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Trump Era

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Trump Era

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INSTITUTE OF STRATEGIC STUDIES ISLAMABAD

Web: www.issi.org.pk
ISSUE BRIEF Phone: +92-51-9204423, 24
Fax: +92-51-9204658

TRUMP 2.0: WHAT TO EXPECT ON THE


NUCLEAR HORIZON?
By
Ghazala Yasmin Jalil
Research Fellow
Arms Control & Disarmament Centre, ISSI

Edited by
Malik Qasim Mustafa

December 30, 2024

(Views expressed in the brief are those of the author, and do


not represent those of ISSI)

With Donald Trump’s re-election as the U.S. President, several foreign policy and
nuclear policy questions are looming large. Trump’s second term may bring many
challenges and perhaps some opportunities for arms control and disarmament. In
light of Trump’s previous term as U.S. President and election campaign iterations,
it is possible to envisage the future trajectory of the U.S. nuclear policies.

Iran and Nuclear Enrichment

President Donald Trump withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 20181
even though Iran was adhering to the terms of the agreement. Despite hopes of revival of the
JCPOA, the Biden Administration did not make serious efforts to engage Iran. With Trump assuming
office again, there is no probability that the Administration would make it a priority. Today, Iran may
be closer to developing a nuclear weapon than it would have been if the U.S. had remained engaged
in the JCPOA. Arguably, the withdrawal from the JCPOA and subsequently the Biden Administration’s
failure to reengage Iran was a diplomatic failure and a blow to the non-proliferation cause.

1 Mark Landler, “Trump Abandons Iran Nuclear Deal He Long Scorned,” New York Times, May 18, 2024,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/08/world/middleeast/trump-iran-nuclear-deal.html.

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IB Trump 2.0: What to Expect on the Nuclear Horizon? December 30, 2024

Engagement with North Korea

President Trump’s engagement with North Korea was stormy, to say the least. The summit in 2018
commenced with much fanfare but ultimately produced nothing substantive.2 Trump used his brand
of proactive diplomacy to engage with the North Korean leader. However, the reality was that no
progress was made towards denuclearizing North Korea. North Korea developed Inter Continental
Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) that could hit the U.S. mainland. The Biden Administration did not engage in
any negotiations with North Korea. In Trump’s second term, more of the same can be expected of
what took place in his first term. President Trump may decide to engage in nuclear diplomacy with
North Korea. However, with an advanced nuclear and missile programme, with an estimated 50
nuclear warheads and the potential to produce many more,3 North Korea is unlikely to roll back its
capabilities. The best that the U.S. can hope to achieve is to manage tensions on the Korean
Peninsula.

Arms Control and Disarmament: Prospects of Revival?

The previous Trump Administration exuded disdain for arms control and disarmament efforts. The
arms control and disarmament regime suffered many irreparable blows under President Trump's
watch. The U.S. withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) that prevented the
placement of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. Another causality was the 1992 Open Skies
Treaty that allowed member states to conduct unarmed reconnaissance flights over each other’s
territories to build confidence by allowing transparency. The U.S. withdrew from the Treaty in 2020
and subsequently Russia also withdrew in December 2021.

Perhaps the biggest arms control causality would have been the New START, which puts limits on
the number of deployed warheads and delivery systems by the U.S. and Russia. It was due for
renewal in February 2021; while Russia pushed for renewal, the Trump Administration showed
reluctance. The Treaty was rescued when the Biden Administration took over and it was extended
for another 5 years till February 2026. For the incoming Trump Administration, the most pressing
arms control priority should be the New START with a fast-approaching deadline. New START is the
last arms control treaty between Russia and the U.S. If it is not renewed in 2026, it will bring an end
to an era of strategic arms control. Both Russia and the U.S. have suspended their participation in

2 Kesley Davenport, “Summit Reflects New Attitudes, Old Challenges,” Arms Control Today, (July/August:
2018), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-07/news/summit-reflects-new-attitudes-old-challenges.
3 “Role of Nuclear Weapons grows as Geopolitical Relations Deteriorate - new SIPRI Yearbook out now,”
SIPRI, June 17, 2024, https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2024/role-nuclear-weapons-grows-
geopolitical-relations-deteriorate-new-sipri-yearbook-out-now.

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IB Trump 2.0: What to Expect on the Nuclear Horizon? December 30, 2024

New START.4 The Ukraine conflict has been at the center of the tensions between the U.S. and
Russia and has helped precipitate the decline in the New START adherence. The revival of New
START could be the litmus test for the Trump Administration and also Russia on managing their
strategic relationship and preventing a quantitative arms race. President Trump could score a
diplomatic win by salvaging the New START once he takes office. However, there has been a general
trend in the last decade or so in the U.S. that shuns formal arms control treaties, a refusal to
negotiate any new meaningful treaties and to replace them with a “normative” approach embodied
by initiatives like Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament (CEND) put forth in 2019.
Moreover, the U.S. threat perception vis-a-vis a rising China means that Washington wants to
renegotiate all arms control arrangements to include China as a party.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has shown willingness to engage in strategic stability proposals. He
recently said: “We will see how a new future U.S. administration will be formulating its proposals on
this matter, if at all.”5 On strategic stability, he added, while Russia is ready “it is necessary for the
other side to approach it honestly, with due regard for all aspects of relations.”6 A lot of the U.S.-
Russia engagement on arms control and strategic stability will depend on whether the U.S. pulls
back from the Ukraine conflict. When President Trump assumes office, the chances of a turnaround
in the U.S. arms control policies are slim. The world would likely see a further erosion in the non-
proliferation, arms control, and disarmament regimes.

U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Policies

President Trump initiated several nuclear policies for the U.S. in his first term. It provides a peep in
to what he might try in his second term. A new edition of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) was
launched in 2018. It highlighted the role of nuclear weapons in achieving the U.S. national
objectives, deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, and ensuring allies and partners under
extended deterrence. Moreover, it highlighted the increasing competition and threat from Russia
and China and talked about “devising tailored strategies and flexible responses against
contemporary and future threats.”7 It also envisaged modernization of the U.S. nuclear
infrastructure and capabilities. The Trump Administration also deployed a low-yield Submarine-
launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM) as well as initiated a programme to build a new nuclear sea-

4 Ghazala Yasmin Jalil, “New START: The Next Arms Control Casualty?” ISSI, Issue Brief, April 20, 2023,
https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-new-start-the-next-arms-control-casualty/.
5 “Russia to look at New US Administration’s Proposals for Strategic Stability – Putin,” Tass, November 8,
2024, https://issi.org.pk/issue-brief-on-new-start-the-next-arms-control-
casualty/https://tass.com/politics/1869307.
6 Ibid.
7 “Nuclear Posture Review,” February 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/feb/02/2001872886/-1/-
1/1/2018-nuclear-posture-review-final-report.pdf

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IB Trump 2.0: What to Expect on the Nuclear Horizon? December 30, 2024

launched cruise missile.8 Even before taking office this time, President-elect Trump has entrusted
the Secretary of Defence-designate with the task of preparation of a new NPR, to define the nuclear
policy, strategy, and the country’s position on the use of nuclear weapons.9 The next few months
will determine the trajectory of the U.S. nuclear policies. There is every likelihood that Trump will
pursue nuclear weapons modernization, introduction of new ones, and a more aggressive posture
towards its competitors – Russia and China. As per the Congressional Budget Office, the U.S. nuclear
forces will cost US$756 billion over the next decade. There is Republican support to increase the size
and diversity of the U.S. nuclear weapons further to deal with two near-peer nuclear competitors.10

Also since Trump does not believe in deep commitment to the U.S. alliances, it is likely to imply its
allies. Presently the U.S. extends nuclear protection to countries such as Japan, South Korea, and
NATO. There are fears that Trump would seek to reduce or eliminate these commitments. Thus, the
reliability of the U.S. nuclear umbrella may come into question.11

Nuclear Testing on the Horizon?

The US has conducted 1,030 nuclear tests, the last one in 1992. There has been an on-and-off
chatter in the U.S. regarding the resumption of nuclear testing. This chatter was loud during the first
Trump Administration. During the earlier Trump term, there were statements in 2018 that the U.S.
did not intend to ratify the CTBT. The U.S. also reduced the time line necessary to resume nuclear
testing to 6 to 10 months from previous requirement of 24 to 36 months.12 Also reportedly in May
2020, senior national security officials in Trump administration “discussed the idea of a
demonstration U.S. nuclear test explosion to try to intimidate China and Russia at the negotiating
table.”13 In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, the National Security Adviser during the first Trump
term, Robert O’Brien, made the case that in order to maintain technical and numerical superiority to
China and Russia’s combined nuclear forces, the U.S. needs to resume nuclear testing.14 There are
numerous such examples where nuclear testing was discussed or considered in U.S. high echelons.
Thus, in the second Trump term, the world may see a return to nuclear testing. This would bode ill

8 Caitlin Talmadge, “How would Trump and Biden handle US nuclear policy upon reelection?” July 8, 2024,
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/how-would-trump-and-biden-handle-us-nuclear-policy-upon-
reelection/
9 “Clues on Trump’s Future Nuclear Policy,” https://www.icip.cat/perlapau/en/article/clues-on-trumps-
future-nuclear-policy/
10 “Trump Re-Election Introduces New Variables to Nuclear Disarmament Equation,” 14 Nov. 2024,
https://www.armscontrol.org/blog/2024-011/nuclear-disarmament-monitor
11 “How would Trump and Biden handle US nuclear policy upon reelection?” July 8, 2024
12 Daryl G. Kimball, “The Looming Threat of Renewed U.S. Nuclear Testing,” Arms Control Today, July/August
2024, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-07/focus/looming-threat-renewed-us-nuclear-testing
13 Ibid
14 Robert O. Brien, “The Return of Peace Through Strength,” Foreign Affairs, July/August 2024,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/return-peace-strength-trump-obrien

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IB Trump 2.0: What to Expect on the Nuclear Horizon? December 30, 2024

for the strategic stability globally. It is likely to start a domino effect whereby other countries would
also contemplate nuclear testing. Russia has already de-ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT) in October 2023 saying it wants to be at par with the U.S. Russia ratified the CTBT in
2000, while the U.S. signed it but did not ratify. While Russia has stated that it has no intention to
test, it is likely to do so if the U.S. does. Other countries like China, North Korea, and India may
follow suit. The CTBT, although it never entered into force, has maintained the norm against nuclear
testing for nearly three decades, and has largely helped prevent horizontal and vertical nuclear
proliferation. Nuclear testing by the U.S. will violate the three-decades-long norm against testing
and may start a chain reaction of nuclear testing, further plunging the world into chaos and renewed
arms races.

Conclusion

If the nuclear policies during Trump’s first term are any guide, the world may see a pursuit of new
nuclear arms, modernization of existing nuclear arsenal, a softening of the U.S. nuclear umbrella
commitments to its close allies, and a resumption of nuclear testing. The nuclear testing by the U.S.
may open a Pandora’s Box of nuclear testing by others. Moreover, opponents of nuclear testing
argue that it is not technologically required or needed, and must be avoided at all costs. Also,
President Trump’s disdain for formal arms control treaties would mean that the declines in global
arms control and disarmament regimes will continue. It remains to be seen how President Trump
handles strategic arms control and its relations with China and Russia. Decisions he takes early on in
his second term will decide the course of the United States’ nuclear policies, strategic stability
dialogue with Russia, and its strategic relations with China.

© ISSI 2024 • All Rights Reserved 5|Page

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