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European Journal of Political Research 46: 557–589, 2007 557

Procedural legitimacy and political trust: The case of citizen juries


in Spain

JOAN FONT & ISMAEL BLANCO


Autonomous University of Barcelona, Spain

Abstract. During the past few years, new mechanisms of citizen participation in decision
making have been introduced into local governance frameworks in many countries around
the world. One of the basic objectives of these mechanisms is to bridge the gap between
citizens and politicians or, in other words, to build political trust. In Spain, citizen juries are
one of the main manifestations of this trend towards local democratic innovation. Their
contribution to the building of political trust depends above all on their ability to secure their
own procedural legitimacy. Case studies of Spanish citizen juries demonstrate that this
mechanism can guarantee sufficient pluralism, and that appropriate amounts of information
and deliberation, as well as devices to guarantee neutrality, can be incorporated. However,
the limited role that citizen juries assign to associations and the strategic considerations that
all political actors have with respect to them are crucial limits to their broader political
acceptance. Moreover, their educative effects are limited by two factors: they are isolated
experiences in a context of very limited opportunities for participation; and their impact on
decision making tends to be irregular and diffuse. Nevertheless, Spanish citizen juries also
have the potential to increase citizens’ interest in local events and the topics under discus-
sion, and to stimulate reflection on social problems. Their contribution to achieving better
informed and more responsive bureaucrats and politicians could also be a crucial step
towards establishing a greater degree of political trust.

Introduction

New mechanisms of citizen participation in decision making have become


more common during the last decades. Local governments have been the
crucial setting where most of these processes have emerged and developed:
citizen juries, participatory budgets, participatory strategic planning or pro-
spective workshops are just a few of the new forms of citizen participation that
have emerged. From established democracies such as the United Kingdom or
the Scandinavian countries to new democracies such as Spain or Brazil, these
processes have become more common, even though they continue to be
more the exception than the rule in the context of polities that are basically
representative democracies. What do these mechanisms mean? What is their
contribution to the enrichment of democratic procedures? The description
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden,
MA 02148, USA
558 joan font & ismael blanco

and analysis of their emergence has already produced a substantial amount of


literature in comparative terms (Khan 1998; Fishkin 1991; Fung & Wright
2001) as well as in Spain (Blanco & Gomà 2002; Font 2003; Subirats et al.
2001).
During these same years, the debate on political trust has had a substantial
boost, with new ideas and new data emerging from the social capital field. The
hypothesis that political support was in crisis in consolidated democracies has
collected new evidence and a debate has emerged on the very existence of this
crisis as well as about its possible causes.1 Unfortunately, these two fields have
had only limited contact with each other. Even though they share basic ques-
tions about the state and function of representative democracies, two sets of
researches and scholars have worked in parallel without much communica-
tion. The debate on political trust has essentially ignored the role of new forms
of participation, perhaps assuming that something so small and so local could
only have a marginal effect on a broad cultural change. At the same time, the
literature about new mechanisms has often uncritically assumed that problems
with political support were one of the basic reasons for developing these new
mechanisms. Basically, this would also assume that these mechanisms could
make a contribution to bridging the gap between citizens and politicians. This
argument has often been used by political scientists as well as politicians. To
give just a few examples, the majority of the justification for German ‘Plan-
nungszellen’ is based on the crisis of democratic representation (Dienel 1992)
and the expansion of interactive policy-making mechanisms in the Nether-
lands is explained as a reaction to decreasing levels of voter turnout in local
elections (Akkerman et al. 1999). Also, the need for new mechanisms for
citizen participation in Spain is based consistently on the arguments of both
politicians and social scientists who cite the lack of confidence in traditional
forms of representation.
This article intends to take a small step towards exploring some possible
avenues to connect both fields of research, and to discuss critically the con-
nections that have been established between them. The main content of the
article is a critical evaluation of the performance of citizen juries in Spain. As
we mentioned earlier, the use of citizen juries and other new methods of
citizen participation have been justified, inter alia, by the need to create politi-
cal trust. Of course, this is not the only reason for their development.As we will
demonstrate throughout the article, other reasons, such as the desire to avoid
polarised conflicts, create political identities, or gain electoral support, have
also played an important role. Our goal is not to discuss fully these reasons, nor
to determine the precise role that the lack of political trust has played in the
development of citizen juries. We want to discuss the assumption that citizen
juries, as they are used today, can make a significant contribution towards a
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 559

more positive view of political life in the eyes of most citizens, while exploring
the larger contribution that citizen juries have made to local democracy.
The main thrust of this article is the following: if these methods are to be
able to create a certain degree of political trust, then there is probably a
necessary previous step – that of gaining enough procedural legitimacy by
themselves. They must become clearly accepted as fair, convenient and
adequate methods for listening to citizens and for involving them in public
decision making. Throughout this article we will thus distinguish between
two different but complementary objectives: the contribution of citizen juries
to building political trust, and the overriding need that they gain procedural
legitimacy. To assess the potential impact of citizen juries, we will analyse
them according to the following criteria. First, we will consider three aspects
that may contribute to their broader public acceptance through enlarged
procedural legitimacy: their ability to represent the interests of the popula-
tion; their capacity to make informed decisions following an open delibera-
tion; and the perceptions that they are fair and unbiased, rather than
instruments of government control. Second, we will consider how they could
contribute to building political trust. There are at least three basic factors to
consider: their contribution to creating a sense of citizenship and engage-
ment in public affairs; their influence in decision making; and their capacity
to produce outputs that more closely mirror citizens’ preferences. Although
this last aspect is a crucial issue, we lack empirical evidence to make a proper
analysis. Therefore, the analysis of citizen juries will be made on the basis of
the other criteria. Of course, all these criteria are interrelated. For instance,
perceptions that citizen juries are fair and unbiased might be related to the
fact that they are really influential, or their educational effects, may in turn,
depend on the perception that they have been adequately fair, pluralist and
influential.
In many respects, these criteria are similar to those used by Papadopoulos
and Warin in their introductory article to this special issue. Our interest in the
ability to represent, and on information and deliberation, very closely match the
criteria of openness and access and of quality of deliberation pointed out in the
introduction to this special issue. Both influence on decision making as well as
the capacity to reach ‘good decisions’ would fit the efficiency and effectiveness
idea.Also, our criterion regarding the perception of neutrality clearly belongs to
the wider idea of ‘publicity, transparency and accountability’. Throughout the
text, but especially in the conclusion, we will return to discuss of how the results
of the Spanish citizen juries fit into the general theoretical framework of this
special issue. We will discuss these issues throughout the article using the
Spanish experience with citizen juries.2 Citizen juries have been selected as the
example to be discussed, both because they represent the major characteristics
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
560 joan font & ismael blanco

of these new mechanisms well and because significant empirical evidence exists
related to their performance in the Spanish case.Also, they are mechanisms that
have not only been used in an experimental form, but have been fully incorpo-
rated into several policy-making processes.
In spite of its short democratic history, Spain is not a truly exceptional
country regarding its levels of political trust. Democratic legitimacy is high, but
is combined with limited levels of trust in professional politicians and repre-
sentative institutions, as well as levels of interest that are clearly below the
European average (Montero & Torcal 1990; Montero et al. 1998). As a result,
Maravall (1982) labelled Spanish political culture as ‘democratic cynicism’,
combining the two ideas of support for democracy, but with a lack of interest.
During the years of democratic transition, those who had acted in favour of
democracy had high expectations for the potential for democratic renewal of
local government. However, the model of local government that emerged
during the 1980s gave little room for direct citizen participation. When leaders
of parties and social movements became the politicians and bureaucrats of the
new democratic local governments, they focused their efforts on the organisa-
tional consolidation of parties and administration. They established a model of
local democracy that emphasised efficiency of management, and blindly
trusted the representational capacity of new democratic institutions (Brugué
& Vallès 1997). The current tendency towards democratic innovation in the
local sphere, as it occurs in other Western European countries, is linked to a
growing awareness of political disaffection.
However, the expansion of participatory mechanisms is not particularly
high, and although the debate concerning them on the public agenda is
growing, it clearly remains below the level of courtries such as the United
Kingdom. Courses, seminars and books have appeared in the last seven years,
promoted either by local governments or by academics, and the issue gained
some saliency in the campaign of the 1999 and 2003 local elections. The debate
has not yet expanded beyond these limited communities, nor has it not reached
substantial swathes of the citizenry. In addition, it has occupied a very limited
space on the agenda of the media and other public institutions.
In the next section we will briefly describe Spanish citizen juries and give an
overview of all the cases developed in Spain. However, the ensuing sections
basically will concentrate their analysis on the Catalan cases, from which there
is richer empirical material available. For the rest of the cases, often only the
final report is available, whereas for the Catalan cases we can often count on
other sources. The two main sections of the text that follow will develop both
the arguments and the empirical evidence related to the five criteria men-
tioned earlier, with those related to acceptance of the methods (procedural
legitimacy) in one section, and those related with building political trust in the
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 561

other. Finally, the conclusion will summarise the arguments and relate them to
the main topics raised in this special issue.

Citizen juries in Spain

Citizen juries are one mechanism used to organise citizen participation in


processes of public decision making.Their Spanish version tries to combine the
best elements of ordinary juries and opinion polls and to adapt these mecha-
nisms to a new objective: making political decisions. Citizen juries basically
consist of a randomly selected group of people who make a decision on a given
public policy after an exhaustive informative process. As with ordinary juries,
randomly selected people work in small groups, are informed by the main
agents involved in the issue and by experts, have an external organiser and
reach a final decision. As in opinion polls, people are randomly selected and
asked a full set of questions that help clarify what their preferences are on a
given issue. Moreover, when people are asked their opinions in citizen juries,
they are much better informed than respondents to normal opinion polls. Also,
the final result of a citizen jury is much richer than the simple ‘guilty or
innocent’ that comes from an ordinary jury.
Citizen juries3 were initially introduced in Spain following the example of
their German version. The first Spanish citizen jury was developed in Idiazabal
(Basque Country) in 1992 and since then approximately 20 cases have been
developed, mostly in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Juries were intro-
duced in the Basque Country mostly as a mechanism for conflict resolution in
a polity extremely polarised by the effects of political violence. Their subse-
quent introduction in Catalonia was facilitated by several crucial agents: local
and provincial left-wing governments, a private foundation and university
support. Table 1 summarises some basic information about most juries in
Spain: the policy to be discussed, the number of participants and the number of
groups (juries) into which they were divided, and also the number of partici-
pants who favoured their more continued use after the experience, as an
indicator of satisfaction with the process.

Obstacles on the road to public acceptance

What are the crucial factors needed in order for public participation mecha-
nisms such as citizen juries to be fully accepted? Basically, they are unknown
methods, which in some ways break with ‘politics as usual’ in representative
democracies. Some of the crucial questions raised by political actors (citizens,
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
562

Table 1. Basic characteristics of some citizen juries in Spain

© 2007 The Author(s)


Guipúz
Coa St Montornès Montornès
Astigarraga Idiazabal (1993– Antzuola Oñati Rubí Salvatierra Quirze Corbera Calafell I II
(1992) (1992) 1994) (1996) (1996) (1997) (1997) (1997) (1998) (1998) (1998) (1999) Cardedeu

Location and Population


design of Use of a General Integration Social and Design Design growth and
Sports Soccer Road/ cultural Tourism public Tourism urban of economic of an of an urban
facilities stadium highway facilities policies space policies planning immigrants development urban park urban park planning

Number of 50 25 303 65 74 77 44 93 72 81 52 56 3
participants
Number of 2 1 14 3 3 3 2 4 3 4 4 3 68
juries

Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)


Percentage in 94 100 75 92 90 99 88 93 99 79 98 – 87
favour of
further use
joan font & ismael blanco

of juries

Notes: Includes all cases developed up to the end of 1999; since then at least 6 other cases have been completed. Issue = the topic with which
citizen juries dealt. Number of participants = total of participants in citizen juries. Number of juries = number of sub-groups (juries) into which
the total number of participants were divided. Percentage in favour of further use of juries: percentage of participants stating in the evaluation
questionnaire that they are in favour of using citizen juries for dealing with other relevant public issues.
Source: Font and Medina (2001).
procedural legitimacy and political trust 563

politicians, public administrators or associations) concern the basic problems:


who participates, how participation is organised, and why these methods are
put into practice. The three arguments that follow address these concerns. In
each case, we will start by presenting the arguments as to why the problem is
important and then we will discuss its empirical development based on the
Catalan cases.

Representation and inclusion

Probably the most frequently used criterion to evaluate mechanisms for


citizen participation is their ability to become representative of the larger
population. Both the academic community and politicians and associations
agree that it is important to evaluate this criterion. While near unanimity exists
on the academic side regarding the more effective methods of evaluation, great
debate arises from associations and politicians. Local governments often do try
to legitimise their decisions by referring to the idea that they are founded on
a participatory process, without taking into account exactly who was repre-
sented in the process. When this occurs, other actors feeling that participation
was biased in favour of certain positions criticise the process because of its
representational bias. Similarly, a typical argument that governments use
against various social opposition movements or associations is that they do not
accurately represent the population. Social actors who believe that certain
issues should be addressed through participatory processes are usually more
worried about securing a primary role for themselves than ensuring that they
are truly pluralistic. Once they reach this goal, they tend to dismiss the ques-
tion of representation.
In fact, the exact meaning of ‘being representative’ is far from clear. Weeks
(2000) writes that participation should be ‘broad and representative’, but
suggests that this condition was fulfilled because the participants were quite
diverse in their social composition, without making any precise comparison
between their composition and that of the population. Smith and Wales (2000)
argue that the traditional criteria of sociological representation (how does the
social and political profile of participants correspond to that of the whole
population?) may not be sufficient. Apart from the personal traits of the
individuals that participate, we might also ask, as Papadopoulos and Warin
suggest in their introductory article, to what extent is the plurality of social and
political organisations well represented in the participatory process? Citizen
juries put much more emphasis on the representativeness of the individuals
that participate than on that of the collective actors who are involved in the
participatory process. All decision-making power in citizen juries is given to
randomly selected citizens, whereas organised groups only play an informative
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
564 joan font & ismael blanco

role by explaining their positions on the topic and later attempting to persuade
the jury to agree with them. As we will discuss later, this might be an important
factor in understanding the scepticism and even the critical attitudes of some
associations in relation to this participatory methodology.
Even with an agreement on what representation means, we still have to
discuss how it can be secured in terms of recruitment procedures. Self-
selection has clear advantages over random selection because it reduces costs
and relies on the existing participatory energies in society. However, an
adequate level of sociological representativeness is very difficult to attain via
self-selection procedures, except when combined with strong mobilisation
efforts such as those existing in processes like the Brazilian participatory
budget (Baiocchi 2001; Abers 2000). Even in these cases significant biases
related to the social and political profile of participants can occur (Avritzer
2002). By randomly selecting people, citizen juries claim to give all citizens the
same opportunity to participate, as well as to generate a representative sample
of participants. Juries aim to be composed of common citizens who are neither
experts nor actors with a vested interest in the topics with which they deal.
However, their representativeness cannot be taken for granted since the
number of participants is low and their participation is absolutely voluntary.
Once they have been selected and contacted, participants are offered several
incentives to participate. Organisers usually offer them assistance with arrang-
ing time off from work, child care or further assistance in the case of physical
disability. In some cases (in Rubi and Corbera), participants have even
received monetary compensation to participate (€30–60 each day). Neverthe-
less, bearing in mind the limits we have pointed out, we should remember that
the purpose of juries cannot be statistical representativeness, but rather an
adequate degree of heterogeneity.
To what extent have Spanish jurors’ profiles been diverse? What have been
the main biases that have occurred in relation to the respective local popula-
tions? The proportion of those asked agreeing to participate in juries has been
relatively low, and in nearly all cases the number of citizens that have not
participated has been higher than those who have (Table 2). Owing to census
errors, some jurors could not be contacted, which was the main explanation for
non-participation. Among those who have been contacted, refusal to partici-
pate can be explained by sheer lack of interest or by other personal reasons
(e.g., work and family commitments or health problems).
However, refusal to participate seems to go beyond the explanations that
citizens themselves provided. In the Montornès II experience we set up a
questionnaire in order to compare the sociopolitical profile of those who
agreed to participate with those who refused the invitation. We observed
significant differences between these two groups in several respects: for
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 565

instance, 57 per cent of participants stated that they were interested in politics,
in contrast to 37 per cent of non-participants; 50 per cent of non-participants
said that they did not trust politics, in contrast to 23 per cent of participants; 75
per cent of participants said that they were ‘quite’ or ‘very’ interested in local
politics, while 60 per cent of non-participants acknowledged that they were not
interested at all, or only a little (Blanco 2000).
Discrepancies in non-participation rates can be explained by several factors
(Blanco 2000). First, the sociopolitical features of the local population: part of
the explanation for the low non-participation rates in the cases of Astigarraga
Idiazabal, Antzuola, Oñati and Salvatierra could be that they are small munici-
palities in the Basque Country, with a strong participatory tradition. Second,
the features of the issue under discussion: it might be that the more well known
the topic and the greater the conflict it has aroused in the municipality, the
stronger will be the motivation of citizens to accept the invitation to partici-
pate. Regrettably, we do not have enough information from all the cases to test
this hypothesis empirically, but cases such as the use of a public space at Rubi
(the Catalan case with the lowest non-participation rate) are a good example
of this factor (high conflict, high participation).Third, the role of organisational
factors related to the methodology of selection should not be underestimated.
For instance, part of the explanation for the high non-participation rate in
Corbera is that the organisers had more difficulty locating the individuals they
had selected: 146 individuals of the 555 that were selected were not found.4 In
other cases, such as Montornès del Vallès, organisers asked individuals to
accept or refuse participation by telephone, which gave more room for indi-

Table 2. Participation in Spanish citizen juries

Place Selected Jurors Ratio jurors/selected

Astigarraga 158 50 0.32


Idiazábal 53 25 0.47
Antzuola 100 65 0.65
Oñati 200 74 0.37
Rubí 265 77 0.29
Salvatierra 113 44 0.39
St. Quirze del Vallès 397 93 0.23
Corbera 555 72 0.13
Calafell 500 81 0.16
Montornès I 450 52 0.12
Montornès II 402 56 0.14

Source: Font and Medina (2001).

© 2007 The Author(s)


Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
566 joan font & ismael blanco

viduals to decline the invitation. When individuals are invited to a personal


interview with organisers, they tend eventually to accept the invitation since
they can freely voice their doubts, concerns and difficulties regarding partici-
pation in that interview and organisers are then in a better position to convince
them. Other important organisational factors are publicity and compensation.
The more publicity the future citizen juries receive, the more individuals tend
to accept the invitation to participate. Also, larger compensation makes
participation more attractive – at least for some segments of the population.
For example, many of the Basque cases received more publicity and people
received greater compensation for participating, while publicity was quite
limited in Montornes and a free lunch was the only economic incentive on
offer.
Although non-participation rates are high, this does not impede social
diversity from occurring. According to the data that compare jurors and the
local population included in the final reports, the degree of pluralism has been
very high, ensuring that citizens who would not have participated by other
means did become involved. In relation to gender, for instance, the partici-
pants’ profile was found to be very similar to that of the local population. In
contrast to other forms of non-electoral political participation, from protest to
local consultation councils, juries have reached a satisfactory balance in terms
of this variable and in some cases a bias was even detected in favour of women
(Table 3).
In relation to jurors’ age, the diversity of participants has also been high,
but the biases in this variable have been more significant. In most cases, young
adults have been slightly over-represented at the expense of the elderly. In the
first citizen jury in Montornès del Vallès, for instance, young adults between 16
and 25 years old made up 34 per cent of participants, while they represent only
19 per cent of the population. In the second citizen jury in the same city, the
organisers introduced a quota to prevent this bias from occurring again. In the
other Catalan cases, the over-representation of young adults has also occurred,
but not to the same degree as in the Montornès case.5 Lack of participation of
the elderly is also related to a lack of participatory tradition, and to a lack of
sense of personal political efficacy among people who were greatly exposed to
the Franco period.
Age biases also have to do with different participation costs. For instance,
participation costs in citizen juries might be lower for young adults as they are
normally studying and have no strong family commitments. Health problems
more often and more seriously affect the elderly, whereas adults often have
work-related and family commitments that cannot be waived. In addition, the
financial compensation for participation or the mere innovative character of
the experience might be more stimulating for young people than for adults.
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
Table 3. Gender of participants in Catalan citizen juries (percentages)

Rubí Montornès I Montornès II Calafell Corbera de Ll.

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female

Participants 52.6 47.4 64.0 36.0 48.2 51.8 48.1 51.9 48.6 51.4
Population 49.8 50.1 51.0 49.0 51.0 49.0 50.7 49.3 50.1 49.9

Source: see Appendix.

Table 4. Jurors’ and populations’ level of education (percentages)

Rubí Montornès I Montornès II Cardedeu

Level of education Jurors Population Jurors Population Jurors Population Jurors Population

No education 7.7 28.1 4 28 7.1 28 6 12


Primary education 57.7 48.8 38 36 41.1 36 37 39
Secondary education 29.5 18.4 42 33 35.7 33 32 38
procedural legitimacy and political trust

Higher education 5.1 4.7 16 3 16.1 3 25 11

Source: see Appendix.


567

© 2007 The Author(s)


Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
568 joan font & ismael blanco

The features of the topic under discussion might also affect the levels of
participation according to the age group. For instance, when the main topic
is the use of a specific urban space (such as in Rubí or in the two cases of
Montornès del Vallès), young people might be more motivated to participate
than in more global issues such as urban planning or immigration policies.
The same could be pointed out in relation to other variables: the less socio-
politically prepared are the individuals, the less likely they are to participate in
abstract and global topics and the more likely they are to participate in more
concrete issues with a day-to-day significance for them.
As expected, the most significant bias refers to the level of education.
Table 4 shows that people without education are clearly under-represented in
citizen juries. Even though this group represents up to 30 per cent of the local
populations, it does not reach 10 per cent in any of the cases. By contrast,
groups with a higher level of education are clearly over-represented in all
cases, but it must also be noted that people with low (primary) education are
well represented.
In conclusion, despite the existence of biases in terms of age and above all
of formal education, the diversity of the social profile of jurors were relatively
high, especially when compared with those involved in protest activities
(Barnes & Kaase 1979). Gender equilibrium is the most significant achieve-
ment in this sense. The presence of a significant group of participants with a
low level of education and even the over-representation of young adults and
women in some cases, show that citizen juries are able to involve non-
traditional participants. Random selection, the personalised invitation to par-
ticipate, and the material incentives and compensations for participation have
proven to be useful in reaching considerable levels of diversity.

Information and deliberation

Information and deliberation are also two classical criteria that appear in
almost every evaluation of new participatory mechanisms. Participants need to
be informed in order to make wise decisions and they must have the oppor-
tunity to discuss the issues sufficiently among themselves and with the provid-
ers of the information.6 What is relevant is not the amount of information the
participants had beforehand, but whether they received enough information
during the process to a make a final decision.7 One crucial factor to consider
here is to what extent participants were able to understand, process and use
the information they received to take their final position.
Deliberation is defined as the ability to discuss a set of plural arguments.
Deliberation does not mean lack of conflict or very sophisticated arguments,
but to be able to hear all points of view and to avoid dominance of the
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 569

discussion by any one individual.8 One radical interpretation of the delibera-


tive argument is resistance to the introduction of voting procedures in some of
these processes,9 creating a forced consensus that can often emerge in small
communities where voting is strongly avoided (Mansbridge 1980). This is not
the case with Spanish citizen juries, where participants must answer a ques-
tionnaire with several questions related to the topic.
The philosophy of the citizen jury is to obtain informed and reasoned
opinions from ordinary citizens who are not selected because of their knowl-
edge of the topic to be discussed. In this sense, juries aim to generate optimal
conditions for jurors to become well informed. The information they are
provided with stems from two kinds of sources: experts from the public
administration and external experts not linked to the municipality (often
from a university). These experts provide jurors with technical information
through talks, and by answering the questions posed by participants. All local
actors (political parties and local associations) are also invited to explain and
discuss with jurors their positions on the topics under discussion. They give
talks and debate with jurors, sometimes alone and on other occasions using
round tables with other political and social actors. Experts (both external
and from the administration) are normally selected by the organisational
staff, taking into account the suggestions of the local government and, if it
exists, a commission where social and political actors are represented (see
below). Their selection is crucial for the quality and pluralism of the infor-
mational process, as we will discuss later. In addition, jurors have several
opportunities to deliberate among themselves. After an intensive informa-
tion and deliberation process, jurors are supposed to have received enough
information and reflected enough to be able to make a reasonable decision
on the issue. Decisions in juries are made by majority voting, which distin-
guishes them from other participatory forms discussed in this volume, thus
avoiding the problems raised in the introductory chapter regarding the need
to reach a consensus.
The selection of a suitable topic is important for this process to be effective.
Topics that demand a high degree of technical know-how are not well adapted
to citizen juries since the participatory process is too short for participants to
fully understand and process all the information they would need. Very broad
topics are not suitable for citizen juries for the same reason. In their evalua-
tions of citizen juries, both in the final meetings and in the questionnaires
answered at the end of the process, participants often said that they needed
more time in order to understand and process all the information they were
provided. Many of them also stated that they would have liked to have some
sort of documentation in advance in order to be able to reflect more on the
topics they were going to discuss.10 These kinds of claims were more significant
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
570 joan font & ismael blanco

in the cases where the technical complexity or the breadth of the topic dealt
with were greater, such as in the Cardedeu experience.
In the majority of cases, organisers have made an effort to simplify the
topics in order to adapt them to the participatory setting. For instance, in
Montornès del Vallès, an earlier pre-selection of the alternative projects for
designing the urban areas that were under discussion was made. Therefore,
jurors had to choose only between three alternative projects and could also
make suggestions for improving each of them. In Cardedeu, participants had to
take a stance regarding the revision of the town plan. Nevertheless, they did
not have to discuss the whole plan, but only two basic, general questions:
Should the city expand in demographic and urban terms (to what extent, in
which areas and when)? And, did they prefer a compact urban model, with a
high urban concentration and mixture of dwellings, shops and services, or a
diffuse model with dispersed houses and a clear segmentation of urban func-
tions (residence, shopping, public services, etc.)? This framing of the topics
helped the participants take a position on issues that would initially seem far
too complex from a technical standpoint.
Jurors have had several opportunities to deliberate, either in plenary ses-
sions or in small groups of four or five people. Relying on our participant
observation in Rubí, and the two cases of Montornès del Vallès and in
Cardedeu, we can state that small discussion groups were very effective in
assisting people with poorer communication skills to express their opinions
and questions. In these deliberation sessions, jurors prepared questions to be
put to speakers, exchanged personal impressions and provided personal expe-
riences and knowledge that enriched the information available. In a few cases,
especially in Corbera and Cardedeu, several jurors and other political actors
blamed some of the moderators for influencing the content of the debates,
but in general their role was accepted and supported by all participants (see
below).
The Catalan case studies demonstrate that if topics are well framed, pre-
sentations well adapted to participants’ skills and pluralist in their contents,
and questions are formulated appropriately, ordinary citizens are able to
understand complex issues and discuss them. In the Cardedeu case study, for
example, tests were conducted in order to check the internal consistency of
questionnaires and these revealed a considerable level of consistency. The
experience included both a postal survey and a jury. The postal survey, which
did not include information and deliberation, showed larger numbers of
people asking for both preservation of non-urban areas of the municipality
and the development of single-family houses – two goals difficult to achieve
simultaneously. The participants in the jury showed a much greater consistency
in their answers to questions about different, but related, issues (see EAP
© 2007 The Author(s)
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procedural legitimacy and political trust 571

(2000b) in Annex 1). Even when participants failed to grasp some aspects of
the technical information, they complemented the available information with
common sense, personal experience and ethical values. An adequate panel of
experts and panellists and an unbiased moderator proved to be crucial factors
in the success of the information and deliberation process. The design of juries
is especially important in this respect, even if, in practice, insufficient informa-
tion or an incomplete group of panellists did occur on some occasions.

Fairness

The unbiased character of participatory cases is one of the goals mentioned


by several authors if these mechanisms are to gain procedural legitimacy.
Weeks (2000) discusses credibility and Barnes (2000) the incorporation of
stakeholders in the design process in order to guarantee its fairness as a
desirable feature. Even if juries are normally organised by an external agent
who is trying precisely to guarantee a certain degree of neutrality, the fact that
this moderator is employed by a given public administration brings the need
for further assurances. In Spain, the first initiatives for citizen involvement in
local policy making were viewed with some suspicion by different agents.
According to the interviews we conducted with participants (pre- and post-
juries) and the meetings we had with social and political actors during the
organisation of the cases of Montornès, Rubí and Cardedeu, citizens, local
associations and opposition parties, at least at the beginning of the process,
tended to perceive the initiative of citizen juries as a possible instrument of
government control.
In Table 5, we use several variables that help us describe the political
conditions under which citizen juries were developed. First, we identify who
initiated citizen juries.This does not mean that there is only one agent involved
in the initiation of the participatory experience, since, as we will see later, this
agent could try to reach some sort of consensus with other political and/or
social agents. Nevertheless, it is this agent that assumes the political leadership
of the process. Second, we check whether citizen juries have to face any
opposition. We consider opposition to be ‘relevant’ when stakeholders (politi-
cal parties or local associations) used public devices to oppose the use of
citizen juries (media, demonstrations, propaganda on the street) and main-
tained this opposition throughout the entire process. Third, we describe
mechanisms of political control of the process. Political commissions are
created before the organisation of citizen juries and keep on working during
their deliberations. They are usually composed of all political parties repre-
sented in the City Hall, mainly discuss the agenda of citizen juries and are
informed about all organisational issues. Jurors’ commissions are created when
© 2007 The Author(s)
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572

Table 5. Fairness of Catalan citizen juries

© 2007 The Author(s)


St Quirze Rubí Corbera Montornès I Montornès II Calafell Cardedeu

Initiator Local Local Local Local Local Local Local


government government government government government government association
Relevant
opposition to Yes Yes No No No Yes No
the initiative?
Who opposed PSC (main Local – – – PSC (main –
the jury? opposition party) associations opposition party)
Mechanisms of Jurors Political Political Jurors Jurors Jurors Political
control commission commission commission commission commission commission commission

Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)


and jurors and jurors and jurors
commission commission commission
Percentage of
joan font & ismael blanco

participants
very satisfied 75 93 – – 52 75 65
with the
organiser’s
neutrality

Source: see Appendix.


procedural legitimacy and political trust 573

citizen juries have finished: they are composed of jurors elected by participants
in order to oversee the completion of the final report. Finally, we mention the
percentage of participants who express that they are ‘very satisfied with
the organiser’s neutrality’ in the questionnaire they answer at the end of the
process.
An important factor to take into account is that in all the cases except one,
it was the local government that initiated the participatory process. The only
exception is Cardedeu, in which a local environmental association took the
first steps for citizen juries to be established in view of the revision of the urban
plan. Once organised, juries asked the local government to become the main
agent of the process since it would also bear the main responsibility in assum-
ing their conclusions. The fear of electoral manipulation has always been
present and produced reluctance or even conflict with opposition parties. It
was established, through post-jury interviews with participants, that such an
attitude of suspicion has induced some of the citizens selected to participate to
refuse the invitation (Blanco et al. 2000). However, the support of all political
parties for the initiative helped moderate the suspicion of electoral manipu-
lation. In those cases where the process benefited from cross-party support, all
letters sent to citizens were signed not only by the Mayor, but by all parties.
Similarly, in any public presentation of the process all parties had been invited
to participate. In Rubí, all political parties supported and became actively
involved in the process after being able to negotiate the agenda of citizen juries
and other organisational aspects with the organising committee and the local
government. Thus, political support in Rubí was the result of a long process of
dialogue in order to reassure reluctant opposition parties. In Montornès,
however, the local government never had the will to make a similar effort, and
in Calafell or Sant Quirze these efforts were quite limited (a formal written
invitation) and clearly not successful. In Cardedeu, the main opposition party
(CiU) was quite reluctant in the beginning, but was incorporated into the
process through the role it played in the political commission, where it was
able to influence the drafting of the final questionnaire. The attitude of parties
is usually influenced by the hope or the fear that the jury may have an electoral
effect. This creates a predisposition to non-cooperation from the opposition,
which can only be overcome with a process of dialogue and guarantees.
With respect to local associations, in all cases the organising committee
initiated the process by summoning them to a meeting where the content of
citizen juries was explained. Local associations were thereafter invited to
present their opinions to jurors. In spite of this, in some cases the strongest
resistance to citizen juries came from civic associations. In Rubí, the neigh-
bourhood association federation firmly opposed the organisation of juries
because they perceived them as an instrument to neutralise their role as the
© 2007 The Author(s)
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574 joan font & ismael blanco

‘real’ representatives of local residents. Furthermore, they were convinced that


‘normal’ people are poorly informed and can be easily manipulated. This
opposition to juries was based on the fact that before the organisation of
citizen juries, the neighbourhood association made a proposal for designing
the urban area under discussion and supported this proposal with more than a
thousand signatures. Therefore, they claimed that the mobilisation process
they had initiated was much more legitimate than citizen juries (1,000 signa-
tures versus 75 participants).
The conflict has not always been as strong as it was in Rubí, and the most
common attitude of organised groups has been scepticism rather than open
and public opposition to the process. In all cases, the process has only been able
to achieve the active involvement of a very limited number of associations.
Some associations tend to distrust citizen juries to the extent to which this
mechanism places them in a mere informative role, meaning that they lose
their traditional capacity to directly influence the process of decision making.
Most often, the attitude of reluctant associations is non-participation instead
of open opposition. An interesting example in this respect is that of a citizen
jury in Montornès del Vallès that never came to exist. The local government
proposed the creation of a jury to an environmental group in order to debate
a new Coca-Cola plant that was to be built in the area surrounding the city. The
debate would essentially focus on the trade-off between jobs and environmen-
tal protection. Since the environmental group had the impression they had
everything in their favour (environmental impact evaluations, support from
crucial actors) they refused to organise the jury. They were afraid of losing if it
was ever held, even if they were generally in favour of citizen participation
mechanisms.
There are some exceptions to the tendency of organised groups to be
sceptical vis-à-vis juries because they feel that they would weaken their role,
but they can still be explained within this framework. As noted above, the
Cardedeu jury arose following a proposal from an environmental group. This
group had largely promoted innovative ways of citizen involvement and their
organisation of a jury simply demonstrated consistency with this belief. In
addition, they seemed convinced that the jury would agree with them. The case
of Rubí also demonstrates how instrumental motivations can also favour the
adoption of a positive attitude towards participation. Even though it would not
play a crucial role in a decision-making process organised through a jury, the
shopkeepers’ association was a strong supporter of the Rubí jury. A decision
made by the local government could have had very negative effects (the
building of a large commercial centre) and their traditional relationship with
the local government was quite poor. Basically, the option for them was either
the jury (with some chance of winning) or nothing: so they chose the jury.
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 575

The main way to overcome the existing doubts about the neutrality of
citizen juries has been to delegate their organisation to an external agent. In all
cases, the initiators of citizen juries have contacted several organisations to
fulfil this role: basically, the Jaume Bofill Foundation and two research groups
– namely, Citcon from the Basque Country and the Institute of Government
and Public Policy from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB).
External organisers have played several roles, similar in all cases. They have
tried to persuade social and political actors to involve themselves in the
process; they have prepared and negotiated the agenda of citizen juries with all
participants; they have moderated the juries; and they have drafted the final
report with juries’ recommendations under the supervision of a commission of
participants.11
In some cases, however, the role of the organiser has been questioned by
certain participants since it is usually financed by the administration itself and
because of the power that it accumulates. In Rubí, for instance, the neigh-
bourhood associations publicly stated that the organisers – the Jaume Bofill
Foundation and the research group of the UAB – were acting according to the
interests of the local government. In several informal conversations that we
had with some representatives of local parties and associations from Rubí,
they acknowledged that the neutrality of the external organiser had not been
fully accepted by many individuals that belonged to those groups. Regrettably,
no systematic data are available to check to what extent this attitude of
suspicion had spread throughout the members of the different local organisa-
tions. A similar distrust emerged in the Basque case of the Guipuzcoa runway,
where the level of political conflict was quite high and where some associations
close to the Basque pro-independence movement withdrew their support for
the process, expressing their opinion that the organiser was not fair in its role.
In this sense, the role of the external organiser itself has been moderated by
two kinds of mechanisms. In some cases the previously mentioned commission
composed of political representatives was created with a consultative function.
All the important decisions that the organiser had to make were negotiated
and approved by this commission. The organiser informed this commission
how the process of participant selection would be executed, what the dynamics
of citizen juries were going to consist of, as well as negotiating the topics and
the speakers. A complementary strategy used in several Catalan citizen juries
was to introduce a certain margin of self-organisation. Starting from the
agenda set by the organiser, the members of the first jury defined what the
agenda of the next group should be at the end of their sessions. In some cases,
the first jury introduced some significant changes. In Rubí, for example, the
members of the first jury asked for an earlier presentation of the local gov-
ernment proposal and the removal of a civil servant’s presentation since the
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
576 joan font & ismael blanco

latter had provided no relevant information. Both suggestions were imple-


mented in the next two juries that took part in the same decision-making
process. In all cases, a jurors’ commission was created with one basic goal: to
control the production and completion of the final report. The jurors’ commis-
sion was composed of several jurors selected at the end of citizen juries, with
a combination of voluntary participation and direct selection, attempting to
find a balance in their composition in terms of gender and age. Several weeks
after the meetings, the commission members were summoned to a meeting
with the organiser in order to discuss the content of the report, which had been
sent to them previously.
In the end, the participants’ assessment of the neutrality of the process was,
generally speaking, positive. Most participants were very satisfied with the
organiser’s neutrality (Table 5) and, according to the questionnaires, almost
100 per cent of participants in all cases were satisfied. However, the reluctance
of civic associations and political parties to support citizen juries is a crucial
problem that needs to be addressed if juries are to enjoy procedural legitimacy.
Furthermore, it seems possible that those who did not participate in citizen
juries, in spite of having been selected, were perhaps less satisfied with the
neutrality of this participatory mechanism. Regrettably, no data are available
to confirm this hypothesis.

Building political trust?

Public acceptance of citizen juries is a necessary first step. However, the


organisation of a participatory process should provide benefits going beyond
the process itself. Here we will discuss two conditions that, if fulfilled by citizen
juries, could contribute to bridging the gap between citizens and politicians: the
educational effect of participation and its impact on public policies.

Juries as schools for democracy

What is the juries’ capacity to act as a ‘school for democracy’ – that is, to
function as an arena where one can obtain skills and develop the necessary
attitude and knowledge to become a ‘good citizen’? This seems to be such a
crucial goal that it has often been mentioned in research on citizen participa-
tion mechanisms (Barnes 2000; Bowler & Donovan 2002). However, beyond
this apparent unanimity, we can distinguish at least two different meanings of
the educational effects of participatory mechanisms. The most relevant educa-
tional effects, mentioned by Fishkin’s accounts of deliberative opinion polls,
point to changes in attitudes to more open, ‘deliberative and tolerant positions
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 577

(Fishkin 1991). This is something very different from generating a sense of


citizenship or strengthening social capital, which is what most other authors
refer to when they talk about educational effects (O’Neill 2003; Guston 1998).
In order to clarify the kinds of existing effects, we propose to distinguish
them through two criteria. First, the people on whom these effects are exerted.
We should distinguish between three crucial groups: citizen participants,
professional participants (experts and politicians) and non-participants.
Obviously, the potential effects will be much greater in the two first groups of
people. However, since the number of participants is limited, there is often a
desire to extend some of the benefits of the experience to a larger audience.
This is, for example, especially visible in the case of deliberative opinion polls
(DOPs), which are shown on television specifically to gain this larger audience.
Although a television viewer might not see his or her deliberative capacity
much enhanced through a programme on a DOP, he or she may still experi-
ence an increase in trust either in politicians (because they appear willing to
listen to the ‘people’) or in other individuals (because they appear able to
listen, understand and make proposals). The effects on citizen participants are
the most obvious ones, and those which are most often mentioned in the
literature. However, some research has shown convincingly that some crucial
effects also exist among the experts and politicians who become involved in
these cases (Guston 1998), especially in terms of appreciating what they can
learn from ordinary people.
Another criterion is the different kinds of effects. We will briefly outline five
of them, with the first one being social trust. As a result of continued coopera-
tion with others, trust in other people is expected to increase, as suggested by
the social capital literature (Putnam 1993). We have argued that the very
existence of several citizen juries in Spain has been justified by the need to
increase political trust (i.e., the confidence people have in political represen-
tatives), which is the second possible effect. There are at least two possible
causal mechanisms leading to political trust.12 First, the organisation of partici-
patory initiatives may be viewed as a sign of willingness to listen to citizens.
Second, the fact that throughout the jury process, citizens have to adopt the
politicians’ role, hear all views and consider the advantages and problems of
every option, contributes to a more complex and positive view of politicians’
roles.13
Participation can increase because we have confidence in other people, in
politicians or in ourselves. The empowerment of the participants – an enlarged
sense of personal political efficacy – is a third possible effect. As a result of
their involvement, citizens would realise that their participation matters and
become more willing to be involved again in the future. Often participation is
not a matter of attitudes, but a question of previous organisation that has
© 2007 The Author(s)
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578 joan font & ismael blanco

placed people in mobilisation networks (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Iglic &
Font 2006). Thus, the construction of the more structural component of social
capital (i.e., of new social organisations) is a fourth possible effect. Finally, the
effects may not reside so much in specific attitudes or behaviours as in the
ability and willingness to get involved in deliberation, in the capacity to frame
and present arguments, and to listen to and accept ideas from others.14 This is
the most traditional sense in which we can talk about a ‘school’ for democracy,
since people would be learning crucial political skills.15 In Table 6, we see a
large set of possible cultural results of participation. Of course, some of the
possible boxes make no sense (the increase of the deliberative capacities of
non-participants) and some are much more likely to be relevant than others.
Each participatory process will be more likely to contribute something to some
boxes and not much to others, depending on its organisational traits (e.g., a
televised DOP may have an effect on the political trust of non-participants
(box 11), but this is unlikely to occur in a non-televised experience).
Which of these effects appear in the Catalan cases? Research on former
Catalan participants has been conducted to evaluate the effects on their values
and behaviour.16 This research began with several questions: did citizen juries
affect in any way the images participants held of politicians and politics? Did
participants subsequently attend local forums more often, or did they involve
themselves in any other participatory processes? Did they follow local collec-
tive events and did they talk about them more often? Immediately after the
citizen juries, a very large majority of participants showed a considerable
degree of satisfaction and had positive feelings about the experience,17 and
about those who had promoted it.
Do these feelings last? The main conclusion was that the long-term impact
of citizen juries in participants was limited. The fact that citizen juries are an
isolated experience limits their educational potential. Most jurors insisted that
the experience had neither significantly changed their image of politics and

Table 6. Possible different cultural effects on participation and three sectors of the
population (box number)

Social Political Political Deliberative


trust trust efficacy Organisation capacity

Citizen (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)


participants
Professional (6) (7) (8) (9)
participants
Non-participants (10) (11)

Note: Empty cells indicate that these kinds of effects are very unlikely to occur.

© 2007 The Author(s)


Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 579

politicians, nor had it significantly motivated them to become involved in


collective issues. The contrast between the short-term excitement of partici-
pants after the juries and the disappearance of these effects after a period of
time was interpreted by the authors as the result of returning to ‘business as
usual’. The effect of two days as a valued participant evaporated after a return
to regular politics, where only professional politicians participate.18 Conse-
quently, only a more regular and extended use of participatory devices could
produce longlasting effects.
However, several of the jurors’ comments pointed to the learning potential
of such participatory experiences. Younger, less educated and less politically
motivated jurors confessed that they became more interested in local events.
Also, almost all participants said that they are now more interested in current
jury topics. Bearing in mind that some of these topics were relatively general
(urban planning, social integration of immigrants), citizen juries were, for most
participants, an opportunity to reflect on the problems in their city. For jurors
with a less developed sense of political knowledge, this feeling was especially
intense and helped them to perceive themselves as relevant members of the
community. Finally, all participants noticed that the diversity of jurors and the
pluralistic process of deliberation was the most important phenomenon that
they experienced.
Thus from the first line in Table 6, Blanco et al. (2000) found no evidence of
effect in boxes 2 and 4, but some in boxes 3 and 5.19 The effects on professional
participants have never been fully explored empirically in Spain; therefore we
have no evidence regarding boxes 6 through 9. However, some professionals
who participated in a seminar for evaluating the Catalan cases of citizen
juries (organised by the Jaume Bofill Foundation) pointed out that they were
surprised by the capacity exhibited by common citizens to deal with complex
issues. Consequently, an increase of their trust in citizens’ capabilities might be
one of the most important things that they could learn from these kinds of
experiences (Blanco 2003). Our research indicated that participants only made
a limited effort to share their experience with other people. If we add to this
the relatively low visibility of most processes,20 their possible impact on non-
participants was quite limited. Learning from these problems, Cardedeu
framed juries in a more complex process of citizen involvement. Juries
were part of a larger consultation process that involved six monographic
programmes on local television informing the public about the experience and
the issues to be discussed (urban planning).A questionnaire was also sent to all
local households, which could be answered either on paper or via a website. In
this sense, citizen juries were conceived of as the final step of a general process
of information and deliberation where, in principle, the whole population
should be involved. Larger segments of the population came to know about
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
580 joan font & ismael blanco

the process of participation and many citizens followed the television pro-
grammes. Almost a thousand residents answered the poll and the audience
figures for televised forums were apparently high. To summarise, there is no
clear evidence regarding boxes 10 and 11, but as a clear precondition to them,
participatory processes should be visible so that non-participants receive infor-
mation about them.
In conclusion, the scope of potential cultural effects of juries is quite
broad and can affect quite a diverse set of actors. We have very limited
evidence to assess to what extent these effects have effectively developed in
the Spanish cases. The impacts on participants have been explored in greater
depth: the political attitudes of participants have not significantly changed.
It is also clear that citizen juries are a minor competitor with other sources
of political socialisation such as the media and the social environment.
Therefore, the educational effects of citizen juries can only be effective if
participatory mechanisms become a more regular and common occurrence.
As mentioned in the introduction by Papadopoulos and Warin, owing to
their limited presence in the media, their effects can hardly go beyond the
participants. Nevertheless, the fact that the limited effects concentrate pre-
cisely on those normally less active and interested, those who would never
participate through other mechanisms, is good news in terms of the assess-
ment of their potential effectiveness.

Impact on public decisions

Substantive decisions are not the single goal of participatory processes, but
they should play a key role if these are to be considered something more
than just a human laboratory. The organisation of juries involves economic
and organisational efforts that would make no sense if juries’ recommenda-
tions were to be ignored. As we shall see, their real impact on policies has
been quite diverse, depending on the case, but the jury has always been
developed in the midst of a real policy debate on the local institutions: they
have discussed the use of public areas when they became available for public
use and have made proposals on immigration when it became a real policy
issue in the municipality. Their specific role in the policy process, however, is
hard to define in a context dominated by the logic of representation. This is
the reason why, in contrast with most of the criteria mentioned above, their
substantive impact on policies is often not mentioned as an evaluation
criterion.
For some, the participatory process cannot go beyond a consultative role.
Processes that go beyond this role, like the regular use of binding referendums,
are accused of weakening parties and creating contradictions between poli-
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 581

cies.21 Cases that break with the consultation logic are exceptions, like most
Brazilian participatory budgets, where, after a strong negotiation process, the
citizen-built budget is fully adopted by politicians. In other areas, even if there
is a lot of pressure to accept the results of these mechanisms as if they were
binding, they can face resistance from politicians, who lack strong incentives to
share their decision-making capacity. A trade-off appears then, between
making these procedures more binding but less frequent and selecting them
strategically, or keeping them consultative but making them more common
and universally used. Nonetheless, it is also difficult to mobilise potential
participants without assigning a relevant role to the process in policy making.
Participants do not need to know that their recommendations will be followed
fully, but want reassurance that their work will be valued. One of the most
important incentives for citizens when participating in such mechanisms as
citizen juries is the chance to influence policies, and one of the questions most
often raised by citizens when asked to participate is whether their choices will
be translated into real decisions.22 Catalan empirical evidence is mixed in that
respect. In principle, most local governments express their commitment to
implement juries’ recommendations (Table 7).
Only in Calafell and St Quirze have the decisions reached by juries been
ignored totally since the new local governments formed by parties that
consistently opposed the processes decided to do so. In two other cases,
Montornes-I and Corbera, the city council has taken some measures in order
to demonstrate that the recommendations of juries are being taken into
account, either fully or partially. Finally, in three cases, the local government
has expressed its strong commitment to the juries’ results and has promised to
implement them, but has been unable to cope with technical or political
problems. In Rubí, for example, strong financial problems in the city council,
constant changes in government composition, lack of consensus about the
conclusions of the jury, and lack of conviction from the local government have
meant that no measures have yet been taken. To summarise, in terms of their
real influence on policies, the impact of Catalan juries is again mixed. It is clear
that in some cases their recommendations have been fully or partially fol-
lowed. At the same time, in more than half of the cases, important obstacles
have emerged preventing implementation.
The lack of implementation of jury recommendations requires two
further assessments. First, a jury recommendation not followed is not only an
opportunity lost, but also a source of disappointment. Today it would be
more difficult to organise a successful jury in Rubí than in a city where one
has never been organised because it would face reluctance and resistance
from segments of the population who may not want to become involved in
a process with an unclear future (Blanco 2003). Second, participants and
© 2007 The Author(s)
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582

Table 7. Policy results of Catalan citizen juries

© 2007 The Author(s)


Time passed since the Status of the decision Main obstacle to
Place Topic presentation of the report made by juries implementation

St Quirze Urban planning 4 years and 8 months None of the recommendations Lack of support from the
made by juries have been opposition; government
implemented since the new change
government has decided to
organise a new process
Rubí Uses for a public space 4 years and 7 months The agreements reached by Cost of the decision;
juries are included in the local opposition from
action plan for the period neighbourhood
2000–2003, but none of them associations; lack of
have yet been implemented political will and

Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)


government instability
Corbera Social integration of 3 years and 1 month The new government has None
immigrants promised to implement the
joan font & ismael blanco

main recommendations of
juries. Some of them have
already been implemented
Montornes Design for a public 3 years and 1 month The new public square has None
I square already been finished
according to the juries’
recommendations
Calafell Socio-economical 3 years and 1 month None of the juries’ Lack of support from
planning recommendations have been the opposition;
implemented since the new government change
government has decided to
start a new process
Montornes Design for a public 2 years and 1 month The city council has promised Cost of the decision;
II park to implement juries’ cooperation needed
recommendations this year from energy company
Cardedeu Urban planning 1 year and 1 month The planning details have been Unknown
developed. According to the
government, they have
followed the jury
recommendations, but other
local actors disagree

Source: Font and Medina (2001).


procedural legitimacy and political trust
583

© 2007 The Author(s)


Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
584 joan font & ismael blanco

public opinion in general would likely accept a public explanation of why the
recommendations of a given jury have not been followed.23 The public expla-
nation given by the authorities on which recommendations are going to be
followed (and why) is precisely the logic followed in most British juries
(Delap 2001). In Idiazabal, the first Basque case, this kind of situation
emerged: the jury chose a place for the football stadium that had not been
analysed previously by technicians and when the analysis was done, it
became clear that the site was not appropriate. After a new, short meeting,
the jury easily accepted that the stadium be moved to the place that received
the second highest vote. Disappointment from lack of implementation of
juries’ results is also derived from the lack of accountability of decision
makers once the jury process is finished.

Conclusion

Some Spanish local governments have started to use citizen juries, as well as
other mechanisms of citizen participation, in decision making processes. Most
organisers and participants in the cases we have studied have expressed satis-
faction with citizen juries, but a critical assessment of their use demonstrates
that expectations about them may be too high – given the role they truly play.
One of the arguments most commonly used to justify the promotion of new
mechanisms of citizen participation is their potential capacity to bridge the gap
between citizens and politicians (i.e., to create political trust). Throughout this
article we have argued that in order to achieve this goal, these mechanisms
need first to gain a wide degree of public acceptance and eliminate some of the
problems that still generate reluctance. Among these arguments, we have
discussed the doubts regarding their capacity to represent citizen interests, the
role that information and deliberation play, and the perception that they can
be biased in favour of the interests of local governments.
These problems have been partially addressed in Spanish citizen juries.
Juries are able to promote the participation of diverse sectors of the popula-
tion (including groups of non-traditional participants) and to incorporate
appropriate amounts of information and deliberation. They also can develop
methodologies to guarantee their neutrality (external organisers, jurors and
political commissions). However, the limited role that juries assign to associa-
tions and the strategic considerations that all political actors make with respect
to them are crucial limits to their larger procedural acceptance. Even when
widely accepted, juries experience difficulties in becoming important agents in
trust building – at least given their current use.
© 2007 The Author(s)
Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 585

We saw that their potential educational effects are quite diverse. At the end
of jury deliberations, we find a considerable number of participants who admit
to a heightened understanding of the complexity of decision making, and who
even feel more sympathetic towards the politicians’ role. However, as time
passes, two obstacles emerge. First, the juries are an isolated experience in a
context with very limited opportunities for participation: after a period, jurors
tend to view this experience as an exception and perceive regular politics as a
field closed to citizens and restricted to professional politicians. The cynical
view of politics typical in Spanish political culture re-emerges once the short-
term trusting effect of the jury vanishes. It may be reasonable to believe that
this is a specific effect of Spain’s authoritarian past, but comparative research
is needed to show whether a similar process also appears in other countries.
Second, trust requires reciprocity. Citizens need to feel trusted in order to be
able to trust. When juries have limited effects on real policies and no public
explanations are provided of why this is so, disappointment becomes
widespread.
The possible contribution that new mechanisms of citizen participation
may have as sources of political trust was a central question in this article.
However, we assumed that there is a much wider range of educational effects
of juries (increase in interest in local events, increase in interest in the topics
under discussion, stimulation to reflect on urban problems) – many of which
could not be empirically assessed here. If these effects could also be proved,
they would provide additional arguments for the development of new forms of
citizen participation. Eventually, the contribution of citizen juries to not only
make ‘better’ citizens, but also bureaucrats and politicians who are better
informed and more responsive, could also be a crucial step towards more
political trust.
Even though we have focused our attention on the capacity of citizen juries
to create political trust, many of the criteria we have used are strongly related to
those proposed by Papadopoulos and Warin to assess the performance of
participatory mechanisms.The openness and access of participatory devices, the
quality of their deliberative activity, their efficiency and their transparency and
accountability might be just as important for scholars as for political actors
getting involved in decision-making processes. The fact that these mechanisms
of citizen participation correspond well to the diversity of the population, that
participants are provided with adequate information and appropriate condi-
tions for deliberating, that juries have a real impact on public decisions, or that
they are developed in a transparent and accountable manner are not only
important for scholars aiming to assess them, but also for political actors –
including citizens – who demand that these participatory mechanisms be
trustworthy.
© 2007 The Author(s)
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586 joan font & ismael blanco

Appendix. List of the final reports of citizen juries


(The data presented in the tables is extracted from these reports if we do not
refer to other sources.)
Ajuntament de Callafell (1998). Informe dels Consells Ciutadans de Calafell. Calafell: City
Council of Calafell.
Citcon (1998). Informe dels Consells Ciutdadans de Sant Quirze del Vallès. Sant Quirze del
Vallès: City Council of Sant Quirze del Vallès.
Equip d’Analisi Política (EAP) (1997). Informe dels Consells Ciutadans de Rubí. Rubí: City
Council of Rubí.
Equip d’Analisi Política (EAP) (1998). Informe dels Consells Ciutadans de Montornès del
Vallès I. Montornès del Vallès: City Council of Montornès.
Equip d’Analisi Política (EAP) (2000a). Informe dels Consells Ciutadans de Montornès del
Vallès II. Montornès del Vallès: City Council of Montornès.
Equip d’Analisi Política (EAP) (2000b). Informe dels Consells Ciutadans de Cardedeu.
Cardedeu: City Council of Montornès.
Fundació Jaume Bofill (1998). Informe dels Consells Ciutadans de Corbera de Llobregat.
Corbera de Llobregat: City Council of Corbera de Llobregat.

Notes

1. The debate on the causes and the extension of a possible crisis in political trust has
recently received considerable attention (see, among others, Nie et al. 1997; Norris 1999;
Pharr & Putnam 2000).
2. The information used in this article is derived from three main sources. First, our
research group (Institute of Government and Public Policy) has been involved in the
management of several of the cases we analyse here (Rubí, Montornès I and II and
Cardedeu). Second, we use documentation that is produced during the organisation of
citizen juries (see list in the Appendix). This documentation provides us with several
pieces of relevant data: the management of the recruitment process, the agenda of the
meetings, the topics dealt with, the profile of participants, the results of juries. Finally, we
also extract information from 30 in-depth interviews conducted with randomly selected
individuals among the 200 people who participated in the cases of Rubí, Montornes I
and Corbera.
3. Juries have received different names in Spain, depending on the group responsible
for their development: Nucleos de Intervención Participativa (NIP) or Consejos
Ciudadanos (Citizen Councils). We will use here the British term, ‘citizen jury’, even if
there are some minor differences in the ways they are implemented. E.g., British juries
normally use a single group of citizens selected through quotas, whereas in Spain, several
groups are used and the most common criteria of selection is pure randomness (Del Pino
& Colino 2003).
4. This can be explained by two kinds of factors: the quality of the census and the efforts
that organisers put into finding those participants who are not located by telephone. In
some cases, organisers go to their homes to find them; in other cases, when fewer
resources are available, organisers decide to delete them from the lists after a certain
number of phone calls (normally, 3–5). We must also take into account that all partici-

© 2007 The Author(s)


Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
procedural legitimacy and political trust 587

pants are supposed to have received a letter from the organisers in which the phone
number of their office is provided, but very few participants voluntarily phone them if
organisers have not been able to contact them directly.
5. The reports we have consulted classify the groups of age in a different manner. Thus, for
graphical reasons, we do not include a table comparing the age of participants. Data are
available in the reports of the citizen juries we analyse in this article (see the Appendix).
6. E.g., these are two criteria used by Weeks (2000). Fishkin (2003) has strongly argued in
favour of both of them and made specific proposals to make their use possible.
7. An empirical analysis of the role of information appears in Kuklinski et al.
(2001).
8. The role of deliberation has been very strongly emphasised by the literature on delib-
erative democracy (see, e.g., Elster 1998; Macedo 1999; Dryzek 2000).
9. See Akkerman et al. (1999). On the contrary, an empirical demonstration of the good
results produced by the combination of deliberation and voting appears in Baccaro
(2001).
10. Several reports among those in the Appendix include these claims from participants
(see, e.g., EAP 2000b; Fundació Jaume Bofill 1998).
11. The sessions are recorded on tape and this material is used when writing the final report
to complement the main source – the answers to the questionnaires.
12. There would be an additional indirect mechanism if we accepted Putnam’s view
(Putnam, 1993), according to which social trust contributes to creating political trust.
13. In many informal conversations after the jury, the participants stated that they better
understood the fact that, having to consider several technical and political aspects,
producing collectively binding decisions was not an easy task. This new assessment
improved their opinions of politicians.
14. This is probably the main kind of effect that appears in O’Neill (2003).
15. This is not exactly the same kind of effect as the effect mentioned by Fishkin (1996)
when discussing the consequences of DOPs. He talks about change in the content of
attitudes, towards more progressive positions (i.e., more support for the idea of social
integration of criminal offenders and less support for punishment). Here we talk about
learning to accept different views (e.g., learning to accept that some people may prefer
strong punishment for a criminal offence).
16. The basic methodological details of the research are explained in the introduction. Since
the research is based on 30 interviews and the answers were not standardised, we will
refer to general tendencies (most/few jurors) and not to specific numbers (for more
details, see Blanco et al. 2000).
17. The final questionnaires include a question on whether the participant’s interest in
collective events has increased as a result of the process. In all cases, more than two-
thirds of the participants said that their interest had increased.
18. In fact, this change is similar to what has happened in DOPs, where the attitudinal
change that appears during the process is partially reversed when people return to their
regular social environments (Fishkin 1996; see also the contribution on the Danish DOP
in this special issue).
19. The research did not ask about social trust (box 1).
20. In most cases there has been a presentation of the process to the media; however, the
final appearance of the process in the media depended on three factors: the size of the
city and the existence of local media; the ability and the effort of both the local govern-
ment and the organisers to publicise citizen juries; and the novelty of the process, so that

© 2007 The Author(s)


Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)
588 joan font & ismael blanco

the first cases appeared on regional television, but the interest of the larger media
disappeared with later cases.
21. Budge (1996) challenges these arguments when they are presented about referendums.
22. Source: participation in the Rubí, Montornès (I and II) and Cardedeu cases. In all cases,
there were several participants whose main concern when contacted was whether they
would be listened to.
23. In fact, we find a similar process of partial disappearance of short-term attitudinal
changes produced by DOPs in Britain (Fishkin, 1996).

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Address for correspondence: Joan Font, CIS, Montalban 8, E-28024 Madrid, Spain. E-mail:
jfont@cis.es

© 2007 The Author(s)


Journal compilation © 2007 (European Consortium for Political Research)

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