Memorandum for Respondent Team No.

907

TEAM NO. 907 R

THE 6TH INTERNATIONAL ADR (ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE

RESOLUTION) MOOTING COMPETITION

5TH - 9TH JULY 2016

CITY UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG, HONG KONG

ALBAS WATCHSTRAPS MFG. CO. LTD.

CLAIMANT

V.

GAMMA CELLTECH CO. LTD.

RESPONDENT

MEMORANDUM FOR RESPONDENT

Claimant: Respondent:

Albas Watchstraps Mfg. Co. Ltd., Gamma Celltech Co. Ltd.,

a company incorporated under the laws a company incorporated under the laws
of Yanyu of Wulaba
241 Nathan Drive, Yanyu City, Yanyu 17 Rodeo Lane, Mulaba, Wulaba
Head of Company: Giovanni Head of Company: Anastasia Carter,
Konstantopoulos, CEO CEO

Legal Representative: Legal Representative:

Tim Morrow Joseph Cunningham QC

Ring and Associates, LLP Cunningham Chambers
7/F, The Bauxer Building 20 Innex Court
7 Garden Street, Yanyu City, Yanyu 7 Garden Street, Mulaba, Wulaba

1
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

¶, para. Paragraph

Arbitration Rules China International Economic and Trade Arbitration

Commission Arbitration Rules

Art.(s) Article(s)

Article 19(a) Article 19(a) of the Sale and Purchase Agreements

concluded on 23. July 2014 and 7. November 2014

CIETAC China International Economic and Trade Arbitration

Commission

CISG United Nations Convention on Contracts for the

International Sale of Goods

CNO Clarification number

HK Hong Kong

Ibid. Ibidem / The same place

mil. million

NY New York

p. /pp Page / Pages

PIL Private International Law

PNO Page of the Problem

Problem 2016 ADR Moot Court Problem

SPA 1 Share Purchase Agreement concluded on 23. July 2014

SPA 2 Share Purchase Agreement concluded on 7. November

2014

SPAs SPA 1 and SPA 2

UNCITRAL United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

UNCITRAL Model Law UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial

Arbitration (1985), with amendments as adopted in 2006

2
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

LIST OF AUTHORITIES

BERGER BERGER, P. Klaus. “Law and Practice of Escalation

Clauses” in Arbitration International, vol. 22, 2006.

BLACK'S Garner, B. A. Black's Law Dictionary. 10th ed. Thomson

Reuters, 2014.

BORN BORN, B. Gary. International Commercial Arbitration.

Kluwer Law International, 2009.

BORN&ŠĆEKIĆ BORN, Gary and Marija ŠĆEKIĆ. Chapter 14: Pre-

Arbitration Procedural Requirements. ‘A Dismal Swamp’
in CARON, d. David. Practising Virtue Inside
International Arbitration. Oxford University Press, 2015.

ENDERLEIN ENDERLEIN, F. Rights and Obligations of the Seller

under the UN Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods. Oceana, 1996.

FIGUERES FIGUERES, J. Dyalé. “Multi-Tiered Dispute Resolution

Clauses in ICC Arbitration” in ICC Bull., vol. 14, 2003.

HENSCHEL HENSCHEL, R. F. Creation of Rules in National and

International Business Law: A Non-National, Analytical-
Synthetic Comparative Method. Wildy, Simmonds & Hill
Publishing, 2008.

JOLLES JOLLES, Alexander. “Consequences of Multi-tier

Arbitration Clauses: Issues of Enforcement.” in
Arbitration, vol. 72, 2006.

TRAVAINI TRAVAINI, Gregory. Multi-tiered dispute resolution

clauses, a friendly Miranda warning [online]. Kluwer
Arbitration Blog, 2014. Accessible at:
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2014/09/30/multi-tiered-
dispute-resolution-clauses-a-friendly-miranda-warning/

WINSHIP WINSHIP, P. The Scope of the Vienna Convention on

International Sales Contracts in GALSTON&SMIT ed.
International Sales: The United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. Matthew
Bender, 1984.

LIST OF CASES

Biophysics-Dubois Am. Biophysics Corp. v. Dubois Marine Specialties,

411 F. Supp. 2d 61, 62-64 (D.R.I. 2006)

3
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

Emirates Emirates Trading Agency LLC v. Prime Mineral

Exports private Limited (2014) EWHC 2104.

ICC Case No. 12739 ICC Case No. 12739, Award, cited in BÜHLER,
Michael and Thomas H. WEBSTER. Handbook of ICC
Arbitration. Sweet & Maxwell, 2008.

ICC Case No. 6276 ICC Case No. 6276; Partial Award of January 29, 1990

ICC Case No. 8462 ICC Case No. 8462; Final Award of January 27, 1997

ICC Case No. 8482 ICC Arbitration Case No. 8482 of December 1996
[Digest of Presentation at ICAB, Vol. 11/No. 2 (Fall
2000)]

ICC Case No. 9977 ICC Case No. 9977; Final Award of June 22, 1999

ICC Case No. 9984 ICC Case No. 9984; Preliminary Award of June 7, 1999

Mitsubishi-Chrysler Mitsubishi v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth 473 U.S. 614

(1985)

Societa-Societa Società X v. Società Y, Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal -

Firenze (Florence), Italy, Arbitral Award, 19. 4. 1994

Threlkeld-Metallgesellschaft David L. Threlkeld & Co., Inc. v. Metallgesellschaft

Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d. Cir. 1991)

MISCELLANEOUS
Marine UNCTAD, Legal and Documentary Aspects of the
Marine Insurance Contract, 1982. Available at:
http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/c4isl27rev1_en.
pdf

OPINION CISG-AC Opinion No. 16, Exclusion of the CISG under

Article 6, Rapporteur: Doctor Lisa Spagnolo, Monash
University, Australia. Adopted by the CISG Advisory
Council following its 19th meeting, in Pretoria, South
Africa on 30 May 2014.

Secretariat The Secretariat Commentary is on the 1978 Draft of the

CISG. Available at:
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/cisg-toc.html

UNC Yearbook United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

yearbook. v. XXXII, 2001.

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 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

TABLE OF CONTENT

1. THE TRIBUNAL DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE DISPUTE 6

1.1. Escalation Clause is a Condition Precedent to Jurisdiction of Tribunal 6

1.2. Alternatively, the Notion of “payment” Shall Be Interpreted Broadly 7

2. CISG DOES NOT GOVERN THE CLAIMS RAISED IN DISPUTE AT HAND 8

2.1. CISG Has Been Implicitly Excluded by Exclusive Choice-of-Law Clause Referring to
Particular Code 8
2.2. CISG Has Been Implicitly Excluded by Exclusive Choice-of-Law Clause Referring to
Law of Wulaba 9
2.3. Tribunal Is Not Bound by International Private Law of Any State 9

3. CLAIMANT PERSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED LACK OF DILIGENCE WITH

RESPECT TO ITS OBLIGATIONS 10

4. CLAIMANT IS IN BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATION TO TAKE OUT INSURANCE

10

5. CLAIMANT IS IN BREACH IN ITS OBLIGATION TO PERFORM UNDER THE

SPA 1
12

6. CLAIMANT IS IN BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATION TO DELIVER GOODS IN

CONFORMITY WITH THE SPA 2 12

RELIEF SOUGHT 14

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 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

1. THE TRIBUNAL DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER THE

DISPUTE
1. Respondent submits that Tribunal lacks jurisdiction as there is no consent to arbitrate for the
following reasons. Firstly, pre-arbitration procedure is a condition precedent for present
arbitration which was not followed and therefore created a jurisdictional impediment for
Tribunal to hear the case. As a consequence, the case should be referred to HK courts.
However, shall Tribunal consider the amicable resolution step as unenforceable for any
reason, Respondent argues in favor of wide interpretation of the term “payment” as
enshrined in Art. 19(1) which would cover the Respondent´s counter-claim as whole.

1.1. ESCALATION CLAUSE IS A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO JURISDICTION OF

TRIBUNAL
2. Parties included a pre-arbitral procedure into the arbitration clause by which “disputes
concerning payments shall be resolved amicably within a reasonable period of time (not to
exceed 14 days).” In the following paragraphs Respondent shall submit that based on the
wording and a strong jurisprudence such arrangement is sufficiently certain as well as
definite to be regarded as enforceable.

3. According to the findings of the Emirates Trading Agency tribunal, Respondent

correspondingly submits that the use of the word “shall” indicates that the obligation to begin
with amicable settlement is mandatory, and thus represents a condition precedent to the right
to refer a claim to arbitration. In other words, Parties consented to arbitration only subject to
the fulfillment of the pre-arbitral steps.1 Thus, pre-arbitral procedure shall be considered a
“condition precedent” to access to the arbitral forum, which is a position advocated by the
doctrine,2 NY courts,3 and arbitral tribunals.4

4. Claimant may argue that the pre-arbitral steps have been fulfilled, however such statement
could not be further from the truth. Claimant contacted Respondent only once by letter of 27
February 20155 which was a mere response to the Respondent’s letter.6 Such letter shall not
be considered as an initiation of any pre-arbitral negotiations. Thus, by Claimant’s failure to

1.
1
BORN&ŠĆEKIĆ, p. 246.
2
BERGER, p. 6; BORN, p. 841.
3
BORN&ŠĆEKIĆ, p. 247.
4
ICC Case No. 12739.
5
PNO 13.
6
PNO 18.
6
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

comply with the pre-arbitral requirements, the 14-day period have never been activated.

5. Based upon the aforementioned, Tribunal does not have jurisdiction to hear the dispute at
hand whereupon the dispute shall be handled by HK courts pursuant to Art. 19(b) SPAs.

6. Solely in case Tribunal should find the fulfillment of pre-arbitment procedure to be a matter
of admissibility instead of jurisdiction, then Respondent pursuant to Art. 17 of the
Arbitration rules applies for amendment of its jurisdictional objection and respectfully asks
Tribunal to hold the claims inadmissible. Hence, may Tribunal stay the proceedings until the
first-tier commitment is met.7

1.2. ALTERNATIVELY, THE NOTION OF “PAYMENT” SHALL BE INTERPRETED

BROADLY
7. In the event Tribunal upholds its jurisdiction over the dispute, Respondent, with regard to its
counter-claim, alternatively submits, that the term “Payment” should be interpreted in its
ordinary meaning, thereby covering the whole counter-claim submitted by Respondent.

8. Based on well-established case law under the NY law, the agreed source for interpretation
for Art. 19(a), Respondent submits that the wording “disputes concerning payments” is
reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation. It may be disputed which payments
are concerned and what nature of disputes concerning payments is to be covered - and there
is nothing to indicate what meaning was truly intended. According to the conclusions of the
courts, “such doubts shall be resolved in favor of arbitration.” 8 Respondent therefore
submits that Art. 19(a) covers any dispute related to the term “payment” in its ordinary
meaning.

9. As to the question of what is the ordinary meaning, Respondent draws Tribunal’s attention to
the definition provided by Blacks Law Dictionary that defines “payment” as “performance
of a duty, promise, or obligation, or discharge of a debt or liability, by the delivery of money
or other value. Also the money or other thing so delivered.”9 Accordingly, both Claimant’s
and Respondent’s performance is to be understood as “payment”.

10. As such, any dispute concerning any of the performances is to be arbitrable under Art. 19(a)
and thus, if Tribunal eventually upholds its jurisdiction, it shall do so in respect of the whole

1.
7
JOLLES, p. 331.
8
Threlkeld-Metallgesellschaft; Mitsubishi-Chrysler.
9
BLACK'S.
7
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

Respondent’s counter-claim.

2. CISG DOES NOT GOVERN THE CLAIMS RAISED IN

DISPUTE AT HAND
11. Parties have excluded CISG by incorporating an effective choice-of-law clause into Article
20 SPAs. Accordingly, the dispute at hand shall be adjudicated in accordance with “national
law of Wulaba.”10

12. Article 6 CISG explicitly sets down the possibility to exclude CISG upon the consent of
Parties. There are no formal conditions thereof, nonetheless intention of Parties to that effect
suffices.11 It is acknowledged that such exclusion can be well performed implicitly.12

13. The arisen controversy is whether the reference to “national law of Wulaba” indicates that
SPAs shall be governed by one particular national law or by law of Wulaba in its entirety.
Such differentiation is crucial since the overall understanding of both jurisprudence and
scholars is that the viability of CISG exclusion by reference to law of Contracting State as
such should be rejected.13

2.1. CISG HAS BEEN IMPLICITLY EXCLUDED BY EXCLUSIVE CHOICE-OF-

LAW CLAUSE REFERRING TO PARTICULAR CODE
14. Being familiar with the prevailing view, Respondent submits that pursuant to Article 8 para.
1 CISG the reference pointed to a particular code.

15. Firstly, it is implied by grammatical interpretation of Article 20 which reads that “the
national law” and “[a]ll other applicable laws are excluded.” It suggests Respondent’s intent
to have SPAs governed by one respective Wulaba code while Claimant could have not been
unaware of it.

16. Secondly, this intent is also demonstrated by the fact that while drafting SPAs, Respondent
wanted to avoid situation of being faced with “unknown and unfamiliar”14 law. Since CISG
does not form a part of Wulaba law15 and it is not even one of the sources of Wulaba law,16

1.
10
PNO 7, 12.
11
KRÖLL, p. 102.
12
UNC Yearbook, p. 465.
13
Ibid.
14
CNO 30.
15
CNO 8.
16
CNO 12.
8
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

its application was undoubtedly meant to be avoided. Moreover, it has been acknowledged
that intention of Parties may be also evidenced by the arbitration or jurisdictional clause
pointing to the seat located in non-contracting state.17 Accordingly, it is accepted by both
jurisprudence and scholars that HK is not, for its special administrative status, considered a
contracting state to CISG.18

17. Additionally, Respondent highlights that Parties explicitly stipulated that “[a]ll other
applicable laws shall be excluded” meaning that CISG was excluded even for its potential
application to fill in gaps present in the particular national code.

2.2. CISG HAS BEEN IMPLICITLY EXCLUDED BY EXCLUSIVE CHOICE-OF-

LAW CLAUSE REFERRING TO LAW OF WULABA
18. However, in case Tribunal deems the choice-of-law clause to direct to Wulaba law as a
system, Respondent submits that even such reference is capable of excluding CISG. The
tribunal in Societa-Societa decided that CISG did not apply to the contract, because the
contract itself had been made subject exclusively to Italian law. 19 Alike conclusions were
reached in Biophysics-Dubois20 and ICC Case No. 8482.21

2.3. TRIBUNAL IS NOT BOUND BY INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW OF ANY

STATE
19. Following the previous argument, Claimant could still object that even if applying Wulaba
law, its PIL points Tribunal back to CISG. However, Tribunal is not bound by any PIL but
solely by lex arbitri, i.e. respective arbitration rules and effective arbitration laws in place of
arbitration.22

20. Pursuant to Article 49 para. 2 Arbitration Rules, agreement of parties on applicable law to
the substance shall prevail. Only in absence of such agreement or its conflict with mandatory
provisions of that law, Tribunal shall determine the law applicable to merits. Thus, the
utmost emphasis shall be put on the choice-of-law clause clearly referring to a national law
of Wulaba, not CISG. The converse conclusion would eventually render any contractual

1.
17
OPINION, ¶ 4.10.
18
List of Contracting States: China (PRC).
19
Societa-Societa.
20
Biophysics-Dubois.
21
ICC Case No. 8482.
22
SCHMIDT-AHRENDTS, p. 214.
9
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

choice-of-law absurd and meaningless.23

21. Furthermore, with regard to lex arbitri, HK has separate international arbitration system that
remains based on the UNCITRAL Model Law, as adopted into HK by the Arbitration
Ordinance.24 Art. 28 UNCITRAL Model Law clearly sets forth that any designation to the
law of legal system shall be construed as directly referring to the substantive law of that state
and not its conflict of law rules.

3. CLAIMANT PERSISTENTLY DEMONSTRATED LACK OF DILIGENCE

WITH RESPECT TO ITS OBLIGATIONS

22. Respondent considers as relevant to briefly describe the overall atmosphere of the business
relationship in question beginning with the late delivery of the Prototype. Claimant is in
breach of its obligation to deliver the prototype on a date fixed in Art. 5 SPA 1 as is required
by Art. 33 CISG. Although the violation of fixed date of delivery had occurred, Respondent,
for the purpose of maintaining good business relations, accepted the performance and
expected Claimant to rise its level of diligence in the following arrangements.

23. As is further documented,25 Claimant manifested its lack of professional consistency again.
For instance, when handling of the Cherry watchcase provided by Respondent. Although
Respondent recognizes the difficulties connected to resignation of high positioned workers,
the result of such event being a substantial violation of a contract worth of USD 15 mil. is far
from being linked to anything but an error of overall functionality of Claimant's operations.

24. Respondent therefore respectfully asks Tribunal to assess the facts of the present case in light
of these circumstances, while noting that they began to rise at the surface no sooner than at
the point where Claimant already was to perform under SPAs.

4. CLAIMANT IS IN BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATION TO TAKE OUT

INSURANCE
25. It is Respondent’s position that regardless of whether the risk of loss has or has not
transferred to it, Claimant was obliged to take out insurance. In the former case, the damages
are result of the inability to cover the insured event and, in the latter case, the damage is

1.
23
Cf. UNC Yearbook, p. 465.
24
WEIGAND, p. 240, ¶ 4.07.
25
CNO 41.
10
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

result of the non-fulfillment of an obligation to take out insurance.

26. By applying Art. 8 (3) CISG to Art. 3 SPA 1, statements in the course of negotiations show a
clear intent to oblige Claimant to bear any expenses connected to a successful delivery of
goods to Respondent’s office, as an agreed 26 place of delivery. These statements include
mainly commitment to bear “all related costs,”27 above the costs covered by DDP, and clear
promise of no need to “think of any extra costs.”28

27. Marine insurance is generally recognized as a part of elementary costs of international

transport “so that the risk of an accident [...] is not an inhibiting factor in international
trade.”29 Based on the above mentioned broad agreement on Claimant’s costs obligation,
Respondent legitimately expected a successful delivery to which it is “feasible and
customary that transit losses be covered by a form of insurance.” 30 Such conclusion is
consistent with the 50% increase in the final price after subsequent recalculation.31

28. As a result of Claimant’s failure to perform its obligation to take out insurance, Respondent
has been substantially deprived of what he was entitled to expect under SPA 1 pursuant to
Art. 25 CISG. Respondent therefore asks Tribunal to rule that Respondent is entitled to
remedies provided in Art. 45 CISG and that it lawfully gave a notice 32 avoiding SPA 1
pursuant to Art. 49 (1) (b).

29. In case Tribunal found that the risk of loss was borne by Respondent, it is entitled to
damages equal to the loss in the amount of USD 15 mil. as well as loss of profit in the
amount of difference between purchase and retail price of the goods. Or alternatively, in case
Tribunal found that the risk of loss was borne by Claimant, then Respondent is entitled to
damages equal to the non-performance of a contractual obligation that can not be rectified in
other way than liquidated damages.

30. Respondent further states that Claimant's objection based on Respondent's alleged
“assumption of responsibility”33 bears no grounds in the facts of the present case. The facts

1.
26
CNO 1.
27
PNO 3, ¶ 6.
28
PNO 18.
29
Marine, p. 7.
30
Secretariat, Art. 36.
31
PNO 3, ¶ 6.
32
PNO 18.
33
PNO. 4, ¶ 11.
11
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

of the case34 solely describe Claimant's refusal to discuss any agreements unless the balance
payment is paid. Respondent, for the purposes of a constructive solution to the situation and
mitigation of the losses caused by potential loss of business opportunity to operate on a
newly emerging market, solely acted pursuant to Art. 77 CISG.

5. CLAIMANT IS IN BREACH IN ITS OBLIGATION TO PERFORM UNDER

THE SPA 1
31. It is Respondent’s first line of argumentation that the reference to the DDP (INCOTERMS
2010) contained in Art. 3 SPA 1 applies to the contract as a whole. Based on this Respondent
submits that the risk of loss has not passed to Respondent and Claimant is unjustly enriched
as o result of its refusal to perform under SPA 1.

32. Because the obligation to deliver was not fulfilled due to loss during the transportation,
Claimant did not perform its general obligation within the date determinable from SPA 1
pursuant to Art. 30 and Art. 33 CISG.

33. The breach of general obligation could not have been corrected by any form of acceptance of
responsibility, because no party can take responsibility for absence of the other Party’s
obligation for performance. In absence of any performance, SPA 1 would no longer satisfy
the universally accepted definition of a contract of sale35 as well as a doctrine underlying
CISG36 which would result in Respondent’s performance under SPA 1 being a mere transfer
of money in absence of a legal title.

34. Alternatively, if Tribunal would reach a conclusion that the DDP delivery terms refer solely
to the provision of price, Respondent submits that Claimant is still in breach of its obligation
to take out an insurance, as has been argued in Chapter 4 of this Memorandum.

6. CLAIMANT IS IN BREACH OF ITS OBLIGATION TO DELIVER GOODS

IN CONFORMITY WITH THE SPA 2
35. Claimant is in breach of its obligation to deliver the goods which are of the quality and
description (collectively referred to as “Characteristics”) required by SPA 2 in these three
specific instances:

a) softness of the leather,

1.
34
CNO 53.
35
BLACK'S.
36
WINSHIP.
12
 Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

b) stitching style, and

c) technical parameters of the watchstrap.
36. With respect to the softness and the irregular stitching style of the watchstrap, Claimant
presented the goods as a prototype possessing Characteristics, thereby committing itself to
deliver matching goods pursuant to Art. 35(2)(c).37 Claimant had the undeniable opportunity
to make reservations as to this commitment, however at no point did he pursue those and not
even on a single occasion did it refute Respondent’s clear statements 38 as to expectations to
this commitment.

37. Regarding the stitching style, brand identification based upon a product characteristic that
may to a disinterested observer seem as a defect or imperfection has been a notorious part of
brand building. A shining example of this tendency is the French producer J.P. Chenet. Its
specific curvature of the bottleneck39 gives the impression of imperfection caused during a
hand made glass blowing. However, being the best-selling French wine with over 160
countries of export, it is undoubtedly a result of a precise process of mass production.
Similarly, Respondent could not have been aware that the final goods would not meet the
declared Characteristics even with respect to Art. 35(3) CISG.

38. Lastly, due to factors exclusively in Claimant’s sphere of influence,40 the goods fail to fulfill
the sole purpose they were produced for, that is to fit into Cherry watchcase. Respondent
made numerous references to this essential obligation enshrined in Art. 2(1)(g) SPA 2. Also,
in case of a conflict of technical parameters between the SPA 2 and the prototype, being a
conflict of Art. 35(1) and 35(2), the description in the SPA 2 prevails.41

39. Based on the established obligation to provide goods of a specific Characteristics,

Respondent asks Tribunal to rule that Claimant did deliver goods not conforming to its
obligations pursuant to Articles 35(1) and 35(2)(c) CISG and that Respondent properly
issued a notice42 specifying the nature of the lack of conformity within a reasonable time.

1.
37
Secretariat, Art. 35.
38
PNO 9.
39
Respondent's Exhibit No. 3.
40
CNO 41.
41
ENDERLEIN, p. 158; HENSCHEL, p. 188.
42
PNO 18.
13
Memorandum for Respondent Team No. 907

RELIEF SOUGHT
On the basis of all presented evidence and argumentation, Respondent respectfully asks
Tribunal to find that it lacks jurisdiction over the present dispute.

Alternatively, should Tribunal uphold its jurisdiction over the present dispute, Respondent
respectfully refers Tribunals attention to its counter-claim as submitted in para. 10 of the
Statement of Defense.

Respectfully submitted on 10 June 2016 by

Joseph Cunningham QC
Cunningham Chambers
20 Innex Court 7
Garden Street, Mulaba, Wulaba

On behalf of Respondent

Gamma Celltech Co. Ltd.,

a company incorporated under the laws of Wulaba
17 Rodeo Lane, Mulaba, Wulaba
Head of Company: Anastasia Carter, CEO

14
 Respondent’s Exhibit No. 3

Picture of the bottle of the seller J.P.Chenet:

source: http://www.jpchenet.com/