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Youth Bulge Dynamics in the Mediterranean Region: The Geopolitical

Implications of Human Capital on Security and Stability

Conference Paper · September 2021

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_4

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 Youth Bulge Dynamics in the Mediterranean
Region: The Geopolitical Implications
of Human Capital on Security and Stability

Alfonso Giordano

Contents
1 Introduction: The Youth Bulge Theory and the Geopolitical
Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2 The Youth Bulge in History: Some Empirical Evidence
with Particular Reference to MENA Region . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3 A Demographic Explanation of Youth Turmoil on the South-Eastern
Shores of the Mediterranean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4 Conclusion: The Geo-Demographic Challenges of the Future . . . . 121
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

1 Introduction: The Youth Bulge Theory

and the Geopolitical Vulnerability
The term ‘youth bulge’ is used to define the quantitative and proportional
increase in the share of a country’s youth population, conventionally in
the 16–25 age bracket or the 16–30 age bracket (Castree et al., 2013).

A. Giordano (B)
Niccolò Cusano University, Rome, Italy
e-mail: alfonso.giordano@unicusano.it

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 107

Switzerland AG 2021
F. M. Corrao and R. Redaelli (eds.), States, Actors and Geopolitical
Drivers in the Mediterranean,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69000-7_4
108 A. GIORDANO

According to Gunnar Heinsohn (2003)—who attempted a general inter-

pretative formulation of the theme coined by Gaston Bouthoul (1970),
and developed and applied it to around seventy countries—this condition
comes about when at least 30% of the population belongs to the 15–29
age bracket, or when at least 20% is in the 15–25 age bracket. Technically,
what happens is a swelling in the youth cohorts of a country’s population
pyramid (Newbold, 2017). The theory asserts that societies characterized
by high numbers of young people, scarcity of resources and, in partic-
ular, a lack of social positions of prestige for the youth surplus—third,
fourth, fifth children—are more likely to experience social disorder and
act in a warlike manner in comparison to those societies in which factors
of demographic stress are absent.
However, the idea that a large percentage of young people in a society,
particularly males, can be the cause of violent conflict is not new. Various
scholars (Choucri, 1974; Feuer, 1969; Moller, 1968) have already exam-
ined the question of how and to what extent the two phenomena are
connected, yet scientific discussion about this possible correlation and the
public debate that ensued only became widespread in the 1990s. The
term ‘youth bulge’ was used by Gary Fuller (1995) in his article, ‘The
Demographic Backdrop to Ethnic Conflict: A Geographic Overview’,
presented during a conference organized by the CIA—Central Intelli-
gence Agency—the foreign intelligence service of the United States. As
well as the publications by Fuller (1995, 2004) and the aforementioned
Heinsohn, the work of Jack Goldstone (1999, 2002, 2012), Richard
Cincotta (2009, 2013, 2015a, 2017) and Henrik Urdal (2004, 2006,
2008) should also be cited as having contributed to the creation of a
convincing theoretical framework.
These authors argue that developing countries undergoing a phase
of demographic transition, specifically those moving from high to low
fertility and mortality rates, are particularly vulnerable to geopolitical
instability and civil conflict. The combined effect of large numbers of
young people, rapid growth in the working-age population and lack of
employment opportunities within the job market produce a potentially
explosive situation. As underlined, ‘a large proportion of young adults and
a rapid rate of growth in the working-age population tend to exacerbate
unemployment, prolong dependency on parents, diminish self-esteem’
(Cincotta & Mesquida, 2007: 3).
Although this kind of frustration and competition for jobs does not
directly fuel violence, it increases the probability that young unemployed
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 109

people will seek social and economic advancement through alternative,

extra-legal means (Lam, 2014). ‘If you have no other options and not
much else going on, the opportunity cost of joining an armed move-
ment may be low’ affirms Michelle Gavin, expert in African affairs and
member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations under the Obama
administration (Blanton & Kegley, 2020: 399). Not by chance, between
1970 and 1999, eighty percent of civil conflicts took place in countries
in which at least sixty percent of the population was below the age of
thirty, as ascertained in a report by the PAI, Population Action Interna-
tional (Leahy et al., 2007). Currently, most countries with an abundance
of young people are likewise undergoing social unrest, instability, violence
and migration.
Scholars tend to argue that these conditions alone do not explain
civil conflicts, ethno-religious tension and poverty. Poor political and
economic institutions also play a role (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012).
Others exclude the youth bulge as a determining factor in the eruption
of ethnic conflict, whose origins should be looked for in ethnic differences
rather than in age brackets (Yar & Miodownik, 2016). However, a certain
predisposition towards unstable and conflictual geopolitical situations
cannot be excluded in and between States with large youth populations,
as argued by Goldstone (2002). Furthermore, youth are often attracted
by new ideas and heterodox relations that lead them to challenge older
forms of authority. In the Muslim world large populations of idle youth
are attracted by Islam as an alternative force for social mobility, proof of
which can be found in the ease with which ISIS has been able to recruit
young people in these geographical areas (Gouda & Marktanner, 2018;
Sommers, 2019).
Contributing factors to the development of a youth bulge include
rapid urbanization, heightened expectations among job seekers and envi-
ronmental stress. The migration model that leads to rapid growth in
urbanization plays an important role since cities in the developing world
lack the infrastructure, resources and jobs to accommodate a large influx
of rural workers. This creates the conditions for black market activities,
often led by gangs and paramilitary groups. In terms of employment, an
abundance of both low and highly-skilled workers without job opportu-
nities can foment social unrest. The environmental issue, on the other
hand, is less immediately evident: rapid population growth often leads
110 A. GIORDANO

to the degradation of forests and water supplies. This can generate anti-
governmental sympathies and create conflicts due to scarcity of resources
(Finaz, 2016; Le Billon, 2001, 2005).
It is evident that over and beyond turbulent situations of various inten-
sity and more or less violent conflicts, a youth bulge almost always leads to
youth mobility: within country in the case of rapid urbanization, between
neighbouring States or, more and more frequently, migration towards
countries with better living standards and more developed welfare systems
(Kararach, 2014).
Lastly, the question of whether the youth bulge phenomenon is always
a negative issue should be addressed. The answer is, not necessarily. In
time, with the progression of demographic transition and, above all, given
the right investments, large youth populations will potentially become
economically productive adults who can ensure the wellbeing of their
society. This phenomenon is known as the ‘demographic dividend’ and
arises out of the ‘demographic window of opportunity’: the period of time
in which the age structure of a country sees a large share of the population
enter the potential working age, in comparison to the number of children
and old people who are not economically productive. For example, the
East Asian economies in rapid growth underwent a youth bulgethat only
later led to the good economic performance of those countries (Fong,
2016). Earlier still, the economies of Western countries underwent the
same transition.

2 The Youth Bulge in History: Some

Empirical Evidence with Particular
Reference to MENA Region
As Heinsohn explained the Holocaust (2000) and the practice of human
sacrifice in ancient Mesopotamia (1992) through demographic change,
other authors, as we will see later, have tried to demonstrate the connec-
tion between the youth bulge and terrorism (Schomaker, 2013), revealing
how the Arab Spring has been triggered by a youth surplus, particularly
in males, who, not coincidentally, were won over by the radical Salafi
ideologies which supplanted the liberal democratic reformism that had
once existed in the area. However, the youth bulge phenomenon and its
dangerous effects are evidently not exclusive to the North African and
Middle Eastern shores of the Mediterranean.
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 111

When a youth bulge reaches significant levels, it becomes the cause

of major instability that, in its most extreme forms, can mine demo-
cratic equilibriums. Bouthoul (1970) argued that in practice, from a
sociological-demographic perspective, all major conflicts have contributed
to the elimination of male surplus. The author underlines how every time
the demographic pyramid leans notably in favour of the male section of
the population—as is the case in many pre-war periods of history—the
level of violence increases. According to the originator of this theory,
many events in the history of humanity can be attributed to the youth
bulge model, among which: the sixteenth century European colonialist
expansion that began after nearly a century of progressive demographic
growth following the decimation of the European population caused
by the Black Death; the rise of Nazism that exploited the 1900–1914
German youth bulge during the crisis of the Weimar Republic; the
Marxist revolutions in South America in the 1960s–1980s; and not least,
the acts of terrorism that occurred in Europe in the 1970s. In the latter
case, the endurance of the democratic institutions on the one hand and
the economic recovery that the entire continent was experiencing on the
other, prevented the phenomenon from degenerating.
With regards to the youth bulge in North Africa and the Middle East,
over the last 100 years the population in these areas has increased tenfold,
reaching approximately 1.5 billion people today. This can be explained in
the light of demographic data: in 1950 women from these geographical
areas on average conceived between 6–8 children, of whom 3–4 were
males (Giordano, 2011a). In 1970 those born in 1950 would have been
exactly 20-years old, not by chance therefore the first episodes of unrest
and resulting violence were recorded in the 20 years between 1970 and
1990.
Lebanon provides us with a classic example of the youth bulge.
Between 1975 and 1990 the civil war caused around 150,000 deaths in
a population of approximately three million inhabitants. There is little
doubt that a consistent share of this social unrest was provoked by the
presence of various religious groups who fuelled the disquietude of young
males. Despite this, the violence perpetrated in Lebanese territories came
to a halt in 1990. The reasons behind this sudden change can be identi-
fied also in a drastic demographic drop in the number of male sons: on
average, Lebanese women went from having 6 children to only 2; the
‘raw material’ that had given rise to belligerent conflict was no longer
readily available (Harb, 2016). However, a sizeable youth population is
112 A. GIORDANO

still present in Lebanon and provided the basis for the ongoing protests in
the country nationwide. Demonstrations, however intergenerational, that
began on 17 October 2019 in response to the government’s inability to
find solutions to an economic crisis that has loomed over the past year
(Wimmen, 2019). The protests would have been triggered by the new
taxes expected on petrol, tobacco and online calls through operators such
as WhatsApp.
Another example is provided by the Iranian youth cohort that has been
politically active since the ousting of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosad-
degh in 1953. The death of three students during the protests against
the visit of Vice President Nixon, who was in Iran in the same year to
support the Shah after a CIA operation against the chosen government, is
still commemorated nationally today. Youth were key players in the 1979
revolution. In the 1980s, they made up the majority of fighters in the
eight-year Iran-Iraq war. In the 1990s, they recompensed the post-war
debt by entering into politics and influencing the economic and social
life of the country. In 1997, their numbers contributed to choosing the
reformist president Mohammad Khatami. Their contribution to the 2009
elections saw the so-called ‘green revolution’ or ‘twitter revolution’, seri-
ously alter the political debate in Iran. Today, their strength is in their
numbers. A ‘baby boom’ after the revolution that lasted until the 1980s
nearly doubled the country’s population, which increased from 34 to 63
million in a single decade. Iran is now one of the youngest societies in
the world and its demographic progression is surely one of the greatest
threats to the status quo (Giordano, 2011b).
Just as interesting in terms of the actual extent of the phenomenon is
the Palestinian youth bulge, whose relevance is due to the civil conflict
currently in course with Israel (Laborce et al., 2018). It must be said that
during conventional wars a drastic drop in the birth rate is the norm—
this is due to both the very negative expectations of bringing a child
into the world during these periods and the separation of parents, whose
male members are at the front—while in conflicts involving civilians the
population of the weaker side in the conflict often has higher fertility
rates.
This is also the case for example between Turks and Kurds, whose
fertility rates vary significantly. Today’s fertility rates see Turkish-speaking
women give birth to an average of 1.8 children per head, while Kurdish-
speaking women give birth to an average of four children per head,
double the number of Turkish children. This is one of the most extreme
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 113

discrepancies in the overall decline in the Islamic population. On the other

hand, Ocalan, former leader of the PKK (Partîya Karkerén Kurdîstan,
separatist Kurdish party), was clearly aware of the strategic importance of
the demographic factor when he is said to have suggested that ‘every Kurd
must either grab his gun every morning…or grab his wife every night’
(Sizemore, 2010). Indeed, it is the presence of the Kurdish ethnicity
in the South East of Turkey that has helped increase women’s fertility
rates in comparison to all other areas. Naturally, the difference in fertility
rates is also due to differing socio-economic conditions, reflected in lower
salaries and lower levels of education in the same Kurdish population
(Giordano, 2014).1

3 A Demographic Explanation
of Youth Turmoil on the South-Eastern
Shores of the Mediterranean
While it can be said that environmental geography and economic relations
in the Mediterranean world-system—particularly in ancient times–tended
to uniform the Mediterranean landscape, the same cannot be said of
historical and political events in the various countries that look onto the
Mediterranean basin. Events of this kind have, on the contrary, delin-
eated very different trajectories of development on the two shores of the
Mediterranean. Despite sharing the same sea and many other common
factors, the geographical Euro-Mediterranean2 area presents four distinct
fractures of different kinds (Bonavero et al., 2006):

– Demographic: The demographic process on the two shores of the

Mediterranean shows two quite different trends, revealing a deci-
sive decline on the northern shores and a higher growth rate in the
south-east. According to the most reliable estimations,3 however, the
trend in the south-east shows a long-term evolution that converges
with that of the northern shore of the Basin.
– Geo-economical: The countries in the north belong to one of the
wealthiest areas of the planet and are securely integrated within
the international economic system; conversely, the countries in the
south-east have low economic and employment growth rates, and
many of them remain in the margins of the world economic scenario.
114 A. GIORDANO

– Cultural: While in the past the cultural differences between the two
shores of the Mediterranean were perceived as bringing wellbeing
and positive reciprocal influence, today they are mostly perceived as
conflictual, particularly in terms of religious identification.
– Political: In the North, the European Union prevails, a group of
countries that are more or less integrated as a coalition of stable,
democratic states; while on the south-eastern side countries continue
to be in conflict with each other (the Israeli-Palestinian issue is a
perfect example here) and fail to support rights that are reconcilable
with the fundamental rights of Europe.

For the purposes of this contribution, the fracture that most interests
us is the demographic one. The spatial distribution of the population
in the Mediterranean area is of fundamental importance if we consider
that the relations between the two shores have changed radically in
terms of numbers and structure over the last 50 years. The northern
shores of the Mediterranean have an ageing, static population, while the
southern shores have a young population that will continue to grow over
coming years, despite the diminishing fertility rate in the south-eastern
Mediterranean that will be examined later on.
First, let’s take a step backwards and place the Euro-Mediterranean
question within the global system. We know that ageing is one of the
factors at the basis of the geo-demographic revolution (Giordano, 2017)
that has taken place throughout the world over recent years, alongside an
increase in population and a reduction in birth rates. The world popu-
lation is gradually ageing: the transition from 2015 to 2050 show that
the percentage of over 65-year olds will continue to grow. For example,
in most European countries over 65-year olds will increase from 20–25%
of the population, to over 30%. Overall, the world population has devel-
oped very unevenly, yet the ageing trend has been confirmed despite a
difference in times, speed and intensity.
In fact, while some countries are currently ageing, others are in
full growth and others will be the protagonists of the next demo-
graphic boom, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. The times and speed
of geo-demographic processes are of crucial importance as they change
the strategic, political and economic equilibriums in various geograph-
ical areas. Wallerstein’s world-system, conceived above all as a Marxist
critique of capitalism, will continue to be reconfigured by the long-term
driving forces that determine the evolution of the world population as
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 115

it takes place within and between the various territories on the planet.
As demographic transition (the process at the basis of the evolution of
the population) develops in a spatially and temporally diversified manner,
further imbalance will be added to a planet that is already politically
and economically unequal. The order and spatial organization of human
activity will be more and more disrupted.
It is true that the world is ageing, but it has also never been as diver-
sified as it is in this specific historical period. In the 1980s, the world
was more uniform. Today, some parts of the world have populations that
are structurally old, others are ageing, while others are still very young
(United Nations Population Fund, 2014). The fact is that the world has
never been so full of young people as it is today. The increase in the popu-
lation over recent decades and the actual percentage of young people
today, provides us with this scenario. Currently, the average age in the
world is 30-years-old. In some countries, under 30-year-olds represent
more than 30% of the total population. Looking at Fig. 1, it may occur
to us to match these very young countries to territories of considerable
turbulence.
So, is such a young population a problem? Indeed, if we consult the
Global Conflict Risk Index (Smidt et al., 2016) created by a European
Commission study group, we can see that ‘demographics’ and the ‘youth
bulge’ are both listed as political, social and economic risk factors in the
‘Geography and environment’ section.
Figure 2 represents the youth bulge (and children bulge) in percent-
ages for the various countries and geographical areas of the world. The
darker colours show the countries in which more than 70% of the popu-
lation is under 30-years-old. This is the case in many of the countries
in Sub-Saharan Africa, where, however, there is also a children-bulge
currently in course, with an average age of just 15. This explains why
many of the wars in this part of the world are also fought by children and
why—considering the other difficulties—this area of the world has yet to
experience economic development: there are too many young people. In
regional terms, the Middle East and Africa have the highest percentage of
young people under 30. However, North Africa and the Middle East also
have the highest percentage of real young adults: those between the ages
of 20 and 30.
If we now observe Fig. 3,4 we can see that the average age in almost
all the countries in the MENA region is below the world average of 29.
Only three countries have a higher average age, and yet it is still just a
116 A. GIORDANO

Fig. 1 Under 30 percentages in the world (Source Population Reference Bureau

by New York Times [Sengupta, 2016])

little over 30. Yemen, Palestine and Iraq take up positions at the bottom
of the chart with average ages at Sub-Saharan levels, 17/18-years-old. At
the same time, we can see that young people correspond to a considerable
percentage of the population in the working age. Yemen 42%, Palestine 39
and Jordan 37. Not only do these countries have a lot of young people,
potentially these young people could be available as a significant part of
the workforce.
As said, these conditions alone do not necessarily produce the nega-
tive effects of the youth bulge. Another fundamental factor is represented
by limited or no access to the job market. MENA region has shown the
highest unemployment rates: between 2008 and 2010, the unemploy-
ment rate in the Middle East was at 25.5%, while in North Africa it was
at 23. The MENA region does not just have the highest unemployment
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 117

Fig. 2 The youth bulge and children bulge in the world (Source Euromonitor
International, 2013)

rates, but also the lowest participation of young people in the job market.
There are many young people in other parts of the world, but evidently
the MENA region offers less job opportunities to young people.
It should not surprise us then that the 2008 crisis contributed to aggra-
vating youth unemployment, thus providing further motivation for the
explosion of the Arab Spring (Fig. 4). Therefore, 5% of the world popu-
lation has produced 45% of the terrorist attacks in the world, 57.5 of
refugees in the world, 68.5 of deaths as a result of conflict in the world
and 47 of internally displaced people (Ortiz & Cummins, 2012).
In Jordan the youth bulge is reaching its height, although Algeria’s
youth bulge is expected to last even longer because its fertility rate
began to diminish later. Youth unemployment is still a huge problem
in the country as there are very few possibilities for young people,
including those with higher qualifications. In Egypt, the youth popula-
tion is reaching its peak (LaGraffe, 2012), which adds to the difficulties
118 A. GIORDANO

Fig. 3 Median age in the MENA countries (left); Youth percentage of the
total working-age population (right) (Source Roudi, F. (2011). Youth population
& employment in the Middle East & North Africa: Opportunity or challenge.
Population Reference Bureau)

of high unemployment rates (Ghafar, 2016). A democratic Egypt could

use this population to its advantage, as long as it managed to insert more
young people into the job market.
It is also interesting to consider the two countries Algeria and Tunisia,
both of which are going through a phase of advanced demographic tran-
sition in the area (Haghighat, 2018). The youth population in Algeria is
reaching its peak and fertility rates are diminishing. Youth unemployment
is still high, although oil revenue has contributed to creating more stable
job opportunities in the field (Cincotta, 2015c).
The youth bulge in Tunisia is less dramatic because fertility rates began
to diminish earlier than in the rest of the region. A democratic Tunisia
could represent a favourable moment for development, if the majority of
people of working age are able to find work. The terrorist attacks, for
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 119

Fig. 4 Youth unemployment in some MENA countries (Source Paasonen, K.,

& Urdal, H. (2016). Youth bulges, exclusion and instability: The role of youth in
the Arab Spring . Peace Research Institute Oslo)

which the Islamic State (al-Dawla al-Islāmiyya) claimed responsibility, on

the beaches and at the National Bard Museum, were aimed not so much
at Western tourists as at creating insecurity in the Tunisian population and
above all, weakening the tourist industry in order to provoke potentially
unemployed youths into enlisting in the terrorist organization, also thanks
to religious callings.
What can we foresee for the future? The projections of the United
Nations tell us that the population of the south-eastern Mediterranean has
grown more than that of the European Union and that it will continue
to do so for several years. The trend in the female Arab population—
especially those who are urbanized and educated—is to have less children.
If in the 1950s a woman’s average fertility rate was around 6–7 children,
today it is only slightly above 2, with a strong tendency to converge with
the European reproductive model (Kronfol, 2011).
Life expectancy on the south-eastern coast of the Mediterranean is
more and more similar to European life expectancy, and has improved
dramatically since the 1950s, when expectancy was at just 45-years-old,
to reach over 70-years-old today (Matthijs et al., 2015; Cincotta, 2015b).
120 A. GIORDANO

Fig. 5 Percentage of over-65 in MENA region, 1950–2100 (Source United

Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. (2017). World population
prospects: The 2017 revision. UNDESA)

This helps us understand two aspects: the percentage of over 65-year-

olds in the MENA region will increase (Fig. 5), with differences between
countries but with the same impact as in Europe; the youth bulge will
gradually diminish (Fig. 6) due to both the ageing of the population and
the new generations who, as we have seen, no longer have the same high
fertility rates as before.
The two trends characterize ageing as an irreversible phenomenon—
an aspect that we find harder to accept—because the total growth and
the percentage of elderly people in many contemporary societies is a
direct consequence of the fact that people, on average, live longer and
have less children than in previous eras. This means an induced reduction
in the number of fertile people and therefore the obvious incapacity of
the system to reproduce itself. Change in reproductive behaviour, even
if radical, would not lead to changes in the structure of the population,
except on a very long-term basis.
What is happening in the MENA region—following the route taken by
developed countries and that currently being taken by developing coun-
tries—is a period of demographic transition from an ‘ancient’ regime
characterized by high birth and death rates to a ‘modern’ regime with
low birth and death rates. The same cannot be said of Sub-Saharan Africa,
which is still in the early phases of demographic transition and provides
us with different challenges for the future.
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 121

Fig. 6 Youth bulge in some countries of the MENA region, 1950–2050 (Source
Paasonen [2016])

4 Conclusion: The Geo-Demographic

Challenges of the Future
If the beginning of the century presented us with a demographic curve
of prevailing instability in the MENA region, we should soon be worried
about the situation represented in Sub-Saharan Africa. What has happened
over recent years in the Mediterranean in terms of migration, conflict and
disorder, could happen in even more virulent terms in Sub-Saharan Africa.
These potential threats should be dealt with well in advance, because the
geographic obstacles represented by the Sahara and the Mediterranean
might well not be enough.
Demography, however, provides us with favourable conditions as well
as potentially dangerous ones, such as the demographic window of oppor-
tunity. Demographic transition is decisive: it is the moment in which the
number of children begins to diminish but the population still hasn’t
begun to age. For this reason, the active population extends to more
than 65% of the total. This is a happy period that lasts roughly 30 years.
It offers undoubted advantages, for example: a larger work force, a smaller
number of children thus freeing women from the role of the carer,
122 A. GIORDANO

allowing them to be available for work; this means more savings for invest-
ment and improved human capital due to investments in training and
education.
In fact, the period known as the ‘glorious thirties’—between 1945 and
1975—was Europe’s demographic window of opportunity and economic
development (the ‘economic miracle’ in Italy in the 1950s and 1960s is
a good example), just as China is experiencing its window of opportu-
nity today. The window of opportunity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not
occur until around 2050, when all today’s children will be the adults of
tomorrow.
However, in this case it is important not to be determinist. Demog-
raphy offers moments of crisis and opportunity. It provides a necessary
context, but it is not enough on its own. It is important not to forget
other factors such as the growing education of the population, the
widespread use of new technologies, the unemployment issue, endemic
corruption and the continuing violation of human rights. As in the
case of the youth bulge, specific contextual conditions are necessary for
these demographic events to manifest themselves positively or negatively
through the window of opportunity. Good policies in health, education,
economics and governance are all needed to be able to take advantage of
the demographic dividend.
The future wellbeing of the world population will depend on this. Not
to foresee and provide for this would expose the world to the dangers
inherent in the new demographic tsunami that is redrawing the planet.
Our planet will have to contemplate the equilibrium between those coun-
tries in demographic growth and those in demographic depression, as well
as the relationship between young countries and old countries or ageing
countries, thus redefining centres and suburbs on a geo-demographic
basis. Much will depend on the way in which and the speed with
which we react. The reaction will require multi-scale governance with an
internationally coordinated response and policies suitable to specific terri-
tories that take into consideration past histories, as well as demonstrating
far-sightedness for the future.
 YOUTH BULGE DYNAMICS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN REGION … 123

Notes
1. Turning to Europe, the same considerations can be made for the civil
conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland. It is well
known that Northern Ireland is divided into two culturally diverse commu-
nities, the Unionists (pro United Kingdom) and the Republicans (pro
Republic of Ireland). Both are often described on the basis of religious
identification: The Unionists are mainly Christian-Protestant (predomi-
nantly Presbyterian), while the Republicans are mainly Christian-Roman
Catholic. Contrary to popular belief, however, not all Catholics are Repub-
lican and not all Protestants are Unionist. Indeed, the high fertility rates
in the area during the period of conflict—and therefore the high levels of
young people—were not so much due to religious beliefs, but to a sense of
belonging and the will to prevail. These contending motivations evidently
flattened out with the 1998 Peace Agreement and since then Northern Irish
fertility rates, although still some of the highest in Europe, have begun to
‘normalize’ (Goldstone et al., 2012).
2. The evident semantic fracture provides an initial indication of the gap
between the European and the North African, Middle Eastern shores.
3. UN Population Division: https://population.un.org/wpp/; US Census
Bureau International Database: https://www.census.gov/programs-sur
veys/international-programs/about/idb.html; OECD Population Data:
https://data.oecd.org/pop/population.htm
4. A methodological note: some of the figures here take into consideration
the period from 2008 to 2011. This is intentional in order to understand
what the demographic and economic conditions were before the outbreak
of the Arab Spring and other geopolitical or conflicting events.

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