The problem with a national(ist) method

analytical lenses by looking at provincial and town elites while marginalizing other actors like
Bai Tan and many others from their local/ethnolinguistic narratives and typologies. Let me
parse these arguments further, starting with Bai Tan’s gender.
37
Woman
THE PROBLEM WITH A Feminist politics may have made the oppression and exploitation of Filipinas more visible in the

NATIONAL(IST) METHOD last decades, but the focus is on the open struggle by women activists, movements, and organiza-
tions (Subido, 1955; National Commission on the Role of Women, 1982; Angeles, 1989;
University of the Philippines, 1989; Lansang, 1991; National Commission on Culture and the
Patricio N. Abinales Arts, 1995; Guerrero, 1997; Center for Women’s Resources, 1998; Sobritchea, 2004). The
subtle everyday forms of female resistance, that which James C. Scott calls “the hidden tran-
scripts” are still unwritten. The late professor Albina Fernandez shared this story about then
Leonard Wood noting that the best leaders in the Philippines were not the likes of Manuel
Quezon nor Sergio Osmena; but they were women he encountered while being American
Governor-General of the Philippines. Fernandez was genuinely flummoxed by this, leading her
to ask: “if this is true, how come women in the Philippines are invisible in the history books?”
What would Philippine political development look like if you encounter a Moro woman with (Fernandez, 1996, p. 123).
the last name Tan, sitting in her Panglima Sugala hut, sorting out knock-off iPhones and The scholar Maria Nela B. Florendo noted the challenges of crafting a gender-sensitive
Blackberries from southern China, malong from Indonesia, 5-in-1 coffee sachets from Malay- historical methodology and wrote:
sia, copies of a digitized version of the famous Japanese porn Ichijo’s Wet Lust, and bullets for
the Fabrique National Carabine, the Belgian-made rifle stolen from the Indonesian army? Bai The overemphasis on the process of state formation has resulted in a generalizing
Tan is doing all this while watching reruns of her favorite Indonesian drama series, Love in theory – one that has emphasized the Philippines as a unitary social group – thus,
Paris, featuring the hunk Dimas Anggara, on a rewired Japanese-made TV she bought cheap undermining the heterogenous character of the population in both its cultural matrix
from a Filipino crew member of a Panamanian-owned cargo ship passing through her area. and economic development. This generalizing history has hampered the process of
Occasionally she glances at her cell phone expecting a text from her Saudi Arabia-based sifting through significant particularities – temporal and spatial contexts, differences
daughter, who will tell her how much she will remit to the bank in Tawi-Tawi. She hopes defined by cultural factors, class, gender, ethnicity, and others which are all essential in
to get the text before 1 p.m., because past that time, the currents will shift and if she takes her the formulation of historical explanation. The reduction of many local histories to a
motorized banca then she will most likely end up in Bukaan, Gorontalo province, northern generalizing national history has resulted in the marginalization of many sectors of
Sulawesi.1 Philippine society in historical writings.
So, here we have a citizen and a felon by livelihood, a Filipino cedula holder whose mental (Florendo, 1998, p. 11)
world is global: northern Sulawesi, Saudi Arabia, Panamanian cargo ship, Japanese television
and porn, Indonesian tele-novela, Malaysian coffee, Indonesian malong, southern China, and Florendo suggests that for a gender-sensitive historical methodology to develop scholars must
most surely – Singapore. She is a Muslim comfortable with marketing the most un-Islamic recognize “the plural contexts particularly in the Philippines [where] [l]ocal histories allow the
of goods (Ichijo’s Wet Lust, bullets). She lives at the edge of the national territory (Panglima unfolding of historical constructions founded on unique developments.” This, she added, “is in
Sugala an islet east of Tawi-Tawi), a site, the Sulu Zone, which state leaders (and dare I contrast to reconstructions that simply locate local articulations of national events” (Florendo,
say political scientists?) regard with trepidation because it is where political disorder is at 1998, p. 11). Maria Lourdes Camagay is also aware of this defect and appealed to fellow histor-
its most intense and the national state at its weakest. She is Moro and Chinese – the spawn of ians to look for data in “iconographic evidence such as pictures, literature, diaries, letters, and
the two minority groups that people in the center mistrust the most: recall the racist rants of those that are derived from oral history,” so that they could move forward with the task of
the national artist F. Sionil Jose regarding the Chinese, and the 2004 Philippine Human Devel- “systematically set[ting] up a clearing house or information specifically for women” (Camagay,
opment Report survey that showed 48 percent of Filipinos still believing Moros are terrorists 1995, p. 5).
and amok. Camagay, however, was very aware of the minefield that her feminist colleagues might get
How would you place Bai Tan in the world of Philippine politics? I would suggest that this into. She cautioned that women writing about women based on such alternative evidence will
is not an easy task especially since as a matter of habit, we always assume that history is defined inevitably come up with conclusions that will put to question a national history that is deeply
by the metropolis and that national politics is nothing but the institutional and political combat male-oriented (Camagay, 1995). Strongmen (presidents, tycoons, gangsters, or revolutionaries)
of national elites at the national capital. Political engagements outside of the capital are ancillary are the favored historical actors, and when their wives (or mistresses) find themselves at the
if not insignificant especially if they fail to fit this national (nationalist?) prism. This is a point of political center, they must act like their male partners. Subservience also occurs when women
view that also represents conventional approaches of local politics which tend to replicate the are placed behind the curtain or made to stand beside their male partners, quietly pretending to,

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 P.N. Abinales The problem with a national(ist) method

as it were, “stand by their man.” Those who refused to “act appropriately” do not get a role in Moreover, women often privilege the “informal” over the normal, the non-official over the
the plot and get erased out of the family/national story. Think of what would have happened to official, as these allow them the flexibility to expand the reach of their influence. In their book
Imelda Romualdez had her father not moved his mistress and children from the garahe to the big Querida, Caroline Hau et al. beautifully capture the extent of the kabit’s influence. They write:
house (Francia, 1988). “The querida’s sexual allure, her erotic capital, is a cliché, but her superior access to social, cul-
But what if we turn Camagay’s observations upside down and unwrap the hidden transcripts? tural and financial capital – she is well-networked, well-educated and wealthy – is potentially
If we do this, then it may be the case that the reason men hide their women partners is because unsettling of marriage and the male-ordered social order” (Hau et al., 2013, p. 356).
they know – and their audience know – who controls the levers of power. Placing women Yet, if we are to make women truly visible in our historical and political writings, how
behind the curtain or making them stand like statues beside their male partners could, in fact, be would this affect our male-centered nation-driven, capital-focused narrative? Can the latter
a ruse to pretend that men dominate. It is a scam that everyone is into, but more so the women withstand the pressure of the diverse viewpoints on women’s experiences that result from
because for them clout is at its most effective when it is in stealth mode. What makes it doubly culture, class, race and ethnicity, age and sexual orientation (Ofreneo, 1998, p. 21)?
difficult to figure out the contours of this authority is the near absence of any study of the polit-
ical Filipina. Except for Mina Roces’ preliminary investigation of the Filipina burgis, we still do
Moro
not have a full feminist study of Imelda and her arch-rival Corazon Aquino (Roces, 2012). For
the most part, we are all content with the existing literature’s depiction of Madam (Imelda) Bai Tan is not only a woman, she is also Moro. When you factor in this ethnic identity and figure
Marcos as the grotesque subordinate of her husband, and of Tita Cory (Aquino) as a weak wife out its relationship to national politics, this will inevitably bring you to the separatist rebellions
of an ambitious senator, and later the weak president the Left and the Right caricatured her to of the MNLF and the MILF. The literature on these armed movements trace their growth to
be because she messed up the return of constitutional politics. And when she did turn against Moro fears that the Philippine state – colonial but more so the post-colonial – has been engaged
the communists, Cory had to be masculinized to make her fit the portrait of a tyrant in demo- in a genocidal war against them. Largely under-appreciated and running parallel to this is the
cratic and Christian clothing. resilient belief that Americans had consistently been the Moro’s friend and ally. Historian Samuel
Yet, if we are privy to what happens behind the curtains, in the bedroom, on the backstage, Tan and the student of history Rodrigo Duterte were right in reminding us that the Americans
or at the margins of political and business meetings, what will become gradually evident is how waged a bloody war against the Moros. However, they made very little of the fact that after peace
the nexus of power is regulated by these women. Imelda kept the family out of jail by deploying was established, the American soldiers also became the Moros’ public school teachers, as well as
an array of political and legal weapons that her money could buy. Cory quietly managed the the dogged co-defenders against the forced integration of the ummah to a Philippine body
complex family group of companies before she became president. And did she not successfully politic. Their datus ended up compromising with the colonial state and its Republican successor,
push back machos like Marcos, Johnny Ponce Enrile, Doy Laurel, and Gringo Honasan and his but communities remained nostalgic of the days of the Melikans. What kept this fondness for the
merry bunch of failed coup plotters? The same holds true with Moro women elites. Vivienne colonizer alive was the failure of the national state to establish legitimacy in Moro Mindanao via
Angeles, who has written the only piece on the late Desdemona Misuari, mentioned the influ- a public-school system that could have “educated” Muslims about their Filipino heritage. It did
ence of Nur Misuari’s first wife on the ex-MNLF head (Angeles, 1996). Bai Desdemona had not also help that their elites acted like local satraps imbued with the right to loot the local state
predecessors. There was Princess Piando who quietly hinted to the incoming District Officer Lt. (Abinales, 2000).
Colonel Sydney Cloman who was the real authority by insisting her husband, Sultan Jamalul This failure to erase American colonial rule in the Moros’ popular memory helps explain such
Kiram, wear a termite-ravaged tuxedo he used to wear while trading in British Singapore. Or peculiar political moves like the 1930 Dansalan declaration of Maranao datus, appealing to the
how about Tarhata Kiram’s interesting use of her allure to marginalize her husband, the strong- United States Senate to separate Mindanao before the establishment of the Commonwealth
man and supposedly more historic figure, Datu Tahil Lidasan. The American author Florence (Maulana, 2015). It helps us understand the strong support given by the MNLF to the involve-
Horn wrote: ment of the United States Agency for International Development in the postwar rehabilitation of
Moro Mindanao (Abinales, 2016). It also explains the letter by the late MILF chair Salamat
Moreover, where some see unremitting resistance in the revolts against colonial rule, Hashim to President George W. Bush, requesting that the United States be a fellow mediator
new motivations were at work. A good illustration is the 1927 revolt of Datu Tahil with Malaysia in the peace negotiations with the Ramos government (reprinted in Bondoc,
Lidasan, who had become famous for leading the Battle of Bud Bagsak in 1913 but 2008). And it makes us understand the Muslims’ positive reception (over 70 percent) to the
who later served as member of the Sulu Provincial Board. In 1927, Lidasan announced Balikatan exercises in Mindanao. It did not help, of course, that the first, and for a long while,
his opposition to the head tax and ban on carrying weapons in public and withdrew the only symbol of the national state in Moro Mindanao was the AFP soldier shooting at fathers,
with 100 followers to a cotta (fort) to await government attack. At first glance, a repeat mothers, and children, and burning their houses (Kaplan, 2005).
of Bud Bagsak, but a closer look reveals a different picture: Lidasan took up arms at the War, however, is just a small part of Bai Tan’s life – in fact, what may be more important
instigation of his wife, the American-educated Princess Tarhata, niece of the Sultan of than the MNLF or MILF is her main livelihood as a buyer, negotiator, and seller of the smug-
Sulu, after she failed to get him appointed as governor of Jolo. The Constabulary gled goods mentioned above.
defeated Lidasan (leaving 35 dead) and sentenced him to 7 years imprisonment. Tarhata
divorced her now politically useless husband, married a Cebuano and entered local
politics.
(Horn, 1941, p. 155)

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 P.N. Abinales The problem with a national(ist) method

Smuggling time span cumulative financial flows into and out of the Philippines totaled $410 billion.”2
This has made the Philippine “the sixth larger exporter of illicit capital from the developing
In the eyes of the nation-state, Bai Tan is a criminal who is a member of an underground trading
countries over the period 2001–2010, moving up from the 13th position” globally. If we
network that is subversive of the national political economy. This illicit sector trades in com-
break this figure down and focus on the smuggling at various times, of “selected agricultural
modities that are untaxed and much of the time cheaper compared to their legal, higher-priced,
commodities” vital to everyday life, the figure for the 1980s is $10 billion (Southeast Asian
and taxable competitors. Consider for example the price of a “real” Blackberry to a “smuggled”
Regional Center for Graduate Study and Research in Agriculture, n.d.). The smuggling of
Blueberry. Smuggling must therefore be thoroughly eradicated for the well-being and protec-
rice during the first two years of President Benigno Aquino III was estimated to have risen
tion of the nation-state.
from $2.18 million to $390 million (Tiglao, 2012; The Manila Times, 2016). An economic
It is widely known that the state and the illicit sector live opposed lives for several reasons.
study of the smuggling of gasoline – another important commodity – observed that between
First is the obvious contradiction between the legality that is a built-in feature of the nation-
2000 and 2006, “a general upward trend in petrol and diesel theft can be observed [and this]
state and smuggling. Can one write a single state-and-society narrative with these two realms
has indeed intensified from an estimate of about 8 percent in 2000 to 20 percent in 2006”
that are in constant conflict with each other? This is possible if we accept the premise sug-
(Institute for Development and Econometric Analysis, 2006, p. 15). In short, smuggling may
gested by Alfred W. McCoy that the illicit world of smugglers, drug lords, assassins, and
not be condoned by the state, but it cannot also just be written off as a series of dark episodes
number games operators has always been and continues to be a significant element of the
in the national narrative because, at the community level, it has become an activity that Fili-
national narrative. McCoy argues that one cannot separate the political lives of Filipino leaders
pinos are dependent.
from their other role as masters of the spoils system and patronage politics, and politicians
Then there is the question of contrasting notions of borders. A smuggler’s realm cuts across
with close ties to the economic and political netherworld. In fact, the illicit sector has been
several nation-states and covers much of maritime Southeast Asia, central-eastern China, and
indispensable to the success of every major Filipino political leader since the time of Manuel
even Japan. The nation-state, however, exists in a far constricted territory that regards smug-
L. Quezon (McCoy, 2009).
gling as illegal because it cannot be taxed, is unsupervised, and competed with locally produced,
Smuggling is also very much a part of the economy and Filipinos had one time or the other
legal, higher-priced, and taxed goods. For the state, the smuggler’s world is subversive of the
consumed or traded goods surreptitiously brought into the country. As Table 37.1 shows
national geo-body because of its potential to destroy the political economy. Smuggling, there-
below, the underground economy is a substantial percentage of the gross domestic product,
fore, has to be thoroughly eradicated to protect the nation-state. But this is easier said than done
reaching a high 50 percent in 2002 and settling on the average to 35 percent. One study con-
according to Ralf Emmers, who wrote:
cluded, “between 1960 and 2011, illicit financial flows from the Philippines totaled $132.9
billion, while illicit inflows amounted to $277.6 billion.” The report adds, “over the 52-year
[E]ffective cooperation in combating transnational crime requires some surrendering
of state sovereignty. Indeed, a section of national sovereignty needs to be abandoned
Table 37.1 Philippine underground economy to GDP, 1960–2011 for it to be protected more effectively. This is in direct contradiction with a Westphal-
ian understanding of national sovereignty, which is still prevalent among the ASEAN
Year Underground economy to real GDP (percent) [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] members.
(Emmers, 2003, p. 11)
1960–1969 35.2
1970–1979 27.8 Finally, smuggling belongs to a world far older than the nation-state. The smugglers of today
1980–1989 26.7
belong to a long line of merchants that go back as far as the pre-colonial period. They crisscross
1990–1999 46.5
trading routes across the region where the authority of the charismatic, pugnacious, and business-
2000–2009 38.8
2000 34.8 savvy strong men (orang besar) and strong women (wanita besar) waxed and waned according to
2001 34.8 their ability to trade and engage in warfare (Wolters, 1982; Andaya, 2006). Despite the relative
2002 50.0 success of American, British, Dutch, and French colonialism to restrict this world and replace it
2003 42.0 with one that is defined by colonial boundaries, community loyalty to the orang besar or wanita
2004 33.4 besar was preserved because this was older and more robust than a sense of citizenship. Part of
2005 37.7 the power of this cosmopolitan outlook is its ability to incorporate citizenship when situations
2006 38.6 warrant that it does so.
2007 44.1 People living in the “borders” are polyglot by nature, switching languages and even identities
2008 32.6 with ease in a trading zone where being multilingual are the norm. In the small islands of the
2009 41.7
Sulu archipelago, for example, it is said that for the most part of the year the families there
2010 32.3
imagine themselves as Malaysians (speaking in Bahasa Malaya, Bisayan, Tausog, a sprinkling of
2011 29.7
1960–2011 34.8
Cantonese or Hokkien, and some English) except for one day in a year when they “become”
Filipinos and vote in the local or national elections. They then revert to their “old Malaysian
Source: Kar and LeBlanc (2014). selves” at the end of the day. Compare this to the people in the “center”; familiar with two of

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 P.N. Abinales The problem with a national(ist) method

the national languages: their language of birth (Tagalog, Bisayan, Ilocano) and language for What gives this diaspora minority power to turn their backs on national affairs is the new
social mobility (English). Unless they migrate to the United States or elsewhere, these metro- social power they possess as a result of the incomes. Caroline S. Hau traces the resentment of
politans could not imagine themselves switching identities. The contrasts in the ways of think- the middle class and the intelligentsia towards these overseas Filipinos as
ing are quite palpable.
How then would the national narrative deal with these communities whose worldview and anxieties … induced by the capacity of deterritorialized ‘Filipino’ flows to create new
everyday life do not cohere to what the nation-state expects of its citizen? Can the regional be sources of social power and social production (in matters of social status, fashion, taste
incorporated into the national frame? and public opinion) that cannot be fully controlled or co-opted by either the state or
by the Filipino elite and the middle classes.
(Hau, 2014, p. 211)
Diaspora
The other “essential outsiders” to Philippine politics are the overseas Filipinos workers (OFWs) The “wealth” they had accumulated had gone mainly to improving the lives of their respective
and those who left the country to become citizens of another. Of the two, it is the OFW that family; very little is set aside in the name of national affairs.
appears to have nothing to do anymore with the political affairs of the country (International The rare instance when Filipino associations abroad got involved in Philippine politics, it was
Organization for Migration, 2013, p. 59). After the ouster of President Estrada, the tendency of not to send support to national parties or leaders. American-Filipinos in the United States pre-
many Filipinos was to get out of politics by going abroad in search of work or a new home. ferred to remit contributions to local counterparts. The Filipino-American Moral Crusade
Sheila Coronel observed that many “poor voters came away convinced that their selected against Graft and Corruption, for example, donated to the coffers of “a civil society group in
spokesman had once again been maneuvered out of power by an elite-dominated system that Pampanga” to support the latter’s fight against corruption (Orejas, 2008). These political acts
remains beyond their influence” (Coronel, 2007, p. 177). The Filipino middle class, “once the indicate that American-Filipinos prefer to show their allegiance to their provinces, smaller cities,
agent of democratic reform” (ibid.), and who watched their incomes decline began to migrate or municipalities, and not to the larger nation. OFWs who see their employment as temporary
overseas “rather than [resort to] political action as [an] outlet of their frustrations” (ibid.; Mydans, look forward to going home to their villages and not to the nation. Once back they keep a safe
2006). The poor joined the exodus in search of jobs abroad as it “fail[ed] to see any hope of distance from politicians whom they see as opportunistic and ready to take advantage of them
redemption for the country under the existing political leadership” (quoted in Abinales and and try to re-live “the good times” before they left for abroad.4
Amoroso, 2006, p. 291). As Emmanuel De Dios (2007, p. 187) puts it: These local sympathies are evident in the organizations that overseas Filipinos form. The
Philippine consulate’s survey of Filipino-American Associations of Southern California (and
Overseas migration in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries is by contrast nearby Nevada, Arizona), for example, shows that 48 out of the 139 listed (34.5 percent) were
decidedly apolitical and individual, reflecting a decision by many to withdraw from the associations of former residents from various provinces, cities, and towns, competing for mem-
public into the purely personal sphere; it is a choice to seek a ready-made and purely eco- bership and activities with “national” and American organizations (Philippine Consulate, n.d.).
nomic solution under the individual’s immediate control, rather than await (much less American sociologist Robyn M. Rodriguez was only partially correct when she argued that an
participate in) the resolution of complex political, social and cultural problems at home. “alternative [Filipino] citizenship” was emerging in Filipino diaspora communities (migrant and
migrant labor). Radical nationalism – as espoused by the Communist Party of the Philippines’
On February 13, 2003, President Gloria Arroyo signed into law the Overseas Voting Act front group Migrante International – had to co-exist with the identities associated with other
(Republic Act No. 9189) to give Filipinos residing or working abroad a chance to vote during groups: from social welfare and medical support clusters, alumni clubs, fraternity alumni chap-
elections. The government set aside P112.71 million ($2.3 million) to establish registration ters, and other advocacy assemblages, late generous philanthropists, and the myriad of local
centers in embassies and consulates the world over.3 The campaign failed to mobilize the desired associations (Rodriguez, 2002 and Garchitorena, 2007).
numbers. After a high 64.89 percent in 2004, the voter turnout plunged to 16.21 percent in Thus the antinomy between nation and region runs parallel to the fraught relationship
2007, rose slightly to 25.99 percent in 2010, only to go down again to 15.34 per cent in 2013 between the Filipino diaspora (migrant, immigrant, OFW) and the nation-state. But unlike the
(Center for Migrant Advocacy, 2011; Planet Philippines, 2013). De Dios (2007: 187) provides former, this is a contradiction that has a high local(ist) hue. Where the contention between
us this portrait of OFW apathy: region and nation reveals the latter’s narrowness, diaspora and nation-state is the opposite. Their
engagement brings into prominence the resilience of the provincial and the local and its often-
The general point is that overseas Filipinos – whether temporary or permanent migrants overpowering effect on the national.
– are unlikely to become highly involved in Philippine politics any time soon, since In her book Global Filipinos: Migrants’ Lives in the Virtual Village (2012), Dierdre McKay
neither their original motives nor their present opportunities strongly predispose them tracks the movement of members of a family from the village of Haliap, Ifugao Province who
to collective action, or even political engagement generally. This much should already became OFWs, first working in Hong Kong and then moving to Vancouver. McKay notes how
have been evident in the low turnout of overseas voters in the 2004 elections. Any much her subjects longed for “home” as they traverse the larger world of the OFW network.
impact is likely to be even weaker for local governance, since overseas Filipinos are not At first glance this is not unique; it is the most common sentiment among those of us who had
even enfranchised to vote for local officials, indeed their very physical absence is a to leave home for work. But what is interesting here is that “home” to McKay’s subjects was
signal of non-involvement, justifying their unimportance in the objective functions of not “the Philippines,” but Haliap (McKay, 2012). What they missed was the village, not the
local politicians. nation; friends and relatives, not fellow citizens. While they eventually felt alienated from their

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 P.N. Abinales The problem with a national(ist) method

community and families who perceived them rather as sources of largesse than as fellow vil- that McKay’s OFW joined in Hong Kong versus a similar circle in Vancouver). But the stronger
lagers, these OFWs’ lassitude towards the nation-state also did not fade away. We see them and more lasting relations between home village and new diaspora cluster in Hong Kong or
resorting more and more to the cyber-world to try to remember memories of a lost home, but Vancouver are all outside of the Philippines.
there is no evidence of a parallel soulful longing for the Philippines. The power of these local-driven relationships also helps us understand why alongside the
McKay attributes this shallowness to the OFWs’ continuously negative experiences with the many Filipino associations that litter the diaspora are equally thriving clubs of people coming
national and local states, mainly how the corruption and inefficiencies that now seem to be their from the same province or speaking the same language. In Hawaii, where Filipinos are now the
inherent traits have made the villagers’ lives so difficult to compel some of them to go abroad. biggest “ethnic group,” the most active of their organizations are those who represent Ilocanos
The sense of nation, of patriotism then, cannot be enriched if its institutional representatives are and Bisayans. When one visits Waipahu, a district on the western side of Honolulu, you do not
seen to do the opposite. To whom then do these villagers extend their fidelities and support? just feel that you are back in the Philippines; you believe that entire communities and barangays
McKay just adds another evidence to a political relationship that has been extensively studied by were uprooted from the different Ilocos provinces and replanted – without any alteration – in
historians and investigative journalists (but oddly not much by political scientists): the enduring Waipahu. An Ilocano immigrant may have left home, but she rests in the comfort that in the
patronage ties between the community and local power (be it warlords, bosses, strongmen, or new place she will be living in, well, “feels like home.”
political clans). To write about national political development that includes over 8 million Filipinos the
But community estrangement with the state is not just the result of politics. If you read the world over, and a financially indispensable (nearly $9 billion in annual remittance) diaspora
responses of the book’s subjects more carefully, you will note one particular geographic quirk: would entail breaking down first these “localized” relationships, and replacing them with ties
Manila does not figure much in the constantly moving world of McKay’s OFWs. Where the that place the “home country” at their center. With a perennially weak state and an elite that is
national capital is acknowledged, it is as the essential transit point as they move from village to concerned solely with class and clan power, it would be impossible to implement even the
Hong Kong or Vancouver. You get to sense that these migrant workers did not even leave the beginnings of a massive reorientation of perspectives and fidelities. Moreover, as more Filipinos
airport terminal as they transfer airlines. If Manila did figure prominently in their lives, it was leave for abroad to either work or immigrate, the more likely will their devoutness of village
the site where the working visas to Hong Kong and Canada are sought for but not a domicile and town (and not to country) be reinforced and thereby preserved. And for those who chose
where one wants to stay longer. Once permits are approved and passports released, one could to become citizens of the country they have moved to, their new status further weakens the
not wait to leave the metropole and return home, to the village (Philippine passports can be had position of an already fragile Filipino identity. For where else would they be heading but to
now in regional offices of the immigration bureau). become … American?
You encounter the same fleeting movement when the OFW returns to the Philippines after
two years of being away. He/she leaves Vancouver’s International Airport, transits into Kai Tak
Reversibility?
International Airport, lands at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, transfers to the domestic
terminal, takes the connecting flight to Laoag or Baguio City, lands in either airport and takes Are these processes reversible? Possibly, and I think there exist several counterweights, other
the family jeep or a chartered transportation and by the end of the day walks up the stairs of the than state coercion, that can prevent the worsening of these fissures. For one, like it or not, the
family house where he/she finally can relax and enjoy the feeling of being home. The “spectre Philippines is a sovereign nation with a territory recognized by an international system of similar
of comparisons,” argues Benedict Anderson, enabled Jose Rizal and his fellow ilustrados to nation-states. Given the failed adventures of Moro separatism, I doubt if we can duplicate what
imagine the nascent community that would become the Philippines. He writes: the Timorese did. Second, thanks in part to the nationalization of media and popular culture,
the number of Filipinos who believe in the current version of the national narrative is now
There is a dizzying moment early in the narrative when the young mestizo hero, larger than those who do not believe or are unfamiliar in it. Thus, if Pulse Asia runs the survey
recently returned to the colonial Manila of the 1880s from a long sojourn in Europe, question “What are you first? Filipino or _____,” I suspect that most its respondents will answer
looks out of his carriage window at the municipal botanical gardens, and finds that he the former.
too is, so to speak, at the end of an inverted telescope. These gardens are shadowed There are also historical conjunctures where national identity prevailed over regional and
automatically – Rizal says maquinalmente – and inescapably by images of their sister linguistic divisions. The Cry of Pugadlawin found echoes in several uprisings outside Manila. In
gardens in Europe. He can no longer matter-of-factly experience them, but sees them Misamis Province, the Spanish mestizo Nicolas Capistrano and his Kagay-anon marched against
simultaneously close up and from afar. The novelist arrestingly names the agent of this the Spaniards, while in Sugbu Michael Cullinane discovered 120 Cebuano elites who joined the
incurable double vision el demonio de las comparaciones. Revolution and Resil Mojares wrote vividly of the anti-American struggle across the island
(Anderson, 1998, p. 2) (Mojares, 1999; Montalvan, 2002, Cullinane, 2014). And who could forget the Igorots who
fought alongside Filipino revolutionaries during the war against the Americans as told to us by
McKay’s OFWs, however, sees something different when viewing this inverted telescope. the late historian Walter Henry Scott and the urban planner Gerard A. Finin (Scott, 2006)?
There is little if no comparison between Hong Kong subway systems or Vancouver gardens With memories of these struggles for independence or anti-Americanism beyond Manila kept
with Manila’s Metro Rail Transit System or the Quezon City Botanical Garden/Arboretum, alive in our books, the challenge would be how to reinvigorate these.
the latter places most likely not even visited by the provincial OFW. The only comparison that Then there are the Chinese. We know that Chinese have always had a fraught relationship
we can imagine is either temporal (the real, now thoroughly commoditized Haliap and the old with the state. Mistrusted for being illegal immigrants, accused of collaborating with the Muslims
etiolated Haliap that can only be preserved now in the web), or associational (the Haliap cluster in promoting smuggling, suspected once of being the communists’ fifth column, and of late of

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 P.N. Abinales The problem with a national(ist) method

being surrogates of the People’s Republic of China. The racist Sionil Jose, however, was wrong Notes
when he accused Tsinoys as latent traitors of the nation. In her book The Chinese Question, Carol
1 For a brief description of Ichijo’s Wet Lust, see “Ichijo Sayuri: Nureat Yokujo” (Ichijo’s Wet Lust,
Hau argues that Chinese and Filipino nationalism were “not always mutually exclusive.” The 1973) on the website Rotten Tomatoes (2011). Wikipedia has a brief description of Love in Paris in Indo-
former participated in the anti-Japanese war guerrilla war that the latter led, calling themselves nesian (2017).
Wha-Chi warriors. There was a Chinese section in the Politburo of the Partido Komunista ng 2 Kar and LeBlanc (2014). The most popular means of promoting illicit financial flows is through the
Pilipinas and some of the Wa-Chi veterans even joined the Hukbalahap rebellion. Then in the under-invoicing of imports such that “over the past decade, 25 percent of the value of all good
imported into the Philippines – or 1 out of every 4 dollars – goes unreported to customs officials.”
late 1960s, several Tsinoys were in the protest movement, with some of them – like the writer
3 The law was amended on May 27, 2013 that does not require Filipinos abroad to provide an affidavit
Ricky Lee – becoming cadres of the new communist party. Hau asserts that these examples are stating that they would return to the country within three years before they would vote (Office of the
indicative of the “intimate connections between Chinese and Filipinos in the challenging and President of the Philippines Commission on Filipinos Overseas, 2013).
uncertain wartime conditions” (Hau, 2014, p. 211). Minorities and majorities can thus find in 4 This sentiment and dreams of the village home are wonderfully portrayed in McKay (2012).
nationalism a common basis to work together as … well … Filipinos.
Finally, we go back to Bai Tan. The country’s internal wars have ironically enabled com-
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