ABDELAZIZ BOUTEFLIKA
Abdelaziz Bouteflika (About this sound pronunciation (help·info);
Arabic: [ عبد العزيز بوتفليقةʕaːbd lʕziz butfliqa]; born 2 March
1937) is an Algerian politician who has been the fifth President of
Algeria since 1999.[1] He was Minister of Foreign Affairs from
1963 to 1979. As President, he presided over the end of the bloody
Algerian Civil War in 2002, and he ended emergency rule in
February 2011 amidst regional unrest. He has also served as
president of the United Nations General Assembly.
Protests in Algeria took place between 2010 and 2012; protesters demanded a regime change, as
well as solutions to problems with unemployment, corruption, restrictions of freedom of speech,
and poor living conditions.
In November 2012, he surpassed Houari Boumediene as the longest-serving president of Algeria.
Family
Abdelaziz Bouteflika was born on 2 March 1937. He was the first child of his mother and the
second child of his father (Fatima, his half-sister, preceded him). His father (Ahmed Bouteflika)
and mother (Mansouria Ghezlaoui) originated from the region of Tlemcen, Algeria.[2] Bouteflika
has three half-sisters (Fatima, Yamina, and Aïcha), as well as four brothers (Abdelghani,
Mustapha, Abderahim and Saïd) and one sister (Latifa). Saïd serves as Abdelaziz Bouteflika's
personal physician, and is said by some to be an important figure in Bouteflika's inner circle of
advisers.
Early years and War of Independence
Bouteflika was raised in Oujda, where his father had emigrated as a youngster.[2] He successively
attended three schools there: "Sidi Ziane", "El Hoceinia" and the "Abdel Moumen" high-school,
where he reportedly excelled academically.[2] He was also affiliated with Kadiri Zaouia in Oujda.
[2]
In 1956, Bouteflika went to the village of Ouled Amer near Tlemcen and subsequently joined—at
the age of 19—the Army of National Liberation which was a military branch of the National
Liberation Front (FLN). He was militarily instructed at the "Ecole des Cadres" in Dar El Kebdani,
Morocco.[2] In 1957–1958, he was designated a controller of the Wilaya V,[2] making reports on
the conditions at the Moroccan border and in west Algeria, but later became the administrative
secretary of Houari Boumediene. He emerged as one of the closest collaborators of the influential
Boumédienne, and a core member of his Oujda group. In 1962, at the arrival of independence, he
aligned with Boumédienne and the border armies in support of Ahmed Ben Bella
Post-independence political career
After independence in 1962, Bouteflika became deputy for Tlemcen in the Constituent Assembly
and Minister for Youth and Sport in the government led by Ahmed Ben Bella; the following year,
he was appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was later a prime mover in the military coup
led by Houari Boumediene that overthrew Ben Bella on 19 June 1965.[3] Bouteflika continued as
Minister for Foreign Affairs until the death of President Boumédienne in 1978.
He was also President of the 29th UN General Assembly in 1974 and the seventh special session
in 1975. While in these posts he came in for severe criticism from the United States for what were
regarded as politically partisan decisions.
In 1981, he was sued for having stolen Algerian embassies' money between 1965 and 1979. On 8
August 1983, Bouteflika was convicted by the Court of Financial Auditors and found guilty of
having fraudulently taken 60 million dinars during his diplomatic career. In his defence Bouteflika
said that he "reserved" that money to build a new building for the foreign affairs ministry, but the
court judged his argument as "fallacious". In 1979, just after the death of Boumédiène, Bouteflika
reimbursed 12,212,875.81 dinars out of the 70 million dinars that was deposited in a Swiss bank.
Although Bouteflika was granted amnesty by President Chadli Bendjedid, his colleagues Senouci
and Boudjakdji were jailed. After the amnesty, Bouteflika was given back his diplomatic passport,
a villa where he used to live but did not own and all his debt was erased. He never paid back the
money "he reserved for a new foreign affairs ministry's building".[4]
Succession struggle and exile
Following Boumédienne's unexpected death in 1978, Bouteflika was seen as one of the two main
candidates to succeed the powerful president. Bouteflika was thought to represent the party's
"right wing" that was more open to economic reform and rapprochement with the West. Colonel
Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui represented the "boumédiennist" left wing.[5] In the end, the military
opted for a compromise candidate, the senior army colonel Chadli Bendjedid. Bouteflika was
reassigned the role of Minister of State, but successively lost power as Bendjedid's policies of "de-
Boumédiennisation" marginalized the old guard.
After six years abroad, the army brought him back to the Central Committee of the FLN in 1989,
after the country had entered a troubled period of unrest and disorganized attempts at reform, with
power-struggles between Bendjedid and a group of army generals paralyzing decision-making. In
1992, the reform process ended abruptly when the army took power and scrapped elections that
were about to bring the fundamentalist Islamic Salvation Front to power. This triggered a civil
war that would last throughout the 1990s. During this period, Bouteflika stayed on the sidelines,
with little presence in the media and no political role. In January 1994, Bouteflika is said to have
refused the Army's proposal to succeed the assassinated president, Mohamed Boudiaf; he claimed
later that this was because the army would not grant him full control over the armed forces.
Instead, General Liamine Zéroual became President.
First term as President, 1999–2004
In 1999, Zéroual unexpectedly stepped down and announced early elections. The reasons behind
his decision remain unclear, but it is widely claimed that his pro-reconciliation policies towards
the Islamist insurgency had incurred the wrath of a hard-line faction in the armed forces; or that
some other disagreement with the military, which still dominated politics, lay behind the schism.
Bouteflika ran for president as an independent candidate, supported by the military. He was
elected with 74% of the votes, according to the official count. All other candidates withdrew from
the election immediately prior to the vote, citing fraud concerns. Bouteflika subsequently
organized a referendum on his policies to restore peace and security to Algeria (involving
amnesties for Islamist guerrillas) and to test his support among his countrymen after the contested
election. He won with 81% of the vote, but this figure was also disputed by opponents.
Foreign policy
Bouteflika was also active on the international scene, presiding over what many have
characterized as Algeria's return to international affairs, after almost a decade of international
isolation. He presided over the African Union in 2000, secured the Algiers Peace Treaty between
Eritrea and Ethiopia, and supported peace efforts in the African Great Lakes region. He also
secured a friendship treaty with neighbouring Spain in 2002, and welcomed president Chirac of
France on a state visit to Algiers in 2003. This was intended as a prelude to the signature of a
friendship treaty.
Algeria has been particularly active in African relations, and in mending ties with the West, as
well as trying to some extent to resurrect its role in the declining non-Aligned movement.
However, it has played a more limited role in Arab politics, its other traditional sphere of interest.
Relations with the Kingdom of Morocco remained quite tense, with diplomatic clashes on the
issue of the Western Sahara, despite some expectations of a thaw in 1999, which was also the year
of King Mohamed VI's accession to the throne in Morocco.
Second term as President, 2004–09
On 8 April 2004, he was re-elected by an unexpectedly high 85% of the vote in an election that
was accepted by OSCE observers as a free and fair election, despite minor irregularities. This was
contested by his rival and former Chief of Staff Ali Benflis. Several opponents alleged that the
election had not been fair, and pointed to extensive state control over the broadcast media. The
electoral victory was widely seen as a confirmation of Bouteflika's strengthened control over the
state apparatus, and many saw the following retirement of longtime armed forces commander
Gen. Mohammed Lamari in the light of this. He and military commanders allied to him were
thought to have opposed Bouteflika's bid for a second term and backed Benflis. Other major
military power-brokers would be reassigned to minor posts or withdraw from politics in the years
that followed, underlining Bouteflika's gradual monopolizing of decision-making.
Reconciliation plan
During the first year of his second term, Bouteflika held a referendum on his "Charter for Peace
and National Reconciliation", inspired by the 1995 "Sant'Egidio Platform" document. Bouteflika's
plan aims at concluding his efforts of ending the civil war, from a political and judicial point of
view. He obtained large popular support with this referendum and has since instructed the
government and Parliament to work on the technical details of its implementation. Critics claimed
that the plan will only grant immunity to members of the armed forces responsible for crimes, as
well as to terrorists and have argued for a plan similar to South Africa's "truth and reconciliation
commission" to be adopted instead. Bouteflika dismissed the calls, claiming that each country
needs to find its own solutions to ending painful chapters of its history. He has received large
political support on this issue, from both the Islamist and the nationalist camps, and from parts of
the Democratic opposition.
The amnesty plan was rejected by the main remaining insurgent group, the GSPC, although
perhaps as many as several hundred fighters still left their hideouts to claim amnesty. The group's
warfare against the Algerian state continues despite reconciliation plan, although Bouteflika's
government claims it has had an impact in removing support for the group. In 2006, the GSPC
was officially accepted as a branch of al-Qaida in a video message by Ayman al-Zawahiri; soon
thereafter, it changed its name to al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Bouteflika has kept
the amnesty option open – apparently open-ended despite the end of the deadline stipulated by the
reconciliation law – while simultaneously pursuing the rebel group militarily. Algerian forces
have scored several major captures of GSPC/AQIM commanders, but the groups top leadership
remains at large, and armed activity is frequent in Kabylie, with AQIM-connected smuggling
networks active in parts of the desert south. Unlike in previous years, AQIM have begun using
suicide attack tactics and in 2007–2008 launched several major attacks in Algiers and other big
cities.
Economic policies
The first year of Bouteflika's second term also featured a new five-year plan, much larger this time
drafted. The Complementary Plan for Economic Growth Support (PCSC: Plan Complementaire
de la Croissance Économique) aims for the construction of 1 million housing units, the creation of
2 million jobs, the completion of the East-West highway, the completion of the Algiers subway
project, the delivery of the new Algiers airport, and other similar large scale infrastructure
projects. The PCSC totals $60 billion of spending over the five-year period. Bouteflika also aims
to bring down the external debt from $21 billion to $12 billion in the same time. He has also
obtained from Parliament the reform of the law governing the oil and gas industries, despite initial
opposition from the workers unions. However, Bouteflika has since stepped back from this
position, supporting amendments to the hydrocarbon law in 2006, which propose watering down
some of the clauses of the 2005 legislation relating to the role of Sonatrach, the state owned oil &
gas company, in new developments. It also proposes new provisions enabling the country to
benefit from windfall taxes on foreign investors in times of high prices. Bouteflika has also put up
for sale 1300 public sector companies, and has already achieved privatization of about 150 of
them, mainly in the tourism, food processing, cement, construction material and chemical
industries.
Foreign policy
On the international scene, Bouteflika's second term has seen diplomatic tensions rise with France
due to the controversial voting by the French Parliament of a law ordering French history school
books to teach that French colonisation had positive effects abroad, especially in North Africa.
The diplomatic crisis which ensued has put on hold the signing of a friendship treaty with France
(23 February 2004, re-endorsed in December 2005). Ties to Russia have been strengthened by
large imports of Russian military hardware – about 7 billion USD were spent in one single
purchase – although relations entered a rocky phase, at least temporarily, when Algeria refused to
accept some MiG fighter jets due to their allegedly poor quality. Rumors of the two countries
negotiating a form of cartel for natural gas, similar to OPEC's role in oil affairs, with Iran and
Qatar also involved, have appeared repeatedly, and Bouteflika has confirmed an interest in the
idea. (Russia is the no. 1 gas supplier to the EU, and Algeria the no. 2 supplier.) Bouteflika has
also carefully cultivated a relationship with China, with exchanges of state visits between the two
countries.
Algeria has remained involved in Arab affairs, and seen a somewhat growing role there. In 2004
Bouteflika also organised the Arab League Summit and became President of the Arab League for
one year. His calls for reform of the League did not gain sufficient support to pass in during the
Algiers summit however. Like in previous years since the late 1980s, Algeria has kept a relatively
low profile in the Palestine and Iraq issues. Algeria has remained preoccupied with the Western
Sahara issue, counter-lobbying Moroccan attempts to gain international acceptance for Moroccan-
ruled autonomy in the disputed territory, at the expense of Polisario's (and Algeria's) calls for the
long-since decided self-determination referendum to finally be held. Relations with Morocco
therefore remain poor, and Algeria in 2008 repeatedly refused to answer Moroccan demands to
open the common land border, which has been closed since 1994. Both Morocco and Algeria have
since approximately 2005 spent several billion dollars in what could be described as an arms race
between them, mainly on modernizing and expanding their air forces.
In sub-Saharan Africa, a major concern of Bouteflika's Algeria has been on-and-off Tuareg
rebellions in northern Mali. Algeria has asserted itself forcefully as mediator in the conflict,
perhaps underlining its growing regional influence. Algerian interest is driven by its extensive
interests in the region: smuggling routes as well as legal economic activity crosses these virtually
unguarded borderlands, and refugees from the conflict have entered southern Algeria to mix with
the Tuareg populations there. Also, the area is known as a hideout of a southern branch of AQIM,
further heightening Algeria's interest in the area. Compromise peace agreements were reached in
2007 and 2008, both mediated by Algiers. The related Touareg revolt in neighbouring Niger has
not seen the same Algerian involvement, even if the anti-government MNJ movement has on at
least one occasion called for Algerian mediation similar to in Mali. Algeria's involvement in
Africa has otherwise been concerned with supporting the African Union, and been marked by a
rapidly strengthening coordination with South Africa, which, among other things, has emerged as
Algeria's main ally on the Western Sahara issue.
All in all, Algeria's foreign policy under Bouteflika remains hinged on same axis as under earlier
governments, emphasizing South–South ties, especially with growing Third World powers
(China, South Africa, Brazil, etc.) and guarding the country's independence in decision-making
vis-a-vis the West, although simultaneously striving for good trade relations and non-
confrontational political relations with the EU and USA.
President of Vietnam Nguyen Minh Triet on 16 July 2009 met with Bouteflika on the sidelines of
the 15th Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit in Egypt. President Triet and Bouteflika agreed
that the two countries still have great potential for development of political and trade relations.
Triet thanked the Algerian government for creating favourable conditions for the Vietnam Oil and
Gas Group to invest in oil and gas exploration and exploitation in Algeria.[6]
Hospitalization in 2005 and later
Bouteflika was admitted to a hospital in France on 26 November 2005, reportedly suffering from a
gastric ulcer hemorrhage, and discharged three weeks later.[7] However, the length of time for
which Bouteflika remained virtually incommunicado led to rumours that he was critically ill with
stomach cancer.[8] He checked into the hospital again in April 2006.[9]
A leaked diplomatic cable revealed that by the end of 2008, Bouteflika had developed stomach
cancer.[10]
In spring and summer 2013, Boutflika stayed nearly four months in a hospital in Paris dealing
with health problems.[11]
Bouteflika was admitted to a clinic at Grenoble in France in November 2014.[12]
Constitutional amendment for a third term
Bouteflika appointed a new Prime Minister, Abdelaziz Belkhadem, in 2006. Belkhadem then
announced plans to amend the Algerian Constitution to allow the President to run for office
indefinitely and increase his powers.[13] This was widely regarded as aimed to let Bouteflika run
for president a third term. A referendum was originally scheduled for 2007, but cancelled for
reasons never explained. In 2008, Belkhadem was again shifted out of the premiership and his
predecessor Ahmed Ouyahia brought in, having also come out in favor of the constitutional
amendment.
The Council of Ministers announced on 3 November 2008 that the planned constitutional revision
proposal would remove the presidential term limit previously included in Article 74.[14] The
People's National Assembly endorsed the removal of the term limit on 12 November 2008; only
the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD) voted against its removal.[15]
Third term as President, 2009–14
Following the constitutional amendment allowing him to run for a third term, on 12 February
2009, Bouteflika announced his independent candidacy in the 2009 presidential election.[16] On
10 April 2009, it was announced that Bouteflika had won the election with 90.24% of the vote, on
a turnout of 74%,[17] thereby obtaining a new five-year term. Several opposition parties had
boycotted the election, with the opposition Socialist Forces Front citing a "tsunami of massive
fraud."[17]
Fourth term as President, 2014–present
Following yet another constitutional amendment, allowing him to run for a fourth term, Bouteflika
announced that he would. He very seldom appeared in person on the campaign trail. On 18 April
2014, he was re-elected with 81% of the vote., while Benflis was second placed with 12.18%.[18]
The turnout was 51.7%, down from the 75% turnout in 2009.[19] Again several opposition parties
had boycotted the election, making allegations of fraud.
