The Global Future of Higher Education and the Academic

Profession
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The Global Future of
Higher Education and the
Academic Profession
The BRICs and the United States

Edited by

Philip G. Altbach
Center of International Higher Education, Boston College, USA

Gregory Androushchak
National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Russia

Yaroslav Kuzminov
National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Russia

Maria Yudkevich
National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Russia

Liz Reisberg
Reisberg & Associates, USA
Selection and editorial matter © Philip G. Altbach, Gregory Androushchak,
Yaroslav Kuzminov, Maria Yudkevich, and Liz Reisberg 2013
Individual chapters © Respective authors 2013
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Contents

List of Figures and Tables vi

Preface viii

Acknowledgments x

Notes on Contributors xi

1 The Prospects for the BRICs: The New Academic

Superpowers? 1
Philip G. Altbach

2 Higher Education, the Academic Profession, and Economic

Development in Brazil 28
Simon Schwartzman

3 Changing Realities: Russian Higher Education and the

Academic Profession 56
Gregory Androushchak, Yaroslav Kuzminov, and Maria
Yudkevich

4 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession for a

Knowledge Economy 93
N. Jayaram

5 The Chinese Academic Profession: New Realities 126

Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo

6 The Changing American Academic Profession 160

Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias

Index 199

v
Figures and Tables

Figures

1.1 Enrollment in higher education, BRICs and the United

States, 2006–2010 6
2.1 Income distribution of teacher earnings (R$) 46
3.1 Average and “optimal” monthly salaries of faculty in
institutions of higher education, 2009 (per month, PPP
US$) 58
3.2 Distribution of faculty by academic rank in public
universities 59
3.3 Earnings of professional workers and university
professors—average wage in the economy (%) 68
3.4 Ratio of average wages of faculty in various disciplines,
based on average salary in the university sector (%) 69
3.5 Percentage of teachers receiving various allowances 69
6.1 Full-time faculty salary by union status, 1999 and 2004 183

Tables

1.1 Total and gross enrollment, 2009 5

1.2 Expenditure in education and research and development
(R&D) 7
1.3 Academic salaries comparison 22
2.1 Postgraduate education in Brazil: students and degree
programs, by level and type of institutions 35
2.2 Academic posts in higher education institutions 37
2.3 Academic qualifications of faculty members in
institutions 40
2.4 Academic salaries in federal universities in Brazil, 2010
(R$) 44
2.5 Mean income of teachers in higher education 45
2.6 Hours worked per week in different activities, by type of
institution, 2007 48
2.7 International publication patterns, 2007 49

vi
 List of Figures and Tables vii

3.1 Faculty engaged in different aspects of research,

2007–2008 76
3.2 Publications, conference attendance, and other activities
related to teaching and research, 2008 77
3.3 Factors that impede faculty from carrying out research 78
3.4 Teachers engaged in activities outside the home
institution 2008 (%) 80
3.5 Highest degree of most professors 83
4.1 Summary of qualifications for professoriate 101
4.2 Career advancement scheme for professoriate 111
4.3 Salaries of university faculty, as on August 1, 2010 114
5.1 Monthly salary of a fourth-rank full English professor in
foreign language studies, 2010 (RMB) 144
5.2 Estimated monthly salary of a first-rank English professor
in foreign language studies, 2010 (RMB) 147
5.3 Possible monetary subsidies for junior faculty in, 2010
(RMB) 148
5.4 Data on full-time and part-time teachers in private higher
education institutions 149
5.5 Degrees held by professors in public higher education
institutions 153
5.6 Degrees held by professors in private higher education
institutions 154
6.1 The number of institutions, students, and faculty, 2009 164
6.2 Average salaries in selected fields and the average salaries
in English language and literature, 2009 177
6.3 Salaries by academic field and rank, 2009 179
6.4 Salaries of male and female academic staff by institutional
type and rank, 2009 181
6.5 Salaries (average and 75th percentile) of other
US professionals and academic staff in the public and
private sector by field, 2009 186
Preface

The BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—are among the

fastest-growing economies in the world. These countries are destined to
play a more important global role, joining the United States in shap-
ing a shared economic future. Additionally, with the development of an
international higher education market, the BRIC countries will play an
increasingly central role in this sphere as well. The BRICs are also likely
to compete with each other for prestige and placement in the global
rankings, as they work to achieve world-class standing and to strengthen
their research universities.
Three of the BRICs—China, Brazil, and India—will continue to expe-
rience rapid growth in higher education in the coming years and will
absorb more than half of the global growth in enrollments in the next
decades. Like the United States, Russia hosts a mature academic sys-
tem, but spectacular changes in the governing economic model during
the last several decades have left the higher education system some-
what adrift. Currently, Russia has excess enrollment capacity and the
subsequent challenge of filling seats to sustain budgets—but without
compromising quality.
While sheer size does not produce academic superpowers, the aca-
demic systems of these four countries will inevitably play a more
central role in the global knowledge economy—indeed they are doing
so already and all show an upward trajectory in terms of research pro-
ductivity and expenditure on research and development, with China
and Brazil exhibiting the most impressive strength. Additionally, each
of the BRIC countries is developing aggressive international strategies to
engage foreign partners in new ways.
Yet, all four BRIC countries face serious academic challenges in the
quest to serve the needs of their economies and populations, create
“world-class” universities, develop a vigorous academic culture, and
provide better quality more consistently across the entire sector.
The United States, arguably the world’s most influential academic
system, is included in our analysis as a point of comparison with the
BRIC countries. Although higher education globally reflects many dif-
ferent traditions, the US system is widely emulated in many respects;
for the moment it continues to be the primary producer of original
basic research. Yet, like the BRICs, the United States currently faces

viii
 Preface ix

significant challenges, many resulting from having limited sources of

revenue while the cost of providing instruction and research continues
to increase. An analysis of these issues should prove useful for under-
standing the challenges that the BRIC nations may confront as they
evolve as important international contributors to teaching and research.
The Global Future of Higher Education and the Academic Profession pro-
vides an original analysis of the academic systems and challenges of each
of the BRIC countries with a comparable analysis of the United States.
While there are common elements among these countries, many differ-
ences also exist. This book’s approach considers all relevant aspects of
higher education development in each country, but ultimately focuses
on the academic profession.
The academic profession is at the heart of any successful university or
academic system, and thus the theme of this book is the professoriate;
the challenges face the academic profession in terms of working con-
ditions and how these conditions have changed as each of these
economies confronts dramatic change—growth in each of the BRICs
and contraction in the case of the United States. The analysis addresses
issues relating to salaries, remuneration, and contracts. These central ele-
ments determine whether the professoriate can be fully productive and
effective.
This book resulted from a related research project concerning aca-
demic salaries, remuneration, and contracts (see Paying the Professoriate:
A Global Comparison of Compensation and Contracts, edited by Philip
G. Altbach, Liz Reisberg, Maria Yudkevich, Gregory Androushchak, and
Iván F. Pacheco (2012)). The goal here is to expand on the previous
study to highlight what is happening in the BRIC countries. Each chap-
ter provides context and analysis that will be useful to policymakers
and scholars alike. This is a pivotal moment, as each country considers
the relevance of higher education to future economic development in
general and the critical importance of cultivating conditions to ensure
that the professoriate can flourish. This volume is a multifaceted analy-
sis of some of the challenges, as well as the prospects, facing four of the
world’s most important emerging academic systems—and a comparison
with the United States.

Philip G. Altbach
Gregory Androushchak
Yaroslav Kuzminov
Maria Yudkevich
Liz Reisberg
Boston, USA, and Moscow, Russia
Acknowledgments

This volume has complex origins, and thus we are indebted to many
colleagues as well as to our sponsoring organizations. It grew out of a
previous study of academic salaries, remuneration, and contracts in 28
countries. We are indebted to all of the researchers who contributed to
that project and helped to collect data and analyze this complicated
issue. The project reflects collaboration between the National Research
University Higher School of Economics’ Center for Institutional Studies
in Russia and the Center for International Higher Education at Boston
College in the United States. Both partners contributed to the funding
that made this research possible.
At the Higher School of Economics’ Center for Institutional Studies,
Elena Shutova provided logistical support. Alexander Novikov and Anna
Panova helped us to collect and analyze empirical country data. The
World Bank also provided logistical and other assistance.
The Boston College Center is indebted to the Ford Foundation for its
support during the early phases of the project. We are also indebted
to Edith S. Hoshino, CIHE publications editor, for editing the final
manuscript, and to Salina Kopellas for logistical support.

x
Contributors

Editors

Philip G. Altbach is J. Donald Monan, S. J. University Professor

and Director of the Center for International Higher Education at
Boston College in the United States. He was the 2004–2006 Distin-
guished Scholar Leader for the New Century Scholars initiative of the
Fulbright program. He has taught at Harvard University, the University
of Wisconsin–Madison, and the State University of New York at Buffalo,
and has been a visiting scholar at SciencesPo, Paris, France, and the Uni-
versity of Bombay, India. He has also been a guest professor at Peking
University, China.

Gregory Androushchak is Adviser to the Rector of the National

Research University Higher School of Economics (on topics in eco-
nomics of education), and a researcher at the Center for Institutional
Studies, Russia. His research focuses on college choice and differentia-
tion of returns to higher education by different types of universities,
and efficiency of public funding of higher education. He participates in
consulting activities with the Ministry of Education and Science of the
Russian Federation and the Ministry of Economic Development of the
Russian Federation, and regarding policies of public funding of higher
education and indicators of efficiency of Russian universities.

Yaroslav Kuzminov is Rector of the National Research University

Higher School of Economics, Head of the Department of Institutional
Economics, and Academic Supervisor of the Center for Institutional
Studies of the Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia. In 2001
he initiated the establishment of the Russian Public Council for Educa-
tion Development (Russian acronym: ROSRO), an independent agency
lobbying for education priorities in budgeting. Since 2002 the ROSRO
has held open-door discussions on the problems of national education

xi
xii Notes on Contributors

development. He is a member of the Presidential Council for Facilitating

the Development of Civil Society Institutions and Human Rights and a
member of the Public Council at the Ministry of Education and Science
of the Russian Federation. His research interests include economics of
education, institutional economics, and economics of culture.

Liz Reisberg is President of Reisberg & Associates, a consulting firm.

She was formerly a research associate at the Center for International
Higher Education at Boston College in the United States, where she
coordinated several grant-funded projects, conducted research, and
contributed to center publications. She was the founder and for-
mer executive director of the MBA Tour, a company that organizes
professional recruitment tours throughout the world to help grad-
uate schools of business meet talented candidates for their MBA
programs.

Maria Yudkevich is Vice-rector of the National Research University

Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Russia, and an associate
professor in its Economics Department. She also chairs the Center for
Institutional Studies and Laboratory for Institutional Analysis, a research
center for young scholars focusing on both theoretical and applied eco-
nomic analysis of institutions. Her main areas of interest and research
work are contract theory with a special reference to faculty contracts,
universities, and markets for higher education.

Authors

Martin J. Finkelstein is Professor of Higher Education at Seton Hall

University, South Orange, NJ, United States. He has taught at the Uni-
versity of Denver and Teacher’s College, Columbia University, and has
served as a visiting scholar at the Claremont Graduate University, the
Research Institute for Higher Education, Hiroshima University, Japan,
and as a visiting professor at the University of Hong Kong. He is author,
with Jack Schuster, of The American Faculty: The Restructuring of Academic
Work and Careers (2006).

Kevin W. Iglesias is a senior research associate with the Center for Col-
lege Readiness at Seton Hall University. Prior to joining the center, he
served as a human resource manager for the US government. He holds
a BA in psychology from La Salle University, an MA in education from
Seton Hall University, and a master’s in human resource management
 Notes on Contributors xiii

from Rutgers University. Currently, he is a PhD candidate in higher

education research, assessment, and evaluation at Seton Hall University.

N. Jayaram is a senior fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Studies,

Shimla, India. He is also Professor of Research Methodology at, and for-
mer dean of, the School of Social Sciences at the Tata Institute of Social
Sciences, Mumbai, India. He has taught sociology in various capacities
at Bangalore University (1972–1999) and Goa University (1999–2003).
He was the Director of the Institute for Social and Economic Change in
Bangalore. He was a visiting professor of Indian studies at the University
of the West Indies.

Ma Wanhua is a professor at the Graduate School of Education and

Director of the Center for International Higher Education at Peking Uni-
versity, Beijing, China. She has been a visiting professor at the University
of California, Berkeley, teaching an undergraduate course on economic
reform and education change in China. She has also been a consultant at
the East-West Center at Hawaii University and was selected as a Fulbright
New Century Scholar, carrying out a research project on the formation
of global research universities. In the fall of 2008, she was invited as an
Erasmus Mundus professor to Finland and Norway. She has published
extensively on reforms of Chinese higher education and the formation
of American research universities. Her current research focuses on inter-
nationalization of Chinese higher education and capacity building of
research universities in both the United States and China.

Simon Schwartzman is President of Instituto de Estudos do Trabalho e

Sociedade in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, and a Fulbright New Century Scholar
for 2009–2010. He is a member of the Brazilian Academy of Sciences and
a recipient of the Brazilian Order of Scientific Merit. He has also served
as the President of the Brazilian Institute for Geography and Statistics,
Brazil’s census office.

Wen Jianbo is an English lecturer and Vice-director of the College

English Department of the School of Foreign Studies, Central University
of Finance and Economics, Beijing, China. He is also currently a PhD
candidate attending the Graduate School of Education, Peking Univer-
sity, specializing in higher education and comparative education. He was
a visiting fellow at the College of Education and Social Services, Uni-
versity of Vermont, from 2008 to 2009. He received his bachelor’s and
master’s degrees in English language and literature.
1
The Prospects for the BRICs: The
New Academic Superpowers?
Philip G. Altbach

The BRIC countries—Brazil, Russia, India, and China—are expanding

rapidly, and many observers see these countries as dominant economies
in the coming decades. When economist Jim O’Neill coined the term
BRIC in 2001, those countries accounted for 8 per cent of global gross
domestic product (GDP). He predicted that this would increase to
14 per cent by 2011. In fact, the BRICs accounted for almost 20 per cent
of GDP in 2012 (Liu and Li 2012). Fareed Zakaria, among others, has
commented on a major shift in global influence away from North
America and western Europe, and the BRICs are seen at the forefront
of this shift (Zakaria 2008). Logic might dictate that academic power
will rise along with economic and political expansion (Levin 2010).
These four countries do indeed show impressive growth in their higher
education systems and promise to expand and improve in the coming
decades. Yet, it is by no means assured that the BRICs will achieve the
academic prominence that is likely in economic or political spheres.
Each, as will be discussed here, faces significant challenges. Some of
the systemic factors that impact higher education in the BRICs are ana-
lyzed in this chapter; this is followed by an analysis of the most central
prerequisite for academic development and excellence—the academic
profession.
If the economic destiny of the BRICs is on an upward trajectory,
the same cannot be said with certainty for higher education. Just as
there are significant variations in the details of economic and political
development among the four BRICs, quite different academic traditions,
current realities, future plans, and scenarios make it likely that the four
countries will proceed along quite different academic paths. Further, the
route to global academic dominance is highly complex and depends on

1
2 The Prospects for the BRICs

much more than patterns of economic growth or the sophistication of

a nation’s economy or society.
All four BRICs are, in different ways, transitional academic systems.
Three—Brazil, China, and India—face the challenge of rapid expansion
of access and enrollments; at the same time they are attempting to build
world-class research universities at the top of the system, to contribute
research and top-level training to an increasingly sophisticated econ-
omy. Russia, which possesses a mature higher education system and
offers a high level of access, faces the challenge of rebuilding its research
universities, while improving the quality of the system as a whole.

Centers and peripheries

The BRIC countries find themselves in an unusual paradox. On the one

hand, none of them are yet an academic superpower. All lag behind
the main academic centers. On the other hand, all except Russia have
rapidly expanding academic systems and goals of improving their global
standing and building top-ranking universities. Further, all four BRICs
are significant regional centers, influencing neighboring countries, and
providing academic leadership in their respective areas. Brazil, India,
and Russia are by far the most productive academic systems in their
regions. In East Asia, Japan remains the dominant academic power, and
South Korea is expanding academically, but China has the fastest growth
rate and is investing the most resources in higher education.
Russia remains the central academic influence in the former Soviet
Union, and Russian is the main language of instruction and research
as well. Although countries in Eastern Europe are increasingly look-
ing toward the West and English is replacing Russian a key language
of academic communication, Russia retains some influence. India is
by far the largest and most influential academic system in south Asia,
with some modest impact in the Middle East as well. Brazil is the
scientific superpower in Latin America, in terms of research productiv-
ity, the production of doctorates, and to other areas. The fact that it
uses Portuguese and the other countries are Spanish-speaking limits its
influence, however.
Each of the BRICs, because they contain large and self-sustaining aca-
demic systems, see themselves as independent academic entities. At the
same time, they look to the major academic powers for ideas about
higher education development, research paradigms, and other matters.
China and Russia are to some extent adapting Western academic orga-
nizational and governance ideas. Brazil seems mainly immune from
 Philip G. Altbach 3

external ideas, while India’s academic system, built on the British pat-
tern and influenced by India’s own bureaucratic culture, does not look
abroad for ideas about change.
English, as the dominant scientific language, has an impact in all of
the BRIC countries, and it is a challenge for all but India, which from
the beginning of its academic history has used English as the primary
language of teaching and research. Following independence in 1947,
Indian languages began to be used for teaching in some undergraduate
colleges and a few universities. However, a majority of undergraduate
courses and almost all graduate-level degrees are taught in English.
English is more problematical in the other BRIC countries. China and
Russia have established a small number of courses and degree programs
taught in English, in part to attract international students. China in
particular has expanded the number of English-medium degrees, and
at the top universities some courses are offered in English for domestic
students. Brazil seems to lag somewhat behind in embracing English as
a major theme in academic development.
The BRICs, with the partial exception of Brazil, are emphasizing
the importance of their academics publishing in English, in recog-
nized international scientific journals, and in general participating in
the global scientific community. Promotion and prestige are increas-
ingly related to publication, and many Chinese universities offer special
payments to their academics who publish in top international journals.
The balance between striving to achieve global recognition, on the
one hand, and sustaining a national and regional academic culture on
the other remains a dilemma for the BRICs. While they seek to join the
academic superpowers, at the same time their own national academic
systems require support and their regional influence deserves attention
(Altbach and Salmi 2011).
The BRICs remain peripheral in the global knowledge system. China
and India send the largest numbers of students in the world overseas
for international study. Indeed, those two countries account for close
to half of all global student mobility—and their numbers are likely to
increase. All of the BRICs have a significant net outflow of students.
Students studying in the BRIC countries by and large come from sur-
rounding countries, emphasizing their roles as regional centers. Only
China attracts significant numbers of international students, mostly
from neighboring East Asian countries.
China, India, and Russia also contribute significantly to the global
flow of academic talent, with many PhD graduates from these coun-
tries working elsewhere. This brain drain has been quite significant over
4 The Prospects for the BRICs

several decades. Despite modestly improving rates of return and the new
trend for some top academics and scientists to hold appointments in
several countries, quite significant numbers of academics chose to leave
these three countries. The causes are complex and include better work-
ing conditions, infrastructure, salaries abroad, academic atmosphere,
academic freedom, and other factors.
Interesting variations among the four BRIC countries can be observed.
Brazil has not suffered much of a brain drain, and the return rate for
Brazilians who study abroad is quite high. An attractive academic envi-
ronment in the top universities and competitive salaries, no doubt,
contribute to the country’s higher education. Russia, which has a long
and distinguished academic tradition, suffered dramatic financial cut-
backs in higher education following the collapse of the Soviet Union in
the 1990s. Numerous academics, including many distinguished scien-
tists, left the country, and others quit the universities to start different
careers. Only recently has the government recognized the need to
rebuild the academic system. Funds have been invested in research
universities and in several programs to improve the academic system,
although salaries remain largely unattractive. China has implemented
several programs to lure back top academics, who returned to China
with improved salaries and working conditions. These programs have
been modestly successful. India has not recognized its academic brain
drain and has no programs in place to lure Indian academics back,
although many Indians in various technology fields have returned to
the booming high-tech sector—but not to the universities.
The BRIC countries thus occupy an anomalous academic terrain. They
are at the same time large, growing, and increasingly powerful academic
systems and still striving to occupy a more important global position.
In many respects, they remain gigantic peripheries (Altbach 1993).

Massification as the underlying reality

The expansion of enrollments has been the key reality of global higher
education in the last half of the 20th and the beginning of the
21st century (Altbach, Reisberg, and Rumbley 2010). The “logic” of
massification has affected all countries, resulting in increased access
to higher education, greater importance of academic credentials for
employment and social mobility, and the centrality of higher education
in increasingly knowledge-based economies.
China and India have experienced massive growth in the past two
decades and, in fact, will account for more than half the world’s
 Philip G. Altbach 5

Table 1.1 Total and gross enrollment, 2009

Country Total enrollment Gross enrollment ratio

Brazil 6, 115, 138 36a

China 29, 295, 841 24
India 18, 648, 923 16
Russian Federation 9, 330, 115 76
United States 19, 102, 814 89

Notes: a Gross enrollment ratio for Brazil was not available from UNESCO Statistics. The
number was retrieved from Trading Economics, which used data from the World Bank.
Sources: UNESCO Institute of Statistics; Brazil gross enrollment ratio: Trading Economics.

enrollment expansion by 2050. Brazil, which had no universities until

1920, began to rapidly expand its enrollments later than the others.
Table 1.1 shows current enrollments for the four BRIC countries and
includes the United States for comparison.
In 2012, the BRIC countries and the United States have the five largest
enrollments in higher education, and by 2008 the five countries, com-
bined, accounted for 48 per cent of the world’s enrollment in higher
education (see Figure 1.1). In terms of enrollment, China and India
are now among the world’s three largest academic systems, and India
will soon move into second place. Brazil ranks in fifth position and
will no doubt move up the charts in the coming years. Russia will
probably experience little enrollment expansion. The reason for the
inevitability of expansion in China, India, and Brazil is, of course, the
fact that they currently enroll, by international standards, a modest per-
centage of the relevant age cohort—in the case of India only 16 per
cent, while China serves 24 per cent, and Brazil 36 per cent. Russia, in
contrast, enrolls 75 per cent—similar to most economically developed
countries.
Rapid massification produces some inevitable results—including an
overall deterioration in the quality of higher education. This does not
mean that the top part of academe becomes worse, but the average
quality, measured by virtually any criteria, does go down. For example,
38 per cent of those teaching in postsecondary education in China have
only a bachelor’s degree, although the proportions of academics with at
least a master’s degree are much higher in the other BRIC nations. The
average quality of students entering postsecondary education declines,
at the same time that competition for places in the top universities
increases. The phenomenon occurs because a larger number of more
modestly qualified students are entering the bottom tier of universities,
6 The Prospects for the BRICs

Enrollment in higher education (millions) 35

30

25

20

15

10

0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year

China United States of America India

Russian Federation Brazil

Figure 1.1 Enrollment in higher education, BRICs and the United States,
2006–2010.
Sources: UNESCO Institute of Statistics; Brazil gross enrollment ratio: Trading Economics.

while competition for the limited number of places at the top-ranking

universities is greater as applicants are aware of the quality and pres-
tige variations among universities. Per-student funding also declines as
numbers increase, and governments do not allocate sufficient funding
to maintain quality for larger numbers. Thus, academic systems become
more differentiated, either by plan or by the forces of the market—
with the emergence of a small top tier of universities, alongside a much
larger group of institutions catering to students from a wide range of
backgrounds and abilities.
The fact is that none of the BRIC countries provide a reasonable
standard of quality to students in the mass sector of postsecondary edu-
cation. Each underinvests in this sector. As a partial result, the private
sector has moved in to provide mass access, and its quality is often low.
In China and Brazil, particularly, the academic qualifications of those
teaching in the mass sector are inadequate, and part-time instructors are
widely used. Dropout rates are high, and many graduates are deemed to
be unemployable.
 Philip G. Altbach 7

Few countries have been able to develop and sustain a well-defined

higher education system that adequately supports mass enrollments and
world-class research universities at the same time. The BRIC countries,
each in its own way, have been grappling with this key challenge in the
era of massification.

The challenge of funding

Postsecondary education everywhere faces significant financial chal-

lenges. The cost of catering to a larger and more diverse clientele is
at the heart of the problem. Very few governments have the finan-
cial resources to fully support a comprehensive mass higher education
system. The BRIC countries, due largely to their economic success in
recent years, have the ability to provide more funds to higher educa-
tion. Yet, despite clear needs, public investment remains relatively low
when compared to that in developed countries. The average expenditure
in education as a percentage of GDP for countries in the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in general the
wealthier nations, is 5.9 per cent (public and private combined); and
the United States spends 7.2 per cent of GDP (public and private com-
bined). Table 1.2 shows the BRICs range from 2.1 per cent (China) to
4.3 per cent (Brazil).
Inadequate funding has significant implications throughout the aca-
demic system and makes it difficult, if not impossible, for postsecondary

Table 1.2 Expenditure in education and research and development (R&D)

Expenditure in education Expenditure in R&D

% GDP Tertiary education Domestic gross As % of

(2009) as % of GDP (2008) expenditure GDP
(PPP US$ (2009)
Public Private billions, 2009)

Brazil 4.3 0.8 n.d. 18.0 0.9

China 2.1 n.d. n.d. 123.7 1.4
India 4.1 n.d. n.d. 28.1 0.8
Russia 3.1 0.9 0.5 21.8 1.0
United States 5.7 1.0 1.7 383.6 2.7

Note: n.d. = no data.

Sources: Percentage of expenditure in education as % of GDP: The Economist’s “Pocket
World in Figures.” Expenditure in tertiary education as % of GDP: OECD Factbook, 2011.
Expenditure in R&D: Batelle, R&D Magazine. Data from International Monetary Fund and
Batelle.
8 The Prospects for the BRICs

education to fulfill its goals and to serve the needs of individuals and
society. The implications include low salaries for the academic profes-
sion and others working in higher education, a theme that will be
discussed later in this essay. Quality suffers in many ways, with poor and
often overcrowded facilities, a lack of support staff, outdated or nonex-
istent laboratories, substandard libraries and information technology, as
well as limited access to internet-based resources, and other problems.
All of the BRIC countries have implemented special funding initia-
tives for higher education from public resources and have in the past
several decades increased financial support for higher education. Yet, in
all cases, the amounts allocated have been inadequate. In all four cases,
base funding for higher education to pay for the expansion has been
especially inadequate—resulting in poor quality of education, denial
of access to some who seek to enter postsecondary education, and
increasing dropout rates.

R&D and the research universities

Despite the rapidly growing economies of the BRIC countries, and the
stated goals of each to emphasize research and development (R&D) as a
keystone of economic development, all four countries spend less than
the 2008 OECD average of 2.3 per cent of GDP and well under the
2.7 per cent spent by the United States (see Table 1.2 above).
R&D expenditures do not, of course, all go to universities, but there
is a correlation between broader R&D expenditures and research sup-
port for higher education—and it is clear that the BRICs lag behind
the most developed countries. China spends the largest amount and
also the greatest proportion of GDP, and India and Brazil do worse.
This is also the case for patent applications, another proxy indication of
scientific productivity. Most observers note that China’s R&D growth—
as measured by patents, research expenditures, and facilities—has been
impressive; and if current trends continue, China will become a major
research power in a decade. The other BRIC nations show less impres-
sive growth, although segments of the higher education systems in each
country are impressive.
Two of the BRIC countries, China and Russia, have complex research
systems that in many ways weaken the research strength of the univer-
sities. In both countries, the apex research organizations are institutes
that are part of the Academy of Sciences system. These institutes focus
exclusively on research and, by local standards, are better funded by the
government than the universities. Perhaps most significant, national
 Philip G. Altbach 9

policy has long given the universities responsibility mainly for teach-
ing, with research receiving less support. The academy tradition was
a central part of Russian, and then Soviet, scientific policy and was
adopted in China after the establishment of the People’s Republic in
1949. In recent years, both countries have recognized the problems of
the academy system and have moved to better integrate the institutes
with some of the universities, and also provide more resources to the
universities for research. In some cases, academicians have university
appointments, and doctoral students work in the institutes. India also
has a small number of research institutes, but they are less central to the
scientific system.
Research universities are at the pinnacle of any higher education
system, and they are central in the efforts of the BRICs to rise to
prominence both in higher education and in economic and scientific
development (Altbach 2007). Progress has been impressive in three of
the BRICs—Brazil, China, and Russia. India lags behind. China, as a
result of its two major initiatives aimed at building research universities,
the 211 and 985 Projects, invested heavily and now has approximately
100 universities with impressive infrastructures, some of which are
developing into globally competitive institutions (Levin 2010). China’s
government and the top universities aim at establishing the country as
a major academic power. China’s growing research universities are strug-
gling to build an academic culture to accompany their facilities (Altbach
2009).
Brazil’s research universities are, with a few exceptions, concentrated
in the state of São Paulo, which allocates a significant part of its tax
revenues, by law, to major public research universities and has been
able over time to build some of Latin America’s top research universi-
ties. A few other federal universities have also built a research profile.
None of India’s universities appear anywhere near the top in any of the
international rankings, a surprising fact for a country with the world’s
third largest academic system. Only the highly respected Indian Insti-
tutes of Technology are internationally recognized, and these are small
and specialized schools. Russia’s traditional research universities, which
had significant strength and global respect, declined following the end
of the Soviet Union in the 1990s. Rebuilding is now underway, and
the government has identified 29 national research universities. Addi-
tional funding is provided, and these institutions have a mission of
building world-class research universities in Russia. The traditional key
universities maintained significant strength, and several new institu-
tions have been established. It is too early to determine if this initiative
10 The Prospects for the BRICs

will result in several Russian universities joining the ranks of the leading
global universities.
While the BRIC economies are expanding rapidly, and higher edu-
cation is recognized as a top priority for each country, none has
universities that are in the top ranks of global research universities yet.

A mania for mergers

Two BRIC countries, China and Russia, have frequently used insti-
tutional mergers as a means of improving efficiency and enhancing
the ranking of universities (indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin
recently announced that another wave of mergers will take place). Per-
haps not surprising, since many universities in these two countries were
divided into small specialized institutions during the Soviet period in
Russia and in the 1950s in China, when the Soviet model was widely
followed. But academic mergers are often very difficult to successfully
implement. For the most part, they stem from government decisions,
rather than the institutions themselves. Often, the goals of mergers are
bureaucratic efficiency or a desire to bring together institutions, so that
there will be economies of scale—and quick improvement in the global
rankings.
Variations in academic culture may also contribute to problems in
the successful implementation of mergers: overlapping and conflict-
ing bureaucratic structures, the geographical separation of campuses,
entrenched interests of administrators or faculty, the challenges of com-
bining management and other systems, and the simple matter of size.
While mergers may not be problematical in all cases, careful atten-
tion needs to be paid to both goals and the practical challenges of
implementation.

The private sector and the privatization of public higher

education

Massification and inadequate public support for higher education have

been responsible for the rise of a growing private sector worldwide.
Indeed, private higher education is the fastest growing segment world-
wide (Levy and Zumeta 2011). Each of the BRIC countries has a growing
private sector. In fact, much of the enrollment expansion in the BRICs
is in the private sector or in revenue producing segments of the public
sector. Brazil’s is the largest in terms of the proportion of students
attending private universities—about 75 per cent. India has the most
 Philip G. Altbach 11

complex private sector, since the majority of undergraduate colleges

are privately managed, although most receive the bulk of their fund-
ing from the government. The growing number of “unaided” (fully
privately funded) undergraduate colleges are supervised by a public uni-
versity and their degrees are awarded by the university. India has a
growing segment of private universities—53 out of a total of 496 uni-
versities. These private universities are allowed by the government to
grant degrees but receive no public funding. Private postsecondary insti-
tutions in China and Russia educate a small but growing segment of the
student population—0.9 and 17 per cent, respectively. The private sec-
tor in the BRIC countries is, with only a few exceptions, for-profit. Brazil
and Russia do possess a few high-quality private institutions. In the
Brazilian case they are mainly traditional Catholic universities, while in
Russia several well-funded private economics and business institutions
have emerged in recent years. Neither China nor India has any top-level
private universities, although several institutions aspire to achieve excel-
lence. In general, as is common in developing and emerging economies,
the private sector caters to students who cannot be admitted to the pub-
lic universities or to those who have vocational interests served by some
of the private institutions. Quality assurance is a challenge in the BRIC
countries generally, but it has been particularly problematical for the
private sector.
In each of the BRICs the public sector has higher prestige, and stu-
dents, if they have a choice, will typically choose a public university.
This preference is in part changing, as the public sector deteriorates, and
a small number of prestigious private institutions have been established.
Prestigious private specialized institutions are particularly evident in
fields such as management and information technology. As the qual-
ity of public higher education deteriorates, the emerging middle classes
in the BRICs may be willing to pay for elite private institutions. More
wealthy parents are sending their children overseas for undergraduate
education as well—particularly in China and India.
There has also been a notable privatization of the public universi-
ties in several of the BRIC countries, a phenomenon that is changing
the nature of public higher education and affects these four countries
in different ways. Public university tuition fees are low in three of the
countries (China, India, and Russia) and free in Brazil. In China and
Russia, central and provincial authorities allocate budgets for specific
numbers of students in each public university, although the amounts
are too low to support the full budget of the institution. The universi-
ties are permitted to enroll “extra-budgetary” students, who are charged
12 The Prospects for the BRICs

high fees and generally receive the same degree as the regular students.
Funds earned from these students provide extra payments to professors
and support the budget in general. In this way, public universities func-
tion as dual public and private institutions. Indian undergraduate and
professional education is increasingly offered by private colleges, which
are affiliated to the public universities but receive no funding from pub-
lic sources. The growing importance of “unaided” colleges is a notable
new phenomenon in India.
In all of the BRICs, as in much of the world, universities are asked
to earn income from consulting, the sale of intellectual property, and
other sources. Some top Chinese universities have been particularly
successful in starting companies, such as Peking University’s Founder
Group, specializing in information technology products, which con-
tribute to the institutional budgets. Many Chinese universities have
invested in “technology parks”—some of which have spawned inno-
vative industries and other commercial ventures. The Brazilian public
universities seem least affected by the pressure to privatize, as Brazil
has, at least so far, retained its commitment to fairly generous public
support for its public universities. However, it should be kept in mind
that 80 per cent of Brazilian students attend private higher education
institutions.
These factors have, without question, produced significant change in
the nature of public universities worldwide and have brought market
forces to academe as never before.

Corruption and the creation of an academic culture

Universities in all of the four BRIC countries face the challenges

of solidifying academic cultures that are at the same time merito-
cratic, collaborative, and competitive. The need is particularly acute
at the top of the system in the research universities, if they are to
aspire to world-class status, but it is relevant throughout the sys-
tem. The culture within an academic institution is central to fulfilling
the mission of the university and significant to the academic staff
as well.
This discussion mainly concerns public universities in the BRIC coun-
tries. Most of the growing private sector has little semblance of academic
culture. As noted, most institutions are run for profit, offering voca-
tionally popular qualifications and with no aspirations to conduct
research. Most of the teachers are part-time, and few, if any, have
 Philip G. Altbach 13

long-term or permanent employment arrangements. There is no shared

governance; top managers control all aspects of the institutions. There
are, of course, a few exceptions to these general patterns. The older
Catholic universities in Brazil, several new and well-funded business
schools in Russia, and Manipal, Symbiosis, and several other institutions
in India are among these exceptions.
An effective institutional culture includes a system of shared gover-
nance in which the academic staff has effective control over the key
elements of curriculum, hiring and promotion of staff, awarding of
degrees, and related aspects at the core of any university. At the same
time, academic leaders must hold the power to lead the institution and
not be subject either to strict governmental control or to the “anarchy”
of professorial (or sometimes student) participation in each decision.
An appropriate mix of faculty autonomy and administrative leadership
is necessary for effective governance.
The BRIC countries vary in their arrangements. China’s highly
bureaucratic academic structures are formed by a combination of
academic governance and the parallel administrative authority of
Communist Party groups in each department and at the top university
level, creating a highly bureaucratic and sometimes politicized academic
culture. Both India and Russia have substantial degrees of bureaucratic
controls. Brazilian universities are typically governed by elected admin-
istrators at all levels, with academic and other staff and often students
voting. This arrangement encourages a politicization of academic deci-
sion making and often makes needed but difficult decisions impossible
to implement. It is fair to say that aspects of university internal organi-
zation and university–government relationships create problems in the
BRIC countries.
Academic freedom is also a central value for higher education world-
wide. All of the BRIC countries have faced some challenges to academic
freedom, which in some cases continue. China’s situation is the most
problematic. Many observers have commented on problems of access
to information in some disciplines, and restrictions (sometimes self-
imposed) on certain kinds of research or on the interpretation of
findings. Publishing certain results or interpretations may create prob-
lems. Sanctions for violating norms can be either subtle or severe and
are on the minds of many academics, especially in the social sciences.
The fact that political authorities are an integral part of the university
administration, through the Communist Party secretary, underlines the
concern for ideological conformity.
14 The Prospects for the BRICs

Academic freedom issues are more subtle in the three other BRIC
countries, and in general all three offer a high degree of academic free-
dom. Although academic freedom was severely compromised in Brazil
during the military dictatorship between 1964 and 1985, it now has
a very strong record of academic freedom, with no restrictions on
information access and publication, or barriers to the faculty’s politi-
cal expression or involvement. Russia continues to be affected by the
legacy of the Soviet Union in many aspects of its society and economy,
including in higher education. This tradition includes a certain amount
of self-censorship of perceived controversial ideas, while academic free-
dom, at least in terms of the freedom to speak out and publish in areas
of relevant expertise, seems to be reasonably well-protected in Russia at
present. The situation in India, as in many areas, is complex. Academic
freedom is in general well-entrenched and protected. Yet, in some parts
of the country, there are informal constraints on publishing controver-
sial findings in areas such as religious conflicts, interpretations of aspects
of Indian history, intercaste and ethnic relations, among others. From
the legal perspective, however, academic freedom is protected.
Academic corruption is not a topic that lends itself to careful research
or open discussion (Heyneman 2009). Yet, that issue exists to some
extent in many academic systems. Three of the BRIC countries have
been, and to some extent continue to be, affected by serious malfea-
sance. Only Brazil seems not to have any entrenched corrupt practices
although, as is the case everywhere, there is occasional corruption that
may involve an individual or institution. In the other three countries,
elements of corruption have affected many universities, and in some
cases remain a problem. It is not possible to accurately measure the
phenomenon, and this discussion will simply mention aspects of the
problem that have been noted by observers. It has not been suggested
that any of these countries face systemic and endemic malfeasance in
the academic system, but China and India in particular face sufficient
issues to create problems for the success of an effective national higher
education system.
In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian higher
education experienced a multiplicity of crises, many stemming from
drastic cutbacks in funding from the government. Among these prob-
lems was a dramatic increase in corrupt practices. Professors, unable to
support themselves with their deteriorating salaries, charged students
for “tutoring,” which resulted in good grades, sold course materials,
and charged money for admission to some faculties and institutions.
In recent years, improvements in salaries—although salaries are still
 Philip G. Altbach 15

quite low by international standards, better working conditions, and

enforcement of rules by both government and academic authorities
have decreased corrupt practices dramatically. The implementation of
a national entrance examination for the universities, for example,
eliminated payments for admission to departments or institutions.
Corruption in India varies by institution and region. Practices that
are frequently highlighted in the Indian media include “selling” aca-
demic posts—by asking for bribes for appointments, awarding posts to
people from specific regional or caste groups or for political reasons,
widespread cheating by students in examinations, and many others.
It is possible that the media exaggerates the extent of the problem, and
there is no accurate data. It is the case that the top institutions, such as
the Indian Institutes of Technology and others, operate with complete
probity; and national examinations for entry to these institutes and for
other purposes seem to be free of problems.
Numerous reports of plagiarism of academic work by students and
professors have been noted in the Chinese media and are widely dis-
cussed. Many observers have commented on widespread falsification
of data in research, manipulation of the journal publication process,
and other shady practices. The pressure to publish research articles is
immense, and many have commented that a generally understood set
of academic ethics has not been widely accepted in China. The all-
important national entrance examination, the gaokao, is widely regarded
as entirely fair and efficiently managed. While the extent of actual cor-
ruption cannot be measured, it is mainly agreed that the development
of an academic culture with probity as a key element is slow to be
implemented in China.
Corruption is, thus, an issue of some importance in three of the BRICs,
and is, in some ways, a detriment to the development of a world-class
academic system. Basically, all of the BRICs need to foster an academic
culture that supports the essential missions of higher education. While
such a culture takes time to mature, it also requires an adequately funded
higher education system, clear rules that are enforced by governmen-
tal and academic authorities, and working conditions that foster high
quality.

National challenges

The foregoing discussion has highlighted some of the key factors affect-
ing the BRIC nations as they participate in the rapidly changing global
higher education environment of the 21st century. It is also useful to
16 The Prospects for the BRICs

examine some of the specific challenges affecting each of the coun-

tries. National academic development is affected by global trends and
national circumstances and policies. This discussion only highlights
some of the most significant national elements shaping the country.

Brazil
Brazil has significant advantages in its higher education environment,
particularly when compared to other Latin American countries. The
country’s public universities, although they account for only 20 per cent
of enrollments, are Latin America’s research powerhouses. They produce
more than half of Latin America’s doctorates and a high percentage
of the continent’s research. They also mainly employ full-time faculty
and pay relatively attractive salaries. Yet, there are only a few interna-
tionally competitive universities—three in the state of São Paulo and
a few other federal institutions. The majority of the public universities
and all but a few of the growing private sector are of mediocre to poor
quality. The system as a whole is poorly coordinated, with the largely
anarchic for-profit private sector dominating Brazilian higher education.
The public universities are sponsored by several different governmental
entities, with little coordination among them.
The governance of the private institutions tends to be in the hands
of the owners and their appointed administrators, with little chance
for an independent academic culture to emerge. The public institutions
all operate with the traditional Latin American concept of autonomy
from government control and with internal “democracy.” This unwieldy
arrangement makes academic leadership difficult or unachievable and
contributes to academic paralysis. The fact that public universities
cannot charge for tuition and are restricted from generating much
income from intellectual property and other entrepreneurial activi-
ties also makes it difficult for the universities to engage in innovative
programs.
While Brazil’s federal governments and some of the state governments
provide relatively generous support for public universities, only the
three main public universities in the state of São Paulo and a few other
federal universities have achieved prominence as research universities
of an international standard. There is no national strategy for higher
education, other than a commitment to expand access. The powerful
state governments have no specific plans for their universities, although
the generous funding arrangements in São Paulo, where the three main
public universities receive a set percentage of state tax revenues, have
permitted these institutions to develop impressively into key research
 Philip G. Altbach 17

universities. One of the few federal efforts is a large scholarship scheme

to send Brazilian students abroad, in the hope to build up skill levels.
Brazil, in common with many countries, has a serious problem of
access and degree completion for some racial and ethnic groups and for
lower-income groups in society, and it is currently experimenting with
an innovative program offering funding and support for students.
On average, Brazil’s universities are among the best in Latin America.
Brazil does not suffer from the Latin American problem of an academic
profession that is largely part-time, and the country produces many
more advanced degrees than its neighbors. Yet, its higher education
system is inadequate to serve Brazil’s rapidly growing and increasingly
sophisticated economy.

Russia
Russia’s challenges are, in general, of a different nature than in the other
BRICs. Russia is a mature economy with a population that is contracting.
Its access rate is high: 76 per cent of the age cohort attends postsec-
ondary institutions, and the academic system will not expand. Quality
throughout the system is considered to be a major challenge, and it
is recognized that Russia needs to rebuild its once impressive research
universities. While many problems faced higher education during the
Soviet period, the top universities were recognized for their high qual-
ity in the sciences. Following the end of the Soviet Union, funds were
dramatically cut, morale collapsed, many of the top academics left for
other countries, and many of those who stayed left the academic pro-
fession. Low salaries necessitated moonlighting and, as noted earlier,
contributed to rising corruption. Facilities deteriorated, and laboratories
quickly became outdated.
Like China, Russia has an “academy system,” in which much of
the research is conducted by the relatively well-funded and prestigious
Academy of Sciences. The system faces the challenge of integrating the
universities and the academies, in order to maximize the effectiveness
of research and to make the most efficient use of available human and
financial resources.
Internationalization lags far behind in Russia. While the country is
host to over 90,000 international students, almost all of them are from
the former Soviet Union. Only a few courses are offered in English, at
places such as the Higher School of Economics, the Peoples Friendship
University, and a few others. Few international students are prepared
to undertake studies in Russian. Relatively few Russian students study
abroad, and many of those do not return home.
18 The Prospects for the BRICs

Like many countries, non-elite postsecondary institutions face severe

resource constraints, low morale, overcrowded facilities, and an influx
of students who may not be well-qualified for higher education. As a
result, dropout rates are high, and many graduates cannot easily find
employment. Improving these institutions presents a significant chal-
lenge: how to better integrate them into a more coherent academic
system and ensure that the quality of instruction is adequate. At the
top of the system, rebuilding the research universities has already
begun. The government has identified 29 research universities and
has provided them with significant, but still inadequate, additional
resources. National policy aims at enabling these universities to join
the top ranks of world universities and to score well in the global
rankings.
Russia still faces the challenge of building an academic culture that
stresses productivity, academic freedom, teaching excellence, and a com-
mitment by the academic staff to their universities and to the highest
standards of scholarship. To achieve these goals, salaries will need to be
significantly improved, along with the internal governance and ethos of
many universities.

India
India faces the greatest challenges of all of the BRIC countries (Altbach
2009). Its access rate is significantly lower, at 13 per cent, than the oth-
ers, and its population is growing more rapidly than any of the others.
Thus, the key reality in the coming decades will be providing access for
millions of new students (Agarwal 2009).
India has no world-class universities. The Indian Institutes of Technol-
ogy, a few of which appear on the global rankings, are small and are not
universities, since they offer a limited number of disciplines. A few of the
traditional universities, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New
Delhi, are recognized as having several distinguished departments and
some top professors but are nonetheless largely unranked. India may be
the only large country with no top universities.
Indian higher education is inadequately funded, and a surprising
amount of the financial resources spent are paid to the academics, whose
salaries, when compared to other developing and middle-income coun-
tries, are surprisingly high. Very little public funding is available for
research. The state governments, which are mainly responsible for fund-
ing the universities and many of the colleges, seldom provide adequate
resources and have no consciousness of the importance of the research
function of the universities. However, a number of schemes aimed at
 Philip G. Altbach 19

improving the capacity at the top of the academic system have been
proposed by the central government. The funds allocated are largely
inadequate, and in any case most government resources in the coming
period will necessarily be spent on coping with the expansion of student
numbers and access.
Structurally, the Indian system is also the most problematical. The
current arrangements in undergraduate colleges affiliated to univer-
sities that have responsibility for examinations, awarding of degrees,
and certain aspects of quality assurance are no longer effective.
India’s 32,000 colleges are overwhelming the 496 universities, many
of which are responsible for hundreds of colleges, often located far
from the main campus. The system has proved over decades to be
immune to efforts to reform it and has grown even more unwieldy.
When India has successfully implemented change in higher edu-
cation, it has had to ignore the established universities and start
entirely new institutions, such as the Institutes of Technology. Fur-
ther, although there is a quality-assurance agency, it is inadequate
and has been unable to evaluate more than a small minority of
institutions.
In recent years, the private sector has expanded dramatically. There
are now more than 100 private universities—called “deemed univer-
sities.” There are thousands of “unaided,” mainly private, colleges in
all fields that are subject to the authority of the affiliating universi-
ties but are somewhat loosely controlled. Many of these colleges are
for-profit, sponsored by local politicians, or by nonprofit religious or
ethnic societies. Most of the private universities focus on high-demand
subjects—such as management studies, information technology, and the
like. Many are for-profit. A few are nonprofit.
India’s system of providing special advantages for students from dis-
advantaged caste, ethnic, and income groups, commonly referred to
as reservations, now accounts for close to half the places allocated in
many colleges and universities. Reservations also govern who may be
appointed to teaching and research positions. While there are significant
historical, political, and sociological reasons for the reservation policies,
they have come under much criticism in recent years and certainly have
an impact on the academic system as a whole.
It is difficult to envisage a practical strategy for India to overcome
these structural, political, and financial challenges and build a glob-
ally competitive academic system or, for that matter, to produce the
talent needed for India’s rapidly growing and increasingly high-tech
economy.
20 The Prospects for the BRICs

China
China’s academic progress in the past several decades has been
remarkable, especially since the nation emerged from the Cultural
Revolution of 1966–1976 with its academic system largely destroyed
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2007). The
211 and 985 Projects, aimed at supporting about 100 research uni-
versities, succeeded in adding infrastructure and creating an impres-
sive group of research universities—a dozen of which are achieving
international stature. Even more impressive has been the growth of
enrollments. China has increased its access rates from a few percent to
24 per cent.
Yet, serious challenges persist. While China has invested heavily in the
top of its academic system and has achieved impressive results, academic
institutions (public and private) at the bottom of the hierarchy are
often of low quality and produce graduates unable to find appropriate
employment. The gulf between the top and the bottom of the system,
as is the case in many countries, has grown. China seems to have no
strategy in place for improving the mass sector of its higher education
system.
The practice in many Chinese universities of enrolling additional
students on campus or in affiliated colleges—in order to earn addi-
tional income, increase access, and provide opportunities for academic
staff to supplement their salaries—has many negative aspects, including
distracting academics from their basic tasks, quality control, and others.
The private (minban) institutions are typically focused on vocational
subjects and are often of poor quality. They are typically uncoordinated
and have few links to the rest of the higher education system. Quality
assurance is problematical. Many of the private institutions use aca-
demic staff employed in the public universities, thus taking them away
from their core responsibilities. Ensuring that the “private sector serves
the public interest” is a significant challenge.
The Chinese academic profession is under significant strain. Aca-
demics are underpaid and must earn extra income. Only 13 per cent
hold doctoral degrees and 35 per cent have earned only a bache-
lor’s degree. They are subject to tight bureaucratic and, in some cases,
political controls. Many have only a rudimentary grasp of academic
culture.
The Chinese academic system exhibits some significant contradic-
tions. On the one hand, it has accomplished much in the past several
decades, and the best universities are close to achieving a world-class
status. Substantial resources have been invested, and there have been
 Philip G. Altbach 21

significant improvements in research output and impact, patents, and

other measures of productivity. On the other hand, much of the system
remains on quite shaky ground and in need of major improvement. The
problem of continued enrollment growth, as China moves from the cur-
rent access rate of 22 per cent to double that figure, will create additional
strains on the system.
The national challenges described here are quite significant for each
of the BRIC countries. While there are some common threads among
them, each country faces its own reality. And each has different ways of
coping with problems. Some are likely to be more successful than others.
One of the central requirements of a successful academic system is the
academic profession. Thus, a consideration of the challenges facing the
professoriate in the BRIC nations is of special importance.

The academic profession

The academic profession is at the heart of the university. No institution

of higher education can be successful without a well-qualified, highly
motivated, and effective professoriate. Yet, too often the academics are
forgotten in discussions of the problems of universities—or sometimes
demonized as creators of the university’s difficulties. The academic pro-
fession in the BRIC countries, as in the rest of the world, faces significant
challenges in the 21st century. Indeed, in many countries salaries are
inadequate and in some cases deteriorating, and conditions for teaching
and research are inadequate. In general, the “best and brightest” are not
attracted to the universities.
As a general rule, the overall academic qualifications and working con-
ditions of the professoriate decline in a mass higher education system.
Not surprisingly, the proportion of academic staff with doctoral degrees
declines, as do overall salaries, working conditions, and most likely the
quality of teaching. The proportion of part-time staff increases, as does
the number of full-time professors who moonlight in other teaching or
research positions or in non-academic work.
If there ever was an academic community, it is weakened by the
circumstances of mass higher education. The differences in salaries,
working conditions, and prestige between the minority of academics
with positions at the top in the research universities and the very large
majority of those with appointments elsewhere are huge.
An examination of the status of the academic profession in the BRIC
countries—particularly the terms and conditions of academic appoint-
ments, remuneration, and contracts—is of central relevance because the
22 The Prospects for the BRICs

future of the academic systems of these key countries will depend, in

large degree, on the health of the academic profession.
Unlike the professoriates in many other parts of the world, including
the United States and, dramatically, in developing countries with rapidly
expanding enrollments, none of the BRIC countries are overwhelmed
by part-time academics. Brazil is particularly notable since the rest of
Latin America relies on part-time faculty for a large majority of teaching.
There are part-time teachers in the BRIC countries, and their numbers
seem to be growing, but they do not dominate. A pattern, however,
which is evident in China and Russia, is that regular faculty members
often teach extra classes to students who are admitted “above the state
allocation,” in order to earn extra salary for themselves and income for
the university, or “moonlight” in private postsecondary institutions.

Salaries and remuneration

Our research reveals some surprising patterns in salaries among the four
BRIC countries (Altbach et al. 2012). Surprisingly, in the public colleges
and universities, India and Brazil score best on academic salaries, when
measured according to purchasing power parity (see Table 1.3).
Indeed, both India and Brazil compare reasonably favorably with
the United States and other developed countries. Full-time academics
in these countries can live on their academic salaries, without earn-
ing significant extra income. Russia and China compare less favorably.
At average levels, their salaries are only one-fifth of those in the
other two countries and dramatically less than salaries in developed
countries.
These basic salary comparisons have great significance for the aca-
demic profession. Chinese and Russian academics cannot live on their

Table 1.3 Academic salaries comparison

Salaries (US$ PPP) Top/Average ratio

Entry Average Top

Brazil 1, 858 3, 179 4, 550 2.4

China 259 720 1, 107 4.3
India 3, 954 6, 070 7, 433 1.9
Russian 433 617 910 2.1
Federation
United States 4, 950 6, 054 7, 358 1.5

Source: Altbach, Reisberg, Yudkevich, Androushchak, and Pacheco (2012).

 Philip G. Altbach 23

academic salaries and must earn additional funds from other sources,
from within or outside the university (Ma 2009). The need for additional
income means that they cannot devote full attention to their academic
work, and both research and teaching suffer as a result.
The comparisons also show inequalities among academic ranks.
China is the most unequal, with senior professors earning more than
four times the salaries of junior academic staff. The other three coun-
tries show an approximate doubling between the most junior and the
top ranks. The United States and other developed countries show less
variation between the ranks and thus a flatter academic salary structure.
While there is relatively little data on the total compensation earned
by academics in the four countries, it is clear that in all of them
academics typically earn more from their universities than the basic
salaries reported here. In China, especially, academics are paid extra
for publication, research, and other academic activities; and the most
productive staff can earn significant additional income. In both China
and Russia, as noted earlier, many academics earn extra income by
teaching more classes. These practices seem to be less evident in Brazil
and India, although Indian academics earn added income through spe-
cial allocations—due to cost of living in cities, and other categorical
increments.
Somewhat surprisingly, Indian academic salaries, when measured
by purchasing power parity, are highest among the four BRIC coun-
tries, largely as a result of recent across-the-board salary increments
implemented by India’s University Grants Commission and funded by
the central and state governments. Current salary scales place Indian
academics in the burgeoning middle class, and provide a reasonable
standard of living. However, these relatively attractive salaries are not
accompanied by any performance measures, and are incrementally
increased on the basis of length of service and not according to any eval-
uation. Brazilian salaries are also relatively attractive and permit most
Brazilian academics with full-time appointments to enjoy a middle-
class lifestyle. In both China and Russia, academics do not earn enough
from their basic academic salaries to enjoy a middle-class existence and
thus must earn additional income—with consequences for academic
productivity, morale, teaching quality, and institutional commitment.
In all four BRIC countries, the basic pattern of allocation of salary
increments is largely based on length of service and other bureaucratic
elements, rather than on productivity or merit. Generally, it is possible
to estimate the salary of a member of the academic staff, based on his
or her rank and length of service, with other variables playing little role.
24 The Prospects for the BRICs

The lack of a merit system for salary allocation removes a key measure
of productivity among academic staff.
In common with most countries, the salary structures available in the
BRICs are not competitive with those of similarly qualified professionals
in other fields, nor are salaries competitive internationally. Even Indian
and Brazilian academic salaries do not compare favorably, when mea-
sured in direct terms with salaries in developed countries—even if it is
possible for academics in India and Brazil to enjoy a middle-class local
lifestyle. For Russia and China, salaries are dramatically below global
norms. These disparities contribute to a significant brain drain and non-
return rates from all of the BRIC countries, particularly from Russia,
China, and India.

Academic appointments
The terms and conditions of academic appointments are central to creat-
ing a career structure and measuring the productivity of academic staff.
Academic freedom is, in part, dependent on the nature of academic
appointments. Without an effective means of hiring, evaluating, and
promoting the academics, it is difficult to attract and retain the best
minds for the profession.
In all four BRIC countries, there is a significant degree of academic
inbreeding—hiring faculty members who received their degrees from
the university hiring them. Most agree that inbreeding limits the diver-
sity of the professoriate and mobility among institutions, reduces the
possibilities of hiring the best talent, and creates a more hierarchical
structure in departments and faculties. On the other hand, there are
often reasons for this practice, including a lack of appropriate talent out-
side the university that is hiring and, of course, a tradition of inbreeding.
With the exception of a few universities at the top of the academic
hierarchy in each of the BRIC countries, there is no national market
for hiring and little possibility of employing internationally—India in
fact has legal restrictions on hiring permanent foreign staff. Some of
the top universities in China and Russia do hire internationally and
offer distinguished professors salary packages significantly higher than
national averages. China’s top universities also place a premium on hir-
ing Chinese with foreign doctorates as a way of building a high-quality
faculty and reducing inbreeding.
Appointment processes at the top institutions in the BRIC coun-
tries are well established and reasonably transparent, and positions are
typically advertised publically and open to all applicants. At many
institutions, however, appointment processes are less clear and often
 Philip G. Altbach 25

subject to favoritism and other irregularities. The appointment processes

in the private higher education sector is often problematical, with few
controls.
Most academics are appointed at entry level, and over time are pro-
moted up the hierarchy. In some countries there are quotas on the
number of full professors, and thus not everyone can achieve the top
rank. Only rarely are openings available for senior professors.

Security of employment
None of the BRICs have formal tenure arrangements similar to the sys-
tem in the United States or civil service appointments as are common
in western Europe. These arrangements provide security of employment
after a period of probation and, in the American case, a careful evalu-
ation of the individual prior to promotion and awarding of a tenured
position. Tenure and civil service appointments protect academic free-
dom, and at the same time provide significant but not completely
guaranteed security of employment (Chait 2002).
For most public universities, in all four BRICs, as is the case for
most countries, academic staff have considerable “de facto” job secu-
rity. Once appointed at the bottom rank, few are ever fired. Although
a variety of formal employment arrangements exist—including renew-
able contracts, periodic reviews, and others—there is little evaluation
of academic work and an expectation among both the employer and
the faculty member that jobs are permanent until retirement. There are
some exceptions to this generalization—for example, many of China’s
top universities have instituted rigorous internal evaluation processes
for contract renewals and promotions.
The de facto job-security arrangements mean significant disadvan-
tages for the universities and some drawbacks for individual academics:
first, a significant security of tenure for most academics; second, no
firm guarantee of job protection relating to academic freedom. In all
four BRIC countries, academic salaries are by and large related to rank
and longevity of service—and not related to job performance or market
conditions (Altbach and Jayaram 2006). Only in China are some aca-
demics at the top universities judged and rewarded based on academic
performance.

Conclusion

The higher education systems of the BRIC countries, because of the

growing economic importance of these four key nations, are now global
26 The Prospects for the BRICs

players. They have received a great deal of attention and are seen as
on their way to the top ranks of the world’s academic systems. All
four countries see higher education as a key ingredient to future eco-
nomic development, and all have developed impressive plans for their
universities. All have goals of improving the status of their top uni-
versities in the global rankings, as they provide increased access to
underserved populations. Observers worldwide—pointing to impressive
plans and, especially in China, increased spending on higher education
and improved performance in research, patents, and publications—are
optimistic about the future prospects of the BRICs.
This analysis shows that BRIC countries face quite significant chal-
lenges in their efforts to build world-class higher education systems.
Among these challenges are:

• building a “system” of postsecondary education that accommodates

both research universities at the top and mass access at the bottom—
with appropriate articulation for students;
• ensuring that the private higher education sector serves a broader
public interest and that quality is maintained;
• adequately funding the postsecondary sector to ensure both quality
and access;
• ensuring that the academic profession is appropriately trained and
adequately paid;
• supporting effective internal governance and management of uni-
versities so that the academic profession has appropriate authority
and at the same time complex academic institutions are effectively
managed;
• providing appropriate institutional autonomy, so that the key aca-
demic decisions can be made by the academic community, while at
the same time there is effective overall supervision by government or
other relevant authorities.

The higher education success of the BRICs is by no means assured—

the stakes are quite high because these four key countries need effective
higher education systems to support their impressive economic growth.
Just as important, universities are central to the civil societies of coun-
tries that will inevitably play global leadership roles in the coming
decades.

Acknowledgement

I am indebted to Iván F. Pacheco for comments.

 Philip G. Altbach 27

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2
Higher Education, the Academic
Profession, and Economic
Development in Brazil
Simon Schwartzman

With 192 million inhabitants and more than two trillion dollars of gross
domestic product in 2010, Brazil has one of the largest economies in
the world and, with about US$11,000 per capita, is an upper-middle-
income country. In the last ten years, the country has benefited from
the expansion of international trade and is a major exporter of agricul-
tural, mineral, and also manufactured products. Most of the population
lives in large urban settlements, such as São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro,
Recife, Belo Horizonte, and Salvador. Social and economic inequality,
still one of the highest in the world, is improving; and absolute poverty
is being reduced. Brazil is a federation, with 27 states and more than
5,000 municipalities, with the central government playing a major role
in tax collection and distribution of social services and benefits. Taxes
amount to about 37 per cent of the gross domestic product—the high-
est percentage in Latin America and similar to that of developed welfare
states—without, however, providing similar types of services. Most of
the tax revenue supports an oversized public bureaucracy, social security,
and the service of public debt.
Public education started late and higher education later still. By 1950,
57 per cent of the population of five years and older, was illiterate; and
only 56,000 attended some kind of a higher education institution, in
a population of 41 million. By 2000, all children had access to educa-
tion, but many still drop out when reaching puberty; and the quality of
education, as measured by the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development Program for International Student Assessment (OECD
2009) and other national and international assessments, is low. At age

28
 Simon Schwartzman 29

15, most students entering high school do not have the minimum com-
petencies in reading and mathematics for their levels, and many others
have already dropped out of school. Higher education has been expand-
ing continuously—6.3 million students for a population of 191 million
in 2009. Yet, there are still serious shortcomings of quality and coverage.
With recent economic growth, shortages of qualified manpower became
a serious problem. In 2011, a survey among Brazilian industrialists found
that 69 per cent of them revealed difficulties in finding qualified work-
ers and that this was affecting their ability to compete. In recent years,
education has become a major issue in public debate. The public sector
already spends 5 per cent of gross domestic product on public education
(with an additional 2% spent by families), and there is a proposal to
extend public expenditure to at least 7 per cent (Confederação Nacional
da Indústria 2011).

Higher education in Brazil

Until the early 19th century, Brazil was a Portuguese colony. The first
higher education institutions—two schools of law, two medical schools,
and one polytechnic and military school—were created around 1810.
Other institutions were created later on, but the first university, the
Universidade de São Paulo, was only established in 1934—bringing
together the pre-existing schools of engineering, medicine, law, agricul-
ture, and some others, in the state of São Paulo. They were supposed
to be integrated by a new Faculty of Philosophy, Sciences, and Letters,
modeled presumably on the Italian legislation, conceived to prepare aca-
demics for secondary education, and doing research, which at the time
only existed in schools of agriculture and medicine and in some insti-
tutes dealing with tropical diseases and plagues (Stepan 1971). To staff
the new institution, professors from Germany, Italy, and France were
hired in the areas of chemistry, physics, biology, and the social sciences,
and some of them remained in Brazil. In 1937, the national government
created the Universidade do Brasil (currently the Federal University of
Rio de Janeiro, which existed on paper since 1920), also around a Fac-
ulty of Philosophy and with invited professors from abroad. In the
early 1940s a Catholic university was established in Rio de Janeiro, and
since the 1950s a network of federal universities was created through-
out the country, together with public and private non-university higher
education institutions (Schwartzman 1991). In 1991, Brazil had about
893 higher education institutions, enrolling about 1.5 million stu-
dents. Of these institutions, 99 had university status—half of them
30 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

public—while 794 were non-university, small, mostly private higher

education schools—teaching evening courses in areas such as law,
administration, and accounting (Instituto Brasileiro 1993).
This typology of institutions—university and non-university, pub-
lic and private—summarizes the way the higher education sector was
shaped from the beginning and still remains, to a large extent, today.
The main purpose of all institutions, university or otherwise, has been
to provide students with a legally and nationally valid professional cer-
tification. This certification is particularly valued in the more traditional
learned professions—law, medicine, engineering, and dentistry—which
are regulated by law and have a legal minimum curriculum established
by the Ministry of Education, in partnership with legally established
professional councils. This same model was extended to other fields.
In 2004, Brazil had 43 legally regulated higher education professions—
including statisticians, chemists, public-relation specialists, journalists,
economists, sociologists, meteorologists, nurses, musicians, and football
coaches (Nunes and Carvalho 2007). All these course programs last four
to six years. There are no general education, college-type undergraduate
courses and few two-year, postsecondary vocational programs.
From a legal point of view, professional degrees—granted by a uni-
versity, non-university institutions, or faculties—are the same, which
creates a permanent problem for government and professional cor-
porations of trying to prevent (unsuccessfully, in most cases) the
proliferation of low-quality diploma mills.
According to the legislation, universities are institutions that, besides
providing professional degrees, also offer graduate education, do
research, and include the social, biological, and physical sciences, and
professions. Universities are autonomous and free to decide how many
students to admit and what programs to offer. However, they have
to abide to the minimum legal syllabus for the regulated professions.
Non-university institutions require authorization from the Ministry of
Education to open new course programs and change the number of
places being offered, and are subject to closer oversight. In practice,
only a few universities actually do research and graduate education in
a significant way. In 1968, new legislation introduced several features
of North American higher education, including regular master’s degree
and doctoral programs, the credit system, the replacement of chairs by
academic departments, and strengthening the role of the university cen-
tral administration. In the new model, academics would be affiliated not
to a faculty but to a department, according to their field of knowledge,
and be assigned to teach in professional or graduate-course programs, as
 Simon Schwartzman 31

needed. However, the most traditional faculties maintained their auton-

omy, and, in the public perception, the main role of higher education
institutions is still to provide degrees in the learned professions.
Public institutions are fully funded by the national or state budgets,
while private institutions are funded either by private endowments or,
in most cases, by tuition. In the past, private institutions were supposed
to be nonprofit, and this was indeed the case for the Catholic uni-
versities and other denominational institutions (such as Universidade
Mackenzie in São Paulo, established by the Presbyterian Church in
1870 as a high school), and also some community-supported insti-
tutions in the southern states, populated largely with descendants of
German, Italian, and Japanese immigrants. However, as demand for
higher education expanded, for-profit institutions began to appear, and
the legislation now allows higher education institutions to function as
privately owned, for-profit companies.
The 1968 reform led to two diverging trends. Until the 1960s, teach-
ing in a public university was mostly a secondary activity for prestigious
professionals, who would earn most of their income from their prac-
tice as lawyers, medical doctors, dentists, or engineers and would teach
for the prestige and networking opportunities provided by the univer-
sity. After the reform, teaching in public universities became a career
in the civil service, with competitive salaries and other benefits of
full-time employment. Besides lecturing, higher education academics
were supposed to do research and service activities and graduate edu-
cation programs were created to grant the advanced degrees required
for their careers (Balbachevsky and Schwartzman 2010). These trends
were followed by the creation or expansion of several research-support
agencies, by both national and state governments, which provide addi-
tional resources and income for academics in public universities. They
include the National Council for Scientific and Technological Devel-
opment, an agency within the Ministry of Science and Technology
which provides fellowships and research grants; the Financing Agency
for Studies and Projects, also within the Ministry of Science and
Technology, which provides support to large-scale projects and indus-
trial innovation; and the Coordination for the Advancement of High
Level Personnel, an agency within the Ministry of Education which
provides fellowships for postgraduate studies and performs the assess-
ment of postgraduate course programs. In the state of São Paulo, the
State Foundation for Science and Technology provides both fellow-
ships and research support of various kinds, and many other states
have similar institutions. Most of this professionalization of academic
32 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

careers took place in the federal universities and in the state of

São Paulo, the largest and richest state in the Brazilian federation.
Later, other states also created their own academic careers for their
institutions.
This public sector, however, did not grow fast enough to accommo-
date the expanding demand for higher education, which was mostly
absorbed by private institutions. The limited growth of the public sector
can be explained by two factors: its high cost, due to the relatively high
academic salaries; and selective admission of students, based on numerus
clausus (closed numbers) and competitive entrance examinations for the
various course programs in each university. This differed from policies
in most other Latin American countries, where the rule has been open
admissions and a lack of well-paid careers for academic staff in public
institutions.
Today, about 78 per cent of enrollment in higher education in Brazil
takes place in private institutions. Private institutions could not adopt
the same organization model and career patterns of the public ones.
Public institutions are fully supported with budgetary resources and
legally forbidden to charge tuition; private institutions, with few excep-
tions, cannot receive public subsidies and depend on tuition to survive.
Since public institutions attract the best-qualified students, coming usu-
ally from richer families, private institutions need to cater to low-income
sectors unable to pay much. Most of their students must work and,
because of that, most of their courses are provided in the evenings. The
private institutions cannot afford to hire many full-time academics or
provide the conditions for academic research. It is difficult for the pri-
vate sector to teach in fields requiring technical facilities; so, it tends to
concentrate on the social professions—administration, accounting, law,
and teacher education—instead of medicine, dentistry, engineering, and
other technically based fields.
Brazilian legislation still assumes that all higher education provi-
sion should be organized within a university or, eventually, evolve
into one—centered on high-quality academic research and Wilhelm
von Humboldt’s ideal of integration between research and teaching.
Yet, in practice, few institutions, even in the public sector, can meet
the standards related to a research university. A recent study found
that only ten universities in Brazil could be classified as comprehensive
research universities, providing doctoral education and doing research
in a wide variety of subjects: the three state universities of São Paulo
(Universidade de São Paulo, Universidade Campinas, and Universidade
Estadual Paulista) and seven federal universities in the states of Rio de
 Simon Schwartzman 33

Janeiro, Minas Gerais, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul, Brasilia, and

Santa Catarina (Steiner 2005); other institutions may provide advanced
education and research in selected areas.
Twenty-one per cent of the country’s population and 33 per cent
of the national gross domestic product is concentrated in the state of
São Paulo. It is the country’s industrial, agricultural, and financial hub;
and the metropolitan area around the city of São Paulo, with about
20 million people, is one of the largest in the world. Politically, the
state has a strong tradition of autonomy regarding the national govern-
ment. Besides the three state universities, which are among the best in
the country, São Paulo has a well-endowed Science Foundation, which
provides support for graduate education and research in the state.
Currently, Brazilian legislation allows the existence of three main
types of institutions: fully autonomous universities, with graduate edu-
cation and research; autonomous university centers, with no graduate
education and research but, supposedly, good-quality teaching in dif-
ferent fields; and isolated faculties, with limited autonomy to create
new programs and to expand admission. There are also a small num-
ber of technical institutes supported by the federal government, but
Brazil never developed an extended system of technical, shorter higher-
education programs—such as the French Institutes Universitaires de
Technologie.
In recent years, this picture has been changing in many ways. In the
public sector, the federal government has been pressing public institu-
tions to admit more students and to open evening courses. One program
gives additional resources for federal universities willing to expand.
Many institutions are introducing quotas for low-income or minority
students. Private universities are granted tax exemption, if they admit
a certain number of low-income students without fees. The quality of
public higher education is uneven, with some observers believing it is
declining. Some private institutions are starting to compete with the
public ones, by providing high-quality and expensive education—in
fields such as business administration, law, and economics. In the past,
most private institutions were small, family-owned institutions. Today,
some private institutions have opted to provide high-quality, expensive
education in fields such as business administration, economics, and law.
Yet, most of the private sector has developed into large for-profit insti-
tutions, offering low-cost evening courses for older and less-qualified
students, who would not be admitted or could not manage the course
loads at public institutions in the most demanding fields. A recent
merger of two large private universities created the Universidade de
34 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

Anhanguera, in São Paulo, probably the second largest higher education

institution in the world—after the University of Phoenix in the United
States—with more than 400,000 students. Some of the large for-profit
universities attract money from national and international investment
funds, and their shares are negotiated in the stock exchange.
As the Brazilian economy grows and the country seeks to compete
more strongly in the international economy, the issues of quality and
coverage of Brazilian higher education become more pressing. The per-
centage of young people, of the age 18–24 years attending higher
education is still very low, about 15 per cent, with half of the students
older. This limits the number of students who finish secondary educa-
tion and are able to continue to study for a postsecondary degree. The
priority of the national government in the last several years has been
to expand access by all means, without considering its implications in
terms of quality. Except for the Universities of São Paulo and Campinas,
no Brazilian institution appears in the different international rankings
of higher education institutions. Quality control in graduate education
and research has been traditionally much stronger but is still limited, in
terms of the requirements of a mature, knowledge-based economy.
According to the Ministry of Education,1 in 2009, there were 2,314
higher education institutions in Brazil—90 per cent private—and
5.1 million students in regular, first-degree courses, 75 per cent of which
are in private institutions. Of the institutions, only 186 had univer-
sity status. The size of these institutions varies enormously. A small,
isolated faculty would have about 1,700 students, on average; a uni-
versity, 15,000. The largest private university, based in São Paulo and
with locations scattered in many cities, had 213,000 first-degree stu-
dents in 2008; the largest public university, the University of São
Paulo, had about 55,000 first-degree and 25,000 graduate students in 11
locations.
Data on graduate education are collected by a different agency in the
Ministry of Education, the Coordination for Improvement of Higher
Education Personnel (see Table 2.1). In 2009, there were 88,286 students
in master’s degree programs, 53,237 students in doctoral programs, and
9,122 students in professional master’s degree programs. Of the 150,000
graduate students, 80 per cent were in public universities, one-third of
them in the state of São Paulo. Also, some graduate programs are granted
by public research institutes, which are not usually classified as higher
education institutions—such as the Institute of Applied and Pure Math-
ematics in Rio de Janeiro, the Brazilian Center for Physics Research, or
the Oswaldo Cruz Institute in the field of public health.
 Simon Schwartzman 35

Table 2.1 Postgraduate education in Brazil: students and degree programs, by

level and type of institutions

Institutions Students

Master’s Doctoral Professional master’s Total

Federal 46,628 28,569 3,234 78,431

State 23,522 19,486 1,396 44,404
Private 17,585 5,163 4,253 27,001
Municipal 551 19 239 809

Total 88,286 53,237 9,122 150,645

Degree programs

Master’s Doctoral Master’s/ Professional Total

Doctoral master’s

Federal 568 22 792 97 1,479

State 210 18 416 33 677
Private 262 0 172 109 543
Municipal 14 n.a. 2 4 20
Total 1,054 40 243 1,337

Note: n.a. = not applicable.

Source: Ministry of Education, Coordination for the Advancement of High-Level Personnel
2009. http://www.capes.gov.br (accessed August 26, 2010).

These data from the Ministry of Education do not fully coincide with
those of the National Household Sample Survey. The 2008 survey identi-
fied 6.2 million first-degree students, 1.1 million more than the Ministry
of Education; and 326,000 graduate students, half of them in private
institutions, about twice as many as those reported by the education
authorities. The larger number of graduate students is probably due to
the inclusion of students in non-degree, specialization, or master of busi-
ness administration-type programs, which are not regulated and do not
enter the Ministry of Education official statistics.

The academic profession and its subcultures

Public and private, university and non-university, and nonprofit and

for-profit institutions have different institutional cultures, deal with cer-
tain kinds of students, and arrange various working contracts with their
staff; and these differences affect, necessarily, the characteristics of the
academic staff in each of these contexts. In public universities, most
36 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

academics have full-time contracts, earn most of their income, and

spend most of the time at their institution. This varies somewhat, by
fields and generation. Older lawyers, medical doctors, and dentists may
maintain a private practice, while younger professors of mathematics,
physics, or economics would not. Although all academics are supposed
to have a doctoral degree and to engage in research, in practice only
some of them meet these requirements. Those who do research have
access to funds from science and technology agencies, are affiliated with
scientific societies, travel to participate in scientific events, and can do
consulting or technical assistance work. Those with lesser academic cre-
dentials may get more involved with local professional networks and
with the academics’ unions, which are present and active in all insti-
tutions. In both cases, academics have a sense of ownership regarding
their university and participate directly or indirectly in commissions,
councils, and other governance bodies.
The situation is quite different in the private sector and, particularly,
in the new, large, for-profit universities that have emerged in recent
years. In these institutions, the teacher is just an employee. Some of
them may have full- or half-time contracts; but most work with part-
time contracts—based on the number of classes taught in each semester,
with no job stability or prospects for a career. These large universities
have adopted quality controls that are typical of large service compa-
nies, controlling the time the teacher enters and leaves the classroom
and the fulfillment of prescribed teaching curricula. Another approach
is to make sure that the teachers are not too severe or too lenient
with their students, who are asked to respond to consumer satisfac-
tion surveys. If a concern exists regarding quality control, a teacher
can be reprimanded or replaced. The teachers usually teach in the
evenings, work in their main jobs during the day, and may teach in
different institutions at the same time, with no particular loyalty to any
of them.
Table 2.2 gives the main figures for the academic profession in Brazil,
based on the 2008 higher education census carried out by the Ministry
of Education. The census counts the number of teaching posts per insti-
tution but does not say whether the same person holds posts in different
places. There were, in 2008, 338,890 higher education teaching posts in
the country, or about 15 first-degree students per teacher, with large vari-
ations among sectors: 10.6 students per teacher-post in the public sector
and about 17.3 in the private sector. Besides, 76 per cent of the aca-
demics in public institutions had full-time contracts, against just 18 per
cent in the private sector.
 Simon Schwartzman 37

Table 2.2 Academic postsa in higher education institutions

Full-time Part-time Per hour Total

Private 40,774 50,431 128,317 219,522

Public 91,608 18,756 9,004 119,368
Total 132,382 69,187 137,321 338,890

Note: a The same person can have two or more part-time posts.
Source: Ministry of Education, Higher Education Census 2008.

It is possible to summarize the features of the academic profes-

sion in Brazil, in terms of four clearly differentiated groups of peo-
ple (Schwartzman and Balbachevsky 1996). The more traditional and
smaller group is formed by people in prestigious professions—lawyers,
medical doctors, engineers—who earn most of their income from their
private practice or outside jobs and for whom teaching in higher edu-
cation is a secondary activity. They may teach in private institutions
but also work part-time in public institutions, as happens with many
of the professors in the more prestigious public law schools. A second
small group is formed by academics, who were able to complete their
doctoral studies in a prestigious institution, often abroad, and consider
themselves, in the first place, to be academic researchers. The third
group, which makes up the bulk of the teaching staff in public insti-
tutions, is composed of people who depend wholly on their university
job, have a specialization or a master’s degree (seldom a doctorate), and
see themselves mostly as public employees. Most of them have full-time
contracts and enjoy the benefits of civil service employment—including
job stability, reasonable salaries, and early retirement. The fourth group
is made up of staff whose main source of income comes from teach-
ing part-time in private institutions, without stable contracts and often
working in one or more places.
The political organization and mobilization of the third group display
many of the features of the teaching profession in public institutions
in Brazil. The staff are organized in powerful unions, both at national
and regional levels—such as the National Docent’s Union of Higher
Education Institutions and the Docent’s Association of the Univer-
sity of São Paulo. These unions are associated with Brazil’s Laborers’
Party, of former president Luis Ignácio Lula da Silva, and can influence
and have veto power on the legislation and actions from the educa-
tion authorities that may affect the interests of their affiliates. They
oppose anything that they may consider the “privatization” of public
universities (including charging tuition for students, individual salary
38 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

negotiations, or competing in the market for research grants) or that

can threaten the stability and the contract benefits of their members.
The unions are opposed to any policy that may differentiate the aca-
demics’ income in terms of their performance, except through seniority
or formal academic credentials. For instance, in 1998 (during the gov-
ernment of Fernando Henrique Cardoso), the Ministry of Education
introduced an additional premium to the teachers’ salaries, according
to the number of classes taught each month. This was a “gratuity,” in
the sense that it was a temporary payment that could be stopped if the
teacher taught fewer classes or upon retirement. In 2005, the unions
demanded, and achieved, the transformation of this additional payment
into a permanent part of their salaries.
For academics in the third group, with doctoral degrees and engaged
in research, who can get additional benefits from research grants, affil-
iation with their academic association is more relevant than affiliation
with the unions; but their interests usually coincide, except when the
unions try to curtail the freedom the researchers have to administer
their grants or earn additional income from consulting. The National
Council for Science and Technology provides about 6,000 research pro-
ductivity grants every year, which can add up to R$2,800 (Brazilian reais,
equivalent to US$1,600) a month, tax free, for university professors who
apply for it with a research plan—not usually accessible to the other
three groups.
The fourth group is made up mostly by academics who work in pri-
vate institutions. They work more, earn less, and have less political
clout. One would expect that the staff in such working conditions would
be unhappy with their situation, but in fact they are mostly satisfied
with their jobs (Balbachevsky and Schwartzman forthcoming), which is
probably explained by the low expectations regarding their situation.
They do not identify much with the institution where they work, either
because they teach in different places or because teaching is a secondary
activity for them. They are also unionized, but the unions in the private
sector are less politicized and militant than those in the public insti-
tutions. One important difference is that unions in the public sector
can strike without risking job stability and loss of income, while in the
private sector they cannot.

Qualifications

In federal universities, an academic career comprises five ranks—

auxiliary, assistant, adjunct, associate, and full professor (auxiliar,
 Simon Schwartzman 39

assistente, adjunto, associado, titular). Each of these ranks, up to full pro-

fessor, is divided into four levels. In principle, access to a university
career track should require a doctoral degree and passing and winning
an open formal contest (concurso). These contests are formal procedures
for each track to which anyone can apply, requiring a written and oral
examination and a formal lecture, plus an evaluation of the applicant’s
qualifications by a committee of internal and external examiners.
However, in federal institutions, a doctoral degree is not required
for the first two ranks. In the past, many academics with just a grad-
uate (undergraduate) degree were hired through provisional contracts,
which were later transformed into permanent appointments. Promotion
up to associate level is done by seniority and also by the acquisition
of postgraduate degrees; promotion to full professorship, in principle,
should also depend on passing an open competition. Admission is usu-
ally at the assistant level, but individuals can present themselves in a
formal contest for full professorship, if they have the proper formal
qualification.
In the state universities of São Paulo, the ranks are auxiliary, assistant,
doctor professor, associate, and full professor (auxiliar, assistente, profes-
sor doutor, associado, titular). A doctoral degree is required for the doctor
professor’s rank. To be promoted to associate professor, it is necessary
to pass a livre docência exam, reminiscent of the German Privatdozent
qualification2 ; to be promoted to full professorship, it is necessary to
be approved in an open competitive exam. Other states have similar
career paths, except for the livre docência, which is a peculiarity of the
São Paulo institutions. Most private institutions do not have career lad-
ders, instead salaries are paid according to the academic degree owned
by the faculty member. The Ministry of Education collects information
on formal degrees, but not on academic ranks.
Table 2.3 gives the distribution of Brazilian academics by academic
qualification and type of institution. Although, in principle, it is neces-
sary to have a doctoral degree to teach in higher education, only 22 per
cent of academics actually have that degree, ranging from 48.1 per cent
in public universities to 17 per cent in a public faculty. The best situation
is found at the public universities in the state of São Paulo, where 86 per
cent of the academic staff have a doctorate. At present, lesser degrees—
such as master’s, specialization, and training certificates—are accepted
by many institutions as academic credentials. Specializations are pro-
grams that provide a teaching load of at least 360 hours of instruction
to the students, and are given by a recognized institution; and train-
ing certificates are similar programs with a teaching load of 180 hours
 40
Table 2.3 Academic qualifications of faculty members in institutions

Institution and With no First Specialization Master’s Doctoral Total

faculty university degree (%)a degree degree
degree (%) (%) (%)
(%)

Public university 0.02 11.9 12.8 27.1 48.1 103,607

Private university 0.00 7.9 20.3 29.4 14.3 103,607
Public university center 0.00 9.5 37.2 36.9 16.3 975
Private university 0.00 9.9 34.1 43.2 12.8 35,212
center
Public faculty 0.04 7.8 36.8 38.3 17.0 6,729
Private faculty 0.01 9.2 44.4 38.0 8.3 109,770
Public technological 0.65 15.8 30.7 38.4 14.4 8,057
center
Total (N) 97 36,012 100,419 121,548 80,814 367,957

Note: a Specialization is one of the lesser degrees—a program with a teaching load of at least 360 hours, provided by an institution.
Source: Ministry of Education, Higher Education Census (2008).
 Simon Schwartzman 41

of instruction. Currently, Brazilian universities graduate about 11,000

students with PhDs each year—a significant number, but still a small
proportion compared with the need to fill the 287,000 teaching posi-
tions still staffed by underqualified personnel. Moreover, since private,
low-cost teaching institutions are not able to pay for full-time staff with
advanced degrees, this picture is not likely to change in the foreseeable
future.

Academic contracts

Public universities in Brazil are part of the civil service, and both
academics and administrative staff are subject to national rules and
regulations relating to the civil service. All academic hiring in public
universities requires a public posting of positions; and the applicants
must submit their curriculum vitae, provide a formal lecture, and go
through a written examination—assessed by a committee of people from
within and outside the department. This is a formal procedure; there
are no search committees and no possibility of choice by the university
authorities. Anyone can apply, and those with higher grades obtain the
jobs. University departments can exert some discretion in the selection
of the examiners (with at least one coming from an outside institution);
and the examiners can confer among themselves, before grading the
candidates according to their formal qualifications and performance in
the written and oral examination and public lecture. But, at the end,
each examiner issues their verdict, and the applicant with the higher
grade gains the job. For federal universities, the Ministry of Education
establishes the number of postings available for each institution. Beyond
that, the universities are free to carry out the selection process. Once
admitted, an academic gets a full-time contract and becomes a civil ser-
vant of the national or state government, depending on the university
affiliation.
To be a civil servant in Brazil has many advantages—including addi-
tional benefits for academics. Once hired as a civil servant, it is impossi-
ble for a person to be dismissed; except due to gross misbehavior, which
requires a complex procedure and final approval at the ministerial level,
although it can be overruled by the courts. This means that, in prac-
tice, all academics entering public institutions are tenured, regardless
of their future performance. Salaries tend to be higher than those in
the private job market. The retirement age in the country is 65 years
for men and 60 years for women, but, for those in education, includ-
ing university professors, it is five years earlier—60 and 55. It is also
possible to retire earlier from public service after ten or more years of
42 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

work, with proportional earnings, and to get another job in another

university, combining the two salaries.
In public universities, up to an associate professor rank, promotion
takes place regularly, based on seniority and the acquisition of addi-
tional academic credentials. It is a bureaucratic procedure that does not
depend on assessments of any kind. Salaries are the same, according to
the rank, in all federal universities; and there is no allowance for indi-
vidual salary negotiations. Benefits include 45 days of paid vacations,
health coverage, and generous retirement benefits. Until recently, aca-
demics could retain their full salary after retirement. However, some
changes have been introduced in recent years, reducing this value—
depending on the time the person occupied the position, his or her
age, and other factors. The universities can also grant extended leaves
for academics to complete their master’s or doctoral degrees in other
institutions, as well as sabbatical leaves every five years.
Besides the basic salary, actual remuneration may include benefits
related to academic degrees and current or past administrative activ-
ity. Full-time, exclusively dedicated academics cannot have other regular
employment but may receive research fellowships and additional pay-
ment for research and technical activities done within the university.
Many public universities have established autonomous foundations,
which are used to sign research and technical assistance contracts
with public and private agencies, and firms that pay additional money
for researchers involved in their projects. This practice is not allowed
in other branches of the civil service but has been tolerated in the
universities.
Most private higher education institutions work with part-time or
hourly contracts for their academic staff, with a core group of full-
time employees as well. The minimum qualification is an undergraduate
degree, but the institutions need to hire a certain number of lectur-
ers with specialization and master’s or doctoral degrees to meet the
requirements of the Ministry of Education. There are no formal pro-
cedures for hiring the staff. An institution needing a lecturer in a
given subject can place an advertisement in a newspaper or on the
internet, and the decision to hire is made by the person in charge.
In both cases, contracts are regulated by Brazilian legislation for private
labor contracts. Even if the payment is made according to the num-
ber of hours taught, it is necessary to have a formal working contract
if it is not an occasional job. This legislation requires a one-month
vacation and an additional “Christmas” salary for all labor contracts
in the country. Both the employer and employee must contribute
 Simon Schwartzman 43

about 10 per cent of the salary to the national social security fund,
which allows for retirement after 30 years of work for women and
35 years for men, or at ages 60 and 65—at most about R$3,000 a
month (US$1,700) or less, depending on the previous income. More-
over, employers have to make a monthly deposit for each employee in
a government fund (“working time warranty fund”), which can be used
if the person loses the job, retires, or faces some other special circum-
stances. The employer is free to dismiss the employee at any time—with
payment of an indemnity that is proportional to the duration of the
contract. There is no tenure, and the employee does not lose retire-
ment benefits. So, mobility is much easier in the private than in the
public sector, both from the employer’s and the employee’s points of
view. In some institutions, academics have access to a private health
plan, but this is not mandatory. Those working in the private sector
are also entitled to 13 salaries (13 paychecks a year), 30 days of paid
vacation, and early retirement, if they teach; but otherwise, the ben-
efits are much smaller. They can be dismissed at any time, receiving
a small compensation in proportion to the working time—there is no
tenure. There is a ceiling for retirement payments equivalent to about
US$2,000 a month, or less, depending on the salary earned while active,
the person’s age, and the number of years contributing to social secu-
rity. For greater retirement benefits, it is necessary to join a private
retirement fund.

Salaries and other revenues

Table 2.4 gives the range of monthly salaries for academics in full-
time, exclusive dedication contracts in federal universities. It goes from
about US$20,000 to 87,000 a year. State universities have their own
payment scale. In the state of São Paulo, the corresponding range is
from R$3,435.00 to R$10,216.96 per month, or between US$25,000 and
US$76,000, a year. Salaries in poorer states can be lower. The admission
procedures, promotion rules, and benefits in state universities are similar
to those of the federal government.
Although the pay scales are the same in all federal universities, each
person is attached to the institution where she/he works and not to the
national civil service, which means that one cannot move to another
institution with the same job, except in exceptional situations. One
consequence of this system is the minor mobility of academics from
one institution to another and the lack of mechanisms for public uni-
versities to compete for talent in the country or abroad. There are
44 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

Table 2.4 Academic salaries in federal universities in Brazil, 2010 (R$)

First Traininga Specializationb Master’s Doctoral

degree degree degree

Full 4,786.62 5,221.96 5,580.63 7,818.69 11,755.05

professor
Associate 4 3,662.97 3,945.91 4,241.00 5,793.14 7,913.30
Adjunct 3,662.97 3,945.91 4,241.00 5,793.14 7,913.30
Assistant 3,201.62 3,444.85 3,643.99 4,874.54
Auxiliary 1 2,762.36 2,949.68 3,120.08

Notes: Values in Brazilian reais (US$1.00 = R$1.75).

a Training is a lesser programs, similar to specialization, with a teaching load of 180 hours.
b Specialization is a lesser programs, with a teaching load of at least 360 hours.

Source: Ministry of Education; the full source of the information is Presiden̂cia da Reput’blica
Casa Civil Subchefia para Assuntos Jurit’dicos LEI No 11.784, DE 22 DE SETEMBRO DE 2008.
http:www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/_ato2007-2010/2008/lei/l11784.htm (accessed April 6,
2011).

resources to pay visiting professors for short periods, but a public univer-
sity finds it difficult to hire a foreign-born academic for its permanent
staff.
Most private institutions do not publish data on their salary levels
and career paths. However, an informal enquiry among several private
institutions showed that they pay between R$20 and R$50 per hour
taught, depending on the academic’s formal degree. This means that
a 20-hour, part-time job receives between R$455 and R$1,032 (US$260
and US$590) per month. Yet, many academics work only 12 or fewer
hours per week in an institution, which means that they have to work in
different institutions or must combine teaching with other professional
activities to earn a reasonable income.
Table 2.5 presents the main data on university academics’ income,
based on the National Household Survey for 2008. The figures refer to
monthly income in Brazilian reais in 2008. The estimated number of
academics in the survey is much smaller than the figures reported by the
higher education census—96,000 in the public sector against 119,000 in
the census and 112,000 in the private sector against 219,000 in the
census. One possible explanation for the differences is that the census
gives information on posts, while the household survey gives infor-
mation on people who may hold one or more teaching posts; and
there may also be sampling errors. As one could expect, this differ-
ence is much higher in the private sector, where part-time contracts are
the rule.
 Simon Schwartzman 45

Table 2.5 Mean income of teachers in higher education

Main All Main Number

work (R$) activities work (%) of cases
(R$)

Public sector, civil servant 2,564.00 2,921.98 87.7 65,756.00

Private sector, regular 2,025.13 2,471.29 81.9 98,835.00
contract
All public sector 2,213.37 2,512.83 88.1 96,000.00
All private sector 1,887.77 2,301.15 82.0 112,026.00
Total 2,027.75 2,389.71 84.9 208,026.00

Notes: R$1.75 = US$1.00.

Source: National Household Survey (PNAD) (2008).

The data also show that, although most academics in public

institutions are civil servants and most of those in the private sector
have private working contracts, many exceptions occur regarding these
rules. About 17 per cent of those working in the public sector do not
have a regular job, and 12.6 per cent are hired according to private law
legislation. While only limited information is available about the kind
of jobs held, these academics may be, for instance, graduate students
working as research or teaching assistants or replacement academics
with temporary contracts. In the private sector, about 9 per cent of the
academics do not have a regular working contract. Incomes of those
in the public sector are higher than those in the private sector, and
incomes of those with regular contracts are higher than those without
these contracts. For the civil servants in the public sector, their main
salary represents 87.7 per cent of their income from all activities. For
those with regular contracts in the public sector, their main salary is
only 82 per cent, with another 18 per cent coming from other sources.
One-fourth of the academics holding civil servant status earn additional
income from a secondary job and for those with private law contracts,
32 per cent do. This proportion is likely to be still higher, given people’s
propensity to not fully report the income earned outside their main job.
Figure 2.1 compares the distribution of earnings for higher education
teachers in public institutions, with civil service contracts, and for those
in the private sector, with labor-market contracts. Each column corre-
sponds to one-fifth of the income distribution for the academics. For the
lowest 20 per cent, the mean monthly income is R$898.54 (US$511.16);
for the upper 20 per cent, the mean monthly income is R$7,320.54
(US$4,183.16). Of the academics in the private sector, 43 per cent are
46 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

35%
30%
25%
20%
15%
10%
5%
0%
898.54 1,974.95 3,198.19 4,506.25 7,320.54
Income quintiles∗

Private Public

Figure 2.1 Income distribution of teacher earnings (R$).

Notes: The data are monthly incomes. ∗ Five salary levels.
Source: National Household Survey (PNAD) (2008).

in the first two of the five levels, while 58.4 per cent of those in the
public sector are in the two highest groups.
Higher education teachers in Brazil tend to have incomes above the
average for persons in other careers with similar qualifications. For those
in the public higher education sector, income is not as good as salaries
of medical doctors, top-level engineers, and those in business—but is
better than in other, less prestigious occupations. Earnings for those in
the private higher education sector are closer to the average for per-
sons with higher education—similar to architects, civil engineers, and
data-processing specialists. Thus, higher education teachers, particularly
those working in the public sector, are part of the country’s upper-
middle class—that is, likely to live in upper-middle-class neighborhoods,
own a house or an apartment, have a car, and send their children to
private schools.

Academics’ working conditions

More detailed information on the working conditions of Brazilian aca-

demics can be obtained from the International Comparative Survey on
the Academic Profession, carried out in Brazil, in 2007 (Balbachevsky
and Schwartzman 2009; Balbachevsky et al. 2008). The sample of 1,200
respondents included academics in public and private institutions,
as well as in non-university scientific research centers and institutes.
For the analysis, the respondents were divided into five strata, based
 Simon Schwartzman 47

on the characteristics of the institutions in which they work—public,

research-intensive universities; other public universities; private, elite
institutions; other private institutions; and research institutes.
Table 2.6 shows that, in a typical 40-hour week, for half of the time
academics are devoted to teaching and related activities, with the heavi-
est teaching load taking place in private institutions. Research-related
activities consume half of the time in research centers but less than
6 per cent in private institutions. The third activity is administrative
work, about 5 per cent of the time; and other activities take another 2–3
per cent of the time.
In public universities, full-time contracts assume that academics
spend half of their time in research. As Table 2.6 shows, the percentage
reported by academics is closer to ten hours, or 25 per cent of the time,
except in research institutes. Still, there are many indications that only a
fraction of those claiming to do research are actually engaged in research
activities. In the private sector, most academics have a secondary job;
and even among those in the public sector, 18.3 per cent have an addi-
tional job, either in another teaching institution, a non-governmental
organization, or working in private practice.
Given the expectation that all academics should do research and pub-
lish, the number of persons reporting to have done research and been
published is relatively high in all groups. However, Table 2.7 shows
large differences in the nature of the research activity of various groups.
In the research centers and research-intensive universities, research is
done with outside funding, more articles are published in international
publications and in peer-review journals, and international collabora-
tion is more frequent. In non-research public and private institutions,
external funding is much more limited, most of the publications are in
Portuguese, and international cooperation is less active. In the private
sector, the teaching load tends to be large, and little time is allocated for
research. This is not necessarily the practice in public universities, where
the teaching load is not related to one’s performance in research. The
2007 Academic Profession Survey found that, on average, academics
in public, research-intensive institutions spend 16.7 hours a week in
teaching activities, compared with 18.9 hours in other public institu-
tions and 21 hours in the private sector. Most academics in the public
sector have full-time contracts, while very few do in the private sec-
tor. In 1988, the federal government introduced legislation providing
an additional payment for higher education teachers, according to the
number of classes given; but this policy was abolished in 2006, with the
additional payment becoming part of the regular salary.
 48
Table 2.6 Hours worked per week in different activities, by type of institution, 2007

Type of institution Intensive Other Elite Other Research Total

public public private private institutes
research

Teaching (preparation of 17.11 19.82 21.17 22.76 12.03 19.87

instructional materials and lesson
plans, classroom instruction,
advising students, reading and
evaluating student work) in hours
Research (reading literature, writing, 12.84 9.14 9.3 5.86 20.41 9.36
conducting experiments, fieldwork)
in hours
Extension (services to clients and/or 2.78 2.6 3.55 2.17 1.09 2.53
patients, unpaid consulting, public
or voluntary services) in hours
Administration (committees, 5.41 4.77 6.34 3.24 6.09 4.64
department meetings, paperwork) in
hours
Other academic activities 3.03 2.36 2.17 2.73 2.24 2.54
(professional activities not clearly
attributable to any of the categories
above) in hours
Total respondents in the survey 195 614 60 270 53 1,192

Source: Changing Academic Project. 2007. http://www.open.ac.uk/cheri/pages/CHERI-Projects-CAP.shtml (accessed April 8, 2012).

 Simon Schwartzman 49

Table 2.7 International publication patterns, 2007

Characteristics of research Types of institution

Public, Public, Private, Private, Research

research other elite others institutes
intensive

Academic articles published 6.51 4.19 2.46 3.28 7.43

in the last three years
Research with outside 59.2 29.9 24.9 13.1 40.0
funding (%)
Only published the language 28.5 57.9 29.7 71.9 19.6
of instruction at your
current institution (%)
Never co-authored with 71.8 85.5 91.9 94.2 51.0
colleagues located in other
(foreign) countries (%)
Never published in a foreign 37.2 68.1 45.9 84.3 25.5
country (%)
Never published in a 41.6 54.0 40.5 75.9 19.6
peer-reviewed journal (%)

Note: % within the type of institution.

Source: Changing Academic Project. 2007. http://www.open.ac.uk/cheri/pages/CHERI-
Projects-CAP.shtml (accessed April 8, 2012).

Dispersed centers of research

A better account of the effects of higher education on economic devel-

opment requires an analysis of the scope of research. Research in Brazil
is not only conducted at research universities. Several ministries support
research at non-university institutions.
The best contribution to economic development in Brazil, in terms of
research, was probably in agriculture. Agricultural research takes place
mostly in an institution associated with the Ministry of Agriculture,
the Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural Research, which has provided a
long history of developing new-plant varieties and technologies to make
use of impoverished soil, enabling Brazil to become one of the largest
agricultural producers in the world. This institution works in partner-
ship with several universities and benefits from researchers graduated
from Brazilian institutions and abroad, but is not a higher education
institution.
50 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

A century ago, research in tropical medicine in non-university insti-

tutions, such as the Oswaldo Cruz Institute in Rio de Janeiro, was
important to identify the nature and to reduce or eliminate the dev-
astating effects of Chagas disease, malaria, yellow fever, and other
diseases. The Oswaldo Cruz Institute remains an important research cen-
ter within the Ministry of Health, and tropical medicine remains one of
the strongest fields of research in Brazil (Glänzel, Leta, and Thijs 2006;
Leta, Glänzel, and Thijs 2006).
The creation of the National Council of Research and the Brazilian
Institute for Physics research in the 1940s were part of an effort to
develop nuclear capabilities in the country, which was not successful.
In the late 1970s, the science and technology sector was reorganized
by the military government to realign it with the drive for economic
development; several ambitious high-technology projects were started,
in the areas of computer science, semiconductors, and space technol-
ogy. Some of these projects have not succeeded or are lingering; but
there was a substantial increase in the volume of resources dedicated
to science, technology, and research, which led to the creation of a
Ministry for Science and Technology in 1985. Embraer—the Brazilian
Agency for Space Research and one of the world’s largest manufactur-
ers of mid-size planes—grew from the Technological Institute of the
Air Force in the city of São José dos Campos and was considered the
best engineering school in the country. Petrobrás, Brazil’s oil company,
has partnerships with many universities to develop all kinds of tech-
nologies related to deep-sea oil drilling. Other examples could be listed
(Schwartzman 2008).
Still, overall, the productivity of Brazilian science is not so high.
In 2009, 32,100 articles were published by Brazilian authors, indexed
by Thomson Reuters Scientific INC, corresponding to 54 per cent of
the publications in Latin America and 2.69 per cent worldwide. This
was a significant increase compared to 2000—with 10,521 publica-
tions, 1.35 per cent worldwide. The number of patents registered at
the US Patent Office was quite small, 148 in 2009, compared with
9,556 for South Korea.3 The number of citations of scientific publica-
tions by Brazilian authors was 8.91 for the period 1996 to 2009, above
Russia and India (4.48 and 6.2), but well below the United Kingdom,
Canada, or Belgium (in the 14–15 range).4 This index may be biased
in favor of English-speaking countries (the highest ranks are those
of the United States and the United Kingdom) but is nevertheless a
rough indication of the relevance and impact of a country’s scientific
output.
 Simon Schwartzman 51

Conclusions

To what extent do higher education and the academic profession con-

tribute to Brazil’s social and economic development? The link between
education, as human capital, and economic development, is well estab-
lished in the economic literature (Becker 1964; Schultz 1994). But, also,
the expansion of education is strongly influenced by movements of
social groups, to gain prestige and access to privileged jobs and market
niches, which do not necessarily generate wealth and increased pro-
ductivity to society as a whole. Several authors have analyzed this by
looking at education as a “positional good,” and interpreting education
expansion in terms of the search for credentials, rather than the search
for increasing knowledge and competencies (Brown 2003; Collins 1979;
Hirsch 1977; Schwartzman 2011). These two interpretations do not need
to be considered as mutually exclusive, since, to some extent at least, the
drive for education credentials leads also to the increase in competen-
cies. But the drive for higher credentials leads also to a redistribution of
existing wealth in favor of some groups (Bourdieu and Passeron 1990).
Distinguishing these two aspects of education development helps when
discussing its impact on broader economic development and well-being.
In Brazil, the expansion of higher education was clearly not driven by
sustained public policies for economic growth but, instead, by a demand
for greater social mobility—which governments, at different points in
time and with limited resources and policies, tried to steer. The creation
of a public university sector was linked to a broader process of urban-
ization and the expansion of the public sector, as well as to the ability
of professional corporations to enact legislation protecting their market
niches—already present in the 19th century (Coelho 1999), it became
stronger as the country modernized. A recent example of this trend was
the successful drive of sociologists’ and philosophers’ unions and associ-
ations to make the teaching of sociology and philosophy mandatory in
secondary education, creating a large job market for themselves, justified
by the need to increase the students’ critical thinking.
Another issue is the competencies produced by the higher education
system. About 43 per cent of all first-degree students are in the fields of
the social sciences, business, and law professions, which do not require
much in terms of previous qualifications and limited investments in
equipment by the institutions. This proportion is highest in the private
sector. The second largest segment is in education, provided mostly by
state and private institutions. Most of these courses take place in the
evening, and a large part of the students are schoolteachers, working to
52 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

earn a formal qualification, allowing them to be promoted in the public

schools where they work. At the other extreme, only 8.4 per cent of the
students are in the field of engineering and production.
The large agricultural and mining companies in Brazil are capital
intensive and do not employ many people. Industry is more produc-
tive today than in the past, but employs fewer people and makes
use of imported machinery. The most complex industries—in areas
like automobile manufacturing, industrialized food, metallurgy, and
appliances—are either foreign-based or in partnership with foreign com-
panies that do their research abroad. Industrialists complain of the lack
of qualified middle-level technicians, but do not require many special-
ists with higher education degrees. The most demanding fields, in terms
of manpower, are services of different kinds—commerce, transportation,
education, health care, and also construction work. In that sense, one
could say that the profile of the students coming out of higher education
institutions is adjusted to the country’s economy. Evidentially, a higher
education diploma in Brazil leads to higher income, even if the person
ends up working in activities requiring only secondary education skills.
This status quo has to do with the relative scarcity of people with higher
education degrees in the country. In 2009, only 11 per cent of the popu-
lation aged 25–40 years had a higher education degree, according to the
National Household Survey. Moreover, with the legal knowledge, people
with diplomas are able to circumvent protective legislation, particularly
in public jobs.
Finally, how good is higher education produced in Brazil? If one
judges from international rankings, it is apparent that no institution
in the country appears in the top 100, in any of the most influen-
tial rankings. This is probably unfair to the University of São Paulo,
which appears as the best in the Latin American region in international
comparisons and has strong research departments, graduate programs,
and professional schools in medicine, engineering, law, economics,
agriculture, and other fields (Schwartzman 2007). This university and
some other public institutions—such as the University of Campinas
and the Federal University of Minas Gerais—also appear at the top in
the national rankings of degree programs, carried out regularly by the
Brazilian Ministry of Education. These rankings, however, only report
which programs are better or worse and do not include standards to dis-
tinguish among the excellent, good, acceptable, and unacceptable. Yet,
law students need to pass a bar exam carried out by the lawyers’ pro-
fessional association, before being allowed to practice; and only about
20 per cent of the applicants pass, which is either an indication of the
 Simon Schwartzman 53

quality of the education provided by most Brazilian law schools or a

reflection on the quality of the examination.
It is possible to summarize by saying that some of the higher educa-
tion provided by Brazilian institutions is good but that most of it is bad.
While most of the low-quality programs in business administration, law,
and economics—provided in large scale by private institutions—do not
form specialized study, they do provide students general competencies
they would not receive otherwise. Since these programs are not subsi-
dized, the fact that they respond to demand and that their graduates
earn higher salaries in the job market constitutes their value. The issue
is more serious in low-quality programs provided by public universi-
ties that are heavily subsidized by the government and do not charge
students tuition. There are good reasons to argue that public univer-
sities should be required to show that they are using public resources
effectively and providing skills in areas of higher priority for society.
However, it is difficult politically for governments to implement such
policies, particularly if they are associated with changes that might
restrict access to public subsidies.
Brazilian higher education, as well as the working conditions and
competencies of its academic profession, is uneven—as are most things
in the country, with large social and regional imbalances. Development
of the higher education sector needs to be conceptualized as part of a
broader process of social change, which is neither harmonious nor effi-
cient and is subject to periods of rapid expansion and retraction. The
experience of the last several decades has been mostly of expansion and
growth, and it is hoped that this enhancement will continue.

Notes
1. There are two main sources of information on Brazilian education. One is
the National Institute for Education Research of the Ministry of Education in
Brasilia, which performs regular censuses of basic and higher education, col-
lecting data from the institutions, and is also in charge of the main assessment
systems for basic, secondary, and higher education. The second is the Brazilian
Institute for Geography and Statistics, Brazil’s census office. Besides the decen-
nial demographic census and other statistics, this institute carries out a yearly
National Household Sample Survey, which collects education, employment,
and other information from a sample of about 100,000 households. The data
of these two sources diverge somewhat, but since they bring different types of
information, both will be used in the text that follows.
2. “Privatdozent (abbreviated PD, P.D. or Priv.-Doz.) or Private lecturer is a
title conferred in some European university systems, especially in German-
speaking countries, for someone who pursues an academic career and holds
54 Brazil: Higher Education and Economic Development

all formal qualifications (doctorate and habilitation) to become a tenured uni-

versity professor. With respect to the level of academic achievement, the title
compares to associate professor (North America) or something between senior
lecturer and reader (UK); however, the title is not connected to any salaried
position” (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privatdozent).
3. This data was compiled by Brazil’s Ministry of Science and Technology.
4. According to CSImago Journal and Country Rank. http://www.scimagojr.com/
countryrank.php.

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———. 2010. The Graduate Foundations of Research in Brazil. Higher Educa-
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———. forthcoming. Job satisfaction in a diverse institutional enviroment: The
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Balbachevsky, Elizabeth, Simon Schwartzman, Nathalia Novaes Alves, Dante
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3
Changing Realities: Russian
Higher Education and the
Academic Profession
Gregory Androushchak, Yaroslav Kuzminov,
and Maria Yudkevich

Three perspectives dominate modern debates about higher education in

Russia and the prospects of national universities. Some observers believe
that the Russian higher education system is one of the best in the world,
referring to the success of Russian specialists internationally. Others say
that the former point of view is harmful because the quality of the
country’s education is a myth and the universities have undergone fun-
damentally negative changes during recent decades, which cannot be
abolished. Finally, the third group of people prefer to talk about the cur-
rent challenges the Russian education system faces and the goals that
need to be addressed in order to build an effective system of professional
education to suit the modern labor market and to produce fundamen-
tal research and application studies, based on international standards in
the global academic market.
In many countries, discussions have recently been under way about
building universities that reflect international standards. This goal—as
well as the task of developing an efficient national higher education
system—cannot be achieved without coordinating the best specialists
in higher education and creating conditions conducive to productive
research and teaching. Faculty are at the core of institutional quality and
the most valuable asset for any university; therefore, decent remunera-
tion is key to success. An academic profession is a specific career path,
with its unique incentives, inner motivation, and payoff. Thus, narrow-
ing the characteristics of faculty’s remuneration down to the financial
element would only be ignoring the nature of the university itself.
Therefore, providing adequate remuneration does not simply constitute

56
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 57

offering a decent level of payment but also signifies ensuring academic

freedom, a top-level academic environment, and ample opportuni-
ties for further professional development. In other words, institutional
frameworks that provide such conditions and incentives are essential for
the functioning of universities, and these elements together comprise
what are called academic contracts.
This chapter will show how changing academic market conditions
and the recent developments in the Russian economy, as a whole, have
influenced the way academic contracts, incentives, and faculty’s oppor-
tunities are organized and what the consequences of these changes
involve.
What is so interesting about analyzing academic contracts and remu-
neration in the Russian higher education system? First of all, the issue
is academic contracts, per se. Second, it is the consequences of sharp
shocks experienced by the Russian higher education system, when the
Soviet economy collapsed. Examining the academic profession in Russia
over the past 30 years gives striking examples of how a certain institu-
tional equilibrium disintegrates, while new forces emerge (and turn out
to be less efficient). Third, features of the current academic contract sys-
tem have to be taken into account when moving toward the integration
of the Russian system with the global one.
The current systematic underfunding of higher education results
in salaries that are insufficient for professors’ primary employment.
According to the survey of university administration, which took
place in 2009 in the framework of Monitoring of Educational Markets
and Organizations (2009),1 in order for faculty to abandon additional
sources of income and focus exclusively on teaching and research at the
institution where they are employed, their salaries should be more than
doubled (see Figure 3.1). Further estimations, based on the same survey,
demonstrate that for the university to attract faculty with advanced aca-
demic skills who are able to teach and do research, to a high standard,
it should be able to increase wages by four times—which is not really
much, compared with current total incomes of university teachers.
As a result, the conditions and opportunities outside their primary
contract shape employment patterns and priorities for university fac-
ulty. They include private tutoring, where one’s status as a university
teacher offers definite advantages, working in the business sector, and
adopting an additional teaching load. Since all of these further respon-
sibilities create separate (often strong) incentives for and expectations
of faculty members, the supplemental activities should be considered as
part of an academic contract, in the broader sense.
58 Russian Higher Education

4,954

2,758
1,934
1,222

Actual average Salary that could Salary high enough Salary high enough
salary make it possible to to attract best to hire a professor
stop moonlighting graduates to with advanced
insitutions of higher academic skills
education

Figure 3.1 Average and “optimal” monthly salaries of faculty in institutions of

higher education, 2009 (per month, PPP US$).
Source: Monitoring of Education Markets and Organizations (2009).

Institutional legacy

Currently (in 2012) the Russian system of higher education includes 662
public and 474 private institutions and slightly more than 1,600 related
regional branches; approximately two-thirds of which relate to public
and one-third to private institutions. This chapter focuses on higher
education institutions only and does not consider academic contracts
and salaries at research institutions affiliated with the Russian Academy
of Sciences—which is, based on a long-standing tradition, separated
from the university sector in Russia.
There are three types of higher education institutions: universities,
academies, and institutes. Universities offer a wide range of educational
programs—including postgraduate programs (PhD and doctorate) and
research—and coordinate research and methodological activities in their
key areas of expertise. The Academy of Sciences and other academies dif-
fer from universities by offering a narrower range of programs, as well
as narrower areas of research. Institutes are different from universities
and academies and offer an even narrower range of ongoing educa-
tional programs and research activities—for a discussion on different
types of higher education institutions in Russia, see Androushchak and
Yudkevich (2012).
The largest number of institutions—just over half of all public higher
education institutions—are affiliated with the Ministry of Education
and Science. Twenty-two other ministries and agencies have higher
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 59

education institutions under their jurisdictions. Among the largest oper-

ators are the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Health and Social
Development, the Ministry of Culture, the Ministry of Transport, and
the Ministry of Sport and Tourism.
There are 7.4 million students in the higher education system, with
only 17 per cent of them enrolled in private universities. In the past,
only 65 per cent of secondary school graduates enrolled in higher edu-
cation institutions. In 2009, 89 per cent of all 17-year-old youths became
first-year university students. Naturally, with such a low level of selec-
tivity, the average portion of the entering population becomes a central
problem.
While 45 per cent of the total number of students at Russian higher
education institutions are enrolled as full-time students, 4 per cent of
students are enrolled part-time, and the rest of students (over 45%) are
enrolled in a type of distance-learning program. The quality of part-
time and distance-learning programs differ drastically from full-time
programs. Moreover, in most cases, the former programs basically mean
acquiring a formal title, without any relevant competencies.
At the present time, the total number of faculty at public universities
is estimated to be around 0.948 million people. See Figure 3.2 for the
approximate distribution of positions.

16% 21%

22%

41%

Associate professors Senior lecturers

Professors Lecturers, teaching assistants

Figure 3.2 Distribution of faculty by academic rank in public universities.

Source: Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) (2009).
60 Russian Higher Education

Some conditions and challenges face the higher education system

now. First of all, there is an ongoing demographic decline, caused by
the harsh recession and the degradation of living standards. In the early
and mid-1990s Russian families faced much uncertainty and, thus, had
fewer children. So, the birth cohort of those applying to universities is
declining in comparison to previous years. This basically exaggerates the
lack of selectivity at low-quality universities, which are worried about
filling government-funded places.
Second, the public consensus is that higher education is a social
imperative: even with the record-breaking numbers of secondary school
graduates entering universities and an accompanying deterioration in
overall quality, the percentage of people pursuing higher education
(even though it is extremely high now) should not be decreased.
Everyone needs at least some type of further education.
Third, the Unified State Exam results now determine who gets admit-
ted to which university in Russia. The Unified State Exam replaced
specific exams that were held by each university. It opened up more
opportunities for students and has also begun providing additional
information for the main actors in the education market—universities,
households, schools, and the government. For example, comparisons of
universities are provided through data on the quality of admitted stu-
dents, and ultimately secondary schools will be evaluated (on the basis
of the Unified State Exam results of their graduates and the universities
they attend).
Finally, another impact is the globalization of the education market.
More and more students are considering universities abroad at the bach-
elor’s, master’s, or PhD level, so that the monopoly that local universities
in all regions once enjoyed is now threatened by foreign competition.
This issue primarily affects the most academically talented and eco-
nomically well-off students. This challenge, faced by universities, is also
drawing the best graduates to PhD programs abroad. In both cases, the
figures are low on a national scale, but they are growing and will grow
even faster.
The current organization of the Russian higher education market
results from a series of systemic changes during the past two decades.
However, it would be impossible to understand how academic con-
tracts function in Russia and to analyze faculty incentives within the
present system without understanding how the Soviet higher education
system was organized and how it performed. So, the next section will
focus on the Soviet, post-Soviet, and modern stages of higher education
development.
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 61

The legacy of the Soviet higher education system

The number of universities in the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist

Republic remained virtually the same between 1940 and the beginning
of perestroika (481 higher education institutions were functioning in
1940 versus 494 in 1980), yet the percentage of young people pursu-
ing a university degree started to grow in the middle of the 1960s.
In 1970, there were 474 universities, nearly a quarter of which were
situated in Moscow and Leningrad (now Saint Petersburg)—76 and 41,
respectively. A significant number of universities were situated in the
research centers in Siberia, which were founded during the 1950s and
1960s (11 in Krasnoyarsk, 14 in Novosibirsk). At that time, there were
2.67 million students at the universities (1.3 million full-time, 0.39 mil-
lion part-time, and 0.985 million at distance-learning programs). There
were 204 students for every 10,000 people.
Higher education was free. Moreover, all full-time students with a
good academic performance received a scholarship—enough support to
live without financial aid from one’s parents or a part-time job. Stu-
dents coming from other regions were always provided with dormitory
accommodation, usually for a nominal payment.
Also, the large distance-learning sector accounted for up to one-third
of all students. At the time, studying in that sector usually meant that
students had to actually come to the university twice a year, for exam
sessions. Distance education enabled individuals employed full-time to
earn a degree and was usually necessary to fulfill requirements related
to the development of one’s career. Multiple distinctive characteristics
of the Soviet system are summarized next.

The planned economy and mandatory job assignments

In the framework of a planned economy, one main feature of the
higher education system was the system of mandatory job assign-
ment. Accordingly, each university graduate received a specific and
unavoidable assignment. She or he could be assigned to remain within
the university in an academic job, to stay in a big city or even in
the capital, or to go to some production site in a faraway district
of the country. The type of the assignment depended on various
factors: academic performance, social activity, ideological loyalty, or
relations with the decision makers involved in the process of dis-
tributing assignments. Receiving an assignment for postgraduate studies
was considered a fortunate result—the first step toward a successful
career.
62 Russian Higher Education

To balance supply and demand of qualified specialists, each university

was allocated a fixed number of places for new students and an amount
of public funding, for each educational program. Today, the govern-
ment assigns an enrollment plan to each public university that receives
state financing; this determines the number of places for university
entrants, secured with public funding. This vestige of the Soviet period
only creates incentives to lower admissions requirements, to preserve
the existing level of state financing and to receive even more.
Besides universities that were under the auspices of the Ministry for
Education, there used to be a number of them under various industry-
specific ministries. The existence of these ties was caused by a certain
degree of vertical integration. Thus, the educational program was tai-
lored to match the needs of the corresponding industry and needed to
be flexible in adjusting to the new demands of the industry. In addi-
tion, the program meant that graduates would be provided with a job at
one of the production sites subordinate to the ministry. Employers were
quite interested in a broader division of the professions. It allowed them
not only to get specialists who were perfectly suited to industrial needs
but also to minimize the potential risks that employees would be drawn
to other industries.
In other words, specialists were trained not for the labor market as
a whole (which did not really exist) but for specified segments of the
system. Each production site was a channel for the inflow of grad-
uates from specific universities. The balance between the industry’s
needs and higher education was reached not only due to the for-
mal mechanisms but also to informal connections between universities
and organizations—through which university administrations secured
job positions for their graduates. The Ministry of Defense, Ministry of
Agriculture, Ministry of Health, as well as Ministries of Light Industry
and Heavy Industries were among those that had the most subordi-
nate universities. The orientation of student enrollment was biased
toward engineering jobs: up to 40 per cent of students graduated in
engineering.

Efficient contracts
To understand the contract between university and faculty during the
Soviet period, it is essential to bear in mind the following trends of the
system. First, from the formal status point of view, faculty did not differ
much from the other types of civil servants. At the same time, the aca-
demic profession was prestigious. Furthermore, faculty members with
the highest positions in academic hierarchy had access to additional
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 63

benefits—such as food purchase orders, discounted holiday vouchers,

and better medical services—and rarely suffered a shortfall.
Second, inter-university mobility was practically zero. So, one began
an academic career as a teaching assistant and moved toward the
position of a professor or head of chair, within the same university.
The academic sector was a rather closed system; professional mobility
between universities and other organizations was virtually nonexistent.
Academic positions were highly attractive, which made the system quite
selective. Individuals who enjoyed a high status in the non-academic
sector (factory administrators, party administrators, etc.) needed to
begin at a relatively low position, in order to join the academic pro-
fession. Wages depended on the position and, hence, employment
history.
Finally, Soviet higher education included a smooth-running system
of reassessment and skill improvement, for which each professor had to
complete a retraining course, at least once every five years. This practice
mostly guided the improvement of teaching methods.
Even though employment agreements were signed only for a lim-
ited period (i.e., several years), cases in which they were not renewed
occurred extremely rarely. The academic system of control over fac-
ulty’s research and teaching activities was closely related to the party-
controlled system. So, each faculty member’s commitment and desire to
keep their place and progress in their career led to maximum compliance
with the rules.
It is possible to talk of an efficient contract for university faculty
during the Soviet period. First, there was heavy regulation of the
production sphere and public administration in the Soviet Union. With-
out entrepreneurship in the country, universities, as well as research
institutes affiliated with the Academy of Sciences, remained the only ter-
ritory of even limited freedom. Of course, people who valued personal
freedom gathered into the higher education system.
Second, academic work was well remunerated. A university profes-
sor’s wage was about 300 per cent higher than the average wage, while a
young teaching assistant—at the start of his or her career and without an
advanced degree—received approximately 110–120 per cent more than
the average wage. So, both pecuniary and non-pecuniary remunera-
tion at Soviet universities were rather high. Despite ideological pressure,
universities developed reasonably well-functioning mechanisms for aca-
demic control and quality control. That led to the famous phenomenon
of Soviet education, which was valued all over the world during this
period.
64 Russian Higher Education

As already mentioned, an employee’s salary was dependent on his

or her position in the academic hierarchy. A teaching assistant with-
out an advanced degree earned around US$120–150 per month, in
today’s dollars, a senior lecturer around US$200, while a full professor’s
monthly salary was about US$400–450. These wages were the same in all
disciplines—only universities working for the arms industry had higher
salaries. An average wage in the industrial sector, at the time, was about
US$190 per month.
Having a candidate of sciences degree (only about 45% of faculty did)
or even a doctor of sciences degree (5% of faculty) provided not only
some extra pay but also certain social benefits. For example, a better
standard of housing was provided to the holder of these degrees.
Beside the actual wage, faculty members also had access to additional
ways of earning, through the so-called economic contract. This was
basically research, commissioned by organizations, regional authorities,
and other groups and carried out by university chairs and individual
faculty members. Such commissions were initiated by heads of chairs
and deputy heads of departments. On average, professors could earn up
to half of their wage through such contracts. At the same time, even
though many people had an opportunity to earn such income, standing
out too much was not encouraged, so the faculty did not let colleagues
neglect their main contract.

Postgraduate studies and the replacement of specialists

Recruiting new faculty from the university’s own graduates (inbreeding)
was common. The source was normally postgraduate programs. Even
though being admitted into a postgraduate program was quite hard in
itself (additional work experience was usually required), it was even
more difficult and more prestigious to get a job assignment, and to
remain with the department. Many graduates regarded the opportu-
nity to stay at the university as a teaching assistant to be one of the
most attractive career paths. A postgraduate scholarship allowed the stu-
dent to focus on research, while flexible working hours provided the
conditions expected by research institute staff. The replacement of spe-
cialists caused the formation of certain schools of thought with all their
strengths and weaknesses.

Institutional shock: factors and external disintegration

The transformation of economic institutions affected higher education;

comparing the working conditions and the remuneration system of
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 65

university faculty in the last years of the Soviet Union with the current
faculty contracts makes this evident.
When the Soviet Union collapsed, educational budgets decreased by
three or four times, as did the budgets in all sectors of the economy.
However, while the rest could just disappear or dramatically diminish
in size (like the arms industry, for example), the educational system did
not decline but continued to grow. It grew both in the number of uni-
versities (which more than doubled after 1990) and the percentage of
young people who continued their studies toward a university degree.
Thus, the higher education system has doubled in size since 1991, to 520
students for every 10,000 people. This is approximately 15–20 per cent
more than in the United States or Finland. Thus, these days higher edu-
cation is considered as a social imperative; yet, financing was cut despite
such a huge increase in demand for higher education.
In 1992 a new federal act—On Education in the Russian Federation—
was passed, which created a legal framework for the establishment
and functioning of new educational institutions; and those institutions
began to grow in number, exponentially. The nongovernmental sec-
tor basically grew, from nothing (zero), in the past 15 years. Privately
financed education is a relatively new phenomenon in the Russian
higher education market.
Public and private institutions differ in their organizational and
legal structures. Public universities receive public funding for train-
ing students who achieve high academic results in the entrance
examinations—since 2009, the State Unified Exam—at high school
graduation. Public institutions are provided with buildings and basic
infrastructure. A limited number of public universities receive public
support to finance their research activities. The share of public fund-
ing to higher education has increased over recent years and, according
to the Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat), currently constitutes
approximately 60 per cent of the total funds available to universities,
as compared to about 40 per cent at the beginning of 2000/2001.2
Private universities do not receive any government funding to sup-
port even the most talented students or to cover research costs. By late
2003, the Russian Ministry of Education and Science had started to
develop mechanisms that would allow private institutions to receive
government financing for students or research on a competitive basis.
Private universities usually teach economics and management and/or
humanities. They usually admit less-prepared students or those who
choose not to spend a lot of time and effort on education—for example,
attending classes, doing homework, or writing essays or term papers.
66 Russian Higher Education

Because of that, private higher education has, from the very start, been
associated invariably with low-quality education.

Divergence from the productive sector: lost ties

with industry

The privatization of government-owned production sites disrupted

job placement channels for university graduates. Although in the
government-owned sector demand for recent graduates remained
stable—and even grew, due to the massive migration of competent
senior specialists into the business sector—it was not financially attrac-
tive anymore. In the absence of mandatory job assignments and com-
pulsory “binding” between graduates and employers, the inadequacy
of the wages in the public sector led to few applicants. Many gradu-
ates, whose education, qualifications, and competences were tailored to
match the needs of a specific industry (as in engineering, for example),
just were not in demand anymore. The job assignment system ceased to
be efficient. When it broke down, direct market control of the quality
of education weakened significantly. The development of new control
mechanisms was going to take some time.
The sharp external changes, which caused systemic internal transfor-
mations, unsettled the equilibrium in the former contract system. That
led, in its turn, to the breakdown of efficient contract equilibrium in
Russian universities during the first decade of democratic development
during the 1990s.
The gap between the wages of university faculty and people with
the same educational level in other fields, grew so big that it was no
longer compensated by the intrinsic nonmonetary rewards of an aca-
demic career. Moreover, the wages fell so low in absolute value that
faculty could no longer live without additional income and were obliged
to look for it either within academia or externally.
Many faculty who would have preferred to stay within universities
decided to leave. The mass exodus of talented individuals from univer-
sities was not only caused by the fact that wages fell below subsistence
level. Underfunding also affected equipment, expendable materials, and
other expensive components, crucial for research, in many disciplines.
No information was accessible about the latest international scientific
achievements; subscriptions to scientific journals were cut down, and
hardly any foreign books were purchased.
Only faculty who had nowhere else to go kept their positions—those
who were not sought by the business sector, foreign universities, the
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 67

public sector, or anywhere else. Up to 50 per cent of all faculty left.

As well as the mass migration of former university teachers to the
external labor market within Russia, the country also suffered a signifi-
cant brain drain during the 1990s (Agamova and Allakhverdyan 2007).
Attending conferences at universities abroad, Russian researchers often
found that the conditions for research were incomparable with Russian
ones, and many of them made a decision to emigrate as a result. It is
estimated that no less than 7 per cent of all university employees moved
abroad.
Those who stayed in the country tended to be less professionally tal-
ented and accomplished. In addition, standards of consumption and
income in the business sector—primarily in industrial areas such as
banking and finance, insurance, real estate, and a few others—grew dra-
matically. People employed in these spheres could earn US$2,000–4,000
monthly in the 1990s, while a university lecturer’s wage was US$100 per
month.
As most of the best professionals left, the system was replenished with
younger scholars or people from other sectors, who were usually aca-
demically weak. The competence level of these scholars was low, as was
their professional status, which did not match the standards in the busi-
ness sector. These new entrants were initially willing to violate academic
standards, for money. The 2005 survey of Russian university teachers of
all ages, investigating incentives and behavior, included the following
question: “In certain circumstances, would you agree to accept a mate-
rial remuneration from a student in exchange for some study-related
services provided to him?”—the softest form of admitting corruption.
Only 10 per cent among the respondents over the age of 65 answered
“yes,” among those over 50 years the proportion was about 20 per cent;
among those over 40 years, it was already 30 per cent; and it was more
than 50 per cent among those aged 25–30 years.
Thus came about the failure of academic culture and the downfall
of the established institutional equilibrium, with its long-standing aca-
demic norms and conventions. New people filled the profession, and
the behavioral patterns and value system changed.

Contracts and salaries today

In the beginning of the 2000s, earnings in the academic sector were

25–50 per cent lower than the average in the economy. However, dur-
ing the last five years the gap has been decreasing mostly due to
a significant rise in public spending on higher education. By 2009,
68 Russian Higher Education

Senior and middle managers 185%

Professionals with the highest... 111%

Professionals with high qualification 83%

Retail and service personnel 68%

Accountants, office personnel 66%

Qualified workers 100%

Operators 103%

Nonqualified workers 46%

Academic personnel, incl. 87%

Professors 125%

Assistant professors 86%

Lecturers, teaching assistants 67%

Figure 3.3 Earnings of professional workers and university professors—average

wage in the economy (%).
Sources: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2008); Federal State Statistics
Service (Rosstat) (2009).

the gap between earnings in academia and the rest of the econ-
omy averaged at about 10 per cent. However, faculty salaries are still
noticeably lower than the earnings of specialists with higher education
employed outside academia, let alone senior and mid-level managers
(see Figure 3.3).
Today, in contrast to the Soviet period, considerable variations in
wages exist between academic fields, which correspond to the demand
for the relevant study programs. In any case, as in most countries, the
remuneration of a university-employed specialist (e.g., an economist or
lawyer) is much lower than that of the same specialist in the business
sector. The most in-demand and therefore highly paid departments are
economics and social sciences, while the least in-demand and therefore
poorly paid are arts and natural sciences (see Figure 3.4).
The main determinants of academic salaries at universities are rank—
which determines a budget category on the wage scale and, conse-
quently, the size of the wage component of the budget—academic
degree, teaching loads (extra loads are especially important), and admin-
istrative services (see Figure 3.5). Relevant payments constitute about
70 per cent of the earnings of a higher education institution teacher.
The remaining 30 per cent is paid in the form of bonuses.
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 69

Social sciences and 119%

economics 67%

Humanities 113%

Mathematics and
105%
information technology

Engineering 103%

Foreign languages 97%

Natural sciences 92%

Arts 86%

Figure 3.4 Ratio of average wages of faculty in various disciplines, based on

average salary in the university sector (%).
Source: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2009).

Excess (not specified in contract) teaching 25%

Additional (specified in contract) teaching 20%
High quality of teaching 24%
Administrative activities 17%
Student assistance officer 17%
Scientific adviser’s activities 15%
Methodical publications 24%
Research 22%
Academic publications 21%
Good results by student’s evaluation 16%
Young age 16%

Figure 3.5 Percentage of teachers receiving various allowances.

Source: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2008).

Overall, with regard to setting up faculty remuneration, university pol-

icy is based on several aspects of a prevailing model of university
governance. First, according to federal regulations, the principal deci-
sion maker within a Russian university is the academic senate—the
“soviet” of faculty. The rector, in turn, is just supposed to be the admin-
istrator. However, in reality, the hierarchical model of decision making
prevails in Russian universities, with the rector as a major decision
70 Russian Higher Education

maker, and the academic senate just formally approving their decisions
(Panova 2008).
Second, most of the universities receive just enough federal funding
to cover the costs of teaching and property maintenance, as determined
by the current allocation-per-student formula.
Some universities receive additional public funds, to cover the costs of
research; but that amount is significant at only 5 per cent of Russian uni-
versities, so public funding for research is negligible. Therefore, average
faculty salary received for teaching activities from their primary employ-
ment contract does not differ significantly between various universities.
No substantial differences occur between universities in Moscow and the
regions, either between main campuses and their regional branches or
by discipline. Probably the only exception is the north of Russia, where
people receive the so-called northern allowance. However, living costs
there are generally higher, and that may outweigh the allowance.
Third, the system of approved per-student spending, calculated for
each university, was introduced as recently as 2011, based on historical
patterns of per-student spending that previously depended primarily on
the rectors’ communications skills and connections in the ministries.
Fourth, given the extreme rigidity of federal prescriptions regarding
spending of public funds, academic councils are pursuing policies aimed
at attracting as much private funding as possible, which in Russia comes
mainly from tuition. Those funds can be redistributed at the discretion
of the universities—that is, academic councils and rectors. Obviously,
no less than 70 per cent of private funding ends up in the payroll.
In academic contracts, the basic part of salaries is rather small and is
usually secured with public funding. By cleverly allocating time between
teaching and research and some forms of internal moonlighting, faculty
may receive quite substantial additions to the basic teaching salaries; but
the obvious downside is an overloaded faculty. Universities with a large
share of funds coming from private sources use them to increase faculty
salaries.
Pension schemes and health-care plans are legally guaranteed to all
employees, including university faculty. There are few additional bene-
fits beyond a two-month annual paid leave. In a small number of cases,
a teacher may receive temporary housing at the university. This may
even be the primary motivation for working for a university, but such
cases are rather exceptional and not the rule.
It would, however, be incorrect to say that the long summer vaca-
tion is the only nonmonetary benefit. The main issue in this situation
is that, despite relatively low salaries, for many faculty members the
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 71

professorial status at a public university, in conjunction with a suffi-

ciently large amount of free time, is of great value. This status can be
monetized through private tuition, part-time teaching in other public
or private universities, and in other ways.

Formal contracts and informal supplements

The academic contract system in Russian higher education not only rep-
resents the formal parts of the contract but also the existing system of
expectations—between universities and individual faculty members—
and the mechanisms that support such expectations. The way academic
contracts are formally organized in Russia is largely a result of the
internal organizational peculiarities of Russian universities. These are
described below.

Chairs
Chairs (kafedras) are the smallest organizational units (subdepartments)
and, at the same time, the center of decision making relating to the
educational process (including faculty recruitment). Formally, a chair is
defined as a narrow research area, developed by those employed by the
chair. This position is a highly hierarchical structure ruled by the head
of chair, which, basically, makes all the main decisions. Therefore, when
new faculty are hired, they are employed by a specific chair, rather than
a department. An average state university in Russia has approximately
15 chairs, while a private one has around ten chairs. A state university
employs an average of 12 teachers in an average chair, while a private
one has just 8. Departments, which may be called institutes in some
universities (usually engineering ones), make up another hierarchical
level in Russian universities. Departments effectively unite chairs that
provide courses within one educational program. Unlike departments at
US universities, chairs in Russia are characterized by a greater concentra-
tion of power, stronger hierarchical patterns, and the fact that a chair is
a teaching unit in the first place.

Teaching load
The main tool for coordination, planning, and control of the educa-
tional process is determining an individual teaching load (at the chair
level) and an aggregate load for the chair (at the department level). The
teaching load is the amount of instruction a teacher (or chair) needs
to provide, during an academic year. The annual load is calculated
in hours; a teaching assistant’s workload is 750 hours per year, versus
72 Russian Higher Education

600 hours for professors. Such a workload means that a teacher has at
least three full days of instruction a week, sometimes even four, which
leaves minimum time for research.

Activities in individual workloads

Most of the teaching process takes place in lectures and seminars, which
are not equivalent in value for calculating the workload; lecturing hours
are recorded at double rate. Besides contact hours, the teaching load also
takes into account the time spent on grading homework, test papers and
exams, tutoring term papers and theses, and working with postgraduate
students. There are no graders (students hired to review homework) in
Russia; all work is done by the teachers themselves.

Hiring policies: theory and practice

To hire a new faculty member, a chair should have a relevant open

position, available with a guaranteed teaching load. Formally, it is a
competition-based recruitment: if there is a vacant position or if term
contracts with some faculty members are about to expire, the uni-
versity publishes advertisements as part of the hiring process—on the
university’s website, in mass media, or through employment services,
including private ones. Finding new faculty on the “open market” usu-
ally takes place when a university is opening new educational programs.
In all other cases, there is no open competition (or any, at all). While
information about new positions is distributed, no one regards it as a
real opportunity for anyone outside the university. In fact, the head
of the chair—with his or her connections (including informal ones)—
decides on the extension of existing contracts and new recruits for
associate professor positions and higher ones. Teaching assistants and
teacher positions are usually filled by young graduates or postgraduate
students of the same chair (for reasons mentioned above).
Only in exceptional circumstances is an existing contract not
extended. Yet, meeting formal requirements for faculty (such as pub-
lished research and methodology papers or positive feedback from
students) is significant. These are one of the parameters used to assess
the chair’s performance as a whole, for which the chair head is respon-
sible. At the same time, the chair’s publications—both research and
didactic ones—are relevant at the university level, as well. The relevant
ministry provides additional allowance for university administration,
if faculty members are strong and manage their work effectively. As a
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 73

result, there is an internal system of rewards for faculty members, based

on productive work within universities.
Full-time faculty sign a standard employment contract for one, three,
or five years. The first contract will usually be signed for one year, the
next one for three years; and then the contract is extended every five
years, if there are no complications or complaints on either side. The
extension of a contract does not entail any major changes (regarding
workload, wage, etc.). While tenure does not exist, due to the lack of
any real competition for teaching positions and the fact that contracts
are extended nearly automatically, faculty members treat their contracts
as permanent. Thus, while there is no de jure tenure system, a de facto
tenure system does exist. People’s expectations and hence strategies are
formed under the assumption that their job positions (not job condi-
tions or remuneration) are secure. However, the decreasing number of
students will, probably, lead to a cutback in teaching positions at univer-
sities, until about 2016, and will cause more internal competition. The
main things defined in the contract are basic salary and teaching load.
A lecturer’s contract determines the teaching load for their position,
while the individual curriculum is determined yearly.
A chair’s aggregate load is defined by the courses assigned to it in the
program’s syllabus. This creates strong incentives for chairs to increase
their number of courses in the academic curriculum. The chair’s load
is distributed among its faculty, by the head of the chair, before the
beginning of each academic year. Therefore, the decision of the chair
head determines the real teaching load of each employee.

Contract expectations

Faculty’s main function is teaching, which is heavily regulated by the

teaching-load calculation procedure. Yet, lecturers are supposed to do
research, as well; so, they work under the looming imperative that “one
has to do research in order to be a good teacher.”
However, the labor contract defines neither the amount of research
to be produced nor the expected results. Any attempts to formalize the
time split between teaching and research are unlikely to succeed, given
that most faculty members do not even hold their own workplaces and
only come to the chair offices in between classes.
In any case, the university contract is a rather incomplete frame-
work, regarding mutual responsibilities, and reflects conditions in a
general form (not specific to each individual). Many faculty members
have just a vague idea about the contents of their contract, which is a
74 Russian Higher Education

well-established, semi-formal convention. The results of a faculty sur-

vey demonstrate that only 55 per cent of respondents mention that the
total teaching workload is mentioned in the contract, while in reality it
always is (Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations 2008).
Only slightly more than half of the respondents know that it is formally
stated in their contracts that they are required to produce research. So,
faculty never consider their contracts as working guidelines—relying
mainly either on academic norms that exist in the department or in
direct agreement with the department chair, who is viewed as a direct
employer in most cases.
Basically teachers cannot negotiate their contract conditions, due to
the highly hierarchical nature of faculty–administration relations. How-
ever, they face an increase in real workload, given the vast paperwork
now required for formal reporting on teaching and research (Panova
2008) and the high level of hierarchic control in Russian universities.
The heavy teaching load in their primary job and additional employ-
ment (to be discussed further) means that, for most teachers, research
output either diminishes to a mere formality or is not done at all.
According to the Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organiza-
tions, only about 20 per cent of all university faculty engage in paid
research. On average, research is allocated around 8 hours per week
(compared to the 18 contact hours and 11 hours of preparatory work).
Also, research performance does not serve as a significant factor when
it comes to extending academic contracts. University chairs and depart-
ments are, on the whole, interested in the impressive research results of
their faculty, which are required for external reports. Thus, they create
opportunities for the improvement of such criteria, through publish-
ing internal paper digests, internal conference proceedings, and other
options.
Without a single faculty assessment system, there is no review of per-
formance results; instead “inputs” such as teaching load, compulsory
teaching materials stored at the chair, and detailed syllabi of the courses
taught are monitored.

Calculating wages

The wage that is specified in the contract includes several parts: a state-
budget component—a legally fixed minimum wage that does not exceed
one-fourth of the average salary in the country; and allowances—that is,
non-budget means. The minimum guaranteed wage is provided from
the budget. Faculty may receive allowances for research at the chair
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 75

head’s discretion. On average, though, budget-funded salaries in state

universities are about 65–70 per cent of the average salary level in the
country. The allowances, including budget-funded ones, are determined
mainly by the heads of chairs.
In principle, universities with a significant private-funding compo-
nent are more or less autonomous, since they can individualize faculty
salaries and compete for the best by providing higher salaries, additional
grants, and other incentives. The only thing that universities cannot do
is decrease the teaching load, because it is fixed for each position and
wage level. Likewise, universities do not really engage in competition
for professors, even though in theory that would be allowed. The causes
for this absence of autonomy include lack of financial resources, the
non-existence of a research market, and high social-tension risks in the
higher education system.
Therefore, new faculty members are often attracted with incentives
other than financial reward. One is the manipulation of workload—that
is, giving the person responsibilities that would match the required for-
mal criteria in working hours but cause the member the lowest cost in
real time. For example, a day spent in the State Examination Board can
be equal in hours to a several-month-long course. Actually, this tactic is
also used, in reverse, to dismiss “unwanted” teachers. The second tool
is appointing teachers to administrative positions. Establishing a new
chair “to suit a professor” is also a common practice if a department is
interested in hiring a particular individual.
The way chairs and incentive systems are organized encourages con-
servation of current practice—in opposition to the modernization of
education programs or even any changes in the education process. Being
more interested in preserving and increasing their existing workload
(and resource allocation), chairs often oppose more flexible curricula,
where students might be free to choose their educational directions.

Employment patterns and sources of remuneration

Teachers have options for increasing their salaries, and the most com-
mon are described in the following sections.

Research
Participation in paid research has grown significantly in recent years.
In 2006, only about 14 per cent of all faculty participated in research
projects; by 2008 their share reached 20 per cent (see Table 3.1). Still,
these indicators remain very low.
76 Russian Higher Education

Table 3.1 Faculty engaged in different aspects of research, 2007–2008

Forms of research Faculty (%)

Writing academic papers and monographs without additional 54.1

funding
Participation in research projects financed by the university 37.9
Permanent position at a research department of a higher 12.5
education institution
Grants for research-teams by research-grant providers 9.9
Research projects finances by governmental agencies 8.9
Research projects in other higher education institutions 8.5
Permanent position at a research institution or a research 6.2
department in another higher education institution
Grants for individual researchers by research-grant providers 5.7
Permanent research or consultancy position at a commercial 2.5
enterprise
Working on innovations and patenting activities without 1.8
additional funding

Source: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2008).

Research performance indicators listed in Table 3.2—based on a rep-

resentative survey of university faculty—are also low. Performance is
generally measured by publications in journals, produced within the
same university; or by new teaching materials, developed for one’s own
courses. Sharing one’s research results is unpopular, too. Faculty mem-
bers usually give presentations at conferences and seminars, organized
within their own university.
Many lecturers say that the main reasons why they cannot do research
are lack of time and the fact that research is poorly funded, if at all (see
Table 3.3). However, those who do participate in research earn up to
one-third of their income from it. In 2008, teachers’ average monthly
income was around US$880, while research might represent an addi-
tional US$250; for reference, according to the Federal State Statistics
Service, the average salary in Russia in 2008 was slightly less than
US$600.
Yet, faculty participation in paid research is an exception rather than
the rule. On average, only 6–8 per cent of the universities’ aggregate
income comes as payments for research or engineering development,
and 80 per cent of all money spent on research comes from the state
budget. Around 30 or 40 leading Russian universities receive a budget
for research.
 77

Table 3.2 Publications, conference attendance, and other activities related to

teaching and research, 2008

Teaching and research activity Proportion of Average number

academic staff of publications/
engaged in the projects per
activity (%) faculty member
per year

Publications in Russian academic 33.1 3.0

journals
Publications in journals edited by 40.9 2.2
the faculty member’s higher
education institution
Publications in academic journals 23.0 2.0
edited by other higher education
institutions
Working papers for the faculty 8.9 2.3
member’s higher education
institution
Working papers for other higher 5.4 2.0
education institutions
Chapters in books or monographs 9.8 1.8
Books or monographs 8.5 1.6
Textbooks 22.5 1.8
Other publications related to 36.8 2.7
methods of teaching
Presentations at conferences held by 40.6 2.0
the faculty member’s higher
education institution
Presentations at other conferences 30.9 2.3
Presentations at seminars held by 21.0 2.0
the faculty member’s higher
education institution
Presentations at other seminars 11.9 2.1
Formal reports based on the results 15.3 1.7
of completed research
Formal reports related to methods of 5.9 2.0
teaching
Patents 1.9 2.0

Source: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2008).

78 Russian Higher Education

Table 3.3 Factors that impede faculty from carrying out research

Factors Facultya (%)

Lack of time 34.5

No economic rewards 31.5
No funding provision for conference attendance 25.7
Insufficient funding for research activities (data collection, 19.5
expendables, etc.) or inadequate equipment
Results of research are not in demand overall 7.8
No relevant literature or academic periodicals 4.5
Personal expertise not relevant for research 3.7
No opportunities for publications 3.5
No interest in research 2.7
Poor health or lack of stamina 2.6

Note: a Faculty who mentioned the corresponding factors.

Source: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2008).

Administrative responsibilities
Administrative work is an important source of income for uni-
versity teachers. According to faculty surveys, up to one-third of
them are, in one way or another, involved in administrative pro-
cesses. Administrative responsibilities include coordination, control,
and micromanagement in chairs—as well as responsibility for writ-
ing various reports for central university administration and external
agencies. The time spent on that work compares to the average num-
ber of contact hours per teacher and amounts to 18 hours per week.
The income of those who do administrative work, besides teach-
ing, is about 50 per cent higher, compared to those who only do
teaching.

Additional employment
For many teachers, working in several universities at the same time is a
way to increase their income, substantially. According to the 2007 Mon-
itoring of Educational Markets and Organizations, about 22 per cent of
teachers worked in more than one university.
A lecturer with a higher workload within the chair (occupying more
than one position) can also have positions at other chairs, within the
same university. Such a practice means that a teacher signs several con-
tracts, approved by all the heads of chairs involved; it is because of the
lack of opportunity for a full workload within one chair or the desire to
earn a little more.
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 79

In addition to their primary work, a faculty member may also

teach at a “for-profit” educational program within the same university,
something that is relatively widespread. This might be a master of busi-
ness administration program or a vocational training program. This
practice involves teaching only and is funded based on a separate labor
contract or, more often, an ordinary contractor agreement, depending
on the number of hours required. Hourly rates at such programs are usu-
ally much higher, and the opportunity to teach there is usually regarded
as compensation for an underpaid primary job.
Statistically, faculty at private universities are more likely to teach at
several universities. This is mainly because most faculty in the private
sector are employed part time. No legal restrictions prevent faculty from
working at several universities. While multiple commitments are not
really encouraged, administrators do wish to keep good faculty. Yet, it is
known that salaries are not high enough to prevent teachers from seek-
ing additional income. Moreover, professors who receive low salaries at
good public universities do leverage their status and reputation by giv-
ing private lessons to prospective students and/or teaching at private
universities and gaining more earnings there.
Furthermore, multiple employment has a negative effect on inter-
chair and interdepartmental cooperation. The time per day teachers
spend at university boils down to contact hours, because the rest of the
time is spent between several universities.

Tutoring
Until recently, tutoring prospective students (giving private lessons) was
a substantial source of income for a large number of university faculty.
Chiefly, this process was encouraged by the system of separate entrance
exams, which existed at universities until 2007. Formally, such exams
could not test students in areas outside the secondary school curriculum.
However, some of the universities violated those rules—especially, in
math, natural sciences, and economics—and used sets of problems in
exams that could be solved by an insight or a sophisticated technique
that was not supposed to be taught at schools. These questions in the
exams usually required specific training and “insider information.” This
resulted in a high demand for private tutoring and, in 2006, up to 45 per
cent of all teachers did such work (see Table 3.4).
Many households regarded tutoring as essential to prepare for uni-
versity admission, and this attitude has proved to be extremely stable.
Yet, with the countrywide introduction of Unified State Exam, which
blocked informal ways of getting into universities, tutoring ceased to
Table 3.4 Teachers engaged in activities outside the home institution 2008 (%)

80
Activities Social Humanities Natural sciences Engineering (%)
sciences (%) and education and
science (%) mathematics (%)

Teaching at other government-funded institutions 29 22 20 9

Teaching at other private institutions 21 11 6 5
Teaching at special training courses for applicants 4 6 6 2
to higher education or vocational secondary
education institutions
Teaching at other educational programs (further 16 16 7 13
education, etc.)
Work at research centers and institutes, etc. 6 3 7 7
Individual research projects, grant-funded research 5 5 6 4
Group research projects, grant-funded research 12 10 14 17
Writing books or articles, editing, reviewing, 16 12 8 8
translating, etc., for a fee
Non-academic work in the public sector 3 2 1 2
Non-academic work in the private sector 8 3 3 6
Entrepreneurship or non-academic jobs 3 2 1 2
Tutoring, private education, private preparation for 9 15 13 3
higher education or vocational secondary
education institutions, schools, etc.
Private non-teaching services 6 6 2 3

Note: The percentages are based on the overall number of faculty.

Source: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2008).
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 81

be as effective a means of guaranteeing admission. However, many

households with high school students applying to universities still
actively seek tutors. Therefore, that position remains important to fac-
ulty income, though it may lose significance over time. The incidence
of finding additional, non-academic sources of income (particularly in
consulting) varies by discipline (see Table 3.4).

Corruption and informal payments received

from students

Informal or semi-formal payments from students remain a substantial

source of income for most teachers at weak universities. These payments
can contribute to a good grade, reduced course assignments (such as
course papers), tutoring for weak students (usually on the subject taught
by the same lecturer or assistant), or even an opportunity to retake an
exam for additional money.
Given the extremely low wages, such informal payments are becom-
ing crucial to keep faculty at universities. The university administration
indulges such practices: first, because they are unable to offer adequate
remuneration for teaching; second, because of the need to accom-
modate self-funded students, who provide a substantial part of the
university’s income. Since self-funded students are usually weaker than
those accepted to government-funded places, they generally cannot
master the education program (on average, government-funded stu-
dents score 75 out of 100 on the Unified State Exam; the average score
for self-funded students is 60).
Such a phenomenon makes the whole education system vulnerable
because it creates pseudo-education, where a system of mutual need
between teachers and students upsets a healthier equilibrium. Students
can expect good grades (and a university diploma, in the end), with-
out truly acquiring substantial knowledge or putting in serious effort;
while faculty, in turn, minimize their teaching output and increase their
income.

Inefficient lock-in

Low salaries, the “exodus” of highly qualified professionals, the low

prestige of the academic profession, and the lack of integration with
the production sector, these changed conditions, create a new institu-
tional equilibrium. This equilibrium took shape in the late 2000s, when
new institutions paying low salaries emerged.
82 Russian Higher Education

The defining characteristic of this new culture involves academic

and research provincialism. Many faculty and researchers who write
articles and dissertations neither read nor cite relevant international
publications.
Another pattern that developed during the past seven to eight years
is in reality an imitation of research. Academic promotion still depends
on quantity indicators, such as the number of research papers and other
indicators. However, related phenomena consist of purchasing papers or
articles, written by other people, and passing them off as one’s own; or
compiling manuscripts that are not really research papers but take the
shape of dissertations, articles, or monographs. While the rate at which
people with PhD degrees are awarded stays the same (in comparison to
the 1970s to 1980s), the number of doctors of sciences has grown 300
per cent in the past two decades since 1990.
Moreover, two other types of corruption have emerged in higher edu-
cation: entrance corruption, when faculty members charge prospective
students for getting government-funded (free) places; and corruption
during the education process, when students and faculty members trade
for grades. Many young and middle-aged teachers are involved into such
activity.
Yet, the safest and most socially acceptable practice for faculty to
increase their wages is to acquire external employment (e.g., consult-
ing and entrepreneurial activities). Honest teachers receive their main
income outside academia, while dishonest ones obtain more cash inside
universities, through corruption.

Qualifications and promotion

Most faculty at Russian higher education institutions achieved a higher

education degree—a diploma or higher. About 64 per cent of teachers
have PhD degree. To start an academic career at a university, a faculty
member would mainly need a diploma (bachelor’s level and above) to
conduct seminars and tutorials. However, in order to provide lectures,
faculty need (with few exceptions) a PhD-equivalent degree.
In the 1930s, the Soviets adopted the German academic system of two
levels of postgraduate degree. The first level, candidate of sciences, is
equivalent to the German Doktor degree and is required for an associate
professor position; the second, doctor of sciences, corresponds with the
German habilitation, is necessary for a full-professor position and var-
ious administrative posts in academia—such as heads of chairs, deans,
vice rectors, and rectors (see Table 3.5).
Table 3.5 Highest degree of most professors

Master’s degree % of higher % of faculty in % of candidates % of doctors of

education higher education of sciences in sciences in
institutions institutions full-time faculty full-time faculty

Federal universities Provided 2.3 7.2 49.1 14.2

National research universities 7.0 13.8 50.7 14.2
Leading technical and profiled 28.2 26.4 51.4 12.3
technological universities
Socio economic, humanities 28.2 31.6 52.8 11.4
and pedagogical universities
Bachelor universities and Not provided 34.3 21.1 51.7 9.3
colleges
Total/average 100.0 100.0 51.6 11.8

Source: Monitoring of Educational Markets and Organizations (2008).

83
84 Russian Higher Education

Most faculty at public Russian higher education institutions are asso-

ciate professors (about 40%), and 20 per cent are professors, including
chair heads and heads of departments. In Russia, universities’ higher
administration (presidents, rectors, and vice rectors) are traditionally
counted as faculty, too. On the whole, these administrators amount to
nearly 2 per cent of all faculty. Senior lecturers and assistants constitute
21 per cent and 15 per cent of the faculty body, respectively.
Promotions at lower academic levels (e.g., from senior lecturer to
assistant professor) are subject to obtaining a degree, and certificates
to confirm the formal qualification. As for higher positions (e.g., pro-
fessor), these important roles (contingent on a doctoral degree) are
assigned, based on work experience at the same institution. Internal
assignments to senior positions reflect low academic mobility between
universities and the lack of competitive mechanisms for allocating
positions.

Inbreeding

Inbreeding, which means recruiting one’s own graduates as faculty

and staff, is a common practice at Russian universities. Even though
research shows the negative effect of inbreeding on academic perfor-
mance at the individual, departmental, and national level, it happens
at many Russian higher education institutions (Dutton 1980; Eisenberg
and Wells 2000; Horta, Veloso, and Grediaga 2010; and Marwell 1974).
The 2007 survey of economics departments at Saint Petersburg uni-
versities, conducted by the Laboratory of Institutional Analysis at the
Higher School of Economics (Sivak and Yudkevich 2009), shows that
chair heads regard their own graduates as the target group for filling
positions. Clearly, the low salaries make full-time university employ-
ment inconceivable for young people who have already entered the
labor market and enjoy better salaries, but would not (for a rather
long time) receive comparable money at a university. Thus, universities
keep students and postgraduates who are inclined to do teaching and
research. Inbreeding does, however, cause an additional negative result:
graduates who remain at their universities—not usually the brightest
ones—have little external work experience, do not belong to wider
academic networks, and lack academic connections outside their own
university or even the department. These graduates more or less pass
on their own knowledge, received at the same university, to the next
generations of students. Their academic supervisors and heads of chairs
remain indisputable academic authorities for the graduates.
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 85

Of course, faculty members at universities where they graduated show

stronger inbreeding-oriented recruitment strategies. Faculty who grad-
uated from other universities are more likely to support externally
oriented recruitment policy and welcome “new blood.” Yet, as usu-
ally very few such colleagues exist, they provide little opportunity to
influence the policy (Sivak and Yudkevich 2009).
Inbreeding affects many aspects of a university’s academic life. Teach-
ers without any outside experience rarely publish in external journals
(since their writing is mostly focused on departmental or university
publications) or participate in external conferences. They participate
in narrower academic networks, usually only linked to their own col-
leagues within their chair or their department, and chained to their
own academic supervisor or head of chair. Inbred faculty are much
more inclined to teach rather than to do research (Gouldner 1957,
1958; Tuma and Grimes 1981). This preference seems rather logical
because teaching includes certain university-related investments at the
particular university—unlike research.
As a result, this exclusiveness affects the norms that regulate research
in at least three ways. First, certain local rules and standards on research
and publications emerge, and the alienation from the external peer
environment negatively impacts research quality. Second, some local
disciplines and fields appear, traditionally developed within only one
university. Finally, developing or supporting a certain research field is
defined not by external factors (such as marketability) but rather by the
private interests of individuals.
Often, inbreeding enables a system of informal contracts (a system of
mutual responsibilities and expectations) between older and younger,
and senior and junior members of faculty. So, inbreeding encourages
paternalism (guarding and promoting one’s disciples) and a kind of clan
system, as well as the tight informal connections.
The high level of specific investments and long hours spent at the
university lead to faculty being oriented toward internal networks.
In contrast, people aspiring to a mobile career want to remain competi-
tive in the market. Therefore, they make fewer investments in teaching
and administrative work and put more effort into research to achieve
results that are viewed and valued in the external academic market.
Thus, if the latter faculty share rather cosmopolitan values, the former
prefer local values and show fidelity to their own university.
In an autonomous system, internal organizational rules dominate
over external professional influences. In particular, external expertise is
eclipsed by the internal expertise, which is not immune to the informal
86 Russian Higher Education

influence of internal networks. As a result, situations exist where pro-

motion is based not on transparent academic achievements but on
internal status and prestige. Moreover, inbreeding-oriented traditions
make research performance less relevant compared to affiliation with a
certain institution, school, or political group. All of that affects research
performance and its competitive potential in the global academic
market.

Differentiation on the academic landscape

Concerning academic contracts, faculty remuneration, and research

performance, it would be misleading to describe the situation using aver-
ages. Indeed, the levels and structure of faculty remuneration, as well as
participation in research, are not at all homogenous. However, the het-
erogeneity is quite difficult to measure by indicators alone; the system
of reporting to the Ministry of Education and Science favors imitation
and institutional “isomorphism.”
At the same time, there are substantial differences. The division of
universities by funding for research per lecturer and funding for teach-
ing per student is quite indicative. Most of the 400 Russian universities
are inadequately funded for teaching and produce little research. Only
25 to 30 of all universities receive better funding, have better research
performance, and are in higher demand. Practically all were selected by
the Russian government, in 2009, as members of the national research
universities.3

Research practices

Examining the practices and views of the faculty in the economics

department at one of the leading Russian universities,4 helps in under-
standing research practices in the fields that suffered most during the
transition period or whose tradition only began in post-Soviet Russia.
The majority of the teachers named their academic supervisor and
head of chair as the person whose opinion on their research mattered
most—rarely mentioning their colleagues or specialists from other uni-
versities. Most of the teachers are chained to the inner circle of the chair
or department in their routine practices, values, and attitudes. External
connections are mainly used only for external reporting requirements.
Only 20 per cent of the respondents mentioned “the importance of the
academic environment” as a necessary condition for effective research;
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 87

and fewer than 40 per cent claimed the need to have access to academic
databases.
For most of the teachers, Russian-language books and articles are the
main sources of information; less than half of them use foreign books or
articles in their work. Most of their publications feature articles from
conference proceedings (usually held at their own university), man-
uals and teaching notes (usually published by their own university),
and articles in journals (again, usually at the university level). Many
respondents also mentioned grant reports as the results of their research
activities (the most frequent answer).
Paying journals and digests to publish articles is also widespread (even
in good universities). Thus, 56 per cent of the respondents within this
university admitted having paid to have their articles published.

Attempts at reform in contemporary Russia

What are the possible dynamics of both wages and academic contracts,
within Russian higher education? What challenges face the academic
profession, and what can universities and the state do to address
them? To address these issues, it is useful to consider the conditions,
opportunities, and limitations that Russian universities face.

Competition-based (differentiated) support mechanisms

A differentiated approach is needed to support universities in the
Russian higher education system today, as the system involves so many
universities. Indeed, the distribution of funding between the research
universities and the rest of the institutions would lead to insufficient
support of strong research teams, on the one hand, and an inefficient
conservation of weak academic groups, on the other hand.
The government’s first step to support higher education was targeted
at a limited number of the best universities, selected on a competi-
tive basis. The first competition (the Innovative Education Program)
took place in 2006 and 2007. As a result, approximately 50 universities
received substantial additional funding for two years. Significantly, this
program mostly supported teaching practices—development of educa-
tion programs, development of new courses and manuals, teachers’ skill
improvement, and new training equipment. Yet, at the end of the pro-
gram, additional funding ended; then, universities that used the money
to start some systemic changes faced serious problems.
In 2009, a new competition—again to identify the best universities—
was announced and awarded 14 universities the status of national
88 Russian Higher Education

research university. These universities were selected on the basis of their

level of research and on the quality of strategic development programs
that they offered. Basically, both the present and future potential of
these universities were judged.
Other criteria were discussed—such as the average level of income a
professor received within the university. Another indicator is whether
the university is involved in international projects with global aca-
demic networks, and international teaching and research standards. The
level of links with global networks and the ability to embrace interna-
tional expertise and standards of quality may be appropriate selection
criteria for the government to determine the allocations of funds to
universities.
The Russian government selected 25–30 universities to participate
in the research universities experiment and to receive better financ-
ing, expecting them to show better research results. However, they
represent 3–4 per cent of all universities, and this percentage is, of
course, not high enough to influence practices and culture in the whole
system.
Furthermore, systemic changes require not only supporting the best
universities, but also working with average universities and developing
policy measures aimed at eliminating weak universities. So, the govern-
ment and the academy face another challenge. They need to not only
to define strategies for national research universities but also to think
seriously about how to change the majority of universities. Otherwise,
the impact of the national research universities will not lead to a change
of situation for the whole country.

Reorganizing the university system

With the decreased numbers of high school graduates, higher educa-
tion institutions face more competition for students. Weak universities
try to fill tuition-funded places and to preserve the number of places
for university entrants secured with public funding at the current level;
this means admitting even weaker students. Since these students are
often only interested in higher education for the sake of credentials,
they tend to apply to programs not in high demand. At Russian univer-
sities, these programs include engineering. So, such universities enroll
students without the preparation or talent for the degree program, judg-
ing by their United State Exam results. In some cases, teachers accept
money for good grades in exams or for additional classes, a practice
which (as already stated) is further reinforced by low wages. This model
does not receive any criticism from the university administration, since
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 89

payments from students retain faculty—which their contract wages

cannot do. Also, universities do not expel current students, given the
budget implications.
To rationalize this system, the number of places funded with pub-
lic funding, for certain specializations, could be decreased. Some steps
in this direction have already been carried out. For example, in 2011,
government-funded places in economics were significantly reduced at
certain universities. Cutting budget-funded places means that universi-
ties will admit fewer students, who, in their turn, will be better ones.
Moreover, this change in funding prevents the admission of really weak
students.
In addition, since people view higher education as a social require-
ment, weak students should have the opportunity to study and to gain
higher education diplomas, as well. One method would be to increase
the variety of educational paths by forming so-called vocational bach-
elor’s degree programs. These vocational programs would be aimed
not at mastering a broad scientific grounding but rather at receiving a
minimum amount of theory and the maximum relevant skills for work.
The Russian Ministry for Education and Science is discussing encour-
aging collaboration between certain weak universities and strong uni-
versities. Even though such a step creates some benefits, it brings a lot
of risks. The first issue faces the negative effect for the academic staff of
strong universities, if joined with faculty at weak universities. Of course,
faculty at weak universities usually have a different academic culture:
they are more tolerant of informal payments, cheating and plagiarism
among students, paid publications, and so on. Moreover, administra-
tors of a strong university will need to provide the same salaries to new
employees. Thus, university administrations face the problem of intro-
ducing a real review system for teachers and ending contracts with those
who are not up to standard. Even though that policy is a good one, such
harsh measures do go against common Russian academic norms and
practices.

The challenges and opportunities of internationalization

An important objective in supporting the best universities and creating
healthier conditions at average universities is integrating the institu-
tions with global academic networks. The integration requires efforts
not only from the universities and researchers but also from the gov-
ernment, which must provide a supportive environment—in the role
of long-term commitment by the state in building world-class univer-
sities, see Khovanskaya, Sonin, and Yudkevich (2009). One aspect of
90 Russian Higher Education

internationalization is recruiting teachers and researchers who studied

in leading universities around the world and received internationally
recognized PhD degrees. These individuals have, among other quali-
ties, experience of working in a “healthy” academic environment (with
the academic norms and routines of a world-class university) and are
themselves bearers of the appropriate academic norms.
However, Russian universities, with few exceptions, do not maintain
any specific international recruitment policy. First, Russian universi-
ties are limited in what they can offer, compared to the salaries at
American and western European universities. Even if universities find
sufficient funds, they face the problem of long-term guarantees and
assurances of their obligations. Moreover, such a policy can create social
tension among the faculty, which is bound to occur with differences
between relatively low-paid long-employed professors and attractive
contracts for younger, recent graduates. Finally, one can foresee a con-
flict between local and foreign academic norms. The foreign systems are
more transparent in terms of recruitment and promotion, and are based
on individual research achievements. The local norms are more com-
munal, more informal, and reward age, experience, and time within the
university.
The government is making some attempts to create conditions
to encourage international cooperation, aimed forming prominent
university research centers and labs for potential “breakthrough”
research. Thus, the government first launched a competition, aimed at
attracting foreign professors, in 2009. In 2010, as a result of the first
stage of the competition, several laboratories were created at Russian
universities under the supervision of leading academics from abroad,
who receive substantial remuneration in exchange for agreeing to spend
at least several months a year in Russia. However, this program requires
high transaction costs for both parties, particularly due to the aca-
demic and bureaucratic differences between Russia and other countries.
Complex formal reporting requirements, restrictions on spending state
money on equipment, databases, and empirical studies, and other issues
have a negative impact on the efficiency of these research groups. At the
same time, even though the program’s impact has not yet been judged,
its positive effect is already clear.
Besides the financial issues, certain legal issues regarding academic
employment of foreign nationals are still unsolved. Currently, this type
of contract requires universities to apply for quotas and work permits
for foreigners and then renew the contracts periodically. In such a situ-
ation, it is quite problematic to create a tenure and tenure-track system
 Gregory Androushchak et al. 91

that would be supported not only by the university’s informal structure

but also by legal institutions.
In terms of planning the internationalization of national universities,
the Chinese experience of recruiting graduates from the best research
universities across the world and supporting world-class research cen-
ters could be a useful reference. In any case, Russian universities have to
overcome the lack of a critical mass of internationally recruited special-
ists, which could make an impact on the Russian academic environment
and address the challenges presented by high-transaction costs caused
by bureaucracy and culture.

Notes
1. This yearly Monitoring of Education Markets and Organizations study consists
of representative surveys of students and their families, teachers (at schools),
faculty from colleges and universities, heads of colleges and universities, and
employers. It is designed and administered by the Higher School of Eco-
nomics, with financial support from the Ministry of Education and Science
of the Russian Federation (http://memo.hse.ru/en/about).
2. The data on sources of income, except for public funding, for higher educa-
tion institutions became available in 2006. By using the official chain price
indexes for tuition, and time series for the number of “commercial” students
who either paid tuition themselves or for whom the tuition was paid by their
employer in 2000–2006, we obtained estimates for the private funding of uni-
versities and compared it to public funding. Surveys by the Higher School of
Economics show that the proportion of private funding of research activities
at universities was negligible during 2000–2008. See Shuvalova (2009).
3. In 2009, the Ministry of Education and Science introduced a new (to the
Russian education sector) competitive mechanism for the provision of pub-
lic funding—aimed at catalyzing research activities, academic collaboration,
and renovation. Overall, the status of National Research Universities, and the
funding, was granted to 14 universities in 2009 and to 15 universities in 2010.
4. In this section, we use the results of the 2007 survey of teachers and heads of
chairs at the economics department of a Russian university, conducted by the
Laboratory of Institutional Analysis at the Higher School of Economics.

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4
India: Streamlining the Academic
Profession for a Knowledge
Economy
N. Jayaram

In the land of the guru, the position of the teacher has for a long time
been regarded with ambivalence. Traditionally, teachers were accorded
the highest esteem and even venerated as a demigod (deva), but their
economic status was low and they were poor. This was also reflected
in the dissonance between the high education qualifications expected
of teachers in higher education institutions and the low remuneration.
However, as a result of the competing demands for talent in the knowl-
edge economy, occasioned by globalization and the best talent turning
away from the academic profession, the salaries of teachers have now
been upwardly revised—to an extent that was unthinkable a decade
back (Jayaram 2003). The professoriate is now comfortably placed; and
the academic profession, it is hoped, will again become attractive in the
employment market.
This hope, surely, is not totally misplaced, as improvements in
pay packets and service conditions are necessary for rejuvenating the
academic profession. They are, however, not sufficient to groom and
orient the academic profession, and to realize the promise of higher
education in the coming decades. The travails of higher education in
India—“a quiet crisis . . . that runs deep,” as the National Knowledge
Commission (NKC 2007, 1) describes it—assume contextual significance
here. How soon and how effectively India addresses these travails will
determine whether this country, among the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India,
and China) countries, can reap the benefits of the demographic window
for the next two decades (Altbach and Jayaram 2010; Jayaram 2009).
As Pawan Agarwal observes, “India’s large size, long history and
diverse culture and the complicated nature of Indian polity and pol-
icy process make Indian higher education a very complex enterprise”

93
94 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

(Agarwal 2009). This complexity is compounded by several issues. As a

system, higher education has grown in fits and starts; its expansion—far
from adequate, given the demand—has been hindered by accessibil-
ity and equity issues (Jayaram 2010); and its quality has been varied,
with islands of excellence in the ocean of mediocrity. Monitoring and
regulating quality has been resisted and ritualized. The language issue
in higher education has remained unresolved, decades after indepen-
dence (Jayaram 1993). There has been no consistent long-term higher
education policy for the country as a whole: both federal and state gov-
ernments make policies; and policymaking is, largely, in the nature of
ad hoc response to contingent situations (Tilak 2004).
The system is set to function in the larger socioeconomic and politi-
cal context. In the quasi-federal polity that India represents, regionalism
and parochialism impinge on higher education, promoting inbreeding
and impeding mobility. The multiplicity of regulatory mechanisms has
bred corruption and nepotism in the system; reports on scandals in insti-
tutions of higher education are perennial in the media. In India, “the
distinction between the public and private sector is somewhat blurred”
with reference to higher education (Agarwal 2009, 67), resulting in bla-
tant privatization of public resources. Even as the federal government
dithers about a policy for the private sector in higher education, the
faith reposed in this sector for enlarging access to and improving quality
of higher education has turned out to be unfounded. Finally, there is the
imminent prospect of opening higher education to foreign investment,
with its attendant consequences.
Thus, one can hardly be sanguine about the prospects for the aca-
demic profession being rejuvenated in the short term or playing a
significant role in realizing the promise of higher education in a global-
ized world. In this context, this chapter discusses the salient features,
notable variations, and key issues in the recruitment and remuner-
ation of the professoriate in India. The chapter is divided into 11
thematic sections, analyzing the typology of institutions, varieties of
teaching positions, qualifications for the professoriate, the policy of
protective discrimination, recruitment procedures, terms of appoint-
ment, career advancement, salaries, non-salary benefits, supplementary
employment, and international faculty.

Typology of higher education institutions

There has been a rapid expansion of higher education since indepen-

dence: from 20 universities and 496 colleges in 1947 to 399 universities
 N. Jayaram 95

and university-level (degree-awarding) institutions and 29,951 colleges

by the end of 2009. These institutions employ about 488,000 teaching
staff and cater to about 11 million students. India, thus, has the third-
largest system of higher education in the world, behind China and the
United States. This massive system is also diverse: the institutions vary
in terms of degree-granting authority, legislative origin, and funding.
Broadly, five types of educational institution can be delineated, forming
an informal hierarchy:

• institutions of national importance;

• central universities;
• state universities;
• grant-in-aid colleges that are part of, or affiliated to, a university;
• unaided (purely private) universities/colleges.

The differences across institutions are reflected in their recruitment and

remuneration systems.
Institutions of national importance include the 16 Indian Institutes
of Technology (IITs), three institutions specializing in medical sciences,
one specializing in statistical techniques and another the Hindi lan-
guage.1 These university-level institutions enjoy special status, accorded
them by the Indian Parliament, and they are all funded directly by the
Indian government’s Ministry of Human Resources Development. They
are empowered to award degrees that, according to the 1956 Univer-
sity Grants Commission (UGC) Act, can be granted only by a university.
The IITs have carved a niche for themselves as institutions of repute for
teaching and research in engineering and technology ( Jayaram 2011).
While the institutions of national importance are academically and
administratively autonomous, they are governed by the rules and reg-
ulations of the central government. These institutions are all-India in
their orientation, lay greater emphasis on research in addition to teach-
ing, spend more per student, and offer better remuneration and working
conditions, when compared to all other universities.
The 40 central universities were established by an act of parliament
and are financed by the Ministry of Human Resources Development,
through the UGC. They are multidisciplinary in their spread, com-
bining postgraduate teaching (primarily) with research. They do not
have colleges affiliated to them—the notable exception being the Uni-
versity of Delhi, which has constituent colleges. Besides these, the
central government has recognized 130 institutions as “deemed-to-be
universities” under the UGC Act, and some of these institutions are
96 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

also funded by the Indian government. While these central universi-

ties and centrally funded, deemed-to-be universities are academically
and administratively autonomous, they are governed by the rules and
regulations of the central government. They, like the institutions of
national importance, are all-India in their orientation, have better aca-
demic reputations, greater research orientation, better remuneration
and working conditions, and spend more per student as compared to
state universities.
The 239 state universities are established through legislation by the
28 states constituting the Indian federation. As public universities, they
receive financial assistance (up to 85%) for five years for all development
initiatives (including teaching positions) from the UGC; thereafter, they
need to be funded by the respective state governments. They have a
central campus housing schools and departments of study that offer
instruction largely at the postgraduate (graduate) level and undertake
research. Most state universities have colleges affiliated to them, whose
academic work they regulate and oversee. While these state universities
are academically and administratively autonomous, they are governed
by the rules and regulations of the state governments. Some states have
a common legislative framework for all their universities.
Grant-in-aid colleges are funded to the tune of 85–90 per cent by
the state governments—a practice going back to colonial times. Some
of these colleges were established with private resources and came to
be financially supported by the state governments. They generally offer
first-degree-level education and are affiliated to state universities. The
academic standards of these colleges are determined and overseen by
the university to which they are affiliated, which also conducts cen-
tralized examinations for the enrolled students. These colleges may be
dispersed geographically but they are under the jurisdiction of a uni-
versity, as determined by law. These colleges may be run either by the
government, through its department of higher education or by private
management bodies.
Unaided (purely private) universities and colleges are privately run
institutions; they do not receive any financial support from the gov-
ernment. They rely almost entirely on funding from tuition fees and
donations—often given as a consideration for enrollment at the insti-
tution. As universities, they are either deemed-to-be universities under
the UGC Act or established by an act of the State Legislative Assembly.2
As compared to the central and state universities, the private univer-
sities enjoy greater administrative freedom and autonomy. They are,
nevertheless, governed by a broader framework of government rules and
 N. Jayaram 97

regulations. As colleges, they are established and managed by private

trusts. While trust laws govern their administration and finance, their
academic programs are determined and overseen by the university to
which they are affiliated. Since they raise their own funds, the purely
private universities and colleges mostly offer programs—like computer
science, biotechnology, management studies, and so on—which are in
high demand and are financially lucrative.
The bulk of the expanding student enrollments in higher educa-
tion has taken place in colleges affiliated to state universities, and in
first-degree courses (about 84%) leading to bachelor’s degrees in arts
(46%), science (20%), and commerce (18%) (Agarwal 2009, 10; Kaur
2003, 366). These institutions also employ most of the teachers, and
their work almost exclusively entails teaching and examining candidates
at the undergraduate level. Among degree-awarding higher education
institutions, research is a priority only in the institutions of national
importance, central universities, and select departments in state univer-
sities. That is, the university system has largely concentrated on retailing
knowledge, rather than creating and refining knowledge—a function
assigned to specialist institutes and laboratories outside the univer-
sity system. This peculiar disjunction between universities and research
institutes explains the paradox of why the large and experienced system
of higher education in India is little known for its excellence in research
(Jayaram 2007).
Be that as it may, despite the massive growth in higher education,
the gross enrollment ratio has been very low—between the conserva-
tive estimate of 7 per cent (NKC 2007, 48) and the liberal estimate of
11 per cent (Agarwal 2009, 10)—compared to other BRIC countries, let
alone the advanced industrial countries. Thus, there have been both
inadequacies and distortions in higher education expansion in India.
Obviously, more of the same policy would be passé, and new think-
ing to catch up with the rest of the world is called for. Among other
things, the problem of faculty shortage—about 54 per cent, according
to the Ministry of Human Resources Development’s task force report
(Times News Network 2011b)—warrants urgent action, as any hope of
a well-balanced and sustainable expansion of higher education depends
on qualified and capable teachers.
Two points need reiteration here. One is that, in India, the
professoriate is devoted to undergraduate teaching in colleges. These
colleges feed the state and central universities, where the emphasis is
on postgraduate education and research. The second point is that the
distinction between public and private sectors in higher education in
98 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

India is fuzzy. Many privately established colleges and some deemed-

to-be universities gain financial support from the government. With
the government having almost stopped financing newly established pri-
vate institutions, the number of purely private institutions is increasing,
especially in the fields of engineering and technology, medicine, and
management.

Varieties of teaching positions

In India, the professoriate is not a homogenous category; the differ-

ent types of teaching positions are characterized by their duration
of employment and privileges. The most coveted is the permanent
(tenured) teaching position in a public-funded university or college.
Appointees to these positions are placed on probation for a period of
two years. Probation provides an opportunity for the university/college
to evaluate the appointee’s strengths and weaknesses as teacher, col-
league, and employee—just as it provides an opportunity for the teacher
to ascertain the prospect of a suitable academic career. During probation,
the institution can terminate the appointment of a teacher by giving
one month’s notice (or, instantly, by giving a month’s salary), without
giving any reason for termination. Similarly, a teacher on probation can
resign by giving a month’s notice (or by paying back a month’s salary).
In most universities and colleges, probation is viewed as a formality, and
teachers on probation rarely have their positions terminated.
The appointees who successfully complete the period of probation
are confirmed in the post. Once confirmed, it is rare for a teacher’s ser-
vices to be terminated, unless the individual is found guilty of moral
turpitude. The procedure for termination is long and cumbersome, and
courts often favor the teacher over the institution. The teacher, how-
ever, can resign from her/his post by giving three months’ notice or
three months’ salary, in lieu of the notice period. Teachers in perma-
nent positions wishing to move to another institution, for the same or a
higher position, generally do so by tendering technical resignation—in
order to retain, in their new job, the service and other benefits linked
to a permanent position. This is done because teachers in public-funded
higher education institutions (including grant-in-aid private colleges)
are treated on par with civil servants, and under civil service regulations
no person can hold two permanent positions concurrently.
The age of superannuation ranges from 65 years of age (as in cen-
tral universities and centrally funded institutions) to 60–62 years of
age in state universities and grant-in-aid colleges. Teachers holding a
 N. Jayaram 99

permanent position can voluntarily retire from their post with the
benefit of a full pension, after completing 20 years of uninterrupted ser-
vice. They can also be compulsorily retired (as a penalty), or prematurely
retired (in the public interest), or retired on medical grounds (after 50
years of age or 30 years of service). All retirements (other than superan-
nuation) can be effected by giving three months’ notice. There are no
gender differences regarding the superannuation of teachers.
In centrally funded institutions, superannuated teachers may be re-
employed for one year at a time—for up to five years. Such a practice
is subject to evaluation of the teacher and the teaching requirements
of the institution. Re-employment is entirely at the discretion of the
institution, and it cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Re-employed
teachers continue to receive all the benefits that they had before
superannuating.
Permanent positions are nonexistent in purely private universities
and colleges. Appointment to teaching positions in such institutions
is contractual in nature. The duration of the contract ranges from about
five months (one semester) to five years. The terms of the contract
may vary from case to case, and they are specifically spelled out in
each case—unlike the terms of appointment to permanent positions,
which are uniform and stipulated in the statutes and ordinances gov-
erning public-funded institutions. Given the shortage of well-qualified
and experienced teachers, retired teachers often find opportunities for
contractual appointments in purely private institutions. Since con-
tractual appointments offer greater flexibility in human-resource man-
agement and involve limited long-run financial commitments, even
public-funded institutions are now turning to such appointments.
Both permanent and contractual teaching positions involve full-time
engagement in teaching and research in the institution. This is different
from the part-time teaching position. In India, the concept of part-time
teachers (who serve a specified number of teaching hours per week)
and guest faculty (who help the college/department to complete por-
tions of the syllabus) originated as a result of the unmet demand for
teachers in particular disciplines. For some positions, full-time teachers
were either not available (in narrow fields of specializations) or could
not be appointed to a full-time position (as they would not have suf-
ficient workload—defined as the number of classroom teaching hours).
Typically, part-time teachers and guest faculty are paid a consolidated
sum, as remuneration for the hours of teaching work in their assign-
ment. Their monthly remuneration is nowhere near what a permanent
teacher receives. Furthermore, they are not entitled to any statutory
100 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

employment benefits—leave, medical insurance, a pension, gratuities,

etc. Obviously, they are looked down upon within the system, as daily
wage workers. Guest lecturers, if they are professionals (medical doctors,
lawyers, chartered accountants, etc.), carry better status than those who
are underemployed master’s degree holders.
A modality of the appointment of teachers has gradually become
an interim solution to a practical problem in academic administration,
especially in private colleges that do not receive governmental support.3
State universities also depend on part-time teachers, while central uni-
versities rarely do so. From the college or university’s point of view, it
is obviously more economical to employ part-time teachers instead of
permanent teachers. There is greater flexibility in the hiring and fir-
ing of part-time teachers, particularly considering the large number of
unemployed or underemployed master’s degree holders.
From the prospective candidates’ perspective, part-time teaching
offers some employment opportunity and the possibility of gaining
experience, which may be useful as (and when) opportunities arise for
more stable or full-time permanent/contractual employment. Periodi-
cally, part-time teachers, with ten or more years of service, have brought
political pressure to bear on the state governments to regularize their
appointments on humanitarian grounds. Courts of law have also been
sympathetic to this cause. To overcome the administrative and finan-
cial problems, which result from such backdoor entry into the academic
profession as encouraged by grant-in-aid private colleges, some govern-
ments have abolished the post of part-time teachers and suggested the
reappointment of retired teachers on a contract or hourly basis (Jayaram
2003).
For the optimal utilization of staff, several states have introduced a
provision for the transfer of teachers between the colleges funded by
them. Similarly, states with a common legal framework for universi-
ties have introduced a provision for the transfer of university teachers
between states for administrative convenience. Such transfers often
become contentious regarding claims of seniority and other issues.
While some teachers use influence or bribes to get transferred to places
or institutions of their choice, the educational bureaucracy uses transfer
as a weapon for dealing with recalcitrant or vexatious teachers.
Thus, teachers in Indian higher education are heterogeneous in terms
of the positions they hold in the system. While revising the salary
and service conditions of teachers in higher education in 2006, the
UGC has attempted the difficult task of standardizing the qualifica-
tions of various categories of teachers, the procedures for recruiting
 N. Jayaram 101

them, the requirements and process of their career advancement, and

the salaries and non-salary benefits to which they are entitled. The fol-
lowing sections present this standardization, in various aspects of the
academic profession.

Qualifications for the professoriate

Since January 2006, a three-tier academic hierarchy—namely, profes-

sor, associate professor, and assistant professor—has been standardized
in publicly funded higher education institutions across the country.
In most cases, entry into the academic profession is at the assistant pro-
fessor’s level, both in university departments and colleges.4 To maintain
the quality of higher education, the UGC has prescribed the mini-
mum qualifications for appointment to teaching and other academic
positions (such as college principals and various cadres of librarians,
directors of physical education, etc.) in the universities and colleges
(UGC 2010). Table 4.1 summarizes the minimum qualifications at each
level of the professoriate.

Table 4.1 Summary of qualifications for professoriate

Designation Level Minimum Qualifying Work Additional

educational test experience qualification
qualifica-
tion

Assistant Entry Good NET/SLETa Not Not

professor academic necessary, prescribed;
record; but but
master’s preference preference
degree in given to given to
the subject candidate candidates
with 5.5 with work with
points on a experience publications
10-point
scale
Associate Midcareer PhD (plus None Eight years API Scoreb
professor the above)
Professor Top-end PhD and None Ten years API scoreb
eminence as
a scholar

Notes: a NET = National Eligibility Test; SLET = State Level Eligibility Test.
b API score = Academic Performance Indicator Score.

Source: Adapted from UGC (2010).

102 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

For appointment to the post of an assistant professor—in arts,

humanities, sciences, social sciences, commerce, education, languages,
law, journalism, and mass communication—in a college, university or
university-level institution, a candidate must have obtained a score of
5.5, on a 10-point scale, at the master’s level examination in the relevant
subject.5 Furthermore, the candidates must have passed the National
Eligibility Test or an accredited test (State Level Eligibility Test).6 Can-
didates with a PhD degree are, however, exempt from the requirement
of a National Eligibility Test qualification. Similar exemption exists for
applicants with master’s degrees in disciplines for which this test is not
conducted.
For appointment to the post of associate professor through direct
recruitment—besides a score of 5.5, as above—a PhD in the con-
cerned/allied/relevant discipline is a mandatory qualification. In addi-
tion, candidates must have put in a minimum of eight years of teaching
and/or research in an academic/research position equivalent to that
of assistant professor in a university, college, or accredited research
institution. They must:

• show evidence of being engaged in research and have a minimum

of five publications as books and/or research/policy papers to their
credit;
• have contributed to educational innovation, designing of new cur-
ricula and courses, and technology-mediated, teaching-learning pro-
cesses;
• have successfully guided doctoral candidates.

Finally, they must have secured a minimum score as stipulated in

the Academic Performance Indicator based on the Performance Based
Appraisal System (UGC 2010, appendix III). The indicators covered for
appraisal include:

• teaching, learning, and evaluation-related activities;

• co-curricular, extension, and professional-development-related activ-
ities;
• research and academic contributions—including publications , par-
ticipation in seminars and conferences, research guidance, and
organization of training programs.

For appointment or promotion to the post of (full) professor,

the candidate must be an eminent scholar with a PhD in
 N. Jayaram 103

the concerned/allied/relevant discipline. Candidates for professor-

ship must have ten years of teaching experience in univer-
sity/college and/or experience in research at university- or national-level
institutions/industries—including experience of guiding research can-
didates at doctoral level. They must have, for their credit, at least
ten publications as books and/or research/policy papers; the guidelines
are vague as to the quality of these publications. Other qualifications
prescribed for an associate professorship are also applicable to professor-
ship. Alternatively, however, scholars or professionals who are reputed
in their discipline and who have made significant contributions to
knowledge in the discipline may also be considered for appointment as
a professor (UGC 2010, 6). It is left to the selection committee to verify
and endorse the credentials of such scholars or professionals.
Almost all professors and associate professors in universities now pos-
sess doctorates. A majority of assistant professors in universities also
possess doctorates. In colleges, the percentage of assistant professors
with doctorates is low; those with a doctorate seek upward mobility
as an associate professor (or even as an assistant professor) in a uni-
versity. As a rule of thumb, if not as a formal guideline, a doctorate
from an internationally renowned university is more valued, compared
to a doctorate from a state or unknown foreign university. Incidentally,
in publicly funded institutions, the regulations governing minimum
qualifications can hardly be flouted. There are far too many applicants
vis-à-vis the number of posts available. The slightest suggestion that
an appointment was made by flouting a regulation is challenged in a
court of law, and such appointments are struck down by the courts. The
institutions have also become more careful after the enactment of the
Right to Information Act, whose provisions will invariably be invoked
by unselected applicants.
The purely private universities and colleges have greater flexibility in
the matter of teachers’ qualifications. However, they would also like
to ensure the minimum as regards the academic qualifications of the
faculty—such as the grade in the master’s level and the doctorate. As for
unaided private colleges, the university to which they are affiliated acts
as the watchdog.

Protective discrimination in recruitment to professoriate

Meritocracy is of cardinal significance for excellence in higher educa-

tion. While merit is emphasized in direct recruitment to academic posi-
tions in public-funded higher education institutions, these institutions
are also required to reserve a certain percentage of such positions for
104 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

candidates hailing from indigent sections of the population. As per the

constitutional mandate, 49.5 per cent of the posts are reserved under the
policy of protective discrimination (affirmative action): 15 per cent for
the scheduled castes, 7.5 per cent for the scheduled tribes, and 27 per
cent for the other backward classes.7 Selection for reserved positions
is also based on the merit of the candidates from among these castes,
tribes, and classes. Besides this so-called “vertical reservation,” there is
“horizontal reservation” to the extent of 3 per cent (across categories)
for people with disabilities, 1 per cent each for candidates with auditory,
visual, and orthopedic disabilities.
The reservation of positions in public-funded institutions, called pro-
tective discrimination, is a form of affirmative action that is peculiar to
India. This provision is mandated by the Constitution of India, in con-
formity with its avowed principles of equality and social justice. It is
intended to rectify centuries-old inequities, resulting from the Hindu
caste system, and ameliorate poverty, illiteracy, and other problems
of the population. The constitution has identified three categories of
the population for protective discrimination: the scheduled castes and
scheduled tribes (so-called because of the schedules in which these castes
and tribes are listed) and other backward classes. This provision has since
been extended to people with disabilities.
Although initially intended for a period of ten years, the provision of
reservation has been extended every ten years, through an act of parlia-
ment; and it is now widely regarded as a permanent part of state policy.
In public parlance, it is a sensitive issue; and it has been frequently chal-
lenged in courts of law, including the Supreme Court of India. Generally,
the legal position has been in its favor. However, opinion on its applica-
tion in the sphere of higher education is divided: some observers view
it as debilitating the quality of education, while others uphold it as an
instrument of social justice and dub its critics as retrograde and elitist.
For many reserved positions, no doubt, it is difficult to find suitable
candidates. There is no provision of reservation in purely private uni-
versities and unaided colleges; the demand for reservation in the private
sector has not yet gained political momentum.

Recruitment procedures

All vacancies in public-funded higher education institutions need to

be advertised in the government’s weekly Employment News (brought
out in both English and Hindi) and at least in one national newspa-
per (also in a vernacular newspaper, in the case of a state university).
 N. Jayaram 105

Vacancy advertisements are also posted on institution websites and

in the University News, a monthly magazine of the Association of
Indian Universities. The advertisement should specify the posts that are
reserved for specific categories of candidates. While purely private insti-
tutions are not obliged to advertise their vacancies, they do so in leading
newspapers and magazines.
All appointments in public-funded institutions are made on the rec-
ommendations of properly constituted selection committees. The com-
position of such committees for various posts is prescribed by the UGC
(UGC 2010, 32–36) and incorporated into the statutes and ordinances
of the universities and institutes. The UGC has also given guidelines for
making the selection methodology transparent, objective, and credible.
The scoring system—developed by the UGC, based on the Academic
Performance Indicator—gives a quantitative dimension to the selection
procedure (UGC 2010, tables I–IX of appendix III).
Since the number of applicants far exceeds the number of vacancies,
some universities and institutes set up a screening committee to short-
list the candidates to be called for interview. To avoid applicants stalling
the selection process—in state universities, by invoking legal interven-
tion on the grounds that they have not been called for interview—all
applicants fulfilling the minimum qualifications for the post are called
for such a consultation. The process in such universities goes on for sev-
eral days, and most often it is carried out as a ritual to satisfy the judicial
requirements. Some universities and institutes examine candidates—by
telephone or via teleconference.
To make the system more credible and efficient, some central universi-
ties and institutes, and all institutions of national importance, assess the
candidates’ teaching ability and/or research aptitude through a seminar
or classroom lecture. Institutions vary widely in the procedures adopted,
but such test seminars/lectures are held outside the purview of the selec-
tion committee. The faculty may give their feedback to the selection
committee, on the suitability of the candidates, and rank them based
on their performance. So as not to bias the selection committee, such a
feedback is provided only after the interviews are concluded.
Appointments to the posts of assistant professor and associate pro-
fessor are invariably made through interviews. While appointment to
a professor’s post is generally made through interviews, in exceptional
cases a scholar may be invited to the position. However, such invi-
tees must already hold a professorship in another institution, and the
decision to invite somebody as a professor will have to be made by
a duly constituted selection committee. Scouting for talent is a rare
106 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

occurrence in higher education institutions in India and is confined to

some institutions of national importance.
While the elaborate guidelines—suggested by the UGC—underline
the importance of transparency and credibility in recruiting to teaching
positions, in actual practice rules are bent and appointments are often
manipulated and fixed. Not infrequently, complaints of favoritism,
nepotism, and corruption are raised, even as most institutions go
through the process of recruitment with a veneer of legality and fair-
ness. In any direct recruitment to professor’s or associate professor’s
posts, those already working in the institution have an advantage.
Often, the drama of recruitment is enacted only to legitimize the
appointment of internal candidates to higher positions. Unsuspecting
applicants from outside the institution fall prey to such legitimization
exercises. Similarly, in many institutions there are opportunities for
backdoor entry into the academic profession for candidates who may
only be marginally qualified. Such candidates are first appointed as ad
hoc assistant professors and given an opportunity to gain experience.
At the interview, the chairperson of the selection committee (the vice-
chancellor, director, or the president of the governing body) pleads the
person’s case, and generally the external experts are obliging. Selecting
candidates on extraneous considerations or through dubious methods
often results in charges of nepotism and corruption in public-funded
institutions.
By law, appointment to teaching positions in public-funded insti-
tutions is open to all citizens of the country. However, in most state
universities and colleges, candidates from the state are preferred since
they are familiar with local realities and the regional language. This
system has had the inadvertent consequences of limiting mobility
among teachers and deleterious inbreeding within the institutions.
With the career-advancement scheme now in place (see below), teach-
ers no longer have an incentive to move from one institution to
another, let alone from one place to another. Thus, most academics
in India retire from the university or college in which they began
their career.
Some institutions of national importance—like the IITs and the
Indian Institutes of Management—follow a pool system for recruit-
ment. The qualifications for various teaching positions are posted on
the institute’s website, and the candidates can submit their applications
all through the year. If the institute needs faculty for some departments,
it will scrutinize the applications and interview the candidates. Thus, the
institute can wait for suitable candidates to apply for the post, instead
 N. Jayaram 107

of mechanically going through the process of selection and appointing

the best among the least suitable candidates.
The above system seems to be working well for the top Indian
Institutes of Management, notwithstanding the general shortage of well-
qualified teachers in the country. The best among them (i.e., those in
Ahmedabad, Bangalore, and Kolkata) have been able not only to recruit
the best among the available talent but also to retain them. The same
cannot be said of the ten Indian Institutes of Management established
in recent years; they face the same problem as central universities in
finding well-qualified candidates for faculty positions.
The story is different in IITs. Even the best among them have been
facing difficulty in recruiting well-qualified faculty, and more than half
of the faculty positions in these recently established institutes have
remained unfilled. This is because core engineering jobs in industry
are preferred by graduates rather than academic appointments. For
instance, in 2010, only 37 (3.82%) of the 969 IIT–Bombay graduates,
including several with doctorates, opted for teaching jobs, down from
50 in 2009 (Times News Network 2011a, 4). This is because “the aver-
age MTech and PhD salary is lower than the average BTech salary in
India”—an irony highlighted by Rangan Banerjee and Vinayak Muley
in their 2005/2006 report on technology and engineering education in
the country (cited in Chhapla 2011, 5).
The private universities and unaided private colleges are not bound
by any formal guidelines for recruitment to teaching positions. They are
not obliged to advertise their vacancies, and their advertisements are fru-
gal on details. Their recruitment procedures are not transparent. Since
they are de facto (though not de jure) for-profit institutions, the finan-
cial part of the institution interest outweighs quality considerations.
Even so, some of the private universities—like the Amity University,
Azim Premji University, and Symbiosis University—have proclaimed
their commitment to quality in higher education. Given the type of
resources that some of the private universities have been able to mobi-
lize, they seem to have greater elbow room in the matter of scouting
for talent and selection of high-quality teaching faculty. Incidentally, as
private enterprises, they are not encumbered by the policy of protective
discrimination.

Terms of appointment

In public-funded institutions, once the recommendation of the

selection committee is approved by the executive body of the university/
108 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

institute, a letter offering the appointment and terms thereof is sent to

the selected candidate. The person needs to communicate (in writing),
within 30 days of receiving the letter, her/his willingness to accept the
appointment and indicate the probable date of reporting for duty. Under
special conditions and on request, this date can be extended at the dis-
cretion of the institution. In case the selected candidate does not accept
the offer or does not report for duty within the stipulated period, the
offer is treated as withdrawn, and the next candidate in the waiting list
is offered the post. The list of selected candidates is valid for six months,
after which the post again needs to be advertised.
In some state universities, the recommendations of the selection
committee—as approved by the executive body—must be ratified by the
chancellor, who is the governor of the state. The appointments at grant-
in-aid private colleges need to be approved by the state government’s
department of education. Appointments to teaching positions in the
government-run colleges are made by a statutory authority, called the
state public-service commission.
The terms of appointment are specified in the appointment order, and
they are enforceable in a court of law. Among other things, the order
specifies the payment in the pay band (on the salary scale) relating to
the post, and other allowances and benefits, as allowed by the rules of
the government, which are adopted by the institution. Generally, in the
universities, there is no negotiation on salary or other benefits. But, dur-
ing the interview, the candidate can make a case for a higher starting
income. If convinced, the selection committee may recommend a max-
imum 15 per cent increase. By and large, the appointment orders are
uniform for different positions, excepting the item on payment.
In private universities, theoretically, the terms of appointment are
negotiable. In reality, however, such negotiations take place only for
faculty of high caliber or faculty in narrow fields of specialization. Thus,
private institutions have the autonomy to compete for faculty and can
use better salaries, fringe benefits, reduced teaching obligations, research
subsidies, and further factors to make a more attractive offer than one
by other similar or public-funded institutions. Some of them do have
the financial resources for this. As a result, public-funded institutions
are occasionally at a disadvantage. However, private institutions can
hardly match the employment security, career advancement, and grad-
uated increase in salary, or other statutory benefits, on offer in public-
funded institutions. Not surprisingly, public-funded institutions, espe-
cially those funded directly by the Ministry of Human Resources Devel-
opment/UGC are the best bet for aspirants to an academic profession.
 N. Jayaram 109

While announcing the revised salary scales in 2008, the UGC (UGC
2010, 60) prescribed a workload of 40 hours a week during 30 working
weeks (180 teaching days) in an academic year for teachers with full-
time appointments. Moreover, teachers are required to be available in
the university department/center or college, as the case may be, for at
least five hours daily. The number of contact (teaching-learning process)
hours for an assistant professor is 16 and for associate professor and
professor, 14. Professors who are actively involved in extension activities
and administration gain a concession of 2 hours.
Since the grant-in-aid colleges are dependent on government funds,
they enforce workload norms strictly; and teachers with inadequate
workload are required to teach in another college to complete it. If in
any subject the workload falls well below the prescribed 16 hours, it is
farmed out to part-time teachers. Due to paucity of financial resources,
especially since the introduction of new pay scales, many state govern-
ments across the country have imposed an embargo on recruitment to
teaching positions in universities. The state universities are permitted to
recruit teachers only if they justify the need in terms of the necessity
for more teaching. Central universities, centrally funded deemed-to-be
universities, and institutions of national importance, however, do not
observe the UGC prescriptions. There is no standardized workload in pri-
vate universities, and the workload in private colleges is exploitatively
higher than in grant-in-aid colleges.
The main responsibility of college teachers is to teach the prescribed
curriculum to the students and prepare them for examinations con-
ducted by the university. Besides teaching, university teachers are also
required to be engaged in research. Only in a few university depart-
ments/centers and institutions of national importance is the primary
emphasis on research. Thus, publication as an academic activity is
more characteristic of university teachers than college teachers; and a
college teacher being engaged in research and publication is commend-
able. Often this enables the teacher to move to a university, pursue
her/his research interests, and improve her/his career prospects. In pri-
vate universities, the emphasis is almost exclusively on teaching. In all
universities and colleges, teachers are expected to assist the univer-
sity/college in such administrative activities as processing applications
for admission, counseling students, assisting the conduct of examina-
tions (supervision, invigilation, and evaluation), and participating in
extension, co-curricular and extracurricular activities. Some teachers
perform nonteaching work as a matter of duty; most teachers avoid it,
if they can.
110 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

Career advancement

For several decades, the job performance of teachers in higher education

institutions remained unevaluated, and any attempt at evaluation was
either resisted or done perfunctorily. Only in government-run colleges
were confidential reports of teachers written by their principals and filed
in their service registers. In universities and institutes, teachers on pro-
bation were confirmed, generally, on the basis of confidential reports by
the head/chairperson of the department; or the dean, if the teacher was
the head/chairperson of the department. However, as part of the pack-
age of pay revision and increases, performance evaluation of teachers in
all public-funded universities and colleges has been introduced.
It is now mandatory that, in public-funded universities, institutes,
and colleges, a service agreement has to be executed between the insti-
tution and the teacher at the time of recruitment. The self-appraisal
and performance-based-appraisal methodology is included in this agree-
ment. Henceforth, the appointment or promotion to associate profes-
sor’s and professor’s positions will be based on a minimum score, as
stipulated in the Academic Performance Indicator.
The UGC (2010, 103–107) has listed three categories of teachers’
contributions for appraisal:

• teaching-, learning-, and evaluation-related activities;

• curricular-, extension-, and professional-development-related activi-
ties;
• research and academic contributions.

For each category, indicators and weights are specified. The institutions
may adopt the template provided by the UGC, or they may devise their
own self-assessment, performance-appraisal forms for teachers in com-
pliance with the Academic Performance Indicator, prescribed by the
UGC. Purely private institutions do not have a mandatory or standard-
ized self-appraisal system. Since this performance-appraisal system has
just been introduced in the university system, it is too early to judge
on its efficacy. But past experience with the UGC’s mandatory measures
(see Jayaram 2003), does not permit optimism, since the UGC, being
a small organization, lacks staff and machinery to oversee hundreds of
universities and thousands of colleges.

Career advancement scheme

The Indian professoriate is pyramidal in structure: there are fewer
positions of professor than of associate professor, and fewer positions
 N. Jayaram 111

Table 4.2 Career advancement scheme for professoriate

Designation Stage Duration of service Academic pay

(level) grade (Rs)

Assistant 1 Entry level (direct recruitment) 6, 000

professor 2 After four years in stage 1 with PhD 7, 000
(bottom) After five years in stage 1 with master
of philosophy
After six years in stage 1 with master’s
3 After five years in stage 2 8, 000
Associate 4 After three years in stage 3 or entry 9, 000
professor level (direct recruitment)
(middle)
Professor (top) 5 After three years in stage 4 or entry 10, 000
level (direct recruitment)
6 After ten years in stage 5 12, 000

Note: All promotions under the CAS are subject to the candidate obtaining a minimum score
as stipulated in the Academic Performance Indicator. US$1.00 = Rs 50.00.
Source: Adapted from UGC (2010).

of associate professor than of assistant professor. Not all members enter-

ing the academic profession at the associate professor’s level can hope to
become a professor. To improve the opportunities for teachers to move
up the career ladder, and as an incentive to performance, the Career
Advancement Scheme has been introduced. The scheme envisages six
stages in a teacher’s career, spread across three levels: an entry-level
assistant professor (stage 1) can move up through two successive stages
(stages 2 and 3); an associate professor (stage 4) can move up to stage
5; and a professor (stage 5) can move up to stage 6 (see Table 4.2). It is
not possible for a teacher to jump stages under the Career Advancement
Scheme.
To be eligible for promotion under the Career Advancement Scheme,
a minimum score, as stipulated in the Academic Performance Indica-
tor, has to be obtained. How soon an entry-level assistant professor can
move to stage two depends on whether she/he possesses a PhD degree
(four years of service), a master of philosophy degree (five years of ser-
vice), or only a master’s degree in the subject (six years of service).
An assistant professor who has completed five years of service at stage
two is eligible to move to stage three. After completing three years of
service in stage three, she/he will be eligible to move to stage four and
be designated as associate professor.
112 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

An associate professor, completing three years of service in stage four

and possessing a PhD degree in the relevant discipline, is eligible to
be appointed and designated as professor and be placed in stage five.
A professor with ten years of teaching and research experience in that
position will be eligible for promotion to stage six, without any change
in the designation. Promotion from stage five to six is applicable only to
professors in university departments, and it is restricted to 10 per cent
of the positions of professor in a university.
Under the Career Advancement Scheme, promotions from stage one
to two and two to three are conducted by a screening-cum-evaluation
committee. However, promotions from stage three to four (i.e., from
assistant professor to associate professor), from stage four to five (i.e.,
from associate professor to professor), and from stage five to six (i.e., at
the professor level) are made by a duly constituted selection committee,
whose composition is the same as the selection committee for direct
recruitment to associate professor and professor positions.
The process of promotion should be initiated by the teacher through
an application and duly completed Performance Based Appraisal Sys-
tem form as per the Academic Performance Indicator, in response to
the notification issued (twice a year) by the university. The process
needs to be completed within six months, from the date of appli-
cation. Candidates who fail the selection process can be reassessed
only after one year. The promotion will be effective after a minimum
period of eligibility (see Table 4.2), in case of candidates being suc-
cessful in the first attempt and from the date on which a teacher
is successfully reassessed, in case of others. Promotion under the
Career Advancement Scheme being personal to the incumbent teacher,
the substantive sanctioned post will be restored on that teacher’s
superannuation.
The newly introduced Career Advancement Scheme is well-defined
and more rigorous than the erstwhile Merit Promotion Scheme, which
had almost been reduced to a time-bound promotion scheme—under
which teachers were indiscriminately promoted to higher levels, based
only on the number of years of service they performed. But India is
a land of great rituals; only time will tell if the Career Advancement
Scheme will live up to its expectations or will also be as diluted as its
predecessor, the Merit Promotion Scheme (Jayaram 2003). Incidentally,
seldom does one come across the case of a teacher, in a public-funded
higher education institution, who has been dismissed from service as
a result of poor performance. Thus, the university system in India is a
haven for mediocrity.
 N. Jayaram 113

Incidentally, student feedback is not taken into consideration

in performance appraisals of teachers for the Career Advancement
Scheme (nor was it under the Merit Promotion Scheme). Some centrally
funded deemed-to-be universities and institutions of national impor-
tance obtain student feedback on curriculum and teaching, but such
feedback is not a formal part of the performance appraisal of teachers.
Given that private universities are fairly new institutions in India, little
is known about their performance-appraisal practices. However, student
feedback apparently influences the renewal of teachers’ contracts in
those universities.
Generally, in higher education institutions in India, incumbent teach-
ers have no voice or influence in the recruitment or promotion of
teachers. It is rare for a vice-chancellor or dean to seek the informal
opinion of teachers on matters of appointment. In institutions where
candidates for selection give a lecture or present a seminar, the feedback
of teachers is provided to the selection committee; such feedback, how-
ever, is not binding on the selection committee, and it does not carry
much weight, either.

Salaries: constituent components

Salaries and service conditions for teachers in universities and col-

leges are fixed by the UGC, as approved by the Ministry of Human
Resources Development. Central universities and centrally funded insti-
tutes adopt these salaries and service conditions in totality, with effect
from the stipulated date. The state governments, however, adopt them
with modifications regarding the age of superannuation (retirement)
and allowances, the date of implementation of the new salaries, and the
payment of arrears, which may accrue due to the delay in implementa-
tion. The ministry fixes the salaries and service conditions of teachers
in institutions of national importance—the Indian Institute of Science,
Bangalore; IITs; Indian Institutes of Management; and others.
The gross monthly salary of a teacher consists of five components:

• the amount in the salary range: assistant professor, Rs 15,600–39,100

(US$312–782); associate professor, Rs 37,400–67,000 ($748–1,340);
professor Rs 37,400–67,000 (US$748–1,340)8 ;
• academic grade pay;
• transport allowance;
• dearness allowance (cost of living)9 ;
• house rental allowance.
114 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

Table 4.3 Salaries of university faculty, as on August 1, 2010

Pay details Rank

Professor Associate professor Assistant

professor

Top of salary band

Payment 67, 000 67, 000 39, 100
Grade payment 10, 000 9, 000 6, 000
Transport allowance 3, 200 3, 200 3, 200
Dearness allowance 28, 070 27, 720 16, 905
House rental allowance 23, 100 22, 800 11, 910
Gross salary 131, 370 129, 720 77, 115
Middle of salary band
Payment 55, 000 52, 200 27, 350
Grade payment 10, 000 9, 000 6, 000
Transport allowance 3, 200 3, 200 3, 200
Dearness allowance 23, 870 22, 540 12, 793
House rental allowance 19, 500 18, 360 10, 005
Gross salary 111, 570 102, 420 59, 348
Bottom of salary band
Payment 43, 000 37, 400 15, 600
Pay grade 10, 000 9, 000 6, 000
Transport allowance 3, 200 3, 200 3, 200
Dearness allowance 19, 670 17, 360 8, 680
House rental allowance 15, 900 13, 920 6, 480
Gross salary 91, 770 80, 880 39, 960

Note: All figures in Indian rupees; approximately, US$1.00 = Rs 50.00.

Source: Adapted from UGC (2010).

The gross salary drawn by different cadres of teachers at the top, mid-
dle, and bottom levels of the income scale are shown in Table 4.3. Being
in the higher ranges of income, all teachers in higher education insti-
tutions now pay graduated income tax (10%, 20%, or 30%), depending
on the band in which their gross income falls after taking advantage of
tax concessions and incentives for saving. In public-funded institutions,
payment of income tax can hardly be evaded, as it is the employer’s
responsibility to deduct income tax from the employees’ salaries.
In public-funded institutions, irrespective of the academic field, all
professors are paid similarly. However, in private institutions, teachers
are paid differentially, depending upon the demand for and supply of
teachers in particular disciplines. Teachers in institutions of national
importance (like the IITs and the Indian Institutes of Management) are
 N. Jayaram 115

paid marginally better salaries. Even among public-funded institutions,

teachers in centrally funded institutions gain relatively higher gross
salaries than those in state-funded institutions. In many states, trans-
port allowance is not paid; and the house rental allowance is fixed as
per state government rates, which are invariably lower than the central
government rates.
Over decades, the gap in salaries between academic and other
professions has narrowed considerably. Nevertheless, professionals in
the management, information and communications technology, and
biotechnology sector, well-established advocates, chartered accoun-
tants/financial consultants; and medical practitioners/surgeons earn
considerably more than teachers. However, in India, regarding teach-
ers’ salaries, the general comparison is with that of the bureaucrats; and
the salaries of these two are now more or less comparable, though the
bureaucrats receive better perquisites.
There is a minimum salary for each level of the professoriate, irre-
spective of the department of study—though the minimum gross salary
may vary between central government–funded institutions and state-
funded institutions, and between universities in general and institutions
of national importance. In fact, the UGC has fixed the remuneration
even for part-time teachers and guest faculty. To ensure transparency
and avoid cheating by grant-in-aid private institutions, the salary of
teachers is credited to their bank accounts. In contrast, there is no
minimum income in purely private universities and colleges. Their
salary scales and allowances are not advertised. Most of these institu-
tions are evasive on salary matters; many of them pay their teachers
in cash.
In all public-funded institutions, teachers are entitled to gain an
annual increase of 3 per cent on their basic salary. Stoppage or defer-
ment of increments is viewed as a punishment, and it must be justified
through appropriate disciplinary procedures. Apart from this, teach-
ers get a bigger hike in salary if they are promoted under the Career
Advancement Scheme. There is, however, no negotiation on salary size
or service conditions. In purely private institutions, renegotiation is
possible; most often, such negotiations are to the advantage of the
management.
On average, the professoriate’s salaries and service conditions are
revised once in ten years, and it generally takes place along with
those of the central government employees. Parallel to the commission
appointed by the central government to recommend payment revi-
sion for its employees, the Ministry of Human Resources Development
116 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

appoints a committee to recommend pay revision for teachers in public-

funded institutions. The committee holds wide-ranging consultations,
with various stakeholders—teachers’ unions, educational administra-
tors, management, experts on higher education, and so on—before
arriving at its recommendations. The committee’s recommendations are
examined by the government (the Ministry of Human Resources Devel-
opment and the Ministry of Finance), before they are approved by the
cabinet of ministers. On approval, the Ministry of Human Resources
Development advises the UGC to go ahead with the implementation of
the revision.
Once the UGC issues the notification, the revisions are instantly
implemented by the centrally funded institutions. The implementation
of the revisions by the state governments is not uniform; sometimes,
the basic structure is accepted but specific allowances are truncated. As a
consequence, there are variations in the gross emoluments of teachers
in different parts of the country, as well as the same teaching position
across the different types of institutions, in a given city. In some states,
the recommendations—even in their truncated form—are implemented
only after prolonged agitation by teachers.
Overall, academics in public-funded universities and colleges now
lead a comfortable middle-class lifestyle, based on the salaries they are
paid. Housing and travel allowances are additional components of the
salary. Inflation in the economy—that is, the rise in cost of living—is
also addressed through biannual revision of the dearness allowance, as
noted earlier. Also, no difference exists in salary scales among academics
in different faculties: those teaching English or mathematics get paid the
same as their counterparts teaching Urdu or history. Since the pay scales
are now uniform across the country, though with minor interstate dif-
ferences, the quality of life of academics living in small towns has also
improved. For teachers in purely private universities and colleges, the
story is different; market conditions rule here, and there are large salary
differentials—in terms of the disciplines and the qualifications of the
teachers. In some private institutions, the salaries are exploitative. In all
institutions, part-time teachers are invariably worse off.

Non-salary and service-related benefits

For the Indian professoriate, salary is the most important component

of income. It constitutes the key element in attracting faculty. Location
of the university/college, reputation of the institution, availability of
facilities for research, and other factors could also be influential for the
 N. Jayaram 117

few who have a choice. The non-salary benefits that teachers obtain
are all as per government provisions, and they have no bearing on the
choice of teaching as a career or of a particular institution.
For those who were appointed to permanent positions before January
2004, the government superannuation pension scheme (for life and
with survival benefit to the spouse)10 was an attraction. In fact, many
teachers, who had in the 1970s subscribed to a contributory provident
fund scheme, switched over to the pension scheme when the option was
given for the last time in the mid-1980s. Those appointed to permanent
positions since January 2004 must contribute 10 per cent of their basic
income to the pension fund, and the government makes a matching
contribution.
Teachers in public-funded institutions are also eligible for a gratuity—
a British colonial legacy, under which a sum of money is paid to an
employee at the end of a period of employment. A retirement gratuity
is due to all employees who retire after completion of at least five years
of service—at the rate of one-fourth of the payment for each completed
six-month period of qualifying service, to a maximum of 16.5 times or
one million rupees (US$200,000). Theoretically, someone retiring after
20 years can collect this gratuity and accept a job in the private sec-
tor. Practically, however, teachers would not leave a permanent job that
carries so many supplementary benefits (see below), unless the private
sector offered a substantially attractive package or on health grounds.
Death gratuities are payable to the teacher’s nominee, in cases where
the teacher dies while in service; its rate varies, depending upon the ser-
vice put in by the teacher. However, it cannot exceed one million rupees
(US$200,000). The nominee will also get a one-off payment at the time
of death, amounting to two months pay.
Teachers are eligible for a variety of paid leave, but none of them can
be taken as a matter of right. There are also restrictions on the combina-
tion of different types of leaves. Every academic year, a teacher can take
eight days of casual leave (to meet exigencies), and this leave cannot be
accumulated. She/he can have one day of earned/privilege leave for 11
days of work, and this leave can be accumulated to a maximum of 300
days. Part of this leave can be exchanged for additional payment—once
in two years or fully at the time of superannuation/retirement. The most
attractive aspect of the academic profession is the fully paid vacation
leave of eight weeks per year.
Female teachers get a maximum of one year’s fully paid maternity
leave during their career, and their spouses get a maximum of 15 days
fully paid paternity leave for each child born (for not more than two
118 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

children). Besides maternity leave, female teachers are entitled to two

years’ fully paid childcare leave, provided they have exhausted all other
leaves to their credit. This leave can be taken at any time, until the child
reaches 18 years of age; it can be split between two children.
Teachers can benefit from travel concessions (return fare for self and
dependents)—once in two years—by using their vacation or applying for
leave to go on a holiday in India. In lieu of this, teachers hailing from
outside the vicinity of their workplace can receive home travel conces-
sions to visit their home town (as declared at the start of the job). The
amount paid by the university or college toward such travel is taxable.
Teachers are eligible for medical leave and medical assistance, for
themselves and their dependents. They are entitled to the use of central-
or state-government health-service facilities. In lieu of this, some insti-
tutions have extended medical insurance coverage to teachers, or they
reimburse medical expenses up to a particular amount. To check misuse
of this facility (by the hospitals, insurance companies, and teachers),
there are elaborate norms governing medical assistance.
As part of their salary, teachers are given a percentage of the basic
amount as house rental allowance, depending on the location of the
university/college. According to the Indian government’s classification,
those in category A cities (e.g., Bangalore, Chennai, Delhi, Hyderabad,
Mumbai, and Kolkata) receive 30 per cent; those in category B cities (e.g.,
Ahmedabad, Chandigarh, Jaipur, Lucknow, and Patna), 20 per cent; and
the rest, 10 per cent. In cases where the university provides housing
(no college does), teachers do not obtain house-rental allowance; they
have to pay a small sum as license fees and maintenance charges, and
the electricity and water charges are payable at the rate of consumption.
Housing provided by the university is in great demand, as it pro-
vides residential security and obviates the need to commute. However,
some teachers prefer to stay away from campus, especially if they can
get cheaper accommodation, as they can save some money from their
house-rental allowance. Furthermore, with income-tax rebates given to
those who build houses or buy apartments it is doubly advantageous
to stay out of campus. This choice is exercised particularly by teachers
who have decided to settle down in the city where they work. Besides
house-rental allowance, there are special categories of allowances such as
tribal area allowance, hardship area allowance, island special payment,
and others; but these are applicable in a limited number of institutions.
Before the liberalization of lending by banks, until the mid-1990s, uni-
versities had surplus funds and advanced loans at concessional rates to
teachers for buying or building houses and buying cars.
 N. Jayaram 119

As an incentive for promoting smaller families, male teachers under-

going vasectomy or female teachers undergoing hysterectomy are given
one increment in payment, on production of a certificate from a medi-
cal authority. Such teachers must have one surviving child and not more
than two children. To be eligible for this incentive, the male teacher
must not be over 50 years of age, and his wife must be between 20 and
45 years of age. Similarly, the female teacher must not be over 45 years
of age, and her husband must not be over 50 years of age.
The foregoing non-salary and service benefits are statutory entitle-
ments in public-funded institutions. That is why, once in a permanent
job, generally no teacher would voluntarily retire. These benefits are,
however, a matter of contractual agreement in purely private educa-
tional institutions; in rare cases they will offer a more attractive package
than public-funded educational institutions.

Supplementary employment

A teacher occupying a permanent position in a public-funded univer-

sity or college cannot take up supplementary employment. However,
with the permission of the institution, a teacher can undertake a
teaching assignment in another university/college, as a visiting/guest
faculty for a brief period (by using the 30 days of duty leave to
which they are entitled in a year). The remuneration received for
this work is called an honorarium (not salary) and is liable to tax.
Generally, teachers collect the honorarium in cash and do not dis-
close this in tax returns. Teachers can undertake long-term teaching
assignments in another university/college by using extraordinary leave,
during which period they are not entitled to any salary or increment
benefits. Teachers can use any earned/privilege leave they may have
to their credit (which, however, cannot exceed 300 days) to cover
this period.
The restriction proscribing working in more than one institution
does not apply to part-time teachers. In purely private institutions,
this restriction may be part of the contract. Of late, some universities
and institutes have introduced the concept of adjunct faculty, whereby
a teacher anchored in one department/center concurrently holds a
position in another department/center. These universities/institutes
state this provision explicitly in the letter offering the appointment.
Such appointments are a matter of administrative convenience (e.g.,
to balance workload), and they do not carry any benefits in pay or
allowances. Universities and institutes running a self-financing diploma
120 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

or certificate programs pay a separate honorarium to teachers, if the

teaching is done outside the normal working hours.
The percentage of university teachers doing consultancy work is neg-
ligible, and consultancy is largely unknown in colleges. Professors in
science, technology, and management departments in universities and
teachers in institutions of national importance do consultancy work.
Teachers in social sciences and humanities departments seldom obtain
consultancy work. Where consultancy is permitted, there are clear
guidelines governing the duration of the teacher’s engagement, and the
sharing of fees accruing from it.
One source of additional income for some college teachers (rarely for
university teachers) is private tuition. Since they are formally employed
in full-time permanent positions, this raises the question of profes-
sional ethics (Jayaram 2003). Private tuition—especially for science and
mathematics courses and in the English language—has now become
such a profitable enterprise that some reputed college teachers have
taken voluntary retirement or resigned from their college jobs to devote
themselves to it full-time.
Moonlighting (holding a second job) by university and college teach-
ers is not totally unknown. Some teachers undertake consultancy,
run insurance or transport agencies, or even become involved in
retail trade. To circumvent institutional regulations, these activities are
mostly done in their spouse’s name. Another source of supplemen-
tary income for a few college teachers is writing guidebooks (in a
question-answer format) on behalf of students appearing for university
examinations.

International faculty

By law, universities in India can only appoint Indian citizens to teaching

positions. Non-citizens can, however, work in Indian universities as vis-
iting professors, under specific exchange programs. Given the pressure
for expansion of higher education institutions and acute shortage of
well-qualified faculty, especially in institutions of national importance,
the appointment of foreign nationals to teaching positions has now
become inevitable. To start with, the IITs have been permitted to appoint
foreign nationals (including non-resident Indians who have changed
their nationality) on a contract basis for up to five years. A proposal to
open up teaching positions to foreign nationals is now under the con-
sideration of the government. If approved, the citizenship act will have
to be amended.
 N. Jayaram 121

Conclusion

India has one of the largest and most diverse systems of higher edu-
cation in the world. Not surprisingly, the diversities in this country’s
higher education institutions are reflected in the varying systems and
practices of recruitment of the professoriate and its remuneration pack-
ages. The institutions of national importance (like the Indian Institutes
of Science, IITs, and Indian Institutes of Management) have developed
the most effective systems and best practices of recruitment, even as
they work under the broad regulations of the central government. They
also pay higher gross salaries and offer better service conditions. Closely
following them are the well-established central universities and cen-
trally funded university-level institutes, which come under the umbrella
of the UGC.
But the vast majority of teaching positions are in state universi-
ties and their affiliated grant-in-aid colleges. For teachers working in
these universities and colleges, salary and allied benefits could not be
upgraded. As yet, it is unclear how much the quality of teachers in these
institutions would improve in the light of the attractive pay packages
now available and the rigorous conditions stipulated for their career
advancement. However, previous experience with well-intentioned pol-
icy measures and programs of the UGC does not promote full optimism.
Regarding purely private universities and colleges, the vagaries of the
higher education market will continue to mediate their recruitment
practices and remuneration packages. Yet, if private universities hope
to carve a niche for themselves in higher education, they will need to
improve on the current offers from centrally funded institutions. Only
then will they be able to attract the candidates with the best teaching
and research talents. This is what some private institutions, backed by
leading industrial houses and committed academic administrators, aim
to achieve. But it will take some time before their efforts will bear fruit.
They, too, can hardly ignore the general economic and political con-
ditions in which the higher education system is set to function in the
country.
The political dynamics in India, as they impact on higher educa-
tion, warrant some observations. According to the federal constitution
of India, higher education is in the concurrent list—that is, an area
in which both the central Parliament and state legislative assemblies
can enact legislation and initiate policies. The constraints under which
central and state governments engage in higher education are differ-
ent. While the central government has to address long-term, all-India,
122 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

and international issues, regarding policy matters, state governments

need to address short-term, region-specific, and populist issues. The two
obviously do not gel. The central government is also beset by the con-
straints of coalition politics, in which the coalition partners on whom
the main ruling party is dependent often hinder policymaking. Thus,
successive governments, since the 1990s, have dithered on key policy
issues in higher education.
Corruption is another big constraining factor affecting higher educa-
tion in India. With a score of 3.3 out of 10, India (along with Albania,
Jamaica, and Liberia) ranks 87 among 178 countries in the Corrup-
tion Perception Index (i.e., perceived levels of corruption in the public
sector), computed by Transparency International (2011, 79–80). The
general malaise of corruption, a big issue in the country today, has not
left the sphere of higher education untouched. Stories of corruption in
higher education abound; permission to start colleges (or universities
in the state) and granting of affiliation, fixing of intake, and appoint-
ment of principals (or vice-chancellors in universities) and teachers—all
aspects appear susceptible to corruption and nepotism.
Another dimension of corruption, related to higher education, is the
fraudulent practices indulged by academics. In the rat race for advance-
ment in an academic career, teachers have increasingly resorted to such
practices. A study by T. A. Abinandanan of the Indian Institute of Science
(Bangalore) has found that, in India, the rate of scientific misconduct
has risen from 10 per 100,000 papers during 1991–2000 to 44 per
100,000 papers during 2001–2010 (Yousaf 2011).11 Academics guilty of
this misconduct “are not only from lower-tier institutions, but also from
top institutions in India,” including national-level laboratories, a central
university, and an IIT (Yousaf 2011). That there has been a drop in the
number of reported scientific misconduct cases since 2007 is, no doubt,
good news.12 However, a scary scenario among state universities, whose
faculty mostly publish in Indian journals, is that these institutions have
no formal monitoring systems yet.
Finally, given the rapid expansion of higher education institutions
and the imminent entry of foreign educational establishments into the
country, the competition for well-qualified and experienced faculty is
sure to increase. Only institutions offering the best remuneration and
service conditions can expect to gain the best teaching talent. Viewed in
this light, the prospects for state universities and grant-in-aid colleges,
which constitute the largest segment of the higher education system in
the country, do not appear to be bright.
Thus, for observers who have been inspecting the higher educa-
tion scenario, the prospects appear to be mixed. Like the proverbial
 N. Jayaram 123

elephant, higher education in India will trudge on, with incremen-

tal improvements here and tinkering of the system there. But, hopes
of any significant change in the next decade or so will remain san-
guine. The changes introduced in 2006—for recruitment of teachers,
their pay scales and service conditions, their performance appraisal and
career advancement, and further trends—are bold and forward looking.
What impact these changes will have on the academic profession, in
particular, and higher education, in general, remains a question.

Notes
1. The Indian Institutes of Management (13 in all), which have established
a niche for themselves in graduate business education and assist industry
through research and consultancy, are not granted the status of institutions
of national importance. These institutes are not authorized to award degrees
as universities do; they award diplomas and fellowships that are considered
equal to degrees and doctorates awarded by the universities. A recommen-
dation for enacting legislation to allow the Indian Institutes of Management
to award degrees without any erosion of their existing autonomy, made by a
committee headed by Professor Madhava N. Menon, has been placed before
the Ministry of Human Resources Development (Seshagiri 2011).
2. The Indian Parliament is yet to legislate on private universities. Meanwhile,
invoking the existing legal provisions (e.g., the UGC Act), several private
institutions of higher education have been given deemed-to-be-university
status. The controversy resulting from this is now before the Supreme Court
of India. Also, considering that higher education is a concurrent subject
under the constitution, some states have enacted legislation for establishing
private universities.
3. Reliable data on part-time teachers are hard to come by. As early as in
1983, the National Commission on Teachers (NCT 1985) found that only
70.7 per cent of university teachers and 68.5 per cent of college teachers
had permanent employment with all statutory benefits. Given the restricted
appointments to teaching positions on a permanent basis in most states,
since the introduction of a structural readjustment program in the 1990s,
the percentage of part-time teachers has increased considerably.
4. In institutions of national importance—such as the Indian Institute of Sci-
ence (Bangalore) and the IITs—a fourth level, namely, assistant professor
(to be recruited on contractual basis)—was introduced in September 2009.
This assistant professor position is not part of the regular faculty cadres in
these institutes, and appointment to this position is made on contractual
basis to enable bright, young doctorate-degree holders to teach and earn
experience in premier institutions. It is stipulated that at least 10 per cent of
the total faculty strength should be recruited at this level.
5. In academic fields—such as engineering and technology, medicine and
pharmacy, management/business administration, occupational therapy and
physiotherapy, physical education, music and performing arts, and others—
special qualifications are prescribed for different levels of teaching staff (UGC
2010, 4–36).
124 India: Streamlining the Academic Profession

6. The National Eligibility Test, jointly conducted by the UGC and the Council
for Scientific and Industrial Research at about 90 centers in the country, is
held twice a year. Many state governments have been permitted by the UGC
to conduct a State Level Eligibility Test, which is treated as equivalent to the
National Eligibility Test. In some states, to cope with various demands, the
standard of the State Level Eligibility Test has been so appallingly diluted and
the norms so brazenly flouted that the UGC has had to withdraw permission
for the state to conduct it (Jayaram 2003).
7. This odd percentage is explained by the fact that the Supreme Court of
India has ruled that reservation shall not exceed 50 per cent of the total
posts. In states like Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, populist politics has pushed
reservations beyond this limit, and the matter is now before the Supreme
Court.
8. Although the pay band is the same for associate professors and professors,
the former start at the bottom of the pay band (i.e., Rs 37,400 or US$748) and
the latter start at a higher level in the pay band (i.e., Rs 43,000 or US$860).
9. The dearness (expensiveness, in British English) allowance is intended to
compensate for inflation; and it is revised twice a year (in January and July,
respectively), based on the price index (100 points as on January 1, 2006).
As on July 1, 2011, it was 51 per cent of payment.
10. A superannuation pension is given to an employee of a public-funded
institution after she/he has completed the required number of years of
service—that is, on superannuation. This is different from a retiring pen-
sion, which is given to an employee who retires voluntarily or is prematurely
retired (as a punitive action) and is proportionate to the service that she/he
has put in, subject to a minimum. The maximum pension that a superannu-
ating/retiring teacher can get is 50 per cent of the highest basic pay drawn.
Dearness allowance is permissible on pension, but at a reduced rate.
11. According to Abinandanan, as many as 70 out of 103,434 papers published
during 2001–2010 have been retracted, 45 of them for text, self- or data pla-
giarism. These 45 papers “had over 130 authors; and 12 authors had at least
three (overlapping) retractions due to misconduct” (cited in Yousaf 2011,
1). Internationally, the rate of retraction is 17 for 100,000 papers: in compar-
ison, China (48) and South Korea (44) have a higher rate of retraction; and
Japan (16), United States (14), and United Kingdom (13) have a lower rate of
retraction (Yousaf 2011).
12. Abinandanan surmises that this may be due to “the real reduction in the
number of misconduct cases”; more plausibly, an increasing number of inter-
national journals have begun using plagiarism detection software to screen
papers submitted for publication (cited in Yousaf 2011, 11).

References
Agarwal, P. 2009. Indian higher education: Envisioning the future. New Delhi: Sage.
Altbach, P. G., and N. Jayaram. 2010. Can India garner the demographic
dividend? Hindu, December 1.
Chhapla, H. 2011. IITs’ PhD jinx: BTechs command higher pay. Times of India,
July 30.
 N. Jayaram 125

Jayaram, N. 1993. The language question in higher education: Trends and issues.
In Higher education reform in India: Experience and perspectives, eds. S. Chitnis and
P. G. Altbach, 84–114. New Delhi: Sage.
——–. 2003. The fall of the guru: The decline of the academic profession in India.
In The decline of the guru: The academic profession in developing and middle-income
countries, ed. P. G. Altbach, 119–230. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
——–. 2007. Beyond retailing knowledge: Prospects of research-oriented univer-
sities in India. In World class worldwide: Transforming research universities in Asia
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Hopkins University Press.
——–2009. Beyond demographic dividend: Some aspects of the sociology of
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——–. 2010. Disparities in access to higher education in India: Persistent issues
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national perspectives, ed. F. Lazin, M. Evans, and N. Jayaram, 161–181. Lanham,
MD: Lexington Books.
——–. 2011. Toward world-class status? The IIT system and IIT Bombay.
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Seshagiri, Mathang. 2011. It’s time IIMs give degree, not diploma: Panel. Sunday
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india/29492823_1_iim-directors-iim-b-indian-institutes (accessed October 4,
2011).
Tilak, J. B. G. 2004. Absence of policy and perspective in higher education.
Economic and Political Weekly, 39: 2159–2164.
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year. Times of India, July 29.
——–. 2011b. Higher edu short of 54% teachers. Times of India, August 10.
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parency.org./publications/annual_report (accessed October 3, 2011).
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Yousaf, Shamsheer. 2011. India tops in academic fraud. Deccan Herald, August 14.
5
The Chinese Academic Profession:
New Realities
Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo

The Chinese higher education system is the largest in the world, in

terms of student enrollment and faculty numbers. In the coming decade,
the system will continue to grow, especially within the public sector.
While the public sector plays the dominating role, the private sector
faces many challenges for survival and quality control. A national dis-
cussion has been initiated by the private sector regarding the problems
of recruiting students and qualified professors.

The higher education system

After three decades of development, since the early 1980s, the Chinese
higher education system has become the largest in the world. In 2009,
the total number of students taking part in higher education nationally
exceeded 28.26 million (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010).
In 2009, the gross enrollment rate was 24.3 per cent. In comparison
with other developed countries, the enrollment rate is low, and there is
still much room for growth. It is predicted that the number of students
in higher education will be 33,500,000 by 2015 and 35,500,000 by 2020;
the gross enrollment rate will be 36 per cent and 40 per cent, respectively
(Ministry of Education 2010). It is easy to predict that in the coming
decade, higher education in China will experience another leap forward.
Most of the increase in student enrollment took place after 1999.
According to the Ministry of Education’s data, in 1978 the total gross
enrollment rate was only 1.59 per cent; and in 1998, it reached
10 per cent. In 1999, many provincial universities increased their num-
ber of students by 30 per cent. Since then, the scale of higher education
in China has expanded notably. In 2002, the gross enrollment rate was
up to 15 per cent (Ministry of Education 2009c). Since then, the number

126
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 127

of graduates at all levels of higher education in China has approximately

quadrupled.
Two important events helped the growth of higher education in
China: first, the presidential call for building world-class universities
at the centennial of Peking University in May 1998; and second, the
mandated increase of enrollment by the Ministry of Education, in 1999.
Then, it was estimated that by 2010 at least 20 per cent of high school
students would be enrolled in some form of higher education institu-
tion. The second goal of increasing the gross enrollment to 20 per cent
was realized before 2010. Now, according to the Outline for Mid- and
Long-Term Higher Education Plan, the gross enrollment rate will reach
40 per cent in just another ten years (by 2020). Chinese higher educa-
tion might make another leap forward, in the coming decade. In order
to provide more access, the system of Chinese higher education has been
diversified with different providers.
Now, Chinese higher education consists of “regular” higher educa-
tion institutions, adult education institutions, Minban higher education
institutions, independent colleges1 and self-study programs by radio
and TV universities. The radio and TV universities could be consid-
ered as the Chinese style of “open university” or continuing education,
administrated by the Ministry of Education. Regular higher education
institutions and adult education institutions are public and controlled
by the ministry, provincial, and local governments. Minban higher edu-
cation institutions and independent colleges are private. In 2012, in the
public higher education sector, there are 1,090 four-year institutions
and 1,215 three-year vocational or technical institutions. These 1,090
institutions include 112 institutions in the 211 Project, and these 112
universities have 49 universities in the 985 Project. The 211 Project is the
Chinese government’s endeavor, launched in 1992, aimed at strength-
ening about 100 higher education institutions and key disciplinary
areas, as the national priority, for the 21st century. The 985 Project
is another project to promote the Chinese higher education system,
prompted by President Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 100th anniversary
of Peking University, on May 4, 1998. The goal of launching such a
program is to have a few world-class universities, and to be globally
competitive.
In China, students who study in three-year colleges cannot transfer
to four-year universities. Thus, only those students in the 1,090 pub-
lic four-year institutions have the opportunity to get bachelor’s degrees,
and the students in the 211- and 985-Project universities would have
easier access to master’s and PhD degree programs. The Academy of
128 The Chinese Academic Profession

Sciences and the Academy of Social Sciences should also be included

as offering master’s- and PhD-level education, because both academies
have graduate programs. The total enrollment of graduates in China is
1,404,942—of which, in 2010, 246,319 students were in PhD programs
and 1,158,623 were in master’s degree programs.
In addition, there are about 1,470 private colleges and universities,
of which 370 institutions are authorized to issue four-year education
certificates, and 39 are authorized to issue bachelor’s degrees. In total,
there are about seven million students studying in private institutions.
China also has a large self-study examination system, and participants
can apply for diplomas or certification through the self-study programs
administrated by the Ministry of Education. Those who pass all the
required examinations could get a qualification equal to a four-year
undergraduate education.
In 1981, China adopted the American style of academic degrees,
which includes bachelor’s, master’s, and PhD degrees. Currently, there
are different professional degrees—with an executive master of business
administration, master of business administration, doctor of education,
and others. In China, as mentioned above, a student usually takes three
years for a technical education, four years for a bachelor’s degree, two
to three years for a master’s degree; and for a PhD degree, it generally
takes another three to four years after the master’s degree. Yet, currently,
only 796 higher education institutions are accredited by the Ministry of
Education to offer graduate degrees.
In terms of finance and governance of Chinese higher education, a
two-level provision is in place for public colleges and universities. The
two-level provision system means the central government is responsible
for policymaking, quality controls, and core funding—mainly research
grants, infrastructure-building capital, basic faculty salary, and subsidies;
and the local governments or provincial governments are responsible for
managing admission, funding, and placement of graduates—in accor-
dance with national policies and laws for local and provincial colleges
and universities.
Currently, the central government provides core funding to the uni-
versities in the 211 and 985 Projects. Since 1998, when the 985 Project
was established, the central government has appropriated additional
funds for the country’s nine leading research universities. Other univer-
sities are partially financed by the central government and by provincial
and local governments.
While China continues to surge onto the global economic stage, it is
undergoing one of the most ambitious higher education expansions in
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 129

the world. However, given the absence of sufficient funds during this fast
growth, many universities have borrowed heavily to pay for expansion.
Many researchers have tried to estimate, but have not yet discovered, the
scale of the debt. Only one 985 Project university in the northeast part
of the country—carrying a debt of US$3 billion, after merging with sev-
eral local colleges and universities—caught the national government’s
attention. The debt problem is not unique to that single university. It is
estimated that the total debt of higher education in Huan province was
US$2.25 billion (at an exchange rate of 6.50 RMB to US$1.00) (Jiang
2010).
Now, there are discussions on how to pay back the loans to the banks;
many suggestions target an increase in national government support to
higher education, and more autonomy for universities to tap different
resources. As a result, in leading research universities, many special pro-
grams now charge higher tuition and fees than for regular programs.
So, commercialization is reflected in many aspects of Chinese academic
life. Faculty working with enterprises and establishing commercialized
labs in university science parks and providing training programs by
collecting fees are some of the fund-raising strategies.

Private higher education

Ownership, governance, and finance of private higher education are

complicated. During the 1980s, Chinese higher education witnessed a
series of reforms. In 1985, a document for higher education reform was
published, noting the boom of private higher education institutions.
In the 1990s, the central government attempted to achieve regional
decentralization or the devolution of authority from central to local gov-
ernment. Local governments received opportunities to develop higher
education institutions, according to local requirements. The introduc-
tion of market forces to China, throughout the 1990s, has resulted
in tuition and fees, more research cooperation with private enter-
prises, and the growth of private colleges. The privatization of Chinese
higher education may indicate two things: the appearance of private
colleges and universities and the commercialized behavior of public
higher education. Currently, public colleges and universities have more
autonomy to generate their own revenue—by operating enterprises,
providing commissioned training, and collecting tuition and fees for
different academic programs. However, major financial support in pub-
lic higher education is still provided by central and local governments.
In Chinese higher education, the term “private” is used to encompass
130 The Chinese Academic Profession

all private institutions. They are called private mainly because of their
financial independence. They are self-financed, mainly through student
tuition and fees, while the central government provides regulations,
requirements, and policies for the development of private colleges and
universities; and provincial governments provide quality controls.
It is worth noting that, in China, the “privatization” of higher edu-
cation inherited from the socialist government is different from the
prevailing notion in the Western world. In essence, in Chinese higher
education, privatization is concerned with the transfer of responsibility,
originally shouldered by central and provincial governments, to the pri-
vate sector; or with a change in the nature of government involvement.
China’s experience certainly differs from much of the world because the
strategies adopted by the Chinese leadership are highly “instrumental”
in terms of creating more educational opportunities in response to the
emerging market needs (Zha 2006).
The rapid expansion of private universities and colleges in China, at
the end of the 20th century, sparked many debates about the nature
and ownership of private higher education institutions. China’s first
national legislation on private education, the Act for Promoting Minban
Education in the People’s Republic of China, was finalized in 2002,
after many years of deliberation. Since the promulgation of this edu-
cation law, more emphasis or attention is given to quality control in
private higher education institutions. Still, most of the private insti-
tutions acknowledge the immense difficulties in competing with their
public counterparts, because public higher education plays a dominant
role in the country.

Reform of the public higher education system

The demand for higher education is immense in China; and while

the higher education system just cannot keep pace with this com-
pelling need, a series of reforms have taken place. According to the
Ministry of Education, five strategies have been implemented: the
reform of education provision, university management, the financing
of higher education institutions, recruitment and job placement, and
finally internal academic management. Among the five reforms, the
changes to the financing of higher education institutions, recruitment
and job-placement, and internal management are of greatest impor-
tance, because they relate directly to hiring and salaries of faculty and
staff. In China, faculty and staff in public higher education institutions
used to be considered as government employees, so they all carried
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 131

official titles. But administrative staff in universities enjoy more senior

titles than academic professors. This means they also have priority over
faculty in accessing the university’s organizational support and admin-
istrative resources. In order to increase academic autonomy and faculty
status, in 2004 Peking University first started personnel reform in the
university in correspondence with other reforms in higher education.
The overall objective of the reform was to harmonize the external
relationships of higher education institutions with government, soci-
ety, and industry; and internal relationships between administrative
staff, faculty, and students. The overall reforms helped to set up a new
system, in which national government is responsible for the overall
planning and macro-management, while the higher education institu-
tions follow the laws and enjoy the autonomy of providing education
according to the needs of society. The personnel reform at Peking Uni-
versity helped to create a supportive environment for faculty to conduct
research, teaching, and other academic activities. Through Peking Uni-
versity’s personnel reform, the tenure system was introduced to Chinese
higher education. Of course, the Chinese personnel reform in higher
education has resulted in a lot of difficulties, but at least the “iron
bowl,” which means lifelong employment for faculty and staff, was
removed. After Peking University’s personnel reform, only full profes-
sors are tenured, and all of the rest of the academic and administrative
staff have contracts.

Academic contracts and faculty hiring

According to the most recent official statistics, in 2009, China had

approximately 2,233,722 faculty and staff in higher education insti-
tutions, in total. Of these, 2,195,647 are in public higher education,
and the rest are in private higher education. Faculty numbers in voca-
tional colleges and private institutions account for approximately 13 per
cent. There are 1,363,531 full-time faculty, of which 1,345,650 are in
public higher education institutions, and 17,881 in private higher edu-
cation institutions. The student–teacher ratio is 18.84 to 1. Among the
401,173 part-time faculty, the 329,528 that are in public higher edu-
cation include 51,519 in adult higher education and 20,126 in private
higher education (Ministry of Education 2009a and b).
Based on those numbers, several things need to be pointed out. First,
most faculty work in the public higher education sector; and second, in
public higher education the faculty to staff ratio is almost 1:1—this indi-
cates that Chinese public universities comprise a large administrative
132 The Chinese Academic Profession

body in university management; third, there are only 141,999 full-time

and 68,019 part-time full professors in China’s whole higher education
system. Of the 141,999 full-time professors, 140,130 work in public insti-
tutions and 1,869 are in private higher education institutions (Ministry
of Education 2009a and b). According to this set of data, full professors
only make up a small proportion of the total faculty in higher education,
and most of them are in the public sector.

Historical change of the employment system

From 1949, in China, all working units including institutions in higher

education have been public; staff and faculty in higher education were
considered as government employees, and all were considered to be in
the same category as civil servants in terms of employment, salary, and
benefits. In society at large, it was said that Chinese workers and civil
servants (then, intellectuals were considered as the working class) were
well protected with three iron bowls: “iron rice bowl” (tiefanwan), “iron
wages,” and “iron chair.” The iron rice bowl means lifetime employ-
ment, the iron wages offer a fixed reward system, and the iron chair
refers to inflexible positions. Another term includes guanbenwei, which
means “official standard.”
Based on the employment system and the official standards, there
was a tradition of inheritance (dingti)—in which jobs could be passed
from parents to children or other members of the family (Warner and
Zhu 2000). Although academic positions could not pass to children,
it was likely that faculty members’ children could easily become reg-
ular employees of the institution. Later on, if the children worked hard
enough or were smart enough to get a degree, they could be promoted
to administrative positions in the universities. This phenomenon shows
something about the problem of less social mobility across sectors in
China at that time.
Prior to the transition from a centrally planned economy to a guided
market economy in the late 1970s, the so-called three-iron-bowls system
prevailed. Under that system, at higher education institutions, quali-
fied employees and academic staff (including all levels of faculty) were
guaranteed lifetime employment—with the “cradle to the grave” wel-
fare, such as medical, educational, and retirement benefits, provided
for workers in governmental enterprises. Wage levels were centrally
controlled.
After economic reform and beginning with the open-door policy in
1978, the lifetime employment (tiefanwan) system has been gradually
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 133

phased out. In the 1990s, with a new, open market economic system,
in which competitiveness and efficiency were emphasized and many
workers in the old industries were laid off in order to increase pro-
ductivity, discussion about reforming the system in higher education
institutions began. Of course, with the serious brain-drain problem in
institutions, reforms could not occur, given the great demand for aca-
demic staff. In institutions, a performance-driven reward system could
only be implemented gradually. Eventually, the employment market
was differentiated through altering the metaphor of the three metal
bowls to: “golden bowls,” (high wages and positions); “silver bowls”
(better salaries); and “iron bowls,” (the lowest salary and social status).
It was after the publication of Decisions on Deepening the Reform of Per-
sonnel System of Higher Education in 1999 by the Ministry of Education in
China, that higher education institutions started to reform regulations
relating to lifelong employment.
Then, a more Western-style, human-resource management system
with contracts was adopted in higher education institutions. All faculty
and staff were required to sign a contract with the university at the turn
of the century, which thus established the contract system. However, it
is still hard for a university to fire faculty members if they are not consid-
ered qualified. Now the contract system prevails in all higher education
institutions, due to an important reform in Peking University.
In 2002, the first personnel reform was initiated at Peking University,
which was followed by other leading Chinese public research universi-
ties. At Peking University there was a debate on the best way to reform
its personnel system. It took two years to resolve the debate, and a
new program was implemented in 2004. The debate focused on how
to remove lifetime employment. The final decision was to only give
tenure to full professors; and all other academic staff—associate profes-
sors, lecturers, and assistant professors—are contracted. Of course, there
has been significant resistance to these changes.

Laws protecting faculty employment

In theory, many laws provide protection to faculty in higher education

institutions. The general labor law and trade union law are two exam-
ples. In 1994, the Labor Law of People’s Republic of China, 1994 was
enacted. According to articles 7 and 8 of this labor law, workers have the
right to join or organize trade unions, and the trade union should initi-
ate its activities independently, in order to protect workers’ legal rights.
Workers are also entitled to participate in democratic management and
134 The Chinese Academic Profession

to negotiate with business organizations to defend workers’ legal rights

through the workers’ assembly. Also, article 33 of this labor law says:

The staff and workers of an enterprise as one party may conclude a

collective contract with the enterprise on matters relating to labor
remuneration . . . . A collective contract shall be concluded by the
trade union on behalf of the staff and workers with the enterprise.
(Labor Law of the People’s Republic of China)

These articles of the labor law actually laid down a foundation for col-
lective bargaining. However in higher education, in reality, faculty or
administrative staff never bargain with the university or college deans—
concerning salaries and other benefits—because basic salaries of faculty
and staff are still decided by the central government.
“Collective bargaining” in China is a new concept, since there was
never such a concept at all in the later 20th century. Thus, it is
unclear to what extent collective bargaining actually occurs, even in
the private sector. It is true that in China, all faculty and staff in
universities are unionized; but they seldom express their grievances
to trade unions, because they believe that the trade union has little
authority to solve their problems. Trade unions in China are very dif-
ferent from the ones in the Western world, because in China they
are still seen as administratively subordinate to different levels of
government.
Labor contracts have been discussed:

Chinese workers are disadvantaged in comparison to employers in

employment relations. They do not have bargaining power to negoti-
ate with employers on the contents of the contract, which are largely
formalized by government labor administrations.
(Shen 2007, 126)

A new framework for an employment system centered on the legal and

contractual regulation of labor relations has, only recently, been grad-
ually passed through national legislation—such as, in 2007, the Labor
Contract Law. It mainly addresses some urgent concerns—such as over-
time pay, delayed payment of wages, and unsafe working conditions.
In addition, the Law of Employment Contracts that became effective
in January 2008 is another important law for protecting the benefits
of all employees. This law has been formulated to improve the labor
contract system, to make the rights and obligations of both parties of
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 135

the labor contract explicit, and to protect the lawful rights and interests
of workers, in order to ensure a harmonious and stable labor relation-
ship. With the Law of Employment Contracts, employees may now
sue their employers directly, without going through the Labor Depart-
ment and governmental agencies to file for employment grievances.
Yet, those laws do not refer specifically to faculty and staff in higher
education institutions. When real disputes occur between faculty and
staff and the university administrative orders are frequently applied—
instead of implementing legal procedures. This means, even in higher
education, administrative orders still play a dominant role in the rela-
tionship between management and workers in respect of decisions on
salary, benefits, and other issues.

The “standardized” practice of faculty hiring

Generally, all universities are required to publish information about

vacancies, in order to encourage all qualified and interested persons
to apply for the positions. For equal employment, universities always
advocate fairness and equality, which means that all employment-
related decisions are based on principles of individual merit and
achievement—including skills, knowledge, education background, and
abilities relevant to the positions.
The primary criterion for academic appointment is, thus, academic
and professional excellence; and no candidate can be recommended
who does not meet the criteria for the appointment in question. The
employment decision is usually made by the academic committee at the
school or college, but it varies at the different institutions. The academic
committee members usually consist of the dean, associate deans, depart-
ment heads, and full professors. The full professors on the academic or
recruiting committee are sometimes appointed by the dean. In current
hiring practices in academic professions, males are usually preferred to
females. If candidates do not differ in academic performance, younger
candidates are also preferred. In many job descriptions, one may find
that a PhD candidate of a certain age is encouraged to apply. Here,
women and older applicants are at a disadvantage.
Though hiring faculty in Chinese universities is the responsibility of
the dean or the chairperson of a department authorized by the per-
sonnel committee of the university, sometimes senior faculty can make
recommendations, too. Occasionally professors can also be invited to
participate in the decision-making process; and at times even students
are invited to offer their opinions, if the applicants on the short list
136 The Chinese Academic Profession

give public lectures. In schools and colleges, the dean and the academic
committee are responsible for making the final decision or the recom-
mendation to the university; the academic committee is responsible for
ensuring that fair practice is followed throughout the hiring process.
Criteria for faculty hiring vary by discipline. But in general, they should
include knowledge of the subject matter, effective teaching, scholarly
background, and potential academic and administrative contribution to
the related schools.
Academic qualifications for faculty positions differ by institutions,
too. In general, to enter into the academic profession, one at least needs
to hold a master’s degree. In leading research universities, one must have
a PhD degree with two years of postdoctorate research experience. But in
some technical colleges and private institutions, a baccalaureate degree
may be sufficient for a teaching position, though universities always
prefer those who have master’s and PhD degrees.
A hiring process includes the following steps: first, the positions or
vacancies are advertised through the internet, newspapers, or other
media, with a description of the job requirements and the selection pro-
cess. Applicants can then apply online. Or, if there is a vacancy, some
senior professors could make recommendations. There is no standard
application form, but a curriculum vitae with educational background
and academic achievements, professional development interests, a list
of PhD thesis and published papers are required. The recruiting commit-
tee, chaired by the department head or the dean, establishes the criteria
for selection, organizes reviews, and determines which applicants will
be interviewed—based on the preferred qualifications established for the
position. As part of the interview process, the candidate may be required
to give a lecture or a public speech, as designated by the academic
committee.
The candidate may also be asked to meet professors and, some-
times, may be required to take a series of written tests—such as
professional knowledge, computer skills, assessment, and English pro-
ficiency tests. The tests are developed by each institution separately and
used to ascertain the candidates’ basic qualification. However, educa-
tional background and academic achievements are valued most highly
in the academic profession. If a candidate receives an offer, he/she
is placed on the eligibility list and ratified by the dean and school
academic committee; then, the decision is submitted to the univer-
sity personnel office for approval. Once an appointment is approved,
the newly hired candidate with a fresh PhD degree may obtain a
three-year contract as an assistant professor or a lecturer. After two to
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 137

three years, the faculty member is likely to be promoted to associate

professor.
The faculty selection process in the top Chinese universities does not
seem much different to hiring faculty in Western universities. However,
faculty inbreeding linked with academic favoritism is still a problem,
because academic favoritism can sometimes bypass the required fac-
ulty hiring procedures. The desire for well-qualified graduates to become
junior faculty at their home institutions led to generations of aca-
demic inbreeding. Now, in order to stop faculty inbreeding, leading
research universities have tried to recruit faculty members interna-
tionally. In 2004, Peking University announced that, in principle, it
would not hire new faculty from the graduates of colleges, schools,
and departments with a single academic lineage in the same year
in an effort to stop academic inbreeding and to eliminate academic
favoritism.

Regulations on faculty hiring

Regarding hiring faculty, there does not seem to be any national regu-
lation. However, the Teachers Law of People’s Republic of China, 1993
directly initiated the current faculty hiring system and provides guid-
ance for faculty hiring and contracting in higher education institutions.
According to this law, teachers at all levels of the education system with
qualifications for taking up a position upon evaluation are employed
by institutions in accordance with the responsibilities, conditions, and
terms of office of the prescribed teachers’ positions. Yet, this law does not
seem to have much direct effect on specific hiring practices in universi-
ties, because it is too general. Chiefly, the regulation of hiring faculty
is built into the governance structure. In each university, there is a
department responsible for regulation, which is considered to be inde-
pendent from the university administration but is under the leadership
of the chairperson of the university council. This department is mainly
in charge of selecting deans and directors for the university adminis-
tration, and preventing any corruptive activity on campus. If there is a
grievance regarding faculty hiring and promotion, it is also dealt with
by this department.

Faculty positions and contracts

The Chinese faculty consists of assistant lecturer, lecturer, associate

professor, and full professor. Within each category, there are different
138 The Chinese Academic Profession

ranks and salary scales. “Full professor” is divided into four ranks, with
the fourth being the entry level. “Associate professor” is divided into
three ranks, while “assistant professor” and “assistant lecturer” may be
divided into two ranks. Within higher education, a first-rank professor
is considered at the top of the academic profession, and so gets the
highest bonus relating to position. The basic salary, allocated by the
central government, depends on the number of year of services and the
rank held.
The tenure system was established in China, following the intro-
duction of the employment-contract system. In 2002, when Peking
University launched its personnel reform with the introduction of a
tenure system, many other universities followed them in adopting this
practice, though it generated hot debate inside the university and across
the country. Now all 985 Project universities and most of the 211 Project
universities can appoint full professors. However, in most other univer-
sities, the situation differs because they do not have the autonomy to
confer full professorships.
According to personnel regulation at Peking University, associate pro-
fessors in arts and sciences and lecturers in all subjects are contracted
for three-year terms, for up to 12 years (four contracts). Theoretically, if
faculty fail their promotion after academic assessment within the fourth
contract period, they should leave voluntarily. Yet, in practice, an asso-
ciate professor can voluntarily postpone the request for promotion, if
they do not believe themselves ready for promotion; and they can stay
in the same position until retirement. Not all universities adopted the
Peking model of personnel management, but some use different hir-
ing and promotion arrangements. However, all universities adopted the
contract system.
Apart from teaching responsibilities, all faculty are required to pub-
lish, including those at non-research universities; the difference lies
in the research quotas and teaching loads. In China, with the excep-
tion of leading universities like 211 and 985 Project universities,
most universities classify themselves as teaching and research uni-
versities, which means they lay equal significance on teaching and
research. However, regarding evaluation and promotion, research abil-
ity and publication carry more weight than teaching effectiveness.
Thus, the “publish and perish” term is very popular at Chinese uni-
versities. While not many faculty really “perish,” they may obtain less
remuneration and take longer to be promoted. Thus, to get promoted,
a faculty member needs to at least fulfill the university publication
quotas.
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 139

Other elements concerning faculty hiring

In China, since most research universities and research institutions

belong to the public sector—usually managed and supported by the
central or provincial governments—faculty and staff enjoy good work-
ing conditions; and they are well protected by laws, in comparison with
faculty in the private sector. Faculty in private colleges and universities
are paid less and in general do not have fixed-term employment status.
Many faculty in private higher education institutions have a minimum
one-year contract, and there are no tenured positions. At the end of each
contracted year, the contract can be easily terminated. In this chapter,
many generalizations apply only to the public higher education sector
but not to the private sector.
Only a few tenured positions are awarded to faculty in local public
universities; so, there are not many full professors in local public univer-
sities. At local universities, though few faculty have tenure, there is still a
presumption of lifetime employment for academics; and their contracts
tend to be extended automatically by the university. Few contracts are
terminated, even when the institution faces financial difficulties. Most
tenured positions are in Peking University, Tsinghua University, and
Zhejiang University. At those universities, appointments to full profes-
sor are carefully monitored and awarded by the appointment committee
of the university, and competitively nominated at colleges and schools.
The contract or tenure a professor holds does not prescribe teaching
hours, nor does it specify any requirement for research. The research and
teaching requirements are set by individual departments and schools.
All faculty are expected to perform research and teaching, simultane-
ously; but the teaching loads of professors, associate professors, lectur-
ers, and teaching assistants are determined annually. Depending on the
actual length of school terms, all faculty are required to teach at least
32–36 weeks per year and two to four courses per academic year. As there
is some weighting of teaching time according to the instructional setting
(seminar, lecture, practical, or field work), the weekly teaching load of
a professor can be as low as four hours in leading research universities.
At other universities, the teaching load for professors could be eight to
ten hours per week. Hours taught in excess of this teaching load are paid
as overtime at a flat rate, which has nothing to do with the basic salaries
set up by the government.
The primary responsibility of faculty in 985 and 211 Project universi-
ties is research—thus, the teaching load is much less in comparison with
local teaching universities. Individuals receiving employment contracts
140 The Chinese Academic Profession

in 985 and 211 Project universities are often given quotas on the number
of publications in designated journals that should be attained within a
limited period of time. Job performance is evaluated mainly on research
rather than teaching, especially on publications and the number of the
research grants a professor receives.
In China, the ranking of a university is mostly based on research pro-
ductivity. So, in order to attract the most talented faculty and to enhance
scientific research, many universities have the autonomy to compete
for top professors by offering better salaries, fringe benefits, reduced
teaching loads, and other incentives.

Factors influencing academic salary and remuneration

Currently, information about faculty salaries in China is difficult to

obtain, because of the complexity of faculty remuneration and the
lack of national data. Historically, this was not a problem, since pro-
fessors were paid according to the national common guidelines. The
central government set up the regulations for payment, according to
rank and official title; so then, everyone knew what and how everyone
else was paid.
The academic salary has been improved greatly, though many fac-
ulty members consider themselves underpaid. Research shows that, in
PhD programs, the proportion of male students with a rural family back-
ground is high. This may indicate that less young urban dynamic and
talented male students are achieving PhD degrees, and more are entering
into other professions—like business, finance, and better-paid indus-
tries. Also, more talented male students went abroad for PhD degrees.
Thus, the academic profession has become less attractive for the younger
generation in the field of humanities and social sciences, while in the
sciences and engineering, and in professional fields such as manage-
ment would be different. It has been pointed out that the remuneration
of the academic profession is central to the success of higher education
enterprises everywhere and is also critically important for individual aca-
demics around the world (Rumbley, Pacheco, and Altbach 2008). This is
very true within China.
As discussed previously, the basic salaries of faculty and staff in pub-
lic higher education institutions are set by the central, provincial, or
local governments. So, the base salary and scale salary for faculty of the
same rank are roughly the same nationwide. The tables in this chapter
illustrate the general situation regarding salary in higher education insti-
tutions in China. In order to improve faculty and staff salaries in higher
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 141

education, universities are now given more autonomy to tap different

resources for institutional development. Under the central government’s
guidelines for faculty compensation, higher education institutions can
use some of their self-generated resources to recompense faculty and
staff. But some universities are doing better than others in tapping dif-
ferent resources—that is, there are variations in compensation levels at
different institutions.
Even in the same university, the gap can be huge between schools and
colleges, because some schools and colleges can generate more money
than others. The well-known business schools of leading research uni-
versities can generate more money in many different ways, so faculty
incomes in those business schools may be many times higher than in
humanities and social sciences.
This situation is in accordance with Todd M. Johnson’s study:

Besides wages, work units in China typically provide a host of other

monetary and non-monetary benefits to their employees. Because
basic wages for government workers tend to be inflexible and fall
within a rather narrow range, it is often the variations in fringe
benefits that differentiate the rewards of various jobs.
(Johnson 1991, 139)

This is very true in the university as a work unit. Faculty may receive
additional money through the fluctuation of benefits that include med-
ical care, housing, pension, and unemployment insurance, as well as
others.
Factors that influence faculty incomes in public higher education
institutions include the number of years worked, the academic field,
the academic rank, teaching load, and research grants. Besides, in order
to increase faculty income, many universities tacitly allow faculty to
engage in a range of additional activities—such as consulting and
night-class teaching. Many professors engage in consulting and coop-
erative research activities, especially at the leading research universities.
Thus, faculty at these universities may earn more in comparison with
academics at teaching colleges and universities. In addition, many pro-
fessors in leading research universities can obtain research grants from
different government research programs and industries; this is espe-
cially true for science and engineering in leading research universities.
Though there are restrictions on the use of government research grants,
a certain amount may be taken as research compensation. Since most
of the government research and development money goes to sciences
142 The Chinese Academic Profession

and engineering, faculty in humanities and social sciences have limited

access to research grants. Even when they receive grants, the amount
is not comparable to the grants in the areas of science and applied
research.
Leading national research universities tend to be more successful in
securing government funds than local universities:

Generally speaking, national institutions have more budget than

local ones for at least three reasons. Firstly, per capita fiscal allo-
cation at national level is higher than local due to better fiscal
condition; secondly, there are several dedicated projects supported
by central budget, funding from which usually go to national insti-
tutions; thirdly, national institutions receive more research funding
due to their mission and stronger capacity. There is less discrepancy
among national institutions, but more among local institutions due
to local economic and fiscal imbalance.
(Yan 2009)

No doubt, most of the government research grants go to 211 and 985

Project universities, and this definitely will affect faculty income in
those universities.
Education may not be a factor influencing individual faculty income,
though it is considered usual for a doctoral degree holder to receive
more pay than a master’s degree holder. However, in China, one hardly
notices a difference in salary between a master’s degree and a PhD degree
holder. The only variation is that a PhD holder gets promoted much
faster than someone with a master’s degree.

Additional compensation

As mentioned previously, faculty and staff used to be treated as part of

the civil service and were paid according to government regulations.
In the mid-1980s, based on anecdotal experience, some top professors
were paid about 200 RMB (US$54.05) per month at the high end of the
scale. Back then, the exchange rate was about US$1.00 to 3.70 RMB.
Since the salary was so low for academic staff and scientists, it was said
that “scientists who did research on the atom bomb were paid less than
peddlers who sold ‘tea eggs’ on the street.” It is only in the last two
decades that there have been great increases in faculty salaries. In the last
ten years, universities were given more autonomy to use institutional
revenues to provide subsidies to faculty and staff. Faculty and staff in
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 143

universities began to receive increases in salary, bonus, and subsidies,

according to government regulations.
Usually faculty receive their school and university bonuses and subsi-
dies on top of the government salary. This makes Chinese faculty salaries
more complicated and difficult to analyze, because the benefits could
be monetary or non-monetary. Some universities may provide more
bonuses and subsidies than others, and schools’ bonuses are ad hoc in
nature. Generally, university bonuses, determined by faculty positions
in public universities, ranged from 3,000 to 10,000 RMB (US$468–
1,562), when the bonus was first initiated in 2000. A fourth-rank full
professor’s salary and remuneration from a well-known university with
specializations in business and finance demonstrate the complexity (see
Table 5.1). It is not our intention to generalize from this case because
there are many variations among the universities
The fourth-rank professor’s total income is 9,807 RMB (US$1,520) per
month, before tax and after the deduction of the public reserve fund.
In China, the public reserve fund is equivalent to the American faculty
retirement plan. The fund is mandated by the government and directly
deposited by the university into the faculty’s reserve account. For this
retirement account, the university is also mandated to dedicate match-
ing funds provided by the government, for an additional retirement
pension for faculty. After the public reserve fund and the tax deduc-
tion, this fourth-rank professor would take home around 8,000 RMB
(US$1,240). If the optional living subsidy is removed, the net income
should be about 7,000 RMB (US$1,085) monthly. The first two items of
this fourth-rank professor’s pay statement are 1,975 RMB (US$306) and
555 RMB (US$86) which is 2,530 RMB (US$392). This demonstrates that
the bonuses and subsidies a faculty member receives can be three to four
times higher than the basic salary.
Some bonuses are not reflected in the fourth-rank professor’s pay
statement, such as the payment received from the university and the
department for teaching above the normal teaching loads, rewards for
influential publications, and compensation for research projects. These
payments could represent anything from a few thousand to more than
one hundred thousand renminbi, or even more, annually, depend-
ing on the professor’s teaching load, research grants, and publications.
These rewards also differ greatly between disciplines and universities.
For example, a faculty member from Peking University, who published
a paper in Science, might earn 5,000 RMB (US$775) as a research bonus;
if she/he were from another university, especially a provincial univer-
sity, she/he might receive between 30,000 RMB (US$4,651) and 50,000
 144
Table 5.1 Monthly salary of a fourth-rank full English professor in foreign language studies, 2010 (RMB)a

Base Scale Teaching Duty subsidy Food Telephone Laundry Transportation Magazine
salary salary subsidy subsidy subscription

1,420 555 50 1,995 50 100 10 315 27

Housing Living Position Unemployment One-child Price Public Other subsidies Total
subsidy subsidy subsidy insurance subsidy subsidy reserve
(optional) fund
115 1,100 3,900 12 50 10 817 100 9,807

Notes: In this university, professors are divided into four ranks. The fourth rank refers to the entry level for a full professor. Information in this table
may not be generalized to another university, because the category of subsidies may vary from university to university.
a US$1.00 = 6.50 RMB.

Source: The data is from the faculty member’s pay statement.

 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 145

RMB (US$7,752), because a provincial university might assume that as

not many of its faculty members will publish in Science, it is better to use
the reward as an instrument to increase the faculty’s productivity. It is
also possible that the professor might not receive anything at all if the
provincial university does not have the same reward policy.
Again, the fourth-rank professor in our example is from a well-known
university, specializing in business and finance, so the payment received
is likely to be higher than a regular fourth-rank professor from other
universities. Telephone and transportation subsidies shown in Table 5.1
are not required by the central government but are options offered at
the discretion of each university. If the university has the money to
provide those subsidies, it funds them; but if not, nobody can complain.
Additionally, the position subsidy for this fourth-rank professor is 3,900
RMB (US$605); at other universities, normally this income would be
between 2,500 RMB (US$388) and 3,000 RMB (US$465). In this case, the
university is more self-sufficient in financial terms. Yet, this fourth-rank
English-language or literature professor is not likely to be eligible for a
publication bonus because, in that field, it is hard to publish papers in
recognized international journals.
A first-rank professor would receive a much higher salary and bonus
than this fourth-rank English-language or literature professor. But not
many professors can reach the first rank, because there is always a quota
for the number of first-rank professors in universities; this is especially
the case for social science and humanities. Usually, the members of the
Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Chinese Academy of Engineering,
and top-level university administrators receive the first-rank professor’s
salary and bonus.
The Chinese Academy of Sciences, established in 1949, is the
leading research institution in natural science, technological science,
and high-tech innovation in China. As a research institute, it has
its own scientists and researchers. But the organization also has the
responsibility to select academics. A number of academics are regu-
larly nominated from both research institutes and universities. In the
China, being selected as an academic is not only considered an honor
but also a promotion, with an increase of academic rank and salary.
Currently, there are 704 academics selected by this academy; a num-
ber come from universities and some from the Academy of Sciences
and the Academy of Social Sciences. The Chinese Academy of Engi-
neering, established in 1994, is the comparable national academy for
engineering; currently it has 747 academics. Faculty named as academics
by these elite institutions automatically become first-rank professors.
146 The Chinese Academic Profession

Given the quotas, this leaves few opportunities for faculty in humanities
and social sciences aspiring to first-rank professorship. However, based
on the fourth-rank English-language or literature professor’s salary and
bonuses, we can estimate a first-rank English professor’s salary and
bonus, demonstrated in Table 5.2.
The first-rank English-language or literature professor enjoys many
additional benefits—like special government subsidies, research grants,
academic rewards, and university housing—compared to the fourth-
rank professor. However, Table 5.2 only shows an estimated salary
because the actual incomes are not disclosed. It is generally under-
stood that some first-rank professors in science and engineering can
receive millions in research grants annually, from national research and
development and industry. Thus, one cannot begin to estimate those
professors’ actual income at all.
In contrast, professors in private universities are employees of a par-
ticular university, whose salary and fringe benefits come solely from the
university or, more specifically, from student tuition and fees. Gener-
ally, faculty salaries in private colleges and universities range from 3,000
RMB to 6,000 RMB (US$465–930), per month. Besides, private colleges
and universities do not seem to provide any benefits such as medical
care insurance, pension plans, or others. So, their salaries or incomes
are much lower in comparison with their counterparts in the public
sector. However, a top-level administrator’s salary in a private univer-
sity could be very high. At a well known private university, in 2000,
the university president’s annual salary was reported to be 200,000 RMB
(US$31,007), which is not unusual at private universities. At that time,
this salary could have been three times higher than that of the president
at a leading public research university.

Fringe benefits for junior professors

There are a number of direct subsidies included in the monthly pay-

ment to university administrators, similar to those shown in Table 5.2.
But Table 5.3 shows the details of how junior faculty members are
paid, and it also provides a comparison of the incomes for an associate
professor, a lecturer, and a teaching assistant at the case-study univer-
sity. In Table 5.4, one may find that a junior professors income is not
high in comparison. In order to increase junior professors’ income and
productivity, Chinese government and universities have established var-
ious programs that are only available to junior professors. In 2000, the
National Science Foundation established the Young Science Fund to
Table 5.2 Estimated monthly salary of a first-rank English professor in foreign language studies, 2010 (RMB)a

Base Scale Teaching Duty subsidy Food Telephone Laundry Transportation Magazine
salary salary subsidy thousand subsidy subscription
separator

2,020 1,610 50 2,995 50 100 10 315 27

Housing Living Position Unemployment One-child Price Public Other subsidies Total
subsidy subsidy subsidy insurance subsidy subsidy reserve
(optional) fund
185 n.a. 6,900 12 n.a. 10 1,335 100 15,719

Notes: The salary is based on the authors’ estimation, since it is hard to get access to the actual information on a professor’s income. From this
estimation, we suppose that the first-rank English professor would get 15,719 RMB monthly.
n.a. = not applicable.
a US$1.00 = 6.50 RMB.

Source: The data is based on the authors’ estimation.

147
148 The Chinese Academic Profession

Table 5.3 Possible monetary subsidies for junior faculty in, 2010 (RMB)a

Subsidies Associate professor Lecturer Teaching assistant

Teaching 50 50 50
Duty 1,675 1,240 1,040
Food 50 50 50
Telephone 100 100 100
Laundry 10 10
Transportation 325 315 300
Book and magazine 27 27 27
Housing subsidy 95 80 70
Livingb 1,100 900
Rentc 600
Internal 2,800 1,800 1,600
One child 10
Price 10 10 10
Public reserve fund 743 505 488
Total (before taxes) 5,895 5,287 5,245

Notes: a US$1.00 = 6.50 RMB.

b Living subsidy is optional because if the faculty member already received the benefits of

welfare-oriented distribution of public housing or the person was given a certain amount of
money equal to the value of a house at one time, she/he cannot get living subsidy, and vice
versa. As the table demonstrates, the associate professors already enjoyed the welfare.
c Rent subsidy is only paid in the faculty member’s first contract period, which lasts three

years.
Source: The data is estimated based on a case study in a university specializing in business
and finance.

support 160 young scholars each year, with a grant of 0.8–1.0 million
RMB (US$12,000–160,000) for four years. And in 2004, the Department
of Education established the New Century Excellent Young Scholar Plan,
to provide external help to those excellent junior professors. Of course,
those programs are very selective, and they do not benefit all junior
professors.
In Chinese faculty income, the largest monetary variations result from
the university bonus allocated according to rank. Subsidies for each
rank are determined by each university and the differences can be as
much as between 50,000 RMB (US$7,752), at the highest level, and
3,000 RMB (US$465), at the lowest, annually. This represents a striking
17-fold difference (Chen 2002). The pay scale applies to faculty, staff,
and administrators in the university system, but most likely no faculty
are awarded the lowest-level subsidy; the lowest level is designed for
lower-level staff. Junior faculty receive 10,000 RMB (around US$1,500).
While not much difference exists in the fringe benefits among associate
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 149

Table 5.4 Data on full-time and part-time teachers in private higher education
institutions

Teachers Total % of all

1. Full-time teachers 17, 881 47.04

Female 8, 691 22.86
Senior (professor) 1,869 4.92
Subsenior (associate professor) 3, 984 10.48
Middle (lecturer) 6,123 16.11
Junior (teaching assistant) 3, 287 8.64
No rank 2,618 6.88
2. Part-time teachers 20,126 52.96
Female 8,601 22.63
Senior (professor) 3,415 8.98
Subsenior (associate professor) 7,078 18.62
Middle (lecturer) 6,483 17.05
Junior (teaching assistant) 1,563 4.11
No rank 1,587 4.17
Foreign teachers among part-time teachers 371 0.97
Total 38,007 100.00

Source: Data on academic qualifications of full-time and part-time teachers in private higher
education institutions (Ministry of Education 2009a).

professor, lecturer, and teaching assistant, there is a huge gap compared

with professors—particularly the first-rank professors.

Other monetary bonuses

Bonuses are paid by departments or schools and sometimes by the uni-

versity, from a special bonus fund, and are not included in the salary or
fringe benefits listed above. The composition of these bonuses is even
more complex and hard to calculate. Mainly, they consist of rewards for
additional teaching, the number of graduate students a faculty mem-
ber advised, and participation in activities to generate funds, and other
factors.
Of course, a professor should teach classes. Generally, a professor is
required to teach two to four courses in an academic year, as discussed
previously. Thus, a professor needs to teach at least one course per
semester—and will therefore receive additional bonuses at the end of
the semester from the university, though this function is considered
as the professor’s duty. If teaching two courses, the professor would
get more additional bonuses. A professor who teaches more than two
150 The Chinese Academic Profession

courses would be entitled to receive an additional bonus on top of the

university bonus. For the case-study university, the professor will get 50
RBM (US$7.70) for each class taught, from the university. The school
in which the professor teaches will pay another 80 RMB (US$12.40),
as a matching bonus. So, putting the two payments together, the total
amount would be 130 RMB (US$20.60) for each class taught. This remu-
neration will not appear on the monthly pay statement but will be paid
at the end of the semester as a reward. But again, it is hard to estimate
the range of reward, because it varies so much.
The case-study university used for elaboration in this chapter is a well-
known university in business and finance, and many schools in this
university run different short-term or long-term training programs, for
higher tuition and fees. The training programs could be transnational
or local. These programs are very profitable. The cost of tuition ranges
from 20,000 to 30,000 RMB (US$3,200–4,651); higher tuition would be
charged for programs designed for executives or senior managers. While
the university takes a percentage as an administrative overhead, the
schools or departments that run the programs keep the majority of the
income for the school’s operational needs, and a certain amount can be
used for faculty and staff bonuses.
At the end of an academic semester, each faculty member will also
get some bonuses for the classes taught at the school; this is only one
example of how schools can provide bonuses to faculty and staff. There
is a great discrepancy in the size of the bonuses among departments and
schools, even within the same university, due to differences between
disciplines and fields of study.

Additional employment (moonlighting)

Professors without much bonus pay or with fewer research grants might
choose to teach outside of the university—to earn extra money by
teaching in private colleges and universities in the evenings or offering
courses for self-study programs. Well-known professors are sometimes
invited to give a regular course in another university, an opportunity
for moonlighting for which they receive generous payments. Most pro-
fessors who teach in other institutions, as well as their main place of
employment, are in economics, business, and finance. While the per-
centage of professors who teach in more than one institution has not
been calculated exactly, Table 5.4 offers data regarding full-time faculty
moonlighting elsewhere. In the Chinese public higher education sys-
tem, part-time faculty are seldom hired unless they are moonlighting.
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 151

Table 5.4 shows that more than 20 per cent of faculty members have
a part-time contract at a private higher education institution. Among
this 20 per cent, there might be professors who have full-time con-
tracts at public universities, while moonlighting at private university for
supplementary employment. Since private institutions have full man-
agement autonomy and responsibility for their own profits and losses,
they may intentionally choose to hire professors from public universi-
ties as part-timers in order to reduce the human cost. In China, it is rare
for professors to have more than one position but, in order to get more
money, it is possible for them to moonlight in private higher education
institutions in the evenings.
Moonlighting has been allowed, but not encouraged, because univer-
sities fear that additional employment will erode the quality of teaching
and research. Still, academic staff do moonlight in accordance with
their financial need, academic discipline, skills, and time. Because of
the ad hoc nature of moonlighting, it is hard to determine how much
money faculty can thus earn. Faculty could sometimes double their
monthly income by moonlighting. This is in accordance with Philip
G. Altbach’s (2009) conclusion that it is difficult to measure non-salary
income.
Universities have a few ways of tracking income sources, though
individual faculty members—particularly those with creative ways of
boosting their incomes—have little incentive to report extra income.
So now, universities are always required to use a faculty member’s per-
sonal identification number to transfer payment to an employee’s bank
account instead of paying by cash.

Qualifications for the academic profession

The educational qualifications for an academic professor, stated in the

Higher Education Law (article 46), prescribe that higher education insti-
tutions incorporate a qualification system. The Teachers Law Provision
5 (article 11) also stipulates that, to obtain qualifications at a higher
education institution, a teacher should have a postgraduate degree.
According to those laws, to enter into the academic profession at least
a master’s degree is required, but in most leading research universities a
doctoral degree is required. In fact, several of the research institutes at
China’s leading research universities—such as the China Center for Eco-
nomic Research in Peking University—have a minimum requirement of
a foreign PhD. Exceptions to these requirements are made under very
rare circumstances in leading research universities now.
152 The Chinese Academic Profession

At public higher education institutions, it is not surprising to find

that more than one-third of professors only achieved undergradu-
ate education. This is because China’s doctoral education only has a
30-year history, and those old professors have never had an oppor-
tunity to obtain a PhD degree. Today, to be a professor in a lead-
ing research university, a PhD degree is a prerequisite. Table 5.5
shows that in public higher education institutions, 40 per cent of
professors have doctoral degrees and 36.1 per cent have bachelor’s
degrees. In private higher education institutions, as shown in Table 5.6,
56.9 per cent of full-time professors just have bachelor’s degrees. In order
to raise quality standards, many of those institutions rely heavily
on moonlighting professors from public universities as their teaching
staff.
Most faculty members with PhD degrees are in leading research uni-
versities, such as Peking University, where more than 70 per cent of
the academic staff hold PhD degrees, and more than 40 per cent have
a foreign PhD. But in those universities, the relationship between edu-
cation background and salary are undocumented and require further
investigation. Determining monetary reward remains primarily based
on teaching loads, research grants, publications, and the number of
master’s and PhD students advised.

Academic promotions and assessment

Universities are now establishing their own internal quality-assessment

systems to maintain a sustainable evaluation of individual faculty per-
formance. They have adopted a performance-based system of promotion
or assessment. Promotion occurs on the basis of individual assessments.
The criteria for faculty promotion focus mainly on research grants, and
publications in core journals, and teaching is considered to be sec-
ondary. However, a certain number of years of services are also required,
before further promotion. Faculty are graded annually or every two or
three years, on their performance (as defined above). This is a move away
from the previous seniority-based promotions. In theory, an assistant
professor with a PhD degree would need seven years at leading research
universities to be promoted to a full professor; but in practice, it would
take longer. In local universities, it would take even longer. Privileges do
exist for faculty who have made great contributions to the university or
society or have distinguished themselves in research or teaching, as they
may be promoted sooner. In regular practice, for junior faculty in local
universities, it always takes more than ten years to be promoted to full
Table 5.5 Degrees held by professors in public higher education institutions

Total Doctoral degrees Master’s degrees Bachelor’s degree Associate bachelor

Full-time 138,161 55,263 40.0% 31,146 22.5% 49,895 36.1% 1,857 1.4%
professor
Part-time 62,157 20,962 33.7% 18,501 29.7% 21,700 34.9% 994 1.7%
professor

Source: Data on academic qualifications of full-time and part-time teachers in regular higher education institutions (Ministry of Education 2009b).

153
 154
Table 5.6 Degrees held by professors in private higher education institutions

Total Doctoral degrees Master’s degrees Bachelor’s degree Associate bachelor

Full-time 1,869 224 12.0% 518 27.7% 1,064 56.9% 63 3.4%

Professor
Part-time 3,415 713 20.8% 1,048 30.7% 1,598 46.8% 56 1.7%
professor

Source: Data on academic qualifications of full-time and part-time teachers in private higher education institutions (Ministry of Education 2009a).
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 155

professor. In most cases, faculty are appointed at the level of lecturer l

or as assistant professor and promoted to associate professor after two or
three years if they fulfill the university’s research requirement. A faculty
member with a PhD degree from a well-known Western university—
with some overseas work experience or with postdoc research experience
at home or abroad—will normally be appointed to associate professor,
and sometimes as a full professor in a provincial or local university.

Recruiting international scholars

Domestic faculty mobility has become more common, since China

adopted the flexible personnel employment policy. Factors such as repu-
tation, location, and better salaries encourage some individuals to move
from one institution to another. But the mobility generally follows
a unidirectional pattern—from local, provincial, and leading research
universities—as revealed in the Chinese expression: “Man struggles
upwards; water flows downwards.”
To increase the country’s capacity for technical innovation and cre-
ativity, a range of high-level and urgently needed overseas professionals
are being brought back to the country through different projects or
plans. The Changjiang Scholar Plan and the 111 Plan are two of the
best known.
The Changjiang Scholar Plan is aimed at attracting experts from
abroad to work in Chinese universities for a longer term; it was origi-
nally called the International Partnership Program for Creative Research
Teams. The program is sponsored by the Chinese government, with
donations from Hong Kong. This was the most prestigious government
program, intending to recruit world-known professors to teach and carry
out research on Chinese campuses, at the end of the 20th century.
At the earlier stages of the program, humanities and social sciences
were excluded; so only 100 professors in sciences and engineering were
selected. In 2004, with the idea of developing the country with science
and technology and strengthening the country with talent, humanities
and social sciences were included in the plan. Currently, there are about
100 Changjiang professors at Peking University. Again, most of them
are in the science fields, with humanities and social sciences a small
fraction.
The Changjiang professors can have a three-year appointment or a
lifelong appointment—as a special-appointed professor or a chair pro-
fessor. A special-appointed professor needs to work full-time on campus,
while a chair professor does not need to serve a full-time position but
156 The Chinese Academic Profession

should be on campus for at least three months, annually. A Changjiang

science professor should not be older than 45 years; and in humanities
and social sciences, the individual should be under 50 years, at the
time of appointment. These appointed professors’ annual award is
100,000 RMB (US$15,500) on the top of a basic salary and bonus,
plus a 2,000,000 RMB (US$310,000) annual research grant. The chair
professors’ monthly salary is 15,000 RMB (US$2,325) on top of basic
salaries and bonuses. In social sciences, 500,000 RMB (US$77,520) may
be available in research grants, annually.
In 2006, another plan—the Expertise-Introduction Project for Disci-
plinary Innovation in Universities—was launched for top scientists to
work at the top research universities in China. The plan is jointly orga-
nized by the Ministry of Education and the State Administration of
Foreign Experts Affairs. It aims to upgrade scientific research and cre-
ate peer competition in Chinese universities, by establishing innovation
centers and gathering groups of first-class intellectuals from around the
world. The plan intends to bring in about 1,000 top scholars from the
top 100 universities and research institutes worldwide. These experts
will be integrated into domestic research infrastructure; alongside the
creation of 100 subject innovation centers, set up in universities. Only
universities from the 985 Project (aimed at developing a number of
world-class universities) and from the 211 Project (aimed at strengthen-
ing about 100 institutions of higher education in key disciplinary areas
for the 21st century) are authorized to recruit overseas Chinese under
the 111 Plan. The plan states that under one 111 Plan professor, at least
ten overseas scholars should be employed to organize a team. In each of
these teams, at least one scholar should be an overseas academic mentor,
while the foreign representatives can only come from the top 100 uni-
versities and research institutes. Generally, the academic mentors should
not be older than 70 years—except for Nobel Prize winners—with other
representatives under 50 years. Subjects should include basic sciences,
technology, and project management, among others.
Both universities and the central government jointly sponsor the
plan. Under this plan, recruited scientists would have an annual salary
package of one million RMB (about US$155,038) on the top of their
basic government salary and departmental and university bonuses, plus
five million RMB (US$775,193), annually, as a research grant.
The two plans discussed above show the national government’s deter-
mination to attract the most talented faculty. The 111 Plan, especially,
is very attractive, even to foreign experts. Comparing the one million
RMB annual award with the fourth-rank English-language and literature
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 157

professor’s annual salary reveals the disparity, but there are many posi-
tive signs regarding the 111 Plan (Altbach and Ma 2011). It shows the
acknowledgment of the importance of knowledge and the value of top
scientists. This acknowledgment reflects great social progress in recent
Chinese academic history.

Conclusion

Since 1978, Chinese higher education has changed dramatically—not

only in size and provision but in the profile and remuneration of the
academic profession, as well. Several laws have been put in place to
provide general protection to the academic profession, and numerous
reforms have been introduced regarding faculty hiring and employ-
ment. Chinese higher education is quite different from only three
decades ago.
Chinese faculty and academic staff are unionized, once they join
the profession, but the Chinese trade union mostly functions as the
coordinator of the relationship between government and union num-
bers, which is quite different from the Western concept of trade
unions. Recently have there been debates about strengthening the trade
union’s role in coordinating labor relationships, especially in helping
workers to solve disputes over labor contracts, hiring practices, and
salaries; but it may not be directly applicable to professors in higher
education.
The transformation includes the hiring of faculty and employment.
Most universities have sought to establish regulations in order to stan-
dardize hiring and employment procedures. In Chinese culture, intel-
lectuals always enjoy a high social status, though their salary may not
be high. Faculty salary or income has improved greatly from a histori-
cal and developmental perspective. As mentioned earlier, in the 1980s
scientists were poorly paid but not now. The current concern is the gap
between professors from different disciplines, even within the same uni-
versity. These differences may not be healthy for a university in the
long term.
Of course, a number of challenges are facing the academic profession
in China. When compared with some of their international counterparts
in other emerging nations and developed countries, Chinese faculty
salaries may be low. They may also be low in comparison with other
professions inside the country, which might make the profession less
attractive. The Chinese government has been trying to improve the
situation, and universities are also trying to make use of salary subsidies
158 The Chinese Academic Profession

and other incentives to attract excellent young faculty members. How-

ever, the size and range of these incentives vary substantially from uni-
versity to university and from discipline to discipline. Again, humanities
and social sciences are suffering because most of the policies favor
sciences and engineering.
Due to China’s salary system, Chinese universities may not be attrac-
tive to top scholars in the international labor market. In a survey of
academic salaries in 15 countries around the world, Canada ranked at
the top, with an average monthly salary of $6,548 per month (in pur-
chasing power parity dollars); and China came last with a monthly
salary of $1,182 (Rumbley, Pacheco, and Altbach 2008). Low salaries
may have contributed to the brain drain in the past two decades. More
than one million Chinese students who studied abroad did not return.
But recently, with the global financial crisis and special policies from
the Chinese government, the situation has begun to change. Now more
and more fresh foreign PhD holders look for opportunities in Chinese
universities—a good sign for brain circulation.
Since the beginning of the 985 Project, the Chinese government
has injected billions of lump sum grants into building world-class
universities. Backed by government funding, many leading research uni-
versities have started to attract world-renowned academics through the
Zhangjiang scholarship and the 111 Plan. These scholars are provided
with well-equipped labs, surrounded with the brightest students, and
given tremendous leeway. Based on these initiatives, many more special
projects have been established to try to improve young faculty members’
salary and income—efforts that provide great hopes for junior faculty
and staff.
This discussion analyzes many issues concerning Chinese faculty
salary and remuneration, hiring, and contracts. Further research is
needed on themes such as: compensation in local universities and
technical colleges; whether there should be regulations on universities,
schools, or even faculty’s engagement in commercial activities; and even
how to reform the Chinese faculty salary and remunerations structure
to simplify the system.

Notes
1. The independent colleges used to be affiliated to public universities, and
served as the commercial arms of these universities. In 2003 they were
required to be “independent” from the public parent universities and to be
self-financing and were named as independent colleges.
 Ma Wanhua and Wen Jianbo 159

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6
The Changing American Academic
Profession
Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias

Today, the American research university is widely recognized as the

global “gold standard” for cutting-edge research, innovation, and grad-
uate education. With the exception of a few subspecialty areas—ceramic
engineering; oceanography (Goodwin and Nacht 1991)—American
scholars and researchers have led the world in refereed journal publi-
cations, citations, patents, and Nobel Prizes. As a result, many look to
American research universities as a model for the identification, incu-
bation, and support of academic talent. Indeed, for scholars across the
globe, American universities still serve as a magnet in the increasingly
global academic marketplace.
It is useful to remember, however, that the United States only rose to
a dominant global position in the higher education industry (graduate
education and research) after World War II. This is, thus, a relatively
recent development. As an account for this rise of the United States
to academic preeminence over the past half century, several explana-
tions may be offered. The most frequent focus is on the high degree
of decentralization in the US system and the resulting autonomy from
government control. In effect, the argument here is that academic
distinction follows institutional independence. American universities,
public as well as private, are autonomous corporations chartered by state
governments to pursue their educational missions, and governed by a
board of lay trustees. While they may be subject to general government
regulations, these universities are nonetheless independent actors—free
to pursue their place in the academic sun and to enhance their compet-
itive position in the market for the best faculty and students. Among
other advantages, this allows considerable institutional flexibility in
competing with business, industry, and the professions in recruiting
the best talent. The great strength of the private sector in the United

160
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 161

States—more independent and insulated from government—promotes

this hypothesis. The second most frequent explanation focuses on the
pattern of sustained and large-scale government support. American
research universities first rose to global prominence largely as a result
of the infusion of research support from the federal government’s war-
related defense efforts in the mid-20th century. Until quite recently, that
support has been sustained and even grown—fueled by the establish-
ment of the National Science Foundation, in 1958, and the National
Institute of Health, in 1887. It was supplemented, beginning in the
1960s, by state governments that invested heavily in the establish-
ment of public university systems—building upon one or two major
universities and a system of former teacher’s colleges and normal
schools.
A third explanation focuses on the “magnet-like” capacity of the
US system to develop and draw in academic talent from across the
globe. Historically, this capacity is illustrated by successive waves of
emigrating scholars—from Nazi Germany, the former Soviet Union,
and developing economies such as China and India—seeking oppor-
tunities for academic careers in a context supporting academic and
individual freedom. The key concept here can be claimed as opportu-
nity. Indeed, the opportunity structure became developed in the post
World War II period, offering at once a highly structured and predictable
career track—defined by the American Association of University Profes-
sors’ 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure—and a robust
job market, providing increasingly competitive salaries allowing aca-
demics to enter the growing American middle class (Bowen and Schuster
1986). That magnetism, while to some extent a result of general political
freedom (with some exceptions), was a function of:

• a robust academic marketplace, with the flexibility to recognize the

market value of faculty in certain fields and with certain accomplish-
ments;
• an established career track that promised a safe and secure road to a
stable career, if not spectacularly well-paid employment—irrespective
of the results of the next national election or political coup.

In the past few years, however, alarm bells have begun to sound
in the United States about gathering threats to American academic
hegemony—parallel to the concerns raised about gathering threats to
America’s global economic and political hegemony, with the rise of
the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) (Zakaria 2008). Indicators
162 The Changing American Academic Profession

of emergent trouble abound: a documented decline in the propor-

tionate number of referred scientific articles produced by American
scholars, as well as a proportionate decline in American representa-
tion in global scientific citations indexes; a decline in the US federal
government’s expenditure on basic scientific research as a percent-
age of gross domestic product; and both amid a sharp proportionate
increase elsewhere in research and development expenditure and scien-
tific publications, especially in East Asia and western Europe (Clotfelter
2010; Cummings 2008). More ominously, the downturn of productivity
seems rooted in declines in conditions that produced American preem-
inence. While sociological theories of accumulative advantage suggest
that privileged groups, by virtue of their initial privilege, tend to enjoy a
substantial advantage in maintaining their position—even as the play-
ing field changes; nonetheless, the prospects for continued supremacy of
the American academic professions—especially in the longer term—are
anything but certain (Clotfelter 2010).
In this chapter, the challenges that the American system is now con-
fronting to these three pillars of its historic strength are considered. The
changing opportunity structure of academic careers in the United States,
associated with these challenges, will be reviewed in some detail, based
on a particular focus on academic employment contracts and compen-
sation. The discussion will conclude with some implications for the
continued preeminence of the US academic profession—a profession
that may no longer be indisputably the most secure and best paid in the
world. However, initially, the basic parameters of the current US system
need to be established, in terms of size and scope.

A system bifurcated by mission and control

The higher education system in the United States is today a large and
highly decentralized one, with some 4,000 autonomous actors (institu-
tions) currently offering instruction at the postsecondary level to some
17 million students by about 1.1 million faculty members (600,000
of whom are full time). The overall system is bifurcated along two
major axes. First, in terms of mission and degree level, approximately
half the system (about 2,000 institutions and nine million students)
is oriented to vocational or workforce preparation (and offers either
two-year degrees or non-degree certificate options). The other half pro-
vides traditional baccalaureate and graduate-degree-level instruction,
in four-year colleges and universities, to a primarily full-time student
body (Gumport 2000). Academic staff in the vocational sector serve
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 163

primarily on part-time appointments; while those in the traditional

baccalaureate and graduate-degree, four-year sector serve primarily full-
time (Leslie and Slaughter 1995). This chapter focuses on academic staff
at the traditional four-year collegiate and university-level institutions
(the non-vocational sector).
Within the traditional four-year college and university sector, a sec-
ond axis of institutional differentiation is between publicly and pri-
vately funded institutions. Beyond the appointment method of their
respective governing boards (political appointment or election in the
public sector and self-perpetuating succession in the private sector),
public and private institutions have historically differed principally
in terms of their revenue streams. Public institutions typically receive
substantial subventions for their instructional mission from state and
local government, allowing them to offer relatively lower tuition prices
than the private sector—yet, still high by the standards of most other
nations. Private institutions typically rely on (relatively high) student
tuition fees, other private support (from alumni, for-profit business
corporations, and philanthropic foundations) and government and/or
corporate research funding.
In 2009, the institutional landscape of the four-year collegiate and
university sector appeared as examined in Table 6.1. Perhaps most strik-
ingly, this table shows the relative small size of the university sector:
only 273 institutions or not quite 40 per cent of the four-year sector
and barely 10 per cent of the entire postsecondary enterprise. Beyond
the 273 research and PhD-granting universities (two-thirds public; one-
third private), the remaining 1,300 institutions are about evenly divided
between master’s and free-standing, baccalaureate granting institutions,
and are disproportionately (two-thirds) private. While private institu-
tions, then, outnumber public institutions, enrollment in the public
sector, led by the research and PhD-granting universities, outpaces that
in the private sector by 2:1. The public sector includes a smaller num-
ber of much larger institutions. This is especially evident among the
research universities. The sole exception here is among the baccalaureate
institutions, the home of the traditional American free-standing arts col-
lege, where the private sector continues to dominate both in terms of
institutional numbers and in enrollments.
As for faculty, their numbers closely follow student enrollment. The
plurality of full-time faculty is located in the research universities and
primarily in the public sector. Part-time faculty, on the other hand,
are located in larger proportion in the private sector. The baccalaureate
institutions, once again, provide the exception: part-time academic staff
164 The Changing American Academic Profession

Table 6.1 The number of institutions, students, and faculty, 2009

Type of Number of Enrollment Full-time Part-time

institution institutions faculty faculty

Research university
Public 139 3, 398, 874 209, 111 55, 363
Private 60 787, 282 79, 661 25, 591
Total 199 4, 186, 156 288, 772 80, 954
PhD university
Public 27 381, 309 16, 371 4, 328
Private 47 336, 407 13, 516 14, 669
Total 74 717, 716 29, 887 18, 997
Master’s level
Public 266 2, 531, 700 97, 714 55, 215
Private 346 1, 353, 981 49, 433 51, 705
Total 612 3, 885, 681 147, 147 106, 920
Baccalaureate
Public 151 511, 129 18, 635 12, 924
Private 528 864, 546 46, 434 23, 684
Total 679 1, 375, 675 65, 069 36, 608

Source: US Department of Education (2009).

are even more likely to be located in the quite small public-sector,

baccalaureate-conferring institutions than in the private sector.

Current challenges

Over the past decade or two, the highly decentralized American system
has encountered many of the same challenges encountered by nations
worldwide: increased demand for access and growing constraints in
public revenues/appropriations (Marginson and Rhoades 2002; OECD
2010). Thus, these challenges have fueled several trends that have
become typical globally: increasing focus on institutional performance
and accountability measures; increasing privatization in the public sec-
tor; and increasing reliance on contingent academic staff (Black 2004).
Enhanced accountability pressures are reflected in the adoption at the
state level of performance budgeting standards, moving partially to
allocation based on outcomes (e.g., number or percentage of gradu-
ates, number of articles published), rather than purely on enrollment
demand; and more generally, in the ascendance of what is now called
“responsibility-centered” management (i.e., individual academic units
responsible for generating revenues in line with their expenditures).
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 165

The declining public baseline institutional support has meant that aca-
demic staff are under increasing pressure to generate revenue from
instructional, research, and service activities. That pressure is reflected in
the trend toward increasing privatization: such as outsourcing of non-
essential services (e.g., dining, security, bookstore); the establishment
and/or expansion of fund-raising units and mechanisms at most public
institutions that support academic quality enhancements; faculty and
administrative salary supplements; and the spin-off of technology trans-
fer units at most major research universities (Slaughter and Rhoades
2004). Over the past several decades, as state allocations for higher
education have declined, the percentage of the institutional budget at
large public research universities that comes from state subventions has
declined in some cases to 10 per cent or less—in effect, making the
annual state allocation only a minor share in the budgets of public
research universities. Indeed, real state-level expenditure per full-time
equivalent student in 2008 was actually lower than nearly a quarter cen-
tury earlier, in 1985 (Zumeta 2009). From a resource perspective, then,
these ostensibly public institutions have largely become privatized.
In terms of the academic profession, these financial pressures have
reshaped instructional staffing, leading most four-year institutions to
resort to contingent staffing.1 While the two-year, vocational sector has
typically involved the use of part-time faculty who teach one course
here, in the four-year college and university sector, there has been
a mushrooming of full-time, limited-term appointments. It has been
reported (Schuster and Finkelstein 2006) that these limited-term, full-
time appointments have over the past two decades constituted the
majority of all new appointments in American four-year colleges and
universities—allowing the proportion of all full-time faculty who are
tenured to dip below 50 per cent, for the first time since 1940.2
While these appointments differ from tenure-eligible appointments
on the face of it in their duration and prospects of permanence—and,
as will be seen, in their salaries—there is growing evidence that these
new types of appointments reflect a new trend toward increasing spe-
cialization in academic work roles. Historically, the American system in
the post World War II period adopted the German Humboldtian model
of integrating teaching, research, and institutional and professional ser-
vice into the ideal typical academic role. All faculty—whatever their field
or institution affiliation—were assumed to integrate all major functions
of their institution in their own individual work role. Even outside the
university sector, some notion remained that even if teaching assumed
primacy, there was still an expectation that all academic staff members
166 The Changing American Academic Profession

at a baccalaureate-level institution at least remain current in the latest

developments in their academic field (even if they themselves were not
active in primary research and publication) and also contribute service
to their institution as good academic citizens.
In a pioneering study of full-time, limited-term faculty appointments,
it has been reported that academic staff on full-time, non-tenure-
eligible appointments tended to play more highly circumscribed work
roles: including teaching only, research only, and administration only
(Baldwin and Chronister 2001). Teaching-only appointments were typi-
cally employed to staff lower-division undergraduate courses, with large
enrollments in fields that provide broad service to undergraduate edu-
cation: English, foreign languages, mathematics, introductory courses
in the health professions, and business. Research-only appointees might
be hired to staff federal and industrial research grants—a more attrac-
tive alternative to the postdoctoral appointment historically typical in
the life and physical sciences. Administration-only appointees might be
hired to launch and maintain new and especially non-traditional aca-
demic programs that are offered either off-campus or via non-traditional
modalities (distance learning), as well as to teach a course in that new
program.
These developments over the past two decades have been exacer-
bated by the great recession of 2008 and its aftermath, which are as
of this chapter still roiling the world economy. Most obviously, the
extant decline in state support for public higher education has been
accelerating. In six states, budget revisions during the fiscal year of 2009
took back 8–24 per cent of state funds already allocated. In California,
the three public college and university systems (the University of
California, the California State University system, and the two-year
community colleges) all suffered 20 per cent cuts in new state fund-
ing. Other states—including Washington, Hawaii, Arizona, and South
Carolina—experienced similar decreases. Unfortunately, in the absence
of federal stimulus funds, severe cuts are likely to continue. Most pub-
lic universities have resorted to substantially increasing student tuition
fees—causing many students to downgrade their educational aspirations
and spending—and to placing limitations on enrollment and the scope
of course offerings. Even the elite private universities, normally immune
to fiscal crises, have suffered significant damage. With the precipitous
plummeting of endowment values among the wealthiest institutions,
including Harvard and Princeton University, even they have been forced
to pull back from their academic commitments and reconsider expan-
sion plans and financial aid policies. Some have announced permanent
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 167

budget reductions, suspended plans for campus expansion (Harvard’s

new science campus), instituted hiring freezes (during the recession,
Stanford did not fill 50 open faculty positions), and reduced student
financial aid (Geiger 2010).
Academic compensation has largely been frozen over the past three
to four years: although averaging 1 per cent increments in the aggregate
(AAUP 2011), many universities in the public sector have had to resort
to staff furloughs and other forms of de facto salary reduction to avoid
layoffs; and many have also had layoffs.
Perhaps most notable among these developments has been the accel-
erating decline of academic tenure in the United States. The percentage
of full-time faculty who are tenured is now about 47 per cent—down
from about 62 per cent in 1970; the percentage of faculty headcount
who are tenured is now in the neighborhood of 15–20 per cent. While,
no doubt, responsive to economic conditions, the trend toward con-
tingent staffing is being accelerated by the introduction of alternative
competing staffing models in the growing for-profit private (propri-
etary) sector of American higher education. Nearly 10 per cent of all
US postsecondary students are enrolled in such institutions, accounting
for nearly one-third of all US federal financial-aid dollars. These insti-
tutions offer vocationally based programs at all levels—ranging from
the non-degree certificate, through the baccalaureate, master’s degree,
and even doctoral and medical education. These programs are struc-
tured around the development of specific skills and competencies and
are largely taught by part-time faculty from syllabi developed centrally
by administrators. They are perceived as offering serious competition
to traditional four-year colleges and universities in a range of academic
areas—including business administration, education, allied health, and
information technology—and are clearly competing with public institu-
tions constrained by budget cuts and, as a result, limited in the number
of aspiring entering students they can accommodate. Even graduate
universities are feeling the competitive pressures and wondering how
they will maintain their advantage in these areas, with the tremendous
expense of fully credentialed, full-time faculty.
What these current challenges have taught observers is just how
vulnerable the three pillars of US historic strength are to economic dis-
location. The decline in research support, and state-level disinvestment
in public higher education, come just as emerging BRIC competitors are
increasing their investment in research and development, as a percent-
age of gross domestic product, and increasing their investment in the
university sector. Moreover, vaunted corporate independence cuts both
168 The Changing American Academic Profession

ways: while this process preserves autonomy from government, it allows

enormous freedom of action to introduce radical staffing and budget
reconfigurations, without regulation or public scrutiny.
All of these developments, of course, are playing out differentially
within an incredibly diverse system of postsecondary education—
defined not only by the type of institution but by the academic field
and faculty demographics. Differences within the system are enormous;
and aggregate generalizations are frequently difficult to make. Policies
for private research universities may not apply to public research uni-
versities, let alone small denominational colleges or public master’s
degree-level institutions. The options for the high professions (law and
business) may not relate to the lower professions (education and nurs-
ing), let alone to the traditional liberal arts fields. The elements facing
new entrants to the faculty may not involve the most senior faculty; and
what applies to academic men may not apply to the rapidly expanding
cohort of academic women.
The remainder of this chapter is focused on a detailed examination of
these changes in the conditions of academic employment and of trends
in academic compensation. The ultimate goal is to provide an appro-
priately “nuanced” basis for assessing the status of these main pillars
of strength supporting the rise to global prominence of the American
research university and the American academic professions, and for
speculating on the prospects for the American academic profession’s
future.

Academic contracts, hiring, and promotion processes

In the United States, the 4,000-plus corporately independent insti-

tutions are the “buyers” that drive the academic job market. Posi-
tions are created at the institutional level in response to replacement
demand—the retirement of current incumbents or their mobility to
other academic institutions or to positions outside academe; and by
growth demand—that is, changes in student enrollment (Carter and
Scott 1998). Historically, the departure of an incumbent from an aca-
demic department created a vacancy. Over the past decade or two
it has become increasingly rare for an incumbent’s departure to lead
to automatic replacement. At most institutions in the United States,
an academic staff member’s departure results in that specific position
being returned to the central university pool—either to be reassigned
to another academic unit on a more promising growth trajectory, with
more pressing academic needs in the eyes of the central administration,
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 169

or to be reallocated outside of the academic personnel rolls to other

more-pressing institutional needs. That is, the position may simply dis-
appear. In those cases in which the unit in question is able to justify
retaining a position, that position may be reclassified from a tenure-
eligible to a limited-term appointment or carved up into multiple
part-time appointments—with any savings returning to the university
pool. Quite beyond a vacancy created by the departure of a current
incumbent, it is not unusual for a new faculty position to be created—
either to support a new academic program or some other institutional
priority. So while the United States serves greater flexibility in generating
position vacancies, there is also considerably less systemic (bureaucratic)
stability now in the number and distribution of positions.
Once a position is created—either through a vacancy or through a
new addition—the search process for full-time academic staff positions,
whether in the public or private sector, is typically highly decentral-
ized. Searches are conducted by individual academic units (departments
and even programs), and recommendations are made from the unit to
the academic dean supervising the unit in question and ultimately to
the campus chief academic officer (Matler 1991). Two aspects of these
searches are particularly important: their scope and the legal parame-
ters within which they operate. Regarding scope, most full-time-faculty
searches at four-year institutions are national in scope—i.e., they seek to
identify and recruit the most-qualified candidates in the United States
in a field or subfield. At major research universities, the scope of such
searches is increasingly international (Bair 2003). In reality, searches at
lesser institutions and searches for limited-term appointments (even at
the research-oriented universities) may be conducted less systematically
and may be largely regional or even local in scope.
Historically, faculty searches in the United States were conducted
through what sociologists referred to as a sponsorship, in contradistinc-
tion to an open, transparent system (Burke 1988; Caplow and McGee
1958). That is, faculty in hiring departments contacted colleagues at
those departments producing the most PhDs in the field and sought
recommendations from mentors of their best doctoral students. The pri-
mary consideration was to recruit the most promising students from
the most prestigious departments (and most prestigious mentors), on
the assumption that prestige in venue would likely provide the best
guarantee of candidate quality and maximize the prestige value of the
new hire.
Beginning with the passage of landmark civil rights legislation in the
United States, in the 1960s and 1970s, searches for academic staff were
170 The Changing American Academic Profession

conducted within the parameters of US government anti-discrimination

policies, reflected in federal legislation protecting against discrimina-
tion in employment on the basis of gender, race/ethnicity, age, sexual
orientation, and other issues. Typically, institutional human-resource
(personnel) office staff have prepared recruitment guidelines covering
scope of advertising, strategies for identification of women and minor-
ity candidates, permissible questions to ask at interviews, as well as other
options (Twombly 2005). For example, it is not permissible according to
such guidelines to ask a prospective female academic staff member if
she is pregnant or planning to have children. Non-discrimination leg-
islation would also restrict any questions about an applicant’s race or
sexual orientation, in screening for interviews. While informal collegial
sponsorship networks still operate, they do so within the parameters
of affirmative action requirements, which include establishing avail-
ability pools of minority and women PhDs in the field, mandatory
advertising in media designed to reach those non-traditional candi-
dates, mandated reporting on the number of women and minorities
included in interviews for a given position, justifications of why a
non-woman or non-minority candidate is preferred over a woman or
minority candidate, and other aspects (Goonen and Blechmen 1999).
In terms of procedure, a hiring academic unit would recommend sev-
eral candidates to the academic dean supervising that unit (often in
some kind of rank order). The dean would make the actual hiring deci-
sions, including not only which candidate should be selected but also
negotiating terms and conditions of employment, covering rank and
salary, directly with the candidate (Twombly 2005). So, in this sense,
while the actual conduct of search and screening processes for academic
staff are highly decentralized (albeit quite standardized), actual hiring
decisions and negotiations are typically conducted more centrally; and
academic deans and chief academic officers, especially in the private
sector, have considerable discretion within basic institutional budgetary
constraints.
At the point of initial authorization for recruitment to an academic
staff vacancy, the type of contract or appointment is usually clearly spec-
ified. Contracts for full-time academic staff differ principally in whether
they offer eligibility for the award of tenure after a probationary period
of typically six or seven years or whether they offer a limited-term con-
tract that may or may not be renewable for one or more succeeding
terms (Clark and Ma 2005). The contract letter would make this clear.
Irrespective of the type of full-time appointment (tenure eligible or
limited contract), the actual length of the initial employment contract
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 171

may vary typically between one and three years. Some kind of annual
review is usually mandated, although it may be somewhat perfunctory
for limited-term appointees. For tenure-eligible appointments, a review
typically takes the form of annual assessments of progress toward tenure
(Twombly 2005). The major high-stakes review for tenure-eligible fac-
ulty comes one year before the end of the entire probationary period,
at which time a decision is made as to whether to award tenure. That
decision is based on an assessment of the performance of academic
staff members in their teaching, research, and service responsibilities.
At research universities, research performance as reflected in publica-
tions and grant awards is emphasized, while at four-year institutions
with a predominantly teaching mission, teaching performance is likely
to be a more central consideration (although some sort of research or
scholarly performance is expected).
The tenure review typically involves a year-long process conducted in
successive stages by faculty committees at the levels of the individual
academic unit and the larger academic super unit in which the focal
academic unit is embedded, and by senior administrators including the
dean of the academic super unit and the chief academic officer and
president of the institution (Twombly 2005). While the recommenda-
tions of the faculty bodies are typically dispositive, the final decision
is ultimately taken by the president and board of trustees. Typically,
about 70 per cent of all eligible academic staff who come up for tenure
consideration are granted tenure, although that figure drops to about
50 per cent at the research universities (Dooris and Sandmeyer 2006).
In the US system, a negative tenure decision is tantamount to a non-
reappointment decision, although in special cases it may be possible to
retain such a faculty member on a limited-term, off-track appointment.
Academic staff who are denied tenure often seek and accept academic
staff positions at less prestigious colleges and universities, which set dif-
ferent standards for promotion and tenure or accept full-time positions
off the tenure track.3 However, some staff, no doubt, take a negative
tenure decision as the impetus to move out of academia altogether.
For limited-contract academic staff, major evaluations and reappoint-
ment decisions are made in the middle of the year, preceding the
final year of the contract. These exercises typically involve review by
lower-level faculty bodies and the deans of major academic units.
Beyond the duration of their appointments and their eligibility for the
award of tenure, fixed-term faculty typically differ from tenure-eligible
faculty based on both their academic credentials and the scope of their
work responsibilities. In terms of credentials, roughly 90 per cent of
172 The Changing American Academic Profession

all tenure-eligible appointees to the entry-level rank of assistant profes-

sor hold a PhD degree at four-year colleges and universities (Clark and
Ma 2005). The analogous figure for fixed-term-contract faculty would
be about 50 per cent. Indeed, a large portion of these non-PhD fac-
ulty might include master’s degree-prepared individuals in health fields
such as nursing, or PhD candidates in English, foreign languages, or
mathematics who are hired on a full-time basis to teach lower-division,
introductory, clinical, or remedial courses. In terms of work responsibil-
ities, tenure-eligible academic staff are typically expected to perform all
three basic academic functions of teaching, research, and service—the
latter including administration and institutional and/or external profes-
sional service to their academic field or the larger community. Indeed,
they likely would have been hired, in no small part, on the basis of
their potential for developing a productive research career—at least at
research universities (Matler 1991).
Fixed-contract faculty typically have a much more specialized func-
tion and are hired to perform one principal function, more often
teaching (especially for lower-division or introductory-undergraduate
courses). However, sometimes, other functions involve research (on an
external government or private foundation grant) or administration
(typically, as director of an academic program that may be based off
the main campus or digital/distance). Unless faculty are specifically
hired on external funds to conduct research, such term appointments
typically are not involved in research activity (Bair 2003). Beyond
specialization among the trinity of teaching, research, and adminis-
tration/service, full-time academic staff on limited-term contracts are
frequently excluded from participation in faculty governance structures
(Baldwin and Chronister 2001) and in certain kinds of professional
development—including sabbatical leaves and internal institutional
research grants. While institutional policy appears non-standardized,
there is some evidence, at least in the humanities, that involvement in
departmental governance is becoming more common. More than two-
thirds of department chairs in English language and literature depart-
ments reported that non-tenure track, full-time faculty were authorized
to cast votes in certain departmental matters (Modern Language Asso-
ciation 2008). Not surprisingly, they would be more likely than tenure-
eligible faculty to be hired based on criteria other than research promise
or past research record—for example, teaching experience, ability, or
administrative experience.4
While fixed-contract appointments are present throughout the uni-
verse of institutional types (including free-standing liberal arts colleges,
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 173

as well as research universities, both public and private), they tend to

be concentrated in a handful of fields—especially in the humanities
and in the professions—in which there are major lower-division teach-
ing responsibilities (courses supplied for students in other major fields).
These include English language, foreign languages, mathematics, busi-
ness, nursing, and other health-related professions.
Except in a few fields in the humanities, especially English or for-
eign languages (see, e.g., Ehrenberg 20105 ), it appears relatively rare for
academic staff to move from a fixed contract to a tenure-eligible posi-
tion and vice versa: about 30 per cent of fixed-term-contract faculty
ultimately move into tenure-eligible position; and only about 10–15
per cent of tenure-eligible faculty move into fixed-contract positions
(Schuster and Finkelstein 2006). When such mobility between appoint-
ments occurs, it almost always requires a change in the employing
institution. This suggests that fixed-term positions are less a new rank
within the traditional career ladder and are more an alternative career
option or track, within a multi-track academic-staff career.6
Before proceeding to a discussion of full-time academic staff salaries,
it is worth viewing the significant trends in numbers of part-time
faculty appointments—in contradistinction to limited term, full-time
appointments. In 1970, US colleges and universities employed 104,000
part-time faculty—about 25 per cent of the workforce of 474,000 full-
time faculty. By 1975, the proportion of part-timers had increased by
81 per cent, to 188,000, while full-time academic staff had increased
about 19 per cent, to 440,000. In the ensuing quarter century, the num-
ber of part-time academic staff swelled to 543,000—an increase of 289
per cent, compared to a 43 per cent increase in full-time academic staff
to 630,000. While the largest increases have been in the public two-year
vocational sector (the community colleges7 ), the university sector has
hardly been immune. In Fall 2005, 61 per cent of the faculty at public
research universities in the United States were full-time (41% tenured or
tenure eligible, 20% fixed term), 20 per cent were part-time, and 19 per
cent were graduate-student teaching assistants (JBL Associates 2008).
Thus, for all practical purposes, about two in five faculty on the rolls
of our public research universities are part-time.8

Academic salaries

Historically, salaries of academic staff in the United States were

abysmally low through the first half of the 20th century (Ruml and
Tickton 1955). Undergirding their low pay were the twin assumptions
174 The Changing American Academic Profession

that academic life was a calling—much like the ministry from whence it
came—and that academics traded off modest salaries for their unusual
job security. Beginning in the 1950s and throughout the 1960s, faculty
compensation registered a slow, steady ascent of 3.6 per cent annually,
which largely paralleled the ascent of the American research univer-
sity to global prominence. These gains were eroded by inflation in the
1970s: professors lost about 15 per cent of their purchasing power in the
1970s—the worst performance of any occupational group in the United
States, outside agriculture (Schuster and Finkelstein 2006). Not until the
mid-1990s did faculty salaries, in constant dollars, recover from the ero-
sion in the 1970s. Indeed, it was not until 1997/1998—a full quarter
century—that faculty salaries on average drew even with the real level
they had attained in 1970/1971, although they had certainly appeared
to rise almost fourfold in current dollars. In the last decade, salaries have
increased modestly in constant dollars (about 6% over the decade).9
Notwithstanding their checkered internal history, academic salaries in
the United States today are among the highest in the world. In a recent
study by the Center for International Higher Education at Boston Col-
lege (Rumbley, Pacheco, and Altbach 2009), the United States ranked
third in overall average monthly salary (after Saudi Arabia and Canada),
among 15 countries.10 Together with the relatively high availability of
positions of one sort or another (vis-à-vis, for example, Germany), such
relatively high salaries in the United States serve as something of a
magnet for academics in Europe (especially those in the United King-
dom, escaping the Thatcher reforms) and Asia (especially China and
India, where many recruits to US doctoral education in the sciences and
engineering stay to pursue academic careers) (Bhandari and Laughlin
2009).
While comparatively high overall, the available data suggest that aca-
demic salaries in the United States vary substantially by type of appoint-
ment: overall, they are generally higher for tenure-eligible, full-time
faculty than for fixed-contract faculty. Yet, in some professional schools,
fixed-contract appointments actually receive a salary supplement as a
type of reward for forsaking tenure eligibility (Chait and Trower 1997).
Moreover, salaries are substantially higher for full-time faculty than for
those on part-time appointments. Indeed, the vast majority of part-time
faculty are employed on a course basis, rather than as a proportion
of a full-time appointment11 ; and they are paid that way. Many are
employed by more than one institution. While there is a dearth of
credible and/or useful salary data on part-timers, triangulating several
sources produces a few reasonable generalizations. First, 91 per cent
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 175

of part-time faculty earn annual salaries of less than US$25,000 from

their employing institutions (64% earn less than US$10,000), although
27 per cent of part-timers at public research universities and 18 per cent
at private research universities earn more than US$25,000 annually12
(US Department of Education 2008). The available evidence on course
salaries suggest that, on average, in the majority of fields, part-timers
earn somewhere in the neighborhood of US$2,600 at public comprehen-
sives and about US$4,200 per course at public research universities (JBL
Associates 2008). Those figures vary somewhat by academic field and are
higher in certain professions (e.g., law and architecture), but probably
lower in certain fields in the humanities. If one were to compare the per
course salary rate of part-time faculty to the per course salary received
by full-time tenure-stream faculty, the full-time tenure-stream advan-
tage would be in the order of 4:1 (JBL 2008).13 Interestingly enough,
in this same analysis of the public sector, full-time and term-limited fac-
ulty were reported to receive about 70 per cent of the salaries of full-time
tenure-stream faculty, while in other analyses, the percentage has been
74 per cent (Curtis and Jacobe 2006).
Given that the evidence is not definitive and, furthermore, the focus
of this study is on faculty in career-ladder appointments, the follow-
ing discussion focuses on salaries of full-time faculty in tenure-eligible
appointments.14
In the United States, although the salaries of full-time, tenure-eligible
academic staff are, on average, substantially higher than for those
academic staff holding non-tenure-eligible or part-time appointments,
there is nonetheless substantial internal variation among tenure-eligible
academic staff. That internal variation is accounted for largely by two
factors: the type of institution/employer and the academic field.

Variation across institutional types

In terms of institutional type, the higher the level of degree offered by an
institution (BA, MA, PhD/MD), the higher the salary it pays its academic
staff.15 That premium tends to increase with academic rank—that is, it is
less discernable at entry level and much larger at the senior ranks. At the
entry level, research-university faculty earn about 20 per cent more than
entry-level faculty at baccalaureate colleges (US$60,000 vs. US$50,000);
and at the full professor rank, they may earn as much as 50 per cent
more on average (US$120,000 vs. US$80,000).
Beyond mission and degree level, in the United States over the past
decade an increasing disparity has emerged between public and pri-
vate institutions. This public–private disparity actually represents a
176 The Changing American Academic Profession

significant new development in American higher education. Until 1990,

public institutions in the United States actually enjoyed a salary pre-
mium over private institutions of close to 10 per cent. Since 1990, largely
as a function of declining state appropriations for higher education,
salaries in the public sector have atrophied. They are now consistently
both lower and less flexible than at private institutions. Salaries are on
average about 10–20 per cent higher at private institutions. That dis-
parity, again, tends to grow larger at the senior ranks (Adams 2010),
compromising the competitive position of many public research univer-
sities in the recruitment of senior scholars. Among private institutions,
church-related colleges tend to offer, on average, lower salaries than
those of non-religiously affiliated private institutions.

Variation by academic field

Unlike most other nations, the United States supports wide disparities
in salaries by academic field, reflective of the market value of a particular
field outside the university in the broader economy. For academic insti-
tutions to compete with business and industry (and even government)
in recruiting academic talent in fields such as law, medicine, engi-
neering, business, chemistry, microbiology, and others, they must offer
higher salaries than for fields, such as English, philosophy, sociology,
and others, with fewer lucrative opportunities outside the university.
The distribution of fields by their outside market value roughly parallels
the proportion of PhD recipients nationally who are employed outside
academe. A newly appointed assistant professor of accounting, for exam-
ple, would at a typical non-research university earn as much as a senior
full professor of English literature or history (both in the mid US$90,000
range).
Table 6.2 shows the differences in average salary for university aca-
demic staff in several professional and liberal arts fields. The data suggest
several observations. First, if the average salaries of the various pro-
fessional fields are computed as a proportion of the average salary in
English language and literature (one of the three liberal arts fields dis-
played in Table 6.2), the salary premium for the professions is found
to range from just above one-quarter in business (27.4% in the pub-
lic sector, 25.9% in the private), to about two-thirds in law (69.1%
in the public sector, 60.7% in the private sector), with engineering
at about 40 per cent (38% in the public sector, 50.7% in the private
sector), and health professions at over 50 per cent in the public sec-
tor and nearly equaling law (above 60%) in the private sector. These
are substantial differences: faculty in law and the health professions
are earning about 1.5 times more than their liberal arts colleagues in
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 177

Table 6.2 Average salaries in selected fields and the average salaries in English
language and literature, 2009

University faculty

Discipline Public Private

Average Difference from Average Difference from

salary (US$) English (%) salary (US$) English (%)

Business 82, 970 +27. 4 84, 940 +25. 9

Computer 75, 670 +16. 1 76, 260 +13. 0
science
Engineering 89, 920 +38. 0 101, 690 +50. 7
English 65, 150 0 67, 460 0
language and
literature
Chemistry 77, 230 +18. 5 77, 580 +15. 0
Psychology 72, 500 +11. 3 71, 570 +6. 1
Health 99, 750 +53. 1 107, 380 +59. 2
specialties
Law teachers 110, 160 +69. 1 108, 440 +60. 4

Source: US Department of Labor (2009).

the humanities. When English language and literature is compared to

chemistry, computer science, and psychology—three fields within the
traditional liberal arts on American campuses—the salary premium for
natural scientists (chemistry and computer science) over literature pro-
fessors is found to be about 15 per cent, much more modest but not
insignificant, and that for social science faculty is under 10 per cent.
Taken together, these data suggest substantial disparities between the
traditional liberal arts and the professions in the United States. More-
over, within the traditional liberal arts, there remain more modest but
consistent differences, favoring the natural sciences.
It is significant to note that inter-field differences persist across both
the public and private sectors at roughly the same magnitude with two
notable exceptions: in both engineering and the health professions, the
salary premiums are somewhat greater in the private than in the public
sector.

Academic rank
Within institutions and academic fields, the prime determinant of salary
is academic rank. Almost all institutions—private as well as public—have
178 The Changing American Academic Profession

a type of salary scale organized by academic rank. There is typically a

floor and a ceiling for the ranks of assistant, associate, and full profes-
sors and several steps—perhaps between four and six—within each rank.
Promotion to the next higher rank commonly entails a substantial salary
increase from the then-current step within the previous rank to the low-
est step on the next higher rank. For tenure-eligible academic staff in
the United States, this policy typically involves promotion to associate
professor with tenure after the six-or-seven-year probationary period.
The available evidence suggests that over the last quarter century, the
salaries of both assistant professors and associate professors, as a percent-
age of the salaries of full professors, have actually declined slightly: from
73.4 per cent to 68.2 per cent for associate professors and from 60 per
cent to 58.2 per cent for assistant professors. This evidence means that
the salary premium for attaining the highest academic rank has actu-
ally increased on average over this period16 (Schuster and Finkelstein
2006). The data in Table 6.3 suggest that the increased premium for
senior ranks varies considerably by academic field—ranging from a low
level of 61 per cent in architecture and language and literatures to close
to 87 per cent in business (where salary compression between ranks is
the greatest), 71 per cent in computer science, and close to 70 per cent
in agriculture, engineering, law, and the health professions—wherein
academia must compete with business and industry in order to recruit
new talent.
Within academic ranks, salary is determined primarily by seniority,
although some evidence reveals that performance factors enter into
the equation. Annual increases at most institutions tend to be across
the board, cost-of-living increases (Perna 2001). Where there is merit
pay, it usually constitutes only a small or secondary component of
annual increments for faculty. This factor is more likely to be based on
research productivity, as reflected in peer-reviewed publications, than on
teaching performance, as reflected in student end-of-the-semester course
evaluations.

Gender discrepancies
Two other possible determinants of salary merit attention. The first
factor is gender. Historically, female academic staff have earned about
80 per cent of the salaries of male academic staff, with similar qualifica-
tions/credentials and performance records—controlling for institutional
type, academic field, and academic rank (Schuster and Finkelstein 2006).
To some extent, that gap has closed—to roughly 90 per cent between
2001 and 2011—as sex discrimination litigation and the results of
Table 6.3 Salaries by academic field and rank, 2009

Discipline Full professor Associate Assistant New assistant New assistant

(US$) professor (US$) professor (US$) professor (US$) professor—% of
full professor

Agriculture, operations, and related 90,053 71, 583 61, 645 62, 589 69.5
sciences
Architecture and related services 95,723 73, 319 60, 181 58, 935 61.6
Communication, journalism, and 83,656 65, 006 53, 599 54, 424 65.1
related programs
Computer and information sciences 101,219 82, 230 70, 791 72, 199 71.3
and support services
Education 82,919 65, 182 54, 953 54, 009 65.1
Engineering 112,679 86, 031 75, 226 75, 450 67.0
Foreign languages, literatures, and 85,620 65, 129 53, 529 52, 271 61.0
linguistics
Legal professions and studies 134,146 101, 045 83, 991 92, 033 68.6
English language and literature/letters 79,372 61, 684 51, 502 51, 204 64.5
Biological and biomedical sciences 91,184 68, 294 57, 545 57, 021 62.5
Mathematics and statistics 84,324 66, 012 55, 765 55, 186 65.4

179
 180
Table 6.3 (Continued)

Discipline Full professor Associate Assistant New assistant New assistant

(US$) professor (US$) professor (US$) professor (US$) professor—% of
full professor

Philosophy and religious studies 84,621 63, 460 53, 018 53, 668 63.4
Physical sciences 88,147 66, 898 56, 720 56, 483 64.1
Psychology 83,840 64, 461 54, 850 54, 584 65.1
Public administration and social 89,342 68, 896 56, 572 57, 873 64.8
service professions
Visual and performing arts 79,098 62, 197 51, 480 50, 762 64.2
Health professions and related clinical 94,610 74, 162 62, 704 64, 296 68.0
sciences
Business, management, marketing, 109,919 92, 573 85, 996 95, 822 87.2
and related support services

Source: College and University Professional Association for Human Resources (2010).
Table 6.4 Salaries of male and female academic staff by institutional type and rank, 2009

Academic rank Public Private

Men Women Women’s Men Women Women’s

disadvantage (%) disadvantage (%)

Institutional type Doctoral Professor 119,255 107,918 9.51 155,952 143,630 7.90
Assistant 71,217 65,820 7.58 86,904 79,132 8.94
Master’s Professor 90,766 87,281 3.84 102,311 94,772 7.37
Assistant 60,986 58,968 3.31 64,656 61,537 4.83
Baccalaureate Professor 85,681 82,345 3.89 100,008 94,362 5.65
Assistant 58,123 55,819 3.97 59,622 57,969 2.78

Source: American Association of University Professors (2010).

181
182 The Changing American Academic Profession

gender equity, salary studies have documented “residual” gender differ-

ences. It appears that at the entry level, these differences are diminishing
even further (Perna 2001).
The data in Table 6.4 provide the latest evidence of shrinking gender
disparities by institutional type and academic rank. This table sug-
gests first that gender differences are greatest at the doctoral institu-
tions and smaller in the public than in the private sector. Moreover,
the distinctions appear smaller (virtually negligible) at the entry-level
ranks—except at the doctoral institutions.

Academic unions

The upcoming discussion looks at collective bargaining and the union-

ization of academic staff. Approximately one-quarter of academic
staff in US higher education—both full and part-time—are unionized
(Schuster and Finkelstein 2006), closer to 30 per cent among academic
staff in the four-year collegiate and university sector (Rhoades 1998).
Following an explosion of such activity in the late 1960s and 1970s
permitted by federal and subsequent state enabling legislation, the
pace of academic unionization has atrophied—as it has in the gen-
eral US economy, where about 15 per cent of workers are represented
by a union. Most of the unionized faculty in American higher edu-
cation are represented by the American Federation of Teachers. About
10 per cent of its 1.4 million members are in higher education, pre-
dominantly in the public sector and evenly divided between two-year
and four-year institutions. The remaining unionized teachers are in
public elementary and secondary education. The National Education
Association (about 100,000 in higher education out of 2.7 million
members) and the American Association of University Professors (about
44,000 members, all in higher education, evenly split between public
and private, mostly four-year institutions—but not all associated with
an American Association of University Professors collective bargaining
unit) constitute the remainder of unionized faculty. These academic
staff are primarily located in the public sector. Because unionization is
higher in states where incomes (and living costs) tend to be greater, it is
hard to isolate the effects of collective bargaining on salaries. Moreover,
in states wherein legislation has enabled unionization among public-
sector employees, nearly all public-sector faculty are unionized. Thus, it
is difficult to identify, for comparison purposes, subgroups of relatively
comparable institutions, in which some faculty are unionized and others
are not.
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 183

Mean salary by field of teaching for union and non-union members

Social sciences

Natural sciences

Humanities

Health sciences

Engineering

Education

Business
$20,000

$30,000

$40,000

$50,000

$60,000

$70,000

$80,000
$10,000

$90,000
$0

1999 Union faculty 1999 Non-union faculty

2004 Union faculty 2004 Non-union faculty

Figure 6.1 Full-time faculty salary by union status, 1999 and 2004.
Source: US Department of Education (2003 and 2008).

With those caveats in mind, it was found that the salaries of faculty
respondents to the 1999 National Study of Postsecondary Faculty, who
were union members, varied from salaries of those who were not
(Schuster and Finkelstein 2006). Unionization was associated with some-
what higher salaries in most fields. The analysis, however, included
both part-time and full-time faculty. When the analysis is restricted
to full-time faculty only and expanded to include the more recent
(2004) National Study of Postsecondary Faculty data (see Figure 6.1), the
union salary advantage largely disappears. Among full-timers, union-
ized faculty show a modest salary boost only in the humanities and
in education, both relatively low-demand fields, and actually show
a slight disadvantage in most other, and relatively high demand,
fields. To the extent that collective bargaining may be a factor in aca-
demic compensation, it seems clear that the impact is restricted to
part-time faculty and among full timers—only those in low-demand
fields.
184 The Changing American Academic Profession

Point of clarification: the typical monthly contract

It is important to clarify that most academic staff in the United States are
employed on nine or ten month (academic year) rather than 12-month
(calendar year) contracts—so salary reports refer to base salaries for
a maximum ten month, or academic year, contract (Clark and Ma
2005). Practically speaking, this means that base-salary figures tend to
underestimate actual academic staff compensation. Many faculty teach
additional courses in the summer, work on research grants, or engage in
other income-producing activities that result in supplemental support
from their employing institution (Bair 2003). They may also engage in
overload teaching and other special assignments during the academic
year, for which they receive supplementary payment from their employ-
ing institution. The point is that most faculty earn at least 5 per cent of
their base salary in summer or other remuneration from their employ-
ing institution—beyond any supplemental employment derived from
outside their employing institution.

Academic salaries compared to those of other professionals

In 1999, academic staff in the United States earned 74.5 per cent of
the weighted average salary of other “highly educated” professionals,
ranging from about half in the case of lawyers and physicians, to about
90 per cent in the case of engineers and computer scientists. By 2003,
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that the academic “salary dis-
advantage” had increased slightly from 25.5 per cent to 27.7 per cent
(Schuster and Finkelstein 2006). Focusing on the point of career entry,
the case of the newly hired assistant professor, the market is viewed as
signaling a long-standing salary disadvantage for at least the last quarter
century. In 1975, entry-level salaries for assistant professors exceeded the
median family income in the United States, as a whole, by 3 per cent.
By 2000, entry-level assistant professor salaries had declined to about
92 per cent of median family income.17
Those entry-level differences tend to widen—even considerably—at
the more advanced career stages when attorneys are moving into part-
nerships and physicians into group practices. Over the past two decades,
the average faculty salary for all ranks has lagged about 30 per cent
behind the average salaries of a comparison group of well-educated pro-
fessionals, holding at least a master’s degree (Schuster and Finkelstein
2006).
As another lens through which to view trends in the competitive-
ness of academic staff’s compensation, the salaries of postsecondary
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 185

academic staff was compared to that of teachers in public elementary

and secondary schools (Schuster and Finkelstein 2006). In 1970, the
ratio of average salaries for assistant professors to elementary/secondary
school teachers was 1.2:1—assistant professors earning, on average, 1.2
times the salary of public school teachers. By 2000, that ratio had shrunk
to 1.09 times—in spite of the relative slowing in the 1990s of teachers’
salary increases, relative to those for all workers.
Finally, Table 6.5 provides yet another lens, through which to view the
compensation of academic staff comparatively, and it yields a slightly
more mixed and nuanced picture. It displays the average (and 75th
percentile) salaries of professionals in various fields employed outside
academe, with those of professionals in the same fields employed as
academic staff in universities. It is found that the average salary of aca-
demic staff in engineering and computer science is roughly equivalent
to that of professionals in similar fields employed in the public sector
outside academe and even to those employed in the private sector as
well, although there is clearly more variation at the upper end in the
private sector. In the case of business, academic staff may be at some-
what of a disadvantage, compared to their non-academic professional
peers; but that depends on the subfield or type of job in which those
outside academe are employed (accountants are decidedly not at a dis-
advantage). Academic staff in law, however, actually enjoy a premium in
average salary over lawyers practicing in the public sector, albeit some-
what of a disadvantage vis-à-vis counterparts in private practice. Only
in medicine are the salaries of academic staff dwarfed by those in pri-
vate practice. However, these comparisons require considerable caution,
since academic staff in the health professions include those in nurs-
ing and other allied health fields (physical therapy and pharmacy), as
well as academic medicine. The lowest academic salaries are located
in the traditional liberal arts fields. While many of these liberal arts
fields do not offer ready equivalents in business and industry, three
such fields—English, psychology, and chemistry—do provide significant
employment opportunities outside academe and Table 6.5 compares
average and 75th percentile salaries within fields across sectors.18 The
results are revealing. In English and literature occupations, among the
lowest-paid occupational group in the liberal arts fields, academics fare
well in terms of average and median salary, although less well at the
lower end of the distribution (the 25th percentile). At the highest end of
the distribution, however, academic staff are actually the highest earn-
ers. In psychology, academic staff tend to do better than psychologists
in private practice or in public school systems but not as well as those in
 186
Table 6.5 Salaries (average and 75th percentile) of other US professionals and academic staff in the public and private sector by
field, 2009

Public Private

Average 75th Average 75th

salary percentile salary percentile
(US$) (US$) (US$) (US$)

Discipline Business Financial managers 93,330 115,540 116,030 142,070

Accountants and auditors 61,560 74,120 68,200 80,090
General and operations managers 94,760 118,440 111,840 142,140
Sales managers 80,950 96,460 111,650 141,560
Human resources managers, all other 92,880 111,940 108,570 130,840
Business operations specialists, all 67,110 81,130 65,370 81,370
other
Financial analysts 67,980 79,480 85,810 99,720
Business teachers, postsecondary 82,970 104,760 84,940 106,620
Computer Science Computer software engineers, 71,660 85,810 90,860 108,450
applications
Computer systems analysts 67,520 81,710 82,020 99,540
Network and computer systems 62,470 75,130 72,190 87,480
administrators
Computer support specialists 45,320 54,340 47,720 57,930
Computer science teachers, 75,670 94,070 76,260 96,180
postsecondary
Engineering Civil engineers 78,920 94,180 82,080 98,250
Electrical engineers 83,400 101,820 86,410 104,210
Industrial engineers 83,450 97,660 77,030 92,010
Mechanical engineers 87,200 104,510 80,180 96,040
Engineering teachers, postsecondary 89,920 110,760 101,690 123,650

Chemistry Chemists 77,640 99,350 71,780 90,260

Chemical technicians 41,700 50,730 44,020 53,650
Chemistry teachers, postsecondary 77,230 93,660 77,580 92,460

Psychology Clinical, counseling, and school 70,810 84,070 74,200 87,700

psychologists
Industrial-organizational 73,460 87,970 108,940 134,490
psychologists
Psychologists, all other 83,310 102,580 86,150 105,360
Psychology teachers, postsecondary 72,500 88,210 71,570 87,030

187
 188
Table 6.5 (Continued)

Public Private

Average 75th Average 75th

salary percentile salary percentile
(US$) (US$) (US$) (US$)

Applied English Editors 49,670 57,760 58,670 71,570

Language/Literature Technical writers 64,640 78,880 65,660 80,560
Occupations Writers and authors 65,890 82,830 64,470 75,190
English language and literature 65,150 $81,150 67,460 $80,350
teachers, postsecondary
Legal Lawyers 98,360 127,890 137,540 #
Arbitrators, mediators, and 87,620 114,730 60,790 70,920
conciliators
Law teachers, postsecondary 110,160 141,360 108,440 138,960
Medicine Family and general practitioners 147,150 # 170,790 #
Internists, general 161,940 # 185,360 #
Pediatricians, general 150,070 # 162,030 #
Surgeons 193,650 # 221,290 #
Physicians and surgeons, all other 144,200 # 180,600 #
Health specialties teachers, 99,750 127,810 107,380 143,540
postsecondary

Note: # = indicates a salary greater than US$166,400 per year.

Source: US Department of Labor (2009).
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 189

the business/industrial sector. Yet, in chemistry, academic staff actually

outearn chemists outside academe across the salary distribution—albeit
by no more than 5 per cent.
This analysis suggests that, at least in part, the comparison of average
salaries between academics (a plurality of whom reside in the tradi-
tional liberal arts) and other professionals outside academe may lead
to somewhat biased—or, at least, insufficiently nuanced—conclusions.
When academic staff in the professional fields—and in chemistry—are
compared directly to their counterparts in the public sector and private
business and industry, the salary differential is less extreme and, in some
cases, may actually involve an academic salary premium—at least over
the public sector. Even within the liberal arts fields, the salary differen-
tials are not always large or in favor of the non-academic sector (as, once
again, in chemistry).
One further layer of nuance is provided by the columns includ-
ing data on salaries at the 75th percentile—the higher end salaries
at the more advanced career stages. These data provide inferences
about comparative salary differentials, at later career stages. Once
again, academic engineers and computer scientists fare relatively well,
vis-à-vis their counterparts outside academe. At the other extreme,
academic staff and private industry differentials clearly swell at the
more senior level in law and medicine. Business falls somewhere in
between.
While the salaries of academic staff in the United States are good,
regarding those of academic staff in many other nations, their posi-
tion in terms of payment in their own national context may be less
favorable—at least in the aggregate, a function of the plurality of
faculty in academic fields with limited employment markets outside
academe. However, academic staff in several of the professions (who
are, after all, at the higher end of the academic salary distribution)
compare favorably with their counterparts in the public sector and,
in several cases, with those in the private sector, as well. Primarily at
the more advanced careers stages, and primarily in law and medicine,
academic/private-sector differentials swell considerably.

Fringe benefits of academic staff

In addition to salary, all institutions in the United States provide their

full-time academic staff with an array of non-salary compensation, typ-
ically referred to as “fringe benefits.”19 These almost always include
health insurance for the staff member and his/her family (to which
190 The Changing American Academic Profession

the staff member may be required to contribute a portion) and an

institutional contribution to a retirement plan (which usually requires
a matching individual contribution) (Clark and Ma 2005). There are
actually two components to institutional contributions to retirement:
there is a cash contribution to either a private annuity plan (such as the
Teacher’s Insurance Annuity Association, usually referred to simply as
“TIAA”) or a “local” public plan (usually the state pension system for
public employees including academic staff in the public sector). Also,
there is a mandated institutional contribution on behalf of the indi-
vidual to the US Social Security fund, as well as a requirement for all
businesses with more than 50 employees that provides a federal retire-
ment annuity for all workers (Bair 2003). Beyond these basics, many
institutions include some kind of tuition benefit for academic staff, their
spouses, and children. Given the costs of higher education in the United
States, especially in the private sector, such a benefit can amount to a
substantial portion of annual salary for years in which it is used by a
staff member or his or her immediate family.
While salary is nearly always the primary component of compensa-
tion, certainly health insurance, retirement contribution, and tuition
benefits are key aspects of the overall package. In 2011, most institutions
estimated the actual costs to them of fringe benefits as about 30 per cent
of an academic staff member’s base salary, compared to about 20 per cent
a decade ago. Many of these benefits, however, are largely invisible to
an individual faculty member, since the increased benefits have primar-
ily involved areas such as increased health insurance premiums and/or
Social Security contributions that do not materially improve his or her
current economic status (i.e., individual purchasing power) (Chronsiter
2001).
The available evidence suggests that the fringe benefits available to
full-time tenure-eligible faculty are, at most institutions also extended
to full-time, limited-term faculty. It has been reported that 93 per
cent of the cross-section of 86 four-year colleges and universities have
extended full-fringe benefits to full-time, non-tenure-track faculty, with
little difference between public and private institutions (Baldwin and
Chronister 2001). Such benefits were spelled out in greatest detail
in unionized campuses. Part-time faculty, on the other hand, are
typically not eligible for most fringe benefits at most institutions.
There may be a variation for those part-time appointees who are
not paid by the course, but as a percentage of a full-time equivalent
appointment.
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 191

Supplementary employment

Data from the 2004 National Study of Postsecondary Faculty (US Depart-
ment of Education 2008) show the following:

1. Just over half of all full-time faculty (whether term appointees or

tenure eligible) report receiving supplementary salary from their
employing institution, beyond their contractual base salary—usually
in form of overload or summer teaching, special administrative
stipends, or pass-through funds from external grants.
2. Only about one-eighth of academic staff receive supplemental
income from another institution of higher education (usually teach-
ing part-time on another campus).
3. Nearly one-third of academic staff report receiving income
from consulting or freelance work in their academic field—
presumably, including royalties and other income from intellectual
property.
4. About one-fifth of academic faculty report receiving income from
other (presumably non-academic) employment outside their home
institution.
5. About one-third of academic staff report other sources of income—
such as investment income from the ownership of stocks, bonds, and
real estate.

Although there are not significant differences in the proportion of aca-

demic staff earning these different categories of income in the public vs.
the private sector, there is some public–private difference in the actual
amounts of outside income earned. Academic staff in the public sector
earn an average of about 11 per cent of their institutional salary in total
outside income and about 6 per cent of their institutional salary from
outside employment income (including consulting). The corresponding
figures for academic staff in the private sector are 14 per cent and 7 per
cent, respectively, of institutional salaries, which are 20 per cent higher
to begin with.
Within sectors, however, there is some evidence that supplemen-
tal employment income varies by institutional type. Academic staff
at research universities are slightly less likely to report supplemen-
tary income from their employing institution (48% vs. 55%) or from
another college or university (9% vs. 13%), and are slightly more
likely to report income from consulting/freelance work (38% vs. 30%)
192 The Changing American Academic Profession

and other employment (25% vs. 21%). A significant difference, however,

does not appear in the outside income they earn from such activities as a
percentage of their institutional salary vis-à-vis non-research university
staff (14% and 11%, respectively).20
An examination of differences among academic staff by discipline
shows that academic staff in engineering and the fine arts were much
more likely (at about 45% each) than other academic staff to earn
income from consulting and freelance work, while academic staff in the
humanities were least likely (23%) compared to the overall 30 per cent
average. Academic staff in business (67%) and education (62%) were
more likely than those in other academic fields (51%, overall) to report
income from their employing institution beyond their base salary. There
were minor differences by field in the percentage reporting income from
other academic institutions (although the range across all fields fell
between 9% and 15%).
All in all, these data clearly suggest that, in the United States, insti-
tutional base salary is by far the major component of academic com-
pensation, especially when fringe benefits are included. While income
from outside sources varies by the type of institution and academic field,
nonetheless it remains a minor component of the total professional
income of academic staff.

Conclusions

In the second half of the 20th century, academic staff in the United
States consummated something of a spectacular rise onto the world
stage. Their career prospects improved substantially in terms of the
emergence of a predictable, regularized career track and an expanding
academic job market capable of absorbing new recruits, almost as fast
as the graduate schools produced them (in some cases, in the 1950s
and 1960s, even faster). The 1970s began a process of erosion, as the
growth of the academic job market slowed and economic conditions,
especially inflation, robbed steadily growing academic salaries of most
of the gains in purchasing power. In the late 1980s and the 1990s a
period began where compensation losses recovered steadily but in which
both the job market continued to deteriorate and the predictability and
regularity of the career track was threatened by new types of academic
appointment practices. Since then, growing marketization of higher
education has fueled a widening stratification of the system across a vari-
ety of dimensions—including institutional type, academic field, and,
now, type of appointment. The internal differences within the system
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 193

are now wider than at almost any point in the past; and it becomes
difficult, if not impossible, to hazard generalizations at the system level.
At the top of the system, at research universities, career tracks remain
predictable structurally, although the competition for shrinking federal
research funds makes it difficult to operationally graft an individual
career path on that frame. A growing gap is emerging between the pri-
vate and public sectors, as state government disinvestment in higher
education continues apace and as the public sector itself struggles to
diversify its revenue base. The market has introduced larger and grow-
ing disparities among the disciplines and professional fields—producing
gaping disparities between resources and opportunities among the lib-
eral arts and the professions and, within the liberal arts, between the
natural sciences, the humanities, and social sciences. The development
of a system of limited-term academic appointments has weakened the
traditional tenure system and introduced clear lines of stratification.
In effect, what had been a relatively homogeneous professional group
has been transitioned into a highly differentiated workforce, playing
multiple roles and progressing on multiple-career tracks.
Working conditions, employment prospects, and salary depend
almost entirely on where an individual academic staff member is
located, along the system’s lines of stratification. Faculty members in
the professional schools and in the natural sciences at research uni-
versities, especially private research universities, boast excellent career
opportunities and compensation that affords them a middle-class—if
not upper-middle-class—lifestyle. Faculty members in the humanities,
and those outside the research university sector, have much more
precarious career prospects and economic opportunities. Another case
involves the large and growing contingent of the workforce—the new
majority—and those full-time faculty who make careers off any pre-
scribed institutional career track. The career opportunities and payment
available to them may be less attractive objectively but may nonethe-
less provide a satisfactory set of trade-offs for young parents or for
early retirees transitioning from lucrative first careers in business or the
military.
Irrespective of location in the newly emerging stratification system,
the prospects for new entrants to the academic staff are among the most
precarious in the past half century. Of the 40 per cent of newly minted
PhDs entering the academic workforce annually, less than half will land
tenure-track, full-time appointments; and the majority of these faculty
will be outside the research university sector. While possessing the req-
uisite doctoral degree, their compensation will not compare favorably
194 The Changing American Academic Profession

to that of a newly minted baccalaureate degree in nursing, physical

therapy, finance, or accounting; and will be about half that of a newly
minted attorney taking a first full-time position in a large, prestigious
law firm. It will not likely permit a middle-class lifestyle—at least, not
yet. The extent to which individuals can find their way to a research
university, especially a private one, and manage to successfully com-
pete for extramural research funds, then a subsequent promotion to a
full professorship and opportunities for career mobility and an upper
middle-class lifestyle may be promising. For those aspiring academics
in the humanities and the less-quantitative social sciences (e.g., his-
tory, anthropology, sociology, and geography), prospects for either a
predictable career track or reasonable economic prosperity are more ten-
uous; and certainly, institutional life is less accommodating and working
conditions are less attractive.
Within the context of the last half century in the United States, cur-
rent developments signal a clear decline in the collective fortunes of
American academic professions. In absolute terms of career opportunity
and compensation, these professions do still compare favorably with
their counterparts in most other nations. However, for the moment, the
trajectory is no longer above the horizontal level and is gradually but
ineluctably declining. At the same time—as the key point—the fortunes
of the academic professions in other rapidly developing economies,
especially the BRIC countries, are on the rise. Thus, the threats to
the continued hegemony of the American research university and aca-
demic profession are sufficiently real. Certainly, in the next half century,
a gradual realignment may be seen in the global scientific pecking
order—a development that may be all to the global good.

Notes
1. Contingent faculty appointments cannot always be directly attributed to
financial pressure. Indeed, colleges and universities fill many different needs
by short-term hiring. This trend allows them to pilot new, untested academic
programs without making long-term commitments; to tap into the unique
expertise of professionals in the field who do not aspire to academic research
careers; to replace permanent faculty who are on research or personal
leaves; as well as other factors (see Cross and Goldenberg 2009). Nonethe-
less, US Department of Education data show quite conclusively that from
a curiosity and a largely peripheral phenomenon in the mid-1980s, these
appointments became within a single decade the modal type of appoint-
ment for newly hired faculty entering the system. The precipitousness and
rapidity of this trend—and its nearly perfect parallelism with deteriorating
fiscal conditions—suggest, at the least, a non-spurious correlation.
 Martin J. Finkelstein and Kevin W. Iglesias 195

2. That was the year that the American Association of University Professors, in
consultation with the American Council on Education, first promulgated its
classic Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, in which it specified the
six-to-seven-year probationary period and the subsequent “up-or-out” deci-
sion as the modal organizing principal for academic appointments (AAUP
2006).
3. This tends to be especially true for academic women, who are much more
likely than men to move from a tenure-track to a fixed-term appointment,
even prior to tenure review—usually for purposes of reducing work demands
and restoring a healthier work–family-life balance.
4. It should be noted that some four-year institutions are placing increased
emphasis on teaching ability and experience in hiring all faculty.
5. Ehrenberg reported that a plurality of humanities doctoral graduates of a
dozen prestigious universities, taking first full-time position on a limited-
term contract, were eventually able to land a full-time, tenure-track
position—suggesting that in the humanities, at least, non-tenure eligible
appointments may have become a new entry step on the academic career
ladder.
6. There is an exception in the humanities, where fixed-term contracts
may provide a new kind of temporary entry-level holding station to the
tenure track, not unlike the postdoc in the physical and life sciences and
engineering.
7. About two-thirds of the headcount faculty at the two-year institutions are
part-time and around about one-third are full-time.
8. For four-year public comprehensive institutions, the proportion of part-time
faculty approaches 40 per cent. Since they rarely employ graduate teaching
assistants, for practical purposes, such institutions do not differ significantly
from research universities.
9. Since the great recession of 2008, however, progress has abruptly stopped
and may have actually receded.
10. This study did not, most notably, include Hong Kong. The countries repre-
sented included: United States, United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Malaysia,
Argentina, Columbia, India, and China.
11. Part-time faculty on appointments that are a portion of full-time are fre-
quently in longer-term situations: some may be professional school faculty
(architects or engineers) with tenure, but substantial outside commitments
(about 10% of all part-time faculty in the United States are tenured or tenure
eligible); others may be female tenure-track or tenured faculty who move to
part-time during early childrearing years.
12. Nearly 3 per cent earn more than US$100,000 annually (US Department of
Education 2008).
13. However, we must remember that in most institutions, full-time tenured and
tenure-track faculty members have significant responsibilities outside of the
classroom. As a result, it may not be accurate to count classroom teaching as
constituting 100 per cent of the salaries of full-time tenured and tenure-track
faculty members. These responsibilities may include research, committee
work, and community service. Full-time tenured and tenure-track faculty
members also receive support to perform other functions—i.e., working with
196 The Changing American Academic Profession

student groups, being available to help with special student projects, and
being available to students outside of class.
14. A systematic comparative study is currently under way in the United States of
differences between salaries of tenure eligible vs. contingent faculty, includ-
ing both full-time, limited-term appointees, and part-time appointees—
according to John Curtis, Director of Research, American Association of
University Professors. The survey, sponsored by the Coalition on the Aca-
demic Workforce, a group including several disciplinary associations and
faculty unions, is scheduled to go into the field in November 2010, and a
preliminary report is tentatively scheduled for late spring, 2011.
15. What follows is based on the 2008 AAUP Annual Survey of the Economic
Status of the Profession (AAUP 2009).
16. There has been much discussion of salary compression in American higher
education, wherein the salaries of new faculty recruits are perceived as gain-
ing ground in a percentage of the salaries of senior faculty—narrowing the
gap among academic ranks. While in a few, select high-demand fields—e.g.,
business, engineering, computer science, and nursing—wherein new recruits
must be paid relative to the current industry norms rather than to salaries of
senior academic staff—this may be the case, the available data suggest that
it is not true in the aggregate.
17. To some extent, of course, a portion of that decline may be attributable to the
rise in the proportion of two-income families, effectively inflating median
family income (and deflating entry-level salaries as a proportion of same).
18. While many PhD psychologists practice outside academe, they tend to be
employed in private practice or in public-sector health and welfare agencies,
where compensation is relatively modest as compared to private business
and industry.
19. Part-time academic staff almost never receive fringe benefits of any kind—
except for benefits mandated by the federal government for all employees of
all large employers (e.g., contributions to social security).
20. Yet, of course, their average institutional base salaries are considerably
higher.

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Index

academic culture, 12–15, 67, 86, 89 Brazil

academic freedom, 13–15, 24, 25, academic profession, 35–8
57, 161 collective bargaining, 134
Academic Performance Indicator contracts, 41–3, 45
(India), 102, 110, 111, 112 demographics of, 28
academic profession, 21–5, 35–8, institutions of higher education,
56–7, 93, 98–101 29–30, 33
academic staff. see faculty public education in, 28–9
Academy of Engineering (China), 145 quality of higher education in, 52–3
Academy of Sciences (China), 128, 145 qualifications, 38–41
Academy of Sciences (Russia), 8, 17, ranks, academic, 38–9
58, 63 salaries, 16, 37, 38, 39, 41–2, 43–6
Academy of Social Sciences (China), Brazilian Center for Physics Research,
128, 145 34, 50
access, 2, 4, 26, 34, 94, 164 Brazilian Enterprise for Agricultural
see also admissions; enrollment Research, 49
(student) BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China),
Act for Promoting Minban Education 1–2, 93, 161, 167, 194
in the People’s Republic of China,
130 California, 166
administrative responsibilities, 47, 68, California State University (United
72, 75, 78, 172 States), 166
admissions, 32, 61, 88, 89, 128 Canada, 50, 158, 174
quotas, 33, 62 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique, 38
see also access; enrollment (student) Career Advancement Scheme (India),
Altbach, Philip G., 151 111, 112, 113, 115
American Association of University Catholic universities, 13, 29, 31
Professors, 161, 182, 195n2, Center for International Higher
196n14 Education (Boston College), 174
American Federation of Changjiang Scholar Plan (China),
Teachers, 182 155–6, 158
Amity University (India), 107 China, 20–1, 126–9
Association of Indian Universities, 105 academic programs, 127–8, 140
autonomy academic profession, 132–3, 137–8,
faculty, 36, 131 140, 157
institutional, 26, 30, 42, 75, 85, 96, contracts, 131, 133–5, 137–8, 139,
129, 131, 138, 139, 140–1, 142, 151
151, 160 English language, 3, 136, 144, 145,
Azim Premji University (India), 107 146, 147, 156
institutions of higher education,
Belgium, 50 126–7, 152
brain drain, 3, 4, 60, 67, 133, 158 labor law, 133–5

199
200 Index

China – continued Docent’s Association of the University

promotion, 25, 136–7, 138, 139, of São Paulo (Brazil), 37
142, 152–5
qualifications, 136, 151–2 economic development, 1–2, 8, 26,
quality of higher education in, 151, 49, 162
152 Embraer (Brazil), 50
ranks, academic, 132, 137–8, 142–6 Employment News (India), 104
reform, 129, 130–1, 133 enrollment (student), 4, 5, 34–5, 59,
salaries, 134, 135, 138, 139, 140–6, 61–2, 73, 88, 89, 95, 97, 126–8,
148, 149–51, 152, 156, 157–8 162, 163, 164, 166
China Center for Economic Research, gross enrollment ratio, 5, 34, 59, 65,
151 97, 126–7
Communist Party, 13 see also access; admissions;
Constitution of India, 104, 121 massification
consulting, 81, 82, 120, 141, 191 Europe, 2, 25, 174
contracts, 25, 41–3, 57, 70, 71–4, evaluation of faculty, 25, 36, 72, 74,
108–9, 131, 133–5, 137–8, 139, 89, 110, 113, 140, 152, 171, 178
170–3, 184 expansion, higher education, 51, 65,
civil-servant, 41, 45, 132 97, 126–9, 160–2
collective bargaining, 134, 182–3 see also higher education systems
full-time, 36, 41, 47, 99, 170 Expertise-Introduction Project for
hourly, 42, 79, 99, 100, 109 Disciplinary Innovation in
part-time, 42, 44, 99, 100, 109, 151 Universities (China), 156
permanent, 73, 98–100, 117
faculty
private labor-market, 42, 45, 79, 99,
autonomy of, 36, 131
139
categories of, 37, 82, 84, 98–101,
probationary, 98, 110, 170–1, 178
131, 133, 166
term (fixed), 45, 63, 72–3, 98–100,
full-time, 37, 79, 82, 99, 131–2,
170–1, 172, 173, 174–5
162–3, 165, 173, 195n11
Coordination for the Advancement of
international, 44, 90–1, 120, 155–7
High Level Personnel (Brazil), 31,
mobility of, 4, 43, 63, 67, 84, 85, 94,
34
106, 133, 155, 161, 173
corruption, 12–15, 67, 81, 83, 88–9,
number of, 36, 44, 59, 95, 131–2,
100, 106, 122, 137
145, 162, 173
Corruption Perception Index, 122
part-time, 22, 37, 42, 79, 99–100,
cost of living allowance, 113, 116
131–2, 132n3, 162–3, 165, 167,
Cultural Revolution, 20
173, 195n11, 196n19
senior, 36, 85, 90, 135, 176
da Silva, Luis Ignácio Lula, 37 status of, 70–1, 93, 116, 131, 139,
de facto tenure. see job security 157
death gratuities. see life insurance young, 36, 67, 72, 84, 85, 90, 146–8
Decisions on Deepening the Reform of family planning allowance, 119
Personnel System of Higher Federal State Statistics Service (Russia),
Education (China), 133 65
Department of Education (China), 148 Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
degrees, 30, 58, 82, 97, 152, 167 (Brazil), 29
dingti, 132 Federal University of Minas Gerais
distance learning, 59, 61, 166 (Brazil), 33, 52
 Index 201

fees. see tuition and fees hiring and recruitment, 39, 41, 42, 75,
Financing Agency for Studies and 90, 103–7, 107–8, 135–7, 139–40,
Projects (Brazil), 31 155–7, 157, 161, 168–73
for-profit institutions, 11, 33, 34, 36, affirmative action, 103–4, 170
79, 107, 167 internal or inbreeding, 64, 84–6, 94,
foreign-born faculty. see faculty, 106, 137
international non-discrimination, 94, 103–4, 170
Founder Group (China), 12 public posting, 41, 42, 72, 104–5,
France, 29 135, 136, 170
French Institutes Universitaires de committees, 41, 105, 135, 136
Technologie, 33 Hong Kong, 155
funding housing benefit, 64, 70, 113, 115, 116,
decreasing, 65, 164, 165, 166, 167, 118, 141
176
inadequate, 7–8, 18, 86
IIT-Bombay (India), 107
increasing, 67, 87, 158, 161
India
private, 70, 75, 91n2, 96–7, 128–9,
academic profession, 93, 98–101,
162
121–3
public, 7–8, 31, 32, 62, 67, 70, 76,
academic programs, 97
87, 89, 91n2, 91n3, 96,
contracts, 98–100, 108–10
128–129, 142, 162
research, 47, 65, 90, 141–2 demographics of, 93
English language, 3, 116, 120
gaokao, 15 institutions of higher education, 19,
Germany, 29, 31, 82, 161, 174 93–8
Doktor degree, 82 promotion, 110–113
globalization, 60, 93 quality of higher education in,
governance and leadership, 13, 26, 69, 93–4, 104
129–30, 164 qualifications, 93, 101–3, 123n5
centralized, 13, 69, 74, 128 ranks, academic, 101–3, 105,
decentralized, 13, 129, 160 110–113
shared with faculty, 13, 69, 134, 172 salaries, 18, 93, 94, 96–7, 99,
guanbenwei, 132 108–9, 110, 113–16, 118,
119, 121
habilitation, 82 Indian Institutes of Management, 106,
Harvard University (United States), 107, 113, 114, 121, 123n1
166, 167 Indian Institutes of Science, 113, 121,
health care benefits, 42, 63, 70, 118, 122, 123n4
132, 141, 189, 190 Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs),
Higher Education Law (China), 151 9, 15, 18, 95, 106, 113, 114, 120,
higher education systems, 16–21, 51, 121, 123n4
94, 95, 126–9 Indian Parliament, 95, 123n2
growth in, 1, 5–7, 51, 65, 97, 126–9, Innovative Education Program
160–1 (Russia), 87
see also expansion, higher education Institute of Applied and Pure
Higher School of Economics (Russia), Mathematics (Brazil), 34
17, 84, 91n1 International Comparative Survey
Hindi language, 95 on the Academic Profession
Hindu caste system, 104 (Brazil), 46
202 Index

International Partnership Program for Ministry of Education (Brazil), 30, 31,

Creative Research Teams (China), 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 52, 53n1
155 Ministry of Education (China), 127,
international partnerships, viii, 88, 128, 130, 133, 156
155 Ministry of Education (Russia), 62, 65
iron bowls system (China), 132 Ministry of Education and Science
isomorphism, 86 (Russia), 58, 86, 89, 91n1, 91n3
Italy, 29, 31 Ministry of Finance (India), 116
Ministry of Health (Brazil), 50
Japan, 2, 31 Ministry of Health (Russia), 62
Jawaharlal Nehru University (India), Ministry of Human Resources
18 Development (India), 95, 97, 113,
job growth, 52, 66 115, 116, 123n1
job security, 25, 41, 43, 63, 72, 73, Ministry of Light Industry and Heavy
90–1, 98–9, 108, 130, 132, 133, Industries (Russia), 62
139, 165, 167, 174 Ministry of Science and Technology
Johnson, Todd, 141 (Brazil), 31
Monitoring of Educational Markets
knowledge-based economy, 34, 93 and Organizations (Russia), 57,
74, 78, 91n1
Labor Contract Law (China), 134 moonlighting, 17, 22, 36, 47, 70, 78,
Labor Department (China), 135 79, 82, 119–20, 141, 150–1, 174,
Labor Law of People’s Republic of 191–2
China, 133–4 Moscow, 61, 70
Laboratory of Institutional Analysis
(Russia), 84, 91n4 National Council for Scientific and
Laborers’ Party (Brazil), 37 Technological Development
Latin America, 2, 9, 16–17, 32, 50, 52 (Brazil), 31
Law of Employment Contracts National Council of Research (Brazil),
(China), 134, 135 50
Leningrad (Russia), 61 National Docent’s Union of Higher
life insurance, 117 Education Institutions (Brazil), 37
livre docência exam (Brazil), 39 National Education Association
(United States), 182
Manipal University (India), 13 National Eligibility Test (India), 102,
massification, 4–7, 10 124n6
see also enrollment (student) National Household Sample Survey
maternity leave, 117–18 (Brazil), 35, 44, 52, 53n1
medical care. see health care benefits National Institute of Health (United
Menon, Madhava N., 123n1 States), 161
mergers, 10, 33–4 National Knowledge Commission
Merit Promotion Scheme (India), 112, (India), 93
113 National Science Foundation (China),
Minban (China), 20, 127, 130 146
Ministry of Agriculture (Brazil), 49, National Science Foundation (United
53n1 States), 161
Ministry of Agriculture (Russia), 62 National Study of Postsecondary
Ministry of Defense (Russia), 62 Faculty (United States), 183, 191
 Index 203

New Century Excellent Young Scholar professors. see faculty

Plan (China), 148 promotion, 25, 39, 42, 52, 84, 86, 106,
non-governmental organization, 47 110–113, 136–7, 138, 139, 142,
Nobel Prize, 156, 160 152–5, 171
North America, 1, 30, 54n2 protective discrimination. see hiring
and recruitment
On Education in the Russian public education (primary and
Federation, 65 secondary), 28–9, 60, 79
O’Neill, Jim, 1 public higher education, 10, 11–12,
111 Plan (China), 155, 156–7, 158 29–35, 58, 65, 93–6, 127, 139,
Organization for Economic 162–3, 166, 167
Cooperation and Development publication of research, 3, 47–9, 50,
(OECD), 7, 8, 28 75–6, 82, 85, 87, 109, 143, 145,
Oswaldo Cruz Institute (Brazil), 152, 162, 178
34, 50 expectations, 47, 72, 76, 86, 102–3,
Outline for Mid- and Long-Term 138, 140
Higher Education Plan
(China), 127 qualifications, 21, 38–41, 42, 82,
84, 93, 101–3, 136, 151–2,
paid leave. see vacation days 172–3
patents, 21, 26, 50, 160 quality control, 34, 63, 88, 93–4, 128,
Peking University (China), 12, 127, 151, 152
131, 133, 137, 138, 139,
143, 151, 155 rankings
Peoples Friendship University of domestic, 140
Russia, 17 international, viii, 2, 6, 9, 10, 18,
Performance Based Appraisal System 26, 34, 52
(India), 102, 112 recruitment. see hiring and
Pernambuco (Brazil), 33 recruitment
Petrobrás (Brazil), 50 ranks, academic, 38–9, 59, 84, 101–3,
plagiarism, 15, 89 105, 110–113, 132, 137–8, 142–6,
Portuguese, 2, 29, 47 171–2
Presbyterian Church, 31 remuneration. see salaries
Princeton University (United States), research, 86–7, 97
166 basic, viii, 162
Privatdozent (Germany), 39, cost, ix, 90
53n2 fellowships, 31, 42
private higher education, 10–12, 32, funding, 47, 65, 70, 76, 90, 141–2,
36, 58, 65–6, 123n2, 128, 129–30, 161, 162, 163, 167
139, 163, 167 grants, 31, 38, 75, 128, 140, 141,
teaching in, 38, 79, 162 142, 143, 146, 150, 152, 156,
salaries in, 45, 68, 79, 96–7, 114, 158, 166, 172, 184, 191
116, 146, 175–6, 191 paid, 75–6
private tutoring, 57, 79, 81, 120 productivity, 2, 50, 73–4, 82,
privatization, 10–12, 37, 66, 94, 86, 102, 143, 145, 161,
129–30, 164, 165 172, 178
revenue generation and, 10, 94, 165 requirements, 47, 73–4, 82, 102,
professional development, 57, 63, 109, 138, 139, 171, 172
102, 110, 136, 172 see also publication of research
204 Index

research and development (R&D) academic field, 68–9, 116, 141, 143,
economic development and, 8, 156, 157, 175, 176–7, 182, 185,
49, 162 189, 192
expenditures and, viii, 7–8, 141–2, administrative responsibilities,
146, 162, 167 68, 78
research foundations, 42 bonuses, 42, 68, 143, 149–50
research institutes, 8–9, 34, 47, 58, corruption and, 81, 94
97, 151 degree and, 68, 142, 175–6
research universities, 2, 9–10, 18, 32, full-time, 43, 150, 174–5, 191
47, 49, 86, 87–8, 91, 126–9, gender and, 99, 118, 119, 178, 182
139–40, 141, 142, 151, 163, 173 grants as part of, 38, 75, 141,
see also specific universities 142, 143, 146, 150, 152, 172,
retirement 184, 191
age, 41, 43, 98–9, 113 minimum wage, 74
benefits, 42, 43, 124n10, 132 negotiation of, 37–8, 42, 108, 115,
early, 43, 99 134, 170
pension, 70, 98–9, 117, 141, part-time, 99–100, 115, 150–1,
143, 190 174–5
Right to Information Act (India), 103 pay scales, 43, 68, 108, 109, 114,
Rio de Janeiro, 29, 32–3, 34, 50 115, 116
Rio Grande do Sul (Brazil), 33 private institutions and, 45, 68, 79,
Russia 96–7, 114, 116, 146, 175–6, 191
academic programs, 62, 87 private sector comparison, 46, 67,
115, 140, 176, 184–5, 189
academic profession, 56–7
public institutions and, 43, 79,
contracts, 57, 70, 74
110, 113, 114–15, 140, 143,
demographics of, 60
175–6, 191
English language, 2, 3, 17
raises, 115, 167
institutions of higher education,
rank, academic, 68, 140, 141, 143,
58–9, 65, 86, 87, 88–9, 91
174, 175, 176, 177–8
mandatory jobs, 61–2, 66
research, 64, 75–6, 110, 138, 141,
planned economy, 61–2
143, 152
public education in, 60, 79
seniority, 38, 42, 152, 178
qualifications, 82, 84
state or region, 43, 70
quality of higher education in, 56, teaching responsibilities, 68, 70,
63, 66 73–4, 75, 109, 139, 141, 143,
ranks, academic, 59, 84 149–50, 152, 174, 175
reform, 87–91 tutoring, 79, 81
salaries, 57–8, 63–4, 66–71, 73–6, Santa Catarina (Brazil), 33
79, 84, 89 São José dos Campos (Brazil), 50
São Paulo, 16, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 39
sabbatical, 42, 172 Science (journal), 143, 145
Saint Petersburg (Russia), 61, 84 science and technology, 50, 129,
salaries, 22–4, 38, 39, 41, 43–6, 57–8, 150, 156
63–4, 66–71, 74–5, 84, 89, 90, 93, Science Foundation (Brazil), 33
108–9, 110, 113–16, 121, 124n8, second job. see moonlighting
134, 135, 138, 140–6, 148, self-funded students, 81, 88, 130
149–50, 156, 157–8, 161, 167, service responsibilities, 165, 166,
173–82, 183, 184–5, 189 171, 172
 Index 205

Siberia (Russia), 61 Tsinghua University (China), 139

social security fund, 43 tuition benefit, 190
South Korea, 2, 50 tuition and fees, 32, 61, 70, 91n2,
Soviet Union, 2, 4, 9, 10, 17, 57, 96, 128, 129–30, 146, 150,
61–7, 161 163, 166
Stanford University (United States), 211 and 985 Projects (China), 9,
167 20, 127, 128, 138, 139–40, 142,
State Administration of Foreign 156, 158
Experts Affairs (China), 156
State Examination Board (Russia), 75 unemployment insurance, 141
State Foundation for Science and Unified State Exam (Russia), 60, 65,
Technology (Brazil), 31 79, 81, 88
State Legislative Assembly (India), 96 unions, 36, 37, 38, 133–4, 157, 182–3,
Statement on Academic Freedom and 190
Tenure (United States), 161, United Kingdom, 50, 54n2
195n2 influence on India, 3, 96, 117
student enrollment. see enrollment United States
(student) academic profession, 165–6, 192
student mobility, 3, 60 contracts, 170–3, 184
Supreme Court of India, 104, 124n7 English language, 166, 172, 173,
Symbiosis International University 177, 179, 185, 188
(India), 13, 107 hiring, 168–73
institutions of higher education,
Teacher’s Insurance Annuity 160, 162–4, 193
Association (United States), 190 promotion, 171
Teachers Law of People’s Republic of quality of higher education in,
China, 137, 151 160–2
teaching assistants, 45, 64, 71, 72 qualifications, 172–3
teaching responsibilities, 47, 68, 71–2, ranks, academic, 171–2
73–4, 109, 138, 139, 143, 149–50, salaries, 161, 167, 170, 172, 173–82,
152, 171, 172 183, 184–5, 189, 191, 192,
technical institutions, 33, 127, 195n12, 196n16
128, 158 unions, 182–3
Technological Institute of the Air United States Patent Office, 50
Force (Brazil), 50 Universidade Campinas (Brazil), 32,
telephone allowance, 145 34, 52
tenure, 25, 41, 43, 73, 90, 98–9, 117, Universidade de Anhanguera, 33–4
131, 133, 138, 139, 165, 166, 167, Universidade de São Paulo (Brazil), 29,
169, 170–1, 173, 174–5, 178, 193, 32, 34, 52
195n3, 195n5, 195n6, 195n11, Universidade do Brasil, 29
195n13 Universidade Estadual Paulista
see also job security; contracts (Brazil), 32
termination, 98 Universidade Mackenzie (Brazil), 31
Thomson Reuters Scientific Inc., 50 University Grants Commission
tiefanwan. see job security (India), 95, 100, 101, 105, 109,
Transparency International, 122 110, 113, 115, 116, 121
transportation allowance, 113, 115, University Grants Commission Act
145 (India), 95, 96
travel allowance, 116, 118 University News (India), 105, 124n6
206 Index

University of California (United von Humboldt, Wilhelm,

States), 166 32, 165
University of Delhi (India), 95
University of Phoenix (USA), 34 wages. see salaries
US Bureau of Labor Statistics, World War II, 160, 161, 165
184
US Social Security, 190 Young Science Fund (China), 146

vacation days, 42, 43, 70, 117–18 Zakaria, Fareed, 1

vocational institutions, 79, 89, 127, Zemin, Jiang, 127
131, 162, 165, 167, 173 Zhejiang University (China), 139