AQP AFRt
AQP AFRt
“If you're faced with a forced landing, fly the thing as far into the
crash as possible.” - Bob Hoover
“Keep thy airspeed up, less the earth come from below and
smite thee.” - William Kershner
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AQP AFR
Advanced Qualification Program | Annual Flight Review
LINK: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLZUuXpwtz5yDJW_eFfnPyX2IBvUzL9w3G
The airlines and most 135 operators of large aircraft operate their own
training and testing (all simulator based) under a program called AQP, or
Advanced Qualifications Program. Under AQP, each airline gets to decide
what to train, and what is on the oral, and what is on the check ride! This is an
amazing difference between GA and AIRLINES! These are not check rides
like you have ever seen before. The airline record is impressive, (see enclosed
summary sheet) as they now train and check all the possible scenarios (called
maneuvers) known to be problematic over the course of time.
https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/training/aqp/more/
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Note *1 Some airlines recently have adopted EET or extended envelope training where stalls
and unusual attitudes may be trained.
Note *2 ADM is mentioned by FAA as being constantly evaluated in each task for all tasks
but Never as an individual task.
Note *3 P
re-Flight verbal “self” briefing as a final review of plan, course, and contingency for
single pilot GA ops is not required.
Note *4 I-IMC ATO is found on the Instrument Pilot ACS, but not private.
Note *5 Stabilized approach is mentioned in FAA ACS and PTS but Never defined as to how
to use it, what the definition of it is, nor is it ever checked as a specific task.
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Based on this comparison, we find that, under AQP, the Airlines have
custom-built their own training and check rides to match possible accident
scenarios, and be fully ready for each. General aviation continues to place
emphasis on the review of unrelated maneuvers that have no connection
with time critical real-world accident scenarios.
It implies that there is a lot of discretion for custom building your own
training program unique to your own aircraft and your own type of flying.
The FAA provides an AC 61-89D that actually encourages the custom design
of an individual program:
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❏ Preflight Preparation
❏ ADM
❏ Before Taxi Check
❏ Preflight Briefing
❏ Rejected Take Off
❏ I-IMC ATO or U-IMC ATO
❏ LOTOT (either single or twin)
❏ SD –D or SD-N
❏ Terrain Avoidance
❏ Loss of AHRS in Flight
❏ Autopilot Failure
❏ Loss of Speed Awareness
❏ Mishandled Abnormal in Flight
❏ Stabilized Approach
❏ Messed up Go-Arounds
❏ Importance of the Flight Review
The idea here is to get to know who’s sitting across from you in an effort
to help t hem, so asking meaningful questions in a casual manner well
immensely help when stepping through the relevant tasks during the
ground portion of the review.
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PREFLIGHT BRIEFING
❏ Even while flying-single pilot, what is the value of a good Pre-Flight Briefing and or
self-briefing?
❏ How prevalent are fatal GA accidents due to missing, or no self-briefing, and not
having a plan B?
❏ Is the task PRE-TAKEOFF BRIEFING on any FAA check ride?
❏ As is, are we in GA adequately prepared for PRE-TAKEOFF BRIEFING?
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SD –D or SD-N
❏ What is spatial Disorientation?
❏ Have you ever been given specific dual instruction for any rating on a task called SD?
❏ Have you ever had SD be tested as a task on any check ride?
❏ On any check ride, when you are given the task of unusual attitude recovery by an
examiner, are you wearing a view limiting device for this task?
❏ For a check ride, when you are asked to recover from an unusual attitude, where are
you expected to look? Inside at the panel, or outside at the horizon?
❏ If you were flying VFR and heard a controller tell you to “Maintain VFR” what does the
V stand for?
❏ If you were flying VFR and accidently got yourself into IMC conditions and a controller
told you to “Maintain VFR”, would that cause you to want to look inside at your panel,
or want to look more outside to stay visual?
❏ Have you ever been flying and heard a controller say anything like: “I know you’re VFR
only, but don’t look outside. Get on those gauges and fly wings level. I’m going to
help you. Even if you fly through a cloud it’s OK, I got you covered. Concentrate on
wings level and steady.”
❏ Does it make sense then, that we as pilots solely train and test with a hood on, and
with an instructor or examiner reminding us to stay on instruments. But we get into
trouble without an instructor, without wearing a hood, and ATC is telling us to stay
visual?
❏ What happens if you fly VFR into a cloud without being IFR and the FAA finds out?
❏ If you are in flight and you declare an emergency, is there a penalty?
❏ What liberties do you have available as soon as you declare an emergency?
❏ Is there a regulation that says this in writing?
❏ Do you think that pilots are generally fearful of declaring an emergency in flight?
❏ Upon entering clouds, (either on purpose or inadvertent) what are your flight
priorities?
❏ How prevalent are fatal GA accidents due to SD?
❏ Is the task SD-D or SD-N on any FAA checkride for GA?
❏ As is, are we in GA adequately prepared for SD-D or SD-N?
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TERRAIN AWARENESS
❏ What is C-FIT
❏ What does the C stand for in C-FIT?
❏ All crashes end up crashing into the earth somehow, there are only two ways to do
this. If C-FIT is one of them, what must the other be?
❏ What is the main difference between C-FIT and U-FIT?
❏ Since all controls are working normally in C-FIT, it must be the pilots incorrect
positioning of those controls that steers a plane into something solid and not
moveable. What can pilots use to avoid CFIT accidents?
❏ How prevalent are fatal GA accidents due to C-FIT?
❏ Is the task C-FIT / TERRAIN AVOIDANCE on any FAA GA check ride?
❏ As is, are we in GA adequately prepared for C-FIT / TERRAIN AVOIDANCE?
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LOSS OF SPEED AWARENESS
❏ What is DMMS
❏ What is this number (speed) for your airplane?
❏ Without calculating this for yourself, is this speed published anywhere in your POH for
your airplane?
❏ Does having this number calculated and placarded on your airspeed indicator help to
remind you of the min speed to fly that will always give you that 30% stall buffer?
❏ The DMMS speed is 1.404 x Vs1 for most GA planes. What three things does this
DMMS speed represent that are very useful to a pilot both in normal and abnormal
scenarios?
❏ While turning base to final at a 30 angle of bank in your plane and holding altitude in
the turn, if you are flying exactly the DMMS speed, what percent above stall should
you still be even if you have no flaps out yet?
❏ Once on final, is it OK to go below DMMS?
❏ What is the FAA’s recommendation for speed on final when fully configured?
❏ How often do airliners stall and spin and crash due to low speed condition?
❏ How often is the low speed condition a cause of fatal accidents in the pattern for GA?
❏ Is DMMS usage on any FAA checkride?
❏ As is, are we in GA adequately prepared for “preventing” a low speed condition via
DMMS usage?
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STABILIZED APPROACH
❏ What is the definition of a stabilized approach according to the FAA?
❏ What are the two gates often used for determining stabilized or not?
❏ If you are not stabilized on time, what will the result likely be?
❏ If you are not stabilized in time, what should you do?
❏ How many fatal accidents are caused by unstable approaches?
❏ What is PIO?
❏ Of these five landing goals, which one of these is least important to you:
❏ landing on speed, 2) landing in TD zone, 3) landing on centerline, 4) Staying on glide
path, 5) squeaky landing
❏ Is there a task called squeaky landing on any FAA check ride?
❏ Is the task Stabilized Approach on any FAA GA check ride?
❏ As is, are we in GA adequately prepared by FAA to make stabilized approaches
without PIO?
MESSED UP GO-AROUNDS
❏ What are some dangers of messed up go arounds?
❏ Does the FAA check the Go Around task on all FAA check-rides?
❏ How often are messed up Go Arounds the cause of a fatal GA accident?
❏ As is, are we in GA adequately prepared by FAA for excellent GO AROUNDS?
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FATAL ACCIDENT DATA
The 2018 NTSB fatal accident data showed a marked increase in fatal
accidents for General Aviation. The rate increased 9.4% per 100,000 flight
hours to a new benchmark of 1.029 fatal accidents per 100,000 flight hours.
Almost a full 10% increase!
This new data will affect all fliers in the private sector due to the
insurance industry response. Many insurance carriers have closed their doors,
or are about to. Most new and expensive used aircraft purchases involve bank
financing. Any time a lender is involved in an aircraft transaction full coverage
for hull loss will be required. The ability for YOU to obtain or renew your
existing coverages may be affected in the near future. An increase in annual
premium is likely imminent even if you have had no losses or claims for many
years. The derived data for 2019 is equally significant.
What can we do? It is obvious that there will be no new revelation or
effective change inspired by either government or large association. The only
obvious direction that we as a community can go, is to recognize the marked
deficiencies in the GA world as compared to airline industry, and copy their
successful methods and techniques for drastically reducing the fatal GA
accident rate.
The following is a side by side comparison of accident rates in General
Aviation versus the Airlines (part 121) from 2011 through 2019*.
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It’s not the fall that will kill you - it’s that sudden STOP at the end.
Loss-of-Control has become all-too common on the stage of GA accidents.
Blunt trauma is almost always the cause of death in a fatal aircraft accident.
All of these flights can therefore broadly be placed in one of two buckets:
Being aware of the problem and practicing and reviewing in advance will
cause drastic improvement in the outcome.
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1. C-FIT: SD-D
CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN: SPATIAL DISORIENTATION - DAY
This happens when an IFR rated or non IFR rated pilot gets disoriented
during day flight. This is usually, but not necessarily in IMC conditions. The
scenario is the result of either intentional or unintentional flight into these
confusing conditions. Regardless of the intent or not, the common scenario
is simply a deteriorating and ultimate loss of distinguishable outside horizon
(earth) using visual cues. Most often this is associated with flying into clouds,
but not necessarily. Flying near rain, over desolate land or over water could
initiate the disorientation. The human mind is often set on “eyes outside” for
reference data, as in what is level and what is not. The matter can often be
complicated by ATC contact and ATC instruction that is a constant reminder
to a pilot already disoriented to “Maintain VFR” This is almost a direct order
from the FAA to keep looking outside the aircraft (includes airplane or
helicopter) and maintain visual reference. Once this reference is gone, the
resulting track of the aircraft is often a large swooping spiral known as a
death spiral, or graveyard spiral of ever tightening radius as the pilot is flying
by seat of the pants feeling and disregarding instruments. Most commonly,
this ever-tightening circle is performed to the left. The aircraft typically hits
the ground very steep and at a very high speed. In error, the NTSB often
makes reference to this type of accident as a loss of airplane control or LOC-I
inflight accident. Loss of control implies that the controls were not working
properly at the time of impact. Most SD fatal crashes occur where the
controls were in fact performing perfectly, and the aircraft was perfectly
controllable even though the pilot positioned those controls improperly due
to undue influences. Most SD fatal crashes are specifically “not” U-FIT or loss
of control, but rather C-FIT.
SOLUTION: When conditions become marginal, and before the situation
deteriorates too far, confess your actual situation to ATC and declare an
emergency. Your PIC emergency authority becomes a status and you are
granted an instant temporary IFR rating, and you are LEGAL to be in the
clouds! If you have any kind of view limiting device, put it on and concentrate
solely on keeping wings level and DO NOT look outside! Much like blinders on
a horse or mule, a view limiting device is calming and eliminates scary stuff
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from your view. A view limiting device eliminates the sensation of rush of
cloud and moisture streaming past your window from your view. It’s like not
looking down while on a tall ladder. Wearing a view limiting device in flight is
NOT normally legal, but once you declare an emergency, use any and all tools
available to you in order to survive the encounter. You did all of your primary
training wearing a view limiting device and you did just fine in keeping the
craft level at that time. This is no different. When ATC says to “maintain VFR”
reply to them: “Negative, unable to maintain VFR, I am emergency aircraft,
request all available assistance.” When ATC gives you instructions, try to
separate out turns and climbs. If a climb is required, accomplish that before a
turn if able. Confess to ATC your actual situation and IFR skill level. If you are
issued a turn, do it very slowly with full concentration on that panel. DO NOT
attempt to look outside until you are very sure that you are back in VMC
conditions.
If you are not in contact with ATC use all resources to point the aircraft
towards where you came from, or towards better weather. Y ou have got to
be very careful and do things very slowly during this time. Do not look
away from that panel for more than a second. This procedure is critical to
your survival. Practice this with a safety pilot or your CFI until you are an
expert at it. SD-D and SD-N is one of the highest repeat causes of fatal
accidents in GA. Normally chances of survival are not very high for a pilot in
these conditions regardless of the skill level of the pilot. SD happens best
when you are not ready for it.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's loss of
airplane control due to spatial disorientation. The accident report may be
accessed through the aviation synopses page on the NTSB website. The
NTSB accident number is CEN17FA362
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b7t4IR-3mSo
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2. C – FIT: SD-N
CONTROLLED FLIGHT INTO TERRAIN: SPATIAL DISORIENTATION - NIGHT
This happens when an IFR rated or non IFR rated pilot gets disoriented
during night flight. This is usually, but not necessarily in IMC conditions. The
scenario is the result of either intentional or unintentional flight into these
confusing conditions. Regardless of the intent or not, the common scenario
is simply a deteriorating and ultimate loss of distinguishable outside horizon
(earth) using visual cues. Most often this is associated with flying into clouds,
but not necessarily. Flying near rain, over desolate land or over water could
initiate the disorientation. The human mind is often set on eyes outside for
reference data, as in what is level and what is not. The matter can often be
complicated by ATC contact and ATC instruction that is a constant reminder
to a pilot already disoriented to “Maintain VFR” This is almost a direct order
from the FAA to keep looking outside the aircraft (includes airplane or
helicopter) and maintain visual reference. Once this reference is gone, the
resulting track of the aircraft is often a large swooping spiral known as a
death spiral, or graveyard spiral of ever tightening radius as the pilot is flying
by the “seat of the pants” feeling and disregarding the instruments. Most
commonly, this ever-tightening circle is performed to the left. The aircraft
typically hits the ground very steep and at a very high speed. In error, the
NTSB often makes reference to this type of accident as a loss of airplane
control or LOC-I inflight accident. Loss of control implies that the controls
were not working properly at the time of impact. Most SD fatal crashes occur
where the controls were in fact performing perfectly, and the aircraft was
perfectly controllable even though the pilot positioned those controls
improperly due to undue influences. Most SD fatal crashes are specifically
not U-FIT or loss of control, but rather C-FIT.
SOLUTION: W hen conditions become marginal, and before the situation
deteriorates too far, confess your actual situation to ATC and declare an
emergency. Your PIC emergency authority becomes a status and you are
granted an instant temporary IFR rating, and you are LEGAL to be in the
clouds! If you have any kind of view limiting device, put it on and concentrate
solely on keeping wings level and DO NOT look outside! Much like binders on
a horse or mule, a view limiting device is calming and eliminates scary stuff
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from your view. A view limiting device eliminates the sensation of rush of
cloud and moisture streaming past your window from your view. It’s like not
looking down while on a tall ladder. Wearing a view limiting device in flight is
NOT normally legal, but once you declare an emergency, use any and all tools
available to you in order to survive the encounter. You did all of your primary
training wearing a view limiting device and you did just fine in keeping the
craft level at that time. This is no different. When ATC says to “maintain VFR”
reply to them: “Negative, unable to maintain VFR, I am emergency aircraft,
request all available assistance.” When ATC gives you instructions, try to
separate out turns and climbs. If a climb is required, accomplish that before a
turn if able. Confess to ATC your actual situation and IFR skill level. If you are
issued a turn, do it very slowly with full concentration on that panel. DO NOT
attempt to look outside until you are very sure that you are back in VMC
conditions. If you are not in contact with ATC use all resources to point the
aircraft towards where you came from, or towards better weather. You have
got to be very careful and do things very slowly during this time. Do not look
away from that panel for more than a second. This procedure is critical to
your survival. Practice this with a safety pilot or your CFI until you are an
expert at it. SD-D and SD-N is one of the highest repeat causes of fatal
accidents in GA. Normally chances of survival are not very high for a pilot in
these conditions regardless of the skill level of the pilot. SD happens best
when you are not ready for it.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The pilot's failure to maintain control of the
airplane during a descent over water at night, which was a result of spatial
disorientation. Factors in the accident were haze and the dark night. The
accident report may be accessed through the aviation synopses page on the
NTSB website. The NTSB accident number is NYC99MA178.
SAMPLE VIDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=028tTU-sZFA
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F84ZyIYGIrY
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This happens when an instrument rated pilot files an IFR flight plan and
receives a proper clearance and is fully trained and expecting IMC conditions
after takeoff. For whatever reasons, the pilot in this case becomes distracted,
overloaded, or disoriented immediately after liftoff. The wreckage is typically
found just off the end of the departure runway, within a few miles of the
departure airport. In error, the NTSB often makes reference to this accident
type as a loss of airplane control as a LOC-I or Loss of Control inflight accident.
Loss of control implies that the controls were not working properly at the
time of impact. Most SD fatal crashes occur where the controls were in fact
performing perfectly, and the aircraft was perfectly controllable even though
the pilot positioned those controls improperly. In the first 1000 feet of climb,
pay very close attention to aircraft control and consider the delay in
accomplishing the following items until you are sure that you can manage an
additional task:
- Flaps up
- Contact departure
- Ident
- Boost pump off
- Landing light off
- Check in with departure
- Reduce power
- Set new assigned altitude
- Set new assigned heading
It is appropriate to add the words Single Pilot IFR to your callsign to
alert ATC that you do not wish to be overloaded after takeoff. This is similar to
using Student Pilot after your call sign when learning to fly. You can also ask
for both runway heading and a higher initial altitude before takeoff.
Sometimes ATC can make a quick call and approve either or both of these for
you so that you are not dealing with both a level off and a turn immediately
after takeoff. Last, you can use your voice and let ATC know that this is a very
low IMC departure and you desire excellent handling. This is like asking for a
sterile cockpit from ATC. Ask them to leave you alone until you get your craft
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stabilized. Most all ATC are highly experienced and very eager to help if you
will tell them exactly how to help you. Most of all, aviate before you navigate,
navigate before you communicate. Once you communicate, you have
opened up the floodgates for ATC workload and they are going to load you
up with more tasks. Take your time. ATC has overloaded many pilots within
the first mile after takeoff from a class D airport and it is totally not necessary
to sacrifice aircraft control. The Cheyenne crash in Louisiana went from liftoff
to impact point in less than two miles. During the takeoff phase, be able to
find the gear handle via feel while keeping your eyes on the ADI. U p Simba,
Up Simba or similar phrases are good self-reminders to say to yourself while
you keep that nose up and climbing properly. Set the pitch first via ADI and
then make slight pitch refinements using airspeed information. If you have
an autopilot, consider bringing it on line as soon as speed, altitude, and
limitations allow.
SOLUTION: G et with your CFI, or a favorite safety pilot and rehearse this
scenario. Get good at prioritizing your workload. File an IFR flight plan from a
controlled field so that you can practice picking up your clearance, using
Single Pilot IFR in your call sign, and asking for a sterile cockpit after takeoff.
Try asking for higher initial altitude and runway heading and see if the
controllers will make that call for you and work out an easier clearance.
Sometimes they can, sometimes they cannot. Practice being super diligent
on that ADI during takeoff and immediately after takeoff. DO NOT let
anything distract you from your primary job. This is an absolute killer category
and ATC is a major contributing factor in many cases. This is your life. Slow
down and ask for help. Do not rush to accomplish tasks ahead of aircraft
control. Practice this routine every time you fly IFR.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's loss of
control due to spatial disorientation during takeoff in instrument
meteorological conditions. Accident Number: CEN18FA061
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://youtu.be/5PZyhCWKvcI
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This happens mostly during day VMC conditions where the goal is low
passes, photo passes, airshow operations, persons watching, or aerobatic
practice. Unseen obstacles such as guy wires, transmission lines, towers,
often are the first point of contact. Attempting acrobatic flight for the first
time, or attempting acrobatic maneuvers too close to the surface area, or
disorientation during high G maneuvers often cause fatal impact with the
terrain. Numerous fatal accidents have been caused by attempted loop
maneuver that was started too low and cannot be completed before impact.
SOLUTION: T ry to avoid impromptu buzzing or unplanned low passes.
Experimental acro is rarely a good idea and it is best to start high with an
experienced acro CFI. Use of Foreflight is highly recommended for obstacle
avoidance during low level flight, but overall low-level flight is highly
dangerous and the best solution is to not participate in this type of flying.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's decision to
fly along the river at a low altitude contrary to applicable regulations and
safety of flight considerations which resulted in the impact with the power
lines. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's inability to see the and
avoid the power lines due to their proximity to a bend in the river and the
position of the sun at the time of the accident. NTSB Accident Number
CEN18FA011
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4ElP2v1_pbQ
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This happens mostly in flight where the pilot does NOT become
disoriented. The pilot is simply unaware of the looming terrain in his or her
flight path. Normally the aircraft is proceeding normally and there is no
cause for alarm, other than the fact that the aircraft path is directly aimed at
an object. These accidents can occur when in either visual or in IMC
conditions.
SOLUTION: In today’s advanced GPS world, there is no reason to ever be the
victim of terrain collision due to not knowing that there was terrain ahead.
Numerous companies such as ForeFlight make products for the iPad and
phones that clearly show terrain in both two dimensional and three
dimensions. Numerous companies make highly accurate synthetic vision for
the portable devices making surprise encounters totally rare and becoming
obsolete. The total cost of such a system is very affordable and other
products such as flight planning, fuel planning, and weather information
make the technology invaluable to fly with. Try to get with your local CFI or
best safety pilot and simulate navigating around towers or terrain using the
electronics for reference as if it was either night or reduced visibility
conditions.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: #1 The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's decision to
fly into a canyon during wind conditions conducive to turbulence and
downdrafts, and his subsequent loss of aircraft control while maneuvering in
the canyon. Contributing to the accident was the pilot's limited canyon flying
experience. NTSB Accident Number: WPR17FA213
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: #2 The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's failure to
maintain clearance from terrain after takeoff during dark night conditions.
NTSB Accident Number: CEN17FA227
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BXr3xr4rj98
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here may not meet your needs. Define your own TDZ definitions and
include it in your own briefings.
Depending on if you are IFR, VFR, IMC or VMC, you should have all four
of these criteria met at some target “gate” on each approach. The gates are
typically 1000 AGL at the highest for solid IMC approaches in heavy aircraft, to
as low as 300 AGL is VFR light aircraft. The solution is to know your targets
and be ready and willing to Go Around when you do not have all four criteria
totally met by the gate that you established.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The flight crew's failure to maintain airplane
control during landing following an unstabilized approach. Contributing to
the accident were the flight crew's decision to land with a tailwind above the
airplane's operating limitations and their failure not to conduct a go-around
when the approach became unstabilized.
SAMPLE VIDEO:
https://tasteofcountry.com/dale-earnhardt-jr-plane-crash-ntsb-report-cause-
details/
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only around 400 feet AGL after takeoff, but this practice is solely at the
discretion of the instructor. In real life, you have only a few seconds to push
during an engine failure immediately after takeoff.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: #1 The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's
inadequate fuel planning, which resulted in a total loss of engine power due
to fuel starvation during the initial climb, and his failure to maintain adequate
airspeed while turning back to the runway, which resulted in an exceedance
of the airplane's critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall. Accident
Number: ERA18FA152
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: #2 The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: An in-flight fire and
total loss of engine power after takeoff due to a loose fuel line. Contributing to
the accident was the installation of an unapproved fuel line by unknown
personnel. Accident Number: ERA18FA138
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: #3 The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: A total loss of engine
power due to fuel starvation for reasons that could not be determined based
on the available evidence. Also causal was the pilot's decision to return to the
runway following the loss of engine power, and his failure to maintain
airspeed during the turn, which resulted in the airplane exceeding its critical
angle of attack and experiencing an aerodynamic stall/spin. NTSB Accident
Number: WPR17FA152
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O-eBrxma1X0
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=In6gWMq35sk
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wVXV6RCHbwA
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The FAA desires that all aircraft maintain a minimum 30% speed buffer
above stall in all flight conditions. The exception to this is during final
approach when under certain conditions it may be permissible to go as low
as 20% above stall speed, or 1.2 Vso. A large percentage of GA accidents occur
during clean wing maneuvering either after takeoff during climb, or entering
the traffic pattern and maneuvering. When a pilot becomes distracted and
allows speed to decay, GA has no audible or visual warning to alert the pilot
that they have transgressed this sacred 30% area. The stall horn does activate
very close to the actual stall but in most cases, it is too late. A spin often
follows an aerodynamic stall. Most of these accidents happen below 1000
AGL where even the most proficient pilot in the world would have no chance
of completing a spin recovery prior to impact. PREVENTION is the only real
tool available. Be aware of that 30% by placarding Vs1 x 1.404 for your aircraft
right on the face of your airspeed indicator! Studies have shown that this
simple indicator is almost 100% effective in increasing a pilot’s awareness of
where this 30% clean buffer boundary is.
SOLUTION: P lacard your ASI with a DMMS marker and practice referring to it
often while in the pattern. Take immediate corrective action any time you are
in flight below DMMS speed and not on final approach. DMMS awareness
leads to the PREVENTION of low speed condition fatal accidents.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: #1 The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The sport
pilot's failure to maintain adequate airspeed during landing in crosswind
conditions resulting in an aerodynamic stall. Accident Number: ERA10LA158
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: #2 The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: An engine
malfunction for undetermined reasons and the subsequent loss of control,
due to the pilot's improper decision to maneuver the airplane below
minimum controllable airspeed and his improper response to the loss of
engine power. Accident Number: CEN18FA116
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This accident is confined to multi engine aircraft only where the sudden
loss of thrust during takeoff causes a large thrust differential between the
two power plants. The continued thrust from one side as compared to the
drag associated with the failed opposite engine causes a turning moment
that is normally quite pronounced. The net effect is that the aircraft performs
what appears to be a low-level acrobatic maneuver and typically impacts the
earth almost inverted and about thirty degrees off of runway heading.
Numerous recent crashes in both Hawaii and Texas have spotlighted the
deadly rollover effect where the crash site was located in a very small area
(near vertical impact) just off the runway. Vmc training is often inadequate,
not recent, or not taught correctly in preventing the fatal outcome. The most
pronounced effect of the sudden loss of power occurs immediately after
takeoff and during a high angle of attack. On some aircraft, the two-engine
climb angle can be as high as 18 degrees. Most training facilities train pilots
for what they consider to be the worst case scenario or loss of power during
the act of rotation. In that case the pilot is easily able to control the craft by
raising the nose up to a target pitch specific to that aircraft and those
conditions. Oftentimes this is the only maneuver that training is provided for.
In real life, the actual engine failure occurs at around 300 feet while climbing
and the pitch has already been established at a very high (normal) angle. A
pilot that is trained to raise the nose up to target pitch in time of crisis will
often pull aft on the yoke during the engine failure when the correct action is
actually to p ush down to the same target pitch. A single engine pitch should
be established that maintains Vyse by adjusting pitch and completing the
memory items.
Quickly establishing proper pitch appropriate to the loss of thrust offers
enough airflow over the vertical stab and rudder to make the aircraft
controllable. Flight below Vmc (red arc) will normally cause the Vmc roll over
effect. Being ready to immediately establish proper pitch and even the
acceptance of the loss of some altitude are all possible during this precarious
maneuver. If it becomes obvious that the rollover is beginning, the pilot
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should consider closing the opposite throttle in order to equalize the thrust
differential immediately.
SOLUTION: If you fly multi engine aircraft, this is one that you have got to
train for and be ready for. Constant preparation and pre takeoff rehearsal are
critical for quick action during the loss of thrust on takeoff in any multi
engine plane. Get with a MEI or consider simulator training that can review
these fundamentals often.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The failure of both
the pilot and the certified flight instructor to ensure that the left fuel selector
was in the on position for takeoff and their failure to follow the proper
procedures when the left engine lost power shortly after takeoff, resulting in
an in-flight loss of control. Accident Number: ERA11FA054
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UYtH84TvYuk
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Many fatal in-flight icing occurrences happen every year with needless
loss of life and property. Most often the information was readily available
concerning the freezing levels, or the pilot never checked this important part
of the trip planning. On occasion, in-flight icing is far more severe than was
forecast and only recent PIREPS relayed in a timely manner could help
prevent a tragedy. Preflight planning and ADM is so important for aircraft
with little or no de-ice or anti-ice capability. Inadvertent flight into severe
known icing is almost always fatal and not survivable. If you do encounter
airframe ice, make your decision to climb or descend early, including
declaring an emergency and making an immediate descent without ATC
clearance if necessary. Often times the ice can accumulate very quickly so
time becomes critical
SOLUTION: Better weather briefing efforts and better training concerning
obtaining weather information for both before takeoff, and enroute becomes
important. Get with your CFI and plan a sample flight, and go fly where you
are asked to obtain updated weather in flight from FSS or electronic data.
Become proficient at obtaining better briefings and becoming better at
making ADM type decisions for on the ground, and in flight. Always ask for a
debrief on how you did, and any tricks that you could use to do better.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The airplane's
encounter with severe icing conditions, which resulted in structural icing, and
the pilot's increased workload and subsequent disorientation while
maneuvering in instrument flight rules (IFR) conditions with malfunctioning
flight instruments, which led to the subsequent loss of airplane control.
Contributing to the accident was the pilot's decision to takeoff in IFR
conditions and fly a single-pilot operation without a functioning autopilot and
with malfunctioning flight instruments. Accident Number: CEN14FA009
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jHm4itwxpVY
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One of the most trusted and sacred maneuvers of any pilot is the Go
Around. They say you can always go around, and usually that is true. But can
you always Go Around and live to tell about it? Many GA fatal accidents occur
as a result of a messed up go around. It’s one where the pilot actually stalls
the plane during the process or leaves the runway environment during the
process of trying to Go Around. During the process of adding full power, the
nose on most any plane will naturally want to rise. The retraction of flaps
while the nose goes too high is often the recipe for disaster. Being fully
trained and ready for the Go Around is paramount.
SOLUTION: T his is one of the most important maneuvers to practice with
your CFI. You should chair fly through your actions prior to even going to the
plane. Think about when to push power in, how much to lower the nose. Are
you going to re-trim? When do flaps start to be retracted? When do you talk
on the radio and when do you flip all the switches for the after-takeoff
checklist? Your CFI can help you rehearse this maneuver so that you are
completely ready, and you do everything in the proper order. All planes are
different concerning specifics, the point is that YOU are ready for the act of
being required to Go Around by surprise at any time, without losing control of
YOUR plane.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's delayed
decision to conduct a go around following an un-stabilized landing approach
and his subsequent failure to maintain clearance from trees near the end of
the runway. NTSB Accident Number: ERA16FA169
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yaaZEK22YRg
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=b_CSX4H2Dh0
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The airlines make exceptional effort to both brief and be ready for the
RTO. They even include it as a maneuver on all recurrent check rides under
AQP. General Aviation for single engine planes does not have such a
maneuver, nor does it have any mention of in training material. The main
emphasis is to know the abort points during any takeoff such as insufficient
speed at a certain marker, or stagnating airspeed, or unknown vibration, etc.
The pilot should be thinking about the runway length and how aggressively
braking is going to occur if an RTO is required.
SOLUTION: Get with your CFI and discuss both the criteria for rejecting a
takeoff (what we will and will not abort for) and the reference points that you
want to use. Some common techniques are to use runway distance
remaining markers, key points on the runway, or an elapsed amount of time
from throttle advance to liftoff. As an example, you could use a timer and
know that in your plane, you should be at 70 knots and rotating at the 20
second mark. If not, effect an immediate abort. Talk over your after-abort
items with your CFI as well. Items such as calling the tower to advise of abort,
whether you should taxi clear or not after abort, are the brakes hot, did you
leave any debris on the runway, etc. All are good things to brief and try out
with a CFI. As a test, have your CFI advance power for you but not give you
full RPM. See if your abort parameters become obvious when you have
passed a point or a certain amount of time and the plane still has not reached
rotation speed. The point here is to think about this and discuss now when
you have the opportunity to be ready for this. If you are surprised in an RTO, it
might not work out well for you.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The pilot's
improper decision to depart into adverse weather conditions. Contributing
was the gusty wind conditions. Accident Number: NYC07LA027
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IljFUURYhaw
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Pilot seats are constructed such that they have a tremendous variance
in position. Normally full aft for getting in and out of the plane, and mostly
forward for operation of the plane. This is so that the pilot can reach the
pedals on the floor and be close to panel controls for operations. The total
distance of travel on some planes is as much as 18 inches. In this unfortunate
scenario, a pilot seat can unlock and slide aft during the acceleration of
takeoff. This causes the pilot to pull aft briskly on the control yoke or stick.
From outside the plane, the aircraft appears to leap skyward in a very sharp
climb until it stalls and returns to earth in an unsurvivable crash.
SOLUTION: V ery careful and frequent inspection or seat tracks by both
maintenance personnel as well as each PIC in each aircraft during each and
every preflight. Be aware of seat tracks with elongated holes where the
locking pin could become dislodged during takeoff. Compare other seat
tracks as often as you can so that you can get an idea what good seat tracks
look like compared to one with opportunity for a seat slide. Be very proactive
on seat track awareness and mechanism operation. Assure that the pilot seat
is properly and firmly locked in place prior to every takeoff, and cannot slide
aft.
SAMPLE ACCIDENT REPORT: The National Transportation Safety Board
determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: The flight instructor's
failure to ensure that her seat was properly secured before initiating the
takeoff, which resulted in a subsequent loss of control. Contributing was the
lack of an installed secondary seat stop. NTSB Accident Number: ERA16FA141
SAMPLE VIDEO: h
ttps://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gDTERUjqusA
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NAME __________________________________________
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