The Professional Bulletin of the Armor Branch, Headquarters, Department of the Army, PB 17-24-2

Commandant Features
BG Chad C. Chalfont
6 Combat Vehicle Service Optimization: Efforts to Streamline
Editor in Chief Services for Abrams and Bradley Family of Vehicles
CPT Andrew J. Porter LTG Heidi J. Hoyle, BG Michael J. Simmering and MAJ Dirk
K. van Ingen
ARMOR (ISSN 0004-2420) is published quarterly by the U.S. Army 10 The Trouble with LOGSTATs
Armor School, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Kark- MAJ Sarah A. Barron
er Street, Fort Moore, GA 31905.
16 U.S Tank Gunnery: Historical Ebb, Flow of Proficiency
Disclaimers: The information contained in ARMOR represents the Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D.
professional opinions of the authors and does not necessarily re- 27 Organizing Light Cavalry in the Army of 2030
flect the official Army, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
CPT Charles Clouse
or U.S. Army Armor School position, nor does it change or super-
sede any information presented in other official Army publications. 32 Applying Patrolling Principles to Large-Scale Combat
Operations at National Training Center
Manuscripts and their accompanying figures become government
property and public domain upon receipt in ARMOR editorial of-
CPT Trent Frum and SFC Jared Stallone
fices. (The ideas within the manuscript remain the author’s intel- 36 BCT Armor Reserve: An Approach to Large-Scale Combat
lectual property and may be reused by the author, but the work it- Operations
self — the particular expression of the ideas — passes to public do- 1LT Leo E. Li
main upon receipt of the manuscript.) ARMOR staff will make nec-
essary grammar, syntax and style corrections on the text to meet 43 Strike Swiftly: Developing Sustainable Maintenance Strategy
publication standards and will redesign illustrations and charts for in Combined Arms Battalion
clarity and to standards as necessary. ARMOR staff may coordinate LTC Mike Kim, MAJ Nate Bennett, CW3 Jason Amsdell and
changes with authors in the interest of ensuring that content re- 1LT Collette Benavidez
mains accurate and professionally developmental. As a non-copy-
righted government publication, no copyright is granted if a work
51 The Defensive Lynchpin: Unveiling Vital Role of Class IV Combat
is published in ARMOR, and in general, no copyrighted works should Configured Loads in Large-Scale Combat Operations
be submitted for consideration to publish. On occasion, however, MAJ William Longwell and CPT Olivia Schretzman
ARMOR may wish to publish copyrighted material, and in that in-
stance, individual authors’ copyrights will be protected by special
56 Leader Conduct in Training: Rebooting retired LTG Hal Moore’s
arrangement. ‘Four Principles of Conduct in Battle’ for Armored Leaders
COL Esli Pitts
As the primary purpose of ARMOR content is the professional de-
velopment of Armor Branch soldiers, ARMOR focuses on materials 65 Future of Cavalry: Multi-Domain Effects Battalions as New
for which the Armor School has proponency: armored, direct-fire Theater Reconnaissance
ground combat systems not serving primarily as infantry carriers; LTC Aaron Ritzema and LTC Thomas Burns
weapons used exclusively in these systems or by CMF 19-series en- 70 Putting the ‘C’ Back in BCT: Creating Change Agents Through
listed Soldiers; miscellaneous items of equipment which armored
and armored cavalry organizations use exclusively; training for all Initiative Ownership
19-series officers and CMF 19-series enlisted Soldiers; and informa- COL Scott C. White and CSM Jonathan M. Duncan
tion concerning the training, logistics, history and leadership of ar-
mor and armored cavalry units at a brigade/regiment level and be-
low, to include threat units at those levels.
Distribution: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited. Departments
Official distribution is made as one copy for each armored brigade
headquarters; armored cavalry regiment headquarters; armor bat-
1 Contacts
talion headquarters; armored cavalry squadron headquarters; re- 2 Chief of Armor’s Hatch: Ready for Next Fight: Armor Force
connaissance squadron headquarters; or armored cavalry troop, Training Standards
armor company and motorized brigade headquarters of the U.S. BG Chad C. Chalfont
Army. In addition, Army libraries, Army and DoD schools, HQDA and 4 Gunner’s Seat: Develop Future Master Gunners
Army Command staff agencies with responsibility for armored, di- CSM Waylon D. Petty
rect fire, ground combat systems, organizations and training of the
personnel for such organizations may request two copies by send-
78 Book Reviews
ing a request to the editor in chief. 81 Featured Unit: 67th Armored Regiment
Reprints: ARMOR is published by the authority of the Chief of Staff,
U.S. Army, and is in the public domain except where copyright is indi-
cated. ARMOR requests that reprinted material carry credit given to
ARMOR and the author. Direct inquiries to Editor in Chief, ARMOR,
McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort
Moore, GA 31905. By Order of the Secretary of the Army:
Official:
RANDY A. GEORGE
General, United States Army
Chief of Staff
MARK F. AVERILL
Administrative Assistant
to the Secretary of the Army
2428908
Edition 2024, Vol. CXXXVI, No. 2
 Armor School Points of Contact
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Editor in Chief
SUBMISSION POLICY NOTE: Due to the limited space per is- CPT Andrew J. Porter (706) 545-9503
sue, we will not print articles that have been submitted to, and Email: andrew.j.porter39.mil@army.mil DSN 835
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the Editor in Chief. Commandant (ATZK-DF)
BG Chad C. Chalfont (706) 545-2029
EDITORIAL MAILING ADDRESS: U.S. Army Armor School, Email: chad.c.chalfont.mil@army.mil DSN 835
ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg.4), Suite W142, 1
Karker Street, Fort Moore, GA 31905. Deputy Commandant (ATZK-DF)
COL James M. Modlin (706) 545-2029
REPRINTS: ARMOR is published by authority of the Chief of Email: james.m.modlin3.mil@army.mil DSN 835
Staff, U.S. Army. Material may be reprinted, provided credit
is given to ARMOR and to the author, except where copyright Armor School Command Sergeant Major (ATZK-CSM)
is indicated. Request all organizations not affiliated with the CSM Waylon D. Petty (706) 545-3815
Department of the Army contact ARMOR for reproduction/re- Email: waylon.d.petty.mil@army.mil DSN 835
printing permission. Inquiries may be directed to Editor in
Chief, ATTN: ARMOR, McGinnis-Wickam Hall (Bldg. 4), Suite 194 th Armored Brigade (ATZK-BAZ)
W142, 1 Karker Street, Fort Moore, GA 31905. COL Gregory W. McLean (706) 626-5899
Email: gregory.w.mclean.mil@army.mil DSN 620
ARMOR MAGAZINE ON-LINE: Visit the ARMOR magazine Web­
site at www.moore.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/. 316 th Cavalry Brigade (ATZK-SBZ)
COL Justin D. Harper (706) 626-8111
ARMOR HOTLINE — (706) 626-TANK (8265)/DSN 620: The Ar- Email: justin.d.harper.mil@army.mil DSN 620
mor Hotline is a 24-hour service to provide assistance with
questions concerning doctrine, training, organizations and Office, Chief of Armor (ATZK-AR)
equipment of the armor force. George DeSario (706) 545-1352
Email: george.desario.civ@army.mil DSN 835
Army Capability Manager-Armored Brigade Combat Team
and Reconnaissance (FCFC-CM-ABC)
Col. Robert (Ken) Furtick (760) 380-9583
Email: robert.k.furtick.mil@army.mil DSN 835
Army Capability Manager-Security Force
Assistance Brigade (FCFC-CM-SFA)
COL Paul R. Davis (706) 626-5054
Email: paul.r.davis8.mil@army.mil DSN 835
Army Capability Manager-Infantry Brigade
Combat Team (FCFC-CMA-I)
Col. Shaun S. Conlin Jr. (706) 545-3911
Email: shaun.s.conlin2.mil@army.mil DSN 835
Army Capability Manager-Stryker Brigade
Combat Team (FCFC-CMA-S)
COL Jerome Parker (706) 545-7751
Email: jerome.a.parker.mil@army.mil DSN 835

1 Fall 2024
CHIEF OF ARMOR’S HATCH

BG Chad C. Chalfont
Chief of Armor/Commandant
U.S. Army Armor School

Ready for Next Fight: Armor Force

Training Standards
It is an honor to join the United States things very well. Establishing the 19C Bradley Crew-
Armor School and serve each of you member MOS is our first payment on a
and our branch as the 55th Chief of Ar- The demands for Armor Brigade Com-
new investment in the Armor Force’s
mor. We thank our 54th Chief of Armor, bat Teams persist, particularly after
mounted maneuver expertise. And
BG Simmering, for his outstanding February 24, 2022. And the war in
while implementing the Army’s new
work over this past year. His efforts, Ukraine has confirmed what we have
structure has created turbulence for
along with your efforts, resulted in real known for some time: in our next war,
our Scouts and Cavalry formations, it
readiness gains across the Armor we will fight on a battlefield that is
has also allowed us to reinforce man-
Force. We are in better shape in terms transparent, extended in depth, and in-
ning in our ABCTs. Still, these positive
of manning, maintenance, and training credibly lethal. We must think hard
developments come with a significant
because of BG Simmering’s leadership. about how the Armor Force will fight
challenge: a lot of new Soldiers are
in the next war. Our Armor and Caval-
joining our ranks, and they require
With this first opportunity to commu- ry formations must be able to survive
training.
nicate to the Armor Force, we should and accomplish the mission during pe-
consider one message: today’s situa- riods where battles are characterized This trifecta – high operational tempo,
tion demands that the Armor Force re- by heavy attrition and a more static the changing character of war, and
inforces and invests in its training stan- battlefield. In other periods, the Ar- manning turbulence – points to a sin-
dards. Here are some thoughts on this. mor Force must be able to move rap- gular imperative: we must reinforce
idly to exploit opportunities where ma- and invest in the Armor Force’s train-
Today, we know the Armor Force oper- ing standards. Here are some ideas on
neuver gives commanders positions of
ates at a high operational tempo. The where we might start working on this:
advantage and holds at risk that which
pace of our operations is demanding,
what the enemy values. The all-arms • D r i v e i n c re a s e d l e t h a l i t y b y
and this presents both opportunities
Armored Brigade Combat Team deliv- implementing the new tank gunnery
and challenges. Our units execute
ers the decisive combination of mobil- standard outlined in the new TC
tough training at home station, at the
ity, firepower, and shock effect to fight 3-20.31-120 (Gunnery: Heavy Tank)
National Training Center, and on oper-
and win on today’s battlefield. In a
ational deployments. Our training • Set conditions for tough, realistic live-
dangerous world, there’s no better
strategies offer tremendous leader de- fire training by assessing our home
place to be than in our Army’s Armor
velopment opportunities: today’s pla- station range capability gaps and
and Cavalry formations.
toon leaders and platoon sergeants then prioritizing resources to resolve
will draw upon their current experienc- With this in mind, it is clear that the these gaps
es when, years from now, they lead Armor Force has begun to move the
battalions. Still, every Armored Bri- • Assist leaders in their efforts to
needle in a positive direction on its
gade Combat Team feels the pressure manning challenges. We have seen a prioritize training by clearly defining
of not having enough time. Every day, remarkable turn-around in 19K recruit- what our “fundamentals” are for tank
leaders in the Armor Force make hard ing. Two years ago, our 19K accessions platoons, scout platoons, tank
choices on the many things that they were well below the target; this year companies, and cavalry troops
must do, perhaps wishing they had just we project to bring tankers into the • D e v e l o p c l e a r sta n d a rd s fo r
a little more time to do just a few Army at or above the target. maintenance training – both for

2 Fall 2024
 operators and mechanics • Review our training standards and ecute tough training.
• D e v e l o p c l e a r sta n d a rd s fo r course outcomes at the US Army
Armor School, with particular focus Again, it’s an honor to serve the Armor
simulations training so that we can
on NCOPDS, Scout Leader Course, Force. While we should be excited
train better during maneuver and
and Cavalry Leader Course about the opportunities that are out
live-fire training
there for us in the coming months, we
• Reinforce our current unit programs • Enforce the standard for Preventive
should also be clear-eyed about the
that i ncenti vi ze and prepare Maintenance Checks and Services,
challenges we face. Please know that
candidates to succeed at the Master leveraging certification programs in
the Armor School is here to support
Gunner Course our units and certification at every US
you in whatever you are doing – we are
Army Armor School course
• Improve our current crew gunnery invested in your success. If there is
training strategy to standardize how Whatever you think of these ideas, it ever anything that we can do to assist
we track and maintain readiness is what you think and do about train- you, do not hesitate – just holler.
across the four fundamentals of ing that matters most. The choices you Forge the Thunderbolt!
mounted maneuver: shoot, move, make and the direction you provide to
communicate, and maintain your teammates will be decisive in be-
• Adapt our current Armor Force ing ready for the next fight. The chal-
training standards to drive tougher lenge is for us to reinforce our training Acronym Quick-Scan
training (for example: night training, standards. Start with your standards –
stress shoots, force on force define them clearly – and then move ABCT – armored brigade combat team
MOS – military occupational specialty
repetitions as competition) out to prioritize, plan, prepare, and ex-

A U.S. Army M1A2 Abrams Tank, with 2nd Squadron, 16th Calvary Regiment, conducts range training during Armor Basic
Leaders Course at Fort Moore, GA. The Armor Basic Leaders Course, led by 2-16 Calvary, trains and develops tank pla-
toon leaders who are competent leaders of character capable to lead, fight, and win in the multi-domain environment
while increasing Soldier readiness and strengthening family and community bonds. (U.S. Army Reserve Photo by Staff
Sgt. Joshua Wooten)

3 Fall 2024
GUNNER’S SEAT

CSM Waylon D. Petty

Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Armor School

Develop Future Master Gunners

The master gunner (MG) is the sub- will primarily train/operate within candidates to attend the AMG/BMG
ject matter expert for all weapon sys- ABCTs where platforms are the most Course. This SOP will require III
tem platforms in armored brigade technical and casualty-producing Corps, divisions with ABCTs, and the
combat teams (ABCTs). MGs advise pieces of equipment in the forma- Armor School to work together to
commanders at all echelons and are tion; therefore, MGs are needed ensure future MGs are identified ear-
a crucial part in the operations pro- more than ever. For our armored ly and trained to standard at unit lev-
cess on combat and gunnery related crewmembers (Abrams and Bradley el, and the best Soldiers selected to
training. For armor specifically, there crews), I would argue the training fo- attend the AMG/BMG Course.
are two master gunner courses — cus needs to be more on the techni-
MGs at echelon will need to be em-
Abrams Master Gunner (AMG) and cal aspect, where MGs are empow-
powered by their commanders with
Bradley Master Gunner (BMG). Both ered to provide that level of training.
MG unit training being prioritized
courses are very demanding and re- There has always been a need for
and protected. The SOP will go into
quire candidates to pass multiple military occupational specialty (MOS)
detail on how this will be accom-
technical tests to earn the coveted 19K (Armor Crewman) Abrams MGs,
plished, but essentially, company/
MG badge. but with the implementation of MOS
troop MGs will identify talent, divi-
19C (Bradley Crewmember) that goes
The term “master” is in the title for sion MGs will run a pre-MG course
live on Oct. 1, 2024, we need to en-
a reason because, quite frankly, we twice a year (commonly referred to
sure they have priority to attend the
need subject matter experts within as SABOT Academy), and III Corps will
BMG Course to instill a culture of
our formations. Therefore, the chal- manage the AMG/BMG slots through
mastery within that MOS.
lenge is to train, in most cases, a ju- a consolidated order of merit list.
nior NCO to achieve the level of mas- There are quite a few changes within
The details are currently being deter-
tery within their craft. The AMG/ Master Gunner Course that will help
mined to include the division-run
BMG cadre are up to this challenge produce more MGs for the Abrams
SABOT Academy instruction. In the
and do produce MGs, but we do not and Bradley platforms. Master gun-
near term, we need to identify and
produce enough of them. Therefore, ner Common Core will close in Octo-
train quality candidates to attend the
identifying, training, and selecting ber 2024 when we go to pure AMG/
AMG/BMG Course. In the long term,
candidates to attend the AMG/BMG BMG standalone courses. AMG/BMG
we need to create a culture where
Course must be a top priority for di- Course prerequisites will be reestab-
every Abrams and Bradley Gunner is
visions with ABCTs. lished and enforced. With the imple-
inspired to be a MG by selecting the
mentation of MOS 19C, the Armor
There needs to be an understanding best gunners to attend SABOT Acad-
School will work with other propo-
between the U.S. Army Armor School emies.
nents to ensure unit authorizations
and the operational force to identify
are adjusted appropriately (especial- Master gunners are crucial for our ar-
the need and produce more MGs to
ly for Bradley Master Gunner). Final- mored crewmembers’ training pro-
increase lethality and be better warf-
ly, the Armor School will propose a gression to increase lethality, now
ighters.
standing operating procedure (SOP) more than ever. With the AMG/BMG
Career Management Field 19 Soldiers for identifying, training and selecting Course realignment and the need to

4 Fall 2024
fill authorized MG positions, we need careers so that by the time they are Acronym Quick-Scan
to develop future MGs by identifying tank and Bradley commanders, they
have the experience and possess the ABCT – armored brigade combat team
potential candidates, providing them
AMG – Abrams Master Gunner
quality training at the unit, and se- prerequisites to attend the AMB/ BMG – Bradley Master Gunner
lecting the best candidates to attend BMG Course and earn the MG badge. MG – master gunner
the course. The goal is to build a fun- MOS – military occupational specialty
nel of candidates early in their Forge the Thunderbolt! SOP – standing operating procedure

MONS, BELGIUM (Sept. 1, 2024) – U.S. Soldiers, assigned to 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry
Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, pose for a photo
on their M2A3 Bradley Fighting Vehicle during the Tanks in Town commemoration
event in Mons, Belgium, Sept. 1, 2024. Events like this one help rotational Soldiers
supporting V Corps connect with local community members and inspire trust and con-
fidence in the U.S. military. (U.S. Army photo by PFC Richard Morgan)

5 Fall 2024
 Combat Vehicle Service Optimization: Efforts to
streamline services for Abrams and Bradley Family
by LTG Heidi J. Hoyle, BG Michael J.
Simmering, and MAJ Dirk K. van
Ingen
In his address at the Association of the
U.S. Army (AUSA) Annual Meeting and
Exposition Oct. 10, 2023, GEN Randy
George, Army Chief of Staff (CSA), ex-
pressed the Army is over-servicing our
equipment, therefore placing a load on
formations that have very little
time.1 He stated “modest changes” to
maintenance intervals could save
Soldiers time to focus on training or
spend with their families.2 Following an
in-depth M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley
service requirements review led by the
U.S. Army Armor School and the sub-
sequent implementation of a pilot at Figure 1. Tank and Bradley services underway in 2017 at Fort Bliss, TX. (U.S.
Fort Moore, LTG Heidi Hoyle, Army Army photo by Matt Perdue)
Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (G- with the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) viced combat vehicles.
4), announced March 27, 2024 chang- of today’s force generation process,
es to M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley ser- The Army traces the standard for how
without sacrificing readiness or Soldier
vices across the Army as part of an ef- we service equipment back to 1938, 86
safety.
fort to reduce maintenance complexity years ago as of the writing of this arti-
and increase readiness.3 Starting in June 2023, the Army assem- cle.7 For the Armored Force, the first
bled a group of senior chief warrant of- M1 Abrams and M2 Bradleys were
LTG Hoyle’s remarks were immediately ficers with the task of determining how fielded in the 1980s with major mod-
followed by an exception to policy al- the Army could “unburden Soldiers ernization programs that delivered
lowing U.S. Army Forces Command and create true readiness.”5 The out- most of today’s combat platforms in
(FORSCOM) units to implement revised put of this group’s work was Headquar- the early 2000s and again starting in
service schedules that, among other ters, Department of the Army (HQDA) 2015+. During this time, the Abrams
changes, align the M1 Abrams and M2 Execution Order (EXORD) 335-23, and Bradley systems have become old-
Bradley family of vehicles (FoV) to the which among other things, was an im- er, and with periodic upgrades to these
Army’s Regionally Aligned Readiness portant step directing the develop- platforms, significantly more complex.
and Modernization Model (ReARMM), ment of a deliberate process to me- In the 40+ years these vehicles have
the force generation process used to thodically replace time-based stan- been in the fleet, the Army maintained
provide predictable forces capable of dards with usage-based standards. Pre- a standardized approach to services re-
supporting the National Defense Strat- viously, the Army started this effort gardless of OPTEMPO, equipment uti-
egy.4 with the publication of the Non-com- lization rates, or trends over time. Con-
For the M1 Abrams these changes will bat Operations Maintenance Plan cerningly, the operational readiness
shift current semi-annual service tasks (NCOMP). (OR) rates for these fleets have contin-
to eight months, current annual tasks ued to drop for the last several years
These programs were designed to bet-
to 16 months, and current biennial with units finding it more and more dif-
ter align maintenance requirements to
tasks remain at 24 months. For the M2 ficult to achieve a 90 percent rating
actual usage rather than time-based
Bradley FoV, this revision would merge due to the combined demands of OP-
service intervals during non-combat
current semi-annual and annual ser- TEMPO, unscheduled and scheduled
operations, with the intent to eventu-
vice task into a single 12-month re- maintenance.
ally replace the Low Usage Program
quirement. described in AR 750-1.6 However, these Due to the age, complexity, and de-
These revisions to M1 Abrams and M2 programs largely focused on the Ar- mands of these platforms, and the call
Bradley scheduled service require- my’s wheeled fleets, leveraged addi- to action from Army Senior Leaders,
ments provide more time for unsched- tional administrative requirements on the U.S. Army Armor School hosted an
uled maintenance, reduce scheduled units to enroll vehicles into the pro- M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley service re-
maintenance complexity, and synchro- gram and did not provide an alterna- view Nov. 8 - 9, 2023, to review oppor-
nize the demands of these platforms tive for how the Armored Force ser- tunities to reduce the demands these

6 Fall 2024
complex platforms place on our crews changes save formations time and existing M1 Abrams pre-gunnery
and mechanics without sacrificing Sol- maintain readiness without inducing a requirements and best practices.
dier safety or readiness levels. safety risk to Soldiers?”
While the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley
In answering BG Simmering’s ques- intervals in the recommendations are
During the M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley
tions, the assembled experts from still time based, the team assessed this
FoV service review, the U.S. Army Ar-
PEO-GCS, Abrams and Bradley product was a critical first step to meeting GEN
mor School hosted participants from
management teams, and senior main- George’s intent by giving more time
across the Armor enterprise to conduct
tenance chief warrant officers and back to maintainers. Most importantly,
analysis of current M1 Abrams and M2
non-commissioned officers from the team assessed all changes added
Bradley scheduled service plans to in-
FORSCOM units produced the follow- negligible risk to Soldiers or platforms.
form recommendations for modified
ing five recommendations. It would become the responsibility of
service checklists and a possible U.S.
Army Armor School pilot. Participants 1. Align the M1 services to the Army’s the U.S. Army Armor School and Ma-
included representatives from the Pro- ReARMM force generation process neuver Center of Excellence (MCoE) to
gram Executive Office Ground Combat by shifting current semi-annual communicate the findings through
Systems (PEO-GCS), Tank-Automotive service tasks to eight months, MCoE back to the Sustainment enter-
& Armaments Command (TACOM), current annual tasks to 16 months, prise and Army senior leaders with re-
Army Capabilities Manger - Armored and current biennial tasks remain at gards to the Abrams and Bradley fleets.
Brigade Combat Team (ACM-ABCT), the 24 months. The allowed service The first critical step was the update of
Maneuver Center of Excellence variance would remain at 10 percent service plans for the fleet of 142 M1
(MCoE), TACOM Field Maintenance Ex- of the service period. Several Abrams and 122 M2 Bradleys by the
pansion (TACOM-FMX), and subject individual service checks were MCoE TACOM-FMX team. These updat-
matter experts from FORSCOM units, modified by frequency or usage ed service plans drew from updated
including 1st Armored Division, 1st Cav- trigger. field service bulletins (FSBs) produced
alry Division, 1st Infantry Division and 2. Align the M2 services to the Army’s in a remarkable short turn from No-
3 rd Infantry Division. 8 This audience ReARMM force generation process vember to December by the Abrams
conducted analysis of the equipment by merging current semi-annual and and Bradley product management
service standard currently required of annual service tasks. This will remove teams. These FSBs documented the
ABCTs on M1 and M2 fleets to inform redundancies and afford commanders changes identified during the Service
possible technical solutions for Army flexibility by offsetting from the M1 Summit and were revised from the cur-
senior leader consideration. The re- service schedule. rent published Abrams and Bradley
sponse generated from the force on technical manuals (TM).
3. Recommend a U.S. Army Armor
this subject showed that across the Ar- School led pilot of the TACOM-FMX Following the publication of an HQDA
mor enterprise, leaders are interested maintained MCoE Abrams and G-4 Exception to Policy to AR 750-1,
in streamlining and improving our ap- Bradley fleets. This pilot started in the U.S. Army Armor School and
proach to services to maintain the January 2024, with initial findings MCoE’s Abrams and Bradley Optimized
highest readiness levels possible while anticipated by May 2024, to Service pilot officially commenced in
keeping our Soldiers safe. determine impacts of the service task January 2024, focusing on evaluating
and schedule revisions on OR rate, its impact on operational readiness
BG Michael Simmering, the 54th Chief
e q u i p m e n t a v a i l a b i l i t y, a n d rates, equipment availability, and
of Armor, asked the participants to
maintainer to task ratio spent maintainer to task ratios. The U.S.
critically review current M1 and M2
between scheduled and unscheduled Army Armor School, even more than
annual and semi-annual service main-
maintenance. the typical ABCTs in the operational
tenance tasks. In addition to this criti-
4. Recommend consideration of force, requires a large daily training set
cal review, his guidance to participants
categorizing transit time from the of Abrams and Bradleys to meet its 19
focused on three areas. First, assessing
port of departure to port of arrival series one station unit training, Armor
the strengths and weaknesses of mov-
as non-service time or not counting Basic Officer Leader Course and func-
ing service windows for equipment
towards time-based service tional course load. On any given train-
from a routine, purely time-based, six-
intervals. ing day, the Armor School requires an
month model to one aligned with the
average of 100 of its 142 M1 tanks in
Army’s ReARMM force generation pro- 5. The U.S. Army Armor School would
the field. To put this in perspective, the
cesses’ requirements. Second, provide continue to work with stakeholders
Armor School has conducted nine M1
recommendations to inform updated to develop recommendations,
and nine M2 company size gunneries
M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley service i n c l u d i n g sta n d a rd i zat i o n o f
since the start of the 2024 calendar
checklists. Third, provide recommen- minimum pre-dispatch quality
year.9
dations the U.S. Army Armor School assurance and quality control (QA/
can pilot and implement at no risk to QC) checks in accordance with AR Through March 31, 2024, the pilot has
FORSCOM units, to see if they have the 750-1 for Abrams and Bradley produced promising initial results, with
desired effect. BG Simmering’s litmus platforms, standardization of a seven percent increase in Abrams
test for any possible changes was, platoon services, and an M2 Bradley availability and a 15 percent rise in
“would the implementation of these pre-gunnery checklist to align with Bradley availability compared to the six

7 Fall 2024
months prior. Most importantly, there these platforms with the OPTEMPO of Virginia and a master’s of science de-
have been no safety issues, no signifi- today’s force generation models. Ulti- gree in national resource strategy from
cant increase in unscheduled mainte- mately, while the Armor School’s pilot National Defense University.
nance, repair part costs, or major as- sought to identify changes at no risk to
BG Michael Simmering is the 54th Chief
sembly consumption. According to the operational units to see if change was
of Armor and Commandant of U.S.
MCoE Chief of Staff for Sustainment, possible and desired, voices from op-
Army Armor School at Fort Moore, GA.
COL Corey Woods, the flexibility of the erational units saw the immediate ben-
His previous assignments include Dep-
pilot program has enabled the capture efit and opportunity to control their
uty Commanding General (Operations)
of more unscheduled maintenance own destiny and meet the CSA’s guid-
for 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, TX;
needs for the M1 Abrams and M2 ance to rebalance maintenance priori-
Commander for Operations Group at
Bradley fleets, which might have oth- ties.
the National Training Center, Fort Ir-
erwise been overlooked during routine
While the FORSCOM exception to pol- win, CA; and Commander, 3rd Brigade,
service.
icy will expire one year from April 3, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, CO.
To ensure safety of Soldiers during the 2024, the DCS, G-4 Maintenance Direc- BG Simmering holds a master’s of sci-
extended service windows, the MCoE torate will reauthorize it if the “pilot” ence degree in continuing education
directed the TACOM-FMX team to im- intervals are not first outlined in a re- from Kansas State University and a
plement additional QA/QC checks dur- vised technical manual or Maintenance master’s of science degree in joint cam-
ing vehicle dispatching. For the Abrams Action Message by TACOM prior to the paign plan and strategy from National
FoVs, maintainers’ QA/QC inspections exception to policy’s expiration. In the Defense University.
included, at a minimum, checks of the meantime, the two pilots are posi-
MAJ van Ingen is the Chief, Comman-
battery box, steering, park and service tioned to offer crucial insights and data
dant’s Initiative Group at the U.S. Army
brakes, main nuclear, biological, and to Army senior leaders, allowing them
Armor School, Fort Moore, GA. His pre-
chemical systems, class III oil leaks, any to make informed decisions regarding
vious assignments include Executive
fuel leak, handheld fire extinguishers service optimization for these critical
Officer, 2nd Armored Brigade Combat
and automatic fire extinguishing sys- vehicles, and possibly expand the ba-
Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss,
tems (AFES), main gun replenisher, and sic principles to other combat and
TX; Executive Officer, 1st Battalion, 35th
drivers vision enhancer (DVE). For the combat support platforms across the
Armored Regiment, 2 nd Armored Bri-
Bradley FoVs, maintainers’ QA/QC in- operational forces’ brigade combat
gade Combat Team, 1st Armored Divi-
spections included the battery box, teams. Rooted in a shared commit-
sion, Fort Bliss, TX; and planner, G-5, 1st
steering, brakes, Class III oil leaks, any ment to readiness, safety, and adapt-
Armored Division, Fort Bliss. MAJ van
fuel leak, manual fire extinguishers and ability, these initiatives underscore a
Ingen holds a master’s of science de-
AFES, seatbelts, and DVE. Also, all ve- proactive approach to addressing fu-
gree in adult learning and leadership
hicles in the pilot must still fulfill the ture challenges that will be necessary
from Kansas State University and a
HQDA EXORD 335-23 90-day operator to implement the CSA’s vision of con-
master’s of arts degree in military op-
road march requirement. Simultane- tinuous transformation. While it is still
erations from the U.S. Army Command
ously, the Armor School is working too early to assess definitive conclu-
and General Staff College.
with stakeholders to work towards im- sions regarding the pilot’s effective-
plementation of the additional recom- ness, early indications suggest that ser- Notes
mendations, by standardizing Abrams vice intervals can be streamlined 1
GEN Randy A. George, Association of the
and Bradley platoon service require- across the operational force without U.S. Army (AUSA) 2023: Army Senior
ments in the soon to be published TC compromising Soldier safety or equip- Leader Press Conference, Washington
3-20.31-9, Armored Platoon Services, ment performance. D.C., Oct. 10, 2023.
and ensuring the pre-fire checks for 2
Joe Lacdan, “Army chief of staff outlines
LTG Heidi Hoyle is the U.S. Army Dep- service priorities at AUSA,” Army News
the M2 Bradley are referenced in fu-
uty Chief of Staff, G-4, Washington, DC. Service, Oct. 10, 2023, accessed April 15,
ture Bradley TMs as well as the pre-op-
Her pervious assignments include Di- 2024, https://www.army.mil/arti-
erational checks found in the plat-
rector of Operations, G-43/5/7, Office cle/270691/army_chief_of_staff_out-
form’s Commander’s Tactical Display. lines_service_priorities_at_ausa.
of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Wash-
With approval of the FORSCOM re- ington, DC; Commanding General, Mil- 3
AUSA, “New maintenance standards aim
quest to deviate from current require- itary Surface Deployment and Distribu- to unburden soldiers,” AUSA.org. March
ments on April 3, 2024, allowing oper- tion Command, Scott Air Force Base; 29, 2024, accessed April 14, 2024,
https://www.ausa.org/news/new-mainte-
ational units to implement the revised Commandant, U.S. Army Ordnance nance-standards-aim-unburden-soldiers.
pilot service schedules for their M1 School, U.S Army Sustainment Center 4
Director Maintenance Programs and Pol-
Abrams and M2 Bradley fleets spear- of Excellence, Fort Gregg-Adams, VA; icy, “Exception to Policy, Army Regulation
headed by the U.S. Army Armor School and Commanding General, Joint Muni- (AR) 750-1, Army Materiel Maintenance
and MCoE, there is an opportunity to tions and Lethality, Life Cycle Manage- Policy,” Washington, D.C.; April 3, 2024.
provide more time for unscheduled ment Command/Joint Munitions Com- 5
AUSA, “New maintenance standards.”
maintenance, reduce scheduled main- mand, Rock Island, IL. LTG Hoyle holds 6
“HMMWV: Non-Combat Operations
tenance complexity, and see how com- a master’s of science degree in systems Maintenance Plan,” PS Magazine, March
manders synchronize the demands of engineering from the University of 22, 2021, https://www.psmagazine.army.

8 Fall 2024
mil/News/Article/2544963/hmmwv-non- Washington, D.C., Oct. 10, 2023. army-overhauling-vehicle-weapon-
combat-operations-maintenance-plan/; • “HMMWV: Non-Combat Operations maintenance-in-common-sense-move/.
“HEMTT, PLS: The New Plan is NCOMP,” Maintenance Plan,” PS Magazine, March • Woods, Corey. “Rethinking Heavy Tracked
PS Magazine, Aug. 3, 2021, https://www. 22, 2021, https://www.psmagazine. Vehicle Maintenance: The M1/M2
psmagazine.army.mil/News/Arti- army.mil/News/Article/2544963/ Optimized S e r v i c e P i l o t ,”
cle/2717273/hemtt-pls-the-new-plan-is- hmmwv-non-combat-operations- unpublished article, April 5, 2024.
ncomp/. maintenance-plan/
7
AUSA, “New maintenance standards.” • “HEMTT, PLS: The New Plan is NCOMP,” Acronym Quick-Scan
8
Note: The only active component ar- PS Magazine, Aug. 3, 2021, https://www.
mored brigade combat team not repre- psmagazine.army.mil/News/ AFES – automatic fire extinguishing
sented at least at the division level was Article/2717273/hemtt-pls-the-new- systems
3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th In- plan-is-ncomp/ ACM-ABCT – Army Capabilities Manger -
fantry Division due to its participation in • Lacdan, Joe. “Army chief of staff outlines Armored Brigade Combat Team
National Training Center (Fort Irwin) Rota- service priorities at AUSA.” Army News CSA – Army chief of staff
tion 24-02. Service. Oct. 10, 2023. Accessed April 15, DVE – drivers vision enhancer
9
COL Corey Woods, “Rethinking Heavy 2 0 2 4 . h t t p s : / / w w w. a r m y. m i l / EXORD – execution order
Tracked Vehicle Maintenance: The M1/ article/270691/army_chief_of_staff_ FSB – field service bulletin
M2 Optimized Service Pilot,” unpublished outlines_service_priorities_at_ausa. FORSCOM – U.S. Army Forces Command
FoV – family of vehicles
article, April 5, 2024. • “M1/M2 Service Optimization Pilot.” HQDA – Headquarters, Department of
Maneuver Center of Excellence. Fort the Army
References Moore, GA; Dec. 15, 2023. MCoE – Maneuver Center of Excellence
• Association of the U.S. Army. “New • Roque, Ashley. “Army launches pilot NCOMP – Non-combat Operations
maintenance standards aim to unburden aimed at trimming excess equipment.” Maintenance Plan
soldiers.” AUSA.org. March 29, 2024. BreakingDefense.com. Oct. 9, 2023. OPTEMPO – operations tempo
Accessed April 14, 2024. https://www. Accessed April 14, 2024. https:// PEO-GCS – Program Executive Office -
ausa.org/news/new-maintenance- breakingdefense.com/2023/10/army- Ground Combat Systems
standards-aim-unburden-soldiers. launches-pilot-aimed-at-trimming- QA – quality assurance
• Director Maintenance Programs and excess-equipment/. QC – quality control
Policy, “Exception to Policy, Army • Winkie, Davis. “Army overhauling vehicle, ReARMM – Regionally Aligned
Regulation (AR) 750-1, Army Materiel weapon maintenance in ‘common sense’ Readiness and Modernization Model
Maintenance Policy,” Washington D.C., move.” ArmyTimes.com. Oct. 18, 2023. TACOM – Tank-Automotive &
April 3, 2024. Accessed April 14, 2024. https://www. Armaments Command
armytimes.com/news/your- TACOM-FMX – TACOM Field
• GEN George, Randy A., AUSA 2023: Army Maintenance Expansion
Senior Leader Press Conference, army/2023/10/18/
TM – technical manuals

9 Fall 2024
 The Trouble with LOGSTATs
by MAJ Sarah A. Barron a recommendation for action.” Field resupply needs. Challenges arise from
Manual (FM) 4-0, Sustainment Opera- inconsistent reporting frequencies hin-
“The logistics status report is the pri-
tions, July 31, 2019. dering sustainment planning. Improv-
mary product used throughout the bri-
ing brigade LOGSTAT reporting is cru-
gade and at higher levels of command The logistics statistics (LOGSTAT) report
cial for efficient operations, focusing
to provide a logistics snapshot of cur- is a critical status report in sustainment
on disciplined, accurate, and timely
rent stock status, on-hand quantities, operations. It is essential for forecast-
submissions to prevent unnecessary
and future requirements. The logistics ing and coordinating resupply and en-
resupply missions and backhauling of
status report is a compilation of data suring combat readiness by accurately
supplies.
that requires analysis before action. reporting logistics and Army Health
Providing the commander a bunch of System support status. Army leaders A comprehensive LOGSTAT is not just
numbers with percentages and colors must shift their mindset to optimize detailed, it is easily transmitted
is useless. The commander requires an on-hand stockages and improve re- through multiple channels, universally
analysis based on the data along with porting accuracy to avoid emergency understood, and regularly practiced.
While an overly detailed LOGSTAT list-
ing every Department of Defense Iden-
tification Code (DODIC) is excessive, a
simplistic list of prowords or color
codes hampers accurate resupply fore-
casting. LOGSTATs should not just be
simple for platoon sergeants to gather
data, they should be detailed enough
for sustainment planners to refine es-
timates and reallocate assets as need-
ed. A clear LOGSTAT reporting plan, in-
cluding primary, alternate, contingency
and emergency (PACE) methods,
should not just be implemented in mis-
sion orders, it should be integrated
into day-to-day operations, including
routine garrison duties. Company, bat-
talion, and brigade executive officers
(XOs) are not just responsible for en-
forcing the process, they are crucial in
ensuring timely, precise reports. Recip-
ients and responsibilities for receiving,
processing, and disseminating brigade
LOGSTATs must be clearly defined to
enable success.
A constant after-action review com-
ment from the combat training centers
is that rotational training units struggle
to submit accurate and timely LOG-
STATs or to accurately forecast required
commodities. This results in emergen-
cy resupplies at every level from line
companies to the division logistics
package (LOGPAC), potentially desyn-
chronizing the entire division sustain-
ment infrastructure. The struggle to
accomplish what, if taken at face value,
is a simple task is attributed to a com-
bination of poor time management at
Figure 1: Example LOGSTAT Format from ATP 3-90.5 Combined Arms Battalion lower echelons (the platoon who ran
JUL 2021, Figure 6-3a, Pg 6-11. (U.S. Army graphic)
out of time to count what they had

10 Fall 2024
on-hand and simply reported “No
change” from the previous report) and
poor connectivity between lower and
higher echelons (“We were jumping”;
“NIPR [Non-Secure Internet Protocol
Router] was down.”; and “I sent it on
JBC-P [Joint Battle Command-Plat-
form]. Didn’t you get it?” are all com-
monly heard phrases). Leaders will is-
sue direct guidance to subordinates to
do better and the timeliness of LOG-
STATs will improve, but the reports re- Figure 2. Defining Green/ Amber/ Red/ Black in percentages. (U.S. Army Chart
main largely inaccurate or insufficient built by MAJ Sarah Barron)
to inform future sustainment planning.
Our observations have found that the on-hand stocks. A recommended tac- those numbers. After the brigade has
problem is not so much how the units tic, technique and procedure (TTP) is established how they are going to
are reporting, as much as that subor- to track commodities as on-hand until count each commodity, and at what
dinate units do not have a clear under- they are issued to the end user, at point each commodity is considered
standing of what to report. This is fur- which point they are considered con- consumed, and how 100 percent of a
ther complicated by staffs at echelon sumed; however, that TTP may not al- commodity is defined by unit, they
who are simply consolidating subordi- ways apply for all commodities. If a must now set what percentage corre-
nate unit reports and pushing them battalion receives 350 cases of Meals sponds to green-amber-red-black for
higher without doing any analysis or Ready to Eat (MRE) (three days of sup- use in abbreviated reporting and what
using the LOGSTATs to inform fore- ply, assuming an M-M-A ration cycle) sustainment actions each report trig-
casts. and immediately issues the MREs to gers.
the individual Soldier, that Class I can- Historically, units will begin reporting
FM 4-0 states that LOGSTATs account not be counted as consumed simply amber as soon as they fall below 90
for a unit’s requirements based on because it was issued to the end user. percent and will be in the red at 70
their task organization and assigned Likewise, a combined arms battalion percent. If the sustainment action tied
mission and should include the current that has just been refueled has more to red on Class IIIB is to push an emer-
on-hand stockages as well as projected than 24,000 gallons of fuel in the vehi- gency resupply, the unit will be ex-
needs out to 72 hours. 1 Army Tech- cles. That fuel must be tracked at the pending significant, unplanned energy
niques Publication (ATP) 4-90, Brigade company level and included in LOG- to distribute less than a single fuel sys-
Support Battalion, further states that STAT reporting to fully inform com- tem worth of Class IIIB. Emergency re-
accurate LOGSTATs are tailored to the manders of their remaining operation- supplies are typically triggered by poor
commander’s critical information re- al reach. LOGSTAT procedures and can degrade
quirements to support decision mak-
the sustainment architecture of the
ing. It also says that the report should Defining ‘100 percent’ brigade by placing unnecessary LOG-
include both on-hand stockage levels Organizations must also clearly define PACs on the road.5 This can further af-
as well as projections out to 72 hours.2 what 100 percent means. Some com- fect future operations as the drivers
Maneuver doctrine states that LOG- modities are easy: 100 percent of Class and convoy commanders are not able
STATs should identify on-hand amounts I rations is three meals per Soldier per to achieve a proper work-rest cycle as
and requirements to inform the com- day while 100 percent of Class IIIB is well as desynchronizing planned resup-
mander’s decision-making process.3,4 the total capacity of all available as- ply operations at both the battalion
While all of the reviewed doctrine stat- sets. Commodities such as Class IV and and brigade level. These inefficiencies
ed that it was a unit responsibility to Class V can be slightly more difficult as can be mitigated by readjusting how
determine the exact format and re- each battalion has different require- the organization assesses green-am-
porting mechanism for LOGSTATs, if ments. The brigade staff must clearly ber-red-black.
they showed an example format, they articulate what the basic load is by
all used the same one (Figure 1). It is Throughout the Global War on Terror
DODIC, item, or combat configured
unrealistic for the same format to ad- and ensuing contingency operations,
load for each battalion. Once this allo-
equately meet the available reporting Army leaders grew comfortable having
cation has occurred, it must be widely
mechanisms and the level of detail re- large amounts of commodities at hand
published to ensure that leaders at all
quired at all echelons. and resupplied on all commodities eas-
levels understand what their “100 per-
ily. Units rarely operated at less than
cent” looks like and how far they can
To drive acuate reporting, the brigade 50 percent of commodities on-hand. It
operate before requiring a resupply.
must first standardize how the organi- will require a mindset shift among
zation will count on-hand vs con- This includes informing higher eche- both maneuver and sustainment lead-
sumed, what constitutes a combat or lons of support of the defined value of ers to get comfortable using more of
basic load, and what green-amber-red- 100 percent and what the total opera- their on-hand stockages without call-
black actually mean as a percentage of tional reach is expected to be based off ing for an emergency resupply,

11 Fall 2024
knowing that the planned resupply will of sustainment executors. This pro- have access to a computer and net-
be able to return them to as close to vides the maneuver commander with work to submit a 60+ line Excel report.
full capacity as possible in accordance a healthier enterprise and increased While vehicle mounted Joint Battle
with the priority of support. Figure 2 operational reach. Command – Platforms (JBC-P) offer an
shows a recommended green-amber- Excel-like option, it is extremely diffi-
Once units have determined what data
red-black dispersion. cult to manipulate a sheet of that size
to report on the LOGSTAT, they must
using the providing stylus and key-
Adjusted dispersion establish how each echelon will report
board. It also becomes more difficult
that information. It is a delicate bal-
This adjusted dispersion encourages to transmit the sheet rather than a
ance of ensuring lower echelons report
subordinate units to consume more of simple free text message. Company-
enough information to properly inform
their on-hand commodities before re- level LOGSTATs should be formatted to
decision-making while ensuring those
questing resupply, which allows sus- enable easy transmission on JBC-P free
echelons have the equipment and net-
text, FM radio, or hard copy as a con-
tainment units to economize their work necessary to submit the report.
tingency. Additionally, the company-
movements. They can execute less fre- Regular brigade and division rotations
level LOGSTAT should focus primarily
quent, larger LOGPACs which provides at the National Training Center make it
on accurate, on-hand commodities.
additional stability to the sustainment clear that LOGSTATs should look differ-
Figure 3 shows an example LOGSTAT
infrastructure by increasing predict- ent at each echelon. A company that is
for an armor company that can be eas-
ability and improving work-rest cycle conducting operations is unlikely to
ily sent by either JBC-P free text or FM.
Company commanders are responsible
for submitting accurate and timely re-
ports, to include LOGSTATs. They may
choose to have their XO, or first ser-
geant gather and turn in the reports on
their behalf, but that does not absolve
them of their responsibility if the LOG-
STATs are late or contain poor data. If
the LOGSTAT format chosen by the bat-
talion is too burdensome to be com-
pleted during operations, companies
must provide feedback to adjust the
format until it works for both echelons.
Once the format is established, com-
pany commanders must prioritize ac-
curate submissions or communication
with higher if there is a delay.
As the battalion staff and forward sup-
port company (FSC) receive the LOG-
STAT, they can now analyze the submis-
sions, consolidate the data and com-
pare with their forecasts, and prepare
the battalion LOGSTAT. The staff, pri-
marily the S-4 and the S-1, is responsi-
ble for reviewing each submission for
accuracy, not simply consolidating bad
data and passing in on. If a company
reports an inexplicable gain of more
fuel on-hand than they have capacity
or states that they have gone from 100
percent Class IIIB to 15 percent since
the last report but hasn’t conducted
any operation that would justify the
change, the S-4 must reach out to the
company to find out the ground truth.
Units must adjust their culture and
eliminate the idea that a report sub-
mitted on time, even if it has bad data,
is acceptable or preferable to a slightly
Figure 3. Example Armor Company LOGSTAT format. (Developed by MAJ Sarah delayed, but accurate, report. Timely,
Barron)

12 Fall 2024
inaccurate reporting can have cata- Logistics Estimation Tool (QLET) are planner is highly flexible and allows
strophic effects on the unit. If each both developed by the Combined Arms for building tailored task forces and
combined arms battalion reports that Support Command (CASCOM) and l i n k i n g s u sta i n m e nt u n i t s to
it needs 5,000 gallons of fuel that it available for download from the maneuver units. Planners at the
doesn’t have capacity for, the brigade OPLOG Planner and Log Planning Tools brigade level and below might find
will request more than 15,000 gallons Teams page.6 OPLOG planner challenging to get the
of unneeded fuel from the division. level of detail required to maintain
• QLET is an Excel sheet that is prefilled
This puts four M969 bulk fuel trucks accurate forecasts.
with Army Force Structure Designs
with eight Soldiers on the road unnec- and the G-4 Approved Planning • CASCOM and the Army Software
essarily. It also causes the FSCs to each Factors that enables a user to quickly Factory are also developing the
put an extra M978 with two Soldiers forecast based on their chosen Mercury: Sustainment Planning
on their battalion LOGPACs, further modified table of organization and Tool. 7 This tool allows the user to
disrupting work-rest cycles or prevent- equipment (MTOE) force file. Users create highly tailorable sustainment
ing the FSCs from conducting proper can make minor changes to the forecasts, down to the company
maintenance on their equipment. This anticipated consumption rate level. These plans can also be shared
wasted effort would have been pre- (Minimum/Average/Maximum) for with other users to enable real-time,
some commodities as well as tailor collaborative planning across
vented if the S-4 had called the XOs to
available distribution asset types. echelons. As Mercury is a web-based
validate LOGSTATs when reports don’t
The QLET data is assuming that the tool, it requires connectivity to build
align with forecasts.
full MTOE of equipment is available, and share plans, which becomes
Before staffs can use forecasts to vali- in use, and fully mission capable. more challenging at lower echelons.
date LOGSTATs, they must first build Once the file is loaded on the user’s The Mercury tool is still in active
the forecasts. Forecasting should occur computer it can be used offline. Each development and the development
at all echelons; it is not simply on the forecast would be saved as an team invites all user to log on, make
support operations office (SPO) shop additional file. plans, and submit feedback to
to create and maintain the forecasts continue to improve the tool.
• OPLOG Planner is a program that
for the brigade. The Army has several must be loaded on a government • The fourth option for forecasting is to
forecasting tools available and in pro- computer by an administrator, which use the Sustainment Planning Factors
duction to assist forecasting, and shar- can make it more difficult to get found in ATP 5-0.2-1, Staff Reference
ing the forecasts with both supporting started. It uses the same planning Guide Volume 1, to manually
and supported units. The Operational factors as QLET but is focused on compute projected consumption
Logistics (OPLOG) Planner and Quick higher echelons of support. OPLOG based on the specific factors for the

Figure 4. Example FSC LOGSTAT formats for both compa-

ny internal and bulk. (Developed by MAJ Sarah Barron)

13 Fall 2024
 unit.8 The ATP gives planning factors utilize tools like Excel to assist in con- flow into the brigade’s area of opera-
for everything from the gallons per solidating the FM or JBC-P company tions. It is vitally important that the
minute bulk fill rate for a M978 to the LOGSTAT submissions they received. brigade maintain and validate their
number of casualties that can fit in a This also enables them to compare the own forecasts based on the upcoming
medium tactical vehicle. This is the company LOGSTAT requirements operations to ensure they are feeding
recommend primary method of against the FSC bulk on-hand commod- accurate requests to the division 48-72
forecasting for battalion and below ities. It is highly recommended to have hours out. Those requests can be re-
as it does not require any connectivity the FSC submit two LOGSTATs: the first fined by actual consumption in the 24-
and can be conducted without a is what they have on-hand to support to 48-hour window, but the initial re-
computer if the organization has their own movement and personnel; quest must be submitted with enough
identified key commodities to be the second shows what they are carry- time for the division to react. Figure 5
forecasted ahead of time and written
ing as bulk to support the battalion. shows the flow of LOGSTATs through
down the planning factors.
This prevents miscounting commodi- the brigade to the division and a brief
Continuous update ties such as CL I MREs that are allocat- description of responsibilities at each
ed to the FSC as being available for is- echelon.
Regardless of which tools the staff sue. Figure 4 shows an example of the
chooses to utilize, they must continu- Additionally, the SPO must capture the
recommended two FSC LOGSTATs.
ally update their forecasts and validate status of LOGSTAT submissions, and an
them against actual consumption. Val- Once the LOGSTATs are consolidated assessment of critical commodities de-
idating the forecasts should be a con- and analyzed, they can be submitted termined by operational requirements
tinual give and take. New forecasts val- to brigade. Again, it is critical that bri- in a logistics common operating pic-
idate the submitted LOGSTATs to re- gade is mindful of what systems the ture (LOGCOP) that is available to the
quest commodities for the next 24 battalions consistently have available staff and commander. The conditions
hours and the actual consumption to them when dictating the format and described in the LOGCOP will drive
from the previous 24 hours shows PACE for LOGSTAT submissions. They commander decisions and should also
whether those forecasts were accu- also need to ensure there is a codified drive future planning. An incomplete
rate. If the staff finds that their fore- feedback mechanism to inform the or stale LOGCOP fed by poor LOGSTAT
casts are continually wrong, they need battalions when the LOGSTAT has been reporting will energize command in-
to relook what planning factors they received. This prevents the “I sent the volvement to correct perceived short-
are using and make modifications as LOGSTAT three hours ago, didn’t you comings. This action can quickly desta-
needed. Staffs must also ensure that get it?” conversations. The reporting bilize the sustainment infrastructure
they are forecasting against the echelon should assume that, if they did and degrade command trust in the sus-
planned operation, not just trying to not receive a confirmation message, tainment community.
get on-hand commodities back to 100 the LOGSTAT was not received, and
percent. In a resource constrained en- they should move through the PACE to Conclusion
vironment, requesting over-forecasted submit their report until they confirm
receipt. Likewise, the higher echelon In conclusion, the trouble with LOG-
requirements to maintain 100 percent STATs is a more multifaceted problem
capacity will put unnecessary strain on must set a time following a missed re-
port that they begin reaching out to than simply assuming that companies
the logistics enterprise. Conversely, if and battalions aren’t doing what
leaders are not forecasting for the mis- subordinate units to inquire about the
status of the report, also utilizing the they’re told. Leaders at every echelon
sion, they may miss a critical resourc- and across warfighting functions must
ing shortfall where the operational re- PACE if they receive no response.
contribute to setting conditions for
quirements exceed capacity. When the
shortfall is identified 24-48 hours out,
Brigade level analysis success, from clearly defining expecta-
tions for LOGSTAT submission to ensur-
there is usually time to either cross- As the brigade staff receives the bat-
ing all echelons have the necessary
level internally or request additional talion LOGSTATs, they also conduct
equipment to submit according to the
assets for a higher echelon of support staff analysis to confirm accuracy and
PACE.
to bridge the gap. If the shortfall is not validate their own forecasts. The bri-
identified until units are reporting that gade S-4 and SPO must ensure that As units refine and solidify their re-
they are black, the unit is at risk of cul- their forecasts do not conflict with porting processes, they must then
minating, even if they were at full ca- each other and, if they identify any practice them. LOGSTATs are rarely
pacity after the LOGPAC. points of friction, they address them submitted outside of field problems or
prior to submitting the LOGSTAT to di- CTC rotations and the LOGSTAT and
After the battalion staff has reviewed vision or confirming commodity re- forecasting processes are highly per-
and validated the company LOGSTATs quests to the division sustainment bri- ishable skills. They must be integrated
against their forecasts, they can con- gade (DSB). If the S-4 requests one into garrison operations and trained
solidate and prepare the battalion thing in the submitted LOGSTAT and continuously at home station if we
LOGSTAT for submission. At this eche- the SPO requests something different hope to change the story at the CTC.
lon, it is likely that staff has access to to the DSB, it can create confusion in
computers, even if steady connectivity the division sustainment enterprise MAJ Sarah A. Barron is a support op-
is a challenge. That allows the staff to and negatively affect the supplies that erations trainer (Goldminer 05),

14 Fall 2024
Operations Group, Fort Irwin, CA. Her Notes Acronym Quick-Scan
previous assignments include support 1
FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations, July
operations officer, 3rd Combat Aviation
2019, Appendix E, Page E-1. ATP – Army Techniques Publication
Brigade, Hunter Army Airfield, GA; XO, CASCOM – Combined Arms Support
603rd Aviation Support Battalion, Hunt-
2
Army Techniques Publication (ATP) Command
er Army Airfield; combined-joint logis- 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, June DODIC – Department of Defense
tics officer (CJ-4), Train Advise Assist 2020, Change 1, November 2021, Chap- Identification Code
Command – South, Kandahar Airfield, ter 2, Pg 2-20. DSB – division sustainment brigade
Afghanistan; sustainment instructor/ 3
ATP 3-90.5, Combined Arms Battalion, FM – field manual
FSC – forward support company
writer, Maneuver Center of Excellence, July 2021, Chapter 6, Page 6-10.
JBC-P – Joint Battle Command-
Fort Moore, GA; and forward support 4
ATP 3-21.20, Infantry Battalion, De- Platform
company commander, Task Force 1 st cember 2017, Appendix H, Page H-15. LOGCOP – logistics common
Battalion, 28 th Infantry Regiment, 3 rd operating picture
5
ATP 4-90, Brigade Support Battalion, LOGPAC – logistics package
Infantry Division, Fort Moore. MAJ Bar-
June 2020, Change 1, November 2021, LOGSTAT – logistics statistics, (or)
ron’s military schools include Com-
Chapter 6, Page 6-3. logistics status
mand and General Staff College, Fort
6
TR-SCoE OPLOG Planner and Log Plan- MRE – Meals Ready to Eat
Leavenworth, KS; Logistics Captains MTOE – modified table of
Career Course, Fort Gregg-Adams, VA; ning Tools TR-SCoE OPLOG Planner and
organization and equipment
Medical Logistics Officer Course, Fort Log Planning Tools | General | Micro-
OPLOG – Operational Logistics
Sam Houston, TX; and Basic Officer soft Teams. PACE – primary, alternate,
Leader Course, Fort Sam Houston. She 7
Mercury: Sustainment Planning Tool contingency and emergency
has a bachelor’s of science from the https://mercury.swf.army.mil/. QLET – Quick Logistics Estimation
Tool
U.S. Military Academy, West Point, NY; 8
ATP 5-0.2-1, Staff Reference Guide, TTP – tactics, techniques and
and a master’s of business administra- December 2020, Appendix G. procedures
tion degree from Kansas State Univer- XO – executive officer
sity.

Figure 5. Brigade LOGSTAT reporting flow with brief descriptions of responsibilities at each echelon. (Developed by MAJ
Sarah Barron)

15 Fall 2024
 U.S Tank Gunnery: Historical Ebb and
Flow of Proficiency
by Robert S. Cameron, Ph.D.
A gap exists today between the capa-
bilities of tank weapon systems and
the ability of crews to employ them to
maximum effectiveness. Current tank
lethality reflects significant recent im-
provements to optics, fire control sys-
tems, networks, and ammunition.
Tanks possess the ability to engage var-
ied targets with precision at ever lon-
ger ranges whether stationary or mov-
ing. Yet many crews struggle with the
basics of tank gunnery. The 2019 III Ar-
mored Corps Lethality Study and anal-
ysis of the most recent Sullivan Cup
Best Tank Crew Gunnery Competition
underscore this lack of proficiency. In
the latter case, armor units sent repre-
sentative crews to compete in a series
of events designed to test foundation-
al skills emphasized in doctrine. Crews
struggled with boresight, target detec-
tion and identification, machine gun
engagements, and target sensing. 1 Figure 1. U.S. Tank Corps tank gunnery training devices of World War I. (Photo
These issues reflect the culmination of by U.S. Army Signal Corps)
a lapse in tank gunnery spanning years
and highlight the linkage between pro- maintained for each individual soldier.3 development program meant still fur-
ficiency and broader, Army-wide devel- ther doctrine and training variations
In the 1930s tank gunnery constituted
opments and trends. between the Infantry’s tank force and
a series of sequential steps from weap-
the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized).*
ons orientation to live fire qualification
World War I and that entailed engaging a variety of sim- By decade’s end modifications to tank
interwar years ulated targets from a moving vehicle. gunnery training included crew and
In World War I the creation of the first Records of individual gunnery skills unit exercises, and a qualification pro-
American tank force triggered genera- were maintained at the unit level, and cess with more training steps and gate-
tion of the Army’s first tank gunnery special insignia and financial compen- way evaluations prior to a live fire
training program. Its focus lay upon sation existed as incentives to achieve event for record. Reflective of the M2-
weapons operation and maintenance.2 high gunnery scores.4 Although these series of light tanks and M1-series of
For crews reliant upon vision slits for measures marked improvements since combat cars, the focus lay upon ma-
situational awareness, subject to sud- the Great War, in practice they tended chine gun engagements at relatively
den vehicle breakdowns, and working to result in better paid range marks- short ranges that did not require com-
in the confines of a steel beast that men rather than effective tank gun- plex ballistic solutions. By 1939, how-
quickly filled with fumes, simply firing ners. More complex gunnery training ever, some infantry tank leaders advo-
the weapon in the general direction of that involved platoon operations in a cated the concentration of tanks in
the enemy proved an accomplishment, tactical environment suffered from the battalions to better manage and pro-
particularly in those tanks in which the variety of different platforms in ser- vide uniformity to gunnery training. 5
gunner also served as the loader and vice. The small Army tank fleet includ- Such benefits were not viable among a
tank commander. In the 1920s tank ed obsolescent World War I-era plat- tank force scattered across the country
gunnery training retained its focus forms, several variants of newer light in small, understrength units with var-
upon the gunner’s ability to operate tanks, and prototypes issued for test- ied access to firing ranges.+ These ideas
and maintain his weapon, refined ing and evaluation. Moreover, most coincided with a shift from machine-
through the addition of checks on sight units lacked a sufficient complement gun armed tanks to ones equipped
usage and target sensing. Live fire en- of personnel and platforms even for with a turret-mounted 37mm main
gagements constituted the culmination their peacetime authorization, while gun, exemplified by the M2A4. This
of this training, with a report card the Army’s bifurcated mechanized weapon required training changes to

16 Fall 2024
reflect the need for accuracy from a
stationary position rather than the de-
livery of suppressive machine gun fire
from a moving platform commonplace
for much of the decade.*

World War II
In 1940 the creation of the Armored
Force in response to wartime develop-
ments in Europe marked a major ex-
pansion of the Army’s tank compo-
nent, resulting in the first armored di-
visions and separate tank battalions.
The scale and pace of this expansion
undermined tank gunnery proficiency.
The emphasis given to training new
personnel, organizing new units, and
building cadres for the next wave of
unit activations diluted the existing tal-
ent and eroded overall gunnery knowl-
edge and skills. The first armored divi-
sions and separate tank battalions Figure 2. The M2A4 Light Tank with a turret-mounted 37mm gun. (U.S. Army
therefore developed their own training Armor and Cavalry Collection)
programs, which included gunnery
techniques. Reports on their activities reflected this bias in their training. The knowledge of gunnery. The Armored
were shared with the Armored Force only common thread across the force Force headquarters endeavored to ad-
headquarters, which in turn strove to lay in ensuring gunners understood the dress this problem by implementing a
incorporate best practices into its own rudiments of how to fire and maintain course in gunnery technique in the Ar-
training efforts. Nevertheless, the ab- their weapons. mor School. The course began in March
sence of a standard gunnery training 1943 and included a detailed immer-
The Armored Force sought a gunnery
program made unit and formation sion into the techniques and nature of
manual to streamline doctrine, reduce
commanders the architects and evalu- gunnery, starkly contrasting with pre-
training complexity, and provide one
ators of their own training. Hence ear- vious classes that focused upon no-
standard to enable uniformity in train-
ly Armored Force gunnery instruction menclature and weapons operation.
ing and employment. The first such
reflected a broad range of approaches This course proved a boon to armor
manual published in April 1943 — long
shaped by materiel availability, range leaders — provided they attended it.
after the combat debut of American ar-
access, and unit commander experi- By war’s end, junior officers and NCOs
mored units. It provided combat tech-
ence. Moreover, commanders who proved unanimous in their recommen-
niques and the first set of principles to
considered maneuver more important dation that commanders of armored
guide training. It was updated the fol-
to combat effectiveness than gunnery units be educated and actively en-
lowing year to reflect combat lessons
gaged in all aspects of tank gunnery.7
learned, but the value of these manu-
als and related doctrinal publications Sustaining tank gunnery proficiency in
overseas proved limited, since they deployed units proved difficult. Com-
lagged behind the deployment of ar- bat losses destabilized both crews and
mored units to combat theaters and unit command arrangements. Trained
the fielding of newer tanks. replacements arrived, but often the ex-
cessive time lag between the comple-
The 1943 manual was not distributed tion of training and arrival in their as-
to units until the subsequent winter, signed unit necessitated in-theater re-
while the 1944 manual published in fresher training. Nor was the overall
July did not actually reach combat level of training, especially gunnery,
units overseas until December.6 There- considered sufficient for combat oper-
fore, many units continued to rely ations.
upon their own gunnery techniques,
despite the uniformity and standard- Newly arrived gunners in combat zones
ization now in published doctrine. tended to lack confidence in their abil-
ities, proved slow to lay the main gun
Figure 3. A tank crew cleaning their Officer ignorance posed another prob- on target, and on the battlefield strug-
tank’s main gun after operations in lem. The rapid expansion of the Ar- gled to make the range estimations so
Belgium, September 1944. (U.S. Army mored Force placed officers in com- critical to an accurate ballistic solu-
Armor and Cavalry Collection) mand positions despite minimal tion.8

17 Fall 2024
Postwar Era regular diversion of senior NCOs and aggravated by the inability to familiar-
officers to assignments that removed ize themselves with tanks issued on
Nevertheless, the war’s end found the
them from troop leadership. Moreover, the eve of combat deployment. Thrust
Armored Force with a uniform tank
the tank units remained understrength into the fighting in the Pusan Perime-
gunnery program, underpinned by
and in deference to Japanese infra- ter, they were unable once in Korea to
doctrine that reflected wartime les-
structure equipped with light tanks in- train and develop gunnery skills in ac-
sons learned and supplemented with
stead of the heavier vehicles mandated cordance with established policy and
effective schoolhouse instruction. Re-
by their tables of organization and doctrine.+ Tank gunnery proficiency de-
alizing the fruits of this positive devel-
equipment. 10 These factors ensured veloped via combat rather than
opment required stability across the
whatever gunnery training occurred through a deliberate training program.
force. Yet the postwar period was char-
bore little resemblance to actual com- Similarly, the readiness levels of those
acterized by chronic instability. The
bat. units providing personnel to deploying
rapid and precipitous demobilization
units also fell until new replacements
resulted in largescale loss of armor tal- In Europe demobilizing mechanized
could be integrated into crews and co-
ent and tsunamis of Army-wide per- cavalry, tank, and tank destroyer units
hesion rebuilt.
sonnel turbulence. Much of the re- provided the resources to create the
maining force was employed in occu- U.S. Constabulary, a light mechanized
Over time and under the pressure of
pation duties that required clerks and force oriented upon stability opera-
combat gunnery improved — and not
patrolmen rather than tank gunners. tions with little need for tank gunnery
just in the war zone. Increases in mili-
The Army’s General Reserve, intended skills. With the onset of the Cold War,
tary funding and end strength enabled
to address national emergencies, in- the U.S. Constabulary transitioned into
more realistic manning and equipping
cluded only a single armor brigade the first armored cavalry regiments.
of armored units that in turn facilitat-
equivalent whose shortages of person- Their creation spurred the develop-
ed training to existing standards and
nel and equipment undermined train- ment of tank training areas dedicated
doctrine. This upward trend continued
ing. Organizational changes to improve to gunnery and maneuver on sites
throughout the 1950s, benefiting from
the combat effectiveness of infantry di- once used by the Wehrmacht. More-
combat experience and the lingering
visions with organic tank units oc- over, theater-specific training pro-
danger of an actual shooting war with
curred largely on paper. grams boosted the overall readiness of
the Soviet Union. Indeed, units began
the small U.S. Army footprint in Eu-
In the Japan-based Eighth Army, for ex- to transcend established doctrinal
rope. These developments reflected a
ample, each of the four infantry divi- training measures, exemplified by the
renewed U.S. commitment to Europe-
sions should have included a tank bat- 1 st Armored Division’s creation of a
an security, underscored by the cre-
talion and three regimental tank com- special battle course to test crew and
ation of the North Atlantic Treaty Or-
panies. In fact, they possessed only a gunnery skills. 11 Tank gunnery profi-
ganization.
single tank company.9 Even so, person- ciency also benefited from the atten-
nel shortages, occupation duties, em- Cold War tion given to crew, section, and pla-
ployment as an opposing force in field toon operations that included the reg-
exercises, and limited access to appro- When the Korean War began in June ular use of crew proficiency tests, bat-
priate maneuver areas and ranges un- 1950, tank gunnery proficiency sank tle drills, and live fire battle runs in
dermined training effectiveness. While further as the Army struggled to orga- which tank platoons engaged targets
improvements to the Eighth Army’s nize and deploy tank units at their war- from offensive and defensive pos-
personnel and training situation oc- time strength. Many of the tank battal- tures. 12 The decade also marked im-
curred in 1949-1950, tank gunnery ions initially deployed to South Korea provements in the tools available to
proficiency continued to suffer from in- received influxes of new replacements tank gunners. The emergence of a fire
experienced leaders, replacements and Soldiers drawn from across the control system that linked the main ar-
lacking military occupational specialty Army.* The new units thus lacked cohe- mament, coincidence or stereoscopic
(MOS) -specific training, and the sion at the crew and unit levels, rangefinder, and a mechanical

Figure 4. M48s on a gunnery range in Germany, 1959. (U.S. Army Armor and Cavalry Collection)

18 Fall 2024
computer enhanced the ability to de-
tect, identify, acquire, and engage tar-
gets at longer ranges. These qualities
became manifest in the M48, and re-
lated crew training focused upon lever-
aging fully the technologically im-
proved capabilities available to them.
In the 1960s and 1970s tank weapons,
optics, ammunition, and fire control
systems continued to improve with the
fielding of the M60-series. Had tank
gunnery proficiency kept pace, the re-
sult would have been ever more capa-
ble and lethal tank crews, platoons,
companies, and battalions — but it did
not. The large-scale commitment of
ground combat forces to Vietnam gen-
erated personnel turbulence that erod- Figure 5. The Canadian Army Trophy. (Photo courtesy of the Royal Canadian Ar-
ed cohesion among non-deploying moured Corps School)
units. Armor units in West Germany,
for example, became little more than experience undermined their ability to tanks did not practice firing from hull
replacement pools for forces in Viet- mentor unit commanders and manage defilade, targets proved exceptionally
nam. Even without the war in South- training.15 Similarly, new platoon lead- large and distinctive, and target arrays
east Asia the personnel management ers possessed a minimal knowledge of never varied. Unit self-evaluations and
system then in place determined indi- their tank and its capabilities, since poor recordkeeping did little to identi-
vidual soldier assignments with no set their schoolhouse training focused fy training deficiencies for correction,
tour lengths and without regard to unit upon preparation for positions of high- and participating crews considered
commander needs. Most units experi- er responsibility in the event of a mass qualification a rote exercise with little
enced a 30-40 percent turnover every mobilization rather than their next relation to the battlefield. Hence, its
quarter, exacerbated by the tendency duty assignment.16 execution was often characterized by
of higher headquarters to siphon Sol- sloppy gunnery techniques that gener-
diers. Commanders who managed to Annual crew qualification served as the
ated results in the unrealistic qualifica-
stabilize their tank crews until qualifi- culminating event in gunnery training
tion environment but did not demon-
cation experienced even higher turn- and an indication of unit readiness.
strate tactical proficiency. Hence, once
over afterward.13 Training remained a progressive devel-
tank battalion commander character-
opment from individual to crew skills
Managing personnel turbulence within ized the entire nature of gunnery train-
followed by live fire qualification. Yet
units proved difficult when many expe- ing and qualification as “… a farce—an
while the platoon constituted the
rienced Armor NCOs either left the unreal, artificial, misleading indicator
smallest maneuver unit and the back-
Army or branch transferred in the wake of a crew’s ability to survive a tank-ver-
bone of an armored unit, collective
of the Vietnam War. Their loss was off- sus-tank battle. It’s barely the begin-
training at the platoon or higher level
set by the transfer and reclassification ning of true tank gunnery training. As
faded along with the battle drills in-
of NCOs from other branches who, de- currently performed, it is possibly
tended to hone unit muscle memory.
spite their responsibility for training ju- marksmanship, but not gunnery.”19
Doctrine provided guidance for unit
nior enlisted Armor crewmen, received gunnery, but there was no correspond- Such a condemnation boded ill for an
no familiarization training before their ing gunnery table or evaluation re- armored force considered critical to
assignment to tank units. The Armor quirement.17 the defense of Central Europe against
School trained NCOs in necessary lead- the Warsaw Pact’s numerically superi-
ership skills but not the related techni- Even with an emphasis only upon crew or armored and mechanized forces.
cal competency. This was either level training, unit commanders cited Moreover, the 1973 Arab - Israeli War
learned on the job or through impro- numerous challenges to achieving pro- highlighted the importance of tank
vised unit schools.14 Hence new NCO ficiency beyond personnel turbulence, gunnery proficiency on the modern
tank commanders proved limited in including limited range access, funding battlefield. This conflict forced the
their ability to supervise their crew shortfalls, the diversion of personnel Army to confront the realities of a po-
members or fully utilize the capabili- to administrative tasks, and ammuni- tential no-notice conflict in which its
ties of their tank. These problems were tion constraints.18 These issues, how- units entered combat in their current
aggravated by the assignment of non- ever, proved far less significant than readiness state without the benefit of
Armor command sergeant majors and the way crew training and qualification weeks and months in which to hone
first sergeants to tank units, where occurred. Qualification generally oc- skills to combat standards. For tank
their lack of technical and tactical curred on pristine ranges in which units in Central Europe this prospect

19 Fall 2024
was frightening indeed, since popular conservation. 22 The creation of the the company headquarters helped to
forecasts of the life expectancy of a 19-series Career Management Field in resolve this problem, while expanding
tanker in the event of war were mea- 1978 enabled the identification of a the amount of gunnery training given
sured in hours and days. The potential specific skill set for armor crewmen to to all Armor NCOs enabled master gun-
for a poor showing in combat found re- guide their selection and training.23 ners to concentrate their expertise
inforcement in the lackluster perfor- upon areas of greatest benefit to their
In the 1980s gunnery doctrine expand-
mance of U.S. tank units in the Cana- unit. The Armor School sought to make
ed the tank tables used to guide and
dian Army Trophy in the late 1970s. the Basic NCO Course responsible for
evaluate training to include crew, sec-
This NATO competition was considered developing tank commanders, while
tion, and platoon. A matching set of
the “Olympics of tank gunnery,” and it the Advanced NCO Course focused
tactical tables emerged to permit the
received considerable international upon the generation of platoon ser-
development of both the technical
and media attention. The substandard geants and incorporated some master
skills associated with placing steel on
performance of American participants gunner training. Officer training simi-
target and tactical maneuver. Reflect-
drew negative attention to training and larly began to include coverage of the
ing the need for true proficiency to
readiness issues in American armored technical aspects of tank platoon and
fight outnumbered and win, qualifica-
formations on the frontline of a poten- company operations. The establish-
tion standards rose. Tankers were ex-
tial war with the Warsaw Pact.* ment of One Station Unit Training and
pected to develop the skills necessary
its orientation upon graduating Sol-
In 1973 the newly created Training and to achieve minimal kill ratios of 5:1.24
diers qualified to serve as a driver,
Doctrine Command sought to trans- These changes retained the progres-
loader, or gunner helped commanders
form Army training through emphasis sive nature of training and evaluation
offset personnel turbulence by giving
upon raising combat readiness in prep- but raised the bar for qualification and
them greater flexibility in crew station
aration for a near-term large-scale con- emphasized tasks and skills oriented
assignments.26
flict. The Arab - Israeli conflict of the upon the battlefield. Moreover, the de-
same year spurred these efforts by liberate linkage of new proficiency The collective benefit of these changes
demonstrating the cost of unprepared- standards, soldier manuals, and Army to doctrine, training, and personnel lay
ness. Efforts to improve tank gunnery Training and Evaluation Programs in the increased focus upon tank gun-
thus began within TRADOC’s broader, (ARTEP) resulted in clear training goals nery in the field. Qualification ceased
Army-wide training reform. Lessons and strategies that included at least to be a check the block item and be-
learned from the Middle East war were one battalion or brigade field training came a serious training event. This
disseminated to tank units via training exercise per year. The opening of the shift in attitude was further encour-
circulars, and the Armor Center devel- National Training Center provided an- aged by competition among units, fu-
oped a proficiency test for tank crew other training opportunity initially fo- eled by the publication of qualification
members. 20 Implementation of the cused upon building maneuver and scores.27 Moreover, sustainment train-
tank master gunner program in 1975 gunnery skills at platoon, company, ing via UCOFT and the generation of
generated subject matter experts to and battalion levels. Laser based devic- training schedules that embedded gun-
assist unit commanders with training, es and simulators also broadened the nery and tactical skills throughout the
weapon operation and maintenance, array of training devices available to annual training cycle obviated the
and the correction of gunnery prob- hone gunnery skills before a live fire need for repetitive relearning of basic
lems. 21 Tank gunnery doctrine also event and sustain them afterward, skills and enabled more advanced
marked a renewed emphasis upon unit with the Unit Conduct of Fire Trainer training.
lethality with the introduction of a pla- (UCOFT) becoming one of the most
The combination of higher crew and
toon gunnery table. Encouraged by the prominent tools.
unit training standards, command em-
TRADOC’s readiness emphasis, units
The effectiveness of these changes lay phasis, and increased training oppor-
undertook their own training initia-
in the active involvement of command- tunities via training aids and simulators
tives, introducing timed engagements
ers and NCOs. The latter provided es- ensured that tank gunnery proficiency
and long-range precision engagements
pecially important due to their roles as matched the capabilities of the M1/
while highlighting the import of first
tank gunners, tank commanders, and M1A1 Abrams. The resultant lethality
round hits and ammunition
master gunners. Hence, Armor Branch became evident during Operation Des-
worked to remove Armor NCOs from ert Storm in 1991. Battlefield clashes
non-Armor duty assignments and re- between American armor and the Iraqi
turn them to tank units. The master army ended with catastrophic conse-
gunner program met its initial expec- quences to the latter. The conflict
tations, and these subject matter ex- served to validate the changes made in
perts soon earned the esteem of their the 1980s to tank gunnery doctrine,
commanders. Unfortunately, many training methodology, leader develop-
master gunners also served as platoon ment, and master gunner employment.
sergeants, and this dual responsibility It marked an apex in tank gunnery pro-
Figure 6. Tank from 2-64 Armor on
Grafenwoehr’s Range 109. (U.S. Army discouraged master gunner candi- ficiency even though the orientation of
photo by Ron Mihalko) dates.25 Moving the master gunner into armor training lay in waging a conflict

20 Fall 2024
against the Warsaw Pact in Central Eu-
rope rather than Iraq in the Middle
East.

1990s
The end of the Cold War removed an
external threat whose nature under-
scored the importance of a properly
trained armored force. In the wake of
superpower rivalry came a series of re-
gional and humanitarian crises that in-
volved the U.S. Army. Such operations
other than war generally necessitated
extensive training in non-warfighting
activities, followed by deployment and
then a period of retraining in warfight-
ing skills. Army downsizing, the related
loss of talent, and budget cuts ampli-
fied the disruptive effective of these
Figure 7. A tank platoon from 3rd Battalion, 64th Armor Regiment at Hohenfels,
deployments upon training in general.
Germany. (U.S. Army photo by Ron Mihalko)
The decade also witnessed the emer-
gence of an array of technological ini- the Army’s first digital tank. Its appear- applications, unmanned aerial sys-
tiatives, collectively dubbed Force XXI, ance marked another advance in ma- tems, robotic ground vehicles, and the
that strove to harness the emerging ca- teriel capabilities, since its digital sys- Future Combat System. In this rede-
pabilities of information technology to tems provided significant improve- signed force, current armor units be-
tactical organizations and operations. ments in communications and data came part of the Legacy Force destined
By senior leader intent the initial focus sharing, and its commander’s indepen- for replacement. Related funding
of this technological development lay dent thermal viewer boosted the abil- streams diverted to Objective Force
upon armored formations, whose lead- ity to detect, acquire, and engage tar- programs. A parallel effort generated
ers and Soldiers played key roles in re- gets more quickly over a broader area. the Initial Brigade Combat Team, re-
lated experimentation and testing. The fielding of the new tank reinforced named the Stryker Brigade Combat
Nevertheless, the aggregate effect of the continued emphasis in training and Team in 2002. Tank units were among
operations other than war, downsizing, doctrine upon long-range precision the first billpayers for this new organi-
fiscal retrenchment, and a flood of new fire. Long distance gunnery, however, zation, while some armor crewmen
technology lay in Army-wide disrup- necessitated crews who practiced pre- suffered mandatory reclassification to
tions to training. The absence of a peer cision in their gunnery training and MOS 19D.* Analysts feared that further
threat further prompted some political technique, particularly during bore- involuntary reclassifications would “be
leaders to question the need for a sight, and understood what factors de- bad for the morale of CMF 19. The per-
large tank force and the related ex- termined whether a round hit or ception will grow that 19K is no longer
pense. The resultant pressure to re- missed its target. The effect of even a viable career MOS.”30 Nevertheless,
duce training costs collided with ef- small errors upon ballistic trajectory other tank units similarly reorganized
forts to sustain readiness, encouraging and accuracy increased with range. into reconnaissance, surveillance and
greater use of virtual and simulations- Hence, fire control and weapon system target acquisition (RSTA) squadrons
based training and the shortening of maintenance, ammunition condition, and tankers were encouraged to be-
programs of instruction. Within the Ar- and boresight became critical actions come scouts. Hence, Transformation’s
mor School, the cumulative impacts lay prior to firing, while the ability to lay high tech, futuristic slant at the ex-
in the removal of main gun live fire the reticle on a target’s center mass, pense of current capabilities coupled
from the Tank Commander Certifica- input barometric pressure, account for with the emphasis given to scouts gen-
tion Course, rollbacks in the rank and crosswinds, and offset peculiarities in erated uncertainty among tankers
grade of instructor personnel, and a a gun’s performance marked a sea- about their future not entirely relieved
burgeoning unfunded requirement for soned gunner.29 by the initial fielding of the M1A2 SEP
tank tracks and parts.28 Consequently, with its improved optics, ballistic pro-
The start of Army Transformation in
tank gunnery proficiency slumped, but tection, and data sharing capabilities.
1999 triggered the onset of a new
it did not bottom out. wave of modernization initiatives heav-
Tank gunnery standards remained ily rooted in emerging technology. The Global War on Terror
high, and doctrine continued to evolve, focus lay upon the creation of the Ob- The Global War on Terror forced a re-
incorporating lessons learned from jective Force with high tech, rapidly de- balancing of the Army’s budget and fo-
Desert Storm. Moreover, the 1990s ployable organizations designed cus. While the Objective Force re-
marked the emergence of the M1A2, around information technology mained a work in progress, the Legacy

21 Fall 2024
Force went to war. In Operation Iraqi training or service experience in overseas as a provisional infantry bri-
Freedom, armored units played a cen- tanks.32 This knowledge deficit directly gade needed dismounted skill training
tral role in the rapid defeat of Iraqi impacted the oversight, training, and and familiarity with HMMWVS and
conventional forces, the capture of mentorship of Armor personnel. More- MRAPS more than tank gunnery.34
Baghdad, and the collapse of Saddam over, the elimination of tank battalions
Moreover, the high deployment tempo
Hussein’s regime in 2003. The next reduced the number of tank master
and the need for COIN-related skills
year armored units again applied mo- gunners to support gunnery training,
overshadowed preparation for other
bility, shock, and firepower to suppress while the smaller size of the tank com-
types of operations. In 2007, for exam-
the Easter Uprising. Collectively, these pany — now the Army’s largest armor
ple, active brigade combat teams spent
actions showcased the effectiveness of unit — amplified the impact of person-
15 months deployed and 12 or less at
crews proficient in maneuver and sus- nel turbulence, skill deficits, or other
home station between deployments,
tainment while validating existing tank issues that could not be offset at bat-
resulting in compressed training nar-
gunnery doctrine and standards. More- talion level due to the reduced armor
rowly focused upon the next COIN de-
over, in the training and development expertise resident in the combined
ployment.35 Vice Chief of Staff for the
of crew effectiveness, unit command- arms battalion.
Army GEN Richard A. Cody noted in
ers relied extensively upon their mas-
Institutional training changed to reflect testimony before Congress that “We
ter gunners. Unsurprisingly, the execu-
the needs of the next deployment and are only able to train them [Army units
tion of gunnery training that followed
current operational environment. and personnel] … for counterinsurgen-
doctrine, pursued established stan-
While such modifications prepared in- cy operations. They’re not trained to
dards, and reflected the active involve-
dividuals and units for overseas opera- full-spectrum operations.” Conse-
ment of leaders and master gunners
tions, the protracted nature of the quently, skills critical to other types of
yielded success in battle. The estab-
Global War on Terror made such mod- operations atrophied.36 The chart be-
lished process of generating individual,
ification the norm rather than a tem- low shows the disposition of Career
crew, and unit gunnery proficiency
porary adjustment to address a singu- Management Field 19 personnel in
honed over the years worked.31
lar deployment. Consequently, for 2007 with 81 percent either deployed
nearly two decades training and doc- or slated to do so. Indeed, the same
Yet 2004 marked another turning of
trine skewed to reflect COIN rather year marked a shortening of the tank
the tide in the ebb and flow of gunnery
than the broader range of military op- master gunner course and a sharp re-
skills. The Army committed to a sus-
erations. This duration resulted in a duction in the time available for units
tained period of counterinsurgency op-
generation of Soldiers and leaders to prepare for combat training center
erations (COIN) in both Afghanistan
whose primary military experience re- rotations. The latter increasingly re-
and Iraq, and it undertook force struc-
flected only COIN and its comparative- flected skills needed for counterinsur-
ture changes to support the related de-
ly narrow range of skills. gency operations rather than the high
ployment operational tempo. Brigades
intensity warfare of earlier years, once
replaced divisions as the principal unit The impact upon tank gunnery profi-
symbolized by the National Training
of action, enabled through the reorga- ciency proved wholly negative. Initial
Center’s live fire event in which the
nization of division assets to facilitate adjustments to gunnery training in-
manipulation of target arrays repre-
the creation of more but smaller bri- cluded a greater focus upon short
sented an attack by a hostile motorized
gade combat teams. The resultant or- range, urban engagements and in-
rifle regiment.37
ganizational reshuffling eliminated the creased attention to machine gun en-
tank battalion and replaced it with a gagements. 33 Precision, long-range Armor brigade combat teams, faced
combined arms battalion of tank and gunnery remained a staple of gunnery with compressed training timelines
mechanized infantry companies. Bat- manuals, but in practice it became and recurring deployments found little
talion leadership was no longer re- eclipsed by the need to hone those time for traditional gunnery and com-
stricted to Armor personnel, resulting skills considered critical to the next de- bined arms maneuver. The frequency
in combined arms battalions led by of- ployment. Tank units that functioned of gunnery fell from semi-annually to
ficers and senior NCOs without as motorized infantry or deployed perhaps once or twice over a

Figure 9. An M1A1 of the 3rd Infantry Division during Operation Iraqi Freedom
Figure 8. Using the in-bore muzzle I. The extended bustle rack was fabricated before the invasion began when it
boresight device. (U.S. Army photo by became clear that division combat units would need more supplies than their
Carl R. Johnson) trains could accommodate. (U.S. Army Armor School Branch Archives)

22 Fall 2024
three-year period. Indeed, some units available online to prepare them for
completed training cycles in prepara- the course, but too many units did not
tion for deployment without executing send their best candidates or ensure
any core gunnery or maneuver mission their access to pretraining.41
sets. Tank crews ceased to perform
gunnery skill testing and crew qualifi- Post Global War on Terror
cation every six months as required, When the U.S. withdrew its combat
and some crews found their platform forces from Iraq and then began to re-
knowledge fading during deployments duce its footprint in Afghanistan prior Figure 10. Armor personnel status in
in which they did not serve on a tank. to its complete withdrawal in 2021, the 2007. (U.S. Army graphic)38
The 2011 chart below, based on data Army had begun to shift its focus from
compiled over several years, indicates COIN to large-scale combat operations leaders upon the technical expertise of
the frequency of tank gunnery train- against a peer or near-peer threat. By their platoon sergeant.
ing.39 Given such circumstances, even then, however, it was clear that the at- The steady erosion of tank gunnery
master gunners could not stem the rophy of skills related to combined proficiency and related skills that oc-
bleed out of platform-related skills and arms maneuver in general and gunnery curred throughout the Global War on
proficiencies, particularly when units in particular made the execution of ac- Terror was not matched by a parallel
experienced shortages of master gun- tions across the range of military op- drop in materiel capability. The reverse
ners. erations impossible without extensive occurred. The Abrams tank continued
retraining.42 For armor brigade combat to evolve from the M1A2 SEP v1 to v3
When the Armor School relocated
teams, the ability to concentrate upon with concomitant boosts in the fire
from Fort Knox to Fort Benning (now
rebuilding tactical competencies suf- control system, network capabilities,
Fort Moore) to become part of the Ma-
fered disruptions from personnel tur- optics, and ammunition that collective-
neuver Center of Excellence (MCoE),
bulence and continued deployments ly raised the platform’s lethality and
NCO instruction changed. The integra-
that tended to increase after the Rus- precision. Unfortunately, these im-
tion of Armor and Infantry NCO train-
sian seizure and annexation of Crimea provements only widened the gap be-
ing largely ended the Armor School’s
in 2014. Hence many armor units tween technological capability and
prior efforts to groom tank command-
found themselves either preparing for crew ability.
ers and tank platoon sergeants through
an overseas tour or deployed, reducing
its branch specific NCOA and introduce Corrective measures included changes
their training time at home station.
at least some master gunner content to doctrine, most notably the adoption
This tempo took a toll on morale and
into course curricula. Worse, units of the Integrated Weapons Training
was considered a factor in higher-than-
proved reluctant to send their NCOs to Strategy, which standardized the pro-
the master gunner course, and the Ar- normal suicide rates in active duty ar-
mor units.43 cess of training and qualification for all
mor School found itself obliged to sell weapons. It therefore marked a signif-
the tank master gunner program and Rebuilding armor tactical and technical icant simplification of gunnery training
its benefits to the force. Units that did competencies remained a work in management for unit commanders.45
send Soldiers to master gunner train- progress. Gradual improvement oc- Gunnery doctrine also identified train-
ing too often failed to prepare them, curred, though undermined by crew ing objectives to be achieved in an an-
tasked individuals who demonstrated shortages that necessitated the impro- nual training cycle but gave command-
little interest in attending, and expect- vised employment of infantry Soldiers ers flexibility in determining the se-
ed master gunner students to address as tank crew members in combined quencing and nature of engagements
unit responsibilities while in school.40 arms battalions. This solution provided to achieve them.* Unfortunately, such
manpower, but the lack of background flexibility resulted in wildly varied ap-
Indeed, even in 2022 units demon- training of these personnel as tankers proaches and shortcuts that stymied
strated a reluctance to send Soldiers to complicated the development of crew efforts to track training efficacy and
attend master gunner training, despite cohesion and qualification. Readiness readiness. Consequently, the next gun-
the critical assistance these experts issues within armor brigade combat nery manual scheduled for publication
could provide to rebuilding gunnery teams contributed to the Armor in 2024, Training Circular (TC) 3-20.31-
proficiency. Soldiers selected to attend School’s decision to focus its basic of- 120, Gunnery: Heavy Tank will remove
this instruction often did not satisfy ficer leadership course upon the tank this flexibility and raise training stan-
the prerequisites for the tank master platoon, removing all unrelated con- dards. These changes will align tank
gunner course, and they could only at- tent from the curriculum. This revision gunnery with the needs of large-scale
tend with a waiver. The Armor School, enabled junior officers to be immersed combat operations against a peer or
acknowledging the need for more mas- in tank operations and related plat- near-peer threat, and, through unifor-
ter gunners, responded by eliminating form skills, resulting in some new pla- mity, simplify efforts to track and as-
the prerequisites, accepting all candi- toon leaders arriving at their first duty sess training progress.
dates, and restructuring the course to assignment knowing more about their
permit students to repeat training in tank than the Soldiers they command- Personnel turbulence remained a ma-
subjects whose evaluation they failed. ed.44 This new dynamic upended the jor factor undermining gunnery train-
A variety of products also became traditional reliance of new platoon ing and proficiency. Constant

23 Fall 2024
personnel turnovers undermined ef- robotic combat vehicles, and artificial Operation IRAQI FREEDOM (Fort Leav-
forts to stabilize crews and develop the intelligence capabilities into units and enworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute
cohesion necessary to progress formations will also have an initially Press, 2010).
through training, qualify, and then sus- disruptive effect. In the meantime, the
tain their training level. Changes in daily depiction of relatively inexpen- Notes
crews too often resulted in frequent sive first-person view drones destroy- 1
CPT Matthew T. Miller and 1SG Andrew
restarts on the path to crew qualifica- ing armored fighting vehicles in the L. Leatherbury, “Closing the Lethality Gap:
tion that eroded overall unit readiness. war in Ukraine encourages a climate of Trend Analysis from Sullivan Cup 2022
The Armor School sought to resolve skepticism concerning the continued and Application of Integrated Weapons
this problem through an initiative battlefield relevance of the tank. Training Strategy (Part I),” ARMOR, CXXX-
known as Armor Standardization and VIV, 3 (Summer 2022), pp. 11-13.
Such challenges are not new and can
Training Strategy 2030 that included a 2
Memorandum, CPT George S. Patton Jr.
be managed. Historically, the key fac-
mechanism to track the skill and read- to Chief of the Tank Service, Subj: Light
tors in achieving tank gunnery profi- Tanks, 12 December 1917, pp. 24-30, US-
iness of tank commanders and gun-
ciency have been active and persistent AARMS Branch Archives, Evolution of Ar-
ners. As they moved from unit to unit,
command involvement, adherence to mor/Tank Gunnery/WWI.
visibility of their readiness level facili-
established training standards derived 3
War Department, Training Regulations
tated integration into crews without
from an intimate knowledge of gun- 420-270, Infantry Tank Marksmanship
necessarily having to requalify each
nery doctrine, and effective training (Washington, D.C.: War Department, 29
tank crew after its composition
management. External events have of- June 1929).
changed. Related actions included ef-
ten served as a forcing function, but 4
War Department, Infantry Field Manual,
forts to restore platform instruction to
this influence has not proven consis- Volume II: Tank Units (Washington, D.C.:
the NCO Advanced Leader Course and
tently beneficial. Whereas the last de- War Department, 1931); Report, The In-
the redesign of master gunner instruc-
cade of the Cold War tended to rein- fantry School, Subj: Notes on Tank Marks-
tion to focus entirely upon separate, manship, 1936-1937, USAARMS Branch
force constructive changes in tank gun-
platform specific courses. The Armor Archives, Evolution of Armor/Tank
nery training, the Global War on Terror
School also sought to stabilize master Gunnery/1930s.
discouraged gunnery proficiency. Sim-
gunners in duty assignments that lev- Memorandum, COL D.S. Wilson to Infan-
ilarly, changes in technology, personnel 5
eraged their expertise without jeopar- try School Assistant Commandant, Subj:
factors, and budget constraints are
dizing career progression, and it con- Tank Gunnery, 5 December 1939, USAA-
persistent shaping influences to be
sidered creation of an Armor warrant RMS Branch Archives, Evolution of Ar-
treated as planning factors. Live fire
officer to serve as master gunner at mor/Tank Gunnery/1930s.
still constitutes the most important
battalion and higher echelons.46 6
War Department, Field Manual (FM) 17-
gunnery training event, but its maxi-
However, rebuilding tank gunnery pro- mum benefit will only be realized by 12: Tank Gunnery (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
ficiency across the force requires time units that make full use of the range of Government Printing Office, 1943); War
Department, FM 17-12: Tank Gunnery
— and there are no shortcuts. In the training aids, simulators, and facilities
(Washington, D.C.: War Department,
same manner that reps and sets are available to them before arriving on 1944); United States Forces European
touted as the key to attaining physical the range and afterward for skill sus- Theater General Board, Tank Gunnery,
fitness, so too for tank gunnery. It is a tainment. Only then will crews gain the Report, 1945, pp. 18-19, Appendices 2
skill that must be learned through do- proficiency necessary to realize the full and 7.
ing and sustained through recurring lethality potential of their tanks. 7
General Board, Tank Gunnery, pp. 19-
training events. The declination of gun- 20.
nery proficiency occurred over more Dr. Robert Cameron is the Armor 8
Ibid, pp. 20-21, Appendix 8.
than a decade, and the skills and Branch Historian, U.S. Army Armor
knowledge necessary to achieve and School, Fort Moore, GA. He has held
9
James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction:
sustain the standards in current doc- The First Year (Washington, D.C.: Center
this position since 1996. Dr. Cameron
of Military History, 1992), pp. 52-54.
trine cannot be mastered on the fly. is an honorary graduate of Armor Of-
Achieving mastery of tank gunnery fice Basic Course, Armor School, Fort
10
James A. Huston, Guns and Butter,
skills necessitates a dedicated and per- Powder and Rice: U.S. Army Logistics in
Knox, KY, 1996. He has a bachelor’s of
the Korean War (Cranbury, New Jersey:
sistent effort by Soldiers and com- arts degree in history from SUNY Bing- Associated University Presses, 1989), p.
manders employing the full array of hamton (now Binghamton University); 35.
talent, training aids, and doctrinal pub- a bachelor’s of arts degree in econom- 11
COL L.L. Doan, “Training Tank Crews,”
lications available, particularly given ics from SUNY Binghamton (now Bing- ARMOR, LXI, 1 (January-February 1952),
current challenges. The Army’s recruit- hamton University) and a doctorate de- pp. 30-32.
ing problem and related difficulties at- gree (Ph.D.) in modern military history
tracting volunteers to combat arms di-
12
BG Hamilton H. Howze, “Notes on the
from Temple University. Dr. Cameron is
Training of an Armored Division,” AR-
rectly links to the personnel shortages the author of several articles and MOR, LXII, 6 (November-December 1953),
in armor units. Recent Army force books, including To Fight or Not to pp. 6-13; LTC Roy L. Dedmon, “Tank Crew
structure changes, the pending fielding Fight?: Organizational and Doctrinal Proficiency Courses,” ARMOR, LXVI, 1
of new materiel, and ongoing efforts to Trends in Mounted Maneuver Recon- (January-February 1957), pp. 26-28; MG
integrate unmanned aerial systems, naissance from the Interwar Years to G.S. Patton, Letter to the editor, ARMOR,

24 Fall 2024
LXXXIV, 1 (January-February 1975), pp. 22
Bahnsen, “Our Tank Gunnery Needs a Modular BCT Impact on AR BR.
2-3; MAJ John B. Whitehead, “Batt- Revival,” pp. 21-23; LTC Charles E. Hon- 33
Headquarters, Department of the Army,
leruns,” ARMOR, LXXXVI, 2 (March-April oré, “Tank Gunnery Under Fire,” ARMOR, FM 3-20.12, Tank Gunnery (Abrams)
1977), p. 18. LXXXIV, 5 (September-October 1975), pp. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the
13
Donn A. Starry, “Training Key to Success 19-23. Army, 2005).
of Force Modernization,” included in Lew- 23
Karl E. Cocke et al. Department of the 34
Briefing, COL Gary Nicoson (TCM HBCT),
is Sorley (ed.), Press On! Selected Works Army Historical Summary: Fiscal Year Subj: HBCT Maneuver Gunnery Skills,
of General Donn A. Starry, Vol. II (Fort 1977 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Mili- 2011, USAARMS Branch Archives, Box
Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies In- tary History, 1979), p. 20; “Tank Forces 340.
stitute Press, 2009), pp. 834-835; LTC Management: Man and Machine,” p. 6. 35
Center for a New American Security,
John C. Bahnsen, “Gaining the Edge,” AR- 24
Department of the Army, FM 17-12, “The State of the U.S. Army,” Fact Sheet,
MOR, LXXXV, 1 (January-February 1976), Tank Gunnery, Change 2 (Washington, November 2007, USAARMS Branch Ar-
p. 51; Lieutenant Colonel Eric L. Prall, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the chives, 07 ACH/Army/Readiness/Assess-
“Tank Crew Proficiency Testing,” ARMOR, Army, 1980). ments.
LXXXV, 5 (September-October 1976), p. 25
“Armor Manning Issues,” ARMOR, XCIII, 36
“Military Is Ill-Prepared for Other Con-
13; MG John W. McEnery, “Shoot First –
4 (July-August 1983), pp. 38-39; MG Fred- flicts,” Washington Post, 19 March 2007.
and Win!” ARMOR, LXXXV, 6 (November-
eric J. Brown, “Manning Issues Revisited,” Quotation from same.
December 1976), p. 5.
ARMOR, XCIV, 2 (March-April 1985), p. 7;
14
“Tank Forces Management: Man and 37
Armor Conference Briefing, MG Robert
MG Thomas H. Tait, “Noncommissioned
Machine,” ARMOR, LXXXVI, 4 (July-August M. Williams, Subj: Armor: Strong Today;
Officers,” ARMOR, XCVI, 3 (May-June
1977), pp. 7-8. Strong Tomorrow, 2007, USAARMS Branch
1987), p. 6; CSM John M. Stephens, “Is
Archives, 07 ACH/Armor Conf/CG Open-
15
“Tank Forces Management: Man and the Master Gunner Competitive?” AR-
ing; COL R. Jenks Reid, Training Ground
Machine,” pp. 6-7; Prall, “Tank Crew Profi- MOR, XCIV, 2 (March-April 1985), p. 8.
ciency Testing,” p. 13. Letter, Starry to Combat Forces for Operation Iraqi Free-
26
MG Thomas P. Lynch,” Update on Armor dom, Report, Naval War College, 6 No-
Gorman, 28 January 1974, p. 770, and Training Strategy for the 1980s,” ARMOR,
Starry, “Training Key to Success of Force vember 2007, p. 14, USAARMS Branch Ar-
LXXXIX, 3 (May-June 1980), pp. 4-5; “Ar- chives, 07 ACH, Army/Readiness/OIF and
Modernization,” p. 835, included in Lewis mor Training Strategies for the 1980s,”
Sorley (ed.), Press On! Selected Works of Training Changes.
ARMOR, LXXXIX, 4 (July-August 1980), pp.
General Donn A. Starry, Vol. II (Fort Leav-
38
Armor Conference Briefing, MG Robert
27-29. MG Louis C. Wagner Jr., “Com-
enworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Insti- M. Williams, Subj: Armor: Strong Today;
mander’s Hatch,” ARMOR, XC, 2 (March-
tute Press, 2009). Strong Tomorrow, 2007.
April 1981), pp. 3-4; “The Armor NCO Ad-
16
LTCs Romie L. Brownlee and William J. vanced Course,” ARMOR, XC, 4 (July-Au-
39
Briefing, COL Gary Nicoson (TCM HBCT),
Mullen III, Changing an Army: An Oral gust 1981), pp. 7-8; “The Basic NCO Subj: HBCT Maneuver Gunnery Skills,
History of General William E. DePuy, USA Course,” ARMOR, XC, 5 (September-Octo- 2011.
Retired (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: ber 1981), pp. 7-8; CSM John W. Gillis, 40
Briefing, MAJ Bender and 1SG Ninelist
U.S. Military History Institute, 1979), p. “Training Second Lieutenants,” ARMOR, (316th Cavalry Brigade) to Armor School
183. XC, 4 (July-August 1981), pp. 9-10. commandant, Subj: Master Gunner Train-
17
Letter, Starry to Gorman, 28 January 27
See for example LTC Robert W. Whitton, ing, July 2010, USAARMS Branch Archives,
1974; Headquarters, Department of the “Gunnery Record Noted,” ARMOR, XCV, 4 Box 359.
Army, FM 17-12, Tank Gunnery (Washing- (July-August 1986), p. 3; “2-66 Armor Sets 4
BG Thomas M. Feltey End of Tour Inter-
ton, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1972). USAREUR Standard,” ARMOR, SCV, 5 (Sep- view, 27 March 2023, pp. 14-15, USAA-
18
Letter, Starry to Gorman, 28 January tember-October 1986), p. 49; or “3ACR RMS Branch Archives, 2023 Annual Com-
1974; MAJ John K. Waters Jr., Letter to Runs Army’s First M1A1 Qualification mand History files.
the editor, ARMOR, LXXXIV, 1 (January- Gunnery,” ARMOR, XCVI, 3 (May-June 42
LTG Michael S. Tucker, “Combined-Arms
February 1975), p. 2; Bahnsen, “Gaining 1987), p. 51. Gunnery: Restoring the Fundamentals,”
the Edge,” p. 51; Prall, “Tank Crew Profi- 28
16th Cavalry, TRADOC Status Report, ARMOR, CXXVI, 4 (October-December
ciency Testing,” p. 13; McEnery, “Shoot March 1997; 16th Cavalry Quarterly Train- 2015), pp. 8-11.
First –and Win!” p. 6; Whitehead, “Batt- ing Briefings, 18 June and 27 October 43
Davis Winkie, “Broken Track: Suicides
leruns,” pp. 18, 19, 21. 1997. Both files in USAARMS Branch Ar- and Suffering in Army’s Exhausted Armor
19
LTC John C. Bahnsen, “Our Tank Gun- chives, Box 27. Community,” Army Times, 11 March
nery Needs a Revival,” ARMOR, LXXXIII, 5 29
MAJ Bruce J. Held and MSG Edward S. 2024.
(September-October 1974), pp. 21-23. Sunoski, “Tank Gun Accuracy,” ARMOR, 44
Briefing, BG David A. Lesperance and
Quotation from p. 21. CII, 1 (January-February 1993), pp. 6-11. CSM Kevin J. Muhlenbeck, Subj: Branch
20
See for example Department of the 30
Briefing, Task Force Manning to Briga- Update, 15 November 2018, USAARMS
Army, TC 17-12-5, Tank Gunnery Training dier General Grazioplene, Subj: Personnel Branch Archives, 18ACH/AR School/Cmdt;
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Management Strategy, 25 January 2000, Captains Nathan Sitterley, Mackenzie Az-
Army, 1975). U.S. Army Armor School, TC USAARMS Branch Archives, ACH 2000/ bell, Charles Huber, and Michael Houri-
17-15-8 (Test), Armor Crewman Physical OCOA/ACH 2000/DIR OCOA. han, “2-16 CAV,” Maneuver Center of Ex-
Proficiency Test (Washington, D.C.: De- 31
Master Gunner Field Survey, 2004, US- cellence E-Newsletter, March 2019, pp.
partment of the Army, 1974). AARMS Branch Archives, Box 254. 18-20, USAAARMS Branch Archives,
21
MSG Wakeland K. Kuamoo, “Master 32
Briefing, Office of the Chief of Armor, 19ACH/MCOE/Digital Newsletter.
Gunners — 20 Years Later,” ARMOR, CIV, Subj: Armor Transformation, 2006, USAA-
45
Headquarters, Department of the Army,
6 (November-December 1995), pp. 37-38. RMS Branch Archives, ACH 2006/OCOA/ TC 3-20.0, Integrated Weapons Training

25 Fall 2024
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Department
of the Army, 2015).
46
Feltey End of Tour Interview, pp. 75-80.

Acronym Quick-Scan
ARTEP – Army Training and
Evaluation Programs
COIN – counterinsurgency
operations
FM – field manual
MCoE – Maneuver Center of
Excellence
MOS – military occupational
specialty
RSTA – reconnaissance,
surveillance and target acquisition
TC – training circular Figure 12. An M1A2 Abrams SEP V2 main battle tank of the 11th Armored Cav-
UCOFT – Unit Conduct of Fire alry Regiment fires a M865 training round at the National Training Center and
Trainer Fort Irwin training area, Dec. 9, 2021. (U.S. Army photo)

MONS, BELGIUM (Sept. 1, 2024) – Locals interact with U.S. Army Soldiers and an M2A3 Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle
from 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division, during the Tanks in
Town commemoration event in Mons, Belgium, Sept. 1, 2024. V Corps regularly provides personnel and equipment to
support community events in various countries across Europe. (U.S. Army photo by PFC Richard Morgan)

26 Fall 2024
 Organizing Light Cavalry in the Army of 2030
by CPT Charles Clouse announced in February 2024 that U.S.- troop (MRT). Unfortunately, the IBCT
based Stryker and infantry brigade cav- cavalry squadron is a fatally flawed
U.S. Army cavalry is about to undergo alry squadrons will be inactivated.3 model and should serve planners
a massive restructuring. As the Army mostly as a negative example. U.S.
transitions to the division-centric Army Most public materials on the new DIV- Army light cavalry needs significant
of 2030 force structure, division caval- CAV formations focus on how the DIV- changes to its force structure to enable
ry (DIVCAV) formations are coming CAV supporting the reinforced ar-
success on the future battlefield.
back from the dead to provide recon- mored divisions will enable their par-
naissance and security support to the ent formations to win decisively in What Not to Do: IBCT
newly empowered division formations. large-scale combat operations (LSCO).
The proposed force structure for these cavalry squadron
The 1st Cavalry Division already has a DIVCAV squadrons is a well-resourced The IBCT cavalry squadron’s structure
test DIVCAV squadron to support its re- and powerful formation capable of ac- is not fit for LSCO. The basic unsuitabil-
organization as a reinforced armored complishing the full spectrum of cav- ity of the IBCT Cavalry Squadron’s
division, and additional DIVCAV forma- alry tasks for the division commander.4 modified table of organization and
tions throughout the force are planned What light DIVCAV will look like is less equipment (MTOE) for carrying out its
to follow.1 Based on publicly released clear. It seems likely there will ulti- doctrinal tactical tasks has been com-
planning materials, DIVCAV will be re-
mately be at least two light DIVCAVs, mented on numerous times in the last
served for the armor division (Rein-
along with a light cavalry troop sup- 10 years, including in the pages of AR-
forced) and the air assault and air-
porting each of the 34 infantry brigade MOR magazine.5,6,7 In fact, the inade-
borne division structures; normal ar-
combat teams (IBCTs). quacy of High Mobility Multipurpose
mor divisions and light divisions will
Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV also known
likely lack DIVCAV.2 Meanwhile, brigade The Army already has a model of what
as “Humvee”) mounted scouts has
combat teams’ (BCTs) cavalry forma- light DIVCAV squadrons and brigade-
been commented on as far back as the
tions are planned to drop from a full level cavalry troops may look like in the
Gulf War.8
cavalry squadron to a cavalry troop. In existing IBCT cavalry squadron and its
line with this model, the Army subordinate mounted reconnaissance The root cause of the IBCT cavalry

Figure 1. The proposed Army 2030 Air Assault Division force structure. The Light Division is almost identical, but lacks a
DIVCAV and has a slightly differently configured aviation brigade. (Reproduced from the “How the Army 2030 Divisions Fight”
White Paper)

27 Fall 2024
squadron’s inadequacies is the organi-
zational choice to build the unit around
an unsuitable mounted platform. The
Humvee has been the vehicle of
“choice” for the IBCT cavalry squadron
for most of the period since the Army
reorganized into a brigade-based struc-
ture. The Humvee is a terrible platform
for reconnaissance, and for combat in
general; it is not lethal, it is not surviv-
able, and it is only stealthy when com-
pared to high signature platforms like
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle.9
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
improves survivability somewhat, but
only at the cost of further decreased
stealth. Scouts equipped with Hum-
vees or JLTVs have limited ability to
fight for information, and in fact in pre-
vious LSCO conflicts commanders have
often chosen to keep Humvee-mount-
ed scouts away from the fighting en-
tirely rather than condemn them to die Figure 2. Cavalry scouts with B Troop, 2nd Squadron, 101st Cavalry maneuver at
fighting at a disadvantage against bet- JRTC in July 2016. (U.S. Army photo by SGT Harley Jelis)
ter-equipped opponents.10, 11
vehicles and dismount as well. When cavalry squadron as currently
The Humvee does provide some com- the unit is under strength or attrited, constituted has no organic UAS save
pelling advantages, most notably in- the dismount position is often the first the obsolete RQ-11 Raven held at the
creased firepower, movement speed, to go unfilled, further reducing the troop level. Effective use of UAS is
and use of sensors like the Long-Range unit’s ability to conduct dismounted critical to effective reconnaissance
Advanced Scout Surveillance System reconnaissance. With so little dis- on the modern battlefield, as shown
(LRAS3), however these advantages mounted capability, the MRT struggles by recent combat in Ukraine,
are mostly nullified by the environ- to emplace an adequate number of Nagorno-Karabakh and the Middle
ment in which an IBCT is expected to long-term observation posts (OPs), re- East. A lack of effective UAS systems
fight. By doctrine, “the IBCT optimizes connoiter and screen severely restric- fielded at the lower tactical levels
for the offense against conventional, tive terrain between high-speed ave- remains a large capability gap in
hybrid, and irregular threats in severe- nues of approach, and conduct effec- many Army units, especially in
ly restrictive terrain.”12 In such condi- tive push-pull maneuver between its reconnaissance formations. It is no
tions, the ability to see and shoot at mounted and dismounted elements. exaggeration to say than many non-
long ranges is inhibited by ground clut- The lack of available dismounts is sim- state militant groups have access to
ter and short intervisibility (IV) lines, ply crippling for a formation intended more numerous, effective, and
while terrain conditions tend to push to operate in severely restrictive ter- advanced UAS systems than a U.S.
mounted scouts onto limited mobility rain. Army cavalry squadron.
corridors where they can be easily de- • Lack of counter-UAS: The IBCT cavalry
stroyed by enemy forces due to their Beyond the limitations created by its
platform, the IBCT Cavalry Squadron squadron has little ability to defend
lack of firepower and survivability. itself from observation or attack by
also lacks important organic enablers
The dependence on the Humvee or that will be required on the future bat- tactical UAS. Given the proliferation
JLTV creates a second critical problem, tlefield. IBCT cavalry squadron’s head- of UAS worldwide, and the fact that
a lack of dismounted capability. The quarters and headquarters troop (HHT) cavalry formations are likely to be the
IBCT MRT has a greater need for dis- has few organic enablers and is typical- first ground troops encountering
mounted troopers than its counter- ly only able to provide command and enemy UAS, the lack of organic
parts in the Stryker brigade combat control (C2) and medical support to counter-UAS capability leaves the
team (SBCT) or the armored brigade subordinate units. Additional support formation extremely vulnerable on
combat team (ABCT) due to the terrain may be task-organized from other ech- the future battlefield.
it is expected to operate in, yet per- elons; however, this causes the squad- • Lack of indirect fires: Unlike a typical
versely has the fewest dismounts. ron to take combat power and enablers maneuver battalion, the IBCT cavalry
Stemming largely from the poor pas- from the formations it is supposed to squadron lacks any indirect fires
senger carrying capacity of the Hum- be supporting. Some of the most press- capability at the squadron level. As a
vee and JLTV, each platoon is only able ing capability gaps of the squadron in- result, the squadron must rely on
to generate six dismounts unless the clude the following. higher echelon fire support to
vehicle commanders abandon the mis- support its subordinate troops should
• Inadequate organic unmanned
sion command systems in their the two mortar tubes possessed by
aerial systems (UAS): The IBCT

28 Fall 2024
 each prove inadequate.
• Headquarters’ lack of ability to self-
secure: The only gun trucks within
the HHT are those of the commander
and the S-3. The net effect is that the
HHT cannot secure itself while
moving, and can barely do so while
stationary, forcing the commander to
either steal combat power from the
subordinate reconnaissance troops
or accept a high degree of risk to
combat support (CS) and combat
service support (CSS) elements. This
also leaves the squadron with no
combat power with which to support
subordinate troops if they become
decisively engaged. 13 The MRT
Headquarters Section has the same
problem, with little ability for the Figure 3. Paratroopers assigned to the Airborne and Special Operations Test
command post (CP) or the mortar Directorate prepare to depart for a 50-kilometer road test in a fully loaded In-
section to self-secure, which creates fantry Squad Vehicle (ISV). (U.S. Army photo by Michael Zigmond)
the same tactical dilemma at the
troop level. (ISV) with a crew-served weapon and greatly increased capabilities for
a sensor like the LRAS3. This would reduced stealth, a larger logistical
The Army would be making a mistake make cavalry formations significantly tail, more difficult off-road mounted
to retain the organizational structures stealthier and provide much better maneuver, and worse strategic
associated with current light cavalry off-road mobility and dismounted mobility.14
formations. The IBCT cavalry MTOE is capability than the current IBCT
already not suited to its current mis- cavalry formations. These formations Shared features for LSCO
sion, and asking the same unit struc- would be relatively cheap to field,
ture to support an even larger parent Regardless of the platform chosen,
would be easy to support logistically,
echelon in a higher tempo combat en- light cavalry organizations will need to
and would possess a high level of
vironment is setting the cavalry up for share several critical features and en-
tactical, operational and strategic
failure. While it would be easy for plan- abling capabilities to successfully exe-
mobility. These platforms would also
ners to simply repurpose existing for- cute reconnaissance and security op-
be suitable for airdrop and sling load,
mations, Army planners need to up- erations in a LSCO environment. Any
especially important for the DIVCAV
grade the capabilities of light cavalry light cavalry force designed for the
tasked to support joint forcible entry
before expecting it to support the divi- Army of 2030 should do the following:
(JFE) capable divisions. The main
sions and brigades of the Army of 2030 drawback of this design is the • Generate an adequate number of
in LSCO. inherent lack of firepower and dismounts: Infantry formations are
survivability in such a platform. These intended to operate in severely
Ways forward: Light scouts would have limited ability to restrictive or complex terrain, and
fight for information against well- the design of the supporting cavalry
cavalry in Army of 2030 armed opponents and would likely be formations must reflect that. Having
Given the inadequacy of current light unable to perform some traditional an adequate number of dismounts is
cavalry structures, the Army should re- cavalry tasks such as a guard. critical for successful reconnaissance
equip cavalry supporting infantry for- • Go heavy: For more robust light in the environments light cavalry
mations. The doctrinal compromises cavalry, troopers should be mounted units are likely to fight in. Whatever
that planners are willing to accept on an armored platform with a platform light cavalry uses should
should drive the most important stabilized autocannon, such as the support at least a 6x36 structure (six
choice in structuring the new forma- M1296 “Dragoon” Stryker variant. vehicles with six troopers each, for a
tions, the selection of their mounted These formations would be able to 36-Soldier platoon) to allow each
platform. Depending on the capabili- able to aggressively fight for ve h i c l e to g e n e rate i t s o w n
ties that planners feel are most impor- information and perform the full dismounted team.
tant, there are two broad options to range of traditional cavalry tasks in • Have nested UAS at all levels from
improve the performance of the caval- support of their parent divisions and section through squadron: UAS will
ry: go light or go heavy. brigades. With additional capacity for be ubiquitous on future battlefields,
• Go light: For very light cavalry, dismounts, these formations would and current force structure does not
troopers should be mounted on an still be able to effectively accomplish provide enough UAS capability. The
extremely light platform with the their missions in severely restrictive Army must field UAS of increasing
capability to transport numerous terrain far better than current size and capability at the section,
dismounts, perhaps a variant of the Humvee-mounted scouts. These platoon, troop and squadron levels
newly fielded Infantry Squad Vehicle cavalry formations would trade these in its reconnaissance formations.

29 Fall 2024
• Have access to necessary enablers need not be organic; Mobile Conclusion
at both squadron and troop level: Protected Firepower (MPF) assets
The Army of 2030 initiative gives the
The DIVCAV squadron will need from the division’s MPF battalion
Army the chance to revitalize its caval-
additional enabling capabilities to could provide a powerful reserve for
ry formations for LSCO. The Army
properly support its subordinate a maneuvering DIVCAV. Whether
should not accept the status quo in its
troops, including fires, intelligence, organic, attached, or DS, DIVCAV and
light cavalry formations and lock in the
and protection assets such as brigade-level cavalry troops need
mistakes in structure and equipment
counter-UAS. These capabilities can enough additional combat power to
that have hamstrung the cavalry for
be split between the HHT and the secure command and logistics nodes,
years. The IBCT cavalry squadron is a
planned cross-domain troop as and to provide an adequate reserve
model that should best be retired and
needed. Some of these enabling to support the maneuver of their
replaced with a force structure that
capabilities will not be organic to the scouts.
will be able to win in the battlefield en-
squadron and must come from • Have realistic doctrine for vironment of the future.
h a b i t u a l d i re c t s u p p o r t ( D S ) employment: Leaders need to
relationships between the DIVCAV understand that light DIVCAV will be CPT Charles Clouse is an armor officer
and various division assets. Where required to be able to fight or infiltrate assigned to Detachment 4, 2500 Mili-
templated force structure does not through an enemy’s disruption zone tary Intelligence Group, National Intel-
support these relationships, the to reach their reconnaissance ligence Support Group, Military Intelli-
Army should consider adding objectives. Where formerly Army gence Readiness Command. His previ-
additional batteries and companies cavalry supported an organization ous assignments include plans officer
to the division artillery (DIVARTY) and one echelon larger than itself, now it (assistant S-3), Headquarters and
protection brigades to support them. will be supporting an organization Headquarters Troop (HHT), 2nd Squad-
Cavalry troops within IBCTs will also two echelons larger than itself. ron, 183rd Cavalry Regiment, 116th In-
need many of the same enablers, and Chinese and Russian units still have a fantry Brigade Combat Team, Ports-
must be assigned them or have reconnaissance battalion per brigade, mouth, VA; East Africa Response Force
habitual DS relationships that provide and both expect their reconnaissance (EARF) tactical planner, Task Force Red
those capabilities. elements to fight aggressively on Dragon, Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti;
• Include extra combat power: The both offense and defense.16, 17 Cavalry plans officer (assistant S-3), HHT, 2-183
proposed armored division will potentially fight outnumbered, Cavalry, 116th IBCT; executive officer,
(reinforced) includes tanks in both and will require significant combat Troop B, 2-183 Cavalry, 116th IBCT, Suf-
the DIVCAV and brigade-level cavalry power or external support to folk, VA; and platoon leader, Troop B,
troops to give these formations the accomplish their mission against a 2-183 Cavalry, 116th IBCT, Suffolk. CPT
combat power needed to win on the peer threat. BCTs also need to accept Clouse’s Military schools include Re-
battlefield.15 Light cavalry similarly that their cavalry troops, however serve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC)
needs augmented combat power if it organized, simply will not be able to Leadership Development Assessment
is to fight for information without provide the same level of Course, Armor Basic Officer Leader
pulling reconnaissance assets away reconnaissance and security support Course, Army Reconnaissance Course,
from critical information collection as the entire squadron they had Pathfinder Course, Maneuver Captain’s
tasks. This additional combat power previously, and plan accordingly. Career Course (RC), Cavalry Leader’s
Course, and Air Movement Control Of-
ficer Course. He has a bachelor’s of arts
degree in history from The College of
William and Mary in History.

Notes
1
LTC Jennifer Bocanegra, “1st Cavalry Divi-
sion Re-Activates Division Cavalry ‘DIV
CAV’ Squadron,” Fort Cavazos Media Cen-
ter, March 8, 2023. https://fortcavazos-
mediacenter.com/1st–cavalry–division–
re–activates–division–cavalry–div–cav–
squadron/. This article was also published
in the Spring 2023 issue of ARMOR.
2
LTC Kevin Hadley, MAJ Savannah Spen-
cer, and MAJ Justin Martens, “How the
Army 2030 Divisions Fight,” Feb. 2, 2023.
A similar structure was presented during
the U.S. Combined Arms Center’s (CAC)
Commanding General and Department of
Figure 4. U.S. Soldiers with 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment prepare to con- the Army G–3/5/7 Remarks at the 2023
duct a live fire exercise using the 30mm Stryker Infantry Carrier Vehicle-Dra- Maneuver Warfighter Conference
goon at the 7th Army Training Command’s Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germa- (MWfC). https://www.youtube.com/
ny, Feb. 20, 2018. (U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Sara Stalvey) watch?v=2hSGGYZd–Ho&list=PLnTI6lVk6

30 Fall 2024
GDyx8LTxQeafFudNHb483X2h&index=10. Emerging Observations.” The U.S. Army
Armor Center. Oct. 7, 1991. Acronym Quick-Scan
3
U.S. Army Public Affairs, “U.S. Army
White Paper – Army Force Structure 12
FM 3-96 Paragraph 1-4, Brigade Com-
Transformation,” Feb. 27, 2024. https:// bat Team, January 2021.
ABCT – armored brigade combat
www.army.mil/article/274003/army_
team
13
Forces held out of contact are neces- BCT – brigade combat team
changes_force_structure_for_future_ sary to enable cavalry to successfully fight
warfighting_operations.
C2 – command and control
for information; due to the current doctri- CP – Command Post
4
MG John Richardson, “Modernizing the nal fundamental of reconnaissance “do CS – Combat Support
Division,” Maneuver Center of Excellence not keep reconnaissance assets in re- CSS – Combat Service Support
Warfighter Conference, March 8, 2022. serve,” this is often either neglected or DIVCAV – division cavalry
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gL- doctrine is twisted into knots to explain DIVARTY – division artillery
Jj7_LyY. why this necessary element does not con- DS – direct support
5
MAJ Charles G Bies, “Too Light to Fight: stitute a “reserve.” For a fuller discussion, FM – field manual
the Infantry Brigade Combat Team Cavalry see MAJ Ragan Rutherford, “Uncertainty HHT – headquarters and
Troop In Combined Arms Maneuver,” AR- and the Reserve: Updating a Fundamental headquarters troop
MOR, Summer 2014. of Reconnaissance,” ARMOR, Fall 2021. HMMWV – high mobility
6
Cavalry Squadron Capability Review
14
It is worth noting for the DIVCAV that multipurpose wheeled vehicle;
White Paper. April 17, 2014. divisions will already have to solve logisti- colloquial: Humvee
cal and deployability issues associated MPF – Mobile Protected Firepower
7
SGT Christopher Broman, “Reforge the
with a heavy platform, since they will in- MRT – mounted reconnaissance
Broken Saber: Evolving the Infantry Bri-
clude an MPF battalion equipped with the troop
gade Combat Team’s Cavalry Squadron to
M10 Booker, which weighs 42 tons. Cory HQ – headquarters
Win the Recon Fight,” ARMOR, Summer
Dickstein, “Army unveils the M10 Booker, IBCT – infantry brigade combat
2020.
its first new combat vehicle in two de- team
8
“Desert Shield and Desert Storm Emerg- cades.” Stars and Stripes, 10 June 2023. ISV – Infantry Squad Vehicle
ing Observations.” The U.S. Army Armor https://www.stripes.com/branches/ IV – Intervisibility
Center. Oct. 7, 1991. army/2023-06-10/army-combat-vehi- JFE – Joint Forcible Entry
9
Reconnaissance doctrine explicitly rec- cle-m10-booker-10387122.html. JLTV – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
ognizes this. IBCT Cavalry Troops are de- 15
MG John Richardson, “Modernizing the LRAS3 – Long Range Advanced
scribed in Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Recon- Division,” Maneuver Center of Excellence Scout Surveillance System
naissance and Security Operations as Warfighter Conference, March 8, 2022. LSCO – large-scale combat
having “limited direct fire standoff, lethal- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_gL- operations
ity, and survivability.” FM 3-98 Paragraph Jj7_LyY. MCOE – Maneuver Center of
1-89, Reconnaissance and Security Oper- Excellence
16
Note that only “New Look” brigades
ations, January 2023. MRT – mounted reconnaissance
have a dedicated reconnaissance battal-
10
Robert S Cameron, Ph.D., To Fight or troop
ion per brigade; older structures include a
Not to Fight? Organizational and Doctri- MTOE – modified table of
reconnaissance battalion per division and
nal Trends in Mounted Maneuver Recon- organization and equipment
a reconnaissance company per regiment.
naissance from the Interwar Years to Op- OP – observation post
ATP 7-100.1 (Russian Tactics, February
eration IRAQI FREEDOM, Combat Studies SBCT – Stryker brigade combat team
2024). See also Lester Grau and Charles
Institute Press. 2009. See also Robert S UAS – unmanned aerial system
Bartles, The Russian Way of War, Foreign
Cameron, Ph.D., “To Fight or Not to Fight? Military Studies Office, 2016.
The Saga Continues,” ARMOR, Fall 2023. 17
ATP 7–100.3 Paragraph 6-7, Chinese
11
“Desert Shield and Desert Storm Tactics, August 2021.

From the ARMOR art archive: “The Raid”

From the ARMOR art archive: An M1IP

31 Fall 2024
 Applying Patrolling Principles to Large-Scale
Combat Operations at National Training Center
by CPT Frum and SFC Jared Stallone purpose from the company command- visually exposed to their area of oper-
er as a warning order or operation or- ations through a terrain model, their
All patrols are governed by five princi- der and begins the planning process.” situational awareness of the boundar-
ples: planning, reconnaissance, secu- (ATP 3-20.15, Tank Platoon [earlier ies associated with their movement
rity, control, and common sense (Train- version]). and maneuver would have increased,
ing Circular (TC) 3-21.76, Ranger Hand-
mitigating significant risk. Successful
book). While each principle in concept Successful units plan and rehearse us-
units plan and rehearse using a terrain
is basic, and each one is codified with- ing a quality terrain model. A terrain
model to maximize situational aware-
in existing Army publications, not model is a graphic depiction of the
ness to the lowest level.
enough Soldiers and leaders use them area of operations that displays the
in training for large-scale combat op- routes, key terrain, and critical graphic
erations (LSCO) at the National Train- control measures for the operation. Reconnaissance
ing Center (NTC). It is the perspective Both the Tank Platoon publication and “Your responsibility as a Ranger leader
of the authors that if our crews, the Ranger handbook list elements to is to confirm what you think you know,
squads, platoons and companies are to be included when building a terrain and to learn that which you do not al-
be successful in the future warfare for model. The terrain model should be ready know.” (Ranger Handbook).
which we are training, the five princi- large enough and detailed enough for Successful units conduct leader’s re-
ples of patrolling must be reinvigorat- the unit to rehearse (ATP 3-21.8) by ei- connaissance with whatever means
ed. ther physically walking or moving icons available. There are three types of re-
amidst the depicted terrain and graph- connaissance capabilities available to
Citations from both TC 3-21.76, and
ic control measures. Gathering materi- every armored brigade combat team
Army Techniques Publication (ATP)
als in a terrain model kit is paramount (ABCT) or Stryker brigade combat team
3-21.15, Tank Platoon, are useful for
to ensuring a large, clear, usable ter- (SBCT) company formation: organic
translating the observations of more
rain model can be built at all echelons, leaders, organic sensors, and adjacent
than 30 Stryker infantry, mechanized
including the company and platoon units.
infantry, and armored tank companies
levels. The quality of the terrain model
during their respective rotations at
positively correlates to the depth of The leader’s reconnaissance is a signif-
NTC into lessons learned. It is remark-
each Soldier’s understanding of the icantly underutilized method of infor-
able how principles derived from some
plan. mation gathering available to the
of the nation’s earliest Rangers facili- ground force. Platoons and companies
tate the understanding and application A tank company from Fort Bliss, TX have strayed away from conducting
of tactics and techniques found within provided maximum situational aware- ground reconnaissance organically due
Tank Platoon and ATP 3-21.8, Infantry ness to its individual tank commanders to the increase in technologically ad-
Platoon & Squad. In this article, each by using a detailed company terrain vanced sensors available. Oftentimes,
principle is accompanied by a tactic or model. As a result, a single tank crew units conduct missions without any
technique for practical application and was able to engage and destroy the confirmation of the assumptions they
a vignette observed during force-on- single enemy main battle tank that had have made in planning with respect to
force operations at the NTC. Units that halted an entire brigade’s worth of re- templated obstacles, enemy forces, or
plan, prepare, and execute using the connaissance elements from a well- objective composition. This makes le-
five principles of patrolling tend to suc- covered and concealed position, re- thality a much more significant chal-
ceed, and those that don’t tend to suf- storing momentum for its brigade. lenge.
fer defeat to varying extents.
Conversely, unit’s that do not rehearse The composition of the leader’s recon-
Planning using a terrain model suffer from a lack naissance element, reconnaissance
of detailed understanding of the plan
“Quickly make a simple plan and effec- party, or quartering party varies based
at the lowest level. While the company
tively communicate it to the lowest on the unit’s progress within the troop
commander or platoon leader may be
level. A great plan that takes forever to leading procedures and leaders avail-
able to visualize the order he or she re-
complete and is poorly disseminated able to conduct the reconnaissance. In
ceived, the tank commanders and dis-
isn’t a great plan. Plan and prepare to both the Infantry Platoon & Squad and
mounted squad leaders have no such
a realistic standard and rehearse ev- the Tank Platoon publication, all ech-
context with which to visualize. De-
erything.” (TC 3-21.76). elons of leaders are suitable to con-
spite receiving a clear task, purpose,
“Planning is the art and science of un- duct reconnaissance, if they are pro-
and end state, NTC observer/coach/
derstanding a situation, envisioning a vided with sufficient reconnaissance
trainers (O/C/Ts) observed a different
desired future, and laying out effective guidance and a timeline within which
infantry company advance beyond its
ways of bringing that future about to operate.
limit of advance and lose the entire
(Army Doctrine Reference Publication company’s worth of Bradley Fighting The Tank Platoon publication advises
(ADRP) 5-0, The Operations Process). Vehicles to two enemy anti-tank trucks. the use of leader’s reconnaissance at
A platoon leader receives a task and If vehicle commanders had been several points in the operation (Ch.3 &

32 Fall 2024
7, ATP 3-20.15), and the Infantry Pla- commander (Company A) took his tank the use of cover and concealment, par-
toon manual lists the objectives of the and a wing tank slowly through his pas- ticularly with respect to vehicle char-
reconnaissance (Ch. 6, ATP 3-21.8). sage route (the Goat Trail) and marked acteristics and terrain backdrop to ef-
Leaders should conduct reconnais- a handrail with chem lights for his pla- fectively hide. Crew members should
sance of routes to and from assembly toons that would traverse the route consider the color of their vehicle and
areas, start points and release points later that evening. The second, less its contrast to what is directly behind
along routes; difficult or disorienting prepared commander (Company B) them and below them, as seen from an
terrain; intervisibility lines, and last conducted solely a map reconnais- observer on and above the ground.
covered and concealed positions with- sance with his platoon leaders to iden- The prevalence of small unmanned
in the area of operations. When able, tify his passage route (Brown Pass). aerial systems has expanded enemy
leaders should mark positions, check observation capabilities from solely
points, or danger areas using predeter- Company A, facilitated by their marked ground-based sensors. Vehicle crews
mined marking techniques (consider- route, efficiently passed through the should use all available operations se-
ing daytime and limited visibility mark- complex terrain and into their attack curity measures to reduce their ability
ing solutions) to ensure efficient move- by fire positions on the far side in un-
to be seen by the enemy while occupy-
ment in to and out of pre-planned po- der 10 minutes and engaged the ene-
ing hide positions.
sitions. my before he could react. Conversely,
Company B received several cata- Recently, O/C/Ts observed a mounted
All ABCTs and SBCTs possess several or- strophic kills from enemy BRDMs Infantry company conduct operations
ganic sensors available to assist in re- (Boyevaya Razvedyvatelnaya Dozorna- solely during periods of darkness in a
connaissance, beginning with the com- ya Mashina [Russian scout vehicles]) “reverse-cycle” battle rhythm. Under
pany fire support element (FSE). BFISTs hidden in an unaccounted urban area concealment of darkness and terrain,
and FSVs are equipped with an FS3 or immediately upon traversing the pass. the Infantry company utilized multiple
LRAS capable of providing accurate This ultimately resulted in 80 percent dispersed, platoon-sized, hide sites to
MGRS locations at a range of over ten combat power loss enroute to pre- cache vehicles outside of enemy battle
kilometers. Company FSEs can also em- planned positions. positions prior to actions on the objec-
ploy various models of dismounted la- tive. The Company culminated all ac-
Successful units conduct reconnais- tions on the objective before morning
ser target locator modules effective at sance using organic leaders and sen-
comparable accuracy and range to nautical twilight, remounted their ve-
sors to preserve their combat power hicles, and occupied preplanned, pla-
their mounted systems. These tools out of contact for as long as possible,
make the company FSE the furthest toon-sized hide sites to conceal under
before concentrating on the decisive camouflage nets nestled into complex
ranging organic sensor in the Company point (7-66, ATP 3-20.15).
and should be deliberately employed terrain in wait for follow-on opera-
tions.
at all phases of the operation. Addi- Security
tionally, the commander’s indepen- Units that employ effective camouflage
“Preserve your force as a whole. Every
dent target viewer onboard the M1 and dispersion relevant to their oper-
Ranger and every rifle counts; anyone
Abrams and the remote weapon sys- ating environment tend to preserve
could be the difference between victo-
tem onboard the Stryker can observe their force longer during large scale
ry and defeat.” (7-3, TC 3-21.76).
out to six kilometers. The employment combat operations.
of any of these sensors in concealed Successful units achieve and maintain
observation posts or battle positions security throughout all types of opera- Control
can effectively answer information re- tions by effectively utilizing hide sites “Clarify the concept of the operation
quirements the commander needs to to conceal their combat power until and commander’s intent, coupled with
succeed, all while positioned safely the pre-determined trigger to apply it. disciplined communications, to bring
outside the enemy’s maximum engage- Hide sites, or hide positions, are natu- every man and weapon available to
ment line. rally covered and concealed positions overwhelm the enemy at the decisive
away from primary positions, intended point.” (7-4, TC 3-21.76).
Coordination with adjacent units is a to protect equipment from enemy con-
third reconnaissance capability avail- tact while allowing employment of Successful units plan and execute op-
able to the ABCT and SBCT platoon and small arms and sensors for observation erations using thorough but flexible
company. By utilizing unit icons on the (4-72, ATP 3-20.15). graphic control measures (GCMs).
Joint Battle Command Platform and a Granular detail in planning is how we
brigade communications card, any ele- Leaders plan for the use of hide sites maximize safety and lethality simulta-
ment can coordinate with an adjacent throughout all phases of the operation, neously. Units must maneuver all forc-
unit in their area of operations (AO) to including but not limited to assault po- es on the battlefield using GCMs from
better understand the environment. sitions in the offense or hide sites dur- the assembly area to hasty battle posi-
ing the defense. Intelligence prepara- tion (BP) at the limit of advance (LOA),
Recently, O/C/Ts observed two tank tion of the battlefield (IPB), specifical- and everything in between.
companies prepare to attack the Iron ly with respect to enemy maximum en-
Triangle from West to East, through the gagement lines and observation capa- Since unit staffs plan two levels down
Sawtooth / Pass Complex. Both com- bilities, is critical to proper hide site se- (FM 3-0, Operations), GCMs should ac-
manders conducted a leader’s recon- lection. count for that level of detail through-
naissance of their passage routes out all phases of the operation. That is,
through the complex terrain. The first The Tank Platoon publication discusses control measures should provide the

33 Fall 2024
requisite space to maneuver while Common Sense judgement allow future combat lead-
maximizing safe adjacent unit influ- ers to succeed in the complexity of
Use all available information and good
ence against that terrain and enemy. LSCO.
judgment to make sound, timely deci-
As time allows, GCMs can be published sions. (7-5, TC 3-21.76).
and disseminated in accordance with
Conclusion
Common sense is the only principle
discussed branch plans, sequels, and Maneuver Leaders must refocus crews,
of patrolling that must be effectively
other contingency plans. These GCMs squads, platoons and companies at the
taught and implemented prior to a ro-
can be published in a fragmentary or- point of contact on the basics of warf-
tation to the NTC as it takes significant
der later but should be as conclusive ighting during this time of transition
time and mentorship to develop. “Each
as possible. Higher headquarters and back to large scale combat operations.
leader-subordinate interaction is a de-
adjacent unit graphics are critical, as While planning and preparation efforts
velopment opportunity and insepara-
units could find themselves operating at the Battalion and above are exten-
ble from training, enforcing standards,
outside their intended AO and utilize sive, winning the first battle of the next
and setting a personal example.” (Field
them to quickly achieve situational war is wholly dependent on the Soldiers
Manual (FM) 6-22, Leader Develop-
awareness and coordinate for support. clearing, seizing, and holding the terrain
ment). The tenet of “supportive rela- deemed to be operationally and strate-
Effective GCM technique tionships and a culture of learning” are gically important. The five principles of
critical to “providing, accepting, and patrolling have existed through decades
One technique for effective GCMs O/C/ acting on candid assessment and feed- of all types of conflict and combat in
Ts have recently observed is a map- back for self-awareness” (FM 6-22). It is various environments. They establish
board overlay of terrain-based target through this support that leaders devel- the fundamental skills and abilities that
reference points (TRPs) covering the op the ability to make common sense our warfighters must be proficient in to
entirety of the NTC. This technique en- decisions. enable successful multi-domain opera-
abled flexibility by allowing the com-
Successful units have developed pre- tions in LSCO.
pany commander to quickly and accu-
rately orient movement, fires, and oth- pared leaders. A prepared leader is dis-
er actions to precise locations on the ciplined, confident, mentally agile, and CPT Trent D. Frum is a mechanized
ground by referencing the TRPs distrib- expresses good judgement — the ex- infantry observer/coach/trainer
uted to his entire element via this ample to follow. (O/C/T) (Scorpion), Operations Group,
overlay. National Training Center, Fort Irwin,
Prepared leaders CA. He has more than 15 rotations
When units do not employ effective coaching company commanders and
GCMs, they severely limit their ability From our observations, prepared lead-
ers are developed by focusing on the battalion staffs during their respective
to mass direct fires against the enemy. rotations to the Leader Training
OC/Ts all too frequently observe self- following competencies (Leadership
Requirements model in Army Doctrine Program and NTC from August 2022 to
inflicted confinement of movement June 2024. CPT Frum’s previous
and maneuver to roads and trails, of- Publication 6-22, Army Leadership and
the Profession). a s s i g n m e nt s i n c l u d e co m p a ny
ten maintaining a column formation commander of a Stryker infantry
into direct fire contact. By not employ- company and Headquarters and
ing flexible GCMs such as an axis of ad- 1. Physical Fitness (achieving goals
through disciplined adherence to Headquarters Company (HHC) with 4th
vance or direction of attack, the unit is Battalion, 23rd Infantry Regiment, 2nd
unable to safely engage the enemy due good fitness plans).
Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2 nd
to the masking of every vehicle weap- 2. Mental and Emotional Resilience Infantry Division (2-2 SBCT), Joint Base
on system in trail. This often results in (cultivating the ability to maintain Lewis-McChord, WA; operations officer
overwhelming losses to combat power focus while experiencing and (forward), company executive officer,
and a lack-luster live fire exercise due recovering from adversity, tactical or and assistant logistics officer at the
to surface danger zone and gun-target- otherwise). Regimental Special Troops Battalion,
line violations from the trail vehicles. 3. Communication (giving and receiving 75th Ranger Regiment, Fort Moore, GA;
Leaders who can trace their finger of feedback — message sent, rifle platoon leader, Heavy Weapons
along a GCM from the assault position received, and confirmed). Company executive officer, and
to the hasty BP past the LOA are con- 4. Farsightedness (ability to anticipate, battalion maintenance officer, 1 st
sistently able to maintain tempo, situ- plan, execute, and adapt. Leaders Battalion, 501 st Parachute Infantry
ational awareness, and safety as op- must be visionaries). Regiment, Joint Base Elmendorf-
posed to their counterparts who em- 5. Military Bearing (technical and Richardson, AK. His military schools
ploy incomplete GCMs. There is also a tactical competence of your craft that include Infantry Basic Officer Leader
positive correlation between mission inspires others to emulate your Course, U.S. Army Ranger School, Basic
success and the dissemination of competence). Airborne Course, Pathfinder Course,
planned GCMs to leaders at the Fire Regimental Assessment and Selection
Team and Crew Level. A well thought Prepared leaders who have been de- Course, Static Line Jumpmaster Course,
out plan that is not shared limits flex- veloped in these five attributes and and NTC Permanent Party O/C/T
ibility and tempo the unit could have competencies, will find themselves Academy. CPT Frum has a bachelor’s of
had if GCMs were disseminated further able to apply common sense in train- arts degree in sociology from California
down into the formation. ing for LSCO. Common sense and good State University, Fullerton and a

34 Fall 2024
master’s of arts degree in applied Recruiter Course, and NTC Observer
psychology from Liberty University. Controller Trainer Course. He has a
Acronym Quick-Scan
b a c h e l o r ’s o f a r t s d e g r e e i n ABCT – armored brigade combat
SFC Jared Stallone is the Chief management from American Military team
Instructor, 1 st Battalion, 81 st Armor University and an associate’s of arts ADRP – army doctrine reference
Regiment, 194th Armored Brigade, Fort degree in general studies from Central publication
Moore, GA. His previous assignments Texas College. AO – area of operation
ATP – Army techniques publication
include platoon sergeant, 2nd Battalion,
34thArmor Regiment, 2nd Brigade, Fort
References BP – battle position
ADRP 5-0, The Operations Process (May FM – field manual
Riley, KS; U.S. Army recruiter, Columbia FSE – fire support element
17, 2012)
Recruiting Battalion, Columbia, SC; and GCM – graphic control measures
ATP 3-20.15, Tank Platoon (July 3, 2019) LOA – limit of advance
O/C/T, 1 st Battalion, 395 th Engineer
Regiment, Fort Cavazos, TX. SFC ATP 3-21.8, Infantry Platoon and Squad LSCO – large-scale combat
(April 12, 2016) operations
Stallone’s military schools include
FM 3-0, Operations (Oct. 1, 2022) NTC – National Training Center
Master Leader Course, Maneuver O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
Senior Leaders Course, Advanced FM 6-22, Leader Development (June 30,
SBCT – Stryker brigade combat
Leader Course, Basic Leader Course, 2015)
team
Equal Opportunity Leaders Course, TC 3-21.76, Ranger Handbook (April 26, TC – training circular
Master Resilience Trainer Course, Army 2017) TRP – target reference point

35 Fall 2024
 BCT Armor Reserve: An Approach to
Large-Scale Combat Operations
by CPT Leo E. Li existing literature on reserve unit op- Very little of U.S. Army armor doc-
As the U.S. Army continues its transi- erations. The intent is to offer armor trine focuses on the reserve element
tion back to large-scale combat oper- companies serving as a BCT’s reserve itself. Additionally, recent U.S. Army
ations, it must also place emphasis on component a doctrinal starting point, Training and Doctrine Command and
reserve operations, which will be crit- from which units can develop or re- Center for Army Lessons Learned
ical in high-intensity, high-casualty vise their own standing operating (CALL) literature does not offer spe-
fights against near peer military procedures (SOPs) to match the mis- cific TTPs or SOPs for how the reserve
threats. In 2023, 3rd Armored Brigade sion sets the role requires. unit should operate in the wider con-
Combat Team (ABCT), 4th Infantry Di- text of BCT operations. This article
As recent conflicts such as the Russo- lays out just one possible approach to
vision (“Iron Brigade”) participated in Ukrainian War have shown, attrition
National Training Center (NTC) Deci- serving as a BCT’s armor company re-
remains widespread; initial attacks or serve; the recommendations of this
sive Action Rotation 24-02, in which operations by even well-armed, well-
Crazy Horse Company of 1st Battalion, article are based both on Crazy
trained units can reach culmination Horse’s SOPs and on after-action re-
8th Infantry Regiment (“Fighting Ea- and even defeat without exercising or
gles”) served as the BCT’s armor re- views conducted with the NTC Opera-
maneuvering reserve forces to sus- tion Group’s Tarantula Team observ-
serve during force-on-force (FoF) op- tain and support those operations.1
erations. er/coach/trainers.
Therefore, how the reserve trains,
The purpose of this article is to cap- fights, and wins decisively on the bat- This article will focus more on the mi-
ture tactics, techniques, and proce- tlefield must be given appropriate cro-elements and minutiae of operat-
dures (TTPs) used and considered by consideration when a BCT plans, re- ing the armor company as a reserve
Crazy Horse Company to supplement sources and executes its missions. – how to plan, maneuver, sustain

Figure 1: Like the conduct of Position Areas of Artillery (PAAs), an armor BCT reserve can have pre-planned areas where
sister and higher echelons know where they will stage and operate during a specific phase of the BCT operation. If the
unit takes contact, it can displace to any location within the pseudo-PAA, increasing survivability, providing deconflic-
tion, and maintaining predictability for higher echelons. As the BCT transitions between phases, it can move towards/
away from the close area or FLOT into another staging area to better posture for activation. If communicated before-
hand, this also provides higher echelons additional predictability across phases in case mobilizing the reserve is re-
quired. (U.S. Army graphic)

36 Fall 2024
itself, and coordinate with higher or company. The organic battalion, al- frequency or scope of its Class III (pe-
neighboring echelons – rather than though not possessing operational troleum, oil, and lubricants) and Class
on more macro-elements about how command or control of the armor V (ammunition) requirements.4 The
the reserve element should be em- company, remained administratively armor company should therefore be
ployed. Furthermore, while Crazy responsible for it. This responsibility placed with a battalion that has an
Horse Company served as a reserve by the battalion included sustainment extremely capable forward support
armor company in its organic ABCT, and logistical support. The operation- company (FSC) that can sustain both
the hope is that some of the TTPs al status of Crazy Horse flipped be- its organic fleet and a company of M1
presented in this article might also tween OPCOM and OPCON depend- Abrams.
apply and be useful to Stryker bri- ing on whether a need existed to fur-
Alternatively, a brigade support bat-
gade combat teams (SBCTs) that re- ther detach tank platoons from the
talion (BSB) may have the assets and
ceive armor company attachments, reserve element and who would
supplies to directly support an armor
and potentially infantry brigade com- make that decision. Usually, this deci-
company. However, that BSB must
bat teams (IBCTs) that receive M1 sion-making took the form of a con-
then be able to conduct resupply and
Abrams or M10 Booker companies in versation the battalion and BCT com-
other sustainment operations closer
support of their combat operations. mander and their staffs.
to the forward line of own troops,
Command and control Maintaining administrative, logistical, where the company may find itself
and sustainment responsibility with engaged. Ultimately, a predictable
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) the organic battalion proved a critical and well-established command and
3-90, Offense and Defense, defines a decision in the reserve company’s administrative structure with a singu-
reserve as “that portion of a body of readiness. This allowed the company lar battalion and brigade headquar-
troops that is withheld from action at to leverage existing, organic relation- ters, instead of a relationship that re-
the beginning of an engagement, to ships within the battalion – relation- quires potential coordination with
be available for a decisive move- ships that could be leaned on to re- several battalions and companies
ment.”2 Field Manual (FM) 3-96, Bri- solve friction and problems as they across time and space, ensured the
gade Combat Team, assumes that a arose. This also allowed the reserve stability required for effective plan-
BCT reserve is usually a company or company to take advantage of exist- ning and operations for the reserve
battalion-minus sized element, while ing logistical infrastructure (combat- armor company.
battalions serve as the key decisive trains command post (CTCP), unit
units for the brigade commander.3 maintenance collection point Communications
During its NTC rotation, Crazy Horse (UMCP), contingency command Based on the command and support
Company, its fire-support team (FST), post (CCPs), logistical resupply point relationships described above, Crazy
and its field maintenance team (FMT) (LRPs)) instead of having to build its Horse Company used the following
served as that reserve. own or rely on last-minute, provision- communication SOP when dealing
Using an organic company as the BCT al command and control (C2) rela- with higher echelons:
reserve, rather than a company team tionships heavily dependent on time • BCT Command and Operations/
or other task organization, allowed and space for both the reserve ele- Intelligence (O/I): The company
the commander to employ long-de- ment and the battalion ordered to commander was primarily
veloped relationships with subordi- provide resources. Predictability built responsible for monitoring these FM
nate leaders and their knowledge of into command and support relation- nets and Joint Battle Command-
their own assets, without the friction ships, for both the reserve unit and Platform (JBC-P) chat rooms, allowing
of developing new relationships, higher echelons, ensures smoother the reserve element to receive
company-specific SOPs, or other operations and reduces risk of either intelligence and operational updates
kinds of coordination that would be echelon being unprepared as opera- for the entirety of the rotation. When
necessary if the commander’s subor- tions continue to face stressful opera- expecting activation by the BCT
dinate units included those not usual- tions tempo (OPTEMPO) and increas- c o m m a n d e r, t h e c o m p a n y
ly their own. While Crazy Horse Com- ing friction. commander focused on the BCT
pany received additional attachments For SBCT and IBCTs, this course of ac- command channels. Otherwise, the
during the rotation, such as engineer tion is not immediately translatable. BCT S-3 or S-2 would provide updates
support during area defense opera- Any attached armor company may to the reserve company commander.
tions, these were usually short-term not have any organic or long-term re- • Battalion Command and O/I: the
relationships meant for specific mis- lationship with a battalion it can le- C ra z y H o rs e c o m m a n d t e a m
sion sets. verage. Therefore, the armor compa- monitored these nets for general
During the entirety of force-on-force ny’s administrative and logistical re- situational awareness but used these
operations, Crazy Horse was placed sponsibilities should be placed with a primarily to coordinate logistical and
either under operational command battalion with strong and adaptive s u sta i n m e nt o p e rat i o n s . T h e
(OPCOM) or operational control (OP- sustainment capabilities. Stryker and company executive officer (XO) and
CON) of the BCT headquarters. The light infantry leaders may not always first sergeant (1SG) were responsible
BCT command team and staff were comprehend or be able to manage for submitting logistics statistics
primarily responsible for planning, as- the significant differences in logistical (LOGSTATs) at least twice daily to the
signing, and coordinating missions, support an armor company needs, appropriate battalion-level
tasks, and operational plans for the particularly when it comes to stakeholders. As necessary, the

37 Fall 2024
 company XO also participated in any from a battalion or BCT S-6 section if until the last-minute to use C&E fol-
maintenance or logistical syncs with the unit is unable to increase its or- lowing 10-level operator preventive-
the FSC, maintenance control section ganic amount on hand. maintenance checks and services
(MCS), and the battalion staff. (PMCS) and troubleshooting is a reci-
Additionally, communications securi-
• Company command post (CP): the pe for failure. C&E shops will cease
ty (COMSEC) remains critical. To en-
company CP monitored both the operations early to pack for deploy-
sure minimum friction COMSEC and
battalion and brigade net, focusing ment and then take time to establish
equipment, M1 loaders were sent to
on the channel related to the most themselves forward. Problems are
a COMSEC custodian course prior to
critical operation at a given time. therefore best identified and resolved
the rotation and trained on loading, earlier rather than later.
The company also attempted to keep filling and dropping COMSEC. This al-
at least two working radios in each lowed most platoons to self-diagnose Planning Priorities
tank. Currently, an armor company and troubleshoot a majority of COM-
SEC issues and maintain a Simple Key Because of its OPCOM/OPCON rela-
modified table of organization and
Loader (SKL) at the platoon level. This tionship with the BCT headquarters,
equipment (MTOE) includes six radios
alleviated much of the demand for the armor reserve force should re-
per platoon. One issue that arose was
the company communications repre- ceive its planning guidance from the
following attrition by the enemy.
sentative and outside assistance from brigade level. Reliance on the battal-
Wing tanks struggled to simultane-
a battalion or BCT S-6 section, allow- ion to provide BCT-level graphics and
ously monitor a higher echelon net;
ing the reserve armor force to oper- overlays, commander’s intent, and
without one radio required hopping
ate as independently as possible on potential objectives can both divert
off its platoon net. Even if the section
this front without major restraints the battalion staff’s attention away
was simply degraded or separated
and requirements from higher eche- from their own objectives and plan-
from the platoon or company, having
lons. ning priorities, while potentially limit-
multiple systems in every tank would ing the reserve commander’s situa-
have alleviated coordination issues Maintenance continues to be vital to tional awareness and understanding
that arose as the company spread out effective communications. Home sta- by receiving information only perti-
and was eventually degraded across tion units should constantly be using nent to the battalion’s piece of the
space and sometimes multiple terrain their BCT’s communications & elec- area of operation (AO).
features. A potential quick fix to this tronics (C&E) shops to fix their FM ra-
issue is to borrow additional radios dios and JBC-P equipment. Waiting During NTC Rotation 24-02, Crazy

Figure 2: The field maintenance section (FMT) should be able to support up to three distinct units or nodes forward,
while maintaining lines of communication or support with the UMCP. The FMT should therefore be positioned to mini-
mize likelihood of contact, receive adequate protection, and still be postured to support forward assets or recover as-
sets back to the MCP or UMCP. (U.S. Army graphic)

38 Fall 2024
Horse attended BCT OPORD briefs than any specific plan of action by should “jump” the priority of fires for
and rehearsals. The company com- the company itself. While the compa- a short period of time, superseding
mander and 1SG could learn the en- ny commander could predict where perhaps all but the company or bat-
tire BCT’s AO and operational intent, activation was most likely due to the talion conducting the decisive opera-
since the reserve force could be acti- levels of risk and priorities at the BCT tion of the BCT. For Crazy Horse Com-
vated to support any number of pos- level, focusing on a singular objective pany, not having this priority of fires,
sible contingencies. Consequently, would make it ill-prepared to conduct even when deployed to prevent ene-
this made attendance at battalion- an alternative operation. my armored envelopments or supple-
level rehearsals repetitive from an menting an area defense at risk of en-
operational standpoint. However, at- To adapt, all tank commanders and emy breakthrough, allowed numer-
tendance at battalion-level OPORDs above attended the company OPORD, ous targets of opportunity, including
was still useful to monitor and advise allowing more time for platoons to enemy breaching elements to move
on sustainment operations, since the concentrate on back-briefs and re- and maneuver freely when operating
company was still reliant on the bat- hearsals. Compacting parts of the just outside the M1’s main gun range.
talion for sustainment and mainte- company’s troop-leading procedures
nance operations. Therefore, when- freed more time for company and Conversely, the reserve force must re-
ever possible, the company com- platoon rehearsals of multiple contin- act quickly and decisively to enemy
mander focused on BCT OPORD briefs gencies over one specific course of indirect fires, whether that involves
and rehearsals, often attending action. Tactically agile and adaptive artillery or drones and loitering muni-
alongside battalion commanders, platoon leaders and sergeants are es- tions. While opposing forces will use
while the XO and 1SG attended bat- sential – those who understand com- these assets to target command
talion briefs and rehearsals, when pany SOPs and battle drills deftly posts, logistical nodes, and other
possible, to maintain an updated lo- enough to be able to apply them to high-signature and key targets, armor
gistical picture for the company. constantly changing circumstances. companies were also subject to at-
tacks, especially when supporting op-
Due to the number of contingencies Fires and Survivability erations at decisive points on the bat-
for which a reserve company could be tlefield. While not in combat, armor
activated to support its BCT’s opera- The FST attached to the reserve force reserves would do well to have pre-
tions, company and platoon-level should establish, prior to combat op- planned displacement locations, like
troop leading procedures and plan- erations, a special priority of fires due how artillery units use Position Areas
ning adapted accordingly. At the com- to the nature of the operations it is for Artillery. This would reduce last-
pany level, OPORDs focused heavily attempting to support. The reserve’s minute identification of new displace-
on paragraphs one and two over FST can and should not be treated as ment locations, while still providing
paragraph three’s scheme of maneu- another line company’s fires targets. both the unit and higher echelons
ver. Because the company could be If activated, the BCT commander is some predictability of where the re-
activated to support any battalion ob- deliberately devoting additional fire- serve is staged at a given point in an
jective, or even a new objective cre- power to a specific operation, either operation.
ated by circumstance, situational to avoid failure or to exploit a deci-
sive point on the battlefield. When Armor companies will also do well to
awareness of the entirety of the AO
activated, the reserve company’s FST conduct anti-unmanned aerial vehicle
and its operations was more critical
(UAV) training at home station and
attempt to acquire drone buster as-
sets whenever possible, especially
when conducting operations like a
defense where contact with UAVs
could force the unit to displace from
tactically advantageous or key posi-
tions. Camouflage of vehicles and CPs
can also minimize risk of detection or
reduce the information obtained by
the enemy. For instance, camo net-
ting covering a tank’s identifiers can
prevent enemy forces from determin-
ing whether it belongs to the com-
mander or another key leader.
Sustainment
While an armor company is OPCOM/
OPCON to an ABCT headquarters, the
reserve armor company should rely
Figure 3: M1A2 crew from 3rd PLT, Company C, 1-8 Infantry moves to a sec- on its organic battalion for sustain-
ondary CP location during force-on-force operations as part of NTC Decisive ment and support. This leverages
Action Rotation 24-02. (U.S. Army photo by Operations Group/Fort Irwin Public long-term relationships; the battal-
Affairs Office) ion’s FSC is likely practiced in

39 Fall 2024
accounting for its logistical require- The most critical sustainment to con- operations, the emergency fueler was
ments. For armor companies aug- sider for the armor reserve force was released to the reserve force so it
menting SBCTs and IBCTs, it is critical Class III. An idle M1A2SEPv2 Abrams could mobilize and operate quickly
that the company is supported by a tank consumes 3,600 gallons of fuel against targets of opportunity that
strong battalion staff and agile FSC per day.5 To maintain a steady OP- were at least 12 kilometers forward
that understands and can support the TEMPO and readiness status as the without waiting for the twice-daily
relatively immense sustainment re- reserve, the unit required refuel mul- resupply prior to movement.
quirements that a company of M1A2s tiple times in a 24-hour period.
requires to remain in the fight. Whether or not multiple LRPs are Class III(P) should also be precisely
conducted for Class III(B) or whether monitored by platoons and the XO, so
Crazy Horse therefore relied on the fuelers remain attached is a tactical that needs are anticipated long-term
Fighting Eagles for its sustainment in- decision; both options sustain the in LOGSTATs to higher echelons. SOPs
frastructure. LRPs, for instance, were company, but one leaves a fueler as- should require that M1 crews enter
either co-located with the CTCP or set forward longer and increases risk combat operations with at least three
placed at a pre-determined location of becoming a target for the opposing days of supply (3DOS) of Class III.
communicated to the 1SG for con- force, but with the benefit of being LOGSTATs should anticipate require-
ducting resupply operations. LOGSTAT ments out to 72 hours of operations.6
able to conduct refuel at any time.
requirements were sent twice a day Loads and resupplies should interpret
by the XO to the battalion S-4, FSC As part of the battalion SOP, an emer- “3DOS” based on the unique require-
command team, battalion mainte- gency fueler was held at the CTCP. ments of the tanks. For instance, one
nance officer, and battalion XO. The purpose of this fueler was for the of Crazy Horse’s tracks had a long-
battalion commander to authorize term issue which consumed turbo-
The exact times of these LOGSTATs and conduct an emergency resupply shaft at higher-than-normal rates. As
and LRPs depended on battalion and at any time for any line company to a result, that tank and the platoon
the FSC: their ability to process re- exploit new developments or conduct carried more turboshaft compared to
quests and move assets to and back extended operations that required the rest of the company to meet the
from the LRPs on time to support the another 12 hours of combat effective- 3DOS standard. Crazy Horse found
next resupply. ness. Twice during force-on-force that 3DOS allowed the vehicles to

Figure 5: Elements from 2nd PLT, Company C, 1-8 Infantry and fire support assets prepare to displace to their next stag-
ing area. (U.S. Army photo by SGT James Drettwan, Company C, 1st Battalion, 8th Infantry Regiment)

40 Fall 2024
conduct operations and maintenance difficult. Similarly, Class IX overaged, maintenance issue requires an 02
for consistently more than three repairable-Item lists (ORILs) are code priority designator deadline on
days. For instance, not all vehicles re- stockpiles meant to sustain the com- the ESR, the unit should do so as
quired grease at the same rates, pany without additional support from soon as possible, having the XO com-
based on each tank’s specific track higher echelons for at least 72 hours. municate immediately to the battal-
tension and health. Infrequent but This stockpile is critical during the ion MCS. It’s important to ensure the
more complex maintenance, like first few days of combat operations, FMT is equipped with all necessary
draining engines, could generally be when the Supply Support Activity equipment to conduct major mainte-
accomplished with the petroleum, oil (SSA) may still need time to establish nance operations, including protec-
and lubricants (POL) on hand, al- and resume operations. Furthermore, tive coverings and tarps to conduct
though the unit found early on that the SSA’s location jumps require a engine pulls in the field if necessary.
risk to mission caused by limited pause in processing Class II/IX re- The XO should also enter the field
Class III could be further mitigated if quests and distributing them to lower with three to five spare sets of 2404s
the FMT carried its own reserve sup- echelons. Therefore, maintenance or 5988s. While these documents
ply of POL, with exact quantities of teams should work to restock Class IX may be blank or old, having them on
specific Class III(B) based on long- ORILs prior to deployment. Addition- hand allows crews and mechanics to
term trends and needs of the fleet. ally, the company should work with conduct PMCS and compile faults
its battalion MCS section to adjust easily. If conducting PMCS and fault
Maintenance, ESR, and the company’s command-directed verification every 72 hours, three to
parts flow lines to add additional, specific Class five sets of 2404s allow for 9 to 15
IX equipment to its ORILs that the days of coverage, allowing the com-
A robust maintenance program and maintenance team predicts may be pany to conduct documentation of its
system is the key to success for an ar- necessary based on the personality PMCS for nearly two weeks if printer,
mor company to conduct and main- and long-term trends of the fleet. UMCP, or SSA capabilities are limited
tain combat operations over the long- or degraded during operations.
term. Failure to anticipate, prevent, Once deployed forward, a BCT armor
and resolve maintenance issues effi- reserve may have to effectively oper- FMT should verify faults and submit
ciently increases reliance on other ate independently from higher head- the form 5988s to the UMCP at the
echelons and outside systems, reduc- quarters or other maintenance as- end of the 72 hours. Critical parts re-
ing a reserve force’s readiness and sets. Especially when attached to an quired for continued operations
ability to operate independently. SBCT or IBCT, other maintenance ex- should be added to LOGSTATs and
pertise on M1s and their associated sent to the UMCP immediately after
All maintenance assets are mission equipment outside the company it- verification. This double tapping gen-
essential. Therefore, FMTs should at- self may prove extremely limited. erally ensured battalion MCS was
tempt to man and bring all its equip- Therefore, the armor reserve force tracking parts requirements, so long
ment forward, staging it either at a must be able to operate as indepen- as the MCS ensured these requests
company maintenance control point dently as possible. For Crazy Horse, were not duplicated because they
(MCP) or at the battalion UMCP. For the command team positioned the came from separate channels. XOs
Crazy Horse’s FMT assets, all vehicles FMT to support as many as three dis- and platoon leaders would also do
and trailers, AC boxes, and the For- tinct nodes of M1 tanks. Military op- well to bring quick-reference guides
ward Repair System were brought erational specialty (MOS) 91A tank that list National Stock Numbers
forward in the company trains, while mechanics assigned to the battalion (NSNs) for high-risk and high-demand
the company BOH container was left service & recovery (S&R) section of parts. For parts like these, being able
with the UMCP. No maintenance as- the FSC remained at the UMCP to to immediately identify the NSN with-
sets were left in the rear. augment battalion maintenance and out needing to conduct research by
Successful maintenance begins long recovery efforts, while always keep- clerks further truncated the time re-
before the start of combat opera- ing a minimum tank mechanic pres- quired to process these parts.
tions. First, service schedules for the ence at the UMCP. Vehicles that could
unit’s equipment must be prioritized be fixed on the spot had parts and Maintain relationships
and protected. Well-planned and exe- mechanics brought forward. Other- Even when trying to operate indepen-
cuted services, prior to training and wise, the tank would be recovered to dently, maintaining relationships
operations, are undoubtedly the most the MCP or UMCP for additional trou- across the BCT are critical, especially
important means of maintaining or bleshooting. The MCP was either co- when operating in an ABCT. Team
improving the readiness of the fleet. located with the company train or left chiefs and XOs can work with coun-
Second, strong maintenance and with an FMC tank to provide protec- terparts in other companies to obtain
command teams should anticipate tion. When displacing, the CP and parts and increase the BCT’s overall
demands and build up load plans and MCP can separate to maintain as low readiness if the opportunity exists.
bench stocks months in advance. For of an electronic signature as possible. Coordinated efforts at the lowest lev-
instance, Class II supplies such as bat- When conducting maintenance oper- el are low-risk opportunities that can
teries (AAA, FM radios, etc.) can be ations, an up-to-date and accurate increase the health of fleets, espe-
ordered and stockpiled before; at- equipment-status report (ESR) re- cially if the SSA is indisposed or re-
tempting to acquire these during op- mains critical to the unit’s ability to quires long lead-times for specific
erations becomes immensely more maintain or return to the fight. If a Class IX parts that are on hand else-

41 Fall 2024
where. especially mechanized assets, are ef-
fectively implemented in operational Acronym Quick-Scan
Finally, a strong culture of operator planning to ensure success.
ownership of their vehicles is critical 1SG – first sergeant
to a unit’s maintenance success and CPT Leo E. Li is the aide-de-camp to 3DOS – three days of supply
can be a force multiplier when at- the Deputy Commanding General- ABCT – armored brigade combat
tempting to operate independently Support, 4th Infantry Division, Fort team
for as long as possible. Issues like Carson, CO. His previous assignments AO – area of operation
track tension and POL issues can be include executive officer, BCT – brigade combat team
identified and fixed during PMCS and Headquarters and Headquarters BSB – brigade support battalion
following every major movement. Company (HHC), 1st Battalion, 8th C&E – communications &
Swapping roadwheels, checking flu- Infantry Regiment (1-8 Infantry), 3rd electronics
ids, can all be conducted at the crew ABCT, 4th Infantry Division; executive COMSEC – communications
level often and should be done in an- officer, Company C, 1-8 Infantry, 3rd security
ticipation of faults, not after. Com- ABCT; tank platoon leader, Company CP – command post
mand teams should enable this by C, 1-8 Infantry, 3rd ABCT; liaison to the CTCP – combat-trains command
encouraging ownership but also pro- 21st Panzer Brigade, HHC, 1-8 post
viding time and space between oper- Infantry, 3rd ABCT; and assistant S-3, ESR – equipment-status report
ations to conduct these activities ef- HHC, 1-8 Infantry, 3rd ABCT. 1LT Li’s FoF – force-on-force
fectively. military schools include Tank FM – field manual
Commanders Course, Bradley FMT – field maintenance team
Conclusion Commanders Course, Dismounted FSC – forward support company
Counter-Improvised Explosive Device FST – fire-support team
Crazy Horse Company’s operations as Course, Scout Leaders Course, and
the BCT reserve proved critical at key IBCT – infantry brigade combat
Armor Basic Officer Leaders Course. team
junctures in the Iron Brigade’s opera- He has a bachelor’s of arts degree
tions against Blackhorse during FoF JBC-P – Joint Battle Command-
from Princeton University with a Platform
operations. While much credit can go major in history and a minor in
to the decision-making processes by LOGSTAT – logistics statistics
international relations. 1LT Li LRP – logistical resupply point
senior leaders on when, where, and participated in One Rotation:
how to utilize the company in sup- MCP – maintenance control point
Operation European Assure, Deter, MCS – maintenance control
port of ongoing missions, reserve and Reinforce (March – December
units can only accomplish these mis- section
2022). NSN – National Stock Number
sions if working SOPs and TTPs are
put in place before and during opera- NTC – National Training Center
tions that enable readiness and suc-
Notes OPCOM – operational command
cess. Commanders and their teams
1
Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Modern Positional OPCON – operational control
ultimately have little say in how they Warfare and How to Win It (2023). OPORD – operations order
are employed by higher echelons. OPTEMPO – operations tempo
2
Department of the Army, ADP 3-90, Of-
Their focus instead should emphasize ORIL – overaged, repairable-
fense and Defense, (Washington, D.C.); Item list
ensuring a lethal and ready force, 2019, 2-15, https://armypubs.army.mil/
prepared to mobilize and execute for PMCS – preventive-maintenance
epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN34828-ADP_3- checks and services
any potential contingency. 90-000-WEB-1.pdf. POL – petroleum, oil and
A single but fully functional armor 3
Department of the Army, FM 3-96, Bri- lubricants
company possesses extraordinary ca- gade Combat Team (Washington, D.C.), SOP – standing operating
pabilities that it can deploy on behalf 2021, 4-21, https://armypubs.army.mil/ procedure
of higher echelons. The effects it epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN31505-FM_3- SSA – Supply Support Activity
brings to the battlefield in terms of 96-000-WEB-1.pdf. SBCT – Stryker brigade combat
lethality are still unmatched. Aversion team
4
Department of the Army, “Tank Compa-
towards aggressively and proficiently TTP – tactics, techniques, and
employing such a force in combat nies: Considerations and References for procedures
risks self-inducing stalemate and even Task Organization, 22-735,” Center for UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle
defeat when courses of action are Army Lessons Learned (CALL), (Fort Leav- UMCP – unit maintenance
still potentially available. BCTs would enworth, KS); 2022. collection point
do well to ensure reserve elements, 5
CALL, 2. XO – executive officer

42 Fall 2024
Strike Swiftly: Developing Sustainable Maintenance
Strategy in Combined Arms Battalion
by LTC Mike Kim, MAJ Nate Bennett, detailed vision that prioritizes and coordinates and synchronizes warfight-
CW3 Jason Amsdell and 1LT Collette manages both training and mainte- ing functions to mass two companies
Benavidez nance lines of effort, while clearly ar- at the decisive point.
The mission of the combined arms bat- ticulating areas where risk can be as-
It is a singular statement that guides all
talion (CAB) is to close with and de- sumed.
battalion efforts. The commander is re-
stroy enemy forces using fire, maneu- There are many ways to approach this sponsible to define this guidance
ver, and shock effect or to repel their problem set. The purpose of this paper based on a clear and defined con-
assault by fire and counterattack (Army is to convey a way to define the CAB struct. The CAB construct can be bro-
Techniques Publication 3-90.5, Com- fight, develop a framework to guide ken down as dipicted in Figure 1 below.
bined Arms Battalion). Although this the maintenance enterprise, and pro-
is the singular mission of the CAB, the For each of these elements, the lethal-
vide recommendations to equip battal-
demands and requirements put on the ity capability requirements can be
ions in executing their mission set.
organization are great, and personnel summarized as dipicted in Table 1.
challenges [both military occupational Defining CAB fight Having listed all the required lethality
specialty (MOS) and experience short- It is commonly said that maintenance capabilities, it is important to clearly
ages] exacerbate the ability to effec- builds lethality. In a constrained envi- describe the equipment/platform
tively meet mission. While the Region- ronment, it is more apropos to state needed to meet each capability. This
ally Aligned Readiness and Moderniza- that lethality requirements drive main- category, which is called the Fight cat-
tion Model (ReARMM) provides a tenance. It is the responsibility of the egory, is the baseline of equipment /
framework with clear delineation be- Battalion Commander to clearly define platforms needed to deliver the re-
tween train, modernization, and mis- what lethality means to the formation. quirement. Although based on the
sion windows, in practice, there is The following utilizes an approach modified tables and organization
overlap where mission sets bleed into used by the 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor equipment, the number requirements
each other creating great demand on Regiment, 2nd Armored Brigade Com- are based on a realistic evaluation of
battalion formations. bat Team (ABCT), 1st Infantry Division. the fleet. Leaders who expect every
Given this environment, it is para- The overachieving goal of the 2-70 Ar- piece of equipment and platform to be
mount that leaders provide a clear and mor is the following: Thunder Battalion fully mission capable are detached

Figure 1. Identification of CAB elements and command nodes. (U.S. Army)

43 Fall 2024
from reality or are being lied to. Using
the Scout PLT as an example, the base-
line list of equipment / platforms need-
ed to deliver the capability is depicted
in Table 2. The full list is depicted in Ta-
ble 3. The overall vision is encom-
passed in the following compilation of
the figures depicted in Figure 2. This
single framework (Figure 2. The Thun-
der Fight) focuses the battalion on
both training and maintenance lines of
effort.

Where formations fit

Each formation at echelon has a clear
idea of how it fits into the overall fight
and the equipment/platforms required
to deliver their capabilities. The next
logical step is to take the fight equip-
ment/platform requirements and com-
pare them to the current mission ca-
pable status of those items.
The O/H column is based off the mod-
ified table of organization and equip-
ment list, the Fight column is the re-
quirement defined by the battalion
commander, and the company column
is the current slant of the item. If the
company fully mission capable (FMC)
equals or is greater than the Fight col-
umn, the status box remains blank. If
the company FMC is less than the Fight
column, the status box turns red. The
final column Manned encompasses
personnel readiness. It is a seemingly
innocuous column but one that con- Table 1. List of capability requirements. (U.S. Army)
veys significant information. If the plat-
form is manned (denoted by Y), it
means that the crew is deployable,
qualified and meets all rank require-
ments (particularly if an NCO vehicle
commander is required). If a platform
is not manned due to personnel short-
ages, the team can assume risk and not
devote maintenance energy to that
platform or request support from high-
er.

Provide clear snapshot

Once done throughout each element Table 2. Scout capability and equipment/platform requirements. (U.S. Army)
and command node, the gaps in readi-
ness (maintenance + personnel) be- enterprise against a prioritized list. The maintenance lines of effort based on
come readily clear. This provides the battalion maintenance officer then co- required lethality capabilities. It is a
battalion a clear snapshot of where ordinates with the S-3 Operations Shop holistic strategy to streamline efforts,
their maintenance and personnel read- and puts the maintenance strategy provide clear guidance and prioritiza-
iness gaps exist based on lethality re- (unscheduled maintenance, services tion, and identify areas where the bat-
quirements. Leadership can then de- and leadership professional develop- talion can assume risk. The overall as-
velop a maintenance strategy over ment) on the training calendar. This is sessment maintenance and personnel
time, applying the maintenance a way to synchronize training and readiness status is captured in Table 5.

44 Fall 2024
Table 3. Consolidated list of capability and equipment/platform requirements. (U.S. Army)

Table 4. Tank company maintenance

and personnel readiness status. (U.S.
Army)

45 Fall 2024
Based on this assessment, the battal- execution. Below are several DOTMLPF flexibility in garrison/field environ-
ion can clearly identify priorities and recommendations that would support ments to build equipment readiness.
friction points, and the commander and streamline maintenance opera-
Recommendation #2 (Education):
can provide Training Week (TW)+8 tions.
Training Deficiencies for MOS 91F
guidance. Furthermore, this dashboard
(M242 25mm) and MOS 91A (M1
(comprised of Figure 2 and Table 5) Recommendation #1 (Organization/
Abrams Schematics).
provides a tangible output (status up- Personnel): Radio Equipment Repair-
date) for CAB meetings. The battalion ers (MOS 94E) and Computer/Detec- Small Arms Repairers (MOS 91F) and
training meeting must entail the devel- tion Systems Repairers (MOS 94F) Or- Tank Mechanics (MOS 91A) do not re-
opment of capabilities required by the ganic to the CAB. ceive sufficient training through Army
CAB to accomplish its mission while schools to prepare them for opera-
maintenance and personnel readiness Due to the sheer amount and complex- tions. The 91F is responsible for servic-
(non-deployable scrubs, etc.) meetings ity of communication systems and ing the M242 25mm Bushmaster. They
must feed Table 5. Commanders are re- equipment, it would benefit the CAB to do not receive adequate training dur-
sponsible, with input from their first have one NCO and two 10-level Sol- ing advanced individual training (AIT)
sergeants and executive officers (XOs), diers organic to the CAB for internal to properly service and repair the
to update the battalion commander on communication and electronics (C&E) weapon system. While master gunners
the dashboard. While this is a way to and electronic maintenance (ELM) re- are present to assist in repairs and ser-
organize and assess capabilities and pairs. Currently, all night vision devices vices, they are only capable of execut-
personnel, there are several doctrine, and communication devices are evacu- ing 10/20 level tasks and repairs. The
organization, training, materiel, lead- ated to the brigade support battalion 91F is responsible for 30 level tasks,
ership and education, personnel, and for repair/service. but they are not provided the educa-
facilities (DOTMLPF) efforts that can tion needed to complete these repairs.
Centralized repair naturally creates a
better equip the CAB in building readi- The Army must increase training time
backlog, which prioritizes units execut-
ness. during AIT for 91F Soldiers, so they are
ing training for repairs. This inhibits
units preparing for training to conduct equipped to execute repairs once they
Recommendations to proper repairs and services prior to ex- get to their unit. An alternate solution
support CAB maintenance ecution. Having organic C&E and ELM is to make the repair/services of the
capabilities will decrease overall turn- M242 a critical task for Bradley me-
Even with clear guidance and a de-
around time, create shop stock for chanics (MOS 91M).
tailed maintenance strategy, CABs will
continually face challenges in common repairs, and provide 91A Soldiers must receive tank

Figure 1. Thunder Battalion coordinates and synchronizes warfighting functions to mass two companies at the decisive
point. (U.S. Army)

46 Fall 2024
Table 5. Consolidated list of maintenance and personnel readiness status by element and command node. (U.S. Army)

47 Fall 2024
schematic training during AIT. This is Points. Soldiers conduct preventative ERPS clerk into GCSS-Army) and the
increasingly significant as the CAB maintenance checks and services second is the manual search of parts
fights through personnel challenges (PMCS) and manually annotate faults by National Item Identification Number
and many mechanics fulfill positions of on a Form 5988. Mechanics, with a se- (NIIN). To alleviate these frictions
greater responsibility than their rank. nior mechanic and team chief, then points, the following recommenda-
In a CAB, junior 91As frequently are verify the faults and either dismiss tions are presented.
faced with tank schematic faults. There (wrong annotation), repair, or request
parts to be ordered. Once this process Recommendation #3 (Material): Digi-
is a knowledge deficiency in tank sche- tal 5988: The amount of error that ex-
matics for junior 91A Soldiers. These is complete, the equipment records
parts specialist (ERPS) clerk manually ists in the current manual process can
tank mechanics do not receive training be reduced through a digitized system.
inputs this information into Global
on tank schematics until the Advanced Additionally, the workload for clerks to
Combat Support System – Army (GCSS-
Leader Course. Tank mechanics, like manually input 5988 information into
Army). There are two points of friction
their Bradley mechanic counterparts, in this process. The first is the transi- GCSS-Army can also be reduced. A
should receive training on schematics tion from a manual process (Form software application with a simple user
during AIT. 5988) to a digital process (manual in- interface that can be accessed by all
The Maintenance Process and Friction put of the 5988 information by the users is advantageous. Table 6 below

Table 6. Use Case and Functional Requirements for Digital 5988 Software. (U.S. Army)

48 Fall 2024
annotates the use case and functional that the CAB commander provides a the General Staff, 1st Infantry Division,
requirement for this software applica- clear and detailed fighting strategy to Fort Riley, KS. His previous assignments
tion. coordinate and synchronize training include battalion XO, 2-70 Armor, 2nd
and maintenance lines of efforts. By ABCT, 1 st Infantry Division; battalion
Recommendation #4 (Material): Arti- defining lethality at echelon, a CAB can operations officer, 2-70 Armor, 2 nd
ficial Intelligence Chatbot for NIIN prioritize maintenance requirements ABCT; team leader in 2nd Battalion, 3rd
Search and develop a coherent strategy over Security Force Assistance Brigade
The current process to find correct NI- time and space. The operational tem- (SFAB); commander, Headquarters and
INs for parts is inefficient and desyn- po for armored brigade combat teams Headquarters Company (HHC), 2nd Bat-
has been significant and does not look talion, 87th Infantry Regiment, 2nd Bri-
chronized. Currently, users have three
to slow down. It is important that CAB
disparate and delinked locations to gade Combat Team (BCT), 10th Moun-
leadership find efficiencies in the Re-
look for NIINs: Electronic Management tain Division; and commander, Compa-
ARMM framework to increase warf-
System-Next Generation; technical ighting capabilities throughout the for- ny B, 2-87 Infantry, 2nd BCT, 10th MTN
manuals through the Army Enterprise mation. DIV. MAJ Bennett’s military schools in-
System Integration Program; and Inter- clude Ranger Course; Pathfinder
active Authoring and Display Software. LTC Mike Kim is the battalion com- School; Air Assault School; Airborne
Additionally, there are numerous NIINs mander, 2nd Battalion, 70thArmor Regi- Course; Survival, Evasion, Resistance,
for similar parts or like items which in- ment, 2 nd Armored Brigade Combat and Escape Level C (SERE-C), U.S. Army
duces error. Team (ABCT), 1st Infantry Division, Fort SERE School; and the Infantry Mortar
Riley, KS. His previous assignments in- Leader Course. He has a bachelor’s of
It is not uncommon for a unit to re-
clude Command and General Staff Col- science degree in defense and strategic
ceive a part only to find that it is the
lege (CGSC) Fellow, Office of Manage- studies from the U.S. Military Academy,
wrong item. An artificial intelligence
ment and Budget, White House, Wash- West Point, NY; and a master’s degree
(AI) Chatbot that an enterprise user
ington D.C.; Director, Joint Pacific Mul- in operational studies from the U.S.
can interact with to search through all
tinational Readiness Center, Fort Army Command and General Staff Col-
three systems simultaneously would
Shafter, HI; Brigade S-3, 196th Infantry lege.
save inordinate amounts of time and
reduce human error. The advent of AI Brigade, U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC),
CW3 Jason T. Amsdell is the battalion
software that can assist in the creation Fort Shafter, HI; squadron executive of-
maintenance technician, 2nd Battalion,
of datasets, train AI, and automate ficer, and 8th Squadron, 1st Cavalry Reg-
70th Armor Regiment, Fort Riley, KS. His
workflows, makes this a reasonable en- iment, 2 nd Stryker Brigade Combat
previous assignments include battalion
deavor. Companies like Palm AI Team, 2nd Infantry Division, Joint Base
maintenance technician, 2 nd Infantry
through their Endobyte Software as a Lewis-McChord (JBLM), WA. LTC Kim’s
Brigade Combat Team, 11 th Airborne
Service allows users to customize da- military schools include Officer Basic
Division, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richard-
tasets, execute AI training and imple- Course, Fort Knox, KY; Maneuver Cap-
son, AK; battalion maintenance techni-
ment AI Chatbots. Below is the use tain’s Career Course (MCCC), Fort Knox;
cian 1st Battalion, 325th Airborne In-
case and functional requirements for and CGSC, Fort Leavenworth, KS. He
fantry Regiment, 82 nd Airborne Divi-
this software. has a bachelor’s of science degree in
sion, Fort Liberty, NC; and maintenance
comparative politics from the U.S. Mil-
management NCO, 7th Special Forces
Conclusion itary Academy at West Point, NY; a
Group Airborne, Eglin Air Force Base
master’s of science degree military art
Combined arms battalions are faced (AFB), FL. CW3 Amsdell’s military
and science from CGSC; and a master’s
with challenges as the Army modern- schools include Jumpmaster Course,
of engineering degree in systems engi-
izes and transforms during an inter-war Eglin AFB; Unit Movement Officer
neering from Cornell University.
period. In a time and resource con- Course, Fort Richardson, AK; Standard
strained environment, it is imperative MAJ Nate Bennett is the Secretary of Army Maintenance System–Enhanced

Table 7. Use Case and Functional Requirements for AI Chatbot NIIN Search Software. (U.S. Army)

49 Fall 2024
(SAMS-1E) Course, Fort Richardson;
Standard Army Retail Supply System - Acronym Quick-Scan
Level 1 (SAARS1) Course, Bagram, Af-
ghanistan; Advanced Leaders Course; ABCT – armored brigade combat team GCSS-Army – Global Combat Support
Senior Leaders Course; Warrant Officer AESIP – Army Enterprise Systems System-Army
Basic Course; and Warrant Officer Ad- Integration Program HHC – headquarters and headquarters
AFATDS – Advanced Field Artillery company
vanced Course, Fort Gregg-Adams, VA.
Tactical Data System JBC-P – Joint Battle Command-Platform
CW3 Amsdell completed Lean Six Sig-
AFB – air force base JLTV – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle
ma - Army Business Management. His
AI – artificial intelligence LMTV – Light Medium Tactical Vehicle
awards include the Bronze Star Medal, LOGPAC – logistics package
AIT – advanced individual training
Meritorious Service Medal and the BAS – battalion aid station LRAS – Long-Range Acquisition System
Combat Action Badge. BCT – brigade combat team MCO – maintenance control officer
BMO – battalion maintenance officer MCS – mission-command system
1LT Collette Benavidez is the battalion
C&E – communication and electronics MOS – military occupational specialty
maintenance officer, 2-70 Armor Regi- NAI – named area of interest
CAB – combined arms battalion
ment, 2 nd ABCT, 1 st Infantry Division, CGSC – Command and General Staff NG – National Guard
Fort Riley, KS. Her previous assign- College NIIN – National Item Identification
ments include maintenance control of- CTCP – combat-trains command post Number
ficer, H Forward-Support Company DOTMLPF – doctrine, organization, OSRVT – One System Remote Video
(FSC), 2-70 Armor, 2 nd ABCT; mainte- training, materiel, leadership and Terminal
nance platoon leader, D FSC, 5th Squad- education, personnel, and facilities PMCS – preventive-maintenance checks
ron, 4th Cavalry Regiment, 2nd ABCT, 1st DRASH – Deployable Rapid Assembly and services
Infantry Division; maintenance control Shelter PIR – priority intelligence requirement
officer, D FSC, 5-4 Cavalry, 2nd ABCT; ELM – electronic maintenance ReARMM – Regionally Aligned
and S-3 Overstrength, HHC, 299th Bri- EMS – Electronic Management System Readiness and Modernization Model
gade Support Battalion, 2nd ABCT. 1LT ERPS – equipment records parts RPOL – rearward passage of lines
Benavidez completed the Quartermas- specialist RETRANS – retransmission
ter Basic Officer Leader Course, Fort EVAC – evacuate STT – Satellite Transportable Terminal
Gregg-Adams, VA. She has a bachelor’s FiST – fire-support team TAC – tactical command post
of arts degree in international relations FMC – fully mission capable TOC – tactical operations center
from American University. FPOL – forward passage of lines TM – technical manual
FSC – forward-support company UMCP – unit maintenance collection
FTCP – field-trains command post point

Donovan Research Library

Maneuver Center of Excellence
hosts Armor student papers on various subjects,
https://www.moore.army.mil/Library/Virtual.html,
and back issues of ARMOR magazine,
https://www.moore.army.mil/Library/CavalryArmorJournal/
index.html
Back-issue archiving shared with eARMOR (1983 through

50 Fall 2024
 X

51 Fall 2024
As the sun sets over the Central Corri- determination to build survivability Background
dor, following a long day of combined and counter mobility obstacle effects
arms breaching, a common story and grows stronger throughout the opera- According to Army Techniques Publica-
phrase is echoed from leaders at all tion. To build a robust defense, it is im- tion (ATP) 3-90.8, Combined Arms
echelons to their subordinates as they perative that construction materiel Countermobility, Paragraph 3-79, “ob-
prepare for the transition to the de- (concertina wire, pickets, barbed wire, stacle resource planning, delivery, and
etc.) and equipment, ammunition, and emplacement are facilitated by CCLs.”
fense. Bracing for the imminent tran-
manpower is in the right place at the In a brigade combat team (BCT) large-
sition, the commander immediately
right time. Following a successful of- scale combat operations (LSCO) fight,
asks those nearby, “Where are the
fensive operation, leaders are already CCLs are mostly referred to as Class IV
CCLs (combat configured loads)?” In (construction and barrier materials)
this pivotal moment, the question un- thinking about minimizing risk in the
defense. One of the most important and Class V (ammunition) packages,
derscores the strategic foresight and prepared ahead of an operation to be
ways to mitigate risk to mission and
meticulous preparation essential for moved forward to units (in need of
risk to force during the defense is the
success in modern warfare. strategic emplacement of obstacles in those supplies) on an M3 Container
Imagine your unit has been fighting specified engagement areas using Roll-in/Out Platform flat rack.
through the day for key terrain, and Class IV CCLs. Class IV CCLs are one of The term “CCL” can be used for any
the sun is quickly going down past the the most vital resources a maneuver pre-configured load package of any
horizon. You receive the order to es- commander can use during defensive class of supply; however, this article
tablish a hasty defense and begin en- operations. will focus on Class IV CCLs for defensive
gagement area development (Army This paper explains how properly built preparations. CCLs can be configured
Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90, Of- CCLs can increase lethality protection, in any method to best enable forward
fense and Defense, Chapter 4, para- while mitigating risk to mission and elements to quickly receive the sup-
graph 4-29). You call forward your risk to force. The authors provide ex- plies they need to prepare to continue
Class IV CCLs, which are dropped off amples of integrating Class IV CCL fighting or defending against an ene-
just as the sun sets and the Soldiers on preparations into unit standing operat- my. Additionally, CCLs of Class IV
the line begin to pull everything off the ing procedures (SOPs). It emphasizes should be developed given the identi-
flat rack. When they remove the ratch- the need for streamlined processes fied terrain, and the most likely type of
et straps or cut the bands, concertina and a comprehensive understanding of obstacles or fighting positions a unit
wire (c-wire) and stakes start getting resource allocation across all levels of expects to emplace. CCLs cannot sole-
tangled and stacks fall over. Conduct- command synchronization matrix (SYN- ly be a logistics officer or an engineer
ing this disassembly in the dark under CMAT) and execution checklist (EX- planner’s priority. The management of
night optical devices, making it that CHECK) integration. The following pa- CCLs is a leader priority across all warf-
much harder. per can help units enhance their defen- ighting functions.
The scene set above is a common trend sive capabilities and prepare leaders There are hundreds of Class IV CCL
at the National Training Center (NTC) with the tools to plan for contingencies configurations a BCT may use in LSCO
and is the lynchpin for a successful with greater efficiency and readiness operations. For example, Class IV CCLs
transition to the defense. Every minute in defensive operations and large-scale include construction material to build
is important and a commander ’s combat scenarios. marking or “fratricide” fences, 300-me-
ter Triple Strand Concertina Wire ob-
stacles, and include concertina wire,
pickets (long and short), barbed wire,
and even plywood. Class IV CCLs opti-
mize resource utilization by providing
standardized sets of construction ma-
terials tailored to specific defensive re-
quirements. This standardization re-
duces logistical complexity, minimizes
waste, and ensures units have the nec-
essary resources to execute defensive
operations effectively. A unit’s tactical
SOPs (TACSOPs) outline its desired CCL
configurations and is vital for shared
understanding at echelon.
Engagement areas use multiple Class
IV CCLs and need to be strategically
emplaced close to the desired obstacle
location to maximize emplacement
time for the emplacing unit. While it
Figure 1. Poorly built CCL loaded with concertina wire, pickets, and barbed
may seem simple to have the Class IV
wire. Note the Concertina Wire falling over and randomly placed ratchet
CCLs on hand before the transition to
straps. (U.S. Army photo by CPT Olivia Schretzman and MAJ William Longwell)
the defense, moving CCLs through

52 Fall 2024
specified breach points or restricted pickets to build disruption obstacles of SOP for how CCLs are assembled,
terrain can take many hours. Addition- double or triple strand concertina wire marked and managed. The unit must
ally, having the CCLs on hand is not al- integrated with direct and indirect then train on this SOP to validate it. At
ways the most significant factor in CCL fires. Building a 300-meter-long obsta- the NTC, rotational units usually train
management. Instead, the way that cle of triple-strand concertina requires on at least two defenses. Most rota-
CCLs are managed and configured can 160 long pickets, eight rolls of barbed tions include a hasty defense and a de-
impact mission success the most. At wire and 60 rolls of concertina wire. liberate defense. Despite knowing they
the NTC, it is a common trend that Observer/coach/trainers (O/C/Ts) wit- will train on defenses up front, we of-
CCLs are not always built or maintained ness that if not properly packaged and ten see CCL preparation and manage-
in accordance with the unit SOPs. secured, removing one picket from the ment take a back seat to other tasks
These poorly assembled CCLs can sig- stack can cause the entire package to the rotational training unit must do
nificantly slow down defensive opera- fall apart during transportation. If not during RSOI.
tions and prevent obstacle effects labeled properly, the forward receiving
(block, fix, disrupt, turn) from being ac- How Class IV CCLs are built, labeled
unit likely will be unable to identify
complished in the mission timeframe. and disassembled to build wire obsta-
what obstacle can be built with the
cles and fighting positions, should be
supplied Class IV.
While it might not be the main effort, understood across a BCT formation.
planning for CCL movement is still an During a previous rotation, a brigade’s These points should be included in the
enabling operation (movement of CCLs (BDE’s) protection SOP specified how brigade and battalion TACSOPs. The
to the forward line of troops) and is vi- CCLs should be built, but not one CCL following is an example of a CCL stan-
tal in maintaining tempo and flexibility. was built to that standard. This became dardization in a protection SOP.
To transition successfully to the de- a larger issue when the battalion (BN)
When preparing for the defense, it is
fense during LSCO, planners need to protection officer assumed there was
imperative that the composition and
focus on the efficient handling and de- enough wire to prepare 300 meters of
location of CCLs are integrated into
ployment of Class IV construction ma- triple strand concertina wire, when
unit planning and rehearsals. All lead-
terials, contained within CCLs and this there was only 200 meters in the deliv-
ers need to understand the unit’s CCL
represents a pivotal yet often over- ered CCL.
disposition; however, it is particularly
looked aspect of defensive planning. At
venues like the NTC, the hurried prep- Create, train, validate important for brigade S-4s and brigade
engineers to thoroughly understand
aration and poorly built resource pack- SOPs for CCL assembly and brief this aspect during orders pro-
ages during reception, staging and on- duction and rehearsals. At the battal-
ward integration (RSOI) can significant- A simple way for BCTs and their down-
trace battalions and companies to be ion level, leveraging the expertise of
ly impact defensive operations in LSCO. S-4s and Battalion Engineers or Battle
more effective while preparing for a
During rotations at the NTC, units of- defense, and save valuable time is to Captains to brief CCL locations and
ten use CCLs of concertina wire and spend the time up front creating an composition during rehearsals, can sig-
nificantly enhance operational readi-
ness. Tracking the movement of CCLs
throughout defensive preparations is
equally important as it ensures seam-
less coordination across the battle-
field.

Shared awareness
Incorporating CCL transfers into SYNC-
MATs or EXCHECKs can foster shared
situational awareness within the for-
mation. Including CCLs in friendly force
information requirements, specifying
their location, current ownership, and
disposition, enhances battlefield trans-
parency for all subordinates. Addition-
ally, a critical decision point for com-
manders arises in determining when to
deploy CCLs to facilitate obstacle em-
placement. To aid staff members and
leaders in risk mitigation, a risk mitiga-
tion strategy example is provided (Fig-
ure 5. Risk Mitigation if Class IV CCLs
are limited) and identifies how you can
mitigate risk using other assets for a
Figure 2. Consequences of a poorly built CCL, Concertina Wire falling off and defense, such as blade assets or using
into an axle. (U.S. Army photo by CPT Olivia Schretzman and MAJ William Lon- explosive measures. Recognizing the
gwell) pivotal role of Class IV in defensive

53 Fall 2024
planning, strategies utilizing target ref- cess and increased lethality in LSCO. obstacle that can be constructed
erence points and vehicle fighting po- using the materials provided. This
sitions are recommended to mitigate Conclusion could be on a Meals Ready to Eat box,
shortages. However, insufficient Class “100mph” tape, or other available
To streamline efficiency and enhance
IV resources can significantly constrain material that is weatherproof.
readiness for future operations and
engagement area development and in- training at the NTC, we propose the 4. D u r i n g p l a n n i n g , d e s i g n a t e
crease the risk of minefield fratricide, following recommendations. responsibilities for transporting and
underscoring the importance of ade-
quate logistical support. 1. Establish an SOP for Class IV CCLs at receiving Class IV CCLs to ensure
the brigade level and disseminate it smooth and timely coordination and
Ultimately, the responsibility for CCLs down to the platoon level. execution.
falls on maneuver and sustainment
2. Specify stacking and securing 5. During rehearsals, the BDE/BN S-4
leaders at both battalion and company
procedures for Class IV CCL materials and BDE/BN engineer should brief
levels. By integrating CCL management
to ensure consistency, stability, ease the composition and locations of
into operational rehearsals and deci-
sion-making processes, units can en- of access and disassembly. CCLs for planned defenses. Individuals
sure the effective use of vital logistical who own the CCL at each phase and
3. Clearly label each Class IV CCL with
assets, which will lead to mission suc- position should also brief during the
its contents and indicate the type of
rehearsal.
By implementing these measures,
leaders at all echelons will have a clear
understanding of the contents and pur-
pose of Class IV CCLs. This will enable
units to efficiently plan, prepare, and
employ obstacles for both hasty and
deliberate defensive operations. The
adoption of these practices will un-
doubtedly yield significant dividends in
terms of operational effectiveness and
preparedness for challenges encoun-
tered in LSCO.

MAJ William Longwell is an Infantry

officer, currently serving as a Task
Force executive officer observer/coach/
trainer at NTC, Fort Irwin, CA. His pre-
vious assignments include Regimental
S-3, 3rd U.S. Infantry Regiment “The Old
Guard,” Joint Base Myer–Henderson
Hall, VA; battalion S-3, 4thBattalion, 3rd
U.S. Infantry Regiment; legislative liai-
son, Office of the Chief Legislative Liai-
son, Pentagon, VA; and defense fellow,
Senate, Capitol Hill, Washington, D.C.
MAJ Longwell’s military schools include
Infantry Basic Officer Leader Course,
Maneuver Captains Career Course,
Command and General Staff College,
Recon Surveillance Leader Course,
Pathfinder School, Airborne School,
Jumpmaster School, and Ranger
School. He has a bachelor’s of arts de-
gree in psychology from Shippensburg
University and Master of Professional
Studies (MPS) degree in legislative af-
fairs from The George Washington Uni-
versity, Washington, D.C. MAJ Lon-
gwell’s awards and badges include the
Purple Heart Medal, Meritorious Ser-
Figure 3. CCL C and CCL D include Class IV examples from a brigade TACSOP vice Medal (2nd oak leaf cluster), Com-
(36th Engineer BDE). (U.S. Army table by CPT Olivia Schretzman and MAJ William bat Infantryman Badge, Expert
Longwell)

54 Fall 2024
Infantryman Badge, Ranger Tab, Senior System (TCAIMS-II) Course, Sapper and was ranked #1 in her class. CPT
Parachutist Badge, and Pathfinder Leader Course, Pathfinder, Air Assault Schretzman is also the recipient the
Badge. School, Engineer Captains Career 2022 U.S. Army’s General Douglas Ma-
Course, and the Marine Engineer Dive cArthur Leadership Award. She has
CPT Olivia Schretzman is a lead engi-
Officer Course. She has a bachelor’s of published papers in the New York
neer observer/coach/trainer (O/C/T) at
the National Training Center. Her pre- science degree in leader development Times and Army Engineer Magazine.
vious assignments include commander, science from the U.S. Military Academy
511th Engineer Dive Detachment, Joint and a master of engineering (MEng) Acronym Quick-Scan
Base Langley-Eustis, VA, (the first fe- degree in engineering management
male dive commander in the U.S. from Vanderbilt University. CPT BCT – brigade combat team
Army); 101st Airborne Division (Air As- Schretzman’s awards and badges in- BDE – brigade
sault) for four years; and construction clude the Army Commendation Medal BN – battalion
officer for Task Force Bastogne in sup- (2 nd oak leaf cluster), Army Achieve- CCL – combat configured load
port of Operation Inherent Resolve in ment Medal (1st oak leaf cluster), Na- EXCHECK – execution checklist
Kirkuk, Iraq; While deployed she also tional Defense Service Medal, Inherent LSCO – large-scale combat
performed duties as plans officer for Resolve Campaign Medal, Global War operations
the 326th Brigade Engineer Battalion. on Terrorism Service Medal, Military NTC – National Training Center
Other previous assignments include Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
Sapper executive officer, Sapper pla- Army Service Ribbon, Joint Diving Offi- RSOI – reception, staging, and
toon leader, Military Intelligence Com- cer Badge, Pathfinder Badge, Air As- onward integration
pany operations officer, and battalion sault Badge, and Sapper Tab. She is the SOP – standing operating
S-1. CPT Schretzman’s military schools 2017 Grizzly Award Recipient (Engineer procedure
include the Engineer Basic Officer Regiment’s Platoon Leader of the Year). SYNCMAT – synchronization
Leader Course, Unit Movement Officer CPT Schretzman was the Naval and matrix
Course, Transportation Coordinators’ Dive Salvage Training Center Joint Dive TACSOP – tactical standing
Automated Information for Movement Officer 20-20 Hooyah Award Recipient operating procedure

Figure 4. Marking examples using materials available. Key is shared understanding of what these markings denote. (U.S.
Army photo by CPT Olivia Schretzman and MAJ William Longwell)

55 Fall 2024
 Leader Conduct in Training:
Rebooting retired LTG Hal Moore’s ‘Four Principles
by COL Esli Pitts and ran the FDC from his track. Then Leader Conduct in Battle” follow [in
he was assessed as a casualty (wow, italics]. His words are not a polished
In recognition of the renaming of Fort
the enemy artillery sure was selective). staff product, but they are a stand-
Benning as Fort Moore, I provide the
Somebody called that we were combat alone leadership lesson written by a
following thoughts on adapting retired
ineffective, but we still had five opera- proven combat leader.2
LTG Moore’s four principles of conduct
tional gun tracks and a lot of ammuni-
in battle for armored leaders. [Excerpt] B. Next, Conduct in battle,
tion. A squad leader dug a charge book
Four principles:
November 1996. There I was — in the out of a dusty helmet bag and we were
box at the National Training Center back in business! Although seriously 1. The first is: “THREE STRIKES AND
(NTC) — with my mortar platoon: two degraded, we continued firing until the YOU ARE NOT OUT!” Two things a
fire direction centers (FDCs), six mor- end of the attack. Lesson learned. Leader can do. Either contaminate his
tar tracks, two cargo trucks, and more environment and his unit with his atti-
Unbeknownst to me, I had just validat-
than 1,500 rounds of 120mm ammuni- tude and actions, OR he can inspire
ed LTG Moore’s second principle of
tion. We had limited redundancy in confidence.”
leader conduct in battle: “There is al-
computing mortar missions due to
ways one more thing you can do to in- Must be visible on the battlefield.
some shortages, but after a frank con-
fluence any situation in your favor – Must be IN the battle; Bn Cdr on down
versation with the observer/coach/
and after that one more thing….” - Bde and Div Cdr on occasion. Self-con-
trainers (O/C/Ts), we did what we
fident. Positive attitude. Must exhibit
could to mitigate the issue. Years later, I had the privilege of hear-
his determination to prevail no matter
ing LTG Moore speak at a squadron
During the next battalion attack, we what the odds or how desperate the
ball. Then, I found a video that cap-
quickly lost the primary FDC with the situation. Must have and display the
tured Moore’s “four principles of lead-
two mortar ballistic computers. Not so WILL TO WIN by his actions, his words,
er conduct in battle,” and I was
fast, O/C/Ts! — we continued to fight his tone of voice on the radio and face
hooked.1 I took the video into battalion
from the second FDC, with two service- command and continued to use it as a to face, his appearance, his demeanor,
able plotting boards. No doubt, the battalion/task force maneuver trainer, his countenance, the look in his eyes.
O/C/Ts thought we were finished when where I found it was an excellent way He must remain calm and cool. NO
the second FDC was also destroyed, to stimulate discussion in after action FEAR. Must ignore the noise, dust,
but my senior squad leader — former- reviews (AARs). smoke, thirst, explosions, screams of
ly a cavalry troop’s mortar section ser- wounded, the yells, the dead lying
geant — pulled out a plotting board LTG Moore’s “Four Principles on around him. That’s all NORMAL!
Must never give off any hint or ev-
idence that he is uncertain about a
positive outcome, even in the most des-
perate of situations. Again, the princi-
ple which must be driven into your own
head, and the heads of your men is:
“THREE STRIKES AND YOU’RE NOT
OUT!”
2. And the corollary principle inter-
reactive with that one is:
“ THERE’S ALWAYS ONE MORE
THING YOU CAN DO TO INFLUENCE
ANY SITUATION IN YOUR FAVOR – AND
AFTER THAT ONE MORE THING – AND
AFTER THAT ONE MORE THING, ETC.
ETC.” In battle, I periodically detached
myself mentally for a few seconds from
the noise, the screams of the wounded,
the explosions, the yelling, the smoke
and dust, the intensity of it all, and
asked myself: WHAT AM I DOING THAT
I SHOULD NOT BE DOING? AND WHAT
AM I NOT DOING THAT I SHOULD BE
Figure 1. Task Force Power, 3rd Battalion, 69th Armor Regiment mortar tracks in DOING TO INFLUENCE THE SITUATION
action at NTC, 1996. (U.S. Army photo by 1LT Esli Pitts in November 1996) IN MY FAVOR?”

56 Fall 2024
 3. The third principle is “WHEN They pointed out the artificialities or rule: keep calm. Getting angry on the
THERE’S NOTHING WRONG – THERE’S gaps, insisting that “we would never...” net simply translates down to the low-
NOTHING WRONG EXCEPT – THERE’S or otherwise emphasized problems, er echelons as stress.
NOTHING WRONG!” That’s exactly whether coming from higher, lower, or You are the leader. When things are go-
when a leader must be most alert. the opposing force. As LTG Moore de- ing wrong, you owe the organization
4. And finally, #4 “TRUST YOUR IN- scribed, this attitude directly “contam- calm, measured leadership. Make it a
STINCTS.” In a critical, fast-moving bat- inated the environment” as subordi- habit for yourself and an expectation
tlefield situation, instincts and intuition nate staff and commanders’ briefings of your team when you are monitoring
amount to an instant Estimate of the quickly focused on workarounds, high- their nets during collective training.
Situation. Your instincts are the prod- lighted “issues,” and found reasons Just as important, even if your own
uct of your education, training, read- why they could not train as they would higher leaders cannot provide calm
ing, personality, and experience. fight (often expressed in snide com- leadership to you, do not pass their an-
ments during briefings). These units ger down on your own net.
“TRUST YOUR INSTINCTS”
might do well, but they rarely learned.
When seconds count, instinct and de- Leaders can project this calm demean-
The second type involved an un- or and a will to win because they
cisiveness come into play. In quick-de-
veloping Situations, the leader must healthy focus on winning at all costs, know…
act fast, impart confidence to all which led to expressed or implied pres-
sures on subordinates, an unwilling- There is always one more thing you
around him, must not second guess a can do. Moore asks, “what am I doing
decision-MAKE IT HAPPEN! In the pro- ness to receive, or report, bad news, a
reliance on gamesmanship such as that I should not be, and what am I not
cess, he cannot stand around slack-
“MILES berms” and contention be- doing that I should be?” The answer to
jawed when he’s hit with the unexpect-
tween rotational and opposing forces this second question is contingent
ed. He must face up the facts, deal with
them, and MOVE ON. on the battlefield (and the O/C/Ts). upon actually having options, whether
These units also tended to learn little. from equipment or depth of training
Harold G. Moore readiness. Having one more thing you
The third type involved leaders that can do (“and after that, one more”)
LTG, U.S. Army (Retired)
came with an emphasis on learning. provides you with flexibility and op-
(Commander, 1st Battalion, 7th Cavalry They tended to utilize their systems, tions. This mindset is a commitment to
Regiment, LZ X-Ray, Ia Drang Valley, improve on them, tolerate acceptable having the necessary equipment, skills,
Vietnam, 1965) risks, lead through mission command, and training proficiency to enable go-
Moore’s words alone are incompara- and grow both individually and as or- ing to the well one more time.
ble; however, I would like to offer some ganizations. No matter what level they
arrived at, they improved. As an O/C/T, I covered a particular air-
thoughts on how the armor communi- borne infantry battalion that jumped
ty could inculcate these principles in These leader attitudes stem from the into their rotation, but deliberately left
training. tone of the senior leader. Listen to the their medium and heavy anti-armor
tone of your subordinates during plan- systems’ thermal optics at home, de-
Three Strikes ning, briefings, and rehearsals — spite knowing there was an armored
A leader either contaminates the envi- whether positive or negative, they threat. By the commander’s choice, as
ronment or inspires confidence. This is might be mirroring you. they hit the ground and rolled up their
all about our demeanor, our presence, parachutes, they were already past
how we act as leaders and how our Once across the line of departure, we
“one more thing you can do,” and “af-
leadership influences those around us. mainly lead via the radio, a medium
ter that, one more thing” and reliant
that is frequently garbled, stepped on,
Particularly at higher echelons, there on light weapons at best. They chose
and “hot mic’d.” It is then that, as
are few opportunities in the field to to have no options.
Moore says, the “tone of our voice” is
provide face-to-face leadership to the all we have to convey everything: guid- I’m a believer that it is better to have
entire team (think plans, briefs, re- ance, clarity, vision, and the will to win. and not need than to need and not
hearsals, and AARs). How you present The first rule is to keep calm. You don’t have. This means train with all your
yourself at those points will influence have to yell over the noise of the bat- equipment and then bring it to the
the team for better or worse. tle for others to hear. Keep calm; just field. As a mortar platoon leader, that
As a battalion senior maneuver trainer speak. The second rule is to be precise. meant bringing not only our new mor-
at the Joint Multinational Readiness At NTC, referring to “the big rock over tar ballistic computers but also the old,
Center, Hohenfels, Germany, I general- there” is useless; likewise, for “that cracked plotting boards and even the
ly saw the battalion’s leaders convey tree” in Germany, so find precise charge books. As a tank company com-
three different attitudes to their units words. The third rule is to be brief. It mander, it meant bringing out my five
during training rotations. Their style might be your net, but if you are al- decoy tanks and fixing and mounting
was clear to us (the observers) even if ways talking, others cannot. The last the broken mine plows I inherited. It
it was not always clear to them. rule, especially when things are going also meant training with the dusty M71
wrong — or you just got jumped on by Remote Control Units and the Modular
First, some focused on the negative. your higher — is to refer to the first Pack Mine Systems and bringing my

57 Fall 2024
own scatterable mine capability to the Maybe you are just one new staff offi- key the mic and find out. Better: let’s
field. It meant bringing all our individ- cer. Are you waiting for guidance? Or instill in our subordinates the habit of
ual and crew chemical protective gear are you already ensuring the depth of reporting problems.
and anything else I could think of. Bot- planning that offers the commander
Is radio silence okay during an opera-
tom line, all our gear is designed to “one more thing” in your lane? As the
tion? Or do you mandate “negative re-
help us make it past “one more thing” S-4, is it sufficient that “everybody
porting” when necessary? Imagine you
and “after that, one more thing” and topped off this morning?” Or is the
are a battalion executive officer (XO),
all the way to “etc.” If we don’t train standard that, not only did everybody
and you haven’t heard from Company
with it, and then leave it behind, it’s top off, but there is a dedicated refuel
for 30 minutes. Would you rather hear
useless. and re-arm asset, associated planning
1) “Sir, Battle is here” (points at a
priorities, primary and alternate logis-
In addition to the gear, our training screen) “and they haven’t reported any
tics release points, and a plan to recon-
proficiency comes into play. I once par- contact;” or, “Sir, Battle is here” (points
stitute it — and rehearse it? Do our
ticipated in a night attack in Hohenfels, at screen, and then reads from the log)
communications, intelligence collec-
during which the battalion executed “and they reported clearing Phase Line
tion and fire support plans also have
eleven breaches. This only worked be- RED 5 minutes ago with no contact.”
redundancy?
cause of the battalion commander’s One report relies on assumptions
emphasis on flexibility and a depth of When there’s nothing wrong, there’s (“Well, I guess nothing is wrong”),
training and resources. Do all our nothing wrong. Except that there’s while the other option provides clarity
crews know required battle drills or nothing wrong. As a junior captain, I and evidence that nothing is wrong.
only the designated crews? Can all four had the pleasure of three combat
Remember: “wrong” is not just enemy
tanks in the platoon conduct a manual training center rotations as the bri-
contact. It can be anything that im-
breach (and have a breach kit?) or just gade’s day battle captain. During two
pacts timelines, combat power or mis-
the plow tank? Do we have redundan- of them, the battalions had a bad hab-
sion accomplishment. Your lead tank
cy in drills across the tank sections? it of not reporting when they were in
threw a track while staging in a tight
Platoons? Companies? Or did we sim- contact — not even “Contact, tanks,
assembly area, but the commander
ply designate 1st Platoon as the breach east, out.” Afterward, they would come
didn’t tell anybody because they’re
force and not train the others? up on the net and report themselves
trying to just “walk it back on.” Now
as “Black” on combat power. As a staff
Surviving to the third “one more thing” the track and road wheels are chewed
of jaded pre-command captains, we
doesn’t just mean equipment and bat- up, and he is blocking the route. But
gleefully chanted “’Green, Green,
tle drills, but also the deliberate plan- nothing is “wrong.”
Black’ is the (insert brigade combat
ning that enables it. Did planning stop
team name) motto,” but the brigade Leaders must come up on the net and
when your exhausted planner finished
was routinely in contact while being report. As they say, bad news does not
writing the base order? Or are you now
unaware of it, denying the commander get better with time. The faster we
building a course of action for the most
the ability to do anything about it. identify and share when something is
likely branch plan? Do your graphics
“There’s nothing wrong, except that wrong, the more time we must deal
enable flexibility in the operation or
there’s nothing wrong.” with the fallout from these things be-
only rigidity? Do your graphics support
cause they WILL occur. Remember our
deviating from the plan? Do you have How do we, as armor leaders, confirm
demeanor on the radio? If we berate
subsequent or supplementary battle that there really is nothing wrong,
our subordinates every time some-
positions planned in case your defens- rather than we just don’t know? First
thing is wrong, they will stop reporting,
es are penetrated? Do you have addi- off, we must actively look for the
hoping for a fix just in time.
tional checkpoints designated to sup- wrong. At the crew or platoon levels,
port a new attack by fire position or that might be through preventive What enables us to quickly recover
counter-attack route? maintenance, detailed pre-combat when something truly is wrong is skill
checks and inspections and thorough and experience. That’s what LTG
Does your battalion staff have suffi-
rehearsals. Moore was referring to when he said
cient reps at planning and orders pro-
to “trust your instinct.”
duction? Do they have additional tools A great place to start (at any echelon)
in their kit bag, such as the Rapid De- is to be in the habit of constantly com- Trust your instinct
cision-making Synchronization Process paring your actual reality to the reality
and staff battle drills? Do they have an as stated in the plan. If the lead battal- Not counting actual deployments, I av-
adaptive mindset? Or are they rigid ion should have cleared the passage eraged about 96 days per year in the
and focused on THIS plan? Is your com- points by 0700 hours and it is now field as a company-grade officer. That’s
bat trains command post prepared to 0745, something’s wrong. You thought a lot of time to build instinct. Fast for-
take over in the event of the loss of the the breach would take 45 minutes, and ward to battalion command, we barely
tactical operations center? Can the it’s been 60? Definitely something got 53 days per year in the field. Every
field trains command post step up to wrong! Haven’t heard from the main one of those “lost” training days trans-
serve as the combat trains command effort for a while? Maybe there is lated to lost “instinct” in my battalion’s
post? Can they do so right now? Do nothing wrong, but maybe you are in a leaders. We offset it in other ways,
they know you expect that? “Green, Green, Black” situation. Let’s such as simulations or professional

58 Fall 2024
development, but the question re- How long does it take to uncoil from an than on their vehicle. Commanders
mains: how do you build instinct? assembly area in the dark or refuel a must also physically detach!
Think about where you train, what les- tank company on the move? How long
January 2013. There I was — in the de-
sons you are learning and what in- does it take to conduct a passage of
fense at NTC — with my battalion: two
stincts you are building. What you lines? Breach two lanes? How long to
tank companies, two infantry compa-
learn in the open, rocky terrain of NTC dig in a company? Tear down the tacti-
nies, and the first planning priority for
or the desert will be very different cal operations center? Emplace five
the brigade reserve. We were well into
from the rolling hills and wooded ter- hundred meters of triple-strand con-
the counter-recon fight and had de-
rain of Europe and you must recognize certina wire? Complete pre-combat in-
stroyed the first battalion (-) of the
the differences between them. spections to standard? Move dis-
main body.
mounted in wooded terrain? How
Learn vicariously. That old-timer’s sto-
long…? I expected to be in contact with the
ry probably has a useful lesson in it —
rest of the enemy’s main body soon,
maybe one you won’t have to learn the The answers to these, and a hundred
but, except for one stale spot report
hard way. Professional development other questions, form a baseline of
from the cavalry squadron, nobody had
programs are also a great way to do knowledge that enables you to plan
contact with the enemy regiment. I as-
this. this fight more effectively and builds
sessed this lack of contact, not as
instinct for the next fight. This familiar-
Read. I once read a report from NTC in “nothing was wrong,” but that “some-
ity also lets you recognize when you
which a contributor said he knew rota- thing was wrong.” My estimate was
have exceeded those planning thresh-
tional leaders had reached exhaustion that if the enemy was attacking but
olds and recognize that something is
when pencils fell from their fingers. was currently invisible, he must be
wrong, even though nothing seems to
When I saw that indicator in others, I “about here” [points at the map].
be.
recognized it for what it was. Even Therefore, what I was not doing, but
lacking a successful unit professional Capture it all and build it in your stand- should be, was re-orienting my de-
reading program, it’s easy to maintain ing operating procedures. By the time fense. My instinct was that if the ene-
a personal program appropriate to you are a mid-grade leader, you should my was where I thought he was, then
your position. Whether it is the Com- have a bedrock understanding of plan- my companies were sufficiently trained
bat Studies Institute, biography, histo- ning factors that enables you to plan to move quickly and could be estab-
ry, or ARMOR magazine, the choices and fight from an instinctual basis. lished in new battle positions before
are infinite. Something will stick with the enemy could close the distance if I
I periodically detached myself: Though
you if you just read. gave quick, calm, clear guidance and
this line comes under his second point,
used my staff to synchronize it. We
Professional Military Education. As I want to highlight this separately. LTG
made the move and set in the new po-
someone who has read almost every- Moore makes an important point when
sitions shortly before the enemy
thing I was assigned at all levels of mil- he said he would periodically step
showed up. It was a long, hard-fought
itary education, I’m going to tell the away to think. The armor community
defense, and we did “one more thing”
ugly truth. The old joke that “It’s only does a good job of empowering our ex-
at least three more times as we adjust-
a lot of reading if you do it” is a disser- ecutive officers and platoon sergeants
ed another battle position, re-armed
vice to the Army and to the Soldiers we to report upwards. Not only does this
tank companies, and then requested
lead. We should read … most of it. allow commanders to fight their orga-
the release of the brigade reserve, but
nizations, but it also allows them to
Learn by doing. Instinct is the mental we ultimately stopped a regimental at-
“periodically detach” to think about
equivalent of muscle memory. Fight to tack in our engagement area. I wasn’t
what comes next. However, we have
get as many training reps as you can in asking myself what LTG Moore would
two other challenges. First, we should
a variety of conditions including ter- do, but I like to think that he would
also give our battalions’ executive of-
rain, weather, visibility, and chemical have approved.
ficers and battle captains the ability to
contamination so that instinct takes “detach” and orchestrate the whole of The sum of all these thoughts is that
root. the staff’s efforts by handing most rou- we must train as we fight. I’ll just leave
Good instincts come from a solid tine traffic to staff or radio-telephone you with one telling statistic: utiliza-
grounding in time-distance analysis operators except when absolutely nec- tion of vehicle smoke grenades across
with lots of repetitions in a variety of essary. Unfortunately, they frequently U.S. Army Forces Command was 9.85
situations. grab a handset and get consumed in percent in fiscal year 2023. Did you
lengthy point-to-point conversations train your tank commanders to salvo
How long will the alpha section have with a resultant loss of their situation- smoke and displace to an alternate po-
to cover the entire platoon sector al awareness. Second, some command- sition?
while bravo section backs down and ers hesitate to leave the tactical-oper-
So, what can YOU do? Regardless of
cross-levels five rounds from the semi- ations center (TOC), sacrificing mission
your position, you can do a lot.
ready to the ready rack? Unless you command with their own main effort
train it, the answer is “a long time.” to ensure they personally remain in The first thing is having the right mind-
(Hint: it can be done in less than four contact with higher headquarters set — a willingness to continue learn-
minutes.) through better connectivity at the TOC ing and an absolute determination to

59 Fall 2024
prevail. Let’s assume that you already the first indicator that something was commander, 3rd Battalion, 8th Cavalry
have these. wrong? When did we realize that the Regiment, Fort Cavazos, TX. COL Pitts
enemy was in sector? attended the U.S. Army War College.
My challenge: Steal LTG Moore’s prin-
• Trust your instinct: How did you He has a bachelor’s of arts degree in
ciples. Who could blame you? Model
know the enemy was going to …? history from Washington State Univer-
them in your own behavior, manifest it
Why did you take that risk? If you sity, a master’s of science degree in in-
in your plans and training, encourage
thought X, then why did you do Y? ternational relations from Troy Univer-
them in your teams, and then use
Would that “lesson” you just learned sity and a master’s of science degree in
them to facilitate open-ended ques-
tions in your after-action reviews. at NTC work in a wooded — or littoral security studies from the U.S. Army
— environment? What did you learn War College.
Please consider the following points.
in this mission that you can take
• Three strikes: This is tough; you may forward to your next mission or next Notes
need to coach your leaders on the job? U.S. Army, “Leadership by LTG Harold
side if you need to adjust their Moore,” YouTube.com, https://www.you-
demeanor. You also need to be alert Adopt any or all these points and make tube.com/watch?v=wGNxHMFjigA
for cues that your own behavior them your own. Demonstrate it in your 2
Author’s note about LTG Moore’s Four
needs to change. own behavior and reinforce it across Principles of Conduct in Battle: I retained
• There’s always one more thing: Did the unit, and watch performance im- the original words, punctuation, and capi-
we effectively use all our tools? What prove. talization; however, I cleaned up some ty-
else could we have done? Why didn’t pographical errors because I am not sure
we complete our planned turning COL Esli Pitts is the Director, Director- if they were LTG Moore’s errors.
obstacle? What else could we have ate of Training and Doctrine, Maneu-
done to disrupt the enemy? Did we ver Center of Excellence, Fort Moore,
have redundancy in …? Why did GA. His previous assignments include
mission command fail after the command inspector general, U.S. Army, Acronym Quick-Scan
tactical operations center jumped? Europe and Africa; Director of Training,
AAR – after action review
Why couldn’t the dismounts employ Education and Leader Development, FDC – fire direction center
Javelins? What else could they have Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator, NTC – National Training Center
done? Why didn’t we bring ...? Jerusalem; task force senior maneuver O/C/T – observer/coach/trainer
• Nothing wrong: Did the TOC know trainer, Joint Multinational Readiness TOC – tactical-operations center
that Company A hadn’t …? What was C e n t e r, H o h e n f e l s , G e r m a n y ; XO – executive officer

FORT IRWIN, CA – The last days of the training rotation begin at the National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, CA. All
Soldiers wake up before dawn to prepare for live-fire missions. This training supports the 116th Cavalry Brigade Combat
Team during its a month-long NTC rotation that provides more than 4,000 service members from 31 states, including
units from 13 National Guard states and territories, with realistic training to enhance their combat, support and sus-
tainment capabilities. (Photo by: Cpl. Alisha Grezlik, 115th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment)

60 Fall 2024
 Future of Cavalry: Multi-Domain Effects Battalions
as New Theater Reconnaissance
by LTC Aaron Ritzema and 1. enable combat operations, 5. Retain freedom of maneuver.
LTC Thomas Burns 2. provide Accurate and Timely Informa- 6. Gain and maintain enemy contact.
tion to the Operations process, 7. Develop the situation rapidly.
Since the dawn of warfare, command- 3. operate as combined arms air-ground
ers have looked for ways to increase teams, There are five forms of reconnais-
the speed and range of their ability to 4. provide reaction time and maneuver sance:
find enemy forces, determine their lo- space, 1. Zone,
cation and develop an appropriate re- 5. preserve combat power, 2. Area,
sponse. First with the horse, then 6. facilitate movement and transitions, 3. Route,
through the air, commanders have de- and 4. Reconnaissance in force, and
7. fight for information. 5. Special Reconnaissance.
pended on cavalry operations to pro-
vide time and space for decision mak-
ing and inform their understanding of
Historically, this has translated into Surveillance
three specific mission sets that fall un-
the battlefield faster than the adver- der the information collection umbrel- FM 3-90 defines Surveillance as “the
sary. la: reconnaissance, surveillance, and systematic observation of aerospace,
security operations.4 Ultimately, these cyberspace, surface or subsurface ar-
As technology has advanced, so have
three roles facilitate the commander’s eas, places, persons, or things by visu-
the means and methods for conduct-
ability to maneuver their forces and al, aerial, electronic, photographic, or
ing reconnaissance, surveillance and
concentrate superior combat power at other means.” 8 Similar to reconnais-
security operations. The increased
the decisive time and place.5 sance in its purpose, surveillance is
prevalence and reliance on multi-do-
typically more passive, persistent, and
main sensors and growth in impor- The following paragraphs summarize feeds the targeting and target develop-
tance of the electromagnetic spectrum Joint and Army doctrine on these mis- ment processes in support of Intelli-
have forced a re-assessment of how sion sets to set the stage for demon- gence Preparation of the Battlefield.
Army formations conduct these caval- strating how the MDEB performs these
ry functions.1, 2 While most of this anal-
ysis is focused on the division and be-
tasks as the new face of cavalry. Security Operations
Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-90,
low, the formation of the multi-domain Reconnaissance Offense and Defense, defines security
task forces, and their multi-domain ef-
fects battalion (MDEB) represents the According to Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, operations as those operations per-
future of cavalry as it performs inte- Reconnaissance, is a mission undertak- formed by commanders to provide ear-
grated reconnaissance, security and en to obtain information about the ac- ly and accurate warning of enemy op-
surveillance in support of targeting at tivities and resources of an enemy or erations, to provide the forces being
the theater level. adversary, or to secure data concern- protected with time and maneuver
ing the meteorological, hydrographic, space within which to react to the en-
To further explore this, we will review geographic, or other characteristics of emy and to develop the situation to al-
the role and purpose of cavalry, review a particular area, by visual observation low commanders to effectively use
the current doctrinal perspective on or other detection methods. 6 In the their protected forces.9
reconnaissance, surveillance, and se- case of the MDEBs, this primarily takes
curity in cyberspace operations and the form of electromagnetic reconnais- Like reconnaissance, security opera-
electromagnetic warfare. We will also sance which JP 3-85, Joint Electromag- tions are a means to determine enemy
discuss the task organization and em- netic Spectrum Operations defines as activity, disposition and intent. The pri-
ployment concept of the MDEB, and “the detection, location, identification, mary difference is that security opera-
then demonstrate how the MDEBs per- and evaluation of foreign electromag- tions are oriented on the protected
form the traditional cavalry roles and netic radiations using assigned electro- force or area rather than on the enemy
functions in a new and innovative way. magnetic warfare personnel and capa- or terrain.
bilities. Electromagnetic reconnais- There are five fundamentals of securi-
Role, purpose of cavalry sance may result in electromagnetic ty operations:
Field Manual (FM) 3-98, Reconnais- protection modifications or lead to an 1. provide early and accurate warning,
sance and Security Operations, de- electromagnetic attack against enemy 2. provide reaction time and maneuver
scribes the fundamental purpose of capabilities.”7 There are seven funda- space,
cavalry as “set(ting) conditions for suc- mentals of reconnaissance. 3. orient on the protected force, area or
1. Ensure continuous reconnaissance. facility to be secured,
cessful operations of their higher head-
2. Do not keep reconnaissance assets in 4. perform continuous reconnaissance,
quarters.”3
reserve. and
To do this, cavalry units perform seven 3. Orient on the reconnaissance objec- 5. maintain enemy contact.
roles that directly enable the com- tive.
mander to visualize, understand, de- 4. Report all required information rapidly There are four types of security opera-
scribe, and direct: and accurately. tions that provide increasing levels of

65 Fall 2024
security for the protected force: (EMS), identify enemy attempts to re- not maneuver units because they can-
1. screen, gain the initiative and request offen- not hold terrain or fight for informa-
sive cyber operations support to con- tion. This view, in the authors’ opinion,
2. guard, duct cyberspace exploitation in cyber- takes a dated and narrow view which
3. cover, and space. 14 Commanders and staff can focuses only on the dirt of the ground
4. area security. also readjust targeting priorities and domain. FM 3-12, Cyberspace Opera-
fire support plans, including cyber- tions and Electromagnetic Warfare is
Support to the operations process. Ul- space attacks and electromagnetic at- clear though, the electromagnetic
timately, the role and goal of recon- tack (EA), to keep adversaries on the spectrum is a maneuver space. Similar-
naissance, security operations, and defensive.15 Further, ES missions con- ly, cyberspace operations require units
surveillance is to provide the com- duct electromagnetic reconnaissance to maneuver. These are both contested
mander with accurate and timely infor- to attain information about the dispo- environments that require identifying
mation. This information helps the sition of enemy threats in the EMS and key terrain and fighting for informa-
commander better understand and vi- modify security efforts. tion.
sualize the operating environment and
further describe, direct, lead, and as- Network surveillance is the collection Key terrain in both domains is just as
sess combat operations.10 The primary of information in cyberspace and the critical to mission success as a hilltop
source of information for the com- EMS. It is the observation of organiza- may be to ground maneuver. Retaining
mander during battle is the reconnais- tional, social, communications, cyber- it provides a marked advantage to
sance and security organization, which space, or infrastructure connections whoever holds it. However, a change in
at the theater level, is the MDEB. and relationships (FM 2-0, Intelli- traditional thinking is required as
gence). Surveillance can also include friendly and enemy forces may be oc-
Support to targeting. Targeting is the detailed information on connections cupying the same terrain, even without
process of selecting and prioritizing and relationships among individuals, knowing each other is operating in the
targets and matching an appropriate groups, and organizations, and the role same space. EMS key terrain includes
response.11 Targeting is an extenuation and importance of aspects of physical frequencies, devices, and infrastruc-
of the operations process and one of or virtual infrastructure. ture. Cyberspace key terrain includes
the three integrating processes for re- locations to gather intelligence, loca-
connaissance and security opera- The electromagnetic support task of
tions that support network connectiv-
tions.12 Cavalry organizations support direction finding is a relevant surveil-
ity, entry points to friendly networks
targeting through timely and accurate lance task. Direction finding obtains
that require defending, and locations
reporting allowing for further refine- bearings of radio frequency emitters.
friendly forces requires access to. EMS
ment of target identification and loca- Using electromagnetic support (ES)
and cyberspace have their own obsta-
tion enabling the application of capa- platforms with direction finding capa-
cles, avenues of approach, cover and
bilities or weapons systems to achieve bilities deployed in various formations
concealment, and observation/fields
a desired effect. to create a coverage area can locate
of fire to identify for both friendly forc-
enemy forces, akin to surveillance of a
es and the adversary. In this fight, step
Cyber domain, named area of interest.
1 of engagement area development is
electromagnetic warfare Cyberspace defense, cyberspace secu- still, “identify likely enemy avenues of
rity, and EP include security actions approach.”
Recon, surveillance, and security in cy-
that allow early detection and mitiga-
berspace and electromagnetic warfare. MDEB
tion of threats in cyberspace and the
The emergence of the cyber domain
EMS. During security operations, infor- Primarily envisioned as a counter anti-
and prevalence of electromagnetic
mation collected on an enemy’s course area access denial organization,16 the
warfare (EW) has driven the Joint Force
of action in cyberspace and the EMS MDEB is equipped to function as multi-
and Army to further expand the defini-
allows units to take preemptive mea- domain cavalry through the employ-
tion of these roles.
sures that prevent enemy intelligence, ment of a combination of terrestrial,
Like cavalry, cyberspace forces and EW surveillance, and reconnaissance as- air launched, and spaced based capa-
organizations’ primary purpose is to sets from determining friendly loca- bilities that operate primarily in the
enable situational understanding, pro- tions, strengths, and weaknesses. Se- EMS. 17 In alignment with FM 3-12’s
tect friendly personnel and capabili- curity operations also present oppor- electromagnetic warfare taxonomy,
ties, and to deliver effects.13 Addition- tunities to identify high value targets these platforms and capabilities can
ally, commanders use cyberspace and for future cyberspace attacks or EA. conduct the full spectrum of Electro-
EW capabilities in the same three roles Akin to the counter-reconnaissance magnetic Warfare helping the com-
as cavalry: reconnaissance, surveil- fight, Threat warning enables the com- mander to see themselves (electro-
lance and security activities. mander and staff to quickly identify magnetic protection (EP)), the enemy
immediate threats to friendly forces (electromagnetic support) and deliver
Electromagnetic reconnaissance is the and implement electronic attack and
detection, location, identification and effects (electromagnetic attack).18
electronic protection countermea-
evaluation of foreign electromagnetic sures. In the full objective build, an MDEB will
radiations (energy) (JP 3-85). Com- consist of the following: a signal com-
manders use electromagnetic recon- A common observation of units pri- pany and a military intelligence com-
naissance assets to collect information marily operating in cyberspace and the pany that are in direct support to the
in the electromagnetic spectrum electromagnetic spectrum is they are task force; an extended range sensing

66 Fall 2024
and effects company that will contain
three high altitude sections with some
form of (to be determined) high alti-
tude balloon or platform, four Class III
unmanned aerial systems, and an elec-
tromagnetic warfare section to man-
age the ES/EA payloads; and a space
company with three sections of three
crews to staff up to three Space Con-
trol Electromagnetic Warfare kits.
A fully mature MDEB will have the abil-
ity to support the Army service compo-
nent commander in achieving situa-
tional understanding through the fu-
sion of national intelligence, reconnais-
sance, surveillance and security data
with data generated by organic assets
to support the commander’s decision-
making cycle. The combination of air
launched effects, space capabilities,
and long loitering platforms and pay-
loads will extend the operational reach
of organic effects. This extended reach Figure 1. MDEB Force Structure.
enables situational understanding and
offers a high level of flexibility and syn- gaining and maintaining contact with fully integrated with the targeting cy-
chronization across all domains to the enemy forces in the EMS and using a cle through the employment of high al-
commander. Subsequent paragraphs robust sensor network to feed infor- titude and space-based electromag-
will further elaborate while the follow- mation rapidly back into the all-do- netic support sensors that provide a
ing concept map shows how the MDEB main operations center. Electromag- “persistent stare” in support of delib-
performs cavalry functions while sup- netic support sensors find and fix en- erate target development. Through the
porting the multi-domain task force’s emy electromagnetic signatures allow- layering of electromagnetic support ca-
(MDTF) synchronization of multi-do- ing the commander to gain a better un- pabilities, the MDEB can tip and
main operations and targeting func- derstanding of the enemy disposition queues assets to develop and refine
tions. and feed that information back into targeting data for MDTF organic effects
How the MDEBs perform reconnais- the targeting process for follow on ki- or drive target nomination at the task
sance operations. Given the nature of netic or non-kinetic effects. Addition- force, joint and national levels.
electromagnetic reconnaissance, the ally, the MDEB uses electromagnetic Surveillance and target development
MDEB almost exclusively conducts area attack sensors to develop the situation in competition. In competition, sur-
reconnaissance oriented on enemy by stimulating enemy capabilities to veillance allows for the deliberate de-
forces operating within named areas of aid in identification or canalize them velopment of target packets through
interest across the strategic deep area. into a specific posture or means of target identification and discovery
In competition and crisis, the MDEB communication to achieve other ef- along with vulnerability analysis pro-
enables intermediate target develop- fects. vided by intelligence and cyber ana-
ment and follow-on non-lethal refer- MDEBs inherently operate as multi-do- lysts. This supports the development
ence points in support of the geo- main teams, or cells, that replicate the of concept of operation packets and
graphic combatant command. In con- combined arms air-ground teams in specific electromagnetic attack and cy-
flict, the MDEB supports the opera- the sense that they employ cyber, EW, ber tools that can be prepared ahead
tions process by answering priority in- and space assets with a variety of plat- of crisis and conflict.
telligence requirements through the forms and capabilities. The composi- Surveillance and targeting in crisis and
positioning of launched effects and air- tion, size and scope of these teams can conflict. In crisis and conflict, the sur-
borne electromagnetic warfare assets vary depending on mission, target set, veillance capabilities of the MDEB pro-
to identify the position, composition, and range required. The MDEB also can vide the initial que for follow-on air
and intent of enemy forces homing in partner with special operations forces, launched effects and airborne sensors
on their electromagnetic signatures. expeditionary cyber teams, security that converge to provide refined tar-
The MDEB provides additional recon- force assistance brigades, other part- geting data for organic and external
naissance and security capability to the ners and allies to further extend oper- fires and effects. MDEB sensors and
Joint Force to offset the dispersion of ational reach, placement and access to non-kinetic effects capabilities inte-
signals intelligence collection assets.19 overcome reconnaissance gaps when grate with the Joint Targeting Cycle and
limited to organic assets. Air Tasking Order cycle to find, fix,
Principles of reconnaissance. While
not all inclusive, the MDEB adheres to How the MDEBs conduct surveillance track and on-order engage.
the fundamentals of reconnaissance by in support of targeting. The MDEB is How the MDEBs perform security

67 Fall 2024
operations. While it is easy to see how the protected force and allows for ad- and accurate warning about the ene-
the MDEBs perform reconnaissance ditional force protection and emission my. Viewed as a maneuver force, the
and surveillance, visualizing how they control measures to be put in place re- MDEB actively conducts reconnais-
perform security operations is a little ducing the threat of enemy contact sance and security operations in con-
more abstract. As previously pointed and observation in the EMS. Limited flict to help commanders ascertain ad-
out, security operations differ from re- electromagnetic attack capabilities versary aims, gain initiative and ulti-
connaissance in that they orient on the also allow for counter reconnaissance mately present dilemmas for the ad-
protected force. The MDEB’s ability to to defeat or disrupt enemy EMS recon- versary.
conduct security operations provides naissance elements and capabilities.
the commander with reaction time and Likewise, the DCO mission elements LTC Aaron Ritzema is the commander,
maneuver space through a combina- screen the key cyber terrain of organic 2nd Multi-Domain Effects Battalion, 2nd
tion of defensive cyber operations and and theater level network and cyber Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF), Wi-
defensive electromagnetic attack capa- assets providing early warning of com- esbaden Germany. His previous assign-
bilities. These teams and assets can promise and coordinating and synchro- ments include Presidential Communi-
perform a variety of support and pro- nizing cyber effects to neutralize or de- cations Officer/J6 – White House Com-
tection functions in cyber and the EMS feat enemy cyber elements. munications Agency, Joint Base Ana-
buying the commander decision space costia Bolling, Washington D.C.; battal-
to react to the enemy’s disposition, un- Conclusion ion S-3/executive officer, 30 th Signal
anticipated actions, and further devel- Battalion, 516th Signal Brigade, Scho-
The MDEBs are uniquely postured to field Barracks, HI; brigade S-6, 25th In-
opments in the strategic deep. The become the cavalry of the future by fantry Division Sustainment Brigade,
MDEB’s Information Defense company adding additional depth to the Joint Schofield Barracks; and commander,
executes security operations in the cy- Force Land Component Commander’s
ber domain and EMS through the de- Headquarters and Headquarters Com-
ability to gain and maintain contact pany, 52nd Engineer Battalion, Fort
fensive electromagnetic attack platoon through the electromagnetic spec-
and three defensive cyber operations Carson, CO. LTC Ritzema’s military
trum, developing the situation rapidly, schools include Signal Officer Basic
(DCO) mission elements. and feed information into the opera- Course, Signal Captains Career Course,
The defensive electromagnetic attack tions process and targeting cycle. and the Command and General Staff
element enables the MDEB to perform Officer College. He has a bachelor’s of
counter reconnaissance and electro- The MDEB is capable of far more than science degree in electrical engineering
magnetic counter measure tasks to support through just intelligence and from the U.S. Military Academy, West
prevent the enemy from determining surveillance. While finding, fixing, and Point, NY; and a master’s of arts degree
friendly locations, strengths, and weak- tracking the enemy is a large part of in information technology manage-
nesses by protecting and screening the that, the MDEB can also determine en- ment from Webster University.
electromagnetic signature of friendly emy strengths, weaknesses, disposi-
forces. They provide early warning to tion, and intentions and provide early LTC Thomas Burns is the deputy

Figure 2. MDEB as cavalry concept map. (U.S. Army graphic)

68 Fall 2024
commander, 2nd MDTF. His previous as- Reconnaissance: Lessons from a Marine Electronic Warfare, and Space (I2CEWS)
signments include commander, 4th Bat- Corps Exercise in the Mojave Desert - Operational and Organizational Concept
talion, 39 th Infantry Regiment, Fort Modern War Institute (westpoint.edu). 2019-2024 v0.9 DRAFT.
Jackson, SC; chief, Exercise Control 2
MG John B. Richardson IV, and MAJ John 7
Chief of Staff Paper #1, Army Multi-Do-
Group, Operations Group, Joint Multi- T. Pelham IV, “The Division Cross-Domain main Transformation, Ready to Win in
national Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Task Force,” ARMOR magazine Fall 2023, Competition and Conflict, https://army-
Germany; Cavalry Squadron S-3 Ob- pages 16-19. pubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/
U.S. Army FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and ARN32547-SD_01_CSA_PAPER-01-000-
server/Coach/Trainer, Grizzly Team, 3

Security Operations, Jan. 10, 2023, Para WEB-1.pdf

Joint Multinational Readiness Center,
Hohenfels; S-3/executive officer, 1 st 1-5. 8
FM 3-12, Cyberspace Operations and
FM 3-90, Tactics, May 1, 2023, Para 12- Electromagnetic Warfare, Aug. 24, 2021,
Squadron, 7th Cavalry Regiment, Fort 4

1. para 2-8.
Cavasos, TX; and commander, Troop A
and Headquarters and Headquarters 5
FM 17-95: Cavalry Operations (Super-
19
Cyber Center of Excellence, 120-Day
seded), Dec. 24, 1996, Paragraph 1-1. Study of U.S. Army Electromagnetic War-
Troop, 2nd Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regi-
fare, Cyberspace Operations, and Infor-
ment, Schofield Barracks. He served in 6
Joint Publication (JP) 2-0, Joint Intelli- mation Advantage Capabilities and Or-
combat with the 3rd Battalion, 21st In- gence, May 26, 2022. ganizations, Coordinating DRAFT, Oct. 14,
fantry Regiment; 4th Squadron, 2nd Cav- 7
JP 3-85, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum 2023.
alry Regiment; and 2nd Squadron, 14th Operations, May 22, 2020.
Cavalry Regiment. LTC Burns’ military 8
JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations,
schools include Armor Officer Basic June 18, 2022.
Course, Maneuver Captains Career 9
U.S. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP)
Course, and the Command and Gener- 3-90, Offense and Defense, July 31, 2019.
al Staff College. He has a bachelor’s of 0
FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security Acronym Quick-Scan
arts degree in political science from Operations, Jan. 10, 2023, Para 1-7.
Boston College and a master’s of arts ADP – Army Doctrine Publication
1
JP 3-0, Joint Campaigns and Operations,
degree in international relations from June 18, 2022. DCO – defensive cyber operations
Princeton University. He is a recipient EA – electromagnetic attack
of the orders of Saint George (Bronze
2
FM 3-98, Reconnaissance and Security
Operations, Jan. 10, 2023, Para 3-123. EMS – electromagnetic spectrum
Medallion) and Saint Maurice. ES – electromagnetic support
3
FM 3-12, Cyberspace Operations and EW – electromagnetic warfare
Notes Electromagnetic Warfare, Aug. 24, 2021,
FM – field manual
1
Sean Parrott and Anthony Perez, “The para 1-7.
JP – Joint Publication
Future of Army Reconnaissance: Lessons 4
Ibid, para 4-15, 4-48. MDEB – multi-domain effects
from a Marine Corps Exercise in the Mo- Ibid, para 4-15.
5
battalion
jave Desert,” Modern War Institute,
March 31, 2023, The Future of Army
6
Intelligence, Information, Cyberspace, MDTF – multi-domain task force

Figure 3. MDEB as Theater Cavalry – Reconnaissance in Depth.

69 Fall 2024
 Putting the ‘C’ Back in BCT:
Creating Change Agents Through Initiative
by COL Scott C. White and about how “we” make things the abso- by the 193rd Infantry Brigade, focused
CSM Jonathan M. Duncan lute best that they can be. on warrior tasks and battle drills (with
Throughout 2023, the 193 rd Infantry a primacy on marksmanship), tactical
In a message to our Army team Oct. 26, discipline, grit, physical fitness, and
2023, GEN Randy A. George, the 41st Brigade at Fort Jackson, SC, focused
heavily on creating a warfighting mind- teamwork. This field training exercise
Army Chief of Staff, reinforced that our (FTX) is executed within a 72-hour, sce-
enduring purpose as a force is to fight set and culture within our trainees and
cadre. This transition aligned with GEN nario-driven format and led by drill
and win our nation’s wars. He further sergeants.1
stated that to do this we must stay George’s vision of bringing warfighting
grounded and dedicate our energy in back to the forefront of our profession We aimed to produce not just Soldiers
four focus areas: warfighting, deliver- and was already in motion within Ini- but incredibly proud warfighters who
ing combat-ready formations, continu- tial Military Training (IMT) when he be- were ready and able to be value added
ous transformation, and strengthening came the Army Chief of Staff. Due to to our profession’s purpose, and ready
the profession. the changing character of war, MG to fight and win our nation’s wars. As
John D. Kline, commanding general recently attested to by a battalion
As of 2022, basic combat training (BCT) (CG) of the U.S. Army’s Center for Ini- command sergeant major in the 193rd,
lacked a focus on sustained ground tial Military Training (CIMT), envi- “We’re now running continuous oper-
combat and failed to prepare new Sol- sioned a BCT environment that im- ations in austere conditions, and you
diers for large-scale combat operations mersed cadre and trainees within a can almost see a company of light In-
(LSCO). It was challenging but concen- scenario-driven LSCO environment. fantrymen by the time we get them
trated on events rather than tactical- This vision was further discussed with back to Hilton Field. They’re tired,
based training which better prepares IMT senior leaders for several months dirty, hungry — and most importantly,
new Soldiers to fight and survive on before MG Jason E. Kelly, the CG of proud of what they were able to ac-
the modern battlefield. As the charac- Army Training Center and Fort Jackson complish during those 72 hours. I in-
ter of war changes, so must our train- (ATCFJ), tasked the 193rd Infantry Bri- clude our drill sergeants in that pool of
ing strategies, leader development, gade to develop a BCT training concept people as well. You can clearly see the
and resulting culture. Change is a dif- that better prepared new Soldiers for amount of pride they have during the
ficult process, as “it’s the way we have LSCO. MG Kelly’s guidance focused on Soldier Induction Ceremony when
always done it” clouds the thoughts of increasing individual survivability and they’re slapping ‘Star’ patches on new
some practitioners and creates road- ensuring the nation’s largest BCT en- Soldiers.” Forge 2.5 is not about a
blocks. By giving subordinate elements terprise was not only “Making Ameri- change to the program of instruction
and external entities significant initia- can Soldiers” but “Making Our Ameri- (POI). It’s about a change in mindset,
tives to own, develop, and create solu- can Soldiers Better.” This evolution, en- through which we are creating a warf-
tions for, change becomes less about visioned by MG Kline, embraced by MG ighting culture among trainees and
the new idea from “them” and more Kelly, and operationalized as Forge 2.5 cadre. Simply put, Forge 2.5 puts the
CUI “C” back in BCT!
FORGE 2.5 Lines of Effort Refocus on warfighting
BEGINING STATE
Logistics H2F
TSC Package
Validation
DESIRED STATE
The process within the 193rd Infantry
1. No standardized logistics
package developed for BN/CO.
1. Established BDE standardized package and
timeline.
Brigade began in early April 2023 with
2. H2F disconnected
form tactical portion of BCT.
SUPPORT 2. H2F integrated into FTX preparation,
execution, and recovery.
a brigade commander/command ser-
DESIRED STATE
geant major (CSM) whiteboard session
1. LPD’s are LSCO focused. Exportable
package to guide training throughout cycle.
and the establishment of the Forge 2.5
LTB DSA
1.
BEGINING STATE
LPD’s are not LSCO focused.
2. Each company has standardized Cadre
certification binders tracking progress and
operational planning team (OPT). This
2. Cadre certification is either not
implemented and not 3.
certification timeline.
Co CDR/1SG course and PCC discusses council was made up of senior drill ser-
LEADER DEVELOPMENT
3.
standardized.
LTB does not integrate the Co
tactical duties and responsibility using Forge
2.5 overview. geants from each of the five BCT bat-
talions in the brigade and led by a com-
CDR/1SG course and PCC. 4. The DSA curriculum supports tactical
baseline knowledge and tactical leadership
exposure.
5. BRIC incorporates tactical and RM classes.
Refined FORGE 2.5 curriculum including
pany commander from 2nd Battalion,
Establish OPFOR Road to BCT
scenario introduction. 13th Infantry Regiment. This group of
1.
BEGINNING STATE
No standardized scenario.
Scenario Package War Execution
experienced professionals met
throughout that month, operating with
2. No standardized enemy threat. DESIRED STATE
3. No standardized plan for 1. Global/Enemy situation inject timeline and
SCENARIO support package standardized by echelon.
initial guidance from the brigade com-
OPFOR.
4. No standard order or plan for 2. Exportable synchronized plan for OPFOR
resource utilization. manning and TASC equipment usage/set up.
mander to embed a tactical focus, de-
Logistics – BDE S4, CPT Turner H2F – 2-13, LTC Hargrove
LOE LEADS:
LPDs – 1-13, LTC Messenger LTB – 3-60, LTC Parker DSA – 3-60, CSM Kern fined as noise and light discipline, per-
Cadre Certification – 1-13, CSM Gudiel BRIC – 120th, LTC Boler / CSM Aquaowo Scenario – 2-60, LTC Bailey / CSM Henderson sonal and positional camouflage, to-
OPFOR – 3-13, LTC Hurdle standard fighting positions, security,
and situational awareness within the
Figure 1. Forge 2.5 Lines of Effort. (U.S. Army graphic) 1
CUI

70 Fall 2024
Forge with drill sergeants, fulfilling the
roles of squad leaders and platoon ser-
geants, leading trainees through. Bat-
talion staffs were to deploy to the field
to establish tactical operations centers
and perform their duties in a quasi-
wartime manner. Every Forge iteration
was to be evaluated utilizing training
and evaluation outlines by a brigade-
level evaluation team to enable contin-
ued refinement through each battal-
ion-level execution. The Forge was to
remain 72 hours in duration and all POI
tasks were to be completed, but signif-
icant work was needed to transition
the existing event-driven administra-
tive exercise into a true tactical FTX
built around a LSCO scenario. Figure 2 - Overview of Forge 2.5 scenario injects. (U.S. Army graphic)
The OPT developed a viable plan and
briefed it to the brigade commander operationalized with input from six the Forge 2.5 concept. Out of the three
and CSM on April 27, 2023. The impor- battalions and many entities external major BCT installations (Fort Jackson;
tant work conducted by the OPT’s to the brigade, and thus the initiative Fort Leonard Wood, MO; and Fort Sill,
NCOs started to steer the aircraft car- became transformational vice transac- OK) only Fort Jackson operationalizes
rier into the necessary direction. The tional. BCT at the battalion level. This makes
first and second iterations of the tran- Fort Jackson’s throughput much great-
sitional Forge were conducted by 2-13 As the brigade iterated through execu-
er but also puts a battalion command-
Infantry and 2nd Battalion, 60th Infantry tions of the Forge with each battalion,
er, CSM, and the requisite support staff
Regiment from May 15-18 and July 10- the lack of an overarching LSCO-fo-
on top of every Soldier’s initial military
13, 2023, respectively. They were not cused scenario proved to be problem-
training experience. The differences
without serious setbacks though; the atic. It prevented the creation of real-
between levels of command involved
most significant of which were the ism and detracted from the purpose of
created some skepticism to this initia-
identification of structural shortcom- the enhanced FTX. The U.S. Army Train-
tive at first. The 3rd Battalion, 13th In-
ings within the brigade and a realiza- ing and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
fantry and 3-60 Infantry commanders
tion of major deficiencies in the basic G-2 became the brigade’s main effort
conducted site surveys at Fort Leonard
tactical knowledge of our cadre. We for enabling the achievement of train-
Wood and Fort Sill respectively to bet-
addressed these by developing lines of ing realism and scenario immersion.
ter understand their operating condi-
effort (LOEs) focused on increasing Coordination between the 2-60 Infan-
tions and procedures. From their visits,
structural support to the battalions try command team and the TRADOC
the brigade acquired a wealth of
and the tactical competence of the G-2 led to the development of an over-
knowledge that enabled them to meet
cadre. arching global scenario, informed by
the exportability intent. Accordingly,
the National Defense Strategy, that
over the course of two BCT cycles, 3-60
The brigade executive officer led the provided the operational framework,
Infantry developed and implemented
staff in the development of three through the backdrop of a series of
a concept by which four companies op-
broad LOEs identified as essential in nine scenario injects that added train-
erated detached from the battalion
moving forward with the Forge 2.5 pro- ing realism and tactical purpose to ev-
throughout the execution of the Forge
cess. (See Figure 1). The LOEs served ery BCT event, starting with reception
and its preparatory tactical FTXs. This
two major roles: to push the brigade (see Figure 2).
important initiative proved the support
from current state to desired state and In addition to the important LSCO sce- received by the battalion headquarters
to design an improved Forge with input nario contributions, 2-60 Infantry de- could be provided at echelon by the
from as many stakeholders as possible, veloped the brigade’s overarching company, and that the level of com-
while using as many of our mission-en- friendly situation and the battalion lin- mand in control of the exercise had no
hancing resources as practical. This ear defense concept. This was not measurable impact on the focus, train-
process, although cumbersome at without debate within the brigade, but ing value, or supportability of Forge
times, gave every battalion within the a standardized execution enabled a 2.5.
brigade (as well as key stakeholders ex- quicker organizational transition and
ternal to the brigade) an active role in The 120th Adjutant General (AG) Battal-
provided for more accurate and consis-
the transformation process. The result ion is charged with receiving and in-
tent evaluations. Henceforth, every
of this approach was increased under- processing upwards of 30,000 civilians
193rd unit conducting the Forge, ex-
standing, a sense of extreme owner- annually who are destined for both the
cept for 3-60 Infantry, would establish
ship, and a culture that encouraged 193rd and 165th Infantry Brigades. Un-
a battalion linear defense.
and incentivized creativity and proac- der the legacy BCT culture, the 120th
tive solutions. What began as the vi- From the outset, MG Kelly was laser fo- AG was where Fort Jackson welcomed
sion of the CIMT CG was cused on ensuring the exportability of civilians into the Army. As the

71 Fall 2024
warfighting culture within BCT began opportunity to introduce the unit’s his- holistic plan that progressed weekly
to take root and develop, the battalion tory and lead trainees through physi- throughout cycle reset and the weeks
identified an opportunity to introduce cally demanding tactical tasks. The ear- of BCT leading up to the Forge. This
the newly arrived civilians into the con- ly inculcation enables their absolute LPD plan provided cadre the education
cept of scenario-based training, begin connection to the Army’s past and fu- necessary to break the mold produced
the LSCO scenario immersion, and ture. Through the introduction to the by 20 years of the global war on terror-
more appropriately welcome these tactical scenario and our warfighting ism (GWOT). It enabled them to think
new trainees into their future warfight- profession in reception, built upon and act in preparation for the next war
ing profession. Scenario injects, battle- through a refined structured and disci- instead of being anchored to the les-
focused discussions, and physical train- plined pickup, and then codified sons learned from the GWOT. Simulta-
ing were easily threaded into the stan- throughout BCT, realism, purpose, and neously, 1-13 Infantry worked diligent-
dard reception tasks to immediately
pride emerged to replace anxiety and ly to identify the key tasks that were
provide a stronger sense of purpose
confusion. imperative for cadre to master. This re-
and increased excitement and pride
about what these trainees had com- sulted in the creation of a certification
As in any tactical FTX, the presence and
mitted to accomplish during the next process that succeeded in enabling all
realistic use of opposing forces (OP-
10 weeks. cadre, no matter their military occupa-
FORs) within Forge 2.5 became essen-
tional specialty (MOS), to embody
tial. The enemy concept, created by
While working to transform how we competence and confidence as tactical
the TRADOC G-2, called for a Southeast
welcome civilians into our warfighting leaders.
Asia-focused threat situation with a fic-
profession, the 120th AG also refocused titious country named Olvana. With Although the leadership within the bri-
the brigade’s permanent party on- the assistance of the Fort Jackson gade developed effective solutions to
boarding mechanism, the Bayonet Re- Training Support Center (TSC), 3-13 In- the immediate concerns uncovered
ception and Integration Course (BRIC). fantry developed and sourced a com- from our initial iterations of Forge 2.5,
It took a multi-day event that served as plete package of OPFOR support items: lasting change would require educa-
an administrative onboarding of new tiger stripe uniforms, pneumatic guns, tion of new cadre members before
cadre members and completely revised improvised explosive device (IED) sim- they were to fill their important roles
it by adding blocks of instruction on ri- ulators, and a full complement of Ka- within BCT. LPDs and cadre certifica-
fle marksmanship, holistic health and lashnikov assault rifles (AK-47s), Sovi- tion were enough to get us back on
fitness (H2F), and the Forge 2.5 scenar- et-type light machine guns, and rocket- track, but foundational change in our
io and expectations. This effort, cou- propelled grenade launchers. With the future cadre, instituted through the
pled with the refined reception initia- equipment packages sourced and built, Leader Training Brigade (LTB) and the
tive, began to plant the warfighting the team developed what became the U.S. Army Drill Sergeant Academy (US-
mindset in trainees and cadre before brigade’s tactics, techniques, and pro- ADSA), was necessary to create the
even arriving to BCT. cedures (TTPs) for OPFOR utilization, “competence to be confident” across
The 120th’s renewed focus on onboard- including element size, where they are every IMT installation. These efforts
ing warfighters created a desire to re- sourced from, tactical control, scenar- were spearheaded by 3-60 Infantry.
visit our standardized handoff mecha- io control, and day-by-day OPFOR mis-
Drill sergeants are masters of training
nism — structured and disciplined sion sets to ensure the training objec-
the POI and have been finely honed by
pickup. The handoff between recep- tives were achieved. Scenario immer-
the USADSA to expertly train basic Sol-
tion and the BCT battalions has sion was further solidified by 3-13 In-
dier skills. However, without a focus on
morphed through the years, but the fantry’s creation of more than 20
tactical leadership and survivability in
standard at ATCFJ developed into an World War II-inspired propaganda
LSCO, we had asked our drill sergeants
extremely professional event focused posters. These were devised and de-
(and company command teams) to en-
on Army and unit history, discipline, signed by the battalion, produced by
ter a realm where they weren’t com-
and Army Combat Fitness Test demon- TSC at Fort Eustis, VA, and posted
petent enough to be confident. There
strations. With the newly found em- around the BCT battalion and company
existed a grave delta between what
phasis on warfighting, this event again areas on Fort Jackson to immerse train-
our cadre knew and understood about
changed, but this time with the addi- ees in a realistic and well-sourced sce-
tactical leadership and where we were
tion of instilling our Army’s warfighting nario that provides added benefit to,
demanding that they go during Forge
purpose. The Army and unit histories and purpose for, every training event
2.5. Tactical leadership across the cad-
were maintained as a means of ensur- within BCT.
re spectrum was integral to bringing
ing ongoing education on the impor- realism and relevance into training,
tant feats accomplished by those who Strengthening the and the brigade’s initial Forge 2.5 iter-
had previously filled the ranks of BCT, profession ations uncovered a need for significant
while also applying these important cadre investment.
lessons learned to the present and The quest to better prepare our cadre
connecting the new crop of trainees to focused internally through the devel- The 3-60 Infantry worked hard refining
the Army’s future. Adding a LSCO-driv- opment of a LSCO-focused leader pro- and establishing the means to fully
en scenario into the disciplined pickup fessional development (LPD) program, prepare the battalion’s cadre to excel
affords drill sergeants an early led by 1-13 Infantry. They developed a as tactical drill sergeants (as squad

72 Fall 2024
 HOLIS TIC HEALTH AND FITNES S
Blu e P h a s e : FORGE 2.5
Nutrition Imagery
Objective: Ensure proper fueling during physical demanding tasks, such as foot Objective: Similar to the way dynamic stretching primes your nerves and muscles for
marches or FTX exercise, performance imagery primes your brain to be ready for mental challenges.
Skill: Increase energy intake through Modular Operation Ration Enhancement Performance imagery rehearses every step of a task, including reactions to potential
(MORE)
obstacles. This preventive action can increase confidence and improve outcomes in a
Educate: MOREs are used for fueling between meals, offering energy +
performance.
electrolytes.
Skill: Imagery
• Before: caffeinated/carbohydrate-containing items: pudding, First Strike Bar,
carb-electrolyte beverage. Apply: Try this for RM: I look at my target. I am confident and in control. Range operator
• During: carbohydrate-containing foods sustain us: dried fruit, First Strike Bar, gives the command. I load the magazine, switch from safe to semi, and take a deep
applesauce, carb-electrolyte beverage. breath. I align my target and breathe in, exhale, hold, and deliberately, smoothly squeeze
• After: protein, carbs and fats replenish the body: fruit & nut mix, toasted corn the trigger.”
kernels, filled pretzels, nuts.

Injury Prevention Grasp the Thorns

Objective: Reduce likelihood of overuse injuries during week eight of BCT Objective: Increase Ability to Endure Emotional Pain and Disappointment. Improved Spiritual
Skill: World's Greatest Stretch: Hold positions A, B, C, and D as pictured below Coping Skills and Soldier Perception of Emotional Pain Reduced.
for a period of 10 seconds each for 3 total repetitions. Alternate legs and repeat. Skill: Coping Strategy
Apply: When you have down time or used as an activation technique during Apply: FORGE week. This is the Super Bow, the World Series… the “fill in the blank sports
warmup prior to running or marching. metaphor” of Basic Combat Training. Everything you’ve trained up until this point will be tested this
week. There’s a good chance that this week will be your hardest yet. With trials or hardships, you
can build endurance and perspective. Paul, an Apostle in the New Testament counseled us to,
“Consider it pure joy, my brothers and sisters, whenever you face trials of many kinds, because you
know that the testing of your faith produces perseverance. Let perseverance finish its work so that
you may be mature and complete, not lacking anything.” Spend time this week during your ruck, or
the STX lanes, or the night infiltration course thinking about how trials have strengthened you.

Sleep Facts
Objective: Sleep is so important to performance. Researchers found that 5 nights
with less than 5 hours of sleep creates a 20% cognitive deficiency; the equivalent
of a 0.08 blood alcohol level (5 alcoholic drinks in a 180 lb. male).
Skill: Sleep
Apply: Whenever you are offered the opportunity, take advantage of sleep. Don’t
stay up at night talking, your performance will suffer.

Figure 4. This H2F smart card focuses on enabling top tier performance throughout the execution of Forge 2.5. A simi-
lar card was developed for preparation during each preceding week of BCT. (U.S. Army)
leaders and platoon sergeants leading makes them the absolute best versions able to devise a training strategy to in-
trainees in simulated combat). Their of themselves possible. As the brigade crease performance, not just in Forge
experiences were enthusiastically re- sought to create irreversible change in 2.5 but throughout BCT (see Figure 4).
ceived by the USADSA. With 3-60 In- the mindset of those within the unit, it This led to many supporting H2F initia-
fantry’s assistance, USADSA staff mem- became apparent that cadre/trainee tives, all geared towards increasing in-
bers immediately identified where investment in each of the five H2F do- dividual and collective performance,
they could evolve training and educa- mains (Mental, Sleep, Nutritional, developing a strong sense of a warf-
tion to produce not only a better drill Physical, and Spiritual) was necessary ighting purpose, increasing confidence
sergeant but a better NCO who was to reach peak performance due to the through competence, and strengthen-
ready to lead trainees in a tactical en- stress created by 72 hours of simulat- ing the sense of team at every echelon.
vironment. Similarly, 3-60 Infantry Sol- ed combat. Not only would this pre-
diers worked with LTB to investigate pare them for Forge 2.5 and empower
their portfolio and identify where they them throughout execution, it would Continuous
could assist with the endeavor. LTB’s also facilitate post-execution recovery. transformation
offerings, the TRADOC Company Com- After nearly nine months and almost
mander and First Sergeant courses and The 2-13 Infantry, in conjunction with 15 iterations of Forge 2.5, the 193rd In-
the TRADOC Pre-Command Course, the 193rd’s H2F Team, led the operation- fantry Brigade had achieved a com-
provided other essential venues to ed- alization of H2F as a mission-enhancing plete transition. Throughout the pro-
ucate and market the growing tactical element of our Forge 2.5 transition. cess, leaders at every echelon within
focus in BCT. This effort started by immersing our the brigade laid a substantial founda-
LTB developed and refined blocks of in- H2F team within the BCT environment tion of tactical knowledge and capabil-
struction to better prepare incoming throughout the cycle, while simultane- ity within their cadre.
command teams for the new training ously instituting full five-domain as-
environment. The efforts with the US- sessments on the brigade’s entire cad- The combination of the BRIC, LPDs,
ADSA and LTB, led by 3-60 Infantry, re- re population. The assessments edu- cadre certification, and USADSA and
sulted in institutional change that en- cated cadre on their performance blind LTB instructional modifications, assess-
sured cadre and leader training spots, while the immersion enabled ments, and battalion/company-level
evolved at pace with the changing the H2F team to assess the physical training improvements laid the ground-
character of war. and mental demands on both trainees work for the added complexity that
and BCT cadre. Once the subject mat- was necessary to complete the LSCO-
H2F is a powerful weapon in the Sol- ter experts understood the stressors focused transition and incorporate les-
dier’s arsenal, the application of which on both cadre and trainees, they were sons learned from the ongoing war in

73 Fall 2024
Ukraine such as the use of small un- battle drill for usage in OSUT, which In a defensive scenario, the emphasis
manned aerial systems (sUAS). sparked further refinement and devel- was put on overhead concealment us-
opment for usage at BCT. Furthermore, ing natural vegetation. While patrolling
Since their first usage in the GWOT,
they trained and certified ATCFJ’s first or stationary in the open, vertically
sUAS have continued to become ever
operators (one from each brigade). The aligning oneself against a tree trunk
more present throughout global con-
U.S. Army Sniper School assisted 193rd enabled the usage of the tree’s branch-
flicts. From Syria to Ukraine, sUAS have
leadership with understanding how es to conceal the Soldier from obser-
proven to be a normal aspect of mod-
best to defeat detection through the vation. While “seeking cover” often-
ern warfare, and with that, they have
application of basic tactical skills, such times involves laying prone, in a sUAS
reinforced the need for the basic tacti-
as personal and positional camouflage, scenario a horizontal body is much eas-
cal skills that Forge 2.5 produces as
noise and light discipline, cover/con- ier to observe from the air than a ver-
part of the foundation of our warfight-
cealment, situational awareness, secu- tical one.
ers. The inclusion of sUAS in BCT pro-
rity, and proper tactical movement (all
vided a means by which cadre could
important basic tasks to be trained in Delivering combat ready
train and reinforce foundational tacti-
cal skills, using real-world threat sce-
BCT). Soldiers for modern war
narios to provide the “why” behind By incorporating a LSCO scenario and
Open-source lessons learned from
tasks inherent to individual survival on continuous tactical operations, the
Ukraine illustrate sUAS being used pri-
the modern battlefield. Reacting to Forge became purposeful, realistic,
marily in two ways: to identify adver-
sUAS is as important to the individual and more challenging; ensured a firm-
sary formations and to drop munitions
Soldier today as the GWOT’s signature er foundation of basic skills within our
or spot for artillery. The 193rd’s use of
“5s & 25s” were to individual avoid- trainees; and empowered our cadre
sUAS within Forge 2.5 followed these
ance of IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan. and staffs to develop as leaders. By fo-
two tactical applications, and hence,
The 193rd’s quest for realism and rele- our mitigation techniques focused to- cusing on the foundational tactical
vance through the inclusion of sUAS wards diminishing a sUAS’s ability to skills of noise and light discipline, per-
began with cross talking and visits with identify forces to target. This was con- sonal and positional camouflage, to-
the 197th and 198th Infantry Brigades, ducted primarily through reinforcing standard fighting positions, security,
as well as cadre from the U.S. Army the foundational tactical standards and situational awareness (including
Sniper Course, all under the Maneuver called for initially in Forge 2.5: noise SA of aerial threats), it creates an en-
Center of Excellence at Fort Moore, and light discipline, personal and posi- try-level Soldier with the skills inherent
GA. The 197th and 198th conduct Infan- tional camouflage, to-standard fighting to survive on the modern battlefield.
try One Station Unit Training (OSUT) positions (including overhead conceal- As the process began, it was evident
and have spearheaded sUAS usage ment), security, and situational aware- that change within a TRADOC BCT bri-
within their training evolutions for al- ness (SA). The brigade developed two gade materialized like the turn of an
most a year. The OSUT brigades shared reactions to sUAS that were passive in aircraft carrier. But serious change
valuable lessons learned with refer- nature, did not call for engaging the needed to happen, and it needed to
ence to gaining approval for sUAS in platforms, and required no specialized take place on a compressed timeline
the airspace, training of operators, and equipment or skills. These reactions much more like the turn of a speed
the implementation of sUAS in train- address the types of sUAS contact in boat. Every BCT cycle that graduated
ing. Additionally, they developed and the individual Soldier task framework before we could accomplish it was an-
implemented the first react to sUAS that is essential in BCT (see Figure 5). other 800­-1,200 new Soldiers who
were not prepared for the wars that
might lie ahead. They would be disci-
plined and fit yet would lack the tacti-
cal foundation necessary to survive in
LSCO. A team comprised of these Sol-
diers would be sub-optimal on the
modern battlefield, regardless of their
combat mission.

As illustrated throughout the preced-

ing text, creating a warfighting mindset
in BCT was a whole of brigade effort.
Every battalion had an essential piece
of the initiative. Change started with
guidance from a few but was planned
for, refined, and operationalized by a
brigade staff, six incredibly talented
battalion command teams and their re-
Figure 5. sUAS photos of trainees during exercise Forge 2.5. (U.S. Army) spective formations, as well as a few

74 Fall 2024
key external stake holders (USADSA, Company, 2 nd Battalion, 3 rd Special Cavalry Regiment; first sergeant of Iron
LTB, TSC). Forces Group (A). COL White’s military Troop, 3rd Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regi-
schools include the Infantry Officer Ba- ment; and first sergeant of Headquar-
These types of initiatives are difficult
sic Course, Airborne School, Ranger ters and Headquarters Company, 1 st
and not without resistance from cadre
School, Special Forces Qualification Battalion, 29th Infantry Regiment. CSM
who operated under the antiquated
Course, Static Line Jumpmaster Course, Duncan’s military schools include Com-
and process-driven FTXs. A clear vision
Military Freefall Course, Military Freef- bat Lifesavers Course, Basic Leaders
and initiative ownership at the lowest
all Jumpmaster Course, Military Tan- Course, Army Combatives Level 1
echelons are essential to transforma-
dem and Tethered Bundle Course, Spe- Course, Advanced Leaders Course,
tional change, both increasing relevan-
cial Forces Advanced Reconnaissance Pathfinder Course, U.S. Army Recon-
cies now and in the future. This pro-
Target Analysis and Exploitation Tech- naissance and Surveillance Leaders
cess has created incredibly proud warf-
niques Course, Special Forces Sniper Course, Battle Staff Course, Senior
ighters who are ready, able, and capa-
Course, Combined Arms and Services Leader Course, Mechanized Leader
ble of taking on the responsibility of
Staff School, Intermediate Level Educa- M2A3 Course, Air Assault Course,
our Profession of Arms to fight and win
tion/ Advanced Operations Warfight- Stryker Brigade Combat Leader Course,
our nation’s wars.
ing Course, and SSC. He holds a mas- Company Commander / First Sergeant
At the time this article was written, ter’s of science degree in defense anal- Course, Master Resilience Training
COL Scott C. White served as the com- ysis/irregular warfare from the Naval Course, U.S. Army Sergeants Major
mander of the 193rd Infantry Brigade at Post Graduate School, a master’s de- Academy, Battalion Pre-Command/
Fort Jackson, SC. He currently serves as gree in strategic studies from the U.S. Command Sergeant Major Course,
the U.S. Army Special Operations Com- Army War College and a bachelor’s of Command Sergeant Major Develop-
mand G-3. His former assignments in- arts degree in political science from ment Program Follow-On Battalion,
clude serving as the assistant chief of The Citadel. TRADOC Brigade/Battalion Command-
staff, G-3 for the U.S. Army John F. Ken- er Sergeant Major Pre-Command
nedy Special Warfare Center and CSM Jonathan M. Duncan is the com- Course, and the Command Sergeant
School; commander of 6th Battalion, 1st mand sergeant major of the 193rd In- Major Development Program Follow-
Special Warfare Training Group (Air- fantry Brigade. His former assignments On Brigade. He holds a master’s of sci-
borne); operations officer for 2nd Bat- include command sergeant major of 1st ence degree in human resources and
talion, 3 rd Special Forces Group (A); Battalion, 34th Infantry Regiment; op- organization development from the
commander of Delta Company, 2nd Bat- erations sergeant major in 1st Battal- University of Louisville, a bachelor’s of
talion, 1 st Special Warfare Training ion, 6th Infantry Regiment; operations science degree in organizational lead-
Group (A); and commander of Charlie sergeant major in 3 rd Squadron, 2 nd ership from the University of Louisville,

Figure 6. Soldiers in training from the 193rd Infantry Brigade occupy a fighting position at Fort Jackson, SC. (U.S. Army
photo courtesy of 3rd Battalion, 60th Infantry Regiment).

75 Fall 2024
and associates degree in liberal arts
from Barton County Community Col- Acronym Quick-Scan
lege.
AG – adjutant general LSCO – large-scale combat
ATCFJ – Army Training Center and operations
Notes Fort Jackson LTB – Leader Training Brigade
BCT – basic combat training OPFOR – opposing force
1
Emphasis added to highlight a major
BRIC – Bayonet Reception and OPT – operational planning team
shift in how drill sergeants operate. A Integration Course OSUT – One Station Unit Training
key aspect of this warfighting focus is CG – commanding general POI – program of instruction
drill sergeants leading as squad lead- CIMT – Center for Initial Military SA – situational awareness
ers and platoon sergeants. As they Training sUAS – small unmanned aerial
transition from trainers to leaders, CSM – command sergeant major system
they show trainees true NCO leader- FTX – field training exercise TRADOC – U.S. Army Training and
GWOT – global war on terrorism Doctrine Command
ship and what it can accomplish.
H2F – holistic health and fitness TSC – Training Support Center
IED – improvised explosive device USADSA – U.S. Army Drill Sergeant
IMT – initial military training Academy
LPD – leader professional
development

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From the ARMOR art archive: “Lessons from OIF”

77 Fall 2024
BOOK REVIEWS
material – is bound to catch my imme- The book has satisfactory maps. Com-
diate attention. Pen and Sword, a pub- pared to the maps in most books of
lisher of sometimes topics more off David Glantz’s, they are easier on the
the beaten histography path, recently eye, covering all three Wehrmacht
released Barbarossa through Soviet army groups in Operation Barbarossa.
Eyes: The First Twenty-Four Hours. The reader gets nine pages of various
Russian figures, from Joseph Stalin
Author Artem Drabkin catches your at- down through the ranks. The overall
tention from the first, telling us that resolution quality of the black-and-
his father was an infantry-platoon white photographs is quite good com-
commander in Barbarossa, wounded pared to many Soviet World War II
seriously but survived the war. Many photographs. The opening chapter “If
of us can relate to hearing such tales War Comes Tomorrow” pulls no
as his father and his comrades related,
Barbarossa through Soviet Eyes: The punches in discussing the army purges
as they are family history, though
First Twenty-Four Hours by Artem – led by the NKVD and instigated by
many veterans disclose little. Drabkin
Drabkin and Alexei Isaev; English text Stalin – with a good graph detailing it.
as a homage to the Lost generation of
by Christopher Summerville; United But with this opening chapter, we see
World War II-era Soviets created the I
Kingdom: Pen and Sword Books; 2012; the author’s inability to apply some
Remember Website (see https://ire-
228 pages; table of contents, index, rigorous discipline to “pruning” remi-
member.ru/en/), a collection of some
photographs, maps, order of battle niscences.
4,000-plus Russian interviews and 400
and sources; $16 (hard cover), $2.99 of other nationalities, broken out by This inability leads at times to several
Kindle. If there is such a thing as click- fields (confirmed to me in an email pages from soldiers. If this was, say,
bait for folks in the Armor community, from Drabkin). Of course, we found Dr. Craig Luther’s superb work on
it is often the Ost Front of World War the reminiscences of Russian tankers Army Group Center in Barbarossa –
II. How can it not be when the most in- to be the most interesting, but the site which is a hefty tome – that would be
teresting tanks were there? When ca- won’t disappoint. (I can say that with no problem, but as this work is under
sualty figures were like those out of some assurance, based on duty posi- 200 pages, the lengthy anecdotical
some pulp military science-fiction tions ranging from Military History De- material begins to feel too much like
thriller? Soviet tank losses are some- tachment commander, responsible for filler. The reason, however, that you
where estimated in the low 8,000s to hundreds of interviews from the 9/11 can’t fully dismiss Barbarossa through
more than 100,000 for a loss rate of Pentagon attack, through my Army Soviet Eyes is that the author makes a
perhaps 650 tanks per day. and U.S. Central Command historian valiant attempt to give us a Cliff Notes
It is for that reason, reading anything duties that lasted to my retirement version of Barbarossa. The smattering
from truly the other side of the hill – during the Global War on Terrorism of graphs and some heretofore-un-
comprised of fresh Soviet archival era.) seen pictures by this reviewer indicat-
ed to me that the author was not sim-
ply mailing in his work. So how does
the verdict come down on Barbarossa
through Soviet Eyes? To be fair to it, I
read it twice, as my first gut reaction
was one of ambivalence. It was better
with a second reading. It is a tough
balancing act to judiciously edit the in-
terviews to extract the meaningful sto-
ry line and not allow it to ramble.
The book doesn’t need a draconian
edit, but perhaps more context could
be given for certain vignettes and less
overkill with better editing of the “I
was there” that often wandered “lost
in the woods.” Having said that, it is an
interesting read even as you try and
weed out genuine stories from those
NIINISALO TRAINING AREA, Finland – U.S. Army SSG Zachary Sobeck, as- that perhaps still smack of Soviet re-
signed to 4th Squadron, 2nd Cavalry Regiment, takes aim with his M-4A1 car- gime think. Still, the story of modern
bine, while conducting dismounted reconnaissance movements during Exer- warfare as told by these Russians is as
cise Arrow 22 at Niinisalo Training Area, Finland, May 6, 2022. (U.S. Army timeless as Homer’s Odessey.
Photo by SPC Garrison Waites, 5th Mobile Public Affairs Detachment) Retired LTC (DR.) Robert G. Smith

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From the ARMOR art archive: “The Battle of Cambrai”

79 Fall 2024
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80 Summer 2024
PB 17-24-2 Headquarters, Department of the Army
PIN : 219267-000 Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited