macOS 15
macOS 15
0
Sequoia Benchmark
v1.0.0 - 10-28-2024
For information on referencing and/or citing CIS Benchmarks in 3rd party documentation
(including using portions of Benchmark Recommendations) please contact CIS Legal
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These tools make the hardening process much more scalable for large numbers of
systems and applications.
NOTE: Some tooling focuses only on the CIS Benchmarks™ Recommendations that
can be fully automated (skipping ones marked Manual). It is important that
ALL Recommendations (Automated and Manual) be addressed, since all
are important for properly securing systems and are typically in scope for
audits.
In addition, CIS has developed CIS Build Kits for some common technologies to assist
in applying CIS Benchmarks™ Recommendations.
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NOTE: CIS and the CIS Benchmarks™ development communities in CIS WorkBench
do their best to test and have high confidence in the Recommendations, but
they cannot test potential conflicts with all possible system deployments.
Known potential issues identified during CIS Benchmarks™ development are
documented in the Impact section of each Recommendation.
By using CIS and/or CIS Benchmarks™ Certified tools, and being careful with
remediation deployment, it is possible to harden large numbers of deployed systems in
a cost effective, efficient, and safe manner.
NOTE: As previously stated, the PDF versions of the CIS Benchmarks™ are
available for free, non-commercial use on the CIS Website. All other formats
of the CIS Benchmarks™ (MS Word, Excel, and Build Kits) are available for
CIS SecureSuite® members.
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Intended Audience
This document is intended for system and application administrators, security
specialists, auditors, help desk, and platform deployment personnel who plan to
develop, deploy, assess, or secure solutions that incorporate Apple macOS 15.0
Sequoia.
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Convention Meaning
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Title
Concise description for the recommendation's intended configuration.
Assessment Status
An assessment status is included for every recommendation. The assessment status
indicates whether the given recommendation can be automated or requires manual
steps to implement. Both statuses are equally important and are determined and
supported as defined below:
Automated
Represents recommendations for which assessment of a technical control can be fully
automated and validated to a pass/fail state. Recommendations will include the
necessary information to implement automation.
Manual
Represents recommendations for which assessment of a technical control cannot be
fully automated and requires all or some manual steps to validate that the configured
state is set as expected. The expected state can vary depending on the environment.
Profile
A collection of recommendations for securing a technology or a supporting platform.
Most benchmarks include at least a Level 1 and Level 2 Profile. Level 2 extends Level 1
recommendations and is not a standalone profile. The Profile Definitions section in the
benchmark provides the definitions as they pertain to the recommendations included for
the technology.
Description
Detailed information pertaining to the setting with which the recommendation is
concerned. In some cases, the description will include the recommended value.
Rationale Statement
Detailed reasoning for the recommendation to provide the user a clear and concise
understanding on the importance of the recommendation.
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Audit Procedure
Systematic instructions for determining if the target system complies with the
recommendation.
Remediation Procedure
Systematic instructions for applying recommendations to the target system to bring it
into compliance according to the recommendation.
Default Value
Default value for the given setting in this recommendation, if known. If not known, either
not configured or not defined will be applied.
References
Additional documentation relative to the recommendation.
Additional Information
Supplementary information that does not correspond to any other field but may be
useful to the user.
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• Level 1
• Level 2
This profile extends the "Level 1" profile. Items in this profile exhibit one or more
of the following characteristics:
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Author
Ron Colvin
Contributor
William Harrison
Mark Andersen
Ben Montour
Sara Archacki
Hao Shu
Jeffrey Compton
Jorge Escobar
Tim Harrison CISSP, ICP, KMP, Center for Internet Security, New York
Laura Gardner
Michael Scarborough
Mauro Faccenda
Jason Olsen BSCS, Comerica Bank
Mischa van der Bent
Bob Gendler
Dan Brodjieski
Allen Golbig
Jason Blake
Isaac Ordonez , Mann Consulting
Joe Goerlich , Siemens AG
Kari Byrd
John Mahlman
Henry Stamerjohann CISSP, CCSP
Matt Durante
Editor
Eric Pinnell
Edward Byrd , Center for Internet Security, New York
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• Level 1
Description:
Software vendors release security patches and software updates for their products
when security vulnerabilities are discovered. There is no simple way to complete this
action without a network connection to an Apple software repository. Please ensure
appropriate access for this control. This check is only for what Apple provides through
software update.
Software updates should be run at minimum every 30 days. Run the following command
to verify when software update was previously run:
$ /usr/bin/sudo defaults read
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.SoftwareUpdate | grep -e
LastFullSuccessfulDate.
The response should be in the last 30 days (Example): LastFullSuccessfulDate =
"2020-07-30 12:45:25 +0000";
Rationale:
It is important that these updates be applied in a timely manner to prevent unauthorized
persons from exploiting the identified vulnerabilities.
Impact:
Installation of updates can be disruptive to the users especially if a restart is required.
Major updates need to be applied after creating an organizational patch policy. It is also
advised to run updates and forced restarts during system downtime and not while in
active use.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to ensure there are no available software updates:
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Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to install all available software updates:
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In the above example, if a restart was required, the command to remediate would be
/usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/softwareupdate -i 'ProVideoFormats-2.2.7' -R
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1. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-40r4.pdf
Additional Information:
If software update has not been ran on the system previously (GUI or in Terminal), then
the End User License agreement may need to be accepted when running
softwareupdate -i. Where that is needed, include the --agree-to-license option.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
Auto Update verifies that your system has the newest security patches and software
updates. If "Automatically check for updates" is not selected, background updates for
new malware definition files from Apple for XProtect and Gatekeeper will not occur.
Rationale:
It is important that a system has the newest updates applied so as to prevent
unauthorized persons from exploiting identified vulnerabilities.
Impact:
Without automatic update, updates may not be made in a timely manner and the system
will be exposed to additional risk.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure the system is automatically checking for updates:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that software updates are automatically checked:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.SoftwareUpdate')\
.objectForKey('AutomaticCheckEnabled').js
EOS
true
Note: If automatic updates were selected during system setup, this setting may not
have left an auditable artifact. Please turn off the check and re-enable when the GUI
does not reflect the audited results.
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable auto update:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.SoftwareUpdate AutomaticCheckEnabled -bool
true
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
References:
1. http://macops.ca/os-x-admins-your-clients-are-not-getting-background-security-
updates/
2. https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2014/12/17/forcing-xprotect-blacklist-updates-
on-mavericks-and-yosemite/
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
In the GUI, both "Install macOS updates" and "Install app updates from the App Store"
are dependent on whether "Download new updates when available" is selected.
Rationale:
It is important that a system has the newest updates downloaded so that they can be
applied.
Impact:
If "Download new updates when available" is not selected, updates may not be made in
a timely manner and the system will be exposed to additional risk.
Audit:
Perform the following to ensure the system is automatically checking for updates:
Graphical Method:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that software updates are automatically checked:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.SoftwareUpdate')\
.objectForKey('AutomaticDownload').js
EOS
true
Note: If automatic updates were selected during system setup, this setting may not
have left an auditable artifact. Please turn off the check and re-enable when the GUI
does not reflect the audited results.
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable auto update:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.SoftwareUpdate AutomaticDownload -bool true
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
Ensure that macOS updates are installed after they are available from Apple. This
setting enables macOS updates to be automatically installed. Some environments will
want to approve and test updates before they are delivered. It is best practice to test
first where updates can and have caused disruptions to operations. Automatic updates
should be turned off where changes are tightly controlled and there are mature testing
and approval processes. Automatic updates should not be turned off simply to allow the
administrator to contact users in order to verify installation. A dependable, repeatable
process involving a patch agent or remote management tool should be in place before
auto-updates are turned off.
Rationale:
Patches need to be applied in a timely manner to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities being
exploited.
Impact:
Unpatched software may be exploited.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to ensure that macOS updates are set to auto update:
or
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true
Note: If automatic updates were selected during system setup, this setting may not
have left an auditable artifact. Please turn off the check and re-enable when the GUI
does not reflect the audited results.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable macOS updates to run automatically:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to to enable automatic checking and installing of macOS
updates:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.SoftwareUpdate
AutomaticallyInstallMacOSUpdates -bool TRUE
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
Ensure that application updates are installed after they are available from Apple. These
updates do not require reboots or administrator privileges for end users.
Rationale:
Patches need to be applied in a timely manner to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities being
exploited.
Impact:
or
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true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable App Store updates to install automatically:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to turn on App Store auto updating:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.commerce AutoUpdate -bool TRUE
Note: This remediation requires a log out and log in to show in the GUI.
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
Ensure that system and security updates are installed after they are available from
Apple. This setting enables definition updates for XProtect and Gatekeeper. With this
setting in place, new malware and adware that Apple has added to the list of malware or
untrusted software will not execute. These updates do not require reboots or end user
admin rights.
Apple has introduced a security feature that allows for smaller downloads and the
installation of security updates when a reboot is not required. This feature is only
available when the last regular update has already been applied. This feature
emphasizes that a Mac must be up-to-date on patches so that Apple's security tools can
be used to quickly patch when a rapid response is necessary.
Rationale:
Patches need to be applied in a timely manner to reduce the risk of vulnerabilities being
exploited.
Impact:
Unpatched software may be exploited.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that system data files and security updates install
automatically:
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true
Note: If automatic updates were selected during system setup, this setting may not
have left an auditable artifact. Please turn off the check and re-enable when the GUI
does not reflect the audited results.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable system data files and security updates to install
automatically:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to enable automatic checking of system data files and
security updates:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.SoftwareUpdate ConfigDataInstall -bool true
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References:
1. https://eclecticlight.co/2021/10/27/silently-updated-security-data-files-in-
monterey/
2. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT202491
3. https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-against-malware-
sec469d47bd8/web
4. https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/rapid-security-responses-
dep93ff7ea78/1/web/1.0
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
Apple provides the capability to manage software updates on Apple devices through
mobile device management. Part of those capabilities permit organizations to defer
software updates and allow for testing. Many organizations have specialized software
and configurations that may be negatively impacted by Apple updates. If software
updates are deferred, they should not be deferred for more than 30 days. This control
only verifies that deferred software updates are not deferred for more than 30 days.
Rationale:
Apple software updates almost always include security updates. Attackers evaluate
updates to create exploit code in order to attack unpatched systems. The longer a
system remains unpatched, the greater an exploit possibility exists in which there are
publicly reported vulnerabilities.
Impact:
Some organizations may need more than 30 days to evaluate the impact of software
updates.
Audit:
Perform the following to ensure that software updates are deferred at most 30 days:
Graphical Method:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that defers software
updates to at most 30 days:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('enforcedSoftwareUpdateDelay').js
EOS
If there is an output, it should be ≤ 30.
Note: If your organization does not use a software deferment mobile configuration,
there will be no output and will pass the audit.
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References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/manage-software-updates-
depc4c80847a/web
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
Apple provides the capability to manage macOS, iOS, and iPadOS using Mobile Device
Management (MDM). Profiles are used to configure devices to enforce security controls
as well as to configure the devices for authorized access. Many security controls
available on Apple devices are only available through the use of profile settings using
MDM. This capability is also misused by attackers who have added rogue profiles to the
list of unwanted software and fake software updates to induce users to approve the
installation of malicious content. Organizations should have Mobile Device Management
software in place to harden organizationally managed devices and take advantage of
additional Apple controls, as well as to make the devices more resistant to attackers
enticing users to install unwanted content from rogue MDMs.
Rationale:
Mobile Device Management is the preferred Apple method to manage Apple devices.
Some capability in this technology is a requirement for the enforcement of some
controls. Users with managed devices should be trained and familiar with authorized
content provided through the organization's MDM.
Impact:
An MDM is yet another additional tool that requires technically adept personnel to
manage correctly. In theory, proper use of an MDM can make services provisioning
simpler with configuration profiles to reach authorized services.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following to verify the system is enrolled in a Mobile Device Management
software:
% sudo /usr/bin/profiles status -type enrollment | /usr/bin/awk -F: '/MDM
enrollment/ {print $2}' | /usr/bin/grep -c "Yes (User Approved)"
Remediation:
Enroll the system in a Mobile Device Management software.
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1. https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-40/rev-4/final
2. https://controlfreak.risk-redux.io/controls/CM-06
3. https://support.apple.com/guide/deployment/intro-to-mdm-profiles-
depc0aadd3fe/web#:~:text=iOS%2C%20iPadOS%2C%20macOS%2C%20and,t
he%20user%20or%20your%20organization.
4. http://lockboxx.blogspot.com/2019/03/macos-red-teaming-202-profiles.html
5. https://simplemdm.com/blog/mdm-migration/
Additional Information:
Apple first announced Declarative Device Management at WWDC 2021 and has since
confirmed that future management capabilities will specifically focus on the declarative
management feature set.
Per Apple, "Declarative Device Management is an update to the existing protocol for
device management that can be used in combination with the existing MDM protocol
capabilities. It allows the device to asynchronously apply settings and report status back
to the MDM solution without constant polling."
Organizations must ensure that their MDM solution supports this feature to utilize
Declarative Device Management. Organizations interested in leveraging Declarative
Device Management (DDM) must become familiar with its capabilities and how it will
interact with other tools.
The Center for Internet Security does not endorse any particular MDM vendor or
methodology for managing macOS devices. However, we aim to provide information for
administrators, security specialists, auditors, help desk personnel, and platform
deployment personnel involved in developing, deploying, assessing, or securing
solutions incorporating Apple macOS 14.0 Sonoma.
A feature of Declarative Device Management is the ability to deploy "Legacy Declarative
Configurations." You can use this configuration to download and install profiles with
payloads unavailable as declarative configurations. In addition, Declarative Device
Management now supports managing already installed MDM profiles without needing to
remove them. An MDM server must send and activate a configuration containing the
same profile as one already installed by MDM. The Declarative Device Management
system will then take over the management of that profile without reinstalling or
updating it. At that point, Declarative Device Management owns the profile. Using
Legacy Declarative Configurations will result in the configuration data being written out
to PLIST files, the same as a configuration profile. With Declarative Management taking
over a configuration profile with Legacy Declarative Configurations, the MDM will not be
able to make changes to it.
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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Apple is a hardware manufacturer that develops operating systems for the hardware it
creates. Apple is also a cloud service provider, and those services include applications,
music, books, television, cloud storage, etc. Apple simplifies the process to ensure that
all user devices are entitled to content where the user has purchased access, or is part
of an Apple basic level of entitlement (BLE) for purchasing an Apple device. The use of
an Apple Account allows for a consistent access and experience across all Apple
devices. An Apple Account functions as Single Sign-On access to all Apple-provided
services. It is critical that each user's account is protected appropriately so that
unauthorized access risk is heavily mitigated.
In rare cases, Apple will send a threat notification to a user where attempts to
compromise an Apple Account have been observed. Apple will NOT send you a link to
sign-in to your Apple Account but will direct you to sign-in through account.apple.com.
Managed Apple Accounts are a type of Apple Account is managed by organizations and
not owned by individual users. Not all Apple Account services are available to managed
Apple Account. Apple keeps a list of available services here: Service access with
Managed Apple Accounts
Note: Previous to WWDC 2024, Apple Accounts were called Apple IDs. There is still a
large amount of media out there that will refer to Apple Accounts as Apple IDs, but the
two are the same service and should not cause any confusion.
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iCloud is Apple's service for synchronizing, storing, and backing up data from Apple
applications in both macOS and iOS.
macOS controls for iCloud are part of the Apple Account settings in macOS. The
configuration options in macOS resemble the options in iOS.
Apple's iCloud is a consumer-oriented service that allows a user to store data as well as
find, control, and back up devices that are associated with their Apple Account. The use
of iCloud on Enterprise devices should align with the acceptable use policy for devices
that are managed, as well as confidentiality requirements for data handled by the user.
If iCloud is allowed, the data that is copied to Apple servers will likely be duplicated on
both personal as well as Enterprise devices.
For many users, the Enterprise email system may replace many of the available
features in iCloud. Calendars, notes, and contacts can sync to the official Enterprise
repository and be available through multiple devices if using either an Exchange or
Google environment email.
Depending on workplace requirements, it may not be appropriate to intermingle
Enterprise and personal bookmarks, photos, and documents. Since the service allows
every device associated with the user's Apple Account to synchronize and have access
to the cloud storage, the concern is not just about having sensitive data on Apple's
servers, but also having that same data on the phone of the teenage son or daughter of
an employee. The use of family sharing options can reduce the risk.
Apple's iCloud is just one of many cloud-based solutions being used for data
synchronization across multiple platforms, and it should be controlled consistently with
other cloud services in your environment. Work with your employees and configure the
access to best enable data protection for your mission.
iCloud can also sync a user's photos. If this feature is used where an organization's
proprietary photos are stored, unauthorized access in a commercial cloud will result.
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• Level 2
Description:
The iCloud keychain is Apple's password manager that works with macOS and iOS.
The capability allows users to store passwords in either iOS or macOS for use in Safari
on both platforms and other iOS-integrated applications. The most pervasive use is
driven by iOS use rather than macOS. The passwords stored in a macOS keychain on
an Enterprise-managed computer could be stored in Apple's cloud and then be
available on a personal computer using the same account. The stored passwords could
be for organizational as well as for personal accounts.
If passwords are no longer being used as organizational tokens, they are not in scope
for iCloud keychain storage.
Rationale:
Ensure that the iCloud keychain is used consistently with organizational requirements.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify a profile is installed for the iCloud keychain sync
service:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that sets iCloud Keychain
sync to your organization's settings:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowCloudKeychainSync').js
EOS
If the output is false, iCloud Keychain Sync is disabled. If the output is true, iCloud
Keychain sync is enabled.
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Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
Additional Information:
Terminal Method:
For each user, run this command to verify the iCloud keychain sync services:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/<username>/Library/Preferences/MobileMeAccounts | grep -B 1
KEYCHAIN_SYNC
Enabled = <0,1>;
Name = "KEYCHAIN_SYNC";
The output will be either a 0, disabled, or 1, enabled. Verify if the setting meets your
organization's requirements
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u seconduser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/seconduser/Library/Preferences/MobileMeAccounts | grep -B 1
KEYCHAIN_SYNC
Enabled = 0;
Name = "KEYCHAIN_SYNC";
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CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 2
Description:
iCloud Drive is Apple's storage solution for applications on both macOS and iOS to use
the same files that are resident in Apple's cloud storage. The iCloud Drive folder is
available much like Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, or Google Drive.
One of the concerns in public cloud storage is that proprietary data may be
inappropriately stored in an end user's personal repository. Organizations that need
specific controls on information should ensure that this service is turned off or the user
knows what information must be stored on services that are approved for storage of
controlled information.
Rationale:
Organizations should review third party storage solutions pertaining to existing data
confidentiality and integrity requirements.
Impact:
Users will not be able to use continuity on macOS to resume the use of newly
composed but unsaved files.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify if a profile is installed to configure iCloud Drive:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that sets iCloud Drive sync
to your organization's settings:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowCloudDocumentSync').js
EOS
If the output is false, iCloud Drive Sync is disabled. If the output is true, iCloud Drive
sync is enabled.
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Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
References:
1. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/restrictions
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify if iCloud Drive is enabled:
or
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The output will include Enabled = and iCloud Drive is either enabled, 1, or disabled, 0.
Verify that the service is set to your organization's requirements.
example:
% /usr/bin/sudosudo -u seconduser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/seconduser/Library/Preferences/MobileMeAccounts | /usr/bin/grep -B 1
MOBILE_DOCUMENTS
Enabled = 0;
Name = "MOBILE_DOCUMENTS";
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set iCloud Drive to your organization's requirements:
Perform the following to verify what applications are syncing with iCloud Drive:
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 49
• Level 2
Description:
With macOS 10.12, Apple introduced the capability to have a user's Desktop and
Documents folders automatically synchronize to the user's iCloud Drive, provided they
have enough room purchased through Apple on their iCloud Drive. This capability
mirrors what Microsoft is doing with the use of OneDrive and Office 365. There are
concerns with using this capability.
The storage space that Apple provides for free is used by users with iCloud mail, all of a
user's Photo Library created with the ever larger Multi-Pixel iPhone cameras, and all
iOS Backups. Adding a synchronization capability for users who have files going back a
decade or more, storage may be tight using the free 5GB provided without purchasing
much larger storage capacity from Apple. Users with multiple computers running 10.12
and above with unique content on each will have issues as well.
Enterprise users may not be allowed to store Enterprise information in a third-party
public cloud. In previous implementations, such as iCloud Drive or DropBox, the user
selected what files were synchronized even if there were no other controls. The new
feature synchronizes all files in a folder widely used to put working files.
The automatic synchronization of all files in a user's Desktop and Documents folders
should be disabled.
https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2016/09/23/icloud-desktop-and-documents-in-
macos-sierra-the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly/
Rationale:
Automated Document synchronization should be planned and controlled to approved
storage.
Impact:
Users will not be able to use iCloud for the automatic sync of the Desktop and
Documents folders.
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disables iCloud
Document and Desktop Sync:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowCloudDesktopAndDocuments').js
EOS
false
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
References:
1. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/restrictions
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Terminal Method:
For each user, run the following command to verify that the Documents and Desktop
folders are not syncing to iCloud:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /bin/ls -l /Users/<username>/Library/Mobile\
Documents/com~apple~CloudDocs/Documents/ | /usr/bin/grep total
total 8
In the above example, there is an output so the machine is not compliant.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable iCloud Desktop and Document syncing:
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• Level 2
Description:
Apple has introduced the capability of using security keys to protect Apple Accounts
using two-factor authentication in macOS Ventura 13.2, in iOS 16.3, and in iPadOS
16.3. This feature along with the purchase of two hardware tokens (a backup device is
required) protects against the compromise of Apple Accounts. This feature requires all
devices using an enrolled Apple Account to meet the minimum OS standard.
Rationale:
Users of Apple devices are supported across their devices by using the same Apple
Account to support shared data in both iCloud and across devices. Compromising an
Apple Account has become a very attractive target for attackers to gain unauthorized
access to iCloud storage and user devices. Two-factor authentication reduces the risk.
Impact:
Legacy devices and test machines will be challenging to ensure that they are all running
recent Operating Systems that can utilize Security Keys. It is best practice not to use
Apple Accounts with access to current user data on legacy and test machines.
Technical staff that use legacy devices are encouraged to create additional Apple
Accounts that do not need two-factor protection and can be used for testing on legacy
devices when required.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify if Security Keys is set to your organization's
requirements:
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References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT213154
2. https://9to5mac.com/2023/02/03/ios-16-3-hardware-security-keys-explained-
video/
3. https://hcsonline.com/images/Security_Key_Apple_ID.pdf
CIS Controls:
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• Level 2
Description:
Starting with macOS 13.1 (Ventura) Apple has made a collaboration tool (Freeform)
available on macOS, iOS and iPadOS. This application allows for extensive whiteboard
creation and sharing using iCloud. Organizations may want to audit the use of Freeform
iCloud sharing of internally created boards.
Rationale:
Internally created whiteboards may not be authorized to share to external contacts
through iCloud.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify if iCloud Freeform sync is enabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disables Freeform
Sync:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowCloudFreeform').js
EOS
The output should match your organization's requirement
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
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1. https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2022/12/apple-launches-freeform-a-powerful-
new-app-designed-for-creative-collaboration/
2. https://support.apple.com/guide/freeform/share-a-board-frfma5307056b/mac
3. https://support.apple.com/guide/icloud/set-up-freeform-mmd1b86048ac/icloud
CIS Controls:
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• Level 2
Description:
Find My is Apple's consumer solution for device tracking of your devices. This allows a
user to track the location of devices associated with their Apple Account. This is a great
solution for consumer or user device management and tracking, but it is not meant to be
an enterprise management solution to device tracking and information management on
enterprise managed devices. There are multiple enterprise MDM solutions for managing
organizational devices.
Rationale:
An enterprise solution should be used for tracking and information management of all
devices, including Apple devices. Apple's Find My solution only handles Apple devices.
If no enterprise solution is available, Find My provides capabilities for a user to manage
and track Apple devices. It is not designed as an enterprise solution, and should not be
used as one. It is better to allow the user to track devices that use their Apple Account
than to have no tracking at all.
Impact:
There should be no impact on the user while using the device. If someone other than
the user has access to tracking information, this can impact the user and needs to be
researched. Users should audit to ensure that only authorized people have access to
your location. Using multiple solutions for device tracking can add unnecessary
complexity.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify if Security Keys is set to your organization's
requirements:
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References:
1. https://support.apple.com/lt-lt/guide/deployment/depdc4ba8d82/web
2. https://support.apple.com/find-my
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• Level 2
Description:
With OS X 10.11, Apple added settings for password storage for the App Store in
macOS. These settings parallel the settings in iOS. As with iOS, the choices are a
requirement to provide a password after every purchase or to have a 15-minute grace
period, and whether or not to require a password for free purchases. The response to
this setting is stored in a cookie and processed by iCloud.
There is plenty of risk information on the wisdom of this setting for parents with children
buying games on iPhones and iPads. The most relevant information here is the
likelihood that users who are not authorized to download software may have physical
access to an unlocked computer where someone who is authorized recently made a
purchase. If that is a concern, a password should be required at all times for App Store
access in the Password Settings controls.
Rationale:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that App Store Passwords are set to your
organization's requirements:
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set App Store Passwords to your organization's
requirements:
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The Network System Settings pane includes the firewall settings. macOS has a built-
in firewall that has two main configuration aspects. Both the Application Layer Firewall
(ALF) and the Packet Filter Firewall (PF) can be used to secure running ports and
services on a Mac. The Application Firewall is the one accessible in System
Preferences under Security. The PF firewall contains many more capabilities than ALF,
but also requires a greater understanding of firewall recipes and rule configurations. For
standard use cases on a Mac, the PF firewall is not necessary. macOS may expose
server services that are reachable remotely, but that is not the primary use case or
design. If custom use cases are required, the PF firewall can provide additional security.
Macs that are used as mobile desktops do not need to use the PF firewall capabilities
unless permanently open ports need to be protected with more granular IP access
controls.
Additional information
https://www.muo.com/tag/mac-really-need-firewall/
https://blog.neilsabol.site/post/quickly-easily-adding-pf-packet-filter-firewall-rules-macos-
osx/
http://marckerr.com/a-simple-guild-to-the-mac-pf-firewall/
https://blog.scottlowe.org/2013/05/15/using-pf-on-os-x-mountain-lion/
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Description:
A firewall is a piece of software that blocks unwanted incoming connections to a system.
The socketfilter Firewall is what is used when the Firewall is turned on in the Security &
Privacy Preference Pane. Logging is required to appropriately monitor what access is
allowed and denied. The logs can be viewed in the macOS Unified Logs.
In previous versions of macOS (prior to macOS 15 Sequoia) there was an additional
step to turn on firewall logging after enabling the firewall. As of macOS 15 logging is
turned on automatically without user interaction. The logging recommendation has been
removed in the macOS 15 benchmark and will not be included going forward. If your
organization is looking for more detailed information about network security, you will
need a third-party solution.
Rationale:
A firewall minimizes the threat of unauthorized users gaining access to your system
while connected to a network or the Internet.
Impact:
The firewall may block legitimate traffic. Applications that are unsigned will require
special handling.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure the firewall is enabled:
or
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true
Also, the status of the firewall can be checked with the binary. Run the following
command to verify if the firewall is enabled with the binary:
% /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getglobalstate
The output will either be Firewall is enabled. (State = 1) or Firewall is
enabled. (State = 2) if the firewall is enabled. If the firewall is disabled, the output
will be Firewall is disabled. (State = 0)
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to turn the firewall on:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable the firewall:
% /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --setglobalstate on
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/guide/security/seca0e83763f/web
2. http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201642
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Description:
While in Stealth mode, the computer will not respond to unsolicited probes, dropping
that traffic.
Rationale:
Stealth mode on the firewall minimizes the threat of system discovery tools while
connected to a network or the Internet.
Impact:
Traditional network discovery tools like ping will not succeed. Other network tools that
measure activity and approved applications will work as expected.
This control aligns with the primary macOS use case of a laptop that is often connected
to untrusted networks where host segregation may be non-existent. In that use case,
hiding from the other inmates is likely more than desirable. In use cases where use is
only on trusted LANs with static IP addresses, stealth mode may not be desirable.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify the firewall has stealth mode enabled:
or
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true
Also, the status of the stealth mode can be checked with the binary. Run the following
command to verify if the firewall is enabled with the binary:
% /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --getstealthmode
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable firewall stealth mode:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable stealth mode:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/libexec/ApplicationFirewall/socketfilterfw --
setstealthmode on
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: This key must be set in the same configuration profile with EnableFirewall set
to <true/>. If it is set in its own configuration profile, it will fail.
References:
1. http://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201642
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Description:
AirDrop is Apple's built-in, on-demand, ad hoc file exchange system that is compatible
with both macOS and iOS. It uses Bluetooth LE for discovery that limits connectivity to
Mac or iOS users that are in close proximity. Depending on the setting, it allows
everyone or only Contacts to share files when they are near each other.
In many ways, this technology is far superior to the alternatives. The file transfer is done
over a TLS encrypted session, does not require any open ports that are required for file
sharing, does not leave file copies on email servers or within cloud storage, and allows
for the service to be mitigated so that only people already trusted and added to contacts
can interact with you.
While there are positives to AirDrop, there are privacy concerns that could expose
personal information. For that reason, AirDrop should be disabled, and should only be
enabled when needed and disabled afterwards. The recommendation against enabling
the sharing is not based on any known lack of security in the protocol, but for specific
user operational concerns.
For organizations concerned about any use of AirDrop because of Digital Loss
Prevention (DLP) monitoring on other protocols, JAMF has an article on reviewing
AirDrop logs.
Detecting outbound AirDrop transfers and logging them
Rationale:
AirDrop can allow malicious files to be downloaded from unknown sources. Contacts
Only limits may expose personal information to devices in the same area.
Impact:
Disabling AirDrop can limit the ability to move files quickly over the network without
using file shares.
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disabled AirDrop:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowAirDrop').js
EOS
false
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: AirDrop can only be enabled or disabled through configuration profiles. If your
organization wants to use AirDrop, it would need to be set through Terminal or the GUI.
Please see the Additional Information for assistance with those options, but those
system will not technically be in compliance.
References:
1. https://www.techrepublic.com/article/apple-airdrop-users-reportedly-vulnerable-
to-security-flaw/
2. https://www.imore.com/how-apple-keeps-your-airdrop-files-private-and-secure
3. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AirDrop
4. https://macmost.com/10-reasons-you-should-be-using-airdrop-to-transfer-
files.html
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Terminal Method:
For all users, run the following commands to verify whether AirDrop is disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read com.apple.NetworkBrowser
DisableAirDrop
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read com.apple.NetworkBrowser
DisableAirDrop
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Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to disable AirDrop:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> defaults write com.apple.NetworkBrowser
DisableAirDrop -bool true
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u seconduser defaults write com.apple.NetworkBrowser
DisableAirDrop -bool true
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Description:
In macOS Monterey (12.0), Apple has added the capability to share content from
another Apple device to the screen of a host Mac. While there are many valuable uses
of this capability, such sharing on a standard Mac user workstation should be enabled
ad hoc as required rather than allowing a continuous sharing service. The feature can
be restricted by Apple Account or network and is configured to use by accepting the
connection on the Mac. Part of the concern is frequent connection requests may
function as a denial-of-service and access control limits may provide too much
information to an attacker.
https://macmost.com/how-to-use-a-mac-as-an-airplay-receiver.html
https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-pro-rack/use-airplay-apdf1417128d/mac
Rationale:
This capability appears very useful for kiosk and shared work spaces. The ability to
allow by network could be especially useful on segregated guest networks where
visitors could share their screens on computers with bigger monitors, including
computers connected to projectors.
Impact:
Turning off AirPlay sharing by default will not allow users to share without turning the
service on. The service should be enabled as needed rather than left on.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that AirPlay Receiver is Disabled:
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false
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
Default Value:
AirPlay Receiver is enabled by default.
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that AirPlay Receiver is Disabled:
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true
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.controlcenter')\
.objectForKey('AirplayRecieverEnabled').js
EOS
true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable AirPlay Receiver:
Terminal Method:
For each user, run the following command to disable AirPlay Receiver:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.controlcenter.plist AirplayRecieverEnabled -bool false
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.controlcenter.plist AirplayRecieverEnabled -bool false
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This section contains recommendations related to the configurable items under the
Date & Time panel.
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Description:
Correct date and time settings are required for authentication protocols, file creation,
modification dates, and log entries.
Note: If your organization has internal time servers, enter them here. Enterprise mobile
devices may need to use a mix of internal and external time servers. If multiple servers
are required, use the Date & Time System Preference with each server separated by a
space.
Additional Note: The default Apple time server is time.apple.com. Variations include
time.euro.apple.com. While it is certainly more efficient to use internal time servers,
there is no reason to block access to global Apple time servers or to add a
time.apple.com alias to internal DNS records. There are no reports that Apple gathers
any information from NTP synchronization, as the computers already phone home to
Apple for Apple services including iCloud use and software updates. Best practice is to
allow DNS resolution to an authoritative time service for time.apple.com, preferably to
connect to Apple servers, but local servers are acceptable as well.
Rationale:
Kerberos may not operate correctly if the time on the Mac is off by more than 5 minutes.
This in turn can affect Apple's single sign-on feature, Active Directory logons, and other
features.
Impact:
The timed service will periodically synchronize with named time servers and will make
the computer time more accurate.
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to ensure that date and time are automatically set:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -getusingnetworktime
Network Time: On
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Note: By default, the operating system will use time.apple.com as the time server.
You can change to any time server that meets your organization's requirements.
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to enable the date and time setting automatically:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -setnetworktimeserver
<your.time.server>
setNetworkTimeServer: <your.time.server>
setUsingNetworkTime: On
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -setnetworktimeserver time.apple.com
setNetworkTimeServer: time.apple.com
setUsingNetworkTime: On
Run the following commands if you have not set, or need to set, a new time zone:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -listtimezones
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -listtimezones
Time Zones:
Africa/Abidjan
Africa/Accra
Africa/Addis_Ababa
...
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The output will include Network Time Server: and the name of your time server.
example: Network Time Server: time.apple.com
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/sntp <your.time.server>
Ensure that the offset result(s) are between -270.x and 270.x seconds.
And to set the time to the correct offset:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/sntp -sS <your.time.server>
CIS Controls:
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Description:
In macOS 10.14, Apple replace ntp with timed for time services, and is used to ensure
correct time is kept. Correct date and time settings are required for authentication
protocols, file creation, modification dates and log entries.
Rationale:
Kerberos may not operate correctly if the time on the Mac is off by more than 5 minutes.
This in turn can affect Apple's single sign-on feature, Active Directory logons, and other
features.
Impact:
Remediation:
If the timed service has been disabled, assume that the operating system has been
compromised. Back up any files, and do a clean install to a known good Operating
System.
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This section contains recommendations related to the configurable items under the
Sharing panel.
With the release of macOS 14.0 Sonoma, Apple has added configuration profile options
in the payloadtype com.apple.applicationaccess for the following sharing settings:
These keys will disable the ability to modify sharing settings in the GUI only. They do
not modify or disable modification through the binary or disable the service. These keys
are not being included in the benchmark beyond this note for that reason, as well as the
fact that they can make an administrator's job more difficult to properly access and
remediate the security posture of the system.
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Description:
DVD or CD Sharing allows users to remotely access the system's optical drive. While
Apple does not ship Macs with built-in optical drives any longer, external optical drives
are still recognized when they are connected. In testing, the sharing of an external
optical drive persists when a drive is reconnected.
Rationale:
Disabling DVD or CD Sharing minimizes the risk of an attacker using the optical drive as
a vector for attack and exposure of sensitive data.
Impact:
Many Apple devices are now sold without optical drives, however drive sharing may be
needed for legacy optical media. The media should be explicitly re-shared as needed
rather than using a persistent share. Optical drives should not be used for long-term
storage. To store necessary data from an optical drive it should be copied to another
form of external storage. Optionally, an image can be made of the optical drive so that it
is stored in its original form on another form of external storage.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that DVD or CD Sharing is disabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that DVD or CD Sharing is disabled
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl list | grep -c com.apple.ODSAgent
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable DVD or CD Sharing:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl disable system/com.apple.ODSAgent
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Description:
Screen Sharing allows a computer to connect to another computer on a network and
display the computer’s screen. While sharing the computer’s screen, the user can
control what happens on that computer, such as opening documents or applications,
opening, moving, or closing windows, and even shutting down the computer.
While mature administration and management does not use graphical connections for
standard maintenance, most help desks have capabilities to assist users in performing
their work when they have technical issues and need support. Help desks use graphical
remote tools to understand what the user sees and assist them so they can get back to
work. For MacOS, some of these remote capabilities can use Apple's OS tools. Control
is therefore not meant to prohibit the use of a just-in-time graphical view from authorized
personnel with authentication controls. Sharing should not be enabled except in narrow
windows when help desk support is required.
Screen Sharing on macOS can allow the use of the insecure VNC protocol. VNC is a
clear text protocol that should not be used on macOS.
Rationale:
Disabling Screen Sharing mitigates the risk of remote connections being made without
the user of the console knowing that they are sharing the computer.
Impact:
Help desks may require the periodic use of a graphical connection mechanism to assist
users. Any support that relies on native MacOS components will not work unless a
scripted solution to enable and disable sharing is used, as necessary.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure Screen Sharing is not enabled:
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Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable Screen Sharing:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to turn off Screen Sharing:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl disable system/com.apple.screensharing
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/turn-screen-sharing-on-or-off-
mh11848/mac
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Description:
File sharing from a user workstation creates additional risks, such as:
Apple's File Sharing uses the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol to share to other
computers that can mount SMB shares. This includes other macOS computers.
Apple warns that SMB sharing stored passwords is less secure, and anyone with
system access can gain access to the password for that account. When sharing with
SMB, each user accessing the Mac must have SMB enabled. Storing passwords,
especially copies of valid directory passwords, decreases security for the directory
account and should not be used.
Rationale:
By disabling File Sharing, the remote attack surface and risk of unauthorized access to
files stored on the system is reduced.
Impact:
File Sharing can be used to share documents with other users, but hardened servers
should be used rather than user endpoints. Turning on File Sharing increases the
visibility and attack surface of a system unnecessarily.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that File Sharing is not enabled:
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Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable File Sharing:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable File Sharing:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl disable system/com.apple.smbd
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Description:
By enabling Printer Sharing, the computer is set up as a print server to accept print jobs
from other computers. Dedicated print servers or direct IP printing should be used
instead.
Rationale:
Disabling Printer Sharing mitigates the risk of attackers attempting to exploit the print
server to gain access to the system.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that Printer Sharing is not enabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Printer Sharing is not enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/cupsctl | grep -c "_share_printers=0"
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable Printer Sharing:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable Printer Sharing:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/cupsctl --no-share-printers
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Description:
Remote Login allows an interactive terminal connection to a computer.
Rationale:
Disabling Remote Login mitigates the risk of an unauthorized person gaining access to
the system via Secure Shell (SSH). While SSH is an industry standard to connect to
posix servers, the scope of the benchmark is for Apple macOS clients, not servers.
macOS does have an IP-based firewall available (pf, ipfw has been deprecated) that is
not enabled or configured. There are more details and links in the Network sub-section.
macOS no longer has TCP Wrappers support built in and does not have strong Brute-
Force password guessing mitigations, or frequent patching of openssh by Apple. Since
most macOS computers are mobile workstations, managing IP-based firewall rules on
mobile devices can be very resource intensive. All of these factors can be parts of
running a hardened SSH server.
Impact:
The SSH server built into macOS should not be enabled on a standard user computer,
particularly one that changes locations and IP addresses. A standard user that runs
local applications, including email, web browser, and productivity tools, should not use
the same device as a server. There are Enterprise management toolsets that do utilize
SSH. If they are in use, the computer should be locked down to only respond to known,
trusted IP addresses and appropriate administrator service accounts.
For macOS computers that are being used for specialized functions, there are several
options to harden the SSH server to protect against unauthorized access, including
brute force attacks. There are some basic criteria that need to be considered:
• Do not open an SSH server to the internet without controls in place to mitigate
SSH brute force attacks. This is particularly important for systems bound to
Directory environments. It is great to have controls in place to protect the system,
but if they trigger after the user is already locked out of their account, they are not
optimal. If authorization happens after authentication, directory accounts for
users that don't even use the system can be locked out.
• Do not use SSH key pairs when there is no insight to the security on the client
system that will authenticate into the server with a private key. If an attacker gets
access to the remote system and can find the key, they may not need a
password or a key logger to access the SSH server.
• Detailed instructions on hardening an SSH server, if needed, are available in the
CIS Linux Benchmarks, but it is beyond the scope of this benchmark.
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Remote Login is disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -getremotelogin
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable Remote Login:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -setremotelogin off
Do you really want to turn remote login off? If you do, you will lose this
connection and can only turn it back on locally at the server (yes/no)?
Entering yes will disable remote login.
Additional Information:
man sshd_config
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Description:
Remote Management is the client portion of Apple Remote Desktop (ARD). Remote
Management can be used by remote administrators to view the current screen, install
software, report on, and generally manage client Macs.
The screen sharing options in Remote Management are identical to those in the Screen
Sharing section. In fact, only one of the two can be configured. If Remote Management
is used, refer to the Screen Sharing section above on issues regarding screen sharing.
Remote Management should only be enabled when a Directory is in place to manage
the accounts with access. Computers will be available on port 5900 on a macOS
System and could accept connections from untrusted hosts depending on the
configuration, which is a major concern for mobile systems. As with other sharing
options, an open port even for authorized management functions can be attacked, and
both unauthorized access and Denial-of-Service vulnerabilities could be exploited. If
remote management is required, the pf firewall should restrict access only to known,
trusted management consoles. Remote management should not be used across the
Internet without the use of a VPN tunnel.
Rationale:
Remote Management should only be enabled on trusted networks with strong user
controls present in a Directory system. Mobile devices without strict controls are
vulnerable to exploitation and monitoring.
Impact:
Many organizations utilize ARD for client management.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that Remote Management is not enabled:
Page 101
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable Remote Management:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable Remote Management:
% /usr/bin/sudo
/System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Resources
/kickstart -deactivate -stop
Starting...
Removed preference to start ARD after reboot.
Done.
Additional Information:
/System/Library/CoreServices/RemoteManagement/ARDAgent.app/Contents/Re
sources/kickstart -help
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• Level 1
Description:
Apple Events is a technology that allows one program to communicate with other
programs. Remote Apple Events allows a program on one computer to communicate
with a program on a different computer.
Rationale:
Disabling Remote Apple Events mitigates the risk of an unauthorized program gaining
access to the system.
Impact:
With remote Apple events turned on, an AppleScript program running on another Mac
can interact with the local computer.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that Remote Apple Events is not enabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to verify that Remote Apple Events is not set
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/systemsetup -getremoteappleevents
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable Remote Apple Events:
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setremoteappleevents: Off
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• Level 1
Description:
Internet Sharing uses the open source natd process to share an internet connection
with other computers and devices on a local network. This allows the Mac to function as
a router and share the connection to other, possibly unauthorized, devices.
Rationale:
Disabling Internet Sharing reduces the remote attack surface of the system.
Impact:
Internet Sharing allows the computer to function as a router and other computers to use
it for access. This can expose both the computer itself and the networks it is accessing
to unacceptable access from unapproved devices.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure Internet Sharing is not enabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to verify that Internet Sharing is not set:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults read
/Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.nat >nul 2>&1 | grep -c
"Enabled = 1;"
or
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that automatically disables
internet sharing:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.MCX')\
.objectForKey('forceInternetSharingOff').js
EOS
true
Page 106
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to turn off Internet Sharing:
% usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/SystemConfiguration/com.apple.nat NAT -dict Enabled -int
0
Note: Using the Terminal Method will not be reflected in the GUI, but will disable the
underlying service.
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
References:
1. STIGID AOSX-12-001270
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• Level 2
Description:
Starting with 10.13 (macOS High Sierra), Apple introduced a service to make it easier to
deploy data from Apple, including software updates, where there are bandwidth
constraints to the Internet and fewer constraints or greater bandwidth exist on the local
subnet. This capability can be very valuable for organizations that have throttled and
possibly metered Internet connections. In heterogeneous enterprise networks with
multiple subnets, the effectiveness of this capability would be determined by how many
Macs were on each subnet at the time new, large updates were made available
upstream. This capability requires the use of mac OS clients as P2P nodes for updated
Apple content. Unless there is a business requirement to manage operational Internet
connectivity and bandwidth, user endpoints should not store content and act as a
cluster to provision data.
Content types supported by Content Caching in macOS
Rationale:
The main use case for Mac computers is as mobile user endpoints. P2P sharing
services should not be enabled on laptops that are using untrusted networks. Content
Caching can allow a computer to be a server for local nodes on an untrusted network.
While there are certainly logical controls that could be used to mitigate risk, they add to
the management complexity. Since the value of the service is in specific use cases,
organizations with the use case described above can accept risk as necessary.
Impact:
This setting will adversely affect bandwidth usage between local subnets and the
Internet.
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or
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Content Caching is not enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
function run() {
let pref1 =
ObjC.unwrap($.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.AssetCache')\
.objectForKey('Activated'))
let pref2 =
ObjC.unwrap($.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationac
cess')\
.objectForKey('allowContentCaching'))
if ( ( pref1 == 0 ) || ( pref2 == 0 ) ) {
return("true")
} else {
return("false")
}
}
EOS
true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable Content Caching:
Page 110
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/about-content-caching-mchl9388ba1b/
2. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/set-up-content-caching-on-mac-
mchl3b6c3720/
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• Level 2
Description:
Starting with macOS 10.15, Apple has provided a control which permits a user to share
Apple downloaded content on all Apple devices that are signed in with the same Apple
Account. This allows users to share downloaded Movies, Music, or TV shows with other
controlled macOS, iOS and iPadOS devices, as well as photos with Apple TVs.
With this capability, guest users can also use media downloaded on the computer.
The recommended best practice is not to use the computer as a server, but to utilize
Apple's cloud storage in order to download and use content stored there if content
stored with Apple is used on multiple devices.
https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/set-up-media-sharing-on-mac-
mchlp13371337/mac
Note: In macOS 15.0 Sequoia, Apple added a supported profile key for Media Sharing
that replaces the keys in the benchmarks in previous versions.
Rationale:
Disabling Media Sharing reduces the remote attack surface of the system.
Impact:
Media Sharing allows for pre-downloaded content on a Mac to be available to other
Apple devices on the same network. Leaving this disabled forces device users to
stream or download content from each Apple authorized device. This sharing could
even allow unauthorized devices on the same network media access.
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true
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Note: If a user has media sharing enabled when installing the profile it will not disable
media sharing, but will instead lock it as enabled. To verify that no users have media
sharing enabled before installing the profile, run the following command for each user
on the system:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read
com.apple.amp.mediasharingd home-sharing-enabled
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Page 113
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Media Sharing is not enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read
com.apple.amp.mediasharingd home-sharing-enabled
0
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u test /usr/bin/defaults read com.apple.amp.mediasharingd
home-sharing-enabled
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable Media Sharing:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
com.apple.amp.mediasharingd home-sharing-enabled -int 0
example:
% sudo -u test2 /usr/bin/defaults write com.apple.amp.mediasharingd home-
sharing-enabled -int 0
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Description:
Bluetooth Sharing allows files to be exchanged with Bluetooth-enabled devices.
Rationale:
Disabling Bluetooth Sharing minimizes the risk of an attacker using Bluetooth to
remotely attack the system.
Impact:
There is a general expectation that Bluetooth peripherals will be used by most users in
Apple's ecosystem. Disabling sharing should have no impact on the use of Bluetooth
peripherals.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that Bluetooth Sharing is not enabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Bluetooth Sharing is disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost read
com.apple.Bluetooth PrefKeyServicesEnabled
0
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost read
com.apple.Bluetooth PrefKeyServicesEnabled
Page 116
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable Bluetooth Sharing is disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.Bluetooth PrefKeyServicesEnabled -bool false
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.Bluetooth PrefKeyServicesEnabled -bool false
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• Level 2
Description:
If the computer is used in an organization that assigns host names, it is a good idea to
change the computer name to the host name. This is more of a best practice than a
security measure. If the host name and the computer name are the same, computer
support may be able to track problems down more easily.
For organizations or for users that self-administer their own computers, it is important to
not use sensitive or personal information in computer names. The name of a computer
that uses untrusted networks will be exposed at a minimum to the responsible network
team of that network. For instance, having your name as your hostname can provide
useful knowledge to an attacker monitoring the network you may be connected to.
Examples of possibly inappropriate content in computer names include:
Standard naming patterns avoid collisions and mitigate risk for computer users.
With mobile devices, using DHCP IP tracking has serious drawbacks. Hostname or
computer name tracking makes much more sense for those organizations that can
implement it. If the computer is using different names for the "Computer Name" DNS
and Directory environments, it can be difficult to manage Macs in an Enterprise asset
inventory.
Rationale:
Part of IT security is having visibility into all of the devices for which an organization is
responsible. Without a complete inventory, it is impossible to ensure all security controls
are met on all organizational devices.
Default macOS naming deconfliction controls can create issues for appropriate
management and tracking as well as privacy exposure. By default, the name of a
macOS computer is derived from the first user created. If the user has multiple
computers or an image is used without an appropriate name change, there will be
multiple computers with names derived from the same user for discovery deconfliction.
How many "Ron Colvin's MacBook Pro" should there be, and are any missing?
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Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify the computer name:
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set the computer name:
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/mac-help/mchlp1177/mac
2. https://uberagent.com/blog/choosing-macos-computer-names-wisely/
3. https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/mac-help/mchlp2322/mac
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• https://eclecticlight.co/tag/time-machine/
• https://www.pcmag.com/how-to/how-to-back-up-your-mac-with-time-machine
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• Level 2
Description:
Backup solutions are only effective if the backups run on a regular basis. The time to
check for backups is before the hard drive fails or the computer goes missing. In order
to simplify the user experience so that backups are more likely to occur, Time Machine
should be on and set to Back Up Automatically whenever the target volume is available.
Operational staff should ensure that backups complete on a regular basis and the
backups are tested to ensure that file restoration from backup is possible when needed.
Backup dates are available even when the target volume is not available in the Time
Machine plist.
SnapshotDates = ( "2020-08-20 12:10:22 +0000", "2021-02-03 23:43:22 +0000", "2022-
02-19 21:37:21 +0000", "2023-02-22 13:07:25 +0000", "2024-08-20 14:07:14 +0000"
When the backup volume is connected to the computer, more extensive information is
available through tmutil. See man tmutil.
Note: This recommendation needs to be set on devices where Time Machine is
enabled. If Time Machine is disabled, the audit is passed by default.
Rationale:
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or
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Time Machine is set to automatically backup if
Time Machine is enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
function run() {
let pref1 =
ObjC.unwrap($.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.TimeMachine')
\
.objectForKey('AutoBackup'))
if ( pref1 == null ) {
return("Preference Not Set")
} else if ( pref1 == 1 ) {
return("true")
} else {
return("false")
}
}
EOS
The output should either be Preference Not Set or true. If it is false, then the
computer is not in compliance
Run the following command to check the snapshot dates to verify that the dates meet
your organization's approved backup frequency:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults read
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.TimeMachine.plist Destinations
The output will contain all the Time Machine backups in the format "YYYY-MM-DD
HH:MM:SS +0000"
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true
(
{
BackupAlias = {length = 348, bytes = 0x00000000 015c0002 00011442
61636b75 ... 20564d00 ffff0000 };
BytesAvailable = 4855873536;
BytesUsed = 5125054464;
ConsistencyScanDate = "2022-09-22 18:21:01 +0000";
DestinationID = "A64EA502-30DD-480C-9F7B-4F3EEDD0D186";
DestinationUUIDs = (
"0D946E5D-68ED-4F63-BCBD-CE7FC94F47C0"
);
FilesystemTypeName = apfs;
HealthCheckDecision = 0;
InheritanceDecision = 0;
LastKnownEncryptionState = Encrypted;
RESULT = 0;
ReferenceLocalSnapshotDate = "2024-09-22 18:21:53 +0000";
SnapshotDates = (
"2024-09-22 18:21:01 +0000",
"2024-09-22 18:21:32 +0000",
"2024-09-22 18:21:57 +0000"
);
}
)
Page 125
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: In previous versions of the benchmark, the plist could be set in Terminal. In
macOS 15 Sequoia that plist is now protected and cannot be written to, so the
command line remediation has been removed. Both the profile method and graphical
method still configure Time Machine to the required state.
CIS Controls:
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• Level 1
Description:
One of the most important security tools for data protection on macOS is FileVault. With
encryption in place, it makes it difficult for an outside party to access your data if they
get physical possession of the computer. One very large weakness in data protection
with FileVault is the level of protection on backup volumes. If the internal drive is
encrypted but the external backup volume that goes home in the same laptop bag is
not, it is self-defeating. Apple tries to make this mistake easily avoided by providing a
checkbox to enable encryption when setting up a Time Machine backup. Using this
option does require some password management, particularly if a large drive is used
with multiple computers. A unique, complex password to unlock the drive can be stored
in keychains on multiple systems for ease of use.
While some portable drives may contain non-sensitive data and encryption may make
interoperability with other systems difficult, backup volumes should be protected just like
boot volumes.
Note: This recommendation needs to be set on devices where Time Machine is
enabled. If Time Machine is disabled, the audit is passed by default.
Rationale:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify if the Time Machine disk encryption is enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults read
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.TimeMachine.plist | grep -c NotEncrypted
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Note: In macOS 12.0 Monterey and previous, the existing Time Machine drive could
have encryption added without formatting it. This is no longer possible in macOS 13.0
Ventura. If you wish to keep previous backups from the unencrypted volume, you will
need to manually move those files over to the new encrypted drive.
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The Control Center System Settings pane allows modification to Control Center
modules and what is displayed in the menu bar.
Many menu bar icons provide additional status information when the option key is
selected along with the menu, including WiFi and Bluetooth.
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• Level 1
Description:
The Wi-Fi status in the menu bar indicates if the system's wireless internet capabilities
are enabled. If so, the system will scan for available wireless networks in order to
connect. At the time of this revision, all computers Apple builds have wireless network
capability, which has not always been the case. This control only pertains to systems
that have a wireless NIC available. Operating systems running in a virtual environment
may not score as expected, either.
Rationale:
Enabling "Show Wi-Fi status in menu bar" is a security awareness method that helps
mitigate public area wireless exploits by making the user aware of their wireless
connectivity status.
Impact:
The user of the system should have a quick check on their wireless network status
available.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that the Wi-Fi status shows in the menu bar:
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18
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Additional Information:
AirPort is Apple’s marketing name for its 802.11x based wireless network interfaces.
Option-click the Wifi icon in the menu bar to find out more information about the
connected wireless network.
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that the Wi-Fi status shows in the menu bar:
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2
Note: If the settings has not been changed from the default, then this audit will fail on
the command line. Follow the remediation instructions to verify that it is set to a disabled
status.
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost read
com.apple.controlcenter.plist WiFi
2
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable Wi-Fi status in the menu bar:
Terminal Method:
For each user, run the following command to enable Wi-Fi status in the menu bar:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.controlcenter.plist WiFi -int 2
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.controlcenter.plist WiFi -int 2
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Description:
By showing the Bluetooth status in the menu bar, a small Bluetooth icon is placed in the
menu bar. This icon quickly shows the status of Bluetooth, and can allow the user to
quickly turn Bluetooth on or off.
Rationale:
Enabling "Show Bluetooth status in menu bar" is a security awareness method that
helps understand the current state of Bluetooth, including whether it is enabled,
discoverable, what paired devices exist, and what paired devices are currently active.
Impact:
Bluetooth is a useful wireless tool that has been widely exploited when configured
improperly. The user should have insight into the Bluetooth status.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that Bluetooth status shows in the menu bar:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that enables Bluetooth to
be shown in the menu bar:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.controlcenter')\
.objectForKey('Bluetooth').js
EOS
18
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Page 135
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that Bluetooth status shows in the menu bar:
Terminal Method:
For each user, run the following command to verify that the Bluetooth status is enabled
to show in the menu bar:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost read
com.apple.controlcenter.plist Bluetooth
18
Note: If the settings has not been changed from the default, then this audit will fail on
the command line. Follow the remediation instructions to verify that it is set to a disabled
status.
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost read
com.apple.controlcenter.plist Bluetooth
18
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable Bluetooth status in the menu bar:
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• Level 1
Description:
With macOS 10.12 Sierra, Apple has introduced Siri from iOS to macOS. While there
are data spillage concerns with the use of data-gathering personal assistant software,
the risk here does not seem greater in sending queries to Apple through Siri than in
sending search terms in a browser to Google or Microsoft. While it is possible that Siri
will be used for local actions rather than Internet searches, Siri could, in theory, tell
Apple about confidential Programs and Projects that should not be revealed. This
appears to be a usage edge case.
In cases where sensitive or protected data is processed and Siri could expose that
information through assisting a user in navigating their machine, it should be disabled.
Siri does need to phone home to Apple, so it should not be available from air-gapped
networks as part of its requirements.
Most of the use case data published has shown that Siri is a tremendous time saver on
iOS where multiple screens and menus need to be navigated through. Information like
sports scores, weather, movie times, and simple to-do items on existing calendars can
be easily found with Siri. None of the standard use cases should be more risky than
already approved activity.
For information on Apple's privacy policy for Siri, click here.
Rationale:
Where "normal" user activity is already limited, Siri use should be controlled as well.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify Siri settings:
Page 139
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
OR
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210657
Page 140
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to verify the Siri settings:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read
com.apple.assistant.support.plist 'Assistant Enabled'
The output will be either 0, Siri is disabled, or 1, Siri is enabled.
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read com.apple.Siri.plist
The output will be either 0, disabled, or 1 for the following Siri options:
Page 141
{
LockscreenEnabled = 0;
StatusMenuVisible = 0;
TypeToSiriEnabled = 0;
VoiceTriggerUserEnabled = 0;
}
{
LockscreenEnabled = 0;
StatusMenuVisible = 1;
TypeToSiriEnabled = 0;
VoiceTriggerUserEnabled = 1;
}
{
LockscreenEnabled = 1;
StatusMenuVisible = 0;
TypeToSiriEnabled = 1;
VoiceTriggerUserEnabled = 1;
}
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Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to enable or disable Siri settings:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
com.apple.assistant.support.plist 'Assistant Enabled' -bool <true/false>
After running the default writes, the WindowServer needs to be restarted and the
caches cleared. Run the following commands to perform that action:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/killall -HUP cfprefsd
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• Level 1
Description:
macOS includes the Siri digital assistant and if enabled it is always listening in case it is
needed. In Sonoma a user may choose either "Hey Siri" or either "Siri" and "Hey Siri." In
either case, Siri is using the microphone at all times to listen for instructions and then
can record questions once activated. In an organizational environment where people
are talking and listening on video/voice calls, there are too many opportunities for
unauthorized information disclosure to have a live microphone at all times. If Siri will be
used it may be on, with "Listen for" Off and a keyboard shortcut selected.
Rationale:
In most environments there is too much unbounded risk of data spillage with a
microphone always on, listening for instruction, and listening for questions if attention is
obtained, relying on cloud compute to answer them. There are many examples of data
leakage for technology in this space, and future vulnerabilities and bugs are certainly
possible.
Impact:
Siri will not be available for hands-free usage, or not available at all if turned off
completely.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that "Hey Siri" is disabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that "Hey Siri" is disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.Siri')\
.objectForKey('VoiceTriggerUserEnabled').js
EOS
false
Page 146
Note: After testing, this profile will disable Hey Siri only for the first input but not
additional inputs. This issues seems to only occur using the Apple Studio Display (and
possibly the Pro Display XDR, but no testing has occurred with that device) and it is not
the primary input source. We are going to continue testing, but this seems to be an
edge case.
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/use-siri-
mchl6b029310/mac#:~:text=Turn%20on%20Siri,may%20need%20to%20scroll%
20down.)&text=On%20the%20right%2C%20turn%20on,already%20on%2C%20t
hen%20click%20Enable.
2. https://clario.co/blog/is-siri-always-listening/
3. https://www.siriuserguide.com/how-to-use-siri-macos/
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This section contains recommendations for configurable options under the Privacy &
Security panel.
Additional privacy preference information from Apple
If the computer is present in an area where there are privacy concerns or sensitive
activity is taking place, the Mac should be configured appropriately for the sensitive
area.
Camera: If the computer is present in an area where there are privacy concerns or
sensitive activity is taking place, the camera should be covered at those times. A
permanent cover or alteration may be required when the computer is always located in
a confidential area.
Microphone: If the computer is present in an area where there are privacy concerns or
sensitive activity is taking place, the microphone input should be set to zero in the input
tab of the Sound preference pane at those times. Individual management of applications
with access to the microphone may be managed in the Security & Privacy Preference
Pane under Microphone.
WiFi and Bluetooth: Some organizations have comprehensive rules that cover the use
of wireless technologies in order to implement operational security. There are often
specific policies governing the use of both Bluetooth and Wi-Fi (802.11) that may
include disabling the wireless capability in either software or hardware, or both. Wireless
access is part of the feature set required for mobile computers and is considered
essential for most users.
Malware is continuously discovered that circumvents the privacy controls of the built-in
video, audio, or network capabilities. No computer has perfect security, and even if all
the drivers are disabled or removed, working drivers can be reintroduced by a
determined attacker. Additional info Apple Pays $100.5K Bug Bounty for Mac Webcam
Hack
Mac users, update Zoom now — your microphone may be spying on you
Recommended settings for Wi-Fi routers and access points
Control access to the microphone on Mac
Bluetooth security
Page 148
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• Level 2
Description:
macOS uses location information gathered through local Wi-Fi networks to enable
applications to supply relevant information to users. With the operating system verifying
the location, users do not need to change the time or the time zone. The computer will
change them based on the user's location. They do not need to specify their location for
weather or travel times, and they will receive alerts on travel times to meetings and
appointments where location information is supplied.
Location Services simplify some processes with mobile computers, such as asset
management and time or log management.
There are some use cases where it is important that the computer not be able to report
its exact location. While the general use case is to enable Location Services, it should
not be allowed if the physical location of the computer and the user should not be public
knowledge.
Rationale:
Location Services are helpful in most use cases and can simplify log and time
management where computers change time zones.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that Location Services is enabled:
Page 150
true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable Location Services:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable Location Services:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl load -w
/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.locationd.plist
Note: In some use cases, organizations may not want Location Services running. To
disable Location Services, run the command: /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults
write /var/db/locationd/Library/Preferences/ByHost/com.apple.locationd
LocationServicesEnabled -bool false
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204690
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Page 152
• Level 2
Description:
This setting provides the user an understanding of the current status of Location
Services and which applications are using it.
Rationale:
Apple has fully integrated location services into macOS. When user applications access
location an arrow is displayed next to the Control Center in the menu bar to give users
an indication when their location is being accessed. By default system services like time
zones, weather, travel times, geolocation, "Find my Mac," and advertising services do
not indicate the location is accessed.
Enabling the “Show location icon in the menu bar when System Services request your
location” setting will show an arrow in the control center when a system service
accesses the location. Although an indication that location was accessed, Control
Center will only say that it was accessed by "System Services" and not the individual
service. Looking in System Settings > Location Services > System Services > Details…
will expose exactly which system services have accessed Location Services in the last
24 hours. Third-party tools will be shown individually when they access location
services.
Impact:
Users may be provided visibility to a setting they cannot control if organizations control
Location Services globally by policy.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify the settings for location services icon to be in the
menu bar:
Page 153
true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set whether the location services icon is in the menu bar:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to set the option of the location services icon being in the
menu bar:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.locationmenu.plist ShowSystemServices -bool
true
CIS Controls:
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Page 154
• Level 2
Description:
macOS uses location information gathered through local Wi-Fi networks to enable
applications to supply relevant information to users. While Location Services may be
very useful, it may not be desirable to allow all applications that can use Location
Services to use your location for Internet queries in order to provide tailored content
based on your current location.
Ensure applications that can use Location Services are authorized and provide that
information where the application interacts with external systems. Apple offers feedback
within System Preferences and may be enabled to supply information on the menu bar
when Location Services are used.
Safari can deny access from websites or prompt for access.
Applications that support Location Services can be individually controlled in the Privacy
tab in Security & Privacy under System Preferences.
Access should be evaluated to ensure that privacy controls are as expected.
Rationale:
Page 155
Perform the following steps to verify what websites are enabled to ask for access to
Location Services:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Websites
5. Select Location
6. Verify that When visiting other websites is set to your organization's
requirements
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to evaluate the applications that are enabled to use
Location Services:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults read /var/db/locationd/clients.plist
Ensure that all applications listed have been authorized to access location information.
Page 156
Perform the following steps to set websites to ask for permission to access Location
Services:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Websites
5. Select Location
6. Set When visiting other websites to your organization's requirements
CIS Controls:
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Page 157
Page 158
• Level 2
Description:
Starting with macOS 10.13, Apple enforces GUI access to the entire File System
through System Preferences. Only Applications from known developers with mission
requirements for Full Disk Access, such as security monitoring tools, should have Full
Disk Access. Applications that have Full Disk Access can access restricted files and
bypass macOS security controls. Any applications with that access should be
organizationally authorized.
Rationale:
Any applications with Full Disk Access can bypass MacOS security controls and must
be reviewed as organizationally accepted risk.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify what applications have full disk access:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that what applications have full disk access
enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/sqlite3 /Library/Application\
Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db 'select client from access where auth_value and
service = "kTCCServiceSystemPolicyAllFiles"'
The output will be what applications have full disk access enabled.
Page 159
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/security/controlling-app-access-to-files-
secddd1d86a6/web
2. https://lapcatsoftware.com/articles/FullDiskAccess.html
3. https://www.techrepublic.com/article/secure-mac-data-full-disk-access/
4. https://support.intego.com/hc/en-us/articles/360016683471-Enable-Full-Disk-
Access-in-macOS
5. https://jumpcloud.com/support/grant-full-disk-access-permissions-to-the-
jumpcloud-agent-for-macos
6. https://docs.metallic.io/metallic/enabling_full_disk_access_for_macos.html
7. https://knowledge.broadcom.com/external/article/176368/configuring-mdm-
profiles-for-full-disk-a.html
CIS Controls:
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Page 160
The settings contained within Analytics & Improvements are designed to help Apple
and developers improve their products and services automatically. To do this, data is
sent automatically to Apple (or app developers). Apple provides a mechanism to send
diagnostic and analytics data back to Apple to help them improve the platform.
Information sent to Apple may contain internal organizational information that should be
controlled and not available for processing by Apple. This data may be shared with
third-parties, and each recommendation in this sub-section deals with different type of
data that is collected and shared.
Share Mac Analytics (Share with App Developers dependent on Mac Analytic sharing)
Page 161
• Level 1
Description:
Share Mac Analytics (Share with App Developers dependent on Mac Analytic sharing)
includes diagnostics, usage, and location data. Turn off all Analytics and Improvements
sharing.
Rationale:
Organizations should have knowledge of what is shared with the vendor and that this
setting automatically forwards information to Apple.
Impact:
There should be no impact.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that Mac analytics are not being send to Apple:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disables sharing Mac
analytics to Apple:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.SubmitDiagInfo')\
.objectForKey('AutoSubmit').js
EOS
false
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Page 162
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Page 163
• Level 1
Description:
Improve Siri & Dictation allows Apple to store and review audio of your Siri and
dictation interactions from the device. Turn off all Analytics and Improvements sharing.
Rationale:
Organizations should have knowledge of what is shared with the vendor and that this
setting automatically forwards information to Apple.
Impact:
There should be no impact.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that Siri and dictation is not being send to Apple:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disables sharing Siri
and dictations to Apple:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('Siri Data Sharing Opt-In Status').js
EOS
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Page 164
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Page 165
• Level 1
Description:
Improve Assistive Voice shares audio recordings and transcripts of Vocal Shortcuts
and Voice Control interactions anonymously to Apple. These are recordings and
transcripts from the user that are being submitted which may include PII or restricted
organizational information. Sharing this kind of information with any 3rd party, including
the platform vendor, needs to be risk evaluated and only allowed after review and
approval based on your organization's policies.
Rationale:
Organizations should have knowledge of what is shared with the vendor and that this
setting automatically forwards information to Apple.
Impact:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify a profile installed that are not sending assistive
voice features to Apple:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.Accessibility')\
.objectForKey('AXSAudioDonationSiriImprovementEnabled').js
EOS
false
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CIS Controls:
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Page 167
• Level 1
Description:
Share with app developers allows Apple to share crash and usage data with app
developers. Turn off all Analytics and Improvements sharing.
Rationale:
Organizations should have knowledge of what is shared with the vendor and that this
setting automatically forwards information to Apple.
Impact:
There should be no impact.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that diagnostic data is not being send to Apple:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disables sharing app
analytics to Apple and developers:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowDiagnosticSubmission').js
EOS
false
Page 168
CIS Controls:
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Page 169
• Level 1
Description:
Share iCloud Analytics shares analytics of usage and data from your iCloud account to
Apple to help improve its products and services (including Siri and other intelligent
features). Turn off all Analytics and Improvements sharing.
This setting will not appear if the user is not signed into a personal Apple Account.
Rationale:
Organizations should have knowledge of what is shared with the vendor and that this
setting automatically forwards information to Apple.
Impact:
There should be no impact.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that iCloud Analytics is not being sent to Apple:
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable Siri and dictation not being sent to Apple:
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Page 171
• Level 1
Description:
Apple provides a framework that allows advertisers to target Apple users and end-users
with advertisements. While many people prefer to see advertising that is relevant to
them and their interests, the detailed information that is collected, correlated, and
available to advertisers in repositories via data mining is often disconcerting. This
information is valuable to both advertisers and attackers, and has been used with other
metadata to reveal users' identities.
Organizations should manage advertising settings on computers rather than allow users
to configure the settings.
Apple Information
Ad tracking should be limited on 10.15 and prior.
Rationale:
Organizations should manage user privacy settings on managed devices to align with
organizational policies and user data protection requirements.
Impact:
Uses will see generic advertising rather than targeted advertising. Apple warns that this
will reduce the number of relevant ads.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that limited ad tracking is set:
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false
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that limited ad tracking is set:
or
Page 173
0
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/firstuser/Library/Preferences/com.apple.AdLib.plist
allowApplePersonalizedAdvertising
Terminal Method:
For each needed user, run the following command to enable limited ad tracking:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/<username>/Library/Preferences/com.apple.Adlib.plist
allowApplePersonalizedAdvertising -bool false
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u seconduser /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/seconduser/Library/Preferences/com.apple.Adlib.plist
allowApplePersonalizedAdvertising -bool false
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Page 175
• Level 1
Description:
Gatekeeper is Apple’s application that utilizes allowlisting to restrict downloaded
applications from launching. It functions as a control to limit applications from unverified
sources from running without authorization. In an update to Gatekeeper in macOS 13
Ventura, Gatekeeper checks every application on every launch, not just quarantined
apps.
Rationale:
Disallowing unsigned software will reduce the risk of unauthorized or malicious
applications from running on the system.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that Gatekeeper is enabled:
or
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Gatekeeper is enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/spctl --status
assessments enabled
Page 176
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: In previous versions of macOS, Gatekeeper could be set using the binary. This
has been removed in macOS 15 Sequoia.
CIS Controls:
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Page 177
• Level 1
Description:
FileVault secures a system's data by automatically encrypting its boot volume and
requiring a password or recovery key to access it.
FileVault should be used with a saved escrow key to ensure that the owner can decrypt
their data if the password is lost.
FileVault may also be enabled using command line using the fdesetup command. To
use this functionality, consult the Der Flounder blog for more details (see link below
under References).
Rationale:
Encrypting sensitive data minimizes the likelihood of unauthorized users gaining access
to it.
Impact:
Mounting a FileVault encrypted volume from an alternate boot source will require a valid
password to decrypt it. Apple has also implemented an escalating policy for failed
passwords. To find out more about that, read here: Passcodes and passwords
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that FileVault is enabled:
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FileVault is On
true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable FileVault:
Note: This will allow you to create a recovery key for FileVault. Keep the key saved
securely in case it is needed at a later date.
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
1. https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2015/02/02/managing-yosemites-filevault-2-
with-fdesetup/
2. https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2019/01/15/unlock-or-decrypt-your-filevault-
encrypted-boot-drive-from-the-command-line-on-macos-mojave/
3. https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2021/10/29/use-of-filevault-institutional-
recovery-keys-no-longer-recommended-by-apple/
4. https://support.apple.com/guide/security/passcodes-and-passwords-
sec20230a10d/1/web/1
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Page 180
• Level 2
Description:
Apple introduced Lockdown Mode as a security feature in their 2022 OS releases that
provides additional security protection Apple describes as extreme. Users and
organizations that suspect some users are targets of advanced attacks must consider
using this control.
When lockdown mode is enabled, specific trusted websites can be excluded from
Lockdown protection if necessary.
Rationale:
Lockdown Mode was designed by Apple as an aggressive approach to commonly
attacked OS features where additional controls could reduce the attack surface. IT
systems and devices, including their users, are subject to continuous exploit attempts.
Most of that activity is not from an advanced attacker and can be considered
background noise to a patched, hardened device. Advanced attackers are of more
concern and a risk review to understand organizational targets and use Lockdown Mode
where appropriate is necessary.
Impact:
Lockdown Mode must be tested appropriately for real-world impact on users prior to
use. As a new feature there is not sufficient technical reporting on user impacts.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify the settings for Lockdown Mode:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Lockdown mode is enabled for the user:
$ /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read .GlobalPreferences.plist
LDMGlobalEnabled 2>/dev/null
When Lockdown mode has been enabled, it will return 1 and when disabled return 0. If
Lockdown has never been enabled, it will return no value.
NOTE: Lockdown mode is set per local user, therefore you must iterate through each
local user to verify the settings.
Page 181
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212650
2. https://www.lifewire.com/use-lockdown-mode-on-mac-6454923
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Page 182
• Level 1
Description:
System Preferences controls system and user settings on a macOS Computer. System
Preferences allows the user to tailor their experience on the computer as well as
allowing the System Administrator to configure global security settings. Some of the
settings should only be altered by the person responsible for the computer.
Rationale:
By requiring a password to unlock system-wide System Preferences, the risk of a user
changing configurations that affect the entire system is mitigated and requires an admin
user to re-authenticate to make changes.
Impact:
Users will need to enter their password to unlock some additional preference panes that
are unlocked by default like Network, Startup and Printers & Scanners.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that an administrator password is required to
access system-wide preferences:
Page 183
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that an administrator password is required to
access system-wide preferences:
Page 184
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Page 186
Page 187
• Level 2
Description:
Hot Corners can be configured to disable the screen saver by moving the mouse cursor
to a corner of the screen.
Rationale:
Setting a hot corner to disable the screen saver poses a potential security risk since an
unauthorized person could use this to bypass the login screen and gain access to the
system.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that a Hot Corner is not set to Disable Screen
Saver:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed secures screen saver
corners:
% /usr/bin/profiles -P -o stdout | /usr/bin/grep -Ec '"wvous-bl-corner" =
6|"wvous-br-corner" = 6|"wvous-tl-corner" = 6|"wvous-tr-corner" = 6'
0
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Page 188
<array>
<dict>
<key>mcx_preference_settings</key>
<dict>
<key>wvous-bl-corner</key>
<integer><≠6></integer>
<key>wvous-br-corner</key>
<integer><≠6></integer>
<key>wvous-tl-corner</key>
<integer><≠6></integer>
<key>wvous-tr-corner</key>
<integer><≠6></integer>
</dict>
</dict>
</array>
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that a Hot Corner is not set to Disable Screen
Saver:
or
Page 189
10
Page 190
Terminal Method: Run the following command to turn off Disable Screen Saver for a
Hot Corner:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write com.apple.dock <corner
that is set to '6'> -int 0
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u seconduser /usr/bin/defaults write com.apple.dock wvous-
tl-corner -int 0
CIS Controls:
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Page 191
• Level 2
Description:
iPhone Mirroring is a new feature offered in iOS 18 and macOS 15.0 Sequoia. It
allows a macOS device to remotely access an iOS device connected to the same Apple
Account. If a user has different Apple Accounts signed into iOS and macOS (ex. a
managed Apple Account on macOS and a personal Apple Account on iOS), the feature
is not available.
Rationale:
Enabling iPhone Mirroring may allow a macOS device to capture data from an iOS
device (ex Image Capture). This would occur where the macOS device has not been
approved to access that information by your organization's policies and the iOS device
has been approved (or vice-versa).
If iPhone Mirroring is currently in use on an iOS device, the lock screen will have a
notification that states iPhone in Use and state what device is using it. If iPhone
Mirroring was in use on an iOS device but is no longer in use, the first time the user
unlocks the iOS device it will notify the user that iPhone was used from Mac.
Impact:
If iPhone Mirroring is disabled, it would stop a user from accessing information on
their iOS device while using their macOS device.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify the configuration for iPhone mirroring:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple. applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowiPhoneMirroring').js
EOS
The output will be either true, allow iPhone mirroring, or false, disable iPhone mirroring.
Page 192
Note: The iPhone setting will only show up if there are multiple iPhones being
connected to the user's Apple Account and setup with iPhone mirroring.
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
CIS Controls:
Page 193
Page 194
• Level 1
Description:
Universal Control is an Apple feature that allows Mac users to control multiple other
Macs and iPads with the same keyboard, mouse, and trackpad using the same Apple
Account. The technology relies on already available iCloud services, particularly
Handoff.
Universal Control simplifies the use of iCloud connectivity of multiple computers using
the same Apple Account. This may simplify data transfer from organizationally-managed
and personal devices. The use of the same iCloud account and Handoff is the
underlying concern that should be evaluated. The use of the same keyboard or mouse
across multiple devices does not by itself decrease organizational security.
Universal Clipboard, a feature of Universal Control, allows any device using the same
Apple Account to access the clipboard of any other devices using the same Apple
Account.
Rationale:
The use of devices together when some are organizational and some are not may
complicate device management standards.
Universal control settings may also enable a user to share their clipboard across
multiple devices authenticated to the same Apple Account, so disabling that should be
discussed by the organization.
Impact:
The user should not be impacted if Universal Control is set either way.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify a profile is installed that configures Universal
Control:
Page 195
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
Note: If your organization is allowing Universal Control, your organization can still
disable Universal Clipboard via a profile. To disable Universal Clipboard, create or edit a
configuration profile with the following information:
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT212757
2. https://support.apple.com/en-us/102459
Page 196
Page 197
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set Universal Control to your organization's requirements:
Page 198
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Page 199
This section is for energy use controls. Prior to Big Sur (Mac OS 11) it was known only
as Energy Saver.
On desktop Macs, this preference pane is still named Energy Saver and not Battery.
Mac Energy Saver preferences explained
Page 200
In order to use a computer with Full Disk Encryption (FDE), macOS must keep
encryption keys in memory to allow the use of the disk that has been FileVault
protected. The storage volume has been unlocked and acts as if it were not encrypted.
When the system is not in use, the volume is protected through encryption. When the
system is sleeping and available to quickly resume, the encryption keys remain in
memory.
If an unauthorized party has possession of the computer and the computer is only slept,
there are known attack vectors that can be attempted against the RAM that has the
encryption keys or the running operating system protected by a login screen. Network
attacks if network interfaces are on, as well as USB or other open device ports, are
possible. Most of these attacks require knowledge of unpatched vulnerabilities or a high
level of sophistication if all the other controls function as intended.
There is little impact on hibernating the system rather than sleeping after an appropriate
time period to remediate the risk of OS level attacks. Hibernation writes the keys to disk
and requires FileVault to be unlocked prior to the OS being available. In the case of
unauthorized personnel with access to the computer, encryption would have to be
broken prior to attacking the operating system in order to recover data from the system.
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• Level 2
Description:
In order to use a computer with Full Disk Encryption (FDE), macOS must keep
encryption keys in memory to allow the use of the disk that has been FileVault
protected. The storage volume has been unlocked and acts as if it were not encrypted.
When the system is not in use, the volume is protected through encryption. When the
system is sleeping and available to quickly resume, the encryption keys remain in
memory.
https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2018/08/20/laptop-sleep-security/
Mac systems should be set to hibernate after sleeping for a risk-acceptable time period.
The default value for "standbydelay" is three hours (10800 seconds). This value is likely
appropriate for most desktops. If Mac desktops are deployed in unmonitored, less
physically secure areas with confidential data, this value might be adjusted. The
desktop would have to retain power, however, so that the running OS or physical RAM
could be attacked.
MacBooks should be set so that the standbydelay is 15 minutes (900 seconds) or less.
This setting should allow laptop users in most cases to stay within physically secured
areas while going to a conference room, auditorium, or other internal location without
having to unlock the encryption. When the user goes home at night, the laptop will auto-
hibernate after 15 minutes and require the FileVault password to unlock prior to logging
back into the system when it resumes.
MacBooks should also be set to a hibernate mode that removes power from the RAM.
This will stop the possibility of cold boot attacks on the system.
Macs running Apple silicon chips, rather than Intel chips, do not require the same
configuration as Intel-based Macs.
Rationale:
To mitigate the risk of data loss, the system should power down and lock the encrypted
drive after a specified time. Laptops should hibernate 15 minutes or less after sleeping.
Impact:
The laptop will take additional time to resume normal operation if only sleeping rather
than hibernating.
Setting hibernatemode to 25 will disable the "always-on" feature of the Apple Silicon
Macs.
Page 202
hibernatemode 25
example:
standbydelaylow 600
standby 1
standbydelayhigh 600
highstandbythreshold 50
hibernatemode 25
Note: To verify if you are running an Intel processor, run /usr/sbin/sysctl -n
machdep.cpu.brand_string. The output will include Intel.
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References:
1. https://www.lifewire.com/change-mac-sleep-settings-2260804
2. https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=6705
3. https://www.howtogeek.com/260478/how-to-choose-when-your-mac-hibernates-
or-enters-standby/
Additional Information:
The Ensure FileVault is Locked on Sleep recommendation has been removed. If your
organization wants to continue setting filevault lock, create or edit a configuration profile
with the following information:
CIS Controls:
Controls
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Version
Page 204
• Level 2
Description:
MacBooks should be set so that the sleep is 15 minutes or less and the display should
sleep at 10 minutes or less. This setting should allow laptop users in most cases to stay
within physically secured areas while going to a conference room, auditorium, or other
internal location without having to unlock the encryption. When the user goes home at
night, the laptop will auto-sleep after 15 minutes and log back into the system when it
resumes.
Rationale:
Laptops should sleep 15 minutes or less after sleeping.
Impact:
The laptop will take additional time to resume normal operation from sleep.
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displaysleep 10
Note: To verify if you are running an Apple Silicon processor, run /usr/sbin/sysctl -
n machdep.cpu.brand_string. The output will include Apple.
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to set the sleep time and hibernate mode:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -a sleep <value≤15>
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -a displaysleep <value≤10 & < value of sleep>
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -a sleep 15
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -a displaysleep 10
Page 206
1. https://www.lifewire.com/change-mac-sleep-settings-2260804
2. https://www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=6705
3. https://www.howtogeek.com/260478/how-to-choose-when-your-mac-hibernates-
or-enters-standby/
Additional Information:
The Ensure FileVault is Locked on Sleep recommendation has been removed. If your
organization wants to continue setting filevault lock, create or edit a configuration profile
with the following information:
Hibernate mode has also been removed from this recommendation. Setting hibernate
mode will require the user to log into the machine after sleep and disable any wake
options. hibernatemode must be set to 25 or it will not force the computer into a pre-
boot state. Organizations may still use this if there is a security need (ex. international
travel), but it can cause kernel panics in Apple Silicon Macs. To enable hibernate mode,
run the following command:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -a hibernatemode 25
Note:
CIS Controls:
Controls
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Version
Page 207
• Level 1
Description:
Power Nap allows the system to stay in low power mode, especially while on battery
power, and periodically connect to previously known networks with stored credentials
for user applications to phone home and get updates. This capability requires FileVault
to remain unlocked and the use of previously joined networks to be risk accepted based
on the SSID without user input.
This control has been updated to check the status on both battery and AC Power. The
presence of an electrical outlet does not completely correlate with logical and physical
security of the device or available networks.
Rationale:
Disabling this feature mitigates the risk of an attacker remotely waking the system and
gaining access.
The use of Power Nap adds to the risk of compromised physical and logical security.
The user should be able to decrypt FileVault and have the applications download what
is required when the computer is actively used.
The control to prevent computer sleep has been retired for this version of the
Benchmark. Forcing the computer to stay on and use energy in case a management
push is needed is contrary to most current management processes. Only keep
computers unslept if after hours pushes are required on closed LANs.
Impact:
Power Nap exists for unattended user application updates like email and social media
clients. With Power Nap disabled, the computer will not wake and reconnect to known
wireless SSIDs intermittently when slept.
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Laptop Instructions:
Note: To verify if you are running an Intel processor, perform the following steps:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify if Power Nap is disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -g custom | /usr/bin/grep -c "^\spowernap\s*1"
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Laptop Instructions:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable Power Nap:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -a powernap 0
Additional Information:
/usr/bin/man pmset
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Controls
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Version
Page 211
• Level 1
Description:
This feature allows the computer to take action when the user is not present and the
computer is in energy saving mode. These tools require FileVault to remain unlocked
and fully rejoin known networks. This macOS feature is meant to allow the computer to
resume activity as needed regardless of physical security controls.
This feature allows other users to be able to access your computer’s shared resources,
such as shared printers or Apple Music playlists, even when your computer is in sleep
mode. In a closed network when only authorized devices could wake a computer, it
could be valuable to wake computers in order to do management push activity. Where
mobile workstations and agents exist, the device will more likely check in to receive
updates when already awake. Mobile devices should not be listening for signals on any
unmanaged network or where untrusted devices exist that could send wake signals.
Rationale:
Disabling this feature mitigates the risk of an attacker remotely waking the system and
gaining access.
Impact:
Management programs like Apple Remote Desktop Administrator use wake-on-LAN to
connect with computers. If turned off, such management programs will not be able to
wake a computer over the LAN. If the wake-on-LAN feature is needed, do not turn off
this feature.
The control to prevent computer sleep has been retired for this version of the
Benchmark. Forcing the computer to stay on and use energy in case a management
push is needed is contrary to most current management processes. Only keep
computers unslept if after hours pushes are required on closed LANs.
Turning off Wake for Network Access will also not allow Find My to work when the
computer is asleep. It will also give this warning: "You won’t be able to locate, lock, or
erase this Mac while it’s asleep because Wake for network access is turned off."
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Laptop Instructions:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command verify if Wake for network access is not enabled:
$ /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -g custom | /usr/bin/grep -e womp
womp 0
or
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disables Wake On
Lan is installed:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/profiles -P -o stdout | /usr/bin/grep "Wake On LAN"
"Wake On LAN" = 0;
"Wake On LAN" = 0;
"Wake On LAN" = 0;
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Laptop Instructions:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable Wake for network access:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pmset -a womp 0
Page 214
<dict>
<key>Wake On LAN</key>
<integer>0</integer>
<key>Wake On Modem Ring</key>
<integer>0</integer>
</dict>
<dict>
<key>Wake On LAN</key>
<integer>0</integer>
<key>Wake On Modem Ring</key>
<integer>0</integer>
</dict>
<dict>
<key>Wake On LAN</key>
<integer>0</integer>
<key>Wake On Modem Ring</key>
<integer>0</integer>
</dict>
Note: Both Wake on LAN and Wake on Modem Ring need to be set. Only setting Wake
On LAN will allow the profile to install but not set any settings. This profile will only apply
the setting at installation and is not sticky.
Additional Information:
/usr/bin/man pmset
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Page 216
Page 217
• Level 1
Description:
A locking screen saver is one of the standard security controls to limit access to a
computer and the current user's session when the computer is temporarily unused or
unattended. In macOS, the screen saver starts after a value is selected in the drop-
down menu. 20 minutes or less is an acceptable value. Any value can be selected
through the command line or script, but a number that is not reflected in the GUI can be
problematic. 20 minutes is the default for new accounts.
Rationale:
Setting an inactivity interval for the screen saver prevents unauthorized persons from
viewing a system left unattended for an extensive period of time.
Impact:
If the screen saver is not set, users may leave the computer available for an
unauthorized person to access information.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that the screen saver is set to activate after less
than or equal to 20 minutes of inactivity:
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true
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
Page 219
or
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the screen saver idle time of individual users
is set to less than or equal to 20 minutes:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
function run() {
let pref1 =
ObjC.unwrap($.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.screensaver')
\
.objectForKey('idleTime'))
if ( pref1 <= 1200 ) {
return("true")
} else {
return("false")
}
}
EOS
true
Note: If there is no output, then the setting has not been changed from the default and
is considered not in compliance. Follow the remediation instructions to set the idle time
to match your organization's policy.
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Terminal Method:
Run the following command to set individual users to an idle time of the screen saver is
set to 20 minutes or less (≤1200):
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.screensaver idleTime -int <value ≤1200>
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u seconduser /usr/bin/defaults -currentHost write
com.apple.screensaver idleTime -int 600
600
Note: Issues arise if the command line is used to make the setting something other than
what is available in the GUI Menu. Choose either 1 (60), 2 (120), 5 (300), 10 (600), or
20 (1200) minutes to avoid any issues.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 221
• Level 1
Description:
Sleep and screen saver modes are low power modes that reduce electrical
consumption while the system is not in use.
Rationale:
Prompting for a password when waking from sleep or screen saver mode mitigates the
threat of an unauthorized person gaining access to a system in the user's absence.
Impact:
Without a screenlock in place, anyone with physical access to the computer would be
logged in and able to use the active user's session.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that a password is required to wake from sleep or
screen saver:
or
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true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable a password for unlock after a screen saver begins
or after sleep:
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References:
1. https://blog.kolide.com/screensaver-security-on-macos-10-13-is-broken-
a385726e2ae2
2. https://github.com/rtrouton/profiles/blob/master/SetDefaultScreensaver/SetDefaul
tScreensaver.mobileconfig
Additional Information:
This only protects the system when the screen saver is running.
Note: The command line check in previous versions of the Benchmark does not work
as expected here. The use of a profile is recommended for both implementation and
auditing on a 10.13 system or later.
CIS Controls:
Controls
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Page 224
• Level 1
Description:
An access warning informs the user that the system is reserved for authorized use only,
and that the use of the system may be monitored.
Rationale:
An access warning may reduce a casual attacker's tendency to target the system.
Access warnings may also aid in the prosecution of an attacker by evincing the
attacker's knowledge of the system's private status, acceptable use policy, and
authorization requirements.
Impact:
If users are not informed of their responsibilities, unapproved activities may occur.
Users that are not approved for access may take the lack of a warning banner as
implied consent to access.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the a login banner is configured:
or
Page 225
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable a login banner set to your organization's required
text:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable a custom login screen message:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow LoginwindowText "<custom message>"
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow LoginwindowText "Center for
Internet Security Test Message"
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
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Controls
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Version
Page 227
• Level 1
Description:
The login window prompts a user for his/her credentials, verifies their authorization
level, and then allows or denies the user access to the system.
Rationale:
Prompting the user to enter both their username and password makes it twice as hard
for unauthorized users to gain access to the system since they must discover two
attributes.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that the login window displays name and password:
or
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify the login window displays name and password:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.loginwindow')\
.objectForKey('SHOWFULLNAME').js
EOS
true
Page 228
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable the login window to display name and password:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow SHOWFULLNAME -bool true
Note: The GUI will not display the updated setting until the current user(s) logs out.
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 229
• Level 1
Description:
Password hints are user-created text displayed when an incorrect password is used for
an account.
Rationale:
Password hints make it easier for unauthorized persons to gain access to systems by
displaying information provided by the user to assist in remembering the password. This
info could include the password itself or other information that might be readily
discerned with basic knowledge of the end user.
Impact:
The user can set the hint to any value, including the password itself or clues that allow
trivial social engineering attacks.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify if password hints are shown:
or
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0
Note: The default setting is not auditable through the command line. Please turn off the
check and re-enable when the GUI does not reflect the audited results, or run the
Terminal command(s).
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable password hints from being shown:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable password hints:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow RetriesUntilHint -int 0
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 231
The Touch ID & Password System Settings pane is named Login Password on
Macs that do not have Touch ID and does not contain any details about Touch ID.
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• Level 1
Description:
Password hints help the user recall their passwords for various systems and/or
accounts. In most cases, password hints are simple and closely related to the user's
password.
Rationale:
Password hints that are closely related to the user's password are a security
vulnerability, especially in the social media age. Unauthorized users are more likely to
guess a user's password if there is a password hint. The password hint is very
susceptible to social engineering attacks and information exposure on social media
networks.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that no users have a password hint:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/dscl . -list /Users hint
The output will list all users. If there is any text listed with the user, then the machine is
not compliant.
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/dscl . -list /Users hint . -list /Users hint
firstuser passwordhint
seconduser passwordhint2
thirduser
fourthuser
Guest
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Note: This will only change the currently logged-in user's password, and not any others
that are not compliant on the Mac. Use the terminal method if multiple users are not in
compliance.
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to remove a user's password hint:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/dscl . -list /Users hint . -delete /Users/<username>
hint
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/dscl . -list /Users hint . -delete /Users/firstuser
hint
Additional Information:
Controls
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Page 234
• Level 1
Description:
Apple has integrated Touch ID with macOS and allows fingerprint use for many
common operations. All use of Touch ID requires the presence of a password and the
use of that password after every reboot, or when more than 48 hours has elapsed since
the device was last unlocked. Touch ID is not a password replacement. The use of
Touch ID can, however, make the use of passwords more secure for authorized users
with physical access to a Mac. Normal day-to-day work operations can eliminate the
use of console password entry unless a reboot is required other than on Monday
morning. The infrequency of password screen unlock can enable a more complicated
pass phrase that is seldom used. When Touch ID is used it remediates the risk of
shoulder surfing (including video surveillance) to capture console credentials. There
have been many reported shoulder surfing password captures on iOS devices. Reports
have not been widespread on Macs, but shoulder surfing password capture is simpler
than the other methods of breaking in to an encrypted Mac.
When a SmartCard or YubiKey is provisioned by an organization and is available for
Console authentication, that is a much more secure option than the use of Touch ID and
is preferred.
Rationale:
Touch ID allows for an account-enrolled fingerprint to access a key that uses a
previously provided password.
Impact:
Touch ID is more convenient for use with aggressive screen lock controls.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to verify Touch ID settings:
Page 235
In the above example, the user has TouchID enabled for both unlocking the system and
for ApplePay. The timeout for TouchID is set to the maximum of 48 hours (172800
seconds).
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set Touch ID to your organization's settings:
Page 236
Note: The -s notates a system configuration and does not need to be ran for each user.
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/touch-id-mchl16fbf90a/mac
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Controls
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Version
Page 238
Account management is a central part of security for any computer system, including
macOS. General practices should be followed to ensure that all accounts on a system
are still needed, and that default accounts have been removed. Users with administrator
roles should have distinct accounts for both administrator functions as well as day-to-
day work where the passwords are different and known only by the user assigned to the
account. Accounts with elevated privileges should not be easily discerned from the
account name from standard accounts.
When any computer system is added to a directory system there are additional controls
available, including user account management, that are not available in a standalone
computer. One of the drawbacks is the local computer is no longer in control of the
accounts that can access or manage it if given permission. For macOS, if the computer
is connected to a directory, any standard user can now log into the computer at console,
which by default may be desirable or not depending on the use case. If an administrator
group is allowed to administer the local computer, the membership of that group is
controlled completely in the directory.
macOS computers connected to a directory should be configured so that the risk is
appropriate for the mission use of the computer. Only those accounts that require local
authentication should be allowed, and only required administrator accounts should be in
the local administrator group. Authenticated users for console access and domain
admins for administration may be too broad or too limited.
Page 239
• Level 1
Description:
The guest account allows users access to the system without having to create an
account or password. Guest users are unable to make setting changes and cannot
remotely login to the system. All files, caches, and passwords created by the guest user
are deleted upon logging out.
Rationale:
Disabling the guest account mitigates the risk of an untrusted user doing basic
reconnaissance and possibly using privilege escalation attacks to take control of the
system.
Impact:
A guest user can use that access to find out additional information about the system
and might be able to use privilege escalation vulnerabilities to establish greater access.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the guest account is not available:
or
Page 240
true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to disable guest account availability:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable the guest account:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow GuestEnabled -bool false
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Page 241
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 242
• Level 1
Description:
Allowing guests to connect to shared folders enables users to access selected shared
folders and their contents from different computers on a network.
Rationale:
Not allowing guests to connect to shared folders mitigates the risk of an untrusted user
doing basic reconnaissance and possibly using privilege escalation attacks to take
control of the system.
Impact:
Unauthorized users could access shared files on the system.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that guests cannot connect to shared folders:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to verify that shared folders are not accessible to guest
users:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/sysadminctl -smbGuestAccess status
The output should include SMB guest access disabled.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to no longer allow guest user access to shared folders:
Page 243
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 244
• Level 1
Description:
The automatic login feature saves a user's system access credentials and bypasses the
login screen. Instead, the system automatically loads to the user's desktop screen.
Rationale:
Disabling automatic login decreases the likelihood of an unauthorized person gaining
access to a system.
Impact:
If automatic login is not disabled, an unauthorized user could gain access to the system
without supplying any credentials.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that automatic login is not enabled:
or
Page 245
true
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set automatic login to off:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable automatic login:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults delete
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow autoLoginUser
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: If both the profile is enabled and a user is set to autologin, the profile will take
precedent. In this case, the graphical or terminal remediation method should also be
applied in case the profile is ever removed.
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Controls
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Page 247
Page 248
• Level 1
Description:
Apple has provided a new interface in macOS Monterey for managing passwords that
mirrors the interfaced capability already available in iOS. Password management in
macOS was previously available in both Safari Preferences and in Keychain Access.
Apple is attempting to simplify password management for macOS and make the user
experience more similar to iOS. Organizations are justifiably concerned about the risk of
password managers, particularly as a possible backdoor to improved credential
management regimes and greater use of Multi-Factor-Authentication (MFA).
Apple has information posted on this system preference with additional information.
Change Passwords preferences on Mac
A warning icon is shown next to a website for any of the following reasons:
• Easily guessed
• Appeared in a data leak
• Reused on another website
Rationale:
Organizations should remove what passwords can be saved on user computers, thus
limiting the ability of attackers to potentially steal organizational credentials. Limits on
password storage must be evaluated based on both user risk and Enterprise risk.
Impact:
Organizations using passwords are constantly reported as having their password
databases leaked to the Internet so every password a user has should be unique.
Locking down secure password management solutions so that they cannot be used
pushes users to password reuse, sticky notes, or always open text files with long lists of
credentials.
Page 249
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set Password system settings to your organization's
settings:
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/security/password-monitoring-
sec78e79fc3b/1/web/1
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Controls
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Version
Page 251
Page 252
• Level 2
Description:
With macOS 10.13, Apple has introduced a separate section for Game Center in
System Settings. It is possible to log in with the Apple Account and use the iCloud-
based Game Center services.
Game Center is a feature from Apple that allows users to engage in game-related
activities with friends when playing multiplayer games online on the Game Center social
network. User profile data such as nickname, contact discovery, and also nearby
players may be shared through iCloud.
Apple collects information here, such as the games users play and when they play
them, all scores and achievements, and the challenges users send and receive. This
information is used to track users' high scores, achievements, and challenges and to
improve Game Center.
The automatic sign in to Game Center with AppleID should be disabled if not aligned
with organizational rules
Personal profile visibility, Finding by Friends, requests from Contacts, Nearby Player
detection and Connecting with Friends are all visibility options that should be risk
accepted through an organizational policy before use.
Users should not sign in to Game Center on organizational managed devices if not
covered under acceptable use. For personal devices Game Center should not be
signed in if the user is not using Apple's gaming service.
Rationale:
Ensure Game Center service is used consistently with organizational requirements.
Impact:
Game Center is designed as a social network to use Apple's gaming service and
includes capabilities to discover players in the service as through local network
discovery. If the Apple feature is not needed it should not be on, and should not be
signed in.
Page 253
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that sets iCloud allow
GameCenter setting to your organization's settings:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('allowGameCenter').js
EOS
If the output is false, Game Center is disabled. If the output is true Game Center is
enabled.
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. We have included the individual user information
in the additional information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210401
2. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/restrictions
3. https://developer.apple.com/game-center/
Page 254
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set iCloud Game Center based on your organization's
requirements:
CIS Controls:
Page 255
Page 256
• Level 1
Description:
Notification capabilities are designed to allow users to receive updates from applications
that are not currently in use. These can be background applications or even notices
from processes running on a computer that is not currently being actively used. Where
the screen of a computer is visible to others other than the logged-in user due to shared
working spaces or public spaces, consideration should be given to the exposure of
sensitive data in notifications. Applications that use the system-wide application service
may be individually managed, and applications that might expose confidential
information to unauthorized users should not expose notifications except to the current
user, especially on the locked screen when the computer may be unattended.
Rationale:
Some work environments will handle sensitive or confidential information with
applications that can provide notifications to anyone who can see the computer screen.
Organizations must review the likelihood that information may be exposed
inappropriately and suppress notifications where risk is not organizationally accepted.
Impact:
Computer users are often juggling too much information through too many applications
that want their attention and are often designed to get attention and never let it go.
Notifications are a mechanism that can be used to cut through the deluge and allow
important issues to be resolved in a timely way. Global controls on limiting user
notifications, even for certain applications, could impact productivity and the timely
remediation of issues.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that Notifications are set to your organization's
requirements:
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CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 258
Page 259
• Level 2
Description:
Touch ID is a prerequisite for using Apple Pay and Wallet on macOS. Apple Pay allows
an Apple account holder to enroll their credit cards in Apple Pay and pay enrolled
vendors without using the physical card or number. Apple's service eliminates the
requirement to send the credit card number itself to the vendor. Apple Pay on a Mac
allows the use of credit cards the user has already enrolled and reduces user risk for
credit card purchases.
Rationale:
Some environments may have rules around purchases from organizationally managed
computers and may want to discourage shopping from them. It is difficult to block
access to websites that allow purchases, and Apple Pay has more controls for user
protection than the manual entry of credit card information.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to verify Wallet & Apple Pay settings:
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set Wallet & Apple Pay to your organization's settings:
References:
1. https://www.apple.com/apple-pay/
2. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/use-wallet-apple-pay-on-mac-
mchl4773988b/mac
Page 260
Page 261
Internet Accounts is an Apple feature to manage accounts for the use of Mac OS native
applications. If Internet accounts are allowed and not tied to Enterprise SSO credentials,
the use of the Internet Accounts setting allows for better tracking and control.
Disabling or hiding the System Preference Pane for Internet Accounts complicates the
ability to audit and use OS level stored credentials. It does not block application access
from a Mac to a domain that offers an authenticated session on the Internet.
Page 262
• Level 1
Description:
Apple provides a section in System Settings to create and display Internet Accounts.
Setting up an Internet Account allows the user to configure access to pre-existing
accounts that are Internet Accessible. The Internet Accounts section is not managing
network access to firewall rules, it only provides a location to manage credentials and
audit external accounts for applications that make use of the "Internet Accounts." Some
applications, like Thunderbird and Firefox, do not natively use Internet Accounts and
store credentials with the application settings. Disabling the Internet Accounts section
does not block access if network reachable, it just makes auditing and use more
difficult. Depending on the maturity of network controls, auditing the providers listed in
Internet Accounts is part of managing acceptable use.
Rationale:
Internet provided services may be restricted in your organization and should be
reviewed. Even with an advanced application firewall, the user may not always be using
an internal trusted network subject to the organizational firewall. An audit will document
which services a user has configured.
Impact:
Risky services may be identified that are not authorized and will require a recess to
work with the user to no longer connect from a managed Mac.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify what accounts have been added to Internet
Accounts:
Page 263
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/add-your-email-and-other-accounts-
mh35565/mac#:~:text=Add%20an%20account%20in%20Internet%20Accounts%
20settings&text=On%20your%20Mac%2C%20choose%20Apple,may%20need%
20to%20scroll%20down.)&text=Click%20Add%20Account%20on%20the,name%
20of%20an%20account%20provider.
Page 264
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 265
Page 266
• Level 1
Description:
In macOS 14.0 Sonoma, Apple released the ability to limit dictation to staying on-device
and not sending data to the Siri servers. The use of dictation is likely to include editing
documents with confidential information. While Apple does have controls to obfuscate
voice data that exists on their servers, it is recommended that Dictation-collected
information does not leave the local Mac.
Rationale:
Sending data from dictation to the Siri servers could allow data spillage to occur. From a
control perspective, it is much safer to ensure information of various levels of
confidentiality is retained locally.
Impact:
Keeping all dictation on-device does not allow the system to better understand and
learn, through machine learning, from the user.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed to allow on-device
dictation only:
% /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.applicationaccess')\
.objectForKey('forceOnDeviceOnlyDictation').js
EOS
true
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Page 267
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 268
• https://developer.apple.com/documentation/os/logging
• https://eclecticlight.co/2018/03/19/macos-unified-log-1-why-what-and-how/
Page 269
• Level 1
Description:
macOS's audit facility, auditd, receives notifications from the kernel when certain
system calls, such as open, fork, and exit, are made. These notifications are captured
and written to an audit log.
Apple has deprecated auditd as of macOS 11.0 Big Sur. In macOS 14.0 Sonoma it is
no longer enabled by default and it is suggested to use an application that integrates
with the EndpointSecurity API. These applications are third party and not built into the
macOS. Until auditd is removed from macOS completely, running the binary is the best
way to collect logging in macOS and the only one that is part of the OS.
Rationale:
Logs generated by auditd may be useful when investigating a security incident as they
may help reveal the vulnerable application and the actions taken by a malicious actor.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Perform the following to verify that security auditing is enabled:
Run the following command to verify auditd:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl list | /usr/bin/grep -i auditd
- 0 com.apple.auditd
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Perform the following to enable security auditing:
Run the following command to load auditd and create the audit_control file:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl load -w
/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.auditd.plist
References:
1. https://boberito.medium.com/auditd-the-logs-we-need-not-the-logs-we-deserve-
cf1d8c83d15d
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 271
• Level 2
Description:
Auditing is the capture and maintenance of information about security-related events.
Auditable events often depend on differing organizational requirements.
Rationale:
Maintaining an audit trail of system activity logs can help identify configuration errors,
troubleshoot service disruptions, and analyze compromises or attacks that have
occurred, have begun, or are about to begin. Audit logs are necessary to provide a trail
of evidence in case the system or network is compromised.
Depending on the governing authority, organizations can have vastly different auditing
requirements. In this control we have selected a minimal set of audit flags that should
be a part of any organizational requirements. The flags selected below may not
adequately meet organizational requirements for users of this benchmark. The auditing
checks for the flags proposed here will not impact additional flags that are selected.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify the Security Auditing Flags that are enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/grep -e "^flags:" /etc/security/audit_control
The output should include the following flags:
The -all flag will capture all failed events across all audit classes and can be used to
supersede the individual flags for failed events.
Note: Excluding potentially noisy audit events may be ideal, depending on your use-
case.
Note: Historical audit flags are listed below as preliminary guidance.
Page 272
References:
1. https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2012/01/30/openbsm-auditing-on-mac-os-x/
2. https://csrc.nist.gov/CSRC/media/Publications/sp/800-179/rev-
1/draft/documents/sp800-179r1-draft.pdf
3. https://www.scip.ch/en/?labs.20150108
4. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-171r2.pdf
5. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/M-21-31-Improving-
the-Federal-Governments-Investigative-and-Remediation-Capabilities-Related-
to-Cybersecurity-Incidents.pdf
Additional Information:
Flag settings are currently based on the guidance provided by the NIST through the
macOS Security guidance they are providing in their GitHub repository. You can find
that guidance here.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 273
• Level 1
Description:
macOS writes information pertaining to system-related events to the file
/var/log/install.log and has a configurable retention policy for this file. The default
logging setting limits the file size of the logs and the maximum size for all logs. The
default allows for an errant application to fill the log files and does not enforce sufficient
log retention. The Benchmark recommends a value based on standard use cases. The
value should align with local requirements within the organization.
The default value has an "all_max" file limitation, no reference to a minimum retention,
and a less precise rotation argument.
The all_max flag control will remove old log entries based only on the size of the log
files. Log size can vary widely depending on how verbose installing applications are in
their log entries. The decision here is to ensure that logs go back a year, and depending
on the applications a size restriction could compromise the ability to store a full year.
While this Benchmark is not scoring for a rotation flag, the default rotation is sequential
rather than using a timestamp. Auditors may prefer timestamps in order to simply review
specific dates where event information is desired.
Please review the File Rotation section in the man page for more information.
man asl.conf
Rationale:
Archiving and retaining install.log for at least a year is beneficial in the event of an
incident as it will allow the user to view the various changes to the system along with the
date and time they occurred.
Impact:
Without log files system maintenance and security, forensics cannot be properly
performed.
Page 274
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 275
• Level 1
Description:
The macOS audit capability contains important information to investigate security or
operational issues. This resource is only completely useful if it is retained long enough
to allow technical staff to find the root cause of anomalies in the records.
Retention can be set to respect both size and longevity. To retain as much as possible
under a certain size, the recommendation is to use the following:
expire-after:60d OR 5G
This recommendation is based on minimum storage for review and investigation. When
a third party tool is in use to allow remote logging or the store and forwarding of logs,
this local storage requirement is not required.
Rationale:
The audit records need to be retained long enough to be reviewed as necessary.
Impact:
The recommendation is that at least 60 days or 5 gigabytes of audit records are
retained. Systems that have very little remaining disk space may have issues retaining
sufficient data.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify audit retention:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/grep -e "^expire-after" /etc/security/audit_control
The output value for expire-after: should be ≥ 60d OR 5G
Note: If your organization is offloading your security logs, we recommend following the
same guidance (at minimum) for your off-site log storage. Your local storage limit (or
time frame) may fail if they are set to lower in this case, but are following the guidance.
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Perform the following to set the audit retention length:
Edit the /etc/security/audit_control file so that expire-after: is at least 60d OR
5G
Page 276
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 277
• Level 1
Description:
The audit system on macOS writes important operational and security information that
can be both useful for an attacker and a place for an attacker to attempt to obfuscate
unwanted changes that were recorded. As part of defense-in-depth, the
/etc/security/audit_control configuration and the files in /var/audit should be
owned only by root with group wheel with read-only rights and no other access allowed.
macOS ACLs should not be used for these files.
The default folder for storing logs is /var/audit, but it can be changed. This
recommendation will ensure that any target directory has appropriate access control in
place even if the target directory is not the default of /var/audit.
Rationale:
Audit records should never be changed except by the system daemon posting events.
Records may be viewed or extracts manipulated, but the authoritative files should be
protected from unauthorized changes.
Impact:
This control is only checking the default configuration to ensure that unwanted access to
audit records is not available.
Page 278
Page 279
Page 280
Controls
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Version
Page 281
• Level 2
Description:
With the introduction of Mac OS X 10.6.6, Apple added a new application, App Store,
which resides in the Applications directory. This application allows a user with admin
privileges and an Apple Account to browse Apple's online App Store, purchase
(including no-cost purchases), and install new applications, bypassing Enterprise
software inventory controls. Any admin user can install software in the /Applications
directory whether from internet downloads, thumb drives, optical media, cloud storage,
or even binaries through email. Even standard users can run executables downloaded
to their home folder by default. The source of the software is not nearly as important as
a consistent audit of all installed software for patch compliance and appropriateness.
A single user desktop where the user, administrator, and the person approving software
are all the same person probably does not need to audit software inventory to this
extent. It is helpful in the case of stability problems or malware, however.
Scan systems on a monthly basis and determine the number of unauthorized pieces of
software that are installed. Verify that if an unauthorized piece of software is found one
month, it is removed from the system the next.
Export System Information through the built-in System Information Application or other
third-party tools on an organizationally defined timetable.
Rationale:
Part of comprehensive IT security involves device management and ensuring that all
software is authorized and patched. Checking for macOS updates and app updates are
relatively simple for the end user, and can even be updated with minimal privileges from
trusted sources, if enabled. Remote monitoring of the patch status for software
maintained through Apple is very well supported by management applications. Neither
Apple capabilities nor third-party patch management solutions will cover all mission-
necessary software for most organizations. Full visibility into software present on the
system enables vulnerability and risk management.
P.S. Don't forget about browser plugins/extensions for all installed software.
Page 282
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to view all System Profiler details
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/system_profiler SPApplicationsDataType
Remediation:
Delete any unnecessary applications from the system.
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT203001
2. https://www.cisecurity.org/controls/inventory-and-control-of-software-assets/
Additional Information:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/man system_profiler
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 283
Page 284
• Level 2
Description:
Bonjour is an auto-discovery mechanism for TCP/IP devices which enumerates devices
and services within a local subnet. DNS on macOS is integrated with Bonjour and
should not be turned off, but the Bonjour advertising service can be disabled.
Rationale:
Bonjour can simplify device discovery from an internal rogue or compromised host. An
attacker could use Bonjour's multicast DNS feature to discover a vulnerable or poorly-
configured service or additional information to aid a targeted attack. Implementing this
control disables the continuous broadcasting of "I'm here!" messages. Typical end-user
endpoints should not have to advertise services to other computers. This setting does
not stop the computer from sending out service discovery messages when looking for
services on an internal subnet, if the computer is looking for a printer or server and
using service discovery. To block all Bonjour traffic except to approved devices, the pf
or other firewall would be needed.
Impact:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Bonjour Advertising is not enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.mDNSResponder')\
.objectForKey('NoMulticastAdvertisements').js
EOS
true
Page 285
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Additional Information:
Anything Bonjour discovers is already available on the network and probably
discoverable with network scanning tools. The security benefit of disabling Bonjour for
that reason is minimal.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 286
• Level 1
Description:
macOS used to have a graphical front-end to the embedded Apache web server in the
Operating System. Personal web sharing could be enabled to allow someone on
another computer to download files or information from the user's computer. Personal
web sharing from a user endpoint has long been considered questionable, and Apple
has removed that capability from the GUI. Apache, however, is still part of the Operating
System and can be easily turned on to share files and provide remote connectivity to an
end-user computer. Web sharing should only be done through hardened web servers
and appropriate cloud services.
Rationale:
Web serving should not be done from a user desktop. Dedicated webservers or
appropriate cloud storage should be used. Open ports make it easier to exploit the
computer.
Impact:
The web server is both a point of attack for the system and a means for unauthorized
file transfers.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the HTTP server services are not currently
enabled. This check does not reflect any auto-start settings, only whether the web
server is currently enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl list | /usr/bin/grep -c "org.apache.httpd"
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable the HTTP server services:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/apachectl stop
Page 287
1. https://www.stigviewer.com/stig/apple_macos_11_big_sur/2021-06-16/finding/V-
230793
2. https://httpd.apache.org/security/vulnerabilities_24.html
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 288
• Level 1
Description:
macOS can act as an NFS fileserver. NFS sharing could be enabled to allow someone
on another computer to mount shares and gain access to information from the user's
computer. File sharing from a user endpoint has long been considered questionable,
and Apple has removed that capability from the GUI. NFSD is still part of the Operating
System and can be easily turned on to export shares and provide remote connectivity to
an end-user computer.
The etc/exports file contains the list of NFS shared directories. If the file exists, it is likely
that NFS sharing has been enabled in the past or may be available periodically. As an
additional check, the audit verifies that there is no /etc/exports file.
Rationale:
File serving should not be done from a user desktop. Dedicated servers should be used.
Open ports make it easier to exploit the computer.
Impact:
The nfs server is both a point of attack for the system and a means for unauthorized file
transfers.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to verify that the NFS fileserver service is not enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl list | /usr/bin/grep -c com.apple.nfsd
Page 289
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 290
Page 291
File system permissions have always been part of computer security. There are several
principles that are part of best practices for a POSIX-based system which are contained
in this section. This section does not contain a complete list of every permission on a
macOS System that might be problematic. Developers and use cases differ, and what
some administrators who are long in the profession might consider a travesty are issues
to which a risk assessor steeped in BYOD trends may not give a second glance. Here
we document controls that should point out truly bad practices or anomalies which
should be looked at and considered closely. Many of the controls are to mitigate the risk
of privilege escalation attacks and data exposure to unauthorized parties.
Page 292
• Level 1
Description:
By default, macOS allows all valid users into the top level of every other user's home
folder and restricts access to the Apple default folders within. Another user on the same
system can see you have a "Documents" folder but cannot see inside it. This
configuration does work for personal file sharing but can expose user files to standard
accounts on the system.
The best parallel for Enterprise environments is that everyone who has a Dropbox
account can see everything that is at the top level but can't see your pictures. Similarly
with macOS, users can see into every new Directory that is created because of the
default permissions.
Home folders should be restricted to access only by the user. Sharing should be used
on dedicated servers or cloud instances that are managing access controls. Some
environments may encounter problems if execute rights are removed as well as read
and write. Either no access or execute only for group or others is acceptable.
Rationale:
Allowing all users to view the top level of all networked users' home folder may not be
desirable since it may lead to the revelation of sensitive information.
Impact:
If implemented, users will not be able to use the "Public" folders in other users' home
folders. "Public" folders with appropriate permissions would need to be set up in the
/Shared folder.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to ensure that all home folders are secure:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/find /System/Volumes/Data/Users -mindepth 1 -
maxdepth 1 -type d -not -perm 700 | /usr/bin/grep -v "Shared" | /usr/bin/grep
-v "Guest"
The output will show what user folders are not secure.
example:
Page 293
/System/Volumes/Data/Users/firstuser
/System/Volumes/Data/Users/thirduser
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
For each user, run the following command to secure all home folders:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/chmod -R og-rwx /Users/<username>
Alternately, run the following command if there needs to be executable access for a
home folder:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/chmod -R og-rw /Users/<username>
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/chmod -R og-rw /Users/firstuser/
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 294
• Level 1
Description:
System Integrity Protection is a security feature introduced in OS X 10.11 El Capitan.
System Integrity Protection restricts access to System domain locations and restricts
runtime attachment to system processes. Any attempt to inspect or attach to a system
process will fail. Kernel Extensions are now restricted to /Library/Extensions and are
required to be signed with a Developer ID.
Rationale:
Running without System Integrity Protection on a production system runs the risk of the
modification of system binaries or code injection of system processes that would
otherwise be protected by SIP.
Impact:
System binaries and processes could become compromised.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that System Integrity Protection is enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/csrutil status
Page 295
1. Reboot into the Recovery Partition (reboot and hold down Command (⌘) +
R)
2. Select Utilities
3. Select Terminal
4. Run the following command:
Note: You should research why the system had SIP disabled. It might be a better option
to erase the Mac and reinstall the operating system. That is at your discretion.
Note: You cannot enable System Integrity Protection from the booted operating system.
If the remediation is attempted in the booted OS and not the Recovery Partition the
output will give the error csrutil: failed to modify system integrity
configuration. This tool needs to be executed from the Recovery OS.
References:
1. https://developer.apple.com/documentation/security/disabling_and_enabling_syst
em_integrity_protection
2. https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204899
Additional Information:
Related to SIP controls, Library Validation is a security feature introduced in macOS
10.10 Yosemite. Library Validation protects processes from loading arbitrary libraries.
This stops root from loading arbitrary libraries into any process (depending on SIP
status), and keeps root from becoming more powerful. Security is strengthened,
because some user processes can no longer be fooled to run additional code without
root's explicit request, which may grant access to daemons that depend on Library
Validation for secure validation of code identity.
With SIP enabled, Library Validation cannot be disabled. To test against a non-validated
library, you will need to disabled SIP AND disable Library Validation.
Page 296
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 297
• Level 1
Description:
Apple Mobile File Integrity (AMFI) was first released in macOS 10.12. The daemon and
service block attempts to run unsigned code. AMFI uses launchd, code signatures,
certificates, entitlements, and provisioning profiles to create a filtered entitlement
dictionary for an app. AMFI is the macOS kernel module that enforces code-signing and
library validation.
Rationale:
0
Note: AMFI cannot be disabled with SIP enabled, but a change attempt can be made
that will appear successful, and report incorrectly as successful. If the AMFI audit fails,
and the SIP audit passes, this is still an issue the admin should research.
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable the Apple Mobile File Integrity service:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/nvram boot-args=""
References:
1. https://eclecticlight.co/2018/12/29/amfi-checking-file-integrity-on-your-mac/
2. https://github.com/usnistgov/macos_security/issues/39
3. https://github.com/usnistgov/macos_security/issues/40
4. https://www.naut.ca/blog/2020/11/13/forbidden-commands-to-liberate-macos/
Page 298
Controls
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Version
Page 299
• Level 1
Description:
Signed System Volume is a security feature introduced in macOS 11.0 Big Sur.
During system installation, a SHA-256 cryptographic hash is calculated for all immutable
system files and stored in a Merkle tree which itself is hashed as the Seal. Both are
stored in the metadata of the snapshot created of the System volume.
The seal is verified by the boot loader at startup. macOS will not boot if system files
have been tampered with. If validation fails, the user will be instructed to reinstall the
operating system.
During read operations for files located in the Signed System Volume, a hash is
calculated and compared to the value stored in the Merkle tree.
Rationale:
Running without Signed System Volume on a production system could run the risk of
Apple software that integrates directly with macOS being modified.
Impact:
Apple Software that integrates with the operating system could become compromised.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that Signed System Volume is enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/csrutil authenticated-root status
Remediation:
If SSV has been disabled, assume that the operating system has been compromised.
Back up any files, and do a clean install to a known good Operating System.
Page 300
1. https://developer.apple.com/news/?id=3xpv8r2m
2. https://eclecticlight.co/2020/11/30/is-big-surs-system-volume-sealed/
3. https://eclecticlight.co/2020/06/25/big-surs-signed-system-volume-added-
security-protection/
4. https://support.apple.com/guide/security/signed-system-volume-security-
secd698747c9/web
5. https://support.apple.com/guide/mac-help/what-is-a-signed-system-volume-
mchl0f9af76f/mac
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 301
• Level 1
Description:
Applications in the System Applications Directory (/Applications) should be world-
executable since that is their reason to be on the system. They should not be world-
writable and allow any process or user to alter them for other processes or users to then
execute modified versions.
Rationale:
Unauthorized modifications of applications could lead to the execution of malicious
code.
Impact:
Applications changed will no longer be world-writable. Depending on the environment,
there will be different risk tolerances on each non-conforming application. Global
changes should not be performed where mission-critical applications are misconfigured.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that all applications have the correct permissions:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/find /System/Volumes/Data/Applications -iname
"*\.app" -type d -perm -2 -ls | grep -v Xcode.app | /usr/bin/wc -l |
/usr/bin/xargs
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to change the permissions for each application that does
not meet the requirements:
% /usr/bin/sudo IFS=$'\n'
for apps in $( /usr/bin/find /System/Volumes/Data/Applications -iname
"*\.app" -type d -perm -2 | grep -v Xcode.app ); do
/bin/chmod -R o-w "$apps"
done
Note: Global changes should not be performed where mission-critical applications are
part of the improperly permissioned applications.
Page 302
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 303
• Level 1
Description:
Software sometimes insists on being installed in the /System/Volumes/Data/System
Directory and has inappropriate world-writable permissions.
Macs with writable files in System should be investigated forensically. A file with open
writable permissions is a sign of at best a rogue application. It could also be a sign of a
computer compromise and a persistent presence on the system.
Rationale:
Folders in /System/Volumes/Data/System should not be world-writable. The audit
check excludes the downloadDir and locks folders that are part of Apple's default user
template.
Impact:
Changing file permissions could disrupt the use of applications that rely on files in the
System Folder with vulnerable permissions.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to check for directories in the /System folder that are world-
writable:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/find /System/Volumes/Data/System -type d -perm -2 -
ls | /usr/bin/grep -vE "downloadDir|locks" | /usr/bin/wc -l | /usr/bin/xargs
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to set permissions so that folders are not world-writable in
the /System folder:
% /usr/bin/sudo IFS=$'\n'
for sysPermissions in $( /usr/bin/find /System/Volumes/Data/System -type d
-perm -2 | /usr/bin/grep -vE "downloadDir|locks" ); do
/bin/chmod -R o-w "$sysPermissions"
done
Page 304
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 305
• Level 2
Description:
Software sometimes insists on being installed in the /System/Volumes/Data/Library
Directory and has inappropriate world-writable permissions.
Rationale:
Folders in /System/Volumes/Data/Library should not be world-writable. The audit
check excludes the /System/Volumes/Data/Library/Caches and
/System/Volumes/Data/Library/Preferences/Audio/Data folders where the sticky
bit is set.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following to verify that no directories in the /System/Volumes/Data/Library
folder are world-writable:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/find /System/Volumes/Data/Library -type d -perm -2 -
ls 2>&1 | /usr/bin/grep -v Caches | /usr/bin/grep -v /Preferences/Audio/Data
| /usr/bin/wc -l | /usr/bin/xargs
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to set permissions so that folders are not world-writable in
the /System/Volumes/Data/Library folder:
% /usr/bin/sudo IFS=$'\n'
for libPermissions in $( /usr/bin/find /System/Volumes/Data/Library -type d -
perm -2 2>&1 | /usr/bin/grep -v Caches | /usr/bin/grep -v
/Preferences/Audio/Data ); do
/bin/chmod -R o-w "$libPermissions"
done
Page 306
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 307
Page 308
• https://developer.apple.com/documentation/devicemanagement/passcode
• https://krypted.com/mac-security/programatically-setting-password-policies/
• https://www.macworld.co.uk/news/flaw-mac-t2-chip-passwords-3813616/
Note: The current method of creating and setting password policy is using the
pwpolicy -setglobalpolicy command. That command has been deprecated by
Apple, but is still in use in the current version of macOS. The Benchmark will continue to
use this command line method for passwords until Apple removes it from the OS.
Setting password policy with mobile configuration profiles is the preferred method going
forward.
Page 309
• Level 1
Description:
The account lockout threshold specifies the amount of times a user can enter an
incorrect password before a lockout will occur.
Ensure that a lockout threshold is part of the password policy on the computer.
Rationale:
The account lockout feature mitigates brute-force password attacks on the system.
Impact:
The number of incorrect log on attempts should be reasonably small to minimize the
possibility of a successful password attack, while allowing for honest errors made during
a normal user log on.
The locked account will auto-unlock after a few minutes when bad password attempts
stop. The computer will accept the still-valid password if remembered or recovered.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the Password Account Threshold is set to
less than or equal to 5 and the lockout time is greater than or equal to 15:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the number of failed attempts is less than or
equal to 5:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies 2> /dev/null |
/usr/bin/tail +2 | /usr/bin/xmllint --xpath
'//dict/key[text()="policyAttributeMaximumFailedAuthentications"]/following-
sibling::integer[1]/text()' -
Page 310
Note: The profile method is the preferred method for setting password policy since -
setglobalpolicy in pwpolicy is deprecated and will likely be removed in a future
macOS release.
Note: This is for the login password only and does not affect the timeout of FileVault.
References:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 311
• Level 1
Description:
A minimum password length is the fewest number of characters a password can contain
to meet a system's requirements.
Ensure that a minimum of a 15-character password is part of the password policy on the
computer.
Where the confidentiality of encrypted information in FileVault is more of a concern,
requiring a longer password or passphrase may be sufficient rather than imposing
additional complexity requirements that may be self-defeating.
Rationale:
Information systems that are not protected with strong password schemes including
passwords of minimum length provide a greater opportunity for attackers to crack the
password and gain access to the system.
Impact:
Short passwords can be easily attacked.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the Password Account Threshold is set to
greater than or equal to 15:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the password length is greater than or equal to
15:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies | /usr/bin/grep -e
"policyAttributePassword matches" | /usr/bin/cut -b 46-53 | /usr/bin/cut -
d',' -f1 | /usr/bin/cut -d'{' -f2
Page 312
Note: The profile method is the preferred method for setting password policy since -
setglobalpolicy in pwpolicy is deprecated and will likely be removed in a future
macOS release.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 313
• Level 2
Description:
Complex passwords contain one character from each of the following classes: English
uppercase letters, English lowercase letters, Westernized Arabic numerals, and non-
alphanumeric characters.
Ensure that an Alphabetic character is part of the password policy on the computer.
Rationale:
The more complex a password, the more resistant it will be against persons seeking
unauthorized access to a system.
Impact:
Password policy should be in effect to reduce the risk of exposed services being
compromised easily through dictionary attacks or other social engineering attempts.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the passwords must contain at least 1
alphabetic character:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the password requires at least one letter:
% pref1=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies | /usr/bin/grep
-e "Contain at least one number and one alphabetic character." | cut -b 13-
68) && pref2=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies |
/usr/bin/grep -A1 minimumLetters | /usr/bin/tail -1 | /usr/bin/cut -d'>' -f2
| /usr/bin/cut -d '<' -f1) && if [ "$pref1" = "Contain at least one number
and one alphabetic character" ]; then echo "true"; elif [[ "$pref2" != "" &&
pref2 -ge 1 ]]; then echo "true"; else echo "false"; fi
true
Page 314
Note: This profile sets a requirement of both an alphabetical and a numeric character.
Note: The profile method is the preferred method for setting password policy since -
setglobalpolicy in pwpolicy is deprecated and will likely be removed in a future
macOS release.
Additional Information:
Note: The CIS macOS community has decided to not require the additional password
complexity settings (Recommendations 5.3 - 5.6). Because of that, we have left the
complexity recommendations as a manual assessment. Since there are a large amount
of admins in the greater macOS world that do need these settings, we include both the
guidance for the proper setting as well as probes for CIS-CAT to test.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 315
• Level 2
Description:
Complex passwords contain one character from each of the following classes: English
uppercase letters, English lowercase letters, Westernized Arabic numerals, and non-
alphanumeric characters.
Ensure that a number or numeric value is part of the password policy on the computer.
Rationale:
The more complex a password, the more resistant it will be against persons seeking
unauthorized access to a system.
Impact:
Password policy should be in effect to reduce the risk of exposed services being
compromised easily through dictionary attacks or other social engineering attempts.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the passwords must contain at least 1
numeric character:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that passwords require at least one number:
% pref1=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies | /usr/bin/grep
-e "Contain at least one number and one alphabetic character." | cut -b 13-
68) && pref2=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies |
/usr/bin/grep -A1 minimumNumericCharacters | /usr/bin/tail -1 | /usr/bin/cut
-d'>' -f2 | /usr/bin/cut -d '<' -f1) && if [ "$pref1" = "Contain at least one
number and one alphabetic character" ]; then echo "true"; elif [[ "$pref2" !=
"" && pref2 -ge 1 ]]; then echo "true"; else echo "false"; fi
true
Page 316
Note: This profile sets a requirement of both an alphabetical and a numeric character.
Note: The profile method is the preferred method for setting password policy since -
setglobalpolicy in pwpolicy is deprecated and will likely be removed in a future
macOS release.
Additional Information:
Note: The CIS macOS community has decided to not require the additional password
complexity settings (Recommendations 5.3 - 5.6). Because of that, we have left the
complexity recommendations as a manual assessment. Since there are a large amount
of admins in the greater macOS world that do need these settings, we include both the
guidance for the proper setting as well as probes for CIS-CAT to test.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 317
• Level 2
Description:
Complex passwords contain one character from each of the following classes: English
uppercase letters, English lowercase letters, Westernized Arabic numerals, and non-
alphanumeric characters. Ensure that a special character is part of the password policy
on the computer.
Rationale:
The more complex a password, the more resistant it will be against persons seeking
unauthorized access to a system.
Impact:
Password policy should be in effect to reduce the risk of exposed services being
compromised easily through dictionary attacks or other social engineering attempts.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the passwords must contain at least 1 special
character:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the password requires at least one special
character:
% pref1=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies |
/usr/bin/grep -e "policyAttributePassword matches '(.*[^a-zA-Z0-9].*){1,}'" |
cut -b 12-67) && pref2=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies
| /usr/bin/grep -A1 minimumSymbols | /usr/bin/tail -1 | /usr/bin/cut -d'>' -
f2 | /usr/bin/cut -d '<' -f1) && if [ "$pref1" = "policyAttributePassword
matches '(.*[^a-zA-Z0-9].*){1,}'" ]; then echo "true"; elif [[ "$pref2" != ""
&& pref2 -ge 1 ]]; then echo "true"; else echo "false"; fi
true
Page 318
Note: The profile method is the preferred method for setting password policy since -
setglobalpolicy in pwpolicy is deprecated and will likely be removed in a future
macOS release.
Additional Information:
Note: The CIS macOS community has decided to not require the additional password
complexity settings (Recommendations 5.3 - 5.6). Because of that, we have left the
complexity recommendations as a manual assessment. Since there are a large amount
of admins in the greater macOS world that do need these settings, we include both the
guidance for the proper setting as well as probes for CIS-CAT to test.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 319
• Level 2
Description:
Complex passwords contain one character from each of the following classes: English
uppercase letters, English lowercase letters, Westernized Arabic numerals, and non-
alphanumeric characters.
Ensure that both uppercase and lowercase letters are part of the password policy on the
computer.
Rationale:
The more complex a password, the more resistant it will be against persons seeking
unauthorized access to a system.
Impact:
Password policy should be in effect to reduce the risk of exposed services being
compromised easily through dictionary attacks or other social engineering attempts.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the password requires an upper and lower
case letter:
% pref=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies | /usr/bin/grep
-A1 minimumMixedCaseCharacters | /usr/bin/tail -1 | /usr/bin/cut -d'>' -f2 |
/usr/bin/cut -d '<' -f1) && if [[ "$pref" != "" && pref -ge 1 ]]; then echo
"true"; else echo "false"; fi
true
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to set passwords to require an upper and lower case letter:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -n /Local/Default -setglobalpolicy
"requiresMixedCase=<value≥1>"
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -n /Local/Default -setglobalpolicy
"requiresMixedCase=1"
Page 320
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 321
• Level 1
Description:
Over time, passwords can be captured by third parties through mistakes, phishing
attacks, third-party breaches, or merely brute-force attacks. To reduce the risk of
exposure and to decrease the incentives of password reuse (passwords that are not
forced to be changed periodically generally are not ever changed), users should reset
passwords periodically. This control uses 365 days as the acceptable value. Some
organizations may be more or less restrictive. This control mainly exists to mitigate
against password reuse of the macOS account password in other realms that may be
more prone to compromise. Attackers take advantage of exposed information to attack
other accounts.
Rationale:
Passwords should be changed periodically to reduce exposure.
Impact:
Required password changes will lead to some locked computers requiring admin
assistance.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the passwords expire after at most 365 days:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that the password expires after at most 365 days:
% pref1=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -getaccountpolicies | /usr/bin/grep
-A1 policyAttributeExpiresEveryNDays | /usr/bin/tail -1 | /usr/bin/cut -d'>'
-f2 | /usr/bin/cut -d '<' -f1) && pref2=$(/usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -
getaccountpolicies | /usr/bin/grep -A1 policyAttributeDaysUntilExpiration |
/usr/bin/tail -1 | /usr/bin/cut -d'>' -f2 | /usr/bin/cut -d '<' -f1) && if [[
"$pref1" != "" && pref1 -le 365 ]]; then echo "true"; elif [[ "$pref2" != ""
&& pref2 -le 365 ]]; then echo "true"; else echo "false"; fi
true
Page 322
Note: The profile method is the preferred method for setting password policy since -
setglobalpolicy in pwpolicy is deprecated and will likely be removed in a future
macOS release.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 323
• Level 1
Description:
Over time, passwords can be captured by third parties through mistakes, phishing
attacks, third-party breaches, or merely brute-force attacks. To reduce the risk of
exposure and to decrease the incentives of password reuse (passwords that are not
forced to be changed periodically generally are not ever changed), users must reset
passwords periodically. This control ensures that previous passwords are not reused
immediately by keeping a history of previous password hashes. Ensure that password
history checks are part of the password policy on the computer. This control checks
whether a new password is different than the previous 15. The latest NIST guidance
based on exploit research referenced in this section details how one of the greatest
risks is password exposure rather than password cracking. Passwords should be
changed to a new unique value whenever a password might have been exposed to
anyone other than the account holder. Attackers have maintained persistent control
based on predictable password change patterns and substantially different patterns
should be used in case of a leak.
Rationale:
Old passwords should not be reused.
Impact:
Required password changes will lead to some locked computers requiring admin
assistance.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that the password is not the same as at least the
last 15 passwords:
Page 324
true
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to require that the password must be different from at least
the last 15 passwords:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -n /Local/Default -setglobalpolicy
"usingHistory=<value≥15>"
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/pwpolicy -n /Local/Default -setglobalpolicy
"usingHistory=15"
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: The profile method is the preferred method for setting password policy since -
setglobalpolicy in pwpolicy is deprecated and will likely be removed in a future
macOS release.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 325
Apple has created simple, easy-to-use encryption capabilities built into macOS. Those
tools need to be utilized in order to protect information processed by macOS computers.
Page 326
• Level 1
Description:
Apple developed a new file system which was first made available in 10.12 and then
became the default in 10.13. The file system is optimized for Flash and Solid-State
storage and encryption. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Apple_File_System macOS
computers generally have several volumes created as part of APFS formatting,
including Preboot, Recovery and Virtual Memory (VM), as well as traditional user disks.
All APFS volumes that do not have specific roles and do not require encryption should
be encrypted. "Role" disks include Preboot, Recovery and VM. User disks are labelled
with "(No specific role)" by default.
Rationale:
In order to protect user data from loss or tampering volumes, carrying data should be
encrypted.
Impact:
While FileVault protects the boot volume, data may be copied to other attached storage
and reduce the protection afforded by FileVault. Ensure all user volumes are encrypted
to protect data.
Page 327
Page 328
Remediation:
Use Disk Utility to erase a user disk and format as APFS (Encrypted).
Note: APFS Encrypted disks will be described as "FileVault" whether they are the boot
volume or not in the ap list.
Page 329
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 330
• Level 1
Description:
Apple introduced CoreStorage with 10.7. It is used as the default for formatting on
macOS volumes prior to 10.13.
All HFS and CoreStorage Volumes should be encrypted.
Rationale:
In order to protect user data from loss or tampering, volumes carrying data should be
encrypted.
Impact:
While FileVault protects the boot volume, data may be copied to other attached storage
and reduce the protection afforded by FileVault. Ensure all user volumes are encrypted
to protect data.
Page 331
Page 332
Remediation:
Use Disk Utility to erase a disk and format as macOS Extended (Journaled, Encrypted).
Page 333
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 334
• Level 1
Description:
The sudo command allows the user to run programs as the root user. Working as the
root user allows the user an extremely high level of configurability within the system.
This control, along with the control to use a separate timestamp for each tty, limits the
window where an unauthorized user, process, or attacker could utilize legitimate
credentials that are valid for longer than required.
Rationale:
The sudo command stays logged in as the root user for five minutes before timing out
and re-requesting a password. This five-minute window should be eliminated since it
leaves the system extremely vulnerable. This is especially true if an exploit were to gain
access to the system, since they would be able to make changes as a root user.
Impact:
This control has a serious impact where users often have to use sudo. It is even more of
an impact where users have to use sudo multiple times in quick succession as part of
normal work processes. Organizations with that common use case will likely find this
control too onerous and are better to accept the risk of not requiring a 0 grace period.
In some ways the use of sudo -s, which is undesirable, is better than a long grace
period since that use does change the hash to show that it is a root shell rather than a
normal shell where sudo commands will be implemented without a password.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Perform the following to verify the sudo timeout period:
$ /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/sudo -V | /usr/bin/grep -c "Authentication timestamp
timeout: 0.0 minutes"
1
Run the following commands to verify that the root is the owner of the /etc/sudoers.d
folder, and that wheel is the group:
% /usr/bin/stat /etc/sudoers.d
Page 335
Additional Information:
In previous iterations and OS versions of the macOS Benchmark, the guidance was to
edit the sudoers file directly. While this would properly configure the OS, any update
would change the settings back to the default configuration. Creating a configuration file
in the /etc/sudoers.d/ folder will not be modified on an OS update and will keep the
proper configuration.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 336
• Level 1
Description:
Using tty tickets ensures that a user must enter the sudo password in each Terminal
session.
With sudo versions 1.8 and higher, introduced in 10.12, the default value is to have tty
tickets for each interface so that root access is limited to a specific terminal. The default
configuration can be overwritten or not configured correctly on earlier versions of
macOS.
Rationale:
In combination with removing the sudo timeout grace period, a further mitigation should
be in place to reduce the possibility of a background process using elevated rights when
a user elevates to root in an explicit context or tty.
Additional mitigation should be in place to reduce the risk of privilege escalation of
background processes.
Impact:
This control should have no user impact. Developers or installers may have issues if
background processes are spawned with different interfaces than where sudo was
executed.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to verify that the default sudoers controls are in place with
explicit tickets per tty:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/sudo -V | /usr/bin/grep -c "Type of authentication
timestamp record: tty"
Page 337
References:
1. https://github.com/jorangreef/sudo-prompt/issues/33
Additional Information:
In previous iterations and OS versions of the macOS Benchmark, the guidance was to
edit the sudoers file directly. While this would properly configure the OS, any update
would change the settings back to the default configuration. Creating a configuration file
in the /etc/sudoers.d/ folder will not be modified on an OS update and will keep the
proper configuration.
With the configuration file, there is no need to remove the Defaults !tty_tickets
line from the visudo settings. The configuration file will take precedent.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 338
• Level 1
Description:
The root account is a superuser account that has access privileges to perform any
actions and read/write to any file on the computer. With some versions of Linux, the
system administrator may commonly use the root account to perform administrative
functions.
Rationale:
Enabling and using the root account puts the system at risk since any successful exploit
or mistake while the root account is in use could have unlimited access privileges within
the system. Using the sudo command allows users to perform functions as a root user
while limiting and password protecting the access privileges. By default the root account
is not enabled on a macOS computer. An administrator can escalate privileges using
the sudo command (use -s or -i to get a root shell).
Impact:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify the the root user has not been enabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/dscl . -read /Users/root AuthenticationAuthority
Page 339
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable the root user:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/dsenableroot -d
username = root
user password:
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 340
• Level 1
Description:
macOS has a privilege that can be granted to any user that will allow that user to unlock
active users' sessions.
Rationale:
Disabling the administrator's and/or user's ability to log into another user's active and
locked session prevents unauthorized persons from viewing potentially sensitive and/or
personal information.
Impact:
While Fast user switching is a workaround for some lab environments, especially where
there is even less of an expectation of privacy, this setting change may impact some
maintenance workflows.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a user cannot log into another user's active
and/or locked session:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/security authorizationdb read
system.login.screensaver 2>&1 | /usr/bin/grep -c 'authenticate-session-owner'
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable a user logging into another user's active and/or
locked session:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/security authorizationdb write
system.login.screensaver authenticate-session-owner
YES (0)
Running this command will disable Touch ID to unlock the screen saver. To re-enable
Touch ID for users, run the following command:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/defaults write
/Library/Preferences/com.apple.loginwindow screenUnlockMode -int 1
Page 341
1. https://derflounder.wordpress.com/2014/02/16/managing-the-authorization-
database-in-os-x-mavericks/
2. https://www.jamf.com/jamf-nation/discussions/18195/system-login-screensaver
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 342
• Level 2
Description:
A Login window banner warning informs the user that the system is reserved for
authorized use only. It enforces an acknowledgment by the user that they have been
informed of the use policy in the banner if required. The system recognizes either the
.txt and the .rtf formats.
Rationale:
An access warning may reduce a casual attacker's tendency to target the system.
Access warnings may also aid in the prosecution of an attacker by evincing the
attacker's knowledge of the system's private status, acceptable use policy, and
authorization requirements.
Impact:
Users will have to click on the window with the Login text before logging into the
computer.
Page 343
{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\cocoartf1561\cocoasubrtf610
{\fonttbl\f0\fswiss\fcharset0 Helvetica;}
{\colortbl;\red255\green255\blue255;}
{\*\expandedcolortbl;;}
\margl1440\margr1440\vieww10800\viewh8400\viewkind0
\pard\tx566\tx1133\tx1700\tx2267\tx2834\tx3401\tx3968\tx4535\tx5102\tx5669\tx
6236\tx6803\pardirnatural\partightenfactor0
{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\cocoartf1561\cocoasubrtf610
{\fonttbl\f0\fswiss\fcharset0 Helvetica;}
{\colortbl;\red255\green255\blue255;}
{\*\expandedcolortbl;;}
\margl1440\margr1440\vieww10800\viewh8400\viewkind0
\pard\tx566\tx1133\tx1700\tx2267\tx2834\tx3401\tx3968\tx4535\tx5102\tx5669\tx
6236\tx6803\pardirnatural\partightenfactor0
\f0\fs24 \cf0 Center for Internet Security Test Message}Center for Internet
Security Test Message
644
Page 344
Note: If your organization uses an .rtfd file to set the policy banner, run %
/usr/bin/sudo /bin/chmod o+rx /Library/Security/PolicyBanner.rtfd to
update the permissions.
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-au/HT202277
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 345
• Level 1
Description:
In the previous two controls, the guest account login has been disabled and sharing to
guests has been disabled, as well. There is no need for the legacy Guest home folder to
remain in the file system. When normal user accounts are removed, you have the option
to archive it, leave it in place, or delete. In the case of the guest folder, the folder
remains in place without a GUI option to remove it. If at some point in the future a Guest
account is needed, it will be re-created. The presence of the Guest home folder can
cause automated audits to fail when looking for compliant settings within all User
folders, as well. Rather than ignoring the folder's continued existence, it is best
removed.
Rationale:
The Guest home folders are unneeded after the Guest account is disabled and could be
used inappropriately.
Impact:
The Guest account should not be necessary after it is disabled, and it will be
automatically re-created if the Guest account is re-enabled
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify if the Guest user home folder exists:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/ls /Users/ | /usr/bin/grep Guest
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to remove the Guest user home folder:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/rm -R /Users/Guest
Page 346
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 347
• Level 1
Description:
XProtect is Apple's native signature-based antivirus technology. XProtect both finds and
blocks the execution of known malware. There are many AV and Endpoint Threat
Detection and Response (ETDR) tools available for Mac OS. The native Apple
provisioned tool looks for specific known malware and is completely integrated into the
OS. No matter what other tools are being used, XProtect should have the latest
signatures available.
Rationale:
Apple creates signatures for known malware that actually affects Macs and that
knowledge should be leveraged.
Impact:
Some organizations may have effective Mac OS anti-malware tools that XProtect
conflicts with.
Page 348
Starting update.
No update applied, already up to date
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable and update XProtect:
% /usr/bin/sudo /bin/launchctl load -w
/Library/Apple/System/Library/LaunchDaemons/com.apple.XProtect.daemon.scan.pl
ist
Starting update.
Update succeeded: Activated update LocalUpdate[<newest XProtect version>]
Note: Xprotect can only be enabled/disabled if SIP (System Integrity Protection) is
disabled. If Xprotect is disabled, the system might be compromised and needs to be
investigated.
Page 349
1. https://eclecticlight.co/2021/10/27/silently-updated-security-data-files-in-
monterey/
2. https://eclecticlight.co/2020/12/14/silently-updated-security-data-files-in-big-sur/
3. https://eclecticlight.co/2019/10/17/security-data-files-how-theyve-changed-in-
catalina/
4. https://eclecticlight.co/2022/05/12/apple-has-pushed-an-update-to-xprotect-21/
5. https://support.apple.com/guide/security/protecting-against-malware-
sec469d47bd8/web
6. https://eclecticlight.co/2023/06/12/malware-detection-and-remediation-by-
xprotect-remediator/
Additional Information:
To verify the XProtect Remediator logs run the following command:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/log show --predicate 'subsystem ==
"com.apple.XProtectFramework.PluginAPI" AND category ==
"XPEvent.structured"' --info --last 1d' to check logs'
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 350
• Level 1
Description:
In order to properly monitor the use of the sudo command, logs events for any use of
sudo should be captured in the unified log.
Rationale:
Apple added sudo logging as part of the unified log in macOS 14.0 Sonoma. In macOS
15.0 Sequoia, it is now disabled by default but it should be enabled.
Impact:
Sensitive date (ex proprietary data, PII, etc) could be sent to the unified log with sudo
logging enabled.
Audit:
Terminal Method:
Run the following commands to verify that the default sudoers controls are in place for
logging of sudo commands:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/sudo -V | /usr/bin/grep -c "Log when a command is
allowed by sudoers"
Remediation:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to edit the sudo settings:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/visudo -f /etc/sudoers
Remove the line, or comment out with # before the line, Defaults !log_allowed
Default Value:
If no value is set, the default value of tty_tickets enabled will be used.
References:
1. https://github.com/jorangreef/sudo-prompt/issues/33
Page 351
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 352
Page 353
Page 354
• Level 1
Description:
A filename extension is a suffix added to a base filename that indicates the base
filename's file format.
Rationale:
Visible filename extensions allow the user to identify the file type and the application it is
associated with which leads to quick identification of misrepresented malicious files.
Impact:
The user of the system can open files of unknown or unexpected filetypes if the
extension is not visible.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that file extensions are shown:
1. Open Finder
2. Select Finder in the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Advanced
5. Verify that Show all filename extensions is set
Page 355
1
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/firstuser/Library/Preferences/.GlobalPreferences.plist
AppleShowAllExtensions
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure file extensions are shown:
1. Open Finder
2. Select Finder in the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Advanced
5. Set Show all filename extensions to enabled
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable displaying of file extensions:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/<username>/Library/Preferences/.GlobalPreferences.plist
AppleShowAllExtensions -bool true
Page 356
1. https://blog.xpnsec.com/macos-filename-homoglyphs-revisited/
2. https://null-byte.wonderhowto.com/how-to/hacking-macos-create-fake-pdf-trojan-
with-applescript-part-2-disguising-script-0184706/
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 357
Mail is Apple's OS-included email client on both macOS and iOS. It supports a range of
email server services including iCloud, Exchange, Gmail and standard IMAP and POP
accounts. With the vast barrage of phishing attacks, any Internet email client is an
exploitable risk on a user system. Any email client should be hardened with controls that
assist the user against social engineering attacks to reduce the risk of unwanted emails.
This benchmark is not advocating for all users to use Apple Mail, just providing
guidance on controls for the built-in email client. Other email clients will have their own
set of security controls.
Apple provides a service for Apple+ users called "Hide My Email." With this service,
Apple creates unique email addresses (@iCloud.com) for domains that ask for my email
addresses which Apple forwards to your email address of record under your Apple
Account. This feature reduces tracking capabilities for third parties.
What is Hide My Email?
What is Email Hashing? The Importance of Hashed Email for Future Success
Apple Mail fully supports S/MIME without the use of any third party plugin. While there
are very few remaining trusted CAs issuing free S/MIME certificates, the use of a
trusted CA and digital signing enables others to interact with you using end-to-end
encryption through encrypted email. An internal CA may also be used but partner trust
of the CA will have to be coordinated.
More S/MIME info
Sign or encrypt emails in Mail on Mac
Installing an S/MIME Certificate and Sending Secure Email in macOS
Obtaining and using an S/MIME certificate on Apple MacOS
Sources of Free S/MIME Certificates
Page 358
• Level 2
Description:
Apple provides privacy protection that should be enabled for the mail app on macOS to
reduce information collection from a user that receives email.
Rationale:
Email is routinely abused by attackers, spammers and marketers. The "Protect Mail
Activity" control reduces risk by hiding the current IP address of your Mac and privately
downloading remote content.
The Protect Mail Activity function of privately downloading remote content is not
applicable for those users that do not download any remote content. Typical Internet
email is no longer plain text and will not render properly without remote content.
Personal email or mailing list email may function without complaint by blocking remote
content.
Impact:
Some remote content may be access-controlled and refuse to download with this setting
enabled.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that protect mail activity is enabled:
1. Open Mail
2. Select Mail in the menu bar
3. Select Settings...
4. Select Privacy
5. Verify that Protect Mail Activity is enabled
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enabled protect mail activity:
1. Open Mail
2. Select Mail in the menu bar
3. Select Settings...
4. Select Privacy
5. Set Protect Mail Activity to enabled
Page 359
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/mail/use-mail-privacy-protection-
mlhl03be2866/mac
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 360
Safari is Apple's included web browser. Many macOS services only operate, or operate
more efficiently, through Safari's (and macOS's) use of WebKit frameworks, Javascript
included. Javascript has become an essential part of the modern web, and should not
be disabled for standard use cases.
https://www.apple.com/safari/
Page 361
• Level 1
Description:
Safari will automatically run or execute what it considers safe files. This can include
installers and other files that execute on the operating system. Safari evaluates file
safety by using a list of filetypes maintained by Apple. The list of files include text,
image, video and archive formats that would be run in the context of the OS rather than
the browser.
Rationale:
Hackers have taken advantage of this setting via drive-by attacks. These attacks occur
when a user visits a legitimate website that has been corrupted. The user unknowingly
downloads a malicious file either by closing an infected pop-up or hovering over a
malicious banner. An attacker can create a malicious file that will fall within Safari's safe
file list that will download and execute without user input.
Impact:
Apple considers many files that the operating system itself auto-executes as "safe files."
Many of these files could be malicious and could execute locally without the user even
knowing that a file of a specific type had been downloaded.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Page 362
AutoOpenSafeDownloads = 0;
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Additional Information:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select General
5. Verify that Open "safe" files after downloading is disabled
or
Page 363
0
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari AutoOpenSafeDownloads
0
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Remediation
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set safe files to not open after downloading in Safari:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select General
5. Set Open "safe" files after downloading to disabled
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to disable safe files from not opening when downloaded in
Safari:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/<username>/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preference
s/com.apple.Safari AutoOpenSafeDownloads -bool false
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari AutoOpenSafeDownloads -bool false
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Page 364
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 365
• Level 2
Description:
Organizational management of user web browsing history is a challenge affected by
multiple facets. Organizations should decide whether to manage browser history and
how much history should be maintained.
Rationale:
There are conflicting concerns in the retention of browser history. Unlimited retention:
Old browser history becomes stale and the use or misuse of the data can lead to
unwanted outcomes. Search engine results are maintained and often provide much
more relevant current information than old website visit information.
Impact:
If old browsing history is not available, it will not be available to authorized or
unauthorized users. Some users may find old and even stale information useful.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify how long the history in Safari is kept:
Page 366
Note: Setting the plist key to a value that is not represented by the GUI could cause
issues.
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
Additional Information:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select General
5. Verify that Remove history items is set to your organization's requirements
or
Page 367
14
31
365
36500
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Page 368
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select General
5. Set Remove history items to your organization's requirements
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to set when Safari will remove history items:
$ /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/<username>/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preference
s/com.apple.Safari HistoryAgeInDaysLimit -int <1,7,14,31,365,36500>
example:
$ /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari HistoryAgeInDaysLimit -int 36500
Page 369
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 370
• Level 1
Description:
Apple uses the Google Safe Browsing API to check for fraudulent websites and report
them to the user attempting to visit one.
Rationale:
Attackers use crafted web pages to social engineer users to load unwanted content.
Warning users prior to loading the content enables better security.
Impact:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that warns when visiting
fraudulent sites in Safari:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/system_profiler SPConfigurationProfileDataType |
/usr/bin/grep WarnAboutFraudulentWebsites | /usr/bin/tr -d ' '
WarnAboutFraudulentWebsites = 1;
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Page 371
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/security-ibrw1074/16.0/mac/12.0
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to verify that warn when visiting a fraudulent site in Safari is
enabled:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Security
5. Verify that Warn when visiting a fraudulent site is enabled
or
Page 372
1
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari WarnAboutFraudulentWebsites
1
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set Safari to warn when visiting a fraudulent site:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Security
5. Set Warn when visiting a fraudulent site to enabled
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable warn when visiting a fraudulent site in Safari:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/<username>/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preference
s/com.apple.Safari WarnAboutFraudulentWebsites -bool true
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari WarnAboutFraudulentWebsites -bool true
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Page 373
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 374
• Level 1
Description:
There is a vast network of groups that collect, use, and sell user data. One method used
to collect user data is pay and provide content and services for website owners. Along
with that "assistance," the site owners also push tracking cookies on visitors. In many
cases the help allows a content owner to keep the site up. The tracking cookies allow
information brokers to track web users across visited sites. For better privacy and to
provide some resistance to data brokers, prevent cross-tracking.
Rationale:
Cross-tracking allows data-brokers to follow you across the Internet to enable their
business model of selling personal data. Users should protect their data and not
volunteer it to marketing companies.
Impact:
Page 375
BlockStoragePolicy = 2;
WebKitPreferences.storageBlockingPolicy = 1;
WebKitStorageBlockingPolicy = 1;
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/guide/safari/prevent-cross-site-tracking-sfri40732/mac
Page 376
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Privacy
5. Verify that Prevent cross-site tracking is enabled
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that preventing cross-site tracking in Safari is not
disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/<username>/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preference
s/com.apple.Safari BlockStoragePolicy
Page 377
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set prevent cross-site tracking in Safari to enabled:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Privacy
5. Set Prevent cross-site tracking is enable
Page 378
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 379
• Level 2
Description:
Public (Routable) IP addresses can be used to track people to their current location,
including home and business addresses. While a valid IP address is necessary to load
the site, the valid address does not need to be provided to known trackers and should
be hidden.
Rationale:
Trackers can correlate your visits through various applications, including websites, and
are a threat to your privacy.
Impact:
Website address blocking through iCloud Private Relay may prevent some wanted
pages from loading that use IP geolocation access controls.
Some organizations use IP address access controls (ACLs). If your organization or
partners are using IP address ACLs, there will be unreachable web services if Apple
hides the IP address.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify the setting for hiding IP addresses from trackers in
Safari:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Privacy
5. Verify that Hide IP address from trackers is set to your organization's
requirement
Page 380
130272
130276
In the above example the firstuser has hide ip address from trackers disabled.
Seconduser has it enabled.
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set Safari whether or not to hide IP addresses from
trackers:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Privacy
5. Set Hide IP address from trackers to your organization's requirements
Page 381
33422560 will set hide IP address from trackers to disabled. 33422564 will enable from
Trackers Only, and 33422572 will enabled from Trackers and Websites.
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari WBSPrivacyProxyAvailabilityTraffic -int 33422560
1. https://support.apple.com/en-bn/guide/safari/sfri35610/16.0/mac/12.0
Page 382
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 383
• Level 1
Description:
Apple provides a framework that allows advertisers to target Apple users and end-users
with advertisements. While many people prefer that when they see advertising it is
relevant to them and their interests, the detailed information that is data mining
collected, correlated, and available to advertisers in repositories is often disconcerting.
This information is valuable to both advertisers and attackers and has been used with
other metadata to reveal users' identities.
Organizations should manage advertising settings on computers rather than allow users
to configure the settings.
Apple Information
Ad tracking should be limited on 10.15 and prior.
Rationale:
Organizations should manage user privacy settings on managed devices to align with
organizational policies and user data protection requirements.
Impact:
Uses will see generic advertising rather than targeted advertising. Apple warns that this
will reduce the number of relevant ads.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that allow privacy-preserving measurement of ad
effectiveness in Safari is enabled:
Page 384
"WebKitPreferences.privateClickMeasurementEnabled" = 1;
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
Note: A user can still uncheck this option in the GUI, but it remains on in the
background and will show it enabled when re-launching Safari.
Page 385
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Privacy
5. Verify that Allow privacy-preserving measurement of ad effectiveness
is enabled
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that allow privacy-preserving measurement of ad
effectiveness in Safari is not disabled:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/<username>/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preference
s/com.apple.Safari WebKitPreferences.privateClickMeasurementEnabled
1
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari WebKitPreferences.privateClickMeasurementEnabled
1
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Note: The default setting is not auditable through the command line. Please turn off the
check and re-enable when the GUI does not reflect the audited results, or run the
Terminal command(s).
Page 386
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Privacy
5. Set Allow privacy-preserving measurement of ad effectiveness to
enabled
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable allow privacy-preserving measurement of ad
effectiveness in Safari:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/<username>/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preference
s/com.apple.Safari WebKitPreferences.privateClickMeasurementEnabled -bool
true
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari WebKitPreferences.privateClickMeasurementEnabled -bool true
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 387
• Level 1
Description:
Attackers use websites with malicious or unwanted content to exploit the user or the
computer. Part of the attack chain is to lure someone to load their content rather than
the desired content. In order to reduce the risk in interacting with unwanted content, the
full website address should always be displayed in Safari.
Rationale:
Full visibility into what site is being visited is important for privacy and security.
Impact:
Many URLs are very long and complicated, particularly for internal content management
systems. Some complete URLS in the Smart Search Field may be difficult to parse.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that showing full website addresses in Safari is
enabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that disables safe files
from opening in Safari:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/system_profiler SPConfigurationProfileDataType |
/usr/bin/grep ShowFullURLInSmartSearchField | /usr/bin/tr -d ' '
ShowFullURLInSmartSearchField = 1;
Page 388
References:
1. https://apple.stackexchange.com/questions/371473/always-show-full-url-in-
safari-address-bar
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify that showing full website addresses in Safari is
enabled:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Advanced
5. Verify that Show full website address is enabled
or
Page 389
1
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari ShowFullURLInSmartSearchField
1
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to set Safari to show full website addresses:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Security
5. Set Show full website address to enabled
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to enable showing full website addresses in Safari:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/<username>/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preference
s/com.apple.Safari ShowFullURLInSmartSearchField -bool true
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults write
/Users/firstuser/Library/Containers/com.apple.Safari/Data/Library/Preferences
/com.apple.Safari ShowFullURLInSmartSearchField -bool true
Note: To run the Terminal commands, Terminal must be granted Full Disk Access in
the Security & Privacy pane in System Preferences.
Page 390
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 391
• Level 2
Description:
AutoFill capabilities in a Web Browser are a feature to allow a user to avoid re-typing
the same user information in every form that a user encounters. Part of the modern
internet consists of vendors establishing a seemingly close relationship with as many
users as possible to market to them, data-mine from them and sell their data to third-
party data aggregators. AutoFill can be a method for a user to share too much
information with untrusted website owners. Many security professionals advise disabling
autofill to reduce the risk of over-sharing. These security professionals appear to believe
that manual data entry is better, since completing the required forms are often the only
method to connect to needed data. The best method for security is to ensure that the
data ready to be auto-filled is an acceptable risk to sites a user interacts with. Users
must review what data they accept the risk to share.
Rationale:
Auditing and accepting information a user is willing to share prior to loading the blank
form is the best way to manage risk.
Impact:
A user could overshare information based on trusting a site more than required.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to verify AutoFill in Safari:
Page 392
Page 393
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
Page 394
• Level 1
Description:
Browser pop-up windows have long been one of the most annoying delivery
mechanisms of unwanted web content. The content can be unwanted content, including
Not Safe For Work, or malicious content relying on a user interacting with the pop-up.
Safari has a built-in capability to disable pop-ups that should be enabled.
Rationale:
Pop-up windows are almost always unwanted content and should be blocked.
Impact:
Obsolete web content delivery systems may still rely on pop-ups on internal web
portals. Specific domains can be set to be allowed if absolutely necessary. Web
Developers should update content to reduce risk in the environment so that no pop-ups
are allowed.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to verify that the pop-up settings in Safari:
1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Websites
5. Select Pop-up Windows
6. Verify the websites listed in Allow pop-up windows on the website below:
are allowed according to your organization's requirements
7. Verify that When visiting other websites is set to Block and Notify or
Block
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1. Open Safari
2. Select Safari from the menu bar
3. Select Settings
4. Select Websites
5. Select Pop-up Windows
6. Set all websites to Block and Notify or Block, listed in Allow pop-up
windows on the website below:, or select Remove to remove a website
7. Set that When visiting other websites is set to Block and Notify or
Block
CIS Controls:
Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
The Status Bar in Safari shows the full URL of any link on hover. It protects the user
from visiting sites where the domain has been obfuscated by allowing the user to review
whether the link points to an unexpected location.
Rationale:
Showing the Status Bar allows the user to review the full URL of hyperlinks.
Impact:
The Status Bar is only visible at the very bottom of the Web page when a hyperlink is
hovered over. There should be no noticeable impact.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following to verify that the status bar in Safari is enabled:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that enables the status bar
in Safari:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/sbin/system_profiler SPConfigurationProfileDataType |
/usr/bin/grep ShowOverlayStatusBar | /usr/bin/tr -d ' '
ShowOverlayStatusBar = 1;
Remediation:
Profile Method:
Create or edit a configuration profile with the following information:
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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• Level 1
Description:
Secure Keyboard Entry prevents other applications on the system and/or network from
detecting and recording what is typed into Terminal. Unauthorized applications and
malicious code could intercept keystrokes entered in the Terminal.
Rationale:
Enabling Secure Keyboard Entry minimizes the risk of a key logger detecting what is
entered in Terminal.
Impact:
Enabling this in Terminal would prevent an application that is otherwise validly
intercepting keyboard input from intercepting that input in Terminal.app. This could
impact productivity tools.
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that keyboard entries are secure in Terminal:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to verify that a profile is installed that enables secure
keyboard entry in Terminal:
% /usr/bin/sudo /usr/bin/osascript -l JavaScript << EOS
$.NSUserDefaults.alloc.initWithSuiteName('com.apple.Terminal')\
.objectForKey('SecureKeyboardEntry').js
EOS
true
Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting, the individual user audit
and/or remediation has been removed. To be compliant, a profile must be installed for
this recommendation. We have included the individual user information in the additional
information section for reference only.
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Note: Since the profile method sets a system-wide setting and not a user-level one, the
profile method is the preferred method. It is always better to set system-wide than per
user.
References:
1. https://support.apple.com/en-ca/guide/terminal/trml109/mac
2. https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/technotes/tn2150/_index.html
3. https://krypted.com/mac-os-x/secure-keyboard-entry-on-macos/
Additional Information:
To verify individual users:
Audit:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to ensure that keyboard entries are secure in Terminal:
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1
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults read -app Terminal
SecureKeyboardEntry
1
In the above example the user seconduser is compliant, and the user firstuser is not
compliant.
Remediation:
Graphical Method:
Perform the following steps to enable secure keyboard entries in Terminal:
Terminal Method:
Run the following command to ensure keyboard entries are secure in Terminal:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u <username> /usr/bin/defaults write -app Terminal
SecureKeyboardEntry -bool true
example:
% /usr/bin/sudo -u firstuser /usr/bin/defaults write -app Terminal
SecureKeyboardEntry -bool true
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Controls
Control IG 1 IG 2 IG 3
Version
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Apple Push Notification Service (APNs) is a platform notification service that allows third
party developers to send notification data to applications installed on macOS (as well as
iOS, iPadOS, watchOS, tvOS, and visionOS) devices. Mobile device management
(MDM) tools can also utilize APNs to manage the devices enrolled in their service.
APNs is an encrypted and authenticated communication protocol.
To learn more about APNs, read Apple's article entiled Use Apple products on
enterprise networks.
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Mobile Configuration Profiles, or profiles for short, are XML files that consist of payloads
to configure or authorize information for Apple devices. Profiles automate the
configuration of settings, accounts, restrictions, and credentials. These files can be
created by an MDM solution or Apple Configurator for Mac, or they can be created
manually. To learn more about creating mobile configuration files, read Apple's support
documentation on either MDM payload list for Mac computers or Profile-Specific
Payload Keys.
The file must contain certain components for it to properly configure the operating
system. An example can be found below:
<?xml version=”1.0” encoding=”UTF-8”?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC “-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN”
“http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd”>
<plist version=”1.0”>
<dict>
<key>PayloadContent</key>
<array>
<dict>
<key>Key that is being set</key>
<Value>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
<string>com.example.myprofile</string>
<key>PayloadType</key>
<string>The PayloadType or what is being configured</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>This is a unique identifier for every profile and can be
created with the command /usr/bin/uuidgen</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key>
<integer>1</integer>
</dict>
</array>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
<string>The name that is displayed in System Settings</string>
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
<string>com.example.myprofile</string>
<key>PayloadType</key>
<string>Configuration</string>
<key>PayloadUUID</key>
<string>This is another unique identifier and can be created with the
command /usr/bin/uuidgen</string>
<key>PayloadVersion</key>
<integer>1</integer>
</dict>
</plist>
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Yes No
2 System Settings
2.1.1 iCloud
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Yes No
2.2 Network
2.3 General
2.3.3 Sharing
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Yes No
2.5 Siri
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Yes No
2.8 Displays
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Yes No
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Yes No
2.13 Passwords
2.15 Notifications
2.18 Keyboard
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Yes No
4 Network Configurations
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Yes No
5.3 Encryption
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Yes No
6 Applications
6.1 Finder
6.2 Mail
6.3 Safari
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Yes No
6.4 Terminal
7 Supplemental
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