist versus integral nationalism as an exemplification of
what happens to an idealist movement when it meets facts see Herz, J. Herz, Political Realism and
Political Idealism, pp. 65-102
510
J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 340-344; also his discussion in J. Herz,
“Legitimacy: Can we retrieve it?” in Comparative Politics, Vol. 10, No. 3, 1978, pp. 317-343, passim
511
J. Herz, “Territorial State Revisited”, pp. 11-34
512
Ibid. pp. 18-22
513
The short-term solutions he outlined in International Politics in the Atomic Age proved very close
to the ones actually followed: delimitation of spheres and non-intervention on each others’ sphere,
limitation of ideological antagonism, and the avoidance of a major war became constant, rather than
temporary as Herz believed, characteristics of the Cold War. J. Herz, International Politics in the
Atomic Age, pp. 244-299; pp. 302-305

128
imperialistic policies that aimed at securing self-sufficiency and established on the
basis of military superiority and the absence of nationalism among the colonised
people were by then crumbling. This development was brought about by a
combination of technological developments, which rendered reliance on raw
materials less important for survival, and the rise of nationalism in the former
colonies.514 Through the close association of legitimacy with the fulfilment of the
main functions of the state and the impact of technological development, Herz
managed to provide an interesting account of the qualitative difference between
defensive nationalism and the aggressive one that preceded it. Nationalism proved
very effective in marshalling the power of the nation when faced with an existential
threat. The cases of Israel and Vietnam demonstrated its potency even when faced
with superior power. At the same time however, it could not be employed for
purposes of conquest because it would firstly meet fierce resistance from a hostile
and equally nationalistic population, and secondly because through modernisation
and economic development the protective functions of a unit could be more easily
fulfilled without the need of territorial expansion.515
For Herz then, the nation-state has secured its existence and retained its position as
the main political unit “providing group identity, protection and welfare”.516 Herz of
course was mindful that not all new nation-states were well-placed to fulfil their
main functions.517 He was also mindful of the fact that despite its survival, the
nation-state could not return to the territoriality of old. The reason he talked about a
“new territoriality” was the perpetuation of what he initially conceived as a
transitional stage i.e. the coexistence of permeability and impenetrability.518 This
permeability was not only referring to nuclear weapons or air power but also to the
newly available means of indirect penetration that technology facilitated.
Additionally, states had to “assert themselves in an environment of vastly and rapidly
increasing technological, economic, and general interrelationships of a shrinking

514
J. Herz, “Territorial state revisited”, pp. 15-18
515
Ibid. pp. 13-15; p. 22; pp. 31-32
516
Ibid. p. 34
517
He often raised doubts about the viability of the ‘artificial’ states that followed the dismantling of
old colonial empires both in terms of legitimacy and of their capacity to modernise. For a
reconsideration of the importance of modernisation in decreasing dependency see: J. Herz,
“Introduction”, pp. 18-19
518
See J. Herz, International Politics in the Atomic Age, pp. 221-223; also Part II in this chapter

129
world”.519 This reformulation of his position on the nation-state may appear as
inconsistent to his classical work on territoriality. By de-emphasising the role of
military power however, Herz managed to offer a more nuanced account of the
nation-state and the challenges it faced, that still remained close to his broad
conceptualisation of power outlined in the previous part.

IV. Realist Liberalism and foreign affairs: Nazi Germany and

the United States

Herz never produced a monograph on the history of a single nation in the way Carr
did, or an extensive commentary like Morgenthau’s engagement with American
foreign policy. Having been uprooted from Germany due to the rise Nazism and
never fully assimilated in the American intellectual tradition, he remained at odds
with both worlds. Yet, as Pluglierin notes, this distance allowed him to approach
both his native homeland and his adopted one in a detached and critical way.520 In his
engagement with German and American politics the main threads of his thought are
on display: the need to balance between and avoid the excesses of extreme realism
and idealism, and the necessity of conscious effort to mitigate the security dilemma.
From the beginning of his career Herz tried to make sense of Nazism and its
implications for domestic and international politics. On the one hand, his study of
Nazi doctrines of international law alerted Herz to the limitations of Kelsen’s theory
of pure law and contributed to his shift towards a more politically-oriented
interpretation of international law.521 On the other hand, however, the gradual
evolution of those doctrines from the initial ‘natural law’ theory when Germany was
in need to reassert legal parity with the rest of European powers to the ‘racial law’
corresponding to the era of assimilation of territories with German population
signified for Herz something more than the mere manipulation of law as a
justification for German foreign policy. The tendency in the development of German
international law was for him clear, and nodded to the eventual prevalence of a view

519
J. Herz, “Territorial state revisited”, p. 23; for indirect penetration see ibid. pp. 26-30.
520
J. Pluglierin, “Towards been a traveler”, p. 423
521
P. Stirk “John H. Herz and the International Law of the Third Reich”, pp. 427-440; C. Sylvest,
“Realism and International Law”, pp. 426-432; J. Herz, “Introduction”, pp. 5-7

130
which would maintain only the “realistic parts of the theory” and achieve consistency
with Nazi worldviews in the embracement of a dogma which accounts for the very
negation of international law and its replacement by continuous conflict.522 Here
Herz, similarly to Morgenthau for that matter, had in mind the extreme realism that
goes beyond the realisation of the role of power to its glorification, a realism that was
exemplified by Nazi Germany.523
Herz later confirmed these insights and broadened them to cover every aspect of life
in Nazi Germany. Faced with similar economic and social problems as other Western
Societies, Nazism opted for the “easy solution” of “always cutting the Gordian knot”:
in essence solution amounted to non-solution but mere evasion of the problem by
relapsing to pre-civilisational means of resolution through force.524 From the series
of contradictions that Herz examined alongside their resolution on behalf of Nazi in
terms of naked power, perhaps the most relevant to the question of the nation-state is
that of international order. At a time when the territorial state was faced with
increasing interdependence the main problem was the reconciliation of the need for
integration with the maintenance of cultural autonomy. The two opposite answers in
post-war Germany were either extreme nationalism or pacifist internationalism, and
Nazism by initially posing as a champion of anti-imperialism and equality among
nations seemingly accommodated both. In reality however, as its racial doctrine had
implied from early on, Nazism demonstrated contempt for all traditional aspects of
international politics that used to limit the struggle for power. In a world comprising
according to Nazism of ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ races the only option with which
other powers were left was either continuous struggle or acceptance of Nazi
domination.525
For Herz, the quest had always been to avoid precisely this extreme realism and the
ensuing unlimited struggle for power. In the conditions of the Cold War with its two
superpowers “armed with conflicting ideologies and annihilating weapons”, this

522
J. Herz, “The National Socialist Doctrine of International Law and the Problems of International
Organisation” in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 54, No. 4, 1939, pp. 536-554: quotes in pp. 553-
554
523
See for instance his discussion on Schmitt’s one-sided realism: J. Herz, “Looking at Carl Schmitt
from the Vantage Point of the 1990s” in Interpretation, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1992, pp. 307-314
524
J. Herz, “Alternative Proposals to Democracy: Naziism” in The Journal of Negro Education, Vol.
10, No. 3, 1941, pp. 353-367: p. 354
525
Ibid. pp. 359-361

131
quest had become imperative.526 His efforts to propose ways to mitigate the security
dilemma in such a setting, such as the plan for ‘holding operation’ discussed in the
previous section, so as to ensure human survival informed constantly his engagement
with American foreign policy for the duration of the Cold War (and beyond). The
main problem with détente, that Herz advocated as a means to limit the insecurity on
both sides of the conflict, was that it superficially resembled the very appeasement
that failed to prevent the Second World War. Herz’s answer to the problem is
particularly interesting since, contrary to Carr and due to the closer attention he paid
to Nazism, he fully realised the risk posed by Hitler and was in no need to learn the
“lessons of Munich”.527
After outlining his plan for ‘holding operation’ Herz had to defend it by means of
dispelling the parallels between appeasement and détente. The world of the Cold
War, he maintained, was essentially different than Europe in the 1930s; and the
Soviet Union, unlike Nazi Germany was a power more interested in maintaining the
status quo. For Herz, the charges of appeasement by extremists on both sides posed a
greater risk to international security than the actual steps taken by the two
superpowers for mutual accommodation.528 The situation was aggravated by the
increased importance of the security dilemma in conditions of ideological
polarisation. Writing in the early 1970s he observed that the almost symmetrical
views of the other side as expansionist advocated by extremists were misleading and
that it was actually more possible that both sides were “defensive-minded”. The way
he chose to illustrate this statement was crucial. By presenting the Soviet viewpoint
he asked whether by expanding to Eastern Europe, a “much invaded country” was
seeing this expansion as merely the establishment of a defensive zone “particularly
when the Americans engaged to what looked to them as encirclement”.529 Here Herz
was actively trying to raise awareness of the security dilemma and its implications
and to persuade his audience to pause and ‘put themselves in the other fellow’s

526
J. Herz, “Introduction”, p. 12
527
P. Stirk, “Herz and the International law of the Third Reich”, pp. 428-429; Carr, in his
autobiographical sketch admitted that being preoccupied with the horrors of the Soviet Union, he was
caught off guard about the real risks posed by Hitler, E. H. Carr, “An autobiography”, pp. xviii-xix
528
J. Herz ,“The Relevancy and Irrelevancy of Appeasement” (1964) in J. Herz, The Nation-State and
the Crisis of World Politics, pp. 148-171
529
J. Herz, “Détente and Appeasement” p. 283

132
shoes’ or more precisely “in Moscow’s shoes”.530 Having realised the implications of
the security dilemma the two superpowers could actively try to mitigate it through
détente.
It is with this mitigation of the security dilemma through conscious effort in mind
that Herz was particularly critical of the disregard for international law often to be
found in American policies. In a series of letters to the editor of New York Times, he
made the case that “more or less clandestine operations” like those orchestrated by
American intelligence services in order to undermine or remove unfriendly
governments were in violation of the most basic rules of modern international law.531
The rules Herz had in mind were those creating the framework for a minimum of co-
existence between territorial states, namely the “inviolability of their territories in
peacetime and of non-interference”.532 Of course during the Cold War this attitude
still entailed the risk of escalation in a crisis and eventually nuclear annihilation, as
Herz claimed when discussing the invasion of Grenada.533 For him however the
problem was more fundamental. In a time when international cooperation and mutual
understanding was increasingly essential for survival given the global problems now
facing humanity, the United States seemed to be moving closer to unilateral policies.
Herz thus maintained his criticism of post-Cold War American policy in terms of
disregarding international law and institutions and abstaining from cooperation in
facing environmental challenges.534 He moreover saw American policy as
unenlightened in terms of traditional security concerns. With the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the United States as the only remaining superpower no longer faced
any credible threat to her security. This new environment allowed in principle for the

530
J. Herz ,“Foreign Policy in the Framework of an Open-Society Bloc” in American Foreign Policy
Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1982, pp. 2-7: p. 3
531
J. Herz, “Iran-Contra hearings may help to cleanse foreign relations” (1987, 14 June) in New York
Times
532
J. Herz, “The president’s error on covert action” (1983, 26 October) in New York Times. Also in J.
Herz, “Iran-Contra hearings” and J. Herz, “U.S. must join world in the rule of law” (1988, 23 April) in
New York Times
533
J. Herz, “International law bent beyond recognition” (1983, 24 November) in New York Times.
When discussing the necessity of awareness about the horrors of nuclear war a decade later, Herz
claimed that “Since Reagan became president, policies have not reflected a sense of awareness”. J.
Herz, “On human survival”, p. 137
534
J. Herz, “Reflections on my century” in International Journal of Applied Economics and
Econometrics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2002, pp. 151-163: pp. 155-162; J. Herz, “The Security Dilemma in
International Relations: Background and Present problems” in International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 4,
2003, pp. 412-416

133
possibility of taking steps to alleviate the security dilemma of other powers but this
never materialised. On the contrary, American foreign policy was characterised by a
series of decisions that intensified the security dilemma in others. This attitude
culminated in the ‘war on terror’ during Bush administration which turned several
countries into potential targets for pre-emptive strikes. Herz, however, observed that
the tendency was clear from earlier decisions such as the maintenance of NATO
despite its apparent uselessness in the new environment and the choice to expand it
eastwards which further intensified the security dilemma of Russia.535 Such an
orientation for Herz, signified a return to the same extreme realism he was so
desperately trying to avert by devising Realist Liberalism in the first place.

Concluding remarks
Herz’s attempt to appraise power and the nation-state is founded upon the central
role the security dilemma plays in his theory. It is the security dilemma that lies at
the root of the struggle for power. Herz here differs from both Carr and Morgenthau.
In contrast to Carr who merely observed that power is there, he tried to ground his
account of power somewhere. In contrast to Morgenthau, he picked a social
condition instead of an anthropological one as the main cause for the struggle for
power. When it comes to his conceptualisation of power, his identification of
elements of power is reminiscent of that offered by Morgenthau. His understanding
of power and its role however as being in flux and his emphasis on the need to
constantly re-define is much more radical not only from Morgenthau’s but also from
Carr’s flexible conceptualisation.
Herz, like Carr and Morgenthau, saw the nation-state as a historically-conditioned
political unit whose existence is closely connected to power. His account of
revolutions in military technology and their impact on the defensive functions of the
state is far more detailed than those offered by the other two realists examined so far.
It represents, however, one of the main weaknesses of his approach in that he tended
to over-emphasise this single-factor. By taking into account factors such as the

535
J. Herz “The Security Dilemma in International Relations”, pp. 412-416. A similar line of
argument was also followed by Waltz: K. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War” in
International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2000, pp. 5-41, passim

134
potency of nationalism as a force and the need of the nation-state to provide for the
welfare of its citizens Herz’s revisiting of the nation-state is more nuanced than his
initial account. He also moved closer to Carr’s interpretation that incorporated all the
aforementioned aspects, albeit with a more basic discussion of military power. One
significant difference is that since Herz’s reformulation aimed at accounting for the
survival of the nation-state the discussion of the elements that contributed to its
resilience are better framed than in Carr who believed it to be on its way out. The
two accounts can be largely seen as complementary.
Herz, while conventionally classified as a classical realist, could more accurately be
described as a transitional figure that belonged to both the classical and the structural
realist world. His adamant removal of power from human nature, the emphasis on the
security dilemma as a social condition and his appreciation of structural approaches
are all elements that connect him to structural realism, and in particular the defensive
realism of Waltz. At the same time however, his insistence for the constant re-
evaluation of concepts, and the perception that systems and structures are in constant
flux does not allow for his classification as a structural realist either. Perhaps the
most telling characteristic of his approach that distinguishes him from structural
realists and offensive realists in particular is his refusal to subscribe to the most
pessimistic implications of the security dilemma. His insistence on what constitutes
sound political thought and the need to balance reality and utopia, whose similarity
with Carr has been promptly been noted in the relevant literature, allowed him to
contemplate and actively promote ways to mitigate the security dilemma.
Mearsheimer, as will be discussed in the following section, followed the security
dilemma to its most pessimistic implications, as would have done the ideo-typical
realism that Herz tried to avoid.

135
CHAPTER IV

John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism

Introduction
If Herz represented a transitional version of realism that displayed elements of both
traditional and structural approaches, with the emergence of Waltz’s neorealism the
transition to a purely structural theory of international relations was completed. In his
effort to create a parsimonious and elegant structural theory, however, Waltz had to
“retreat from the real”, as Molloy put it, and he disassociated his theory from foreign
policy which would need a separate theory.536 John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism
represents an attempt to overcome the gap between international structure and
foreign policy by providing a unifying framework that while preserving the main
features of Waltz’s structural approach also claims to be able to account for state
behaviour.
In the first part of the chapter, I examine the foundations of Mearsheimer’s approach.
He remains generally faithful to the structural framework developed by Waltz but he
draws different conclusions from it. Where Waltz sees security maximisers,
Mearsheimer sees power maximisers. He further modifies the framework to include a
rational actor assumption which he claims is enabling him to transcend the gap
between foreign policy and international structure. As regards Mearsheimer’s
faithfulness to structural realism, it has profound implications on the role power
plays in his epistemological and ontological assumptions. Epistemologically, his
theory is neatly separated from power in a way alien to the reflexivity displayed by
realists examined thus far. Ontologically, power remains of paramount importance
but since it is expected to play a role analogous to money its conceptualisation must
of necessity be narrow.
As regards Mearsheimer’s claim that his modification of structural realism can help
to account for state behaviour and can be employed to both predict and prescribe, I
536
S. Molloy, Hidden History, pp. 115-129. For an overview of Waltz’s realism and some of the
fundamental criticisms it faced, Neorealism and its Critics remains indispensable: R. Keohane (ed),
Neorealism and its Critics

136
claim -drawing on Oren’s and Barkin’s criticisms- that this creates a significant
tension to his theory. This tension is underlying Mearsheimer’s efforts to engage
with the foreign policy of the United States.
In the second part I explore Mearsheimer’s conceptualisation of power. This is
particularly narrow, as one would expect from the function power is expected to
perform in his theory. More specifically, his notion of power is reduced strictly to
material capabilities of which military power and land power in particular are
deemed to be the most important. When it comes to the limits of power, offensive
realism’s image of states striving to achieve hegemony becomes significantly
watered down. Apart from structural constraints and nuclear weapons Mearsheimer
introduces the first important qualifier of offensive realism, the stopping power of
water. The result is a moderated version of offensive realism whence great powers
become satisfied when attaining regional hegemony.
Mearsheimer’s engagement with the nation-state is examined in the third part.
Despite treating the modern state as a billiard ball, he is attentive to the historical
developments that brought about its emergence. The primary focus is, consistently
with his theory, the role of military power. Mearsheimer, however, also attributes to
nationalism an important role in the establishment and expansion of the nation-state.
In this part thus, I also examine how his approach to nationalism tries to balance
between a structural theory on the one hand and a phenomenon that, being
ideological in nature and belonging to the domestic domain, should lie outwith its
scope on the other. The third part ends with an examination of Mearsheimer’s
thought on the future prospects of the nation-state and the possibility of taming
nationalism.
In the final part, I focus on Mearsheimer’s approach as illustrated by his analysis of
American foreign policy. Both his analysis of that policy until the end of Cold War
and his efforts to project its trajectory to the future, as well as his engagement in the
debates about its formulation as a public intellectual after his predictions failed to
materialise, are examined. In this part, Mearsheimer’s engagement with American
foreign policy is examined as illustrative not only of how he translates his theory into
prescriptions but also of the tension between prediction and prescription outlined in
the beginning of the chapter.

137
I. Mearsheimer’s theory of international relations

Foundations of Offensive Realism

There is a marked difference between John Mearsheimer’s philosophical background
and that of the classical realists and Herz examined in the previous chapters. While
the aforementioned realists occasionally commented on each other’s works and
exchanged views, the formulation of their respective variants of realism was by and
large independent from each other. Mearsheimer, belonging to a later – the third
according to Vasquez - generation of realists, is both aware of and has engaged with
the work of classical realists as well as that of the founding father of neorealism,
Kenneth Waltz.537 As such, his variant of realism is primarily founded upon earlier
realists in contrast to the variety of intellectual backgrounds that influenced the
realists examined so far.
Before turning his attention to international relations’ theory Mearsheimer published
works on strategy with a particular emphasis on deterrence.538 Although he initially
did not self-identify as a realist, Mearsheimer soon became one and he unreservedly
lists K. Waltz as the most important realist to having influenced him.539 Mearsheimer
developed his own variant of realism, offensive realism, gradually with its definitive
statement being the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Elements of his theory,
however, were already visible in earlier works.540 Mearsheimer’s offensive realism

537
For Vasquez early realists include Carr and Morgenthau and the second generation neorealists such
as Waltz and Gilpin. J. Vasquez, Power of power politics, p. 2; Mearsheimer offers accounts of his
early engagement with international relations and the authors that influenced him in J. Mearsheimer,
“Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John. J. Mearsheimer (Part I)” in
International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2006, pp. 105-123: pp. 107-109 and in J. Mearsheimer,
“Power as the Currency of International Relations, Disciplining US Foreign Policy, and Being an
Independent Variable”, interview with Theory Talks, 2012, accessed from http://www.theory-
talks.org/2012/06/theory-talk-49.html p. 3.
538
His first monographs were a book about conventional deterrence and a critical biography of the
British strategist Liddell Hart. J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1983; J. Mearsheimer, Liddell Hart and the Weight of History, London: Brassey’s, 1988
539
J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 109
540
According to Toft, they are traceable back to the late 1980s and in particular his critical biography
of Lidell Hart. P. Toft, “John J. Mearsheimer: an offensive realist between geopolitics and power” in
Journal of International Relations and Development, Vol. 8, 2005, pp. 381-408: p. 382. Mearsheimer
confirms this when he states that the decision to write the Tragedy of Great Power Politics and
present his own realist theory dated back to the late 1980s. J, Mearsheimer, “Power as the Currency”,
p. 3

138
superficially appears as a synthesis of the theoretical framework developed by Waltz
and the logical conclusions of ‘classical’ realism.541 He agrees with the starting
assumptions of Waltz and as such he is clear that his theory is a structural one, very
much like Waltz’s neorealism.542
Where he disagrees with Waltz, however, is in the conclusions he draws from said
assumptions and most importantly the answer to the question whether states act as
power or as security maximisers. He believes contra Waltz that states seek to
increase their power and traces his claim back to Morgenthau’s variant of classical
realism. More precisely, Mearsheimer’s reading of classical realism is one according
to which states are inherently aggressive, since they are “naturally endowed with
Type A personalities”.543 Consistent with such a reading, Morgenthau is classified as
an offensive realist since the animus dominandi is interpreted to be automatically
applicable to states.544 Despite being in agreement, however, with what he considers
to be the logical conclusions of classical realism, Mearsheimer does not subscribe to
an explanation that is founded upon assumptions about human nature.545
Mearsheimer then, while disagreeing with the “benign world” of Waltz’s defensive
realism remains attached to the latter’s theoretical framework.546 He makes, however,
a significant modification to this framework in that he is willing to engage with the
historical record in an effort to validate his theory. The structural theory of K. Waltz
was intended as a highly abstract theory that shied away from accounting for foreign
policy, which needed a separate theory. As a result, those defensive realists drawing
on Waltz and aiming at offering comprehensive accounts of state behaviour, like
Snyder and Van Evera, had to develop a “unit-level component” to supplement their

541
It should be noted here that when speaking of ‘classical realism’ or ‘human nature realism’
Mearsheimer has in mind mainly Morgenthau. Other realists such as Carr and Kennan, who are often
classified under the same grouping, are not included in his account since “they do not offer their own
theory of international politics”. J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York:
Norton, 2001, pp. 18-19
542
J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 110; J. Mearsheimer,
Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 21
543
Ibid. pp. 17-22; p. 21
544
For the claim that for Morgenthau the lust for power is hardwired in states see Ibid. p. 19. For
Morgenthau as an offensive realist see J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise of International
Institutions” in International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, 1995, pp. 5-49: p. 12 fn 27
545
J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 110
546
As Molloy points out, Mearsheimer’s reformulation of realism “possesses the language of classical
Realism but is still dependent upon Neorealist categories for ‘theoretical’ validation”. S. Molloy,
Hidden History of Realism, p. 132

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theories of international relations.547 Mearsheimer, however, despite also drawing
heavily on Waltz’s neorealism is willing to apply his theory to real-world problems
without feeling obligated to develop a separate theory which explains unit-level
factors. He sets to achieve the unity between systemic and unit-level analysis by
introducing an assumption of rationality to his theoretical framework.
The major differentiation then of Mearsheimer’s framework from that of Waltz and
his followers is the inclusion of state rationality as the fifth and final of his “bedrock
assumptions”.548 Such an addition, he claims, allows realist theories to account not
only for outcomes but also for state behaviour. By delegating misguided calculations
to the level of the exceptional, such a realist theory would not need a separate theory
of foreign policy to account for state behaviour. Instead, domestic considerations
would have little if any role in influencing the making of foreign policy. The
remaining few cases where “domestic pathologies lead states to act in suboptimal
ways” can be explained away as anomalies to the theory.549
Of course a side effect of such a choice that Mearsheimer is fully aware of and critics
have been quick to exploit, is the fact that his theory becomes vulnerable to
criticisms both in its own terms and for its verifiability vis-à-vis the historical record,
a problem that Waltz never had to face.550 Hence Mearsheimer’s realism is

547
J. Mearsheimer, “Realists as Idealists” in Security Studies, Vol. 20, No. 3, 2011, pp. 424-430: p.
426
548
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 31
549
J. Mearsheimer, “Reckless States and Realism”, in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2009,
pp. 241-256: pp. 244-246
550
See for instance his comment that “In effect, Waltz has created an escape hatch in his theory that
mine does not have” in J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)” p. 112.
Theoretical challenges to Mearsheimer are discussed throughout the present and the following section.
As regards his engagement with the historical record, Snyder suggested that Mearsheimer’s selection
of case studies that comprised of “as aggressive a collection of states as could be imagined” leave his
theory vulnerable to “a suspicion of selection bias”. G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World – Offensive
Realism and the Struggle for Security: A Review Essay” in International Security, Vol. 27, No. 1,
2002, pp. 149-173: p. 161. An edited volume on history and neorealism has sought to engage with the
historical record in order to challenge realists’ claims that their theories are vindicated by history.
Despite some of the contributors’ tendency to engage with a catch-all realism that is often reduced to
the power maxims of the Melian dialogue, the volume includes some insightful engagement with the
cases that Mearsheimer covered in the Tragedy of Great Powers Politics as well as cases that he
omitted. Schroeder examined the 17th and 18th centuries in an effort to demonstrate that both struggle
for power and a quest for order stemmed out of the structure of anarchy and that it would be fallacious
to concentrate only on the former: P. Schroeder, “Not even in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries: power and order in the early modern era” in E. May, R. Rosecrance, and Z. Steiner (eds),
History and Neorealism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 78-102. As regards the
cases that Mearsheimer omitted, Williamson examined the case of Austria-Hungary before the Great
War and claimed that without taking into account the domestic situation, the steps taken towards the

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influenced profoundly by this core theoretical commitment to structural realism and
its modification to include the rational actor assumption. The way this framework
affects the conceptualisation of power in Mearsheimer’s realism will be examined
first through the examination of his epistemology and then through the ensuing
ontological assumptions.

Power vacuum: Mearsheimer’s epistemology

Mearsheimer has indicated that he has a preference for elegant and simple theories
and he believes realism to be such a theory.551 Theories, he maintains, are essential
tools for simplifying complex realities. In fact the more complex the reality one tries
to comprehend is, the greater the need for a “mental map” which helps to simplify it
by isolating the most important forces at play.552 As such theories are of necessity
simplifications of reality whose explanatory power is restricted by the fact that some
of the omitted factors can occasionally influence state behaviour. A few such
‘anomalies’, however, constitute part of the “price to pay for simplifying reality” and
should not pose a significant problem to a theory’s overall credibility. Of course,
when a theory faces too many anomalies then its foundations are undermined since it
cannot adequately explain reality.553

war could not be fully accounted for, and even if it were so then defensive realism seemed to offer
more plausible an explanation for Austro-Hungarian foreign policy than Mearsheimer’s theory: S.
Williamson, “Austria-Hungary and the coming of the First World War”, in E. May et al (eds), History
and Neorealism, pp. 103-128. Apart from the essays that discussed US foreign policy and which will
be covered under Part IV, contributions by Steiner, Ferguson, Welch Larson and Shevchenko, and
Haslam in the same volume engage with great powers that Mearsheimer discussed like Nazi Germany,
the UK and the Soviet Union. The policy of Japan in particular seems to be particularly troubling for
Mearsheimer since as an insular state it should be expected to act as an offshore balancer. Its case is
discussed in M. Barnhart, “Domestic politics, interservice impasse, and Japan’s decisions for war” in
E. May et al (eds), History and Neorealism, pp. 185-200; J. Haslam, “John Mearsheimer’s
‘elementary geometry of power’: Euclidean moment or an intellectual blind alley?” in E. May et al
(eds), History and Neorealism, pp. 322-340: pp. 324-325; P. Toft, “Offensive realist between
geopolitics and power”, pp. 395.
551
J. Mearsheimer, “Conversations in International Relations (Part I)”, p. 107
552
J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing is bad for
International Relations” in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, No 3, 2013, pp. 427-
457: p. 435
553
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, pp. 10-11. The role of anomalies, or ‘error
terms’ as Oren describes them, becomes problematic for Mearsheimer according to critics, because
they occur that often as to undermine the theory’s soundness. See I. Oren, “Unrealism of
Contemporary Realism”, pp. 288-289. For a collection of such anomalies and a very good, albeit
somewhat combative, overall criticism of Mearsheimer’s theory that parallels Oren’s in some respects
see also: J. Haslam, “John Mearsheimer’s ‘elementary geometry of power’”, passim

141
This interpretation of theory as a mental map of reality which should then be verified
in the ‘laboratory’ of the real world represents an epistemological commitment to
positivism that resonates little with the approaches discussed so far.554 The notion of
power has been central for those realists’ epistemological assumptions, whether
through the importance of the sociology of knowledge in Carr, the separation of
spheres for analytical purposes in Morgenthau, or the fundamental motivation behind
political thought in Herz. Mearsheimer, despite his scepticism towards a particular
brand of positivism that he calls “simplistic hypothesis testing”, remains committed
to a positivist methodology according to which a theory should comprise of clearly
defined variables and the examination of the causal connection between them, and
should be ultimately falsifiable.555 Such a theory is epistemologically impenetrable to
power and as a result is missing not only part of the complexity of the phenomenon
of power, but also the self-awareness that previous realists carried.
This disassociation of power from realist epistemology means that it is no longer
possible for the observer to be mindful, and as a result also guarded, of the ways in
which different aspects of power influence the process of theorising itself. By
claiming objectivity, as Barkin points out, the contemporary realist analyst is
deviating from the classical realist call for reflexivity and succumbs to exactly the
same fallacy that Morgenthau attributed to idealism in Scientific Man.556 He is
correct in that sense to conclude that classical realism, “to the extent that it explicitly
won the first debate, implicitly lost the second”.557 In Mearsheimer’s positivist
epistemology power does not enter the field of theory-formation at all. The theorist
has to develop a set of clear and sound assumptions, define their key concepts and
identify causal mechanisms. The theory can then be tested against the facts and
“yield unambiguous predictions”.558
A sound theory then is one that at the same time is able to describe, predict and
prescribe.559 There is however, an important problem with this purported unity

554
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics p. 8
555
On the variant of positivism to which Mearsheimer subscribes as well as the main characteristics of
theory and theory-testing see: J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind”, pp. 431-435.
556
S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy” in Foreign Policy analysis, Vol. 5, No. 3,
2009, pp. 233-246
557
Ibid. p. 237
558
J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind”, p. 432
559
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, pp. 8-12

142
between prediction and prescription. As several authors noted, contemporary realists,
including Mearsheimer, are often at odds with the policies followed by American
administrations and do not hesitate to express their opposition to them in an effort to
influence the public discourse.560 Yet their effort to influence policy is fundamentally
opposed to their positivistic epistemology which presupposes a neat separation
between object and subject of analysis.561 The problem with Mearsheimer’s theory
then is that it cannot overcome the incompatibility between predictive and
prescriptive approaches. The former, being pattern-focused and based on self-
replicating systems, leave no space for agency and “serve to obviate politics” while
the latter, being problem-focused emphasise contingency and the resulting necessity
to be prudent both when making policy recommendations and when analysing
power.562 This reflexivity, so characteristic of classical realism, cannot be reconciled
with an approach that claims to be predictive.563 In such a theory of international
relations, power is of necessity restricted to the sphere of ontology, where it is
expected to play the role of currency.

On power and ontology: a currency for international

relations?
For Mearsheimer, as for all other realists examined, power “lies at the heart of
international politics”.564 The Tragedy of Great Power Politics is structured around
questions regarding this key concept and deriving from the epistemological
commitments mentioned above. More specifically, for Mearsheimer a theory that has
isolated power as its central concept must be able to explain why states seek power in
the first place and how much power they want. Furthermore, it must be able to define
clearly power and to offer a list of indicators that can be measured to rank individual
states and estimate the distribution of power between them. Finally, a clear definition

560
I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, pp. 283-290; S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and
Foreign Policy”, pp. 233-246; R. A. Payne “Neorealists as Critical Theorists: The Purpose of Foreign
Policy Debate” in Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2007, pp. 503-514
561
This separation would mean not only that prediction alone would make prescription unnecessary
but also that prescription is meaningless since the observer’s wishes cannot influence the object of
their analysis. See I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, pp. 286-290
562
S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy”, pp. 237-242
563
Ibid. pp. 242-245
564
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 55

143
of power is required for the patterns of state-behaviour to be more easily
identified.565
Consistent with his epistemological commitments to structural realism, Mearsheimer
founds his theory on a set of bedrock assumptions. Despite being formed
deductively, those assumptions differ from Waltz’s efforts in one important aspect.
Whereas for Waltz the bedrock assumptions of a theory are of necessity radical
simplifications which convey “a false impression of the world”, Mearsheimer rejects
this approach.566 For him theories should be based on sound assumptions that offer
“reasonably accurate representations” of important factors for international
politics.567 Apart from the assumption of state rationality that has already been
mentioned, Mearsheimer’s set of assumptions is comprised by the following:
international anarchy, possession of offensive capabilities by states, uncertainty of
intentions, and survival as the main motivation of states.568
Although if treated in isolation they do not explain why states seek to maximise
power, their combination, Mearsheimer maintains, makes a persuasive case for why
great powers will struggle for power and aim for hegemony.569 As regards the first
part of the argument, that is, the reasons why states seek power in the first place,
Mearsheimer’s logic does not seem to differ significantly from that of other
structural realists. The possession of offensive capabilities by states, combined with
uncertainty about other states intentions and the existence of international anarchy
means that states fear each other and try to accumulate power to ensure their
survival.570 The identification of fear as the main factor behind states’ motivation to
strive for power is a plausible conclusion that can be logically drawn by the
combination of Mearsheimer’s bedrock assumptions. To claim, as Pashakhanlou
does, that the centrality of fear amounts to the introduction of a “psychological unit-
level variable” which undermines his theory, would be to put too fine a point to a

565
Ibid. pp. 12-14
566
K. Waltz, “Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory”, p. 27
567
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 30. Mearsheimer further clarifies his position
on why theories should be based on realistic assumptions when favouring the epistemology of
scientific realism over that of instrumentalism: J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Leaving theory behind”,
pp. 432-434
568
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 30-32
569
Ibid. p. 29-30
570
Ibid. p. 32, 42-43

144
narrow understanding of fear which Mearsheimer does not seem to share.571 The
answer, however, that Mearsheimer gives to the second part of the question i.e. how
much power states want, is more controversial.
Despite beginning from a set of assumptions that are very similar to those entertained
by defensive realists, Mearsheimer reaches the exactly opposite conclusion.572 For
him, given the extremely high stakes in competition between states, the uncertainty
over other states’ intentions, and the unpredictability of future developments in the
distribution of power, states can only behave as relative power maximisers.573 The
discrepancy thus between offensive and defensive realism, as Snyder correctly
observes, is not attributable to disagreements about the constraints imposed by the
international system as one would expect from structural theories, but on different
interpretations of a “unit-level factor” i.e. the amount of security states seek.574
Snyder is further correct to point out that Mearsheimer’s marshalling of Herz’s
formulation of the security dilemma as reflecting “the basic logic of offensive
realism” and as implying that “the best defence is a good offence” is misplaced.575
The problem with Mearsheimer’s reading of the security dilemma is not only that
Herz understood its implications differently.576 It is also that since in Mearsheimer’s
theory all states are “revisionist and believe (correctly) that others are too”, there is
no room left for any effort to address hypothetical threats and thus the ‘dilemmatic’
element of the security dilemma is eliminated.577

571
Pashakhanlou understands fear as an emotion and claims that its use would be incompatible with a
“materialist and systemic theory” such as offensive realism. A. H. Pashakhanlou “Back to the
Drawing Board: A Critique of Offensive Realism” in International Relations, Vol. 27, No. 2, 2013,
pp. 202-225: p. 207. Given, however, the fact that Mearsheimer assumes state rationality and often
uses the term ‘fear’ to signify ‘worry’ it would be fallacious to assume that he understands fear so
narrowly. Besides, a scared state would still have to rationally evaluate the situation and formulate its
policy accordingly without having to respond in the instinctive manner implied by Pashakhanlou’s
psychological reading of fear. For a more nuanced discussion of fear in realism see N. Crawford,
“Human Nature and World Politics: Rethinking ‘Man’” in International Relations, Vol. 23, No. 2,
2009, pp. 271-288
572
G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World”, p. 154; P. Toft, “Offensive realist between geopolitics and
power”, p. 390
573
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 32-35
574
G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World”, pp. 154-155
575
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p.p. 35, 36
576
See relevant discussion in Chapter III: supra p. 115: fn 462
577
G. Snyder “Mearsheimer’s World”, pp. 155-156. Booth and Wheeler raise a similar point when
they claim that “Mearsheimer replaced any dilemma of interpretation with a rule of fatalism, and
abolished any dilemma of response by a rule of offensive potential”: K. Booth and N. Wheeler, The
Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2008, p. 35

145
The final role that power plays in Mearsheimer’s ontology is related to the
importance he attributes to its accurate definition and measurement. Building on the
analogy with economics he claims that power is the equivalent of money in the realm
of international politics: “power is the currency of great-power politics and states
compete for it among themselves”.578 The analogy to money implies that in the same
way that utility maximisation is “expressed and measured in terms of money” so is
“the national interest (security)... in terms of (relative) power”.579 The necessity to
treat power like money stems from the expectation that power can be used as an
indicator which can be measured and that allows states to be ranked.580
Mearsheimer’s notion of power resonates well with such a view. The development of
“good indicators of power” is important for the accurate appreciation of “the power
levels of individual states”, which can be employed by the observer to rank them and
determine whether they qualify as great powers or not. The identification of the
number of great powers can in turn be utilised for the distribution of power and
polarity of the system to be determined.581

II. Mearsheimer’s conceptualisation of power

The nature of power

Since power is expected to play the role of currency in Mearsheimer’s theory, it has
to be measurable and as such a narrow definition of the concept is warranted. He thus
proceeds to approach power in terms of material capabilities, or “tangible assets...
that each great power controls”.582 Mearsheimer is echoing – albeit distantly- Carr’s
facets of power when he distinguishes between two forms of power that are
interconnected but cannot be equated.583 He differs, however, from Carr in some
important aspects the first of which is that he establishes a clear hierarchy between
the two forms of power. It is military power that counts most in Mearsheimer’s
theory, and from its various ingredients it is land power that is of paramount

578
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 12
579
S. Guzzini, “The enduring dilemmas of realism in International Relations”, p. 539
580
Ibid. pp. 537-540
581
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 12
582
Ibid. p. 55, p. 57
583
Ibid. p. 55

146
importance.584 The reason why naval, aerial or even nuclear power can only play a
supplementary role is that land forces are indispensable for “conquering and
controlling land, which is the supreme political objective in a world of territorial
states”.585 This overemphasis on military might and particularly land power, despite
being logically solid offers little if any flexibility when dealing with other forms of
exercising power or power maximisation outwith the scope of territorial conquest, as
Toft correctly observes.586
The second form of power, latent power, “refers to the socio-economic ingredients
that go into building military power”.587 From the various elements of latent power
Mearsheimer distinguishes population size and wealth as being the most important.
And since a large population is a necessary but not sufficient condition for generating
significant amounts of wealth, Mearsheimer opts for using “wealth alone to measure
potential power”.588 Given that whatever importance latent power holds is
conditional upon its ability to be translated to military power, Mearsheimer rejects
indicators of wealth such as the GNP which might be misleading.589 Instead, he
emphasises the importance of identifying indicators that can capture “a state’s
mobilisable wealth and its level of technological development”.590 Here Mearsheimer
makes a similar to Herz point regarding the dependency of measuring power on
historical conditions.591
A second important difference with Carr’s facets of power is that Mearsheimer does
not allow for ideational power in his formula. For him any realist conceptualisation
584
Ibid. pp. 55-56
585
Ibid. p. 86; pp. 83-114, 128-133. This view is hardly surprising given that Mearsheimer claims that
conquest actually pays and helps augment the aggressor’s power: Ibid. pp. 148-151. Also in G. Snyder
“Mearsheimer’s world”, p. 153. It should be noted, however, that in later works Mearsheimer
although maintaining that conquest generally pays, adds a qualifier as regards the age of nationalism:
infra under Part III.
586
Toft traces Mearsheimer’s “preoccupation with military power and especially with land power” to
his earlier engagement with strategy and deterrence. P. Toft, “Offensive realist between geopolitics
and power”, p. 384
587
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 55
588
Ibid. pp. 60-62
589
For Mearsheimer wealth forms the foundations of military power but it cannot always be translated
to the latter neatly. The reasons for what he calls the “gap between latent and military power” are
diminishing returns, differences in efficiency and differences in the type of military forces that each
great power chooses to develop with the wealth available. Ibid. pp. 67-82.
590
Ibid. p. 62
591
It must be noted, however, that Mearsheimer’s preposition is anchored on the assumption that
power is ultimately measurable and that the observer should modify their indicators according to the
historical context. Herz’s views, as mentioned already, are more radical in that he believes the very
measurability of power to be historically conditioned.

147
of power must of necessity emphasise material aspects of power. Ideologies are
indeed included in the list of non-security goals that states can pursue insofar as they
do not require the state to act against its national interest i.e. the pursuit of relative
power.592 Mearsheimer clarified that non-material aspects of power are of no
consequence for his version of realism when challenged by K. Booth on grounds that
several of his ‘idealists’ were actually attentive to the role of power.593 In his
response to Booth’s commentary, Mearsheimer maintained that authors who focus
primarily on the power of ideas differ “fundamentally… from how realists
understand this concept. Realists focus mainly on material power, be it economic or
military...”.594 This position is unsurprising given the function that power is expected
to play in his theory of international relations and the necessity for it to be
measurable.
The function of power as currency also explains Mearsheimer’s inclination to favour
a ‘traditional’ power-as-capabilities approach to more recent developments in the
discussion about power such as Dahl’s notion of power as being relational.595 This is
not to suggest that he neglects such discussions. When appraising power and its role,
Mearsheimer begins with a discussion of the distinction between power-as-outcomes
and power-as-capabilities approaches. He disagrees with approaches that conflate
assets with outcomes since the two are qualitatively different: the former only cover
material capabilities and the latter add to the equation non-material factors that often
affect outcomes.596 For Mearsheimer power cannot be equated with outcomes.
Firstly, an outcome-centred approach would deem any effort “to assess the balance
of power before a conflict” futile because the assessment could be performed only
after the conflict was resolved in one way or another. If this were the case, it would

592
According to Mearsheimer, states do occasionally pursue such goals but “offensive realism has
little to say about them” unless of course their pursuit conflicts with “balance-of-power logic” in
which case they are trumped by security considerations. J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power
Politics, p. 46
593
Booth’s comment was part of his contribution to the discussion about Merasheimer’s 2004 Carr
Memorial Lecture. K. Booth, “Offensive realists, tolerant realists and real realists” in International
Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005, pp. 350- 354
594
J. Mearsheimer, “The more isms the better”, p. 356
595
According to Baldwin, who strongly supports Dahl’s view of power, the shift from traditional
“elements of national power” approaches that understood power as a “property concept” to
approaches understanding it as a relational one, as advocated by Dahl, “constituted a revolution in
power analysis”. D. Baldwin, “Power and International Relations”, pp. 274-275
596
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 58

148
pose significant problems for any theory of international relations based on the
assumption of the state as a rational actor such as Mearsheimer’s. Secondly, he raises
the point that a conceptualisation of power based on outcomes would imply that the
side that prevails in any given conflict is always the most powerful one. This is,
however, not always the case as the examples of United States’ defeat in Vietnam
and Napoleonic France’s in Russia demonstrated. Finally, since power represents
means and outcomes ends, their identification would deem any distinction between
means and ends meaningless.597

Limits of power
Given that Mearsheimer’s states can only be secure only when they have attained
hegemony, his vision of international politics seems superficially to be one of
continuous and unlimited competition between states. Yet, as Snyder correctly points
out, the implications of his theory are watered down if one takes into account the
various qualifiers that he integrates into it.598 What limits the quest for power in
offensive realism however, is not morality as in the case of classical realists.
Morality does not play a prominent role in Mearsheimer’s theory.599 It can -and
should- only be taken into consideration when a state has the luxury to do so, namely
when it does not conflict with “balance-of-power logic”.600 The fact that it is often
employed to justify a selected foreign policy is considered by Mearsheimer as
convenient masking of realistically formed policies.601 With morality taken out of the
equation, what remains to moderate the quest for power are mainly structural and
geopolitical forces.

597
Ibid. pp. 57-60
598
G. Snyder, “Mearsheimer’s World”, p. 153
599
Realism is a “fundamentally amoral theory” as he claimed in his Theory Talks interview in 2012: J.
Mearsheimer, “Power as the Currency”, p. 8
600
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, p. 47. Mearsheimer offered a further
elaboration on this idea in his Carr Memorial Lecture. There, in a rather simplistic reading of Carr’s
dialectics, he claims that Carr might have been exaggerating the conflict between morality and power
given the fact that states sometimes can pursue both goals simultaneously. Additionally moral goals
might be pursued when they are not seriously affecting the logic of realism. But when the two are in
conflict, power considerations will trump everything else. J. Mearsheimer, “E.H Carr vs Idealism” in
International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 2, 2005, pp. 139-152: pp. 142-143.
601
Ibid: 143; J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 25-27. Such lies, employed when
there is a contrast between liberal values and realist policies, or “liberal lies”, are considered by
Mearsheimer relatively harmless compared to fearmongering and strategic cover-ups that can
seriously misfire. J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie: The Truth about Lying in International Politics,
London: Duckworth Overlook, 2011, pp. 81-86, p. 101

149
Although in Mearsheimer’s theory states have, in principle, no motivation to limit
their quest for power they are not “mindless aggressors” striving endlessly to
dominate the system.602 The states in his theory in addition to being power
maximisers are also rational calculators and as such they soon figure out that their
behaviour should match their capabilities lest they find themselves in a position
worse than the one they began in. As a result states calculate carefully the perceived
costs and benefits of every action and pursue it only if the former outweigh the
latter.603 Their moderation is therefore a result of an, as humanely as possible,
accurate evaluation of the external constraints imposed to their quest for power.
The first such constraint comes from the international system itself and more
specifically from the distribution of power. Its importance lies with the way it
influences the levels of fear and balancing behaviour. The more asymmetries in the
distribution of power, the more unstable a system is, and the more great powers fear
each other. Mearsheimer ranks the possible systems from the more stable bipolar one
to the most unstable unbalanced multipolar, with balanced multipolarity somewhere
in between.604 The reading of the distribution of power can help states to modify their
behaviour accordingly and anticipate whether other states are more likely to balance
or pass the buck. An accurate reading thus should be enough in most cases to
persuade a potential hegemon that the costs of attempting to dominate the system are
far greater than the slim chances of success.
The expected counterbalancing that a potential hegemon will face from worried great
powers is further aggravated by an important geopolitical factor. The predominance
of land power in Mearsheimer’s theory means that in order for such power to be
employed effectively, a state should be able to project it when it so needs. For
Mearsheimer, this prospect is severely limited by the stopping power of large bodies
of water that hinder the capacity of great powers to attack each other with land
forces.605 The inclusion of a geopolitical variable helps Mearsheimer to better
account for cases of insular powers as well as the operation of regional systems that

602
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 37
603
Ibid. pp. 37-40
604
Ibid. pp. 337-347
605
Ibid. pp. 114-128

150
could otherwise be treated as anomalies to his theory, but at the cost of making his
overall theoretical framework somewhat more blurry.606
The final limitation to a power achieving hegemony is nuclear weapons.
Mearsheimer sets a high threshold for hegemony: a power that attains this position
must in essence be “the only great power in the system” with any other powers being
unable to seriously challenge it.607 In the age of nuclear weapons, because of their
immense destructive capability, attaining hegemony would require the dominant
state in the system to establish a clear advantage either by monopolising the
possession of nuclear weapons or by establishing a refined defence system that
would neutralise an opponent’s arsenal. Given, however, that such a development is
unlikely, Mearsheimer believes that effectively no global hegemony is attainable.608
Consequently, the best result one state can hope to achieve is regional hegemony and
maintenance of this position by preventing other regional hegemons from
emerging.609 The latter point is however, as Layne noted, logically problematic. If
regional hegemony is the best possible position attainable and the stopping power of
water prevents global hegemony from materialising, then a regional hegemon should
not be seriously worried about a peer emerging in another region of the world since
the stopping power of water would also apply to them.610

606
Toft claims that with the introduction of location Mearsheimer is creating an ambiguity with the
levels of analysis and thus makes his theory very hard to challenge on his own terms: “Only if the
theory fails at both the regional and system-wide level is the theory in serious trouble”. A connected
problem is that due to the lack of a hierarchy between location and the distribution of power “both
variables can individually account for the empirical outcomes” and as such location can supplement
the distribution of power for cases that would otherwise be “obvious anomalies”. P. Toft, “Offensive
realist between geopolitics and power”, pp. 393-394. While Toft is right that this modification is
allowing Mearsheimer more flexibility, his second argument is contradicting his own claim in the
same article that “although location plays an important role... this variable is wholly subordinate to the
structural balance of power variable since different power constellations determine the impact of
location...” Ibid. p. 389. In fact, the latter claim seems to be closer to Mearsheimer’s position since he
deals with the stopping power of water as being important only when facing a defending great power,
and one that is not distracted for that matter. J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.
114-119
607
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 40
608
Ibid. pp. 128-133 and pp. 224-232 where he claims that despite the unlikelihood of attaining
nuclear superiority, great powers will still try to attain it.
609
Ibid. pp. 41-42
610
C. Layne, “The ‘Poster Child for offensive realism’: America as a global hegemon” in Security
Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2002, pp. 120-164: pp. 126-127

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III. Power and the nation-state

The nation-state in offensive realism

Mearsheimer’s view of the state comes very close to the one offered by Legro and
Moravcsik in their paradigmatic reading of realism.611 Since his theory is a structural
one, the domestic setting of each particular state is of no significant consequence for
its behaviour. As such, states cannot be meaningfully differentiated by anything other
than their relative power, at least for the purposes of a theory of international
relations. “In essence”, maintains Mearsheimer, “great powers are like billiard balls
that vary only in size”.612 As happens often with billiard balls, their direction and
their collisions are determined by factors other than themselves. In the case of
Mearsheimer’s billiard balls the external factor that compels states to act in a specific
way is international anarchy. It follows that in his version of realism it is not the state
that is the central element. What realism requires, he maintains, is not the state itself
but the existence of international anarchy. As long as the structure of the international
system is anarchic it will impose constraints upon whichever political unit happens to
be the prevalent form of political organisation in any given period.613
It is clear then that when Mearsheimer approaches the states as the main actors in
international relations he does not engage with the notion of the state as
encompassing an eternal category outside history. Although the idea that the main
political units change throughout history is present in earlier works, Mearsheimer
started placing particular attention on the emergence of the modern state in recent,
and largely still ongoing, research.614 In his recent work he pays attention to the
transition from a ‘stateless’ Europe in the fifteenth century, to the emergence of the

611
J. Legro and A. Moravcsik, “Is Anybody Still a Realist?”, pp. 12-13
612
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 18
613
Ibid. p. 365
614
Apart from the Tragedy of Great Power Politics mentioned already, Mearsheimer examined in his
earlier “False Promise” article how feudal political units behaved vis-à-vis realist assumptions. Even
though his main focus was to make the case for realism being a timeless theory, it is clear from his
discussion that he was mindful of the various macro-historical transformations of political units. See
Mearsheimer, “False Promise of International Institutions”, pp. 44-46. More recently, Mearsheimer
presented a paper at the Yale Workshop for International Relations in which he engages with realism
and nationalism. The paper represents his “preliminary thinking on the subject” and is cited here with
the author’s permission: J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins: Nationalism and Realism”, Prepared for
Yale Workshop of International Relations, 5 May 2011. Accessed, 21 December 2013. Available from
mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/recent.html

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dynastic state and its eventual replacement by the nation-state.615 Mearsheimer cites
C. Tilly approvingly and he attributes the prevalence of the state as a form of
political organisation to its superiority over the other political units of the time.
Consistently with the core assumptions of offensive realism about power, the crucial
advantage for the emerging state was provided by its efficiency in translating latent
to military power vis-à-vis the various alternatives to it such as the city-states of
Italy.616 As a result the prevalence of the state in Europe was largely determined by
its competence “on the battlefield”.617 Here, Mearsheimer’s narrative does not differ
significantly from that of other realists examined as regards the interplay between
power and the emergence of the modern state and bears a particular resemblance to
Herz’s emphasis on military power and the rise of the territorial state.
Power politics thus is the first of the “two main driving forces” which led to the
establishment of the modern state system. The second one, surprisingly for a
structural theory, is nationalism.618 For Mearsheimer, the dynastic state might well
have been more effective than its competitors in marshalling power, but it did not
enjoy the loyalty of its population. When nationalism came to the forefront however,
in the aftermath of the French revolution, the allegiance of the population to the state
could be marshalled and employed as a “huge force multiplier”. The success of
France’s national armies quickly led its neighbours to adopt nationalism themselves
and by “the early twentieth century, every state in Europe was effectively a nation-
state”.619 Mearsheimer’s narrative here is based solidly on the predominance of
military power and the idea of state socialisation. States adapt to new circumstances

615
J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, pp. 15-16
616
Ibid. pp. 17-18
617
Ibid. p. 17
618
Ibid. p. 16
619
Here, Mearsheimer’s account of the transition from dynastic to popular sovereignty parallels Carr’s
account of the phases of nationalism. Especially since the emergence of popular sovereignty is
connected to both increased political power domestically and increase in loyalty for the population.
Ibid. pp. 9-10, 18-19. Mearsheimer, however, does not connect extensively the evolution of
nationalism to that of democracy in the same way Carr did. In fact, in a later comment on Kennan he
claims that “total wars had little to do with democracy and much to do with nationalism”. J.
Mearsheimer, “Introduction” in G. F. Kennan, American Diplomacy, (extended ed.), Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 2012, pp. Vii-xlvii: p. xxxix. A further difference with Carr, and Gellner
for that matter, is that Mearsheimer is not attentive to the differences between Western and Eastern
Europe.

153
and adopt successful behaviour in order to improve their odds of survival.620 This
view of nationalism is common amongst neorealist theorists that provided accounts
of the phenomenon and on whose works Mearsheimer draws, such as Posen and Van
Evera.621 As Kadercan correctly observes, however, such a linear interpretation fails
to explain why states instead of happily embracing such a handy power multiplier
they actually tried to strangle nationalism in its cradle.622
There is however a further problem or, more accurately, two interconnected problems
with the importance Mearsheimer attributes to nationalism. Nationalism is a
phenomenon of ideological nature, and Mearsheimer recognises it as such.623 The
fact then that he singles it out as one of the crucial factors that led to the prevalence
of the nation-state might prove problematic for his theory. First, the importance
attributed to nationalism would imply the introduction of an ideational element of
power in a theory whose understanding of power is claimed to be materialistic.
Second, an ideology is of necessity a factor that influences states at the domestic
level and as such it should not be able to alter state behaviour significantly. In the
following section, I evaluate the way that Mearsheimer addresses those challenges.

Nationalism and power politics

Since Mearsheimer has repeatedly treated nationalism as an ideology and he claims
that the “nation-state system is largely the product of the inter-play between
nationalism and power politics”624, the first problem that needs to be addressed is
whether by granting such an important role to nationalism he undermines his
explicitly materialistic theory by re-introducing an element of ideational power.
After all, not only has he excluded the power of ideas from his framework but he
approaches ideologies in general as non-security goals that are lower in the hierarchy
of state goals than survival. This point has been picked by critics of Mearsheimer
620
Mearsheimer is generally in agreement with Waltz’s views on state socialisation to successful
practices, but he extends such practices beyond balancing to include successful offensive behaviour
and innovation. J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 166-167
621
B. Kadercan, “Military Competition and the emergence of Nationalism: Putting the Logic of
Political Survival into Historical Context” in International Studies Review, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2012, pp.
401-428: pp. 402-406
622
Ibid. p. 406
623
Indicatively, Mearsheimer refers to nationalism as an ideology, and indeed as “the most powerful
ideology” in J. Mearsheimer, “Introduction” p. xxxix. Also in J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great
Power Politics, p. 365; J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, pp. 100-101
624
J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, p. 23

154
who claim that he is not faithful to the model he developed by maintaining the
importance of nationalism i.e. of an ideology.625
Yet for Mearsheimer, nationalism is not any ideology. When he discusses the
hierarchy of state goals he makes special reference to goals that are complementary
to the pursuit of power and tellingly lists national unification amongst them.626 As
long as an ideology is compatible with the premises of offensive realism, there is no
problem with a state pursuing it. And in Mearsheimer’s view, as his later engagement
with the topic demonstrated, nationalism is the par excellence compatible to realism
ideology. This compatibility is attributed by Mearsheimer to the fact that nationalism
and realism share core assumptions at the foundational level, namely that they are
both particularistic and both focused on the state and survival.627 The marriage of the
state to the nation in the late eighteenth century had profound implications for both.
Those nations that were associated with a state by the time of the transition to
popular sovereignty, had to worry about the survival of their respective state since
the fates of the two were now interwoven. And, those that did not posses their own
state acquired a powerful incentive to aspire for one to ensure their survival.628
The reason for nations’ preference for their own state is explained by the impact of
nationalism in the functioning of a state. Drawing from relevant literature in the field
of nationalism studies, Mearsheimer observes that the nation-state is much more
intrusive than its predecessor as regards the lives of its members. The process of
cultural homogenisation, while making sense for the nation-state for both economic
and military reasons poses a fatal threat to minority nations. The ensuing risk of
assimilation or even annihilation is what triggered nations to have a strong
preference for their own state and also led to the expansion of the nation-state
globally through the process of decolonisation.629
Mearsheimer seems to approach in a similar fashion the second potential problem
with the importance he attributes to nationalism as a domestic force in an otherwise
structural theory. The problem is aptly summarised by Oren who, when discussing

625
See for instance R. Little, “Turning back the clock: Mearsheimer resurrects the first great debate” in
International Relations, Vol. 19, No 3, 2005, pp. 341-344: p. 343; A. H. Pashakhanlou, “Back to the
drawing board”, pp. 210-211
626
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 46
627
J. Mearsheimer “Kissing Cousins”, p. 4
628
Ibid. p. 10
629
Ibid. pp. 20-23

155
the conflict between prediction and prescription in Mearsheimer’s approach, claims
that the latter introduces an “error term” in his theory. The error term, is a factor
excluded from the theory, such as domestic politics, that occasionally accounts for
foreign policy. The realist scholar can then try to “expose the error and try to
minimise it”630. What is problematic about this approach empirically is for Oren the
fact that the “error term” seems to be accounting for the rule rather than the
anomalies in American foreign policy.631 Mearsheimer for his part certainly
approached nationalism as a domestic factor in one of his early engagements with
international relations theory, right at the wake of the Cold War. There he claimed
that domestic factors are not of equal importance to structural constraints in
explaining the stability of post-1945 Europe. And the most important of such factors,
‘hyper-nationalism’ was by and large a consequence of security competition rather
than its cause.632 Writing a decade later, despite adding the qualifier that domestic
factors are limiting the ability of offensive realism -or any structural theory for that
matter- to accurately predict in detail when and how often conflict occurs, he
maintained their secondary importance. Focusing on structural factors alone, he
claimed, “should tell us a lot about the origins of great-power war”.633
His treatment of nationalism as a domestic factor notwithstanding, Mearsheimer’s
approach of nationalism can get him beyond the “error term” as a result of the close
interconnectedness he identifies between it and realism. There is certainly a degree of
compatibility between nationalism, as Mearsheimer approaches it, and his variant of
realism. After all, his treatment of nationalism as a power multiplier can easily be, at
least in theory, accommodated with his approach of power as material capabilities.
The employment of nationalism allows states not only to build mass armies but also
to mobilise their citizens to maintain such armies and provide them with resources.
Even the non-material aspect of the increased motivation and thus reliability
displayed by national armies can be accommodated in Mearsheimer’s existing notion

630
I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, p. 288
631
Here Oren is not talking about nationalism but about domestic factors generally. Ibid. pp. 288-289
632
J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”, p. 12; pp. 20-21
633
Interestingly, the domestic factor employed as an example in this case was, again, nationalism. See
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 334-336

156
of power since he allows for a qualitative element in assessing military forces.634 The
main problem with his approach to nationalism is therefore not one of logical
consistency in terms of his theory, at least insofar as the incorporation of nationalism
does not undermine the main logic of such a theory.
Mearsheimer, however, goes beyond this interpretation of nationalism and attributes
to it even more importance, and in so doing he seems to be dealing with nationalism
as an ad hoc qualifier of offensive realism. After discussing the interplay between
power-politics and nationalism in his most recent engagement with the topic,
Mearsheimer moves on to discuss the ways in which nationalism has impacted upon
“aspects of international politics that are of central importance to realism’s
intellectual agenda”.635 In so doing, however, he is awarding to nationalism a
transformative role which is inconsistent with the function it could possibly perform
in a structural theory. When discussing the impact of nationalism to the character of
war, Mearsheimer observes that conflicts between states in the age of nationalism
tend to escalate quickly to the absolute form described by Clausewitz in contrast to
the limited war that dominated the early modern European system. With a limited
war to attain limited aims being out of the question, states have less of an incentive to
start one. Furthermore, nationalism makes it now very difficult “for the victor to
occupy the vanquished state”.636 Ironically here, despite his disregard for ideational
power, Mearsheimer seems to be more attentive than Carr to the potency of
nationalism as an ideology when faced with opponents who posses superior power.637
This conclusion, however, would mean that conquest, does not after all pay as much
as Mearsheimer originally assumed, or at least not in the age of nationalism.638

634
J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, pp. 23-24; J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, pp. 69-80; for the
indicators of measuring power see J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 133-135
635
J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, p. 23
636
Citing, however, the example of the Nazi’s exploitation of conquered territories Mearsheimer
claims that “occupation can succeed under special circumstances”. Ibid. p. 30
637
Mearsheimer’s account is similar to Herz’s discussion of the potency of defensive nationalism. The
similarity is remarkable and is in sharp contrast with early engagements in both Carr and Herz
regarding the vulnerability of nation-states in the face of superior economic and military power as
well as new forms of warfare such as aerial bombardment or economic blockades. It seems that,
despite his bias towards land power, Mearsheimer’s account alongside Herz’s modified views are
better than earlier ones at capturing the resilience of nationalism when employed for defensive
purposes as well as its limits when marshalled for offence.
638
This is a noteworthy modification compared to the previous engagement with the subject in the
Tragedy of Great Power Politics. There he mentions nationalism in passing as a potential obstacle for
conquest but the discussion that follows does not address it in detail. J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of

157
Of course offensive realism is a general theory that cannot be expected to illuminate
everything and Mearsheimer is clear that often non-structural factors influence state
behaviour. For the theory to operate smoothly, however, these anomalies should be
rare exceptions. Yet there is hardly an instance in which Mearsheimer, when
engaging with foreign affairs, has not cautioned against -and most likely rightly so-
attempts to engage in social engineering abroad or conquest on grounds of the
resistance one is to expect by nationalism.639 Furthermore, when discussing the
possibility of transcending the state, Mearsheimer is connecting its survival in the
foreseeable future to the appeal of nationalism and its glorification of the state.640 In
claiming that nationalism not only influences the likelihood of war alongside
structural factors, but also that it is connected to the resilience of the state as a form
of political organisation Mearsheimer does, eventually, allow a non-structural factor
to further qualify the main premises of offensive realism.

Taming the nation-state?

From the preceding discussion it is clear that Mearsheimer does not display the same
deep-rooted scepticism towards nationalism as his mid-twentieth century
predecessors. Neither does he share the same anxiety so indicative of Herz and
Morgenthau about the future survival of not only the nation-state but also humanity
itself in the face of nuclear weapons. The nation-state seems to have weathered some
of the challenges that earlier generations of realists anticipated and, for Mearsheimer,
it does not seem to be going anywhere in the foreseeable future. As a result, he does
not try to devise a blueprint for transcending the nation-state as earlier realists did.
For Mearsheimer, the key question is not how to go beyond the nation-state but how
to tame it for the period that it is going to remain the dominant form of political
organisation.
In evaluating generally nationalism, Mearsheimer approaches the phenomenon

Great Power Politics, pp. 148-152, p. 488. Rosecrance, however, in his review of the book anticipated
the potential implications of such a position when he claimed that “the ‘stopping power’ of modern
nationalism... may be greater than the water barrier”. R. N. Rosecrance, “War and Peace” in World
Politics, Vol. 55, No. 1, 2002, pp. 137-166: p. 148
639
He summarised his views on the subject when commenting on American efforts to attempt social
engineering in the 21st century: “Washington seems to have an uncanny ability to take a bad situation
and make it worse” in J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged” in The National Interest, No. 129, 2014,
pp. 9-30: p. 22
640
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 365-366

158
macro-historically. He claims that, although in the short term nationalism with the
dissolution of multinational states and irredentism that come with it is increasing
instability and the likelihood of war, in the long term it can increase the prospects of
peace. Since nationalism makes the success of conquest less likely the more “pure
nation-states” there are, the less likely they are to fight over minorities or attempt to
conquer each other.641 His commentary during the conflicts in the Balkans, where
Mearsheimer suggested redrawing of borders and transferring populations so that
homogeneous entities are created, makes clear that this idea has been with him long
before it was crystallised theoretically.642 What Carr once deplored as the “mass
sacrifice of human beings to the idol of nationalism” is for Mearsheimer a necessary
evil in order to avoid further conflict.643
This rather benign view of nationalism bears a superficial resemblance to the liberal
nationalism of the 19th century discussed by Carr, Morgenthau and Herz.
Mearsheimer, however, unlike liberal nationalists is aware of the darker side of
nationalism or “ugly hyper-nationalism” as he prefers to call it. This form of
nationalism, similarly to Morgenthau’s nationalistic universalism, is borne out of the
belief that other nations “are both inferior and threatening”.644 For him, however,
hyper-nationalism does not represent a distinct phase in the development of
nationalism but rather a possible transformation of benign nationalism. Mearsheimer
identifies security concerns and the resulting sense of vulnerability as one of the
main reasons behind the emergence of hyper-nationalism. An additional reason is the
tendency of governments to cultivate nationalism in an effort to marshal support for

641
J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, pp. 31-32
642
He proposed for instance a three-way partition of Bosnia in several opinion pieces in New York
Times during the 1990s: J. Mearsheimer, “Shrink Bosnia to Save it”, The New York Times, 31 March
1993; J. Mearsheimer and S. Van Evera, “Hateful Neighbours”, The New York Times, 24 September
1996; J. Mearsheimer, “The Only Exit From Bosnia”, The New York Times, 7 October 1997.
Similarly, he proposed Kosovo to be granted independence from Serbia before the war in J.
Mearsheimer, “A Peace Agreement That’s Bound to Fail”, The New York Times, 19 October 1998. He
returned to the same topic in 1999 and proposed a partition of Kosovo with Serbia maintaining the
North and the rest gaining independence, suggesting that this should also be the formula to be
followed in neighbouring Macedonia in case the ethnic conflict on that country persisted: J.
Mearsheimer and S. Van Evera, “Redraw the Map, Stop the Killing”, The New York Times, 19 April
1999. All opinion pieces are available through the author’s website:
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pub-affairs.html
643
E. H. Carr, Nationalism and After, p. 34
644
J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”, p. 21

159
their security policies.645 The risks of hyper-nationalism, however, are not sufficient
reason for Mearsheimer to contemplate ways to go beyond nationalism and the
nation-state.
As regards the state, he does not believe that the present or foreseeable developments
at the field of power are threatening its existence. Even if the state is replaced by
another entity in the future, there will be no significant difference in their behaviour
for as long as the international system remains anarchic. The only development in the
international system that could possibly challenge the explanatory power of realism
is, for Mearsheimer, the establishment of a hierarchical system.646 When it comes to
nationalism, despite his generally positive view of the phenomenon, Mearsheimer
believes that some moderation is required in order to limit the possibility of its
degeneration to hyper-nationalism and suggested two ways to achieve that end back
in 1990. His first suggestion on the moderation of nationalism is one that resonates
well with his theory. The development of small professional armies and reliance on
“high-technology military organisations” such as the one normally accompanied by
the acquisition of nuclear weapons, should be able to reduce the need for mass
armies and the cultivation of nationalist sentiments associated with them.647
The second proposal was somewhat more ambitious since it involved nothing less
than the “teaching of honest national history” on behalf of the elites.648 What
remained unaddressed in this proposal was why, given the emphasis Mearsheimer
places on nationalism as a power multiplier, governing elites would voluntarily
dispense with such a useful tool. In his later work Mearsheimer seems to be
retreating from this suggestion when he claims that although nationalism is a potent
force and “a major cause of war”, its myths are of only secondary if not tertiary
importance. It is foreign policy behaviour that causes nationalist myths and not the
other way around.649 As such, elites can still safely engage in nationalist myth-
making without risking too much. This rebuttal, however, appears strange given the
emphasis that Mearsheimer places even in his recent work on how nationalist myths

645
Ibid. pp. 20-21, pp. 25-26
646
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 363-366
647
J. Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future”, p. 21
648
Ibid. p. 56
649
J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, pp. 100-101

160
help nation-states forge identities and motivate their citizens to make sacrifices.650

IV. Mearsheimer and American Foreign Policy

US Foreign policy until 1989: a poster child for offensive

realism?
According to the premises of offensive realism outlined in the previous sections, the
ideal American policy should be one of establishing regional hegemony in the
Western Hemisphere and then, since global hegemony is unattainable, make sure that
no other regional hegemon emerges by acting as an offshore balancer. For
Mearsheimer, this is the course that the United States actually followed up to the end
of the Cold War. His engagement with this period demonstrates clearly not only how
he approaches the workings of the international system but also how he understands
the interplay between domestic factors and nationalism.
For Mearsheimer, after its establishment and for the duration of the 19th century the
United States acted according to the theory of offensive realism and attempted to
establish regional hegemony. It pursued this aim by following consistently two
interconnected policies: on the one hand it sought to expand territorially and on the
other it tried to limit the influence of European powers in the Western Hemisphere.651
For Mearsheimer, there was no need for the United States to occupy the whole of
North America for security reasons since Canada and Mexico were not powerful
enough to pose a serious threat. The fact that the United States restrained from
attempting to assimilate those states is explained by Mearsheimer by the difficulties
posed to conquest by nationalism.652 After the United States achieved hegemony in
the Western Hemisphere its main purpose according to offensive realism should be to

650
In Why Leaders Lie, Mearsheimer seems to be suggesting that nationalist myth-making is
intensified after wars or violent state formation and mostly for white-washing. Ibid. p. 69-80. As such,
the “rhetoric of nationalism is tailored to suit the behaviour of states, which is driven largely by other
calculations”. Ibid. p. 100. This of course is in clear contradiction to his statement in “kissing cousins”
where he claims that in trying to motivate their public, elites will “portray the adversary as the
epitome of evil” which n turn “makes it almost impossible to negotiate an end to a war short of total
victory”. J. Mearsheimer, “Kissing Cousins”, p. 28. Here Mearsheimer is attributing to myth-making
the ability to change the character of wars between nation-states and approaches it is as an inalienable
part of nationalism rather than one of its insignificant paraphernalia.
651
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Powers Politics, pp. 238-249
652
Ibid. p. 244 and in particular fn 18, p. 488

161
ensure that no local state forms an alliance with an overseas great power and to
prevent any other regional hegemons from emerging in other regions of the world.
Although in its initial decades the United States had no power to implement the
Monroe doctrine, the European colonial empires were dissolved due to the
disintegrating influence of nationalism. Further efforts on behalf of European powers
to intervene in America such as French and German involvement in Mexico or the
Soviet alliance with Cuba were met with hostility by the United States and every
effort was made to contain them.653 As regards the role of the United States as an
offshore balancer, Mearsheimer believes that in that case too its practice vindicates
his theory. Although inclined to pass the buck to local powers to balance against a
potential hegemon, the United States did not hesitate to actively intervene when the
former failed. As such, the United States intervened in Europe when the entente
powers failed to check Germany in World War I, again in World War II for the same
reasons, and once more during the Cold War since no European power was able to
check the Soviet Union. Similarly, in Asia the United States tried to prevent first
Japan from gaining hegemony when the Soviet Union faced defeat at the hands of
Germany, and subsequently to contain the Soviet Union after no significant power
was left to check it.654
Mearsheimer’s overview of the foreign policy of the United States for the better part
of the past two centuries as being essentially realistic, however, comes as a contrast
to the views of mid-twentieth century realists. Realists such as Morgenthau and
Kennan were often critical of what they considered to be the surrender of American
foreign policy to idealism.655 Mearsheimer accepts that the society of the United
States is characterised by a “deep-seated sense of optimism and moralism”.656 He
thinks, however, that the real influence liberal principles had on American foreign
policy rarely went beyond rhetoric. He thus disagrees with Kennan’s criticism and
claims that there is a marked gap between liberal rhetoric and realist practices in
American foreign policy. What might occasionally obscure the gap is that realist
policies do not always conflict with liberal values and as such can easily be

653
Ibid. p. 249
654
Ibid. pp. 252-261
655
For Morgenthau see Chapter II, Part IV. Mearsheimer discusses extensively Kennan’s views in J.
Mearsheimer, “Introduction”, pp. xxiii-xxxiii
656
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 22-25

162
explained away by reference to moral principles alone. And when there is conflict
between the pursued policies and liberal values, “spin doctors” can be trusted to
invent a story that rationalises the policy.657
Of course, Mearsheimer’s engagement with the historical record and his claim that it
vindicates his theory can -and has been- challenged on various grounds. One of the
most common challenges to Mearsheimer’s engagement with American foreign
policy, and one raised quite early, relates to his insistence that the United States had
not in the past and would not in the future try to reach for global hegemony. Layne
raised the issue in his review of the Tragedy of Great Power Politics. Although he
agrees with Mearsheimer that the United States should try to be an offshore balancer
he claims that it actually entertained hegemonic aspirations even before the end of
World War II and that the foundations for American primacy were laid already from
the 1950s before it was actually achieved in 1990.658 As will be discussed in the
following section, Mearsheimer in his later engagements with the topic came closer
to Layne’s position that the United States are enjoying primacy in the current
international system. The reverse point, that the United States has actually underused
their power for the better part of the twentieth century was raised by May.659
Competing interpretations of historical periods, however, are unlikely to pose a
serious threat to any engagement with history that does not seriously distort the
historical record. When it comes to his commentary on ongoing debates about
American foreign policy, however, Mearsheimer’s approach faces more challenges.
It is one thing to claim retrospectively that a theory can account for state behaviour in
the past and it is quite another to claim that it can accurately predict future behaviour.
Mearsheimer claimed both for offensive realism and as a result his engagement with
post-cold war American foreign policy found his predictions to be at odds with the
policies actually followed. In his effort to offer advice on such issues Mearsheimer
found himself much closer to the classical realists’ arguments about the perils of
moral crusading and the influence of domestic factors than his structural approach
would allow.

657
Ibid. pp. 25-27; Mearsheimer, “Introduction”, pp. xxvii-xli
658
C. Layne, “The Poster Child of offensive realism”, pp.135-158
659
E. May, “The United States’ underuse of military power” in E. May et al (eds), History and
Neorealism, pp. 228-245

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After the Cold War: The conflict between prediction and
prescription
In the decade following the end of the Cold War, Mearsheimer examined the likely
courses of American foreign policy for the years to come. He concluded that the most
likely scenario would be for the United States to replicate the approach they followed
in the past i.e. that of an offshore balancer. Given that the threat of the Soviet Union
was now gone, Mearsheimer expected the United States to gradually withdraw from
both Europe and Asia, and pass the buck to the great powers of those regions in the
hope that they will balance each other.660 If regional powers fail to catch the buck
and a potential regional hegemon emerges amongst them, then the United States
would be expected to intervene to prevent them from dominating the regional
system. As such, the more significant worry for the United States seemed to be
China’s economic rise, which -if continued unchecked- would lead to the
accumulation of unprecedented latent power.661 The alternative of pursuing global
hegemony seemed to Mearsheimer to be out of the question: there was “hardly any
evidence”, he claimed in the final pages of Tragedy of Great Power Politics, “that the
United States is about to take a stab at establishing global hegemony”.662 In the years
that followed the publication of the book, Mearsheimer found himself claiming that
this is precisely what the United States ended up doing.
One year after the September 11 terrorist attacks, Mearsheimer wrote an article about
the Bush administration’s response to them and noted some disturbing developments.
In its anxiety to make the United States secure again, he claimed, the administration
seemed to be contemplating a quest for global hegemony. He warned that an effort to

660
This point was repeated in several publications in the 1990s and early 2000s. See indicatively: J.
Mearsheimer, “The Future of America’s Continental Commitment” in G. Lundestad (ed.), No End To
Alliance: The United States and Western Europe, New York: St. Martin’s, 1998, pp. 221-242; J.
Mearsheimer, “The Future of the American Pacifier” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 5, 2001, pp. 46-
61; J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 380-386
661
For an early discussion of China as a potential regional hegemon in Asia see: J. Mearsheimer,
“Future of American Pacifier”, pp. 53-56. Mearsheimer returned to the theme with J. Mearsheimer,
“China’s Unpeaceful Rise” Current History, Vol. 105, No. 690, 2006, pp. 160-162 and J.
Mearsheimer, “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia” in The Chinese
Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, No. 4, 2010, pp. 381-396
662
J. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 382. For Mearsheimer, despite being by far the
most powerful state in the system after the Cold War, the United States was not a global hegemon and
was unlikely to become one even if it wanted, because it did not have the capacity to project power
across the oceans. Ibid. p. 381; also in J. Mearsheimer, “The Future of America’s Continental
Commitment”, passim

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use American military might to forge an empire, even if a benign one, would not only
be unrealistic but also more likely to aggravate the risk of terrorism. He was
particularly critical of any attempt to remove unfriendly governments abroad and
promote democracy and warned that nationalism and the difficulties of social
engineering are huge impediments for such efforts.663 This line of argument was
repeated consistently by Mearsheimer as the United States was preparing to invade
Iraq. He insisted time and again that the war was unnecessary since Iraq lacked the
capability to pursue regional aspirations and even if it so attempted, that it could be
easily contained.664 He also tried to expose what he considered the militant
Wilsonianism of neoconservatives, a mixture of idealism and a blind belief in power,
which neglected the difficulties imposed by nationalism on efforts to impose friendly
political systems on other countries.665 In his criticism of the pursued policy was not
alone. Indeed most prominent realists opposed the war in Iraq too.666
Mearsheimer’s persistent opposition to the war in Iraq, as well as his analysis
thereof, however is revealing of the tension between prediction and prescription
outlined in the first part. His advice is consistent with what his theory would require
the United States to do, but the foreign policy the latter actually followed is at

663
J. Mearsheimer, “Hearts and Minds” in The National Interest, No. 69, 2002, pp. 13-16
664
J. Mearsheimer et al., “War with Iraq Is Not in America’s National Interest” in New York Times
(paid advertisement), 26 September, 2002; J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “An Unnecessary War” in
Foreign Policy, No. 134, 2003, pp. 50-59; J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “Keeping Saddam Hussein in
a Box” in New York Times, 2 February, 2003.
665
Mearsheimer drew parallels with Morgenthau’s opposition to the Vietnam War and claimed that
had the latter been still alive, he would too have opposed the war in Iraq. His engagement with the
strand of neo-conservatism that focuses on the superiority of American military power and assumes
that states will tend to bandwagon is particularly important, since some commentators have conflated
realism’s emphasis on power as condoning such policies. J. Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the
Iraq War: Realism versus Neo-Conservatism” opendemocracy.com, 2005, available through the
author’s webpage: http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/all-pubs.html For an example of an author
misidentifying the ‘war on terror’ and the invasion of Iraq as a realist endeavour see P. Rogers,
“Missing the point” in International Relations, Vol. 19, No. 3, 2005: pp. 337-340. Similarly, despite
recognising that Mearsheimer has a strong preference for offshore balancing, E. May drawing from an
identification of realism with the power maxims of the Melian dialogue claimed that after the and of
the Cold War and including the war in Iraq the United States behaved “as hard realism would have
predicted”. E. May, “ The United States’ underuse of military power”, p. 244
666
Excellent summaries of their arguments are provided in the following works: M. Lacy, “A History
of Violence: Mearsheimer and Walt’s Writings from ‘An Unnecessary War’ to the ‘Israel Lobby’
controversy” in Geopolitics, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2008, pp. 100-119; B. Schmidt and M. Williams, “The
Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: Neoconservatives Versus Realists” in Security Studies, Vol. 17, No.
2, 2008, pp. 191-220

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variance with that theory.667 Neither was the war in Iraq an isolated case that could
be claimed as an anomaly. As Mearsheimer noted in 2011, since the end of the Cold
War, the United States found itself in war “two out of every three years” by pursuing
the erroneous policy of making the most of the “unipolar moment” to embark on an
imperial project and export democracy.668 This policy that found the United States
entangled in prolonged and largely unwinnable conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq was
not particular to neoconservatives. Mearsheimer believes that the quest for global
domination was also pursued, albeit more cautiously, by the Clinton administration.
He identified the same tendency for “liberal imperialism” in Obama’s administration,
a tendency he confirmed when discussing the latter’s involvement in Libya and
willingness to go to war in Syria.669
For Mearsheimer the policy-makers in Washington can still afford to act foolishly in
the international arena because the United States enjoys an unprecedented
predominance which is unlikely to be challenged in the near future.670 As such, when
he is chastising the hubris of the “indispensable nation”671, he is not doing so with
the sense of urgency that characterised earlier realists during the fierce competition
of the Cold War. In fact, for Mearsheimer, despite risking failure and extreme human
and economic costs, the biggest risk from United States folly is not losing its position
in the world but rather the undermining of democracy at home.672 Mearsheimer
identified lying, and in particular fearmongering, as particularly perilous for
domestic policy since it reveals a disturbing contempt for the public on behalf of the
leadership which can easily spill over to national issues.673 This is for Mearsheimer
part of a broader issue: in its quest for global hegemony, and by remaining constantly
in a state of war or in anticipation of war, the United States is gradually becoming a
“national-security state”. Such a development, he claims, erodes the inherent checks
and balances that were built in American democracy and challenges the very

667
Toft summarised the discrepancy succinctly when, in 2005, he commented that “although
Mearsheimer’s policy advice was undoubtedly correct in most people’s view today, US foreign policy
seems not to conform to the dictates of offensive realism and anomalies... are mounting by the day”.
P. Toft, “Offensive realist between geopolitics and power”, p. 400
668
J. Mearsheimer, “Imperial by design” in The National Interest, No. 111, 2011, pp. 16-34
669
Idem. Also, in his more recent article: J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged”, pp. 9-30
670
J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged”, p. 23
671
J. Mearsheimer, “Introduction”, pp. xxiii-xxviii
672
J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged”, p. 23-29
673
J. Mearsheimer, Why Leaders Lie, pp. 94-96 ; J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged”, pp. 25-26

166
principles that lie at the core of liberal order.674 In that respect, Mearsheimer’s efforts
appear –to an extent- similar to Williams’ reading of mid-twentieth century realism
as an effort to insulate rather than undermine American liberalism.675
As such, for Mearsheimer, the primacy of the United States allows it to behave in a
strategically unwise way without risking much, at least in terms of the balance of
power. This primacy, however, does not explain why the United States do not simply
return to offshore balancing as Mearsheimer’s theory predicts. In trying to explain
this behaviour Mearsheimer developed arguments that invariably focus on domestic
factors. Be it the influence of the Israel Lobby, the ideology of elites, or their
inability to select the right strategy from the toolkit Mearsheimer’s explanation is
based on developments within the United States themselves rather than systemic
constraints.676 Of course, the past 25 years might be one of those anomalies that
offensive realism cannot explain adequately, albeit a rather long one. In the
meanwhile, however, Mearsheimer’s insightful commentary on the interplay between
American foreign policy and domestic factors seems to be doing justice to Snyder’s
call to abandon parsimony in order to reclaim realism.677

674
J. Mearsheimer, “America Unhinged”, pp. 25-29
675
The parallel should not be overstated since early realists had a dual aim of protecting liberalism
from the perils of “rationalist liberalism in the guise of facile pluralism… or naïve scientism and
rationalism”. M. Williams, “In the beginning: The International Relations enlightenment and the ends
of International Relations theory” in European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 19, no. 3,
2013, pp. 647-665: p. 655. Mearsheimer not only subscribes to the scientism that earlier realists
opposed but also does not seem particularly concerned with the legacy of the Enlightenment. The
parallel is thus valid only with respect to Mearsheimer’s concern about the deterioration of liberalism
domestically as a result of liberal crusading internationally.
676
Mearsheimer’s controversial engagement with the Israel Lobby merits here particular attention. His
collaboration with Waltz on the subject produced several articles and a monograph. See indicatively:
J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy” in Middle East Policy, Vol.
13, No. 3, 2006, pp. 29-87 and J. Mearsheimer and S. Walt, The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign
Policy, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007. In their engagement with the subject Mearsheimer
and Walt are claiming that Israel transformed from being a strategic asset during the Cold War to a
strategic liability after the latter’s end. They isolate the influence of the Israel Lobby, a clearly
domestic parameter, as the main reason for the continuing support of Israel by the United States, a
support they also associate with American adventurism in the Middle East. Lacy commented that the
shift of attention from neo-conservative self-deception to foreign penetration as exemplified in
Mearsheimer’s engagement with the Israel Lobby represented an effort to postpone “an interrogation
of the domestic, internal problems of democracy and war”. M. Lacy, “A History of Violence”, passim;
quote in p. 104. Given Mearsheimer’s return to those issues in later works, Lacy’s concern seems to
have been unwarranted.
677
Snyder, after commenting that Mearsheimer sacrifices too much to the altar of parsimony suggested
a couple of modifications to the power maximisation assumption that could make his theory “more
plausible”. Either Mearsheimer could water down the hypothesis by a “marginal utility calculation” or
maintain it as an ideal-type, a “point of departure for more ‘realistic’ estimates”. J. Snyder,
“Mearsheimer’s World”, p. 172. Oren too points towards ideal-types as a way for Mearsheimer to

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Concluding remarks
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism represents an effort to reconnect Waltz’s structural
theory to reality by accounting for foreign policy while maintaining the core
assumptions and the parsimony of the theory intact. Consistently with such an
approach, Mearsheimer offers a clearly defined and narrow definition of power
which is expected to perform the role of currency in international relations.
Compared to the realists examined so far, he offers the most rigid conceptualisation
of power. This clarity is also evident in his account of the emergence of the nation-
state which is predominantly focused on the impact of military power. Nationalism,
the ideological corollary of the nation-state, can be accommodated with such an
approach inasmuch as it is dealt with as a power multiplier.
Yet the balance that Mearsheimer attempts to form between his structural theory, the
development of the nation-states and the role of nationalism remains uneasy.
Through his writings nationalism does not only acquire a transformative role in the
international system, but also is identified as a key factor behind the survival of the
state in the foreseeable future and is limiting the premise of offensive realism that
conquest generally pays. Nationalism then appears to be moderating the implications
of his structural theory in a way that a non-structural force should not be able to.
Neither is nationalism the only qualifier that Mearsheimer integrates to his theory.
Apart from the stopping power of water that was playing a moderating role even in
the initial formulation of the theory, Mearsheimer’s engagement with American
foreign policy as a public intellectual seems to be increasingly taking into account
domestic factors such as pressure groups, ideological commitments or
miscalculations.
It is this engagement of Mearsheimer with American foreign policy that is most
illustrative of the tension between prediction and prescription in his theory. In his
effort to influence the policy of the United States and change its direction,
Mearsheimer echoed the criticisms raised by mid-century realists. Back in 1990,
Waltz warned that the addition of “elements of practical importance” would signify

overcome the gap between prediction and prescription in his theory, even though he believes they too
are problematic: I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, pp. 290-294.

168
the relapse from neorealism to realism: “The rich variety and wondrous complexity
of international life would be reclaimed at the price of extinguishing theory”.678 In
his effort to understand why the United States actually followed policies not
accounted for by his model, Mearsheimer had to take seriously non-structural factors.
In so doing he seems to be following, albeit very hesitantly it should be noted, the
direction that Waltz cautioned against.

678
K. Waltz, “Realist thought and neorealist theory”, p. 32

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CONCLUSION

Introduction

This thesis sought to address and make explicit the connection between realist
conceptions of power and the nation-state. Both elements are of paramount
importance for any realist research agenda since they are both perceived to represent
key tenets of realism. While existing efforts which focused on the recovery of
classical realism have dispelled the alleged state-centrism of realism, the connection
between power and the nation-state has not been adequately explored. By focusing
on the central for realism concept of power, this thesis aimed at exploring how
different conceptions of power influenced the way different realists understood the
nation-state. For that purpose, I focused on four key authors, E.H. Carr, H.
Morgenthau, J. Herz and J. Mearsheimer that are representative not only of the
diversity of realist tradition but also of the various stages in realism’s transformation
from a traditional to a positivistic approach.
This chapter is divided into two main parts. First, I offer a summary of the findings
of the thesis. Second, I identify the distinct contribution of the thesis to our
understanding of realism, power and the nation-state. This part is divided into three
sections. In the first section, I examine the contribution of the thesis to our
understanding of the role of power in realist thought. In the second section, I
highlight what the thesis contributes to our understanding of the relationship between
power and the nation-state and by extension, the role of the nation-state in realist
thought. In the third section I offer an account of the theoretical implications of the
thesis for the study of realism in international relations. A short final part summarises
the conclusions drawn form the thesis.

I. Findings of the thesis

The first focal point of the thesis was to identify the role of power within the theory
of international relations of each realist and more specifically their ontological and
epistemological assumptions. Ontologically, despite the variety of intellectual

170
backgrounds displayed by the authors under examination, power plays a central role
for all of them. In the peculiar dialectics of power and morality which underpins the
work of E.H. Carr it is power that plays the dominant role, with morality being
largely derivative. Similarly, in H. Morgenthau’s approach to politics as tragedy the
lust for power is inseparable from politics, rooted as it is in the anthropological
assumption of the animus dominandi. While rejecting assumptions about human
nature, Herz still granted to power great importance as a means of overcoming a
persistent social condition, namely the security dilemma. Finally, in Mearsheimer’s
offensive realism power is also grounded on the security dilemma, albeit differently
understood, and is expected to play the function of currency in international
relations.
The diversity of realist visions of power is more pronounced when it comes to its role
in epistemology. In the sociology of knowledge employed by Carr, power conditions
the very process of theorising and therefore political thought cannot be neatly
separated by power. Morgenthau’s approach is narrower in that he employs power as
a means to analytically insulate the political sphere for the purpose of its study in
isolation by means of ideal types. For Herz the epistemological importance of power
is founded upon the reaction of the human mind to the security dilemma. His
eclecticism places him between the two classical realists. He employed ideal types,
like Morgenthau, but instead of using them to create an abstraction of politics as the
exclusive domain of power he sought to achieve a dialectical synthesis through
“realist liberalism”. In the case of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, however, his
heavily deductive epistemology is devoid of any entanglement with power. As such,
it misses some of the reflexivity and self-awareness displayed to a varying degree by
older realists.
The second focal point of the thesis was the examination of the realist
conceptualisations of power derived from the assumptions outlined above. If one
takes Carr’s multi-faceted and malleable conceptualisation as a starting point, there is
a considerable narrowing down of the notion of power by the time Mearsheimer’s
minimalist understanding of power as material capabilities is reached. Carr’s
inexplicit conceptualisation of power was focused on its three interconnected facets
of military, economic and ideational power. Morgenthau was more explicit in that he

171
defined power as a psychological relationship which establishes and maintains
control and listed various elements of power that can be evaluated by policy makers.
In moving closer to deductive approaches and systems’ theory Herz would be
expected to continue this tendency.
By disconnecting power from Morgenthau’s anthropological assumptions and
connecting it to a social condition he certainly paved the road for structural realism.
Yet his notion of power is essentially protean and its meaning is bound to change as
the world moves from one form of underlying structure to the other. As such, the
elements of power and its measurability cannot be understood as static but can only
make sense in the context of territoriality. In Mearsheimer’s variant of realism the
move initiated by Morgenthau is completed. Power is reduced to a conceptualisation
that equates it with material capabilities, and such capabilities are clearly organised
in hierarchical order. Military power is more important than latent, and land power is
its most important aspect.
Such diverse conceptualisations of power have a profound impact on the way realists
understood the nation-state. Starting from a fuzzy notion of power, Carr was able to
produce a detailed account of the emergence of the nation-state as a result of the
interplay between domestic and international factors. His emphasis on the multi-
faceted character of power and the power of ideas in particular allowed him to
understand nationalism as a dynamic ideology in constant dialogue with shifts in
realities of economic and military power. Morgenthau, drawing from a narrower
conceptualisation of power, approached the nation-state as the main vehicle for the
projection of the lust for power at the international level. Despite being, like Carr,
mindful of the historically conditioned nature of the nation-state and studying the
interaction between nationalism and power, Morgenthau never produced a nuanced
account of the emergence of the nation-state. As such, he faced difficulties in
disassociating the timeless from the ephemeral. Both realists, however, were
sceptical about the prospects of the nation-state to survive intact developments in the
field of power and sought to theorise beyond it.
The account of the nation-state offered by Herz is informed by his concern with the
security dilemma. For him the variations throughout history in what constitutes the
higher political unit can be accounted for by technological developments and most

172
importantly those in the field of military power. What makes a political unit the
dominant one in any given time is its capacity to protect its subjects and the nation-
state is no exception having been established at the wake of the gunpowder
revolution. Similarly to Morgenthau, Herz initially believed that developments in the
field of power and more specifically the emergence of nuclear weapons would make
the nation-state obsolete since they amounted to the obliteration of its protective
shell. Faced with the apparent resilience of the nation-state, Herz provided a more
nuanced account of its characteristics as a unit of protection, one that somewhat de-
emphasised military power and focused on additional factors such as nationalism and
welfare.
Herz might have nuanced his account of the nation-state on the way but his emphasis
on the close connection between military power and the nation-state was revealing a
tendency that was to be followed by subsequent realists. Given the primacy he
attributes to military power, it is of little surprise that Mearsheimer’s approach to the
nation-state is remarkably similar to the initial formulation of Herz. The
establishment of the modern nation-state came about through its capacity to better
translate latent power to military might and the ability of nationalism to function as a
power multiplier. The role of nationalism as a power multiplier is in theory
compatible with Mearsheimer’s emphasis on a materialistic understanding of power
and his structural approach. The balance, however, remains an uneasy one since
Mearsheimer attributes to nationalism transformative functions that qualify the
rigidity of his theory.
The final element of the thesis comprised of an examination of the way the
aforementioned realists engaged with the policies pursued by various states as an
exemplification of their theories. Whether they sought to understand the history of a
particular state, like Carr after he lost interest to international relations as a
discipline, or combined historical accounts with a conscious effort to influence the
foreign policy of the United States like the remaining three realists, all authors
displayed significant consistency in employing their core theoretical assumptions to
such an engagement. As regards the realists that tried to influence the foreign policy
of the United States, their efforts have in most cases been unsuccessful. This
however does not pose a significant problem for their theories with the exception of

173
Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. The problem with his variant of realism lies with
his subscription to a methodology influenced by natural sciences in which prediction
and prescription are artificially merged. Whenever a state fails to behave in the way
that the theory predicts, this behaviour can only be registered as an anomaly that
weakens the theory. Interestingly, Mearsheimer’s own account for such failures led
him to explore in detail and provide nuanced arguments about non-structural factors
that should have been excluded from his theoretical framework as inconsequential.

II. Theoretical contribution of the thesis

The role of power in realist thought

As explained in the introduction, power plays a central role in realist theories of
international relations.679 With the present thesis I sought to recover the diversity of
realist conceptualisations of power in various authors representing different stages in
the development of the tradition. I claim that such recovery is important for
approaching realism in two interconnected aspects. First, I claim that different
conceptualisations of power developed gradually in a way which reveals the trend to
replace traditional approaches with positivism in contemporary realism. Second, I
claim that the way different realists conceptualise power has profound implications
for the success of their theory. I claim that the gradual replacement of multi-faceted
and flexible conceptualisations of power with narrower ones signifies an
impoverishment of realism in terms of analytical purchase.
Ontologically, the thesis affirms and expands on the insights offered by some of the
more nuanced commentators of realism. The centrality of power in realism’s
ontology seems indeed to be the only element which the paradigmatic reading of
realism actually got right, as Molloy observed.680 Whether power is grounded on
anthropological assumptions as in the case of Morgenthau or on a social condition
such as the security dilemma as in the cases of Herz and Mearsheimer it remains at
the core of any realist ontology. Despite this similarity which signifies the bare

679
See supra “Introduction”, especially pp. 14-16
680
S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism, pp. 145-147

174
minimum of agreement between realists, however, there is a large variety of realist
conceptualisations of power. In fact none of the examined realists offers a vision of
power, its nature and its functions that is identical to another’s.
This diversity has been mostly taken into account by existing literature on realism.
Schmidt for instance took it seriously when he classified different realist
conceptualisations of power in the three broad categories of classical, structural and
modified realism.681 What this thesis revealed, despite its limited scope of four key
authors, is that even a careful categorisation such as Schmidt’s is bound to be
imperfect. Even between realists belonging to the same broad category there are
significant differences. Both Carr and Morgenthau are classical realists but they did
not both ground their analysis of power on human nature as is commonly assumed.682
The same applies to realists who subscribe to systemic approaches and try to
disassociate power from anthropological assumptions. Even though both Herz and
Mearsheimer explicitly reject assumptions about human nature and connect power to
the security dilemma, their conceptions of power as well as the role it is expected to
perform in their theories are at variance with each other.
Most existing accounts of power in realism focus on its ontological assumptions. By
taking into account the role of power in realist epistemology, the thesis offers a
synthesis of such accounts with works from authors who placed a particular
emphasis on the importance of power in realist methodology. Authors like Oren and
Barkin have already demonstrated the advantages of classical realist epistemology
vis-à-vis its scientific counterpart in neorealism as regards the formers’ attentiveness
to power and its influence on the process of theorising.683 Indeed as the present thesis
demonstrated, despite the fact that the role of power was markedly different in each
realists’ epistemology, there is a clear-cut distinction between the epistemologies of
Carr, Morgenthau and Herz on the one hand, and Mearsheimer on the other.

681
B. Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of power”, passim. Molloy too, in the same section as above,
provided a discussion of the variety of realist notions of power: S. Molloy, Hidden History of Realism,
pp. 145-147
682
The view that classical realism relates the struggle for power to human nature while structural
realism distances itself from such assumptions is widespread. See B. Schmidt, “Realist conceptions of
power”, p. 50
683
I. Oren, “Unrealism of Contemporary Realism”, passim; S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and
Foreign Policy”, passim

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Between classical realists like Carr and Morgenthau or the transitional realism of
Herz the epistemological variation is noteworthy. The role power is awarded in
realist epistemology seems to be organically connected to the conceptualisation of
power with which each realist starts as well as its place in their ontology. As such,
Carr’s indeterminate and broad conceptualisation of power with its overlapping with
post-structural interpretations permeates every aspect of his theory of international
relations. The importance he attributes to the sociology of knowledge is indicative of
an understanding of power that is attentive to its complexities and signifies self-
awareness on behalf of the theorist. In a similar fashion, Herz’s approach to power as
being an essentially protean concept and in a state of constant flux is connected to an
epistemology according to which the theorist must be able to appraise power at any
given instant and at the same time try to devise attainable compromises between
power and power-alien considerations.
Morgenthau did not share the explicitly dialectical framework of Carr and Herz and
represented one of the early efforts to isolate analytically the concept of power. In his
effort to define power and its elements clearly, Morgenthau offered a narrower and
less flexible conceptualisation than Carr or Herz. Yet despite his similarity to later
efforts to narrow down the concept of power, Morgenthau’s epistemological choice
rather than signifying a step towards positivism demonstrated a conscious effort to
insulate the political sphere from the intrusion of violence. It is only with the
adoption of positivism by realists, as exemplified by Mearsheimer in the present
thesis, that the concept of power is restricted to the sphere of ontology.
Mearsheimer’s positivistic epistemology is impenetrable by the concept of power
and as such cannot account for any influence the theorist can possibly play in the
formation of foreign policy.
The primacy of power is indeed the core tenet of realism. Yet power means different
things to different realists and performs different functions in their theories. The
transition from a broad and multifaceted vision of power that permeates realism both
ontologically and epistemologically, to a narrow conception of power as measurable
material capabilities which can only perform the role of currency in a heavily
deductive theory is by no means a linear one. Classical realists like Morgenthau for
instance might be closer to the latter than transitional to neorealism figures like Herz.

176
It is only with the explicit and unreserved embrace of a scientific approach to
politics, as with the case of Mearsheimer, that the full implications of this transition
can be felt. This transition left realism with a more easily manageable concept of
power, but also a concept of power which is crippled and devoid of much of its
analytical purchase. This is evident in the way different conceptualisations of power
translated to different understandings of the nation-state as will be discussed in the
following section.

The interplay between power and the nation-state

When it comes to the question of the nation-state the main contribution of the thesis
is that it makes explicit the connection between the two important for realism
concepts of power and the nation-state. By approaching the nation-state through the
lens of the ontological primacy of power, the thesis established the close dependence
on power that all realist conceptualisations of the nation-state share. As such, the
thesis not only supplements recent works on realism that disassociated realism from
its alleged state-centrism but also expands their findings to also include structural
realism as will be explained in the following paragraphs. Second, through
examination of the differences between realist views of the interplay between power
and the nation-state, the thesis identifies the cardinal importance that a broad
conceptualisation of power plays for any realist project aiming to meaningfully
engage with the concept of the nation-state.
Recent efforts to recover the insights of classical realists, notably by Molloy and
Scheuerman, have effectively dissociated those realists from their alleged state-
centrism.684 The study of realist approaches to the nation-state through the lens of
power confirmed this previous research, and in particular Scheuerman’s overview.685
Changes in the domestic and international distribution of power played a crucial role
in bringing about the nation-state in the narratives offered by Carr, Morgenthau and
Herz. Such changes in the middle of the twentieth century also led them to assume
that the nation-state would no longer be able to perform its main functions and

684
W. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 39-66; S. Molloy, Hidden History of
Realism, pp. 139-143
685
W. Scheuerman, The Realist Case for Global Reform, pp. 39-66

177
should give way to other forms of political organisations. Scheuerman, however, is
only concerned with classical realists. Mearsheimer, whilst not sharing the latter’s
scepticism about the prospects of the nation-state, shares their view that it is
developments in the field of power that paved the way for the emergence and
predominance of the nation-state. Consequently, even for Mearsheimer’s variant of
neorealism the nation-state is a historically conditioned entity. The nation-state then,
due to its dependence upon the ontologically central concept of power, is for all
realism but an unfixed manifestation of power.
This does not imply, however, that the relationship between the two concepts is the
same for all realists. Scheuerman is primarily concerned with ‘progressive realists’
and their efforts to transcend the nation-state. As such, he tends to group them
together and provides an account of the relation between the nation-state and power
which emphasises their similarities rather than their differences.686 In fact realists
produced a variety of approaches of the interplay between power and the nation-
state, ranging all the way from a unit of protection in military terms to broad
accounts that include the interplay between military, economic and ideational factors
both domestically and internationally. The present thesis thus goes beyond
Scheuerman’s analysis through the exploration of that relationship to reveal that
approaches to the nation-state that are backed by more flexible conceptualisations of
power are in a better position to account both for the emergence of the nation-state
and the characteristics that differentiate it from previous forms of political
organisation.
In the heavily deductive model of Mearsheimer it is international anarchy that creates
the preconditions for the behaviour of the political units. The latter, being essentially
treated as billiard balls that can only react to external constraints, can vary in form
but are always expected to behave in the same way.687 In such a model, power as a
sum of material capabilities is always expected to perform the role of currency and
can only account for variation between different historical units in terms of
capabilities. As a result, whatever characteristic differentiates the nation-state from
preceding forms of organisation – like, say, the ideology of nationalism - has to be
subsumed to such a conception of power and be understood as a force multiplier.
686
Idem
687
Similar to the paradigmatic reading outlined in the Introduction. See supra pp. 16-18

178
Mearsheimer follows broadly this path but not entirely consistently. For he
eventually approaches nationalism as a phenomenon that can not only transform the
international system but can also influence the odds of survival of the nation-state.
As such, he is forced to be more attentive to ideational power than his theoretical
framework would allow.
This uneasy, even contradictory at places, relationship between the key concepts of
power and the nation-state is less pronounced or even absent in the rest of the realists
who possessed broader conceptualisations of power and whose notion of power was
not as strictly analytically separated from the nation-state as in Mearsheimer’s
offensive realism. Despite having too a relatively narrow conceptualisation of power
Morgenthau managed to somewhat overcome this analytical separation by
organically connecting the political unit to power through the mechanism of
projection of the animus dominandi. Furthermore, by having a distinct notion of
ethics he produced a narrative of nationalism that could account for the qualitative
differences between the nation-state and the units that preceded it. Similarly Herz,
despite sharing at places with Mearsheimer an emphasis on the role of military power
and military technology in the development of political units as well as favouring a
structural approach, offered a more nuanced account because of his reliance on a
volatile conceptualisation of power.
His interpretation of the political units and power as existing in a dialogical
relationship allowed him to account for variation through history in a way that an
approach focused solely on the impact of international anarchy cannot. For Herz,
power might have influenced the emergence of the territorial state, but after the latter
prevailed the very way power was organised and understood also changed. This
flexible framework allowed Herz to account for variation both in the behaviour of
different historical units and the implications of international anarchy at any given
period.
For Mearsheimer, Morgenthau and Herz, nationalism as the ideological corollary of
the nation-state operates mainly in two forms, one benign and defensive and one
aggressive and the prevalence of each form might or might not be associated with a
particular historical period. It is in the realism of Carr, however, that the intimate
connection between nationalism as an ideology and the concept of power is more

179
carefully explored and he was supported in this quest by a flexible and broad
conceptualisation of power. The most important aspects of such a conceptualisation
were his insistence that power is multi-faceted but also indivisible on the one hand
and that it is in a dialectical relation with morality on the other. As such, Carr was
able to produce an account of the nation-state that although attentive to the protective
functions performed by the political unit is not reducible to their operation alone. By
looking at the developments in political power both domestically and internationally,
he was able to understand the establishment of the nation-state and its transformation
through the interplay of the two. By approaching the nation-state in an evolutionary
fashion and connecting nationalism to both power and morality, he provided a
nuanced account of the development of the phenomenon and its impact on
international and domestic politics.
It is thus, Carr’s conceptualisation of power with its remarkable flexibility that offers
the richer background for a distinctively realist perspective of the nation-state and
nationalism. Such an approach of course cannot substitute for and is not superior to
the wide range of research that has been already conducted on the nation-state by
scholars whose focus it is to study the state and nationalism. When it comes to
international relations and realism in particular, however, Carr’s nuanced approach
can form a good starting point that can get realism beyond the subordination of
nationalism to a materialistic notion of power and its reduction to a force multiplier,
as recent commentators complained.688 Despite its premature assumptions about the
future of the nation-state, such a framework can provide a vision of the nation-state
and nationalism that integrates both domestic and international factors and as such
carries more analytical purchase than structural approaches that dominate
contemporary realism.

Implications of research on the study of realism

In the previous two sections I claimed that, based on the findings of the present
thesis, classical realists offer approaches to power and the nation-state that carry
more analytical purchase than modern variants of realism such as Mearsheimer’s
offensive realism. This section examines the broader implications of the conducted

688
B. Kadercan, “Military Competition and the emergence of Nationalism”, passim

180
research for realist theorisation. I argue that, as some of the commentators of
contemporary realism already suspected, the claims of scientific enquiry that most
modern realists subscribe to create for realists more problems than they solve. As
such, the main epistemological contribution of the thesis is to complement existing
research that calls for a return to the more reflexive epistemologies displayed by
classical realists.
The ‘practical’ component of the thesis, which comprised of an examination of the
selected realists’ engagement with the policies followed by states that were of
particular importance for their agenda, highlights this point. As has been shown in
the present thesis it is Mearsheimer’s theory that faces the most significant
challenges in terms of its practical application. The main reason for those problems
lies with the fact that his ontology is often at odds with his epistemological
commitment to positivism. Not only when he tries to prescribe policies that are at
variance with the policies actually pursued as Barkin and Oren observed, but also
when he is trying to make sense of the nation-state and nationalism by expanding his
ontological assumptions, Mearsheimer has to go beyond his epistemology.
Conversely, the ontological and epistemological assumptions of classical realists
seem to be operating more harmoniously.
This is not to suggest that the tendencies they outlined and the predictions they made
always materialised. The Soviet Union did not after all represent the agent of change
that Carr hoped would inspire the Western World to navigate through its multiple
crises or transcend the nation-state. But such an analysis was comfortably
accommodated within the framework of purposeful thinking that for Carr
characterises all political science and resonated well with the necessity for the
political scientist to propose uneasy compromises between reality and utopia he
suggested. In a similar fashion, Morgenthau’s warnings against the risks of hubris
resonated well with his insistence that sound political thought entails speaking “truth
to power”. Herz’s effort to make sense of international politics was characterised by
a concern about the security dilemma that permeated both the ontology and
epistemology of his theory. As such, when he proposed policies that could
consciously alleviate the security dilemma he was not acting at variance with his
epistemological commitments.

181
This harmony between epistemology and ontology is the more important in an age
when the nation-state remains the main form of political organisation because of its
particularistic morality. Barkin touched upon the crucial importance of such a factor
in his call for more reflexivity on contemporary realism, when he claimed that the
recognition of the fact that there are no universal moral standards allowed realists to
“reflect on how foreign policy is likely to look through the eyes of relevant
others”.689 The classical realists examined here challenged this particularistic
morality of the nation-state and identified it as the culprit behind what Bell described
as the “horrors of the twentieth century”.690 At the same time, however, by not
disassociating artificially morality from their theories of international politics as
Mearsheimer does, they demonstrate an acute awareness of the importance different
worldviews play in the formulation of foreign policy.

Conclusion
In this chapter I summarised the findings of the thesis and identified its contribution
to the study of realism. I claimed that the primacy of power in realist theorising is of
profound importance for understanding realist conceptions of the nation-state. In all
realists examined, the nation-state is understood as an unfixed in time manifestation
of power. The success of each realist theory in accounting for the emergence of the
nation-state and its characteristics largely depends on its underlying
conceptualisation of power. As such, I found that flexible and multi-faceted
conceptualisations of power like the one offered by Carr offer better ground for a
nuanced account of the nation-state. Neorealist formulations of power, in contrast,
while offering a more manageable concept of power lack in analytical purchase.
Future realist scholarship will certainly benefit by returning to the reflexivity and
richness of insights displayed in earlier realists.
Perhaps the most encouraging development in that direction comes from
contemporary realists themselves. In his effort to engage with foreign policy and
approach the question of the nation-state Mearsheimer had to at least partially
compromise the narrow framework of his structural theory. In so doing, he might

689
S. Barkin, “Realism, Prediction, and Foreign Policy”, p. 244
690
D. Bell, “Introduction”, p. 7

182
have added some additional anomalies to his theory but at the same time he
recovered some of the nuance and attentiveness to complexity that earlier realists
displayed. This move, I believe, is in the right direction. It is through the recovery of
classical realist insights on the complexity of power and its intricate relation with the
nation-state and nationalism, that contemporary realists can turn to in order to
strengthen and complement their approaches.

183
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