RULE 118: PRE-TRIAL
Pre-trial is a procedural device meant to limit the issues to be tackled and proved at the trial. The purpose of pre-
trials is the simplification, abbreviation and expedition of the trial, if not indeed its dispensation. Pre-trial, mandated by
Rules 18 and 118 of the Rules of Court, narrows issues for trial, promotes speedy case resolution, and binds parties
to agreed stipulations through a pre-trial order (Abubakar v. Abubakar, G.R. No. 134622, October 22, 1999).
Sequence of Procedures and Duties
1. Before arraignment - The Court orders the prosecutor to submit the PI
record to the Branch Clerk of Court.
- The Branch COC attaches the PI record to the
criminal case record.
For an accused under preventive detention:
- The case is raffled, records transmitted within 3 days
of filing, and arraignment held within 10 days of the
raffle.
- Pre-trial occurs within 10 days after arraignment,
unless law provides a shorter period.
2. After arraignment - The Court shall set the pre-trial conference within 30
days from arraignment.
- The Court shall issue an order:
a. Requiring the private offended party to appear for
plea-bargaining (except RA 9165 cases) and other
necessary matters.
b. Referring the case to the Branch COC for a
preliminary conference at least 3 days before pre-trial
to:
(1) Mark and compare exhibits for the record, and
(2) Address matters aiding prompt case disposition.
c. Informing parties that only pre-trial-identified
evidence may be presented at trial, unless allowed for
good cause.
3. During the preliminary conference The Branch COC shall:
- Assist in settling the civil aspect of the case.
- Mark exhibits and attach compared copies to the
records.
- Identify undisputed facts, admissions, and other
matters for prompt case disposition.
4. Before the pre-trial conference The judge must study:
- The information's allegations,
- Statements in Witness affidavits, and
- Documentary evidence from the preliminary
investigation.
5. During the pre-trial - The trial judge shall consider plea-bargaining
arrangements (except for RA 9165 violations).
- If the prosecution and offended party agree to the
plea, the court shall:
a. Issue an order confirming the plea agreement.
b. Proceed to receive evidence on the civil aspect.
c. Render and promulgate a conviction judgment,
including civil liability or damages.
- The judge shall ask questions on raised issues, and
all questions must be directed to the judge to avoid
hostility.
FULE VS. CA (G.R. No. 79094, June 22, 1988)
Manolo P. Fule was convicted by the RTC of Lucena City for violating Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, also known as the
Bouncing Checks Law. The Court of Appeals later affirmed his conviction. The conviction stemmed from a Stipulation
of Facts agreed upon during the pre-trial, which covered the court's jurisdiction, Fule's role as an agent of Towers
Assurance Corporation, the issuance of a dishonored check, and Fule’s identity as the accused. During the trial, Fule
waived his right to present evidence, instead submitting a Memorandum confirming the agreed facts. Fule appealed
to the Court of Appeals, which upheld the RTC's ruling, and later petitioned for review, arguing the Stipulation of
Facts was inadmissible as it was unsigned by him or his counsel.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC's decision to convict Fule based solely on an
unsigned Stipulation of Facts and whether this Stipulation of Facts is inadmissible due to the lack of signatures from
the accused and his counsel.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and ordered the case to be reopened and remanded to
the RTC of Lucena City for further evidence. The Court ruled that under Rule 118, Section 4 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, any pre-trial agreement must be in writing and signed by both the accused and counsel to be
admissible. The mandatory nature of the rule, emphasized by the term "shall," meant that the unsigned Stipulation of
Facts was inadmissible. The Court noted that penal rules must be strictly construed against the government, and the
lawyer's memorandum confirming the stipulation could not cure the defect. Thus, the case was reopened to allow the
prosecution to present independent evidence of the crime.
BAYAS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 143689-91, November 12, 2002)
In Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, petitioners Sixto M. Bayas and Ernesto T. Matuday, municipal treasurer and mayor of
Kabayan, Benguet, faced charges for violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for malversation through
falsification. They pleaded "not guilty" at their arraignment on September 21, 1999. The pretrial conference was
repeatedly postponed due to the absence and unpreparedness of their counsel, Atty. Jose M. Molintas. On
December 10, 1999, a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents" was submitted, signed by the petitioners, their
counsel, and the prosecutor, admitting certain facts and documents. Represented by a new counsel, Atty. Cecilia M.
Cinco, they later moved to withdraw this stipulation, but the Sandiganbayan denied their motion, prompting a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65.
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of a pretrial order is required to make pretrial stipulations binding.
According to Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, a pretrial agreement is binding on the accused if it meets
two conditions: it must be (1) in writing and (2) signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court's approval is
not required to make the stipulations binding; rather, it emphasizes the court’s supervisory role to ensure a fair and
orderly proceeding. Once signed, these stipulations are considered judicial admissions, binding the parties even if
potentially disadvantageous to them. The accused cannot unilaterally rescind these admissions but must accept the
legal consequences. Moreover, the court’s implied assent is presumed unless it explicitly dissents, further reinforcing
the binding nature of stipulations made freely and voluntarily. In this case, repeated delays due to the absence of
petitioners' counsel were sufficient grounds for the court to accept and uphold the Joint Stipulation of Facts and
Documents without express approval, given the fair opportunities for participation in the pretrial process.
PEOPLE VS. ANCHETA (G.R. No. 142431, January 14, 2004)
Ginalyn Ancheta, born on July 22, 1986, was nearly 12 years old when she was raped by her father, Dionisio
Ancheta, on July 13, 1998, in their home in San Gabriel, La Union. On that evening, Ginalyn was in her bedroom
when her father entered and forcibly undressed her before sexually assaulting her despite her pleas for him to stop,
during which she asked him, "Why are you doing this father? I am your daughter." After the assault, he threatened
her with harm if she disclosed the incident. Ginalyn fled and hid until the next morning before confiding in her aunt,
Perla Andaya-Onaliban. It wasn't until July 17 that they reported the crime to the police, leading to a formal complaint.
A medical examination confirmed signs of sexual assault. Dionisio Ancheta admitted his relationship with Ginalyn as
her father and acknowledged that she was living with him at the time of the incident; however, he denied the
allegations, claiming he was not home during the assault. Ultimately, he was convicted of rape by the Regional Trial
Court in January 2004.
Whether the appellant is guilty of qualified rape or simple rape and if the death penalty should be imposed.
Dionisio Ancheta, was found guilty of raping his daughter, Ginalyn Ancheta, and acknowledged the relationship
between them, which is a critical factor in cases of incestuous rape. While Ancheta did not contest the evidence
proving the rape, he challenged the imposition of the death penalty, arguing that the prosecution failed to adequately
prove Ginalyn's age and their relationship through independent evidence. Although he admitted during pre-trial that
Ginalyn is his daughter, this admission was deemed insufficient for establishing the qualifying circumstance of their
relationship due to procedural issues with the documentation. Consequently, while Ginalyn's testimony and medical
evidence supported the conviction, the court ultimately modified the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua (life
imprisonment) for simple rape, citing the lack of proof regarding the special qualifying circumstance of their
relationship. Additionally, Ginalyn was awarded civil indemnity and moral damages for her suffering.
ZALDIVAR VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 197056, March 2, 2016)
Fe P. Zaldivar and her husband, Eliezer, filed a petition for review on certiorari, challenging the Court of Appeals'
decisions on May 31, 2010, and December 15, 2010, which reversed the Iloilo City RTC's orders in Criminal Case
No. 03-57161. The case involved charges of estafa filed by Mamerto Dumasis against Zaldivar and Jeanette Artajo.
Despite a pre-trial conference and the presentation of witnesses, Zaldivar’s counsel did not cross-examine, and
Artajo's counsel waived his right due to absence. After a motion for inhibition was granted, the case was reassigned
to Branch 23. The RTC issued an order denying the prosecution's exhibits and nullifying the proceedings, setting a
new pre-trial. Zaldivar's motions for reconsideration were denied. She then filed a certiorari petition with the CA,
which ruled to set aside the RTC's orders and proceed with the trial, prompting Zaldivar to seek relief from the
Supreme Court.
Whether or not Judge Catilo committed grave abuse of discretion in nullifying the proceedings and setting the case
anew for pre-trial.
The Supreme Court denied the petition for review and affirmed the CA's Decision and Resolution, ordering the Iloilo
City RTC to proceed with Criminal Case No. 03-57161. The Court upheld the CA's ruling that the trial court should
determine whether the evidence proves the crime, as the presence or absence of crime elements is evidentiary and
should be addressed during a full trial. Zaldivar could not seek case termination without filing a demurrer. The Court
agreed with the CA's finding of grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in nullifying the previous proceedings and
ordering a new pre-trial. It emphasized that pre-trial is a procedural device intended to clarify and limit the basic
issues between the parties and to prevent surprises and maneuvering during the trial. Its main purpose is to simplify,
abbreviate, and expedite the trial process. The petition was denied for lack of merit, and the RTC was directed to
continue the case.
ESTIPONA VS. LOBRIGO (G.R. No. 226679, August 15, 2017)
Salvador A. Estipona, Jr. was charged with violating Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165, the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," for possessing dangerous drugs. On March 21, 2016, in Legazpi
City, Estipona was found with 0.084 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). On June 15, 2016, he filed a
motion to enter a plea-bargaining agreement, requesting to change his plea to guilty for a lesser offense under
Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertains to possessing drug paraphernalia, citing his status as a first-time
offender and the small amount of drugs. The prosecution opposed the motion, referring to Section 23 of R.A. No.
9165, which bans plea bargaining in drug cases. On July 12, 2016, Judge Frank E. Lobrigo of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 3, Legazpi City, denied Estipona's motion, arguing that Section 23 infringes on the Supreme
Court’s exclusive rule-making power. Estipona's motion for reconsideration was also rejected, prompting him to file a
petition challenging the constitutionality of Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165.
Whether or not Section 23 of Republic Act No. 9165, which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of the law, is
unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to equal protection under the law.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is unconstitutional. The Court found that Section 23 infringes on its exclusive rule-
making authority under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, which grants the judiciary sole power to
regulate court procedures. This power is not shared with the Executive or Legislative branches, ensuring judicial
independence. The Court explained that plea bargaining, a long-standing procedural tool since 1940, is vital for
efficient justice, conserving judicial resources, and aiding offender rehabilitation. By prohibiting plea bargaining in
drug cases, Section 23 encroached upon this judicial authority. The Court emphasized that procedural rules should
promote substantial justice, particularly in matters of public importance like drug-related issues. Thus, the prohibition
was deemed invalid until properly incorporated into the rules of procedure by the Supreme Court through an
administrative circular.
Pre-trial Agreement
Form (otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused):
1. Reduced in writing, and 3. If it covers those referred in Section 1, shall
2. Signed by the accused and counsel be approved by the court.
Pre-trial Order
The trial judge shall issue a Pre-trial Order within 10 days after pre-trial, outlining the following:
A. Contents
1. The actions taken
2. The facts stipulated
3. Admissions made
4. Evidence marked
5. Number of witnesses to be presented;
and
6. Schedule of trial
B. Effects (unless modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice):
1. Shall bind the parties
2. Shall limit the trial to matters not disposed of; and
3. Control the course of action during the trial
Section 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases
Pre-trial in criminal cases is now mandatory, unlike the 1985 rules where it was optional. It applies to all cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, RTC, MTC, etc., after arraignment and within 30 days of the court acquiring
jurisdiction over the accused.
Plea bargaining (Section 2 of Rule 116) allows negotiating a lesser offense with the prosecutor's and offended
party's consent.
EXCEPTION: Plea bargaining is prohibited under the Dangerous Drugs Act (Section 20-A) for offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death.
Stipulation of Facts
Pre-trial stipulations reduce what needs to be proven during trial. For example, if the accused's age is agreed upon
(e.g., 17 years and 11 months), there’s no need to prove it at trial, even if the accused lacks a birth certificate.
Stipulations in pre-trial are for litigating purposes and do not imply admission of guilt. For example, agreeing on the
accused’s age doesn’t harm the prosecution’s case. However, if the prosecution asks to stipulate certain facts, like
the accused being at a bar, the defense may refuse, as it doesn’t lessen their burden. Refusing to stipulate isn’t
perjury; it’s simply not agreeing to certain facts. Stipulations speed up the trial by reducing what needs to be proven,
but without them, more facts must be proven in court.
Marking for Identification
During pre-trial, all evidence, including object evidence, testimony, and documents (called "annexes"), are marked as
exhibits. Prosecution exhibits are labeled A, B, C, and so on; defense exhibits are numbered 1, 2, 3, etc. Under the
best evidence rule, originals are preferred, but both original and photocopy are presented for comparison. If the
defense does not object to the photocopies, it constitutes a "Waiver of Objections" to their admissibility, making the
photocopies admissible as evidence.
Modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense
Paragraph [e] introduces a modification of the trial order if the accused admits the charge but raises a lawful defense,
such as self-defense. In this case, the prosecution doesn’t present evidence since the accused already admits to the
act, as stated in Section 11(e) of Rule 119: “When the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint
or information but interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified.”
Such other matters as will promote a fair and expedition trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case
Question: Can we discuss settlement in a criminal case pre-trial?
Answer: Yes, but only for the civil aspect, as compromise is not allowed in the criminal aspect. Discussions on
promoting a fair and expeditious trial for the criminal case are allowed, as they don’t involve a bargain (areglo).
DAAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 163972-77, March 28, 2008)
Joselito Raniero J. Daan, the petitioner, was one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170 and 24195-
24196. Daan and his co-accused, Benedicto E. Kuizon, faced charges of malversation of public funds, involving
amounts of P3,293.00, P1,869.00, and P13,528.00. They were accused of falsifying time books and payrolls to
falsely show that laborers worked on the construction of a new municipal hall in Bato, Leyte, and collected salaries
for work they did not perform. As a result, they were also charged with three counts of falsification of public
documents. Daan sought to change his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty" for lesser offenses, a proposal that the
prosecution accepted. However, the Sandiganbayan rejected Daan's plea bargaining request on March 25, 2004,
and later denied his motion for reconsideration on May 31, 2004. In response, Daan filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Supreme Court, arguing that the Sandiganbayan had committed grave abuse of discretion by
rejecting his plea bargaining proposal.
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in rejecting Joselito Raniero J. Daan's plea
bargaining proposal.
The Supreme Court granted Joselito Raniero J. Daan's petition, overturned the Sandiganbayan's resolutions, and
ordered it to approve Daan's plea bargaining motion. The Court emphasized that plea bargaining, a process where
the accused and prosecution agree on a case resolution subject to court approval, is authorized under Section 2,
Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. While typically conducted during pre-trial, it can also occur
during trial. For it to be valid, it requires consent from the offended party, the prosecutor, and a guilty plea to a lesser
offense. The trial court has discretion to approve plea bargaining, but this discretion should not be exercised
arbitrarily. In this case, the Sandiganbayan rejected Daan's plea offer, citing concerns about public benefit and the
seriousness of the charges. However, the Supreme Court found that Daan's restitution and the nature of the lesser
offenses justified acceptance of the plea. The Court concluded that denying the plea would result in inequity, ensuring
equal justice through its decision.
Section 2. Pre-trial agreement
Pre-trial agreements or admissions must be in writing and signed by the accused and counsel to be valid; otherwise,
they cannot be used against the accused. This requirement is mandatory and does not apply in civil procedure.
FULE VS. CA (G.R. No. 79094, June 22, 1988)
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC's conviction of Fule based solely on an unsigned Stipulation
of Facts and whether the Stipulation is inadmissible due to the lack of signatures from the accused and his counsel.
The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the RTC's conviction of Fule based solely on the unsigned Stipulation of
Facts. Under Rule 118 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, no admission or agreement made during pre-trial
can be used as evidence unless it is signed by both the accused and their counsel. The absence of Fule’s signature
renders the Stipulation inadmissible, even if his counsel confirmed it. The prosecution should have presented
independent evidence to establish the elements of the crime, rather than relying on the unsigned Stipulation.
Consequently, the conviction was invalid, and the case should have been reopened for the presentation of additional
evidence.
BAYAS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 143689-91, November 12, 2002)
Issue: Whether or not the issuance of a pretrial order is required to make pretrial stipulations binding.
Under Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, a pretrial agreement is binding on the accused if it satisfies two
conditions: it must be (1) in writing and (2) signed by both the accused and their counsel. Court approval is not
needed for the stipulations to be binding; rather, the court ensures a fair and orderly process. Once signed, these
stipulations are treated as judicial admissions, binding the parties even if they are unfavorable. The accused cannot
withdraw these admissions unilaterally but must accept the legal consequences. The court’s implied approval is
assumed unless it explicitly disagrees, reinforcing the binding effect of freely made stipulations. In this case, the court
was justified in accepting the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents without explicit approval due to repeated
delays caused by the absence of the petitioners' counsel and the fair opportunity provided for participation in the
pretrial process.
PEOPLE VS. ANCHETA (G.R. No. 142431, January 14, 2004)
Whether the appellant's pre-trial admission of being Ginalyn's father can establish the qualifying circumstance of
relationship in the rape case.
The appellant's admission during pre-trial that he is Ginalyn's father cannot be used to establish the qualifying
circumstance of relationship because the stipulation was not signed by him and his counsel. Rule 118, Section 2 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires all pre-trial agreements or admissions to be in writing and signed,
making the unsigned stipulation inadmissible.
Section 3. Non-appearance at pre-trial conference
Section 3 is new and states that if the lawyer of the accused or prosecutor fails to appear at the pre-trial without a
justifiable excuse, the lawyer, not the party, will be penalized.
Section 4. Pre-trial order
After the pre-trial, the court will issue a pre-trial order summarizing agreed matters, established issues, stipulated
facts, and marked exhibits.
PEOPLE VS. GUZMAN (G.R. No. 169246, January 26, 2007)
The accused, Nicolas Guzman y Bocbosila, was charged with the murder of 17-year-old Michael Angelo Balber on
November 25, 1999, in Quezon City. Guzman, along with two unidentified accomplices, allegedly attacked and fatally
stabbed Michael at the corner of Sto. Nino Street and Mactan Street, Brgy. Commonwealth. The prosecution
presented several witnesses, including Ronald Santiago, Edgardo Bauto, Danilo Balber (the victim's father), and law
enforcement officers, while the defense argued that Guzman was at his store during the incident and blamed another
individual, Lemuel Grans Querubin, for the stabbing. The RTC found Guzman guilty of murder, sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay damages to the victim's heirs. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
with modifications, prompting an automatic review by the Supreme Court.
Whether or not the lower court made an error in refusing to permit the accused-appellant to present substitute or
additional witnesses for his defense.
The Court upheld the RTC's decision to deny the motion for substitution of witnesses, referencing procedural rules
and the absence of valid reasons for allowing new witnesses. It confirmed that the RTC properly relied on the pre-trial
order, which listed the witnesses to be presented. The defense's failure to subpoena reluctant witnesses further
undermined their case. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision with modifications, reducing the
actual damages to P25,670.00 and awarding P25,000.00 in exemplary damages, in addition to the previously
granted amounts for moral damages and civil indemnity.
AGBAYANI VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 183623, June 25, 2012)
Petitioner Leticia B. Agbayani, a court stenographer, filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Loida
Marcelina J. Genabe, a legal researcher at the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 275 of Las Piñas City. Agbayani
claimed that Genabe made defamatory statements about her in front of their colleagues. The Office of the City
Prosecutor of Las Piñas found probable cause to charge Genabe with grave oral defamation. However, the
Department of Justice (DOJ) reversed this decision, ruling that the statements amounted to slight oral defamation
and dismissing the case due to failure to comply with the barangay conciliation procedure under the Local
Government Code of 1991. Agbayani's petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals (CA) was dismissed, and her
motion for reconsideration was denied. She then filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court, challenging both
the CA's decision and the DOJ's resolution.
Whether or not the dismissal of the complaint due to non-compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure is
proper.
The Court upheld the dismissal of the complaint due to non-compliance with the barangay conciliation procedure.
Since both parties were residents of Las Piñas City and the incident occurred at their workplace, Agbayani's
complaint was required to undergo mandatory barangay conciliation for possible settlement, as outlined in the Local
Government Code of 1991. The complaint failed to show it fell under any exceptions to this procedure, nor did it
include the necessary certification that conciliation had been attempted. The case was therefore dismissed because
Agbayani did not fulfill the pre-condition of exhausting the barangay conciliation process before filing in court.
