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People vs. Mira

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People vs. Mira

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mclaire.hipolito
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
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Title

People vs. Mira

Case Decision Date


G.R. No. 175324 Oct 10, 2007

In summary, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, finding
the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The penalty was
reduced to reclusion perpetua, and the appellant was ordered to pay the victim
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

561 Phil. 646

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 175324, October 10, 2007 ]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. EDISON MIRA, APPELLANT.

DECISION

TINGA, J,:

This case serves to remind trial judges of their obligation to conduct a searching inquiry
when confronted with a plea of guilt to a capital offense. At the same time, it also reiterates
that the improvidence of the guilty plea will not prevent the conviction of the accused if the
evidence duly presented does establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Before us for automatic review is the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 00452 dated 19 July 2006 which affirmed with modification the Judgment[2] of the
Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 687 finding appellant Edison Mira guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.

Appellant was charged with rape in an information, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about January 6, 1997, in the evening thereof, at Barangay Interior, Municipality
of San Jacinto, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with his 11-year old daughter
[AAA],[3] against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
On arraignment, appellant entered a guilty plea to the offense charged. Thereafter, the trial
court proceeded with the reception of evidence for the prosecution which presented five
witnesses, namely: AAA, the victim; Nema Cabug (Cabug), the victim's teacher; BBB,[5] the
victim's sister; Dr. Rosario P. Mores (Dr. Mores), Medical Officer, and LodeAa Barruga
(Barruga), Municipal Social Welfare and Development Officer. Their testimonies established
the following facts:

On the night of 6 January 1997 in San Jacinto, Masbate, AAA, who was then 11 years old and
BBB, then 8 years old, were sleeping inside their room when appellant, their father, arrived.
He laid down beside AAA, removed her shorts, placed himself on top of her, and succeeded
in having sexual intercourse with her.[6] BBB witnessed the whole incident.[7] AAA further
revealed that she had been raped several times in the past by her father in the presence of
her siblings.[8] AAA recalled that on 26 December 1996, she met her teacher Cabug and told
her about her father's molestations.[9] Three days after learning about AAA's plight, Cabug
told her aunt, Felicisima Bartolata (Bartolata). The latter sought the help of Barruga.[10] On 7
January 1997, Barruga and Bartolata went to Barangay Interior to conduct home visit and
interview AAA. Cabug sent her pupils to fetch AAA and BBB in their house. During the
interview, AAA narrated the rape incident.[11]

On 9 January 1997, AAA was brought to the hospital where she was examined by Dr. Mores.
The medical findings showed that AAA's hymen was no longer intact and there were
abrasions around the vulva.[12] Dr. Mores concluded that AAA was no longer a virgin; that
the sexual intercourse had been forced as evidenced by the abrasions on AAA's vulva; and,
that the abrasion on AAA's vagina was caused by a human male organ.[13]

Unsurprisingly, the defense did not present evidence to counter the charges against
appellant, considering his earlier plea of guilt.

On 23 May 1997, the trial court rendered a decision finding appellant guilty of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death. The trial court relied heavily on the
testimonies of the victim and her younger sister in establishing the identity of appellant
and the act of rape committed against AAA. It regarded the children's testimony as credible
and invoked the adage that no child in her right mind would testify on a carnal and
bastardous act if it were not true:
[AAA] and her sister could not testify and narrate the said heinous crime against their
father if this is not true x x x and this Court is indeed convince [sic] that the child would not
put up this [sic] testimonies if it were not true. What makes these bastardous act more
appalling is the fact that this rape is being committed in front and at the very eyes of her
[sic] other children. Indeed, the bestial act committed by the father against his own flesh
and blood deserves the highest penalty which this Court could impose. Now could the
father [sic] commit this grievous crime against his own daughter when it should be the
former who should protect and care for the latter is a question as perplexing and enigmatic
as todays' time. Everyday, it is judicial knowledge how common this type of canards are
being committed by the parents against their [helpless] children. The very least that this
Court could do is to minimize[,] if not to eliminate this heinous crime is by way of showing
an example by meting out the [s]upreme penalty to the perpetrator of this crime so as to
deter others from committing this kind of mayhem, specially so when this Court is
convinced beyond any doubt as to the complicity of the accused. Indeed, what a
horrendous [world this would] be if the child could no longer trust their parents because of
their bestial deeds. When the two daughters, [AAA] and [BBB] were asked whether or not
they still love their father, the duo immediately without an iota of hesitation, responded in
the negative. When asked why, they answered that they don't love their father [any] longer
because of the rape; the sexual molestation committed by Edison. Truly, no daughter in her
right mind could continue to love their father if the latter continuously commits this kind of
malfeasance.[14]
Appellant directly appealed his conviction to this Court. In a Resolution[15] dated 14
December 2004, the Court resolved to transfer the case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to
People v. Mateo.[16]

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed judgment affirming with modification the trial
court's decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding Defendant-Appellant EDISON MIRA
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the death sentence imposed by the trial court is hereby REDUCED to Reclusion
Perpetua. Additionally, Defendant-Appellant shall pay the victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.

Costs against the Defendant-Appellant.

SO ORDERED.[17]
Appellant filed the instant appeal. In a Resolution[18] dated 5 February 2007, the parties
were required to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs if they so
desired. Both parties manifested that they were adopting their respective briefs filed before
the appellate court.[19]Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not conducting a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and in failing to
inform him if he desires to present evidence in his behalf.[20]

The controversy centers on the legal consequences of an improvident plea of guilt.

Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides:


SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.--When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and shall require the prosecution
to prove his guilt and the precise degree to culpability. The accused may present evidence
in his behalf.
Based on this rule, there are three (3) conditions that the trial court must observe to obviate
an improvident plea of guilt by the accused: (1)it must conduct a searching inquiry into the
voluntariness and full comprehension by the accused of the consequences of his plea; (2) it
must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the
precise degree of his culpability; and (3) it must ask the accused whether he desires to
present evidence on his behalf, and allow him to do so if he so desires. [21]

In People v. Gumimba, we had occasion to revisit the raison d'etre for the rule:
There is no hard and fast rule as to how a judge may conduct a "searching inquiry," or as to
the number and character of questions he may ask the accused, or as to the earnestness
with which he may conduct it, since each case must be measured according to its
individual merit. However, the logic behind the rule is that courts must proceed with
caution where the imposable penalty is death for the reason that the execution of such a
sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have at times
pleaded guilty. An improvident plea of guilty on the part of the accused when capital crimes
are involved should be avoided since he might be admitting his guilt before the court and
thus forfeit his life and liberty without having fully comprehended the meaning and import
and consequences of his plea. Moreover, the requirement of taking further evidence would
aid this Court on appellate review in determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.
[22]

This Court, time and again, has reiterated the guidelines to be observed by the trial court in
the proper conduct of a searching inquiry:
(1) Ascertain from the accused himself (a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial and
preliminary investigations; and (c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated
during the investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical harm
coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge's intimidating robes.

(2) Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.

(3) Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.

(4) Inform the accused of the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under
the law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises
of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse. It
is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship of
the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
punishment.

(5) Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and to fully explain to
him the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to
do so would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise
nature of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.

(6) All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by
the latter.

(7) The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty.
The accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its
missing details.[23]
The searching inquiry conducted by the trial court falls short of these requirements. The
inquiry consisted of two simple questions. We quote in full:

CLERK OF COURT:
(The accused was arraigned in an information read and translated in a language
understandable to him [sic]. When asked of his plea, [he] voluntarily entered a plea of guilty.)

COURT:

[T]o accused

Q- Do you understand the meaning of plea of guilty for the crime charged against you for rape?

A- I admit the crime, Your Honor.

Q- Do you know that when you pleaded [sic] guilty you can be meted out of the supreme
penalty; death or life imprisonment?

A- Yes, Your Honor.[24]

The questions propounded by the trial court judge to appellant were clearly inadequate.
The appellant was not fully apprised of the consequences of his guilt plea. In fact, as argued
by appellant, he was led to believe that the penalty for his crime could still be reduced upon
his plea of guilty, especially when the trial court informed him that he could be meted the
supreme penalty of death or life imprisonment.[25] Moreover, the trial court judge failed to
inform appellant of his right to adduce evidence despite the guilty plea. Verily, appellant
was deprived of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

Notwithstanding the incautiousness that attended appellant's guilty plea, we are not
inclined to remand the case to the trial court as suggested by appellant. Convictions based
on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of the
judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence in finding the accused
guilty, the judgment must be sustained, because then it is predicated not merely on the
guilty plea of the accused but also on evidence proving his commission of the offense
charged.[26]

The RTC and the Court of Appeals are unanimous in sustaining the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. The trial court made the following observations:
All the [p]rosecution witnesses are one in pin-pointing Edison Mira as the one who raped
[AAA]. The testimonies of his two (2) children, [BBB], an 8-year old, younger sister of [AAA]
and [AAA] herself categorically declared without hesistation regarding the [c]ertainty of the
rape committed by Edison Mira against [AAA]. This two (2) children [are] [very] credible
and convincing and defense were not able to destroy the testimonies.[27]
The Court ordinarily puts great weight on the factual findings of the judge who conducted
the trial of the case and heard the testimonies of the witnesses themselves. This is
especially true in rape cases where the crime is usually committed in the presence of no
other person than the victim and the accused. Compared to appellate magistrates who are
merely faced with the cold and inanimate pages of the transcript of records brought before
them, the trial judge comes face to face with the rape victim herself on the witness stand.
He personally observes her conduct and demeanor while responding to the questions
propounded by the prosecutor on direct examination as well as those from the defense
counsel on cross examination. Moreover, it is also the trial judge who has the chance to
pose clarificatory questions to the victim. Thus, when the trial judge makes his findings as
to the issue of credibility, such findings bear great weight upon the appellate court.[28]

The appellate court even concurred with the trial court and went on to cite the
jurisprudential edicts, thus:
Evidently, [AAA's] testimony is straightforward. She positively identified her father-
ravisher and narrated what transpired with simplicity and veracity. Such revelation of
[AAA], a young innocent girl, deserves full credit.

It is settled in a catena of cases, that testimonies of child-victims are given full weight and
credit considering that when a woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been
raped, she in effect says all that is necessary to show that rape was committed. Reason and
experience dictate that a child, who barely understands sex and sexuality, would not
impute to any man a crime so serious as rape, concoct a story of defloration, allow
examination of her private parts, and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she was
not, in truth, a victim of rape. Truly, youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and
sincerity as in the case at bench.[29]
We find no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the courts below. Indeed, AAA
remained steadfast in her claim that she was raped by her father. In her Affidavit dated 10
January 1997, AAA stated that she was molested by her father on 6 January 1997. [30] During
the preliminary investigation conducted by MCTC Judge Joaquin A. Arevalo, AAA narrated
her harrowing experience in the form of answers to questions, thus:
Q: Where were you last January 6, 1997, in the evening?

A: I was at Barangay Interior, San Jacinto, Masbate, together with my brethren[,] namely: [BBB],
[CCC], [Michael], Edwin and Elmer, who is about 15 years old.

Q: During the aforementioned time and place, were your brothers and sisters all in the house?

A: Yes sir, except Manoy Elmer who was ordered by my father to see a movie.

Q: What did you do after eating your supper?

A: We went to sleep.

Q: Did your father aid with [sic] you?

A: He did not [join] us.

Q: While you were sleeping[,] do you remember any unusual incident?

A: Yes, sir, there was an unusual incident.

Q: What was the incident?

A: While I was sleeping beside [BBB][,] my father arrived smelling of gin and then removed his
clothes.

Q: What did he do after he has removed his clothes?

A: He removed my shorts and laid on top of me.

Q: What else did he do after he was on top of you?

A: He placed his manhood inside me and as I suffered paid I cried.

Q: When you cried[,] did you wake your sister especially [BBB] who was sleeping beside you?
A: My sister was still awake when my father raped me.

...

Q: Do you recall the number of times that your father had molested you?

A: Many times.

... [31]

Later at the witness stand, on direct examination, AAA reiterated:

Q: How many times that your father mounted at [sic] you?

A: Many times.

Q: More than ten (10) times, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When your father was molesting you[sic], was anybody present?

A: Yes sir, my younger brother and sister.

Court:

Proceed.

Pros. Rapsing:

Q: Did you remember when was the last time your father mounted at [sic] you and inserted his
penis [in]to your organ, do you remember when was that?
A: January 6, 1997.

Q: How about the first time, can you still remember when was the first time when your father
raped you?

A: I can no longer remember.

Q: What you only recall is the last time[sic]?

A: Yes, sir.[32]

The defense counsel tried to muddle the facts during the cross-examination but AAA did
not waver, thus:

Q: Madam witness, you were staying at Barangay Interior, San Jacinto, Masbate, is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q And your house is situated within the Barangay site of Interior?

A Yes, sir.

Q Of course, you have neighbors [sic] in your house, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q [In fact], you also have friends?

A Yes, sir.

Q How about to your friends, did you sleep at the house of your friends?

A No[,] sir.

Q You have also a relative in your locality, is that right?


A Yes, sir.

Q [In fact], during night time, you were sleeping in the house of your relatives?

A No, sir.

Q Do you have classmates in your school?

A Yes[,] sir.

Q Because you were classmates, so, you were friends, is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q In fact, you have boy friends?

A No, sir

Q Eventhough you have no boy friends but [sic] you usually play with some boys?

A No, sir.[33]

...

Q Madam Witness, previous to the incident on January 6, 1997, were you able to meet physical
accident, example, you were slide [sic] or you were thrown out of balance?

A No, sir.

Q Did you ride a bicycle?

A I do not know how to ride a bicycle.


Q How about a carabao?

A We have no carabao.[34]

AAA testified in a very clear, convincing and straightforward manner which leaves us with
nary a doubt that she was indeed raped by her father. Moreover, her testimony was
corroborated on all material points by her sister BBB who was herself an eyewitness to the
rape. BBB related:

Q: You are staying in the house of your father[,] Edison Mira, is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q You are staying at the same time with [AAA], your sister, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q During nighttime, you are sleeping with [AAA], is that true?

A Yes, sir.

Q During nighttime, you have you seen your father Edison Mira sleeping with you?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was he doing with AAA, your sister?

A She is sleeping with AAA.

COURT:

The Court will allow the prosecution to ask leading questions considering that the witness is
a minor.
PROS. RAPSING:

Q Do you want to tell us that Edison Mira was sleeping side by side with your father?

A Yes, sir.

Q When your father was sleeping beside your sister, [AAA], were you awake?

A Yes, sir.

Q Have you seen your father mounting your sister[,] [AAA]?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your sister[,] [AAA][,] doing whenever your father is mounting her?

A She was crying.

COURT TO WITNESS:

Q Was she naked?

A Both of them naked.

PROS. RAPSING:

Q And whenever your father is mounting your sister[,] [AAA] also crying[,] is that right?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your father doing on top of your sister when you saw him?

A He was telling my sister to keep quiet.


Q Was your father moving while on top of your sister?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was your father doing on top of your sister when you saw him?

A He was telling my sister to keep quiet.

Q Was your father moving while on top of your sister?

A Yes, sir.

Q His buttocks was moving?

A Yes, sir.

Q And while the buttocks of your father was moving, your sister was crying?

A Yes, sir.[35]

These testimonies, taken together with the medical findings that AAA sustained abrasions
on the vulva and that her hymen was no longer intact, lead to no other conclusion that she
had been raped and that appellant, her father, was the perpetrator.

The prosecution has successfully proven the elements of simple rape, namely: (1) that the
accused had carnal knowledge of a woman, and (2) the same was committed by use of
force or intimidation.[36] When the offended party is under 18 years of age and the offender
is an ascendant of the victim, rape is qualified and becomes punishable by death as
provided under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659.

In incestuous rape, it is essential that the relationship and minority be conjointly alleged in
the information and duly proved.[37] The Information states that "accused by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with his 11-year old daughter AAA, against her will and without her consent."[38]
The filial relationship between appellant and AAA was sufficiently alleged in the
Information and established by the testimonies of AAA[39] and BBB.[40] However, during
trial, the prosecution failed to submit any written evidence to prove the age of the victim.
No birth certificate, baptismal record, or testimony relating to the age of AAA was
presented. Even if the complainant's minority and filiation to the appellant were never
refuted nor contested by the defense, proof thereof is critical, considering the penalty of
death imposed for qualified rape.[41]

As eloquently explained by the Court of Appeals:


To justify the imposition of death, proof of the victim's age is indubitable, and there must be
sufficient and clear evidence proving her age, even if not denied by the accused. As
pronounced in People v. Umayam, (n)either her obvious minority nor the absence of any
contrary assertion from the defense, or even an admission by the appellant can exempt the
prosecution from the requirement of proving it. Thus, in the absence of [AAA's] Certificate
of Live Birth, the prosecution should have presented before the trial court her baptismal
certificate or school record to prove her age at the time of the commission of the crime. In
the case at bench, the prosecution failed. Accordingly, the Defendant-Appellant may only
be convicted of simple rape, which is punishable by reclusion perpetua.[42]
In the more recent case of People v. Biyoc,[43] this Court did not appreciate minority as a
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape for failure of the prosecution to adequately
prove that the victim was only 11 years old when she was raped. We observed:
From the accusatory portion of the information quoted . . . AAA was alleged to be 11 years
old at the time of the alleged rape. The certificate of live birth or similar authentic
documents were not presented. There is no showing that the prosecution claimed that the
said documents had been lost, destroyed or were otherwise unavailable, hence, CCC's
testifying on AAA's age does not suffice to prove that AAA was below the age of 12.
When either one of the qualifying circumstances of relationship and minority is omitted or
lacking, that which is pleaded in the Information and proved by the evidence may be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. In the instant case, relationship may thus be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. However, it may not serve to raise the penalty
because in simple rape, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua which is single and
indivisible.[44]

Finally, we affirm the award of indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00. The award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, without need of further proof, is likewise proper.[45]
Relationship between appellant and the victim is an aggravating circumstance which
justifies the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to deter other
fathers with perverse or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their daughters.
[46]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00452, finding
appellant Edison Mira guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Chairperson), Carpio, Carpio-Morales, and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 4-20. Penned by Associate Justice Normandie B. Pizarro and concurred in by
Associate Justices Josefina Guevara-Salonga and Aurora Santiago-Lagman.

[2] CA rollo, pp. 9-12. Penned by Judge Manuel S. Pecson.

[3] The real name of the victim is withheld per R.A. No. 7610 and R.A. No. 9262. See People v.

Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 19 September 2006.

[4] CA rollo, p. 5.

[5] Supra note 3. Name of sister withheld.

[6] Records, pp. 7-8.

[7] TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 10.

[8] TSN, 11 March 1997, p. 26.

[9] Id. at 24.

[10] TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 5.

[11] Id. 13.

[12] Records, p. 17.


[13] Rollo, p. 7.

[14] CA rollo, p. 12.

[15] Id. at 122.

[16] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA 640.

[17] Rollo, p. 19.

[18] Id. at 21.

[19] Rollo, pp. 22, 25.

[20] CA rollo, pp. 28-29. Brief for Accused-Appellant dated 20 September 2002.

[21]People v. Espidol, G.R. No. 150033, 12 November 2004, 442 sCRA 360, 372, citing People
v. Bello, G.R. Nos. 130411-14, 13 October 1999, 316 SCRA 804, 811; People v. Galvez, 428 Phil.
438, 444 (2002), citing People v. Aranzado, G.R. Nos. 132442-44, September 24, 2001.

[22] G.R. No. 174056, 27 February 2007.

[23]People v. Pioquinto, G.R. No. 168326, 11 April 2007; People v. Murillo, G.R. No. 134583, 14
July 2004, 434 SCRA 342; People v. Tonyacao, G.R. No. 134531-32, 7 July 2004, 433 SCRA
513; People v. Ernas, 455 Phil. 829, 839-840 (2003).

[24] TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 2.

[25] CA rollo, p. 28.

[26] People v. Gumimba, G.R. No. 168326, 27 February 2007.

[27] CA rollo, p. 11.

[28] People v. Rayles, G.R. No. 169874, 27 July 2007.

[29] Rollo, p. 14.


[30] Records, p. 4.

[31] Records, pp. 7-8.

[32] TSN, 11 March 1997, p. 26.

[33] Id. at 29-30.

[34] Id. at pp. 29-31.

[35] TSN, 10 March 1997, pp. 9-13.

[36] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 266-B.

[37] People v. Orillosa, G.R. Nos. 148716-18, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 689.

[38] Supra note 4.

[39] TSN, 11 March 1997, p. 24.

[40] TSN, 10 March 1997, p. 8.

[41]
People v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 138742, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 86, 102 citing People v.
Gavino, 399 SCRA 285 (2003).

[42] Rollo, pp. 17-18.

[43] G.R. No. 167670, 7 September 2007.

[44]People v. Hermocilla, G.R. No. 175830, 10 July 2007, citing People v. Esperanza, 453 Phil.
54, 75-76 (2003).

[44] Garces v. People, G.R. No. 173858, 17 July 2007.

[46] Supra note 42; People v. Ebio, G.R. No. 147750, September 29, 2004, 439 SCRA 421.

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