SUBCULTURE

Culture can definitely be a crucial component to study the politics of

any area but one must acknowledge that many political cultures may
co-exist within any given political system. Our attention should be
focused upon the interaction of different subcultures and the impact of
that interaction upon the political system as a whole. So the idea of
subcultures becomes an important corollary to the ideas developed
above about political culture. The term 'subculture' is frequently used
as a shorthand for describing societal groups who possess a particular
identity. This identity is often expressed through forms of behaviour and
forms of expression such as fashion. A political subculture may be
defined as a group of the population that possesses a distinct and
consistent set of attitudes, beliefs and orientations to political objects.

The identification of political subcultures is complicated somewhat by

the variety of possible ways in which such strata might be conceived. In
his book Political Culture (1972), Dennis Kavanagh identifies four
distinct bases on which subcultures develop:

1. Elite versus mass culture.

2. Cultural divisions within elites.

3. Generational subcultures.

4. Social structure.

Each of these ways of thinking about the basis of subcultural divisions

produces particular sorts of investigation. The elite-versus-mass idea
concentrates attention on the attitudinal differences which might
obtain between the political class as a whole and the remainder of the
population. The separation of elite from mass is useful because it
hypothesises that exposure to particular sorts of knowledge and access
to decision-making channels provides a common socialising experience
for political elites. So rather than seeing elites as representative of the
attitudes of particular sectors of the population, this approach treats
the political elite as an investigable subculture in its own right. Indeed a
number of classic empirical studies have argued that elites tend to be
well versed in self-recruitment and that various political systems
possess ways of socialising their elites into a distinct attitudinal pattern .
The work by Prewitt in the United States suggested that political elites
tended to develop a consensus upon basic norms and rules of the
game.

The second way of thinking about subcultures is associated with the

branch of political science which argues that the most important venue
for politics is the zone populated by elite groups. Here, degrees of
stability are not likely to be related to the prevailing 'macro-political
culture in society as a whole, but to the level of cultural consensus or
divergence between elite groups. For Lijphart , the nature of elite
behaviour-particularly whether it is coalescent or adversarial is the key
to understanding the functioning of democratic polities.The
generational model of political subcultures takes us onto very different
terrain. The argument here is that distinct political cultures belong to
particular generations. The idea gives rise to the view that political
culture possesses a dynamism. Political culture changes over time as
particular generations become socialised into distinct value sets, reach
political maturity in possession of those value sets and eventually die
out to be replaced by a new generational political culture. The
consequences for political systems should be clear. Agendas change in
line with priorities that are derived from underlying values; political
parties and political institutions need to adapt accordingly. Such ideas
are particularly associated with the work of Ronald Inglehart, who
maintained that Western societies in the 1970s were undergoing
fundamental political changes thanks to generational hifts in prevailing
values. The core argument revolved around what Inglehart saw as a
transition from materialist to post-materialist values. Materialist values
are defined in terms of the pursuit of economic and physical security as
overriding priorities, whereas postmaterialist values are those which
elevate self- expression, belonging and participation over basic material
needs. The consequences for politics of such a transition would, of
course, be quite profound. The traditional emphasis on military security
and material economic welfare would be displaced by the 'new' politics
of ecology, community and popular participation. Some empirical
research in the 1970s appeared to confirm a definite difference
between generations. Older generations seemed to be more firmly
embedded in a structure of materialist values, while younger
generations were clearly more amenable to post-materialist
concerns.This was stated by R.Inglehart,in The Silent Revolution:
Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Public.

Why does this transition take place? Inglehart makes clear the basis of
his argument:

The hypothesis of an intergenerational shift from materialist towards

post-materialist values is based on two key concepts: people value most
highly those things that are relatively scarce; though to a large extent, a
person's basic values reflect the conditions that prevailed during his or
her pre-adult years.(Inglehart)

So values are rooted in material circumstances, but Inglehart favours a

model of political socialisation that emphasises the durability of
pre-adult experiences. Those raised in the aftermath of the First World
War, in the Great Depression or during the Second World War are much
more likely to place a premium on values which emphasise the primacy
of basic material needs. Those socialised during periods of rapid
economic growth with its attendant consumerism and in conditions of
peace do not regard basic material commodities as scarce resources.
This creates a psychological space in which postmaterialist ideas can
flourish. Finally, there is much to be said for the approach which
understands subcultures as derivatives of a nation's social structure.
From this point of view, political subcultures are attitudinal expressions
of the various class, religious, linguistic and ethnic divisions which
characterise any country. So, for example, in most Western countries it
is possible to speak of working-class culture which gives rise to certain
sorts of beliefs and values which historically have been channelled into
political systems by social democratic, labour and communist political
parties. Some states are divided along religious lines. In the
Netherlands, say, we might identify distinctive Catholic and Calvinist
political cultures. Countries like Belgium and Switzerland are divided
along linguistic lines. The elaborate features of the Swiss federal model
are certainly comprehensible in terms of the various linguistic groups
which form the social structure in Switzerland. Political scientists (or
perhaps more accurately political sociologists) who focus on social
structure are interested in the relationship between the operation of
the political system and the composition of the society which feeds it.
One powerful and influential argument associated with the work of
Stein Rokkan is that the pattern of political cleavages in any country can
be understood with reference to the underlying foundations of the
social structure.

In his work with Seymour Martin Lipset , Rokkan developed a model of

the evolution of cleavage structures in Western political systems. Lipset
and Rokkan maintained that the origins of key social cleavages could be
found in two important historical processes: nation-building (the
'national revolution') and industrialisation ('the industrial revolution'.

The process of nation-building throws up two sorts of conflict involving

the attempts of central elites to gain control over a given territory via
the production of standardised norms and a common legal framework.
The first is a clash with pre-existing religious forms of authority (the
Church) over matters such as education; the second involves a series of
conflicts with peripheral communities that may resist the centralising
tendencies of the state elite. During industrialisation, conflicts develop
between those engaged in pre- industrial forms of production,
particularly agriculture, and the new urban bourgeoisie. Intensive
industrialisation then creates the fourth line of social cleavage between
the bourgeois classes and the social by-product of capitalism, the
concentrated urbanised working classes. In each case and on each side
of the cleavage line there develop distinct interests, identities and value
systems. Should these conflicts fail to be resolved by the time of
democratisation, they will acquire institutional expressions in the form
of political parties.