Question Hour and Legislative Investigations, other powers

ARNAULT vs NAZARENO
GR No. L-3820
July 18, 1950

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Senate in Arnault v.

Nazareno, recognizing the power of inquiry as essential to
the legislative function and affirming the Senate's authority
to commit a witness for contempt.
Facts:
• The case involves Jean L. Arnault (petitioner) against Leon
Nazareno (Sergeant-at-Arms of the Philippine Senate) and
Eustaquio Balagtas (Director of Prisons) as respondents.
• The issue arose from a Senate investigation into the purchase
of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates by the Philippine
Government in October 1949.
• The government paid P5,000,000 for these estates, with
P1,500,000 going to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,
through his attorney-in-fact, Jean L. Arnault.
• Suspecting irregularities and misuse of public funds, the
Senate created a special committee to investigate the
transactions.
• Arnault was called to testify and refused to reveal the name of
the person to whom he gave P440,000, claiming he could not
remember the name and later invoking his privilege against
self-incrimination.
• The Senate found him in contempt and ordered his
imprisonment until he disclosed the information.
• Arnault filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the
Senate's authority to detain him.

Issue:
• Does the Senate have the authority to punish a witness for
contempt for refusing to answer questions pertinent to a
legislative inquiry?
• Can the Senate commit a witness for contempt beyond the
period of its legislative session?

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 • Does the privilege against self-incrimination protect Arnault
from revealing the name of the person to whom he gave
P440,000?

Ruling:
• Yes, the Senate has the authority to punish a witness for
contempt for refusing to answer questions pertinent to a
legislative inquiry.
• Yes, the Senate can commit a witness for contempt beyond the
period of its legislative session.
• No, the privilege against self-incrimination does not protect
Arnault from revealing the name of the person to whom he gave
P440,000.

Ratio:
• The Supreme Court ruled that the power of inquiry is essential
to the legislative function, and the Senate has the authority to
enforce this power by punishing for contempt.
• The Court emphasized that the legislative body must be able to
obtain necessary information to legislate effectively.
• The materiality of the questions asked by the Senate committee
was established, as they were directly related to the
investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal,
which involved a significant amount of public funds.
• The Court also held that the Senate, as a continuing body, has
the authority to commit a witness for contempt beyond the
period of its legislative session.
• This power is necessary to ensure the completion of legislative
investigations and the proper functioning of the legislative
process.
• Regarding the privilege against self-incrimination, the Court
found that Arnault's claim was not justified.
• The Court determined that the danger of self-incrimination
must be reasonable and real, and in this case, Arnault's refusal
to answer was based on an unfounded and evasive claim.
• The Court concluded that Arnault's duty as a citizen to provide
truthful testimony outweighed his claimed privilege against
self-incrimination.

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ARNAULT vs BALAGTAS
GR No. L-6749
July 30, 1955

The Supreme Court ruled that the Senate had the power to
confine a witness who refused to disclose information during
an investigation, as long as the contempt was related to the
exercise of legislative power and committed in the course of
the legislative process.

Facts:
• The case involves Jean L. Arnault (petitioner-appellee) and
Eustaquio Balagtas (respondent-appellant), the Director of
Prisons.
• Decided on July 30, 1955, by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines.
• Arnault acted as an attorney-in-fact for Ernest H. Burt during
the purchase negotiations of the Buenavista and Tambobong
Estates by the Philippine Government.
• The transaction was finalized on October 21, 1949, for
P5,000,000.
• On February 27, 1950, the Philippine Senate adopted
Resolution No. 8, forming a Special Committee to investigate
the purchase's propriety and fairness.
• Arnault was asked to disclose the recipient of P440,000, part
of the purchase price, but he refused.
• The Senate Committee ordered his confinement on May 15,
1950, until he revealed the recipient's identity.
• Arnault challenged this confinement in G.R. No. L-3820, but
the Supreme Court upheld the Senate's authority to detain
him.
• While confined, Arnault later claimed the recipient was Jess D.
Santos, but the Senate did not believe him and continued his
detention under Senate Resolution No. 114, dated November
8, 1952.

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 • Arnault filed a habeas corpus petition in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, which ruled in his favor, declaring his
continued detention illegal.
• The case was appealed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:
• Did the Senate Special Committee act within its authority in
disbelieving Arnault's statement that Jess D. Santos was the
recipient of the P440,000?
• Is the continued confinement and detention of Arnault, as
ordered in Senate Resolution No. 114, valid?
• Does the Senate have the power to punish Arnault for
contempt, and if so, was this power exercised legitimately?
• Has Arnault purged himself of contempt by naming Jess D.
Santos as the recipient of the P440,000?
• Is Arnault entitled to release because his period of
imprisonment has exceeded the maximum penalty for
contempt under the law?

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court ruled that the Senate Special Committee
acted within its authority in disbelieving Arnault's statement.
• The continued confinement and detention of Arnault, as
ordered in Senate Resolution No. 114, was deemed valid.
• The Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt, and
this power was exercised legitimately.
• Arnault has not purged himself of contempt by naming Jess D.
Santos, as the Senate did not believe this was the true identity
of the recipient.
• Arnault is not entitled to release based on the duration of his
imprisonment, as the Senate's confinement order was coercive
rather than punitive.

Ratio:
• The Supreme Court emphasized the principle of separation of
powers, stating that the judiciary cannot review the findings of
legislative bodies in the exercise of their legislative functions
unless there is a clear violation of constitutional rights or an
arbitrary exercise of legislative discretion.
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 • The Court found that the Senate's authority to punish
recalcitrant witnesses is implied and necessary for the exercise
of legislative power.
• The Senate's disbelief in Arnault's statement about Jess D.
Santos was within its discretion, and the judiciary could not
interfere with this finding.
• The Court noted that the Senate's confinement order was
coercive, aimed at compelling Arnault to disclose the true
recipient of the P440,000, rather than punitive.
• Therefore, the duration of his imprisonment did not exceed
legal limits.
• The Court concluded that Arnault had not purged himself of
contempt, as his statement was not believed to be truthful, and
upheld the Senate's authority to continue his confinement.

SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ERMITA

GR No. 169777
April 20, 2006

The Philippine Supreme Court invalidates certain provisions

of Executive Order No. 464 due to lack of specificity in the
claim of executive privilege, while upholding the validity of
Section 3 as an exercise of executive control, but clarifies that
the claim of executive privilege should be based on specific
grounds.

Facts:
• The case "Senate of the Philippines v. Ermita" involves multiple
petitioners, including the Senate of the Philippines,
represented by Senate President Franklin M. Drilon, and other
senators, as well as various organizations and individuals such
as Bayan Muna, Francisco I. Chavez, Alternative Law Groups,
Inc., PDP-Laban, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
• Respondents include Eduardo R. Ermita, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and other executive officials.
• The case arose from the issuance of Executive Order No. 464
(E.O. 464) by President Arroyo, which required senior officials
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 of the executive branch to secure the President's consent before
appearing before Congress.
• Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of E.O. 464,
arguing it violated the principles of separation of powers and
the right to information.
• The Supreme Court initially ruled on April 20, 2006,
invalidating certain provisions of E.O. 464.
• Both respondents and petitioner PDP-Laban filed motions for
reconsideration, which were subsequently denied by the Court
on July 14, 2006.

Issue:
• Whether the provisions of Executive Order No. 464,
particularly Sections 2(b) and 3, are constitutional.
• Whether the President can prohibit executive officials from
appearing before Congress without specific grounds for
claiming executive privilege.
• Whether PDP-Laban has the requisite standing to file the
petition.

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court invalidated certain provisions of E.O. 464
due to lack of specificity in the claim of executive privilege.
• The Court upheld the validity of Section 3 as an exercise of
executive control but clarified that the claim of executive
privilege should be based on specific grounds.
• The Court denied PDP-Laban's motion for reconsideration,
maintaining that it did not have the requisite standing to file
the petition.

Ratio:
• The Supreme Court's decision was based on the 1987
Philippine Constitution.
• The Court found that while the President has the authority to
control executive officials, this power does not extend to
prohibiting their appearance before Congress without specific
grounds for claiming executive privilege.

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 • The Court emphasized that executive privilege must be invoked
with particularity, specifying the grounds for such a claim to
ensure transparency and accountability.
• The Court also noted that the lack of published Senate Rules
of Procedure does not justify the prohibition of executive
officials' appearances before Congress.
• Regarding PDP-Laban's standing, the Court highlighted the
fundamental differences between PDP-Laban and Bayan
Muna, noting that PDP-Laban's members were elected to
represent their constituents, not the party, unlike Bayan
Muna's representatives who were elected to represent their
party.
• Therefore, PDP-Laban did not have the requisite standing to
file the petition.
• The Court's decision underscores the importance of
maintaining the balance of power between the executive and
legislative branches and ensuring that claims of executive
privilege are not used to undermine this balance.

GUDANI vs SENA
GR No. 170165
August 15, 2006

The Supreme Court ruled in favor of the President's authority

to require military officers to seek her approval before
testifying before Congress, while also recognizing Congress's
power to compel their attendance through judicial relief if the
President refuses to allow them to testify.

Facts:
• Petitioners: Brigadier General (Ret.) Francisco V. Gudani and
Lieutenant Colonel Alexander F. Balutan.
• Context: Both were high-ranking officers in the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP) assigned to the Philippine Military
Academy (PMA) in Baguio City.
• Event: On 22 September 2005, Senator Rodolfo Biazon invited
several senior AFP officers, including the petitioners, to testify

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 before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security
regarding the 2004 elections.
• Directive: On 27 September 2005, AFP Chief of Staff Lieutenant
General Generoso S. Senga, following President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo's instructions, issued an order prohibiting
AFP personnel from appearing before Congress without the
President's approval.
• Action: Despite the directive, the petitioners testified before the
Senate on 28 September 2005.
• Consequence: They were charged with violating Articles 65 and
97 of the Articles of War for willfully disobeying a superior
officer and conduct prejudicial to good order and military
discipline.
• Legal Action: The petitioners sought the annulment of the
President's directive and an injunction against the pending
court-martial proceedings.

Issue:
• Can the President require military officers to seek her approval
before testifying before Congress?
• Are the petitioners liable under military law for disobeying the
President's directive?

Ruling:
• Yes, the President can require military officers to seek her
approval before testifying before Congress.
• Yes, the petitioners are liable under military law for disobeying
the President's directive.

Ratio:
• Authority: The President, as the commander-in-chief of the
Armed Forces, has the constitutional authority to require
military officers to seek her approval before appearing before
Congress.
• Basis: This authority stems from the President's commander-
in-chief powers, which are distinct from executive privilege
limitations.
• Importance: Military discipline and the chain of command are
essential for the military's effectiveness.
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 • Legal Implication: Willful disobedience of a superior officer is
punishable under military law.
• Judicial Relief: While Congress can compel the attendance of
military officers through judicial relief, the President's directive
must be respected unless overturned by a final judicial order.
• Petitioners' Violation: The petitioners' act of testifying before
the Senate despite the President's directive was a breach of
military discipline.
• Alternative Action: The petitioners could have sought judicial
relief to resolve the conflict between the executive and
legislative branches without defying the order.

NERI vs SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS
GR No. 180643
March 25, 2008/September 4, 2028

The case of Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of

Public Officers and Investigations involves a dispute over the
invocation of executive privilege by the President to prevent
the disclosure of certain information during a legislative
inquiry, ultimately resulting in the Supreme Court ruling in
favor of the President's claim of executive privilege and
finding the Senate Committees to have committed grave abuse
of discretion in issuing a contempt order against Neri. The
case delves into the complexities of executive privilege, the
balancing of public interests, and the interpretation of the
Senate's rule-making power, with a focus on the specific
details of the NBN-ZTE broadband deal and the
communication between Neri and the President.

Facts:
• Romulo L. Neri, then Chairman of the National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA), was involved in a dispute with
the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, Trade and Commerce, and National Defense
and Security.
• The conflict arose from Neri's refusal to answer questions
during a Senate inquiry into the National Broadband Network
9
 (NBN) project awarded to Zhong Xing Telecommunications
Equipment (ZTE).
• Neri invoked executive privilege, claiming the information
sought was confidential communications between him and
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
• The Senate Committees issued a contempt order against Neri
for his refusal to answer, leading to his arrest and detention.
• Neri filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court,
challenging the Senate's contempt order.
• The Supreme Court initially ruled in favor of Neri, upholding
the claim of executive privilege and finding the Senate
Committees to have committed grave abuse of discretion.
• The Senate Committees filed a motion for reconsideration,
which is the subject of the resolution dated September 4, 2008.

Issue:
• Whether there is a recognized presumptive presidential
communications privilege in the Philippine legal system.
• Whether the communications elicited by the three questions
are covered by executive privilege.
• Whether the Senate Committees have shown that the
communications elicited by the three questions are critical to
the exercise of their functions.
• Whether the Senate Committees committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the contempt order.

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court affirmed that there is a recognized
presumptive presidential communications privilege in the
Philippine legal system.
• The Court held that the communications elicited by the three
questions are covered by executive privilege.
• The Court found that the Senate Committees failed to show
that the communications elicited by the three questions are
critical to the exercise of their functions.
• The Court ruled that the Senate Committees committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order against Neri.

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Ratio:
• Presumptive Presidential Communications Privilege:
o The Court recognized that presidential communications
are presumptively privileged, citing previous cases such as
Almonte v. Vasquez and Chavez v. PEA.
o This privilege is fundamental to the operation of
government and is rooted in the separation of powers
under the Constitution.
o The presumption is not absolute and can be overturned
by a compelling need for disclosure.
• Coverage of Executive Privilege:
o The Court held that the communications between Neri and
President Arroyo are covered by executive privilege.
o The privilege applies to communications that relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President,
are received by a close advisor, and where there is no
compelling need for disclosure shown by the Senate
Committees.
o The privilege is meant to protect candid and objective
discussions necessary for presidential decision-making.
• Critical Need for Information:
o The Court found that the Senate Committees failed to
demonstrate a compelling need for the information
covered by the executive privilege.
o The Senate could still legislate on the NBN project without
the specific details of the privileged communications.
o The Senate Committees had other sources of information
and witnesses to rely on for their investigation.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion:
o The Court ruled that the Senate Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order
against Neri.
o The Court highlighted several procedural lapses, including
the failure to provide Neri with an advance list of questions
and the lack of a majority vote in the Senate Committees'
decision to cite Neri for contempt.
o The Senate Committees acted arbitrarily and precipitately
in issuing the contempt order without adequately
addressing Neri's claim of executive privilege.

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GARCILLANO vs THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC INFORMATION
GR No. 170338
December 23, 2008

A case involving the "Hello Garci" tapes, which allegedly

contained instructions from the President to manipulate the
results of the 2004 presidential elections, leads to a legal
battle over the use of the tapes in legislative inquiries and the
right to privacy of communication.

Facts:
• The case "Garcillano v. House of Representatives Committees
on Public Information" involves two consolidated petitions,
G.R. Nos. 170338 and 179275, decided on December 23, 2008.
• The controversy centers around the "Hello Garci" tapes, which
allegedly contain wiretapped conversations between then-
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and COMELEC
Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, discussing the manipulation
of the 2004 presidential election results.
• The tapes led to legislative inquiries by both the House of
Representatives and the Senate.
• In the House, Minority Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero
initiated an investigation on June 8, 2005, which led to the
playing of the tapes in the House chambers.
• The House Committees later suspended the hearings but
decided to prepare committee reports based on the recordings.
• Alarmed by these developments, Garcillano filed a petition
(G.R. No. 170338) to prohibit the use of the tapes in the House
proceedings.
• Separately, Senator Panfilo Lacson revived the issue in the
Senate, leading to another legislative inquiry.
• Petitioners Santiago Javier Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili,
along with intervenor Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, filed a petition
(G.R. No. 179275) to stop the Senate inquiry, arguing it violated
the Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. No. 4200) and the Constitution.
• The Supreme Court consolidated the cases and heard oral
arguments.

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Issue:
• Whether the petitioners have legal standing (locus standi) to
bring the suit.
• Whether the Senate and House of Representatives must
republish their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation for each Congress.
• Whether the legislative inquiries into the "Hello Garci" tapes
violate Section 3, Article III of the Constitution and/or Republic
Act No. 4200.

Ruling:
• The Court recognized the legal standing of the petitioners in
both cases.
• The Court ruled that the Senate must republish its Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation for each
Congress.
• The Court dismissed G.R. No. 170338 as moot and academic
but granted G.R. No. 179275, prohibiting the Senate from
conducting the inquiry without duly published rules.

Ratio:
• Legal Standing:
o The Court acknowledged that Garcillano had a personal
stake in the outcome of the case as he was directly
implicated in the "Hello Garci" tapes.
o Similarly, Ranada, Agcaoili, and Sagge were recognized for
their interest in the execution of laws and their
constitutional rights, satisfying the requirement for legal
standing.
• Publication of Rules:
o The Court emphasized that Section 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution requires that legislative inquiries be
conducted in accordance with duly published rules of
procedure.
o The Senate's failure to republish its rules at the start of
each Congress violated this constitutional mandate.
o The Court cited the need for due process and public
notice, ruling that the Senate must republish its rules to
ensure transparency and fairness in legislative inquiries.

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 • Mootness of G.R. No. 170338:
o The Court found that the petition filed by Garcillano was
moot because the tapes had already been played in the
House, and the committee reports had been submitted.
o Prohibition is a preventive remedy and cannot address
actions already completed.
• Violation of R.A. No. 4200:
o The Court held that the Senate's inquiry into the "Hello
Garci" tapes could not proceed without duly published
rules, as required by the Constitution.
o The Court underscored that the use of illegally obtained
wiretapped communications is prohibited under R.A. No.
4200, and any legislative inquiry must respect the rights
of individuals involved.
• The decision reflects the Court's commitment to upholding
constitutional mandates and ensuring that legislative bodies
operate within the bounds of the law, particularly concerning
due process and the right to privacy of communication.

Other powers of Congress

a. Act as a board of canvasser for presidential election

PIMENTEL vs CONGRESS
GR No. 163783
June 22, 2004

Facts
• Nature of Action: Petition for Prohibition
• Sen. Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null and void the
continued existence of the Joint Committee of Congress to
determine the authenticity and due execution of the certificates
of canvass and preliminarily canvass the votes cast for
Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates in the May 10,
2004 elections following the adjournment of Congress sine die
on June 11, 2004.
• He prays for the issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the
Joint Committee to cease and desist from conducting any

14
 further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of the Joint Public
Session of Congress on Canvassing.
• With the adjournment sine die on June 11, 2004 by the Twelfth
Congress, all its pending matters and proceedings terminate
upon its expiration (citing Section 15, Art. VI of the
Constitution).
• Respondent argued that the precedents set by the 1992 and
1998 Presidential Elections do not support the move to stop
the ongoing canvassing by the Joint Committee.

Issues:
• Whether or not the continued existence of the Joint Committee
of Congress to canvass the votes for President and Vice-
President upon its adjournment sine die is null and void.

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court held the instant Petition is hereby
DISMISSED.
o The Petition has no basis under the Constitution.
o The term of the present Twelfth Congress did not
terminate and expire upon the adjournment sine die of the
regular session of both Houses on June 11, 2004. Section
15, Art. VI of the Constitution does not pertain to the term
of Congress, but to its regular annual legislative sessions.
o The legislative functions of the Twelfth Congress may have
come to a close upon the final adjournment of its regular
sessions on June 11, 2004, but this does not affect its
non-legislative functions, such as being the National
Board of Canvassers.
o The joint public session cannot adjourn sine die until it
has accomplished its constitutionally mandated task.

b. Call for special election for Presidency

c. Decide on disability of the President
d. Legislative veto or extension for suspension of writ of
habeas corpus or declaration of martial law
e. Presidential Amnesties
f. Concur in treaties
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PIMENTEL vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
GR No. 158088
July 6, 2005

Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and other petitioners seek to

compel the Office of the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court to the
Senate for its concurrence, but the Court rules that only
Senator Pimentel has legal standing and dismisses the
petition.

Facts:
• The case "Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary"
(G.R. No. 158088) was decided on July 6, 2005, by the
Philippine Supreme Court.
• Petitioners, led by Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., included
Rep. Etta Rosales, the Philippine Coalition for the
Establishment of the International Criminal Court, Task Force
Detainees of the Philippines, Families of Victims of Involuntary
Disappearances, and several individuals.
• They sought to compel the Office of the Executive Secretary,
represented by Hon. Alberto Romulo, and the Department of
Foreign Affairs, represented by Hon. Blas Ople, to transmit the
signed copy of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court to the Senate for its concurrence.
• The Rome Statute, which established the International
Criminal Court, was signed by the Philippines on December 28,
2000, but had not been transmitted to the Senate for
ratification.
• Petitioners argued that the executive branch had a ministerial
duty to transmit the treaty to the Senate.
• The Office of the Solicitor General, representing the
respondents, questioned the standing of the petitioners and
argued that the executive branch had no such duty.

Issue:
• Do the petitioners have the legal standing to file the suit?

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 • Does the Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign
Affairs have a ministerial duty to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence?

Ruling:
• Only Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. has the legal standing to
file the suit.
• The Executive Secretary and the Department of Foreign Affairs
do not have a ministerial duty to transmit the signed copy of
the Rome Statute to the Senate for concurrence.

Ratio:
• Legal Standing:
o The Court found that only Senator Pimentel had the legal
standing to file the suit.
o The other petitioners, despite their roles as human rights
advocates and citizens, did not demonstrate that they had
sustained or would sustain a direct injury from the non-
transmittal of the Rome Statute.
o Legal standing requires a personal and substantial
interest in the case, which only Senator Pimentel, as a
member of the Senate, possessed.
o His role in the legislative process gave him the right to
participate in the exercise of the Senate's powers,
including the ratification of treaties.
• Ministerial Duty:
o The Court ruled that the Executive Secretary and the
Department of Foreign Affairs did not have a ministerial
duty to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to
the Senate.
o In the Philippine system of government, the President is
the sole authority in external relations and has the sole
power to negotiate and enter into treaties.
o The validity of a treaty requires the concurrence of two-
thirds of the Senate, as stipulated in Section 21, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution.
o The signing of a treaty and its ratification are distinct steps
in the treaty-making process.

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 o The signature of the treaty by the Philippine representative
is primarily a means of authenticating the instrument and
does not signify the final consent of the state.
o Ratification, which is the formal act of confirming and
accepting the provisions of a treaty, is an executive act
performed by the President.
o The President has the discretion to decide whether or not
to ratify a treaty, even after it has been signed by the
Philippine representative.
o The Court concluded that it could not issue a writ of
mandamus to compel the executive branch to transmit the
signed text of the Rome Statute to the Senate, as this
decision falls within the President's authority and
discretion.

BAYAN MUNA vs ROMULO

GR No. 159618
February 1, 2011

The case "Bayan Muna v. Romulo" involves the validity of the

Non-Surrender Agreement between the Philippines and the
USA, with the petitioner arguing that it violates the
Constitution and the Rome Statute, while the court rules in
favor of the respondents, stating that the agreement is valid
and does not contravene the Rome Statute.

Facts:
• The case "Bayan Muna v. Romulo" (G.R. No. 159618) was
decided on February 1, 2011, by the Philippine Supreme Court.
• Petitioners: Bayan Muna, represented by Representatives
Satur Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, and Liza L. Maza.
• Respondents: Alberto Romulo (Executive Secretary) and Blas
F. Ople (Secretary of Foreign Affairs).
• The dispute centered on the Non-Surrender Agreement
between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the United
States of America (USA).
• The agreement, concluded via diplomatic notes on May 13,
2003, aimed to protect officials, employees, and military

18
 personnel from being surrendered to international tribunals
without their government's consent.
• Petitioners argued the agreement violated the Philippine
Constitution and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), which the Philippines had signed but not
ratified.
• The lower court had not ruled on the matter, prompting the
petitioners to seek a direct ruling from the Supreme Court.

Issue:
• Did the RP President and the DFA Secretary gravely abuse their
discretion in concluding the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement,
given that the Philippines had already signed the Rome Statute
of the ICC, pending Senate ratification?
• Does the Non-Surrender Agreement constitute an act that
defeats the object and purpose of the Rome Statute and
contravenes the obligation of good faith inherent in the
signature of the President on the Rome Statute?
• Is the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement void ab initio for
contracting obligations that are either immoral or otherwise at
variance with universally recognized principles of international
law?
• Is the Non-Surrender Agreement valid, binding, and effective
without the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
members of the Senate?

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
• The Court ruled that the Non-Surrender Agreement was valid
and did not contravene the Rome Statute.
• The Court held that the agreement did not require Senate
concurrence to be effective.

Ratio:
• Locus Standi: The Court affirmed that the petitioners had
standing to sue as concerned citizens raising issues of
transcendental importance.
• Validity of the Agreement: The Court noted that the agreement
was concluded through an exchange of diplomatic notes, a
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 recognized form of international agreement under international
law.
• Doctrine of Incorporation: The Court integrated generally
accepted principles of international law into Philippine law,
finding that the agreement did not require Senate concurrence
as it was an executive agreement, not a treaty.
• Rome Statute: The Court held that the Non-Surrender
Agreement did not undermine the Rome Statute. The Statute
recognizes the primary jurisdiction of national courts over
international crimes, with the ICC's jurisdiction being
complementary.
• National Jurisdiction: The agreement reinforced the primacy of
national jurisdiction and did not preclude the Philippines from
prosecuting crimes under its national laws.
• Signatory Status: The Philippines was only a signatory to the
Rome Statute and not a State-Party, as the Senate had not
ratified it. Thus, the Philippines was only obliged to refrain
from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute.
• Morality and International Law: The Court rejected the
argument that the agreement was immoral or at variance with
international law principles, stating it was an assertion of the
Philippines' desire to try and punish crimes under its national
law.
• Prosecution Assurance: The agreement ensured that
individuals could be prosecuted either in the Philippines or the
USA, or with the consent of both countries, before the ICC.
• Presidential Authority: The Court held that the President acted
within her constitutional authority in entering into the
agreement. The power to enter into international agreements is
vested in the President, and executive agreements do not
require Senate concurrence.
• Consistency with International Law: The agreement did not
amend or repeal any existing law but was consistent with the
Philippines' obligations under international law.

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SAGUISAG vs OCHOA
GR No. 212426, 212444
January 12, 2016

The Supreme Court upholds the constitutionality of the

Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) in the
Philippines, ruling that it does not require Senate concurrence
and is a valid executive agreement.

Facts:
• The case "Saguisag v. Ochoa, Jr." involved petitioners Rene
A.V. Saguisag and Wigberto E. Taada, among others.
• They challenged the constitutionality of the Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) between the Philippines and
the United States.
• Respondents included Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa,
Jr., Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin, Foreign Affairs
Secretary Albert Del Rosario, Jr., Budget Secretary Florencio
Abad, and AFP Chief of Staff General Emmanuel T. Bautista.
• The Supreme Court of the Philippines decided the case on July
26, 2016.
• Petitioners claimed the EDCA required Senate concurrence
under Section 25, Article XVIII of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
• The lower court dismissed the petitions, leading to a Motion for
Reconsideration by the petitioners.

Issue:
• Does the EDCA require Senate concurrence to be valid and
effective under the 1987 Philippine Constitution?
• Does the EDCA constitute a treaty or an executive agreement?
• Does the EDCA allow the establishment of foreign military
bases, troops, or facilities in the Philippines in violation of the
Constitution?

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration.
• The Court upheld its earlier decision that the EDCA is a valid
executive agreement, not requiring Senate concurrence.
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 • The Court ruled that the EDCA does not establish foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities in a manner that violates the
Philippine Constitution.

Ratio:
• The Court applied the verba legis rule, interpreting "allowed in"
to refer to the initial entry of foreign bases, troops, and
facilities.
• The Court reasoned that once entry is established by an
existing treaty, new entries don't require a new treaty.
• The EDCA implements existing treaties, specifically the
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Mutual Defense
Treaty (MDT), without creating new international obligations.
• The EDCA does not establish permanent U.S. military bases
but allows for the rotational presence of U.S. forces and
prepositioning of defense equipment, activities authorized
under the VFA and MDT.
• Concerns about operational control, access to agreed locations,
and the presence of U.S. contractors do not transform the
EDCA into a treaty.
• The Court concluded that the EDCA complies with the MDT
and VFA and does not violate the constitutional requirement
for Senate concurrence.

g. Declaration of existence of war

h. Delegation of emergency powers
i. Utilization of natural resources
j. Amendment of constitution
k. Power of impeachment

GUTIERREZ vs THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE

COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE
GR No. 193459
February 15, 2011

The Supreme Court denies petitioner Gutierrez's motion for

reconsideration, affirming that the initiation of an
impeachment proceeding is determined by both the filing and
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referral of the complaint, clarifying the interpretation of the
term "initiate," and addressing the issue of promulgation of
the House Impeachment Rules and allegations of bias and
vindictiveness against the Committee Chairperson.

Facts:
• Petitioner Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez filed a motion for
reconsideration against the House of Representatives
Committee on Justice and several respondents, including Risa
Hontiveros-Baraquel and Danilo D. Lim.
• The Supreme Court of the Philippines decided the case on
March 8, 2011, with Justice Carpio Morales as the ponente.
• The case arose from the initiation of impeachment proceedings
against Gutierrez, who was then the Ombudsman.
• Gutierrez challenged the interpretation of the term "initiate" in
the context of impeachment proceedings.
• She argued that the initiation should be reckoned from the
filing of the complaint, while the respondents contended that it
should include both the filing and referral of the complaint.
• The lower court had previously ruled against Gutierrez, leading
to her motion for reconsideration before the Supreme Court.

Issue:
• Does the initiation of an impeachment proceeding begin with
the filing of the complaint or does it require both filing and
referral?
• Is the publication of the House Impeachment Rules necessary
for their effectivity?
• Were there instances of bias and vindictiveness by the
Committee Chairperson, Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr.?

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court ruled that the initiation of an impeachment
proceeding requires both the filing and referral of the
complaint.
• The Court held that the publication of the House Impeachment
Rules is not necessary for their effectivity.

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 • The Court found no merit in the allegations of bias and
vindictiveness against the Committee Chairperson, Rep. Niel
Tupas, Jr.

Ratio:
• The Supreme Court reaffirmed the doctrine established in
Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives, which clarified
that the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes both
the filing and referral of the complaint.
• The Court emphasized that merely filing a complaint does not
constitute the initiation of an impeachment proceeding; the
referral to the appropriate committee is also required.
• This interpretation ensures that the constitutional one-year
bar on initiating impeachment proceedings is upheld,
preventing multiple complaints from being filed successively to
harass the impeachable officer.
• Regarding the publication of the House Impeachment Rules,
the Court clarified that the term "promulgate" in the
Constitution does not necessarily mean "publish."
• The Constitution grants the House of Representatives the
discretion to determine how to make its rules known, and there
is no explicit requirement for publication in the Official Gazette
or a newspaper of general circulation.
• The Court noted that if the framers of the Constitution
intended to require publication, they would have explicitly
stated so, as they did for legislative inquiries.
• On the issue of bias and vindictiveness, the Court found that
the actions of Rep. Niel Tupas, Jr. were part of his duties as
the Committee Chairperson and were not solely his actions but
those of the entire Committee.
• The Court reiterated that impeachment is a political process,
not a judicial one, and the standards for inhibition applicable
to judges do not apply to members of the House Committee on
Justice.
• The Court also noted that the Impeachment Rules do not
provide for the inhibition of Committee members, and any
decision on such matters is within the Committee's discretion.
• Finally, the Court addressed the procedural aspect of lifting the
Status Quo Ante Order, stating that its decision to lift the order
24
 was effective immediately, allowing the Committee to proceed
with the impeachment process.
• The Court denied Gutierrez's motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.

CHIEF JUSTICE CORONA vs SENATE

JGR No. 200242
July 17, 2012

The Supreme Court dismisses the petition of former Chief

Justice Renato C. Corona, ruling that the certiorari
jurisdiction cannot be invoked to challenge matters arising
from impeachment proceedings, as the case had become moot
and academic after Corona's conviction and resignation.

Facts:
• The case "Corona v. Senate of the Philippines" involves former
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
• Corona filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and writ of
preliminary injunction.
• The petition was against the impeachment proceedings
initiated by the House of Representatives (HOR) and conducted
by the Senate.
• On December 12, 2011, the HOR majority bloc held a caucus,
and a verified impeachment complaint was submitted and
endorsed by 188 members.
• The required one-third vote by the Constitution was surpassed.
• The complaint was transmitted to the Senate on December 13,
2011, and the Senate convened as an impeachment court the
following day.
• Corona received the complaint on December 15, 2011,
charging him with culpable violation of the Constitution,
betrayal of public trust, and graft and corruption.
• Specific charges included partiality towards the Arroyo
administration, failure to disclose his Statement of Assets,
Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN), and accumulation of ill-
gotten wealth.
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 • Corona filed his answer on December 26, 2011, denying the
charges and alleging political motivation by President Aquino's
allies.
• The impeachment trial began on January 16, 2012, with
various witnesses testifying regarding Corona's SALNs.
• The Impeachment Court allowed the prosecution to present
evidence on certain allegations but disallowed others.
• Subpoenas issued to banks for Corona's alleged accounts led
PS Bank to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition.
• Corona argued that the impeachment complaint was defective
and his right to due process was violated.
• He sought the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno due to
alleged partiality.
• The Supreme Court issued a TRO on February 9, 2012,
enjoining the Senate from implementing the subpoenas.
• Despite the TRO, the impeachment trial continued, and Corona
was eventually convicted by the Senate.
• Following his conviction, Corona accepted the verdict and
vacated his office.
• The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) started screening
candidates for a new Chief Justice.

Issue:
• Can the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court be invoked
to challenge matters arising from impeachment proceedings?
• Did the Impeachment Court commit grave abuse of discretion
in its proceedings against Corona?
• Were Corona's rights to due process violated during the
impeachment trial?

Ruling:
• The Supreme Court dismissed the petition on the ground of
mootness.
• The impeachment trial had concluded with Corona's
conviction.
• Corona had accepted the verdict and vacated his office.

26
Ratio:
• The issues raised by Corona had become moot and academic
due to supervening events, including his conviction and
resignation.
• An issue becomes moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy, and a determination would be without practical
use and value.
• The Court emphasized that impeachment is a political process
and judicial review is limited to ensuring that constitutional
limitations are not violated.
• The Court found no grave abuse of discretion by the
Impeachment Court.
• The constitutional command of public accountability prevailed
over Corona's claims of confidentiality regarding his bank
accounts.
• The Court dismissed the petitioner's claims of due process
violations, as the impeachment proceedings were conducted in
accordance with the Constitution.

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