MEMORANDUM FOR PETITIONERS

TM- 16

SHRI I. M. NANAVATI MEMORIAL MOOT COURT

COMPETITION 2024-25

Before

The Hon’ble Supreme Court of Suvarnadwipa

W.P. No. ________ / 2024

IN THE MATTER OF:

MantraTech Ports & Ors. ……………Petitioners

v.

Union of Suvarnadwipa & SPT …………..Respondents

PETITION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

SUVARNADWIPA

As submitted to the Hon’ble Chief Justice & other Companion judges of the Hon’ble
Supreme Court of Suvarnadwipa

MEMORIAL ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ................................................................................................. iv

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... v

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION...................................................................................... ix

STATEMENT OF FACTS ....................................................................................................... x

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ....................................................................................................xii

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ......................................................................................... xiii

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED .................................................................................................. 1

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION CHALLENGING THE SUVARNADWIPA

PUBLIC SECTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2024 IS MAINTAINABLE
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF SUVARNADWIPA? ........................................ 1

[1.1] THE PETITIONER HAS A LOCUS STANDI IN THE MATTER. .................... 1

[1.2] PETITIONERS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN INFRINGED. ...... 3

[1.3] ENACTMENT OF SPPLA ACT, 2024 IS VIOLATIVE OF SUVARNADWIPA’S

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS. ............................................................................ 6

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE SUVARNADWIPA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

LITIGATION AND ADJUDICATION ACT, 2024 (SPPLA) IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SUVARNADWIPA? ............................... 8

[2.1] THE SPPLA, 2024 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL........................................................................................................ 8

[2.2] ENACTMENT OF SPPLA, 2024 IS NOT JUSTIFIED AS A REASONABLE

RESTRICTION UNDER ARTICLE 19(6). ................................................................. 10

[2.3] SPPLA, 2024 DOES NOT SATISFY THE TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY. 11

[2.4] RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE SPPLA, 2024 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL. ............................................................................................... 11

[2.5] LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PETITIONERS HAS BEEN VIOLATED.

.......................................................................................................................................... 13
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[2.6] THE SPPLA, 2024 IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY. ........................................ 14

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE SUVARNADWIPA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

LITIGATION AND ADJUDICATION ACT, 2024 (SPPLA) IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SUVARNADWIPA? ............................. 15

[3.1] THERE IS NO INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA IN THE CLASSIFICATION

MADE. ............................................................................................................................. 16

[3.2] THERE IS NO RATIONAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE MEANS AND END. . 17

[3.3] THE ACTION TAKEN IS ARBITRARY IN NATURE. .................................... 18

[3.4] THE ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF

THE CONSTITUTION. ................................................................................................. 19

PRAYER ................................................................................................................................. 22

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ABBREVIATION WORD

¶ Paragraph
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
AIR All India Reporter
Art. Article
cl. clause
Consti. Constitution
Ed. Edition
Govt. Government
Hon’ble Honorable
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
JV Joint Venture
MoU Memorandum of Understanding
MP MantraTech Ports
Ors. Others
PSU Public Sector Undertaking
SACA Suvarnadwipa Arbitration and Conciliation Act
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reports
Sec./§/S. Section
SPPLA Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication Act
SPSDR Suvarnadwipa Public Sector Dispute Resolution Act
SPT Suvarnadwipa Port Trust
UOI Union of India
UP Uttar Pradesh
v. versus

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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

STATUTES AND ACTS

1 Code of Civil Procedure, Act no. 5 of 1908 (1908) 1

2 The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Act no. 26 of 1996 (1996) 6, 11, 15
3 The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, (1976) 9
4 The Constitution of India, 1950 1

TREATIES AND DECLARATION

5 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 7

3, 1966
6 UNCITRAL Model Law International Commercial Arbitration, Jun. 6
21, 1985.

CASE LAWS

7 A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88. 5

8 A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) SCC 2 602. 6, 20
9 Air India vs. Nargesh Meerza, 1981 (4) SCC 335 3
10 Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722 2
11 Army Welfare Education Society New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma 14
and Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1683
12 Bennet Coleman Co. v. Union of India, 1973 SCR (2) 757 2
13 Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, 1986 AIR 380 20
14 Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, 1955 AIR 191 16
15 Centre for Public Int. Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1 2
16 Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0008/1950 10
17 Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vatika Township Private Limited, 12
MANU/SC/0810/2014
18 D.C. & G.M. v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 937 5
19 D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416 20

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20 Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, 1991 AIR 19

101
21 Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay vs. The Sholapur Spinning & 4
Weaving Company, 1954 SCR 674
22 E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 SCR (2) 348 4, 18
23 EWP Ltd. v. Moore, [1992] QB 460 (UK) 12
24 Excel Wear v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 25 9
25 Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya, AIR 1959 SC 781 15
26 Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (1999) 2 SCC 228. 7
27 Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 199 2, 5
[28].
28 John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611 17
29 K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, (1994) 5 SCC 593 12
30 K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2011 SC 3430 18, 19
31 Karimbil kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 723 16
32 Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 404 20
33 Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2024] 4 6
S.C.R. 151
34 Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCC 426 7
35 L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon 13
Steamship Co. Ltd., (1994) 1 AC 486
36 Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Audrey D’Cousta, (1987) SCC 2 46 8
37 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 5, 18, 20
38 Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) 1 SCC 222 17
39 Om Kumar And Ors vs UOI, AIR 2000 SC 3689 11
40 OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions 14
India (P) Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2600
41 P. N. Dass v. State of Bihar, (1996) 8 SCC 535 20
42 P. Rajendram v. State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1012 17
43 Phillips v. Eyre, [1870] LR 6 QB 1 (UK) 12
44 Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P, (1984) 4 SCC 251 17

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45 Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, 2

(2002) 5 SCC 111
46 R. K. Sabarwal v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 779 20
47 Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar, (1963) 50 ITR 171 (SC) 13
48 Raj Pal Sharma v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1263 17
49 Ram dial v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1518 16, 17
50 Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice Tendolkar, [1959] 1 S.C.R. 279 3
51 Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC 564 21
52 Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corpn. 10
Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 1
53 Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) 14, 15
SCC 644.
54 Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 SCC (1) 248 2, 4
55 S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87 1
56 Samuel Kamau Macharia and Ors. v. Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. 12
and Ors., MANU/KESC/0002/2012
57 Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609. 19
58 Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children’s Aid Society, 1987 SCR (1) 870. 8
59 Shiv Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2016) 2 SCC 402 21
60 Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015 5 SCC 1 17
61 State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319 17
62 State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952] 1 S.C.R. 284 3, 16, 18
63 Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682 18
64 Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409 21
65 UOI v. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993) 3 SCC 499 13
66 Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, 2012 6 SCC 19
613
67 Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, 2006 3 SCC 374 6, 21

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ARTICLES

68 Adrita Dey, Relaxation on The Purview of Locus Standi and The 1

Evolution of Public Interest Litigation, 2(4) JCLJ 217 (2022)
69 Amit Prasad, Tax and its Retrospectivity: An Appraisal 19 ITR 452 13
(2023)
70 Ananya Bali, Doctrine of Reasonable Classification as an Exception 16
to the Right to Equality: Critical Analysis in Light of the Legal
Provisions and Relevant Case-Laws, 4 ISSUE 1 INT'L JL MGMT. &
HUMAN. 1414 (2021)
71 S.P. Sathe, Public Participation in Judicial Process. New 2
Trends in Law of Locus Standi with Special Reference to
Administrative Law, 26 JILI 1 (1984)
72 Yash Sharan, The Doctrine of ‘Manifest Arbitrariness’: Forestalling 19
Its Arbitrary Use in the Indian Judicial Landscape, 13 NIRMA
ULJ 121 (2023)

BOOKS

73 FRANCIS BENNION, UNDERSTANDING COMMON LAW LEGISLATION: 13

DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION (1st ed. 2004)
74 M P JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (8th ed. 2022) 9, 11
75 VN SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA (13th ed. 2017) 16

OTHER SOURCES

76 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 12

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The Petitioners, MantraTech Ports (MP) have approached this Hon’ble Supreme Court of
Suvarnadwipa under Article 32 of the Constitution of Suvarnadwipa1 challenging the
constitutional validity of the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication
Act (SPPLA), 2024 asserting that it violates various fundamental rights guaranteed under the
Constitution of Suvarnadwipa. The Petitioners contend that this Act infringes upon their rights,
necessitating immediate judicial intervention to uphold the constitutional mandate.

Two situations may arise for clubbing of the petitions:

1. If other petitions were pending in the Supreme Court: Power under Article 1422 has
been used to club the petitions; or
2. If other petitions were pending in various High courts of Suvarnadwipa: Power under
Article 139A3 has been used to club the petitions.

THE PETITIONERS HUMBLY SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THIS

HON'BLE COURT.

1
Article 32: Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part-
(1) The right to move the SC by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred by this Part
is guaranteed.
(2) The SC shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus,
mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the enforcement of any
of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the SC by clause (1) and (2), Parliament may by law empower
any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers exercisable by the SC
under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.
2
142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders as to discovery, etc.—
(1) The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary
for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made
shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law
made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order3
prescribe.
3
139A. Transfer of certain cases. —
(1) Where cases involving the same or substantially the same questions of law are pending before the Supreme
Court and one or more High Courts or before two or more High Courts and the Supreme Court is satisfied on its
own motion or on an application made by the Attorney-General of India or by a party to any such case that such
questions are substantial questions of general importance, the Supreme Court may withdraw the case or cases
pending before the High Court or the High Courts and dispose of all the cases itself.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS

TIMELINE OCCURRENCE OF EVENTS

BACKGROUND OF Suvarnadwipa is an island country situated on the south-eastern

SUVARNADWIPA tip of the great Bhāratakhanda peninsula. Due to its strategic
location, the island has been subjected to numerous military
campaigns. The island was colonised by the Britanni people for
over two-hundred years. During this colonial period,
Suvarnadwipa evolved into a major global trading hub. The
Britanni’s rule ended in 1970 after a prolonged violent struggle,
and Suvarnadwipa gained independence, emerging as a
Sovereign, Socialist and Democratic Republic.

LEADERSHIP OF MR. Suvarnadwipa’s first Prime Minister, Mr. Ramadhir Chaudhari,

RAMADHIR was a visionary leader. Faced with limited natural resources and
CHAUDHARY an inability to initiate an agricultural revolution, Chaudhari
emphasized economic growth. Mr. Chaudhari's policies focused
on establishing Suvarnadwipa as global trade hub, attracting
foreign investment through business-friendly laws, low taxes,
and advanced infrastructure. Reforms resulted in Suvarnadwipa
becoming a destination for global investors.

THE One of the major challenges Mr. Chaudhari faced was the
OVERBURDENED overburdened court system, which caused significant delays in
COURT SYSTEM AND adjudicating commercial disputes. To address this gap and to
ADOPTION OF attract more foreign investors, Mr. Chaudhari’s government
ALTERNATIVE passed the Suvarnadwipa Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
DISPUTE (SACA) on January 1, 1996. With time, ACS was heralded as one
RESOLUTION of the most significant arbitral institutions in the world with
MEASURES nearly 25% of the total disputes arbitrated around the world (by
value) being adjudicated under aegis of ACS. An Act
“Suvarnadwipa Public Sector Dispute Resolution Act, 2009
(SPSDR)” was also implemented.

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DEMISE OF MR. Tragically, Mr. Chaudhari passed away on December 25, 2010.
CHAUDHARY AND By this time, Suvarnadwipa was one of the most significant
RISE OF JP economies of the world. In the ensuing in January 2011 elections,
CHAUDHARY Mr. JP Chaudhari, son of Mr. Chaudhari was elected as the PM
of Suvarnadwipa.

REPEALING OF MantraTech, a Britanni conglomerate is one of the largest

SPSDR ACT , 2009 corporate groups in the world. Since Suvarnadwipa’s
AND THE RISE OF independence, MantraTech had invested millions of dollars in the
DISPUTE BETWEEN country. In June 2023, MP had entered into a Memorandum of
MANTRA TECH Understanding with SPT. After signing the MoU, MP started
ALONG WITH constructing the container terminal and it was anticipated that the
OTHER PRIVATE construction would be completed by 31 March, 2025. In the
PARTIES AND meanwhile, MP and SPT were in negotiations regarding the
SPT(SUVARNADWIPA terms of the JV. However, the SPSDR Act, 2009 posed a matter
PORT TRUST) A PSU of frustration for JayP and his government as the PSUs failed to
ALONG WITH defend themselves in a number of arbitrations. At one point of
OTHER PSU’S time, the total value of arbitral awards which had been passed
against the PSUs and pending enforcement exceeded 20% of the
total GDP of Suvarnadwipa. In response, an Act “Suvarnadwipa
Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication Act of 2024”
was passed on January 1, 2024, with retrospective effect,
repealing the SPSDR Act, 2009. As per the said Act, every
contract between PSUs and private parties would be devoid of
an arbitration clause and all disputes arising out of or related to
the contract would be resolved exclusively through litigation
while following the due process and judicial system laid down in
Suvarnadwipa’s Constitution to resolve the disputes. In the joint
venture agreement between MP and SPT, MP wanted to add an
arbitration clause which was denied by SPT quoting SPPLA
which led to MP filing this matter before the instant bench. MP
was joined by similar other private parties in the litigation.

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STATEMENT OF ISSUES

ISSUE 1

WHETHER THE PETITION CHALLENGING THE SUVARNADWIPA PUBLIC SECTOR

DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2024 IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE THE SUPREME
COURT OF SUVARNADWIPA?

ISSUE 2

WHETHER THE SUVARNADWIPA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LITIGATION AND

ADJUDICATION ACT, 2024 (SPPLA) IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SUVARNADWIPA?

ISSUE 3

WHETHER THE SUVARNADWIPA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT LITIGATION AND

ADJUDICATION ACT, 2024 (SPPLA) IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF SUVARNADWIPA?

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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

ISSUE 1: Whether the petition challenging the Suvarnadwipa Public Sector Dispute
Resolution Act, 2024 is maintainable before the Supreme Court of Suvarnadwipa?

A writ petition has been filed in this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Suvarnadwipa, by MantraTech
Ports (MP), port operator and logistics company incorporated in Suvarnadwipa and a subsidiary
of MantraTech, a Britanni conglomerate, praying that the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement
Litigation and Adjudication Act of 2024 (SPPLA Act) be declared ultra vires the constitution
of Suvarnadwipa as it imposes an unreasonable restraint on business activities of MantraTech
Ports (MP) thus breaching its right to freedom to conduct business, fair trial, and equal
protection under the law as there does not exist a rational nexus to legitimate government
objectives. This petition is therefore, maintainable as (1.1) the petitioner has a locus standi in
the matter as their (1.2) fundamental rights have been infringed. Furthermore, the (1.3)
enactment of SPPLA Act, 2024 is violative of Suvarnadwipa’s international obligations.

ISSUE 2: Whether the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication

Act, 2024 (SPPLA) is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of Suvarnadwipa?

It is submitted that (2.1) SPPLA, 2024 is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, as it
imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right to practice any profession or carry on trade,
business, or occupation. (2.2) Its enactment cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction under
Article 19(6). (2.3) The Act does not satisfy the test of proportionality, as its measures are
excessive and disproportionate to the intended objectives. (2.4) The retrospective application
of the SPPLA, 2024, is unconstitutional. (2.5) The legitimate expectation of the petitioners has
been violated, as the Act disregards their established rights. Lastly, (2.6) the SPPLA, 2024, is
against public policy, as it disrupts societal and economic stability.
ISSUE 3: Whether the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication
Act, 2024 (SPPLA) is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of Suvarnadwipa?
It is most humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement
Litigation and Adjudication Act, 2024 (SPPLA) is violative of Article 14 of the constitution of
Suvarnadwipa as there is (3.1) no intelligible differentia in the classification. (3.2) There is no
rational nexus between the means and end. (3.3) The action taken is arbitrary in nature and
(3.4) the action by the government is violative of Article 21 of the constitution.

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ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

ISSUE 1: WHETHER THE PETITION CHALLENGING THE SUVARNADWIPA

PUBLIC SECTOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION ACT, 2024 IS MAINTAINABLE BEFORE
THE SUPREME COURT OF SUVARNADWIPA?
(¶ 1) A writ petition has been filed in this Hon’ble Supreme Court of Suvarnadwipa, by
MantraTech Ports (MP), port operator and logistics company incorporated in Suvarnadwipa
and a subsidiary of MantraTech, a Britanni conglomerate, praying that the Suvarnadwipa
Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication Act of 2024 (SPPLA Act) be declared ultra
vires the constitution of Suvarnadwipa This petition is therefore, maintainable as (1.1) the
petitioner has a locus standi in the matter as their (1.2) fundamental rights have been infringed.
Furthermore, the (1.3) enactment of SPPLA Act, 2024 is violative of Suvarnadwipa’s
international obligations.

[1.1] THE PETITIONER HAS A LOCUS STANDI IN THE MATTER.

(¶ 2) Locus standi, a Latin phrase, is derived from the term ‘locus’ which in English means
‘place’, and ‘standi’ which in English translates to ‘right to bring an action. The essence of this
phrase is contained in the combined reading of Order 7 Rules 1 and 11, of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 19084. It must have 2 essential ingredients: presence of injury which implies in the
present context violation of a fundamental right or a legal right and cause of such violation
must be the act of a third party.5

(¶ 3) Locus Standi is the basis of entitlement of judicial redress on account of personal injury
to property, body, mind, or reputation arising from violation, actual or threatened, of the legal
right or legally protected interests of the person seeking such redress It must not be forgotten
that procedure is but a hand maiden of justice and the cause of justice can never be allowed to
be thwarted by any procedural technicalities.6 In the present case as well, MantraTech Ports’
fundamental rights under the articles 147, 198 and 219 of the constitution of Suvarnadwipa have
been violated at the hands of Suvarnadwipa Port Trust (SPT), which is wholly owned by the

4
Code of Civil Procedure, Act no. 5 of 1908, O 7, R-1 & 11 (1908).
5
Adrita Dey, Relaxation on The Purview of Locus Standi and The Evolution of Public Interest Litigation, 2(4)
JCLJ 217 (2022).
6
S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, 1981 Supp SCC 87.
7
INDIA CONST. art. 14.
8
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1, sub cl. (g).
9
INDIA CONST. art. 21.
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Government of Suvarnadwipa and administers the Suvarnadwipa Port10 and is therefore a state
within the meaning of Article 12 of the constitution of Suvarnadwipa.11
(¶ 4) Even if the matter pertains to a larger public interest, any member of the public gains the
locus standi in the matter, by virtue of being such member and it is thereafter, upon the courts
to determine whether a genuine public interest persists or not. A balance has to be struck
between rigid compliance with technicality and total dispensation of technicality.12 The
principle of locus standi is thus given wider import and also substantiates the contemporary
principles of public interest litigation.13
(¶ 5) Therefore, it is contended on behalf of the petitioner that the enactment of the impugned
SPPLA Act is unconstitutional on nuances of articles 14, 19 and 21, thereby infringing the
rights of the investors, who intended to invest in the SPT through MantraTech. Though it may
be contested that MantraTech Ports is not a citizen and therefore cannot seek approach this
court for the violation of Article 19. In this regard, the Supreme Court noted that in the case of
Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat14, “if the State action impairs the right of the
shareholders as well as to the Company, the Court will not, concentrating merely upon the
technical operation of the action, deny itself jurisdiction to grant relief.
(¶ 6) In the case of Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India15, the Supreme Court ruled that
if legislative measures directly affect companies of which the petitioner is a shareholder, he
may apply on behalf of the company if any impugned action has violated their rights. In this
case, the Court dealt with the application under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution. Therefore,
it should be noted that an individual's rights are not lost because he is a shareholder of the
company.
(¶ 7) In another case Bennet Coleman Co. v. Union of India (1973)16, the Supreme Court stated
that “it is now clear that the fundamental rights of shareholders as citizens will not be lost when
they associate to start a company. If their fundamental rights as shareholders are affected by
government measures, their rights as shareholders will be protected. The reason is that

10
Moot Proposition, ¶ 17.
11
Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111; Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib
Sehravardi, (1981) 1 SCC 722.
12
S.P. Sathe, Public Participation in Judicial Process. New Trends in Law of Locus Standi with Special Reference
to Administrative Law, 26 JILI 1 (1984).
13
Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India, (2012) 3 SCC 1.
14
Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, (1975) 1 SCC 199 28.
15
Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) SCC 1 248.
16
Bennet Coleman Co. v. Union of India, 1973 SCR (2) 757.
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shareholder rights are equally and necessarily affected if the rights of the company are
affected.”
[1.2] PETITIONERS’ FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS HAVE BEEN INFRINGED.
(¶ 8) The very purpose of the impugned Act was to repeal the previous act- “Suvarnadwipa
Public Sector Dispute Resolution Act, 2009 (SPSDR), and devoid every contract between PSUs
and private parties of an arbitration clause and make national courts the only fora that can
address and resolve such disputes.17 The very intent of the legislation was to empower the PSUs
as they failed to defend themselves in a number of arbitrations, which led to substantial losses
for the government. This reasoning goes beyond the scope of equality and violates under Article
14 of the constitution as the act applies only to class of companies that is, PSUs and not to other
private companies similarly placed which may also indulge with foreign investments.
(¶ 9) Mandating the discontinuation of an arbitration clause also violates the right of equality
of those particular investors, that had specifically invested in the PSUs and this act of the govt
leads to a class legislation that is aimed only to retrieve the economic edge of the PSUs in
public- private joint ventures and to also set aside the previously made arbitral awards.
(¶ 10) The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar18,
laid down two essentials or conditions that are required to be satisfied to pass the test of
reasonable classification. The two essentials are as follows:
• Classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes those that
are grouped together from others.
• The differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the
proposed legislation or law.
(¶ 11) The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar19 held that
Article 14 prohibits class legislation and not reasonable classification, which is done for
legislative purposes. In the present case, no reasonable classification has been made out and
intent of the legislature is seen to decide whether or not there is a reasonable classification. In
the case of Air India v. Nargesh Meerza20 (1978), the petitioners challenged Regulations of the
Air India Employees Service Regulations as discriminatory, stipulating that an air hostess
would retire upon reaching the age of 35, marrying within four years of service, or becoming

17
Moot Proposition, ¶ 22.
18
State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, 1952] 1 S.C.R. 284.
19
Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, [1959] 1 S.C.R. 279.
20
Air India v. Nargesh Meerza, [1981 (4) SCC 335].
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pregnant. These provisions were held ultra vires as they contravened Articles 14, 15, 16, and
21 of the Indian Constitution.
(¶ 12) Apart from above-mentioned fallacies, the Act is plagued with arbitrariness that forms
the basis of any claim for the violation of Article 14. Section 9 of the SPPLA Act provides the
retrospective application of act and nullifies all arbitration proceedings or awards initiated or
issued under such contracts after January 1, 2020 but before the commencement of this Act.
Such a provision not only is manifestly arbitrary but also goes against the principle of finality
of arbitral awards contained in Section 35 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
(¶ 13) The unlawful attempt to meander such finality of awards already made is an arbitrary
exercise of legislative power and therefore, it vitiates Article 14 of the constitution. In the case
of E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu21, the doctrine of manifest arbitrariness was first
established, which allows the state's actions to be struck down if they violate the rule of
law. The court held that Article 14 guarantees against arbitrary actions by the state, and that
equality is against arbitrariness.
(¶ 14) Apart from Article 14, the petitioner has suffered the violation of Article 19 (1) (g) at the
hands of the government of Suvarnadwipa. Though, MantraTech Ports merely by virtue of
being a company incorporated in Suvarnadwipa does not have the right under Article 19 (1) (g)
but its shareholders can bring a cause of action petition against the arbitrary and unreasonable
restriction imposed on such shareholders rights under article 19(1)(g). As early as 1950, Indian
courts began addressing whether companies are entitled to fundamental rights. In the landmark
case of Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company22, a
shareholder of the Sholapur Spinning and Weaving Company challenged the Sholapur
Spinning and Weaving Company (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1950. While delivering its
judgment, the court reaffirmed the established principle of separate legal entity, emphasizing
that a company and its shareholders are distinct entities. It ruled that a shareholder cannot claim
a violation of fundamental rights on behalf of the company unless their personal rights are also
infringed.
(¶ 15) The Supreme Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (Bank
Nationalisation case) permitted a shareholder-cum-director of a banking company to challenge
the law nationalizing banks by way of a writ petition under Article 32. In this regard, the
Supreme Court observed that "if the State action impairs the right of the shareholders as well

21
E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 SCR (2) 348.
22
Dwarkadas Shrinivas of Bombay v. The Sholapur Spinning & Weaving Company, 1954 SCR 674.
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as to the Company, the Court will not, concentrating merely upon the technical operation of
the action, deny itself jurisdiction to grant relief.
(¶ 16) In D.C. & G.M. v. Union of India23, the Supreme Court while permitting shareholders
to challenge a state action against a company held that the rights of shareholders and the
company are rather co-extensive and "the denial to one of the fundamental freedoms would be
denial to the other." As a result of these judicial rulings, it has become a recognized practice
for shareholders to file writ petitions under Article 19 to protect their freedoms when state
actions against the company in which they hold shares directly affect them as well.
(¶ 17) The court in Godhra Electricity Co. Ltd. v. State of Gujarat, held that any adverse state
action against the company affects the shareholder's right to carry on the business through the
agency of the company and that any adverse state action against the company affects the
shareholder's right to a divisible share in future of the property of the company. A review of the
above factors reveals that the primary rationale for granting shareholders standing to challenge
the infringement of a company's legal rights lies in the direct link between the company's
financial interests and those of its shareholders. Therefore, when SPPLA act was passed, it
posed an unreasonable embargo on the exercise of its right to freedom of trade or business.
(¶ 18) Additionally, the petitioner also contends violation of Article 21 of the constitution as
the impugned act interferes with the petitioners’ right to fair trial. Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution guarantees the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to legal representation,
Be heard, present evidence in defence, and a speedy trial. The Supreme Court, however,
overruled the decision in A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras24 through its judgment in Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India25, where it established the interconnection between Articles 14, 19,
and 21 of the Indian Constitution. The Court interpreted the phrase “procedure established by
law” under Article 21 to include the requirements of reasonableness and non-arbitrariness.:
“Article 14 targets arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality in treatment.
The procedure under Article 21 must meet the standard of reasonableness to align with Article
14.”
(¶ 19) The counsel submits that it must be ‘right, just, and fair’ rather than arbitrary, fanciful,
or oppressive; otherwise, it would not qualify as a valid procedure, and the requirements of
Article 21 would remain unmet.” The Supreme Court also observed that the procedure

23
D.C. & G.M. v. Union of India, AIR 1983 SC 937.
24
A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, 1950 SCR 88.
25
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
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prescribed by law for depriving a person of his life and personal liberty must be ‘right, just and
fair’ and not ‘arbitrary, fanciful and oppressive’.
(¶ 20) The free and fair trial has been said to be the sine qua non of Article 21. The Supreme
Court in Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat26 reiterated the same. The Apex court
has also laid down specific guidelines for ensuring speedy trial of offences in A.R. Antulay v.
R.S. Nayak27 one of which states that fair, just and reasonable procedures are implicit in Article
21. MantraTech Ports also contend that because the Act was brought to give a judicial edge to
the PSUs where they can easily defend themselves, the act is violative as it casts a doubt of
bias of the national courts in the favour of PSUs. The Supreme Court in Krishnadatt
Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors.28, held that if a process is vitiated by bias, it would
be violative of natural justice and the such processes may be set aside.

[1.3] ENACTMENT OF SPPLA ACT, 2024 IS VIOLATIVE OF SUVARNADWIPA’S

INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS.
(¶ 21) The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was enacted to fulfil the obligations of the
country under the UNCITRAL’s model law on International Commercial Arbitration29 which
was designed to assist States in reforming and modernizing their laws on arbitral procedure so
as to take into account the particular features and needs of international commercial arbitration.
Suvarnadwipa being a signatory to the UNCITRAL was obligated to adopt the model laws with
or without reservations. The aim of the UNCITRAL model law was to harmonise the disputes
arising out of commercial relationships and provide an out of court, speedy and just system for
resolution of disputes. After the enactment of SPPLA, 2024 all the commercial disputes
between a PSU and a private party would be subjected to the procedure of the national courts
by denying them of the opportunity to arbitrate the matter. This class legislation clearly goes
against the intent of the model law and Suvarnadwipa’s commitment towards ensuring
arbitrability of commercial disputes.
(¶ 22) Apart from obligations under the UNCITRAL model laws, India ratified the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on April 10, 1979.
Article 130 of the Covenant states:

26
Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, AIR 2006 SC 1367.
27
A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, 1988 SCC (2) 602.
28
Krishnadatt Awasthy v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., [2024] 4 S.C.R. 151.
29
UNCITRAL Model Law International Commercial Arbitration, Jun. 21, 1985, Preamble.
30
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1966, art. 1.
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‘1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources
without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based
upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be
deprived of its own means of subsistence’.
(¶ 23) The incorporation of MantraTech Ports by its parent company, MantraTech was done to
fully utilise its economic rights and expand its area of investment by moving into a joint venture
with SPT. The joint venture herein entered into was based on mutual benefits wherein MP
would own 75% stake and SPT would own the balance, 25% stake.31 But later, after the
enactment of SPPLA, 2024 a restraint has been put of the arbitrability of the disputes that may
arise between the parties and therefore, it interferes with the economic liberties of the
MantraTech and violates Article 1 of the ICESCR, that is its right of self-determination of
economic development. In Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India32, the Supreme Court
observed that the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Declaration clearly mandate that state parties take measures
to prevent all forms of discrimination against women. As a signatory to CEDAW, the Court
held that domestic courts are obligated to consider international conventions and norms when
interpreting domestic laws, provided there is no inconsistency between them.
(¶ 24) The doctrine of “pacta sunt servanda” contained in article 26 and article 27 of the –
Vienna convention, 1980 lays down that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it
and must be performed in good faith and a party may not invoke the provisions of its internal
law as a justification for its failure to perform a treaty. International obligations once
undertaken must be complied with. In Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India33, the Supreme Court
held that, “it is generally a well-recognized principle in national legal system that in event of
doubt the national rule is to be interpreted in accordance with the state’s international
obligations.
(¶ 25) In Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Audrey D’Cousta34, the Supreme Court noted that India was
a signatory to the International Convention on Equal Remuneration for Men and Women for

31
Moot Proposition, ¶ 18.
32
Githa Hariharan v. Reserve Bank of India, (1999) 2 SCC 228.
33
Kubic Dariusz v. Union of India, [1981] 2 SCC 426.
34
Mackinnon Mackenzie v. Audrey D’Cousta, 1987 SCC (2) 46.
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Work of Equal Value. The Court applied the principle outlined in the Convention to interpret
the Equal Remuneration Act, 1976, a law enacted by Parliament. Relying on this principle, the
Court ruled in favour of the petitioner, declaring the employer’s actions unconstitutional as
they violated the principle of equal pay for equal work.
(¶ 26) In Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children’s Aid Society35, the Supreme Court, while
directing the State of Maharashtra, held that international conventions ratified by India, which
establish norms for the protection of children, impose an obligation on the state to implement
their principles. Departing from its earlier judgments, the Court concluded that treaties, even if
not incorporated into domestic law, carry a binding effect.
(¶ 27) Thus, in effect, when Suvarnadwipa ratified the ICESCR, the covenant ipso facto
became a part of the law of the land and therefore, it is binding upon the nation. In light of
these contentions, the arbitrability of the commercial disputes that may arise between MP and
SPT must not be denied by the enactment of SPPLA Act and the economic rights of the parties
must be given a wider import for its actualisation.

ISSUE 2: WHETHER THE SUVARNADWIPA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

LITIGATION AND ADJUDICATION ACT, 2024 (SPPLA) IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 19 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SUVARNADWIPA?
(¶ 28) It is submitted that (2.1) SPPLA, 2024 is violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution,
as it imposes unreasonable restrictions on the right to practice any profession or carry on trade,
business, or occupation. (2.2) Its enactment cannot be justified as a reasonable restriction under
Article 19(6). (2.3) The Act does not satisfy the test of proportionality, as its measures are
excessive and disproportionate to the intended objectives. (2.4) The retrospective application
of the SPPLA, 2024, is unconstitutional. (2.5) The legitimate expectation of the petitioners has
been violated, as the Act disregards their established rights. Lastly, (2.6) the SPPLA, 2024, is
against public policy, as it disrupts societal and economic stability.

[2.1] THE SPPLA, 2024 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19(1)(G) OF THE

CONSTITUTIONAL.
(¶ 29) It is submitted that the SPPLA’s restriction on the method of dispute resolution
constitutes an unreasonable restraint on the petitioner’s right to conduct business, violating
fundamental freedoms essential for commercial activity.36 In 1978, through the 44th

35
Sheela Barse v. Secretary, Children’s Aid Society, 1987 SCR (1) 870.
36
Moot Proposition, ¶ 29.
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Amendment to the Constitution, the word ‘socialist’ was added to the Preamble, characterizing
India as a ‘Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic’.37 The Supreme Court, in Excel
Wear v. Union of India.38 clarified that while socialism may encourage nationalization and state
ownership of industries, it does not negate the constitutional recognition of private ownership
and enterprise.
(¶ 30) It is submitted that private enterprise continues to constitute a significant portion of
India’s economic framework, and the principle of socialism must be harmonized with the
legitimate interests of private stakeholders. The framers of the Constitution did not envisage
socialism as a tool to stifle trade or commerce, but rather as a means to ensure social justice
and economic equity without completely disregarding the rights and contributions of private
players in the economy. It is submitted that a private sector undertaking differs from a public
sector undertaking. When the latter closes down, it can protect the labour even at the cost of
the public exchequer. But a private undertaking is run for return to the owner not only to meet
his livelihood or expenses but also for the formation of capital for growth of the national
economy.39
(¶ 31) The counsel for the petitioner emphasizes that it has already invested substantial funds
in the container terminal project, and any unreasonable restraint on dispute resolution processes
to be adopted for any dispute that may arise in the public- private partnership would impair its
business operations.40 In the context of the fundamental right to carry on business under Article
19(1)(g) of the Constitution, the Court has posed the critical question of whether it is reasonable
to impose such rigorous restrictions that the legitimate interests of stakeholders are completely
or substantially ignored.41
(¶ 32) Lastly, it is submitted that the principle of a “level playing field” has been explicitly
acknowledged by the Court as an integral factor to be considered in the application of Article
19(1)(g)42 and forcing the petitioner to litigate through Suvarnadwipa courts, particularly
against a powerful state-owned entity like SPT, creates an unequal playing field. This fosters
potential bias, erodes investor confidence, and undermines Suvarnadwipa’s public policy
objectives.43

37
The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, §. 2 (1976).
38
Excel Wear v. Union of India, AIR 1979 SC 25.
39
See id.
40
Moot Proposition, ¶ 27.
41
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1106 (8th ed. 2022).
42
Reliance Energy Ltd. v. Maharashtra State Road Development Corpn. Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC 1.
43
Moot Proposition, ¶ 25.
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[2.2] ENACTMENT OF SPPLA, 2024 IS NOT JUSTIFIED AS A REASONABLE

RESTRICTION UNDER ARTICLE 19(6).
(¶ 33) The petitioner submits that the state’s governance, under JayP, suffered from cronyism
and the placement of loyalists without merit in key PSU positions. These individuals made
questionable commercial decisions, resulting in adverse impacts on private sector interactions44
and it is to be highlighted that Mantratech has made significant investments in Suvarnadwipa,
including the incorporation of Petitioner’s Company. Any restriction on dispute resolution
mechanisms affects the confidence of such investors, undermining India’s investment
climate.45
(¶ 34) It is submitted that in the landmark case of Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh46,
the Apex Court has interpreted ‘Reasonable Restrictions’ as follows: “The phrase “reasonable
restriction” connotes that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should
not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public.
The word "reasonable" implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course
which reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be
said to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the
freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by Clause (6) of Article
19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality.”
(¶ 35) It is submitted to this Hon’ble Court that the limitations imposed by Articles 19(2) to
19(6) on the freedoms guaranteed under Articles 19(1)(a) to 19(1)(g) serve a dual purpose.
First, they clarify that these freedoms are not absolute and may be subject to regulation. Second,
they place a constraint on the legislature, prohibiting it from imposing restrictions on these
freedoms beyond the parameters established by Articles 19(2) to 19(6).47
(¶ 36) It is pertinent to mention the three key characteristics of Articles 19(2) to 19(6): a)
Restrictions under these provisions can only be imposed by or under the authority of a law; b)
each restriction must meet the test of reasonableness; c) the restriction must align with the
purposes explicitly mentioned in Articles 19(2) to 19(6). 48
Accordingly, the validity of a
restriction is subject to a dual test: a) whether the restriction is reasonable, and b) whether it

44
Moot Proposition, ¶ 14.
45
Moot Proposition, ¶ 16.
46
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, MANU/SC/0008/1950 (India).
47
MP JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1053 (8th ed. 2022).
48
See Id.
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serves a purpose enumerated in the clause under which it is imposed.49 In the present case,
therefore, no reasonable restriction can be discerned from the circumstances that necessitated
the enactment of the SPPLA, 2024, and it is thus not justified.
(¶ 37) Lastly, it is submitted that the enactment of the SPPLA, 2024 is unnecessary and
unjustified, as the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 already provides a robust framework
to address concerns of fraud, corruption, and violations of public policy in arbitration. Section
34 of the Act explicitly allows for the setting aside of arbitral awards if they are vitiated by
fraud, corruption, or violate public policy.50 Additionally, Section 37 provides a clear
mechanism for appeals, ensuring that any grievances regarding arbitral awards can be
addressed through judicial scrutiny.51

[2.3] SPPLA, 2024 DOES NOT SATISFY THE TEST OF PROPORTIONALITY.

(¶ 38) It is submitted that the SPPLA, 2024 doesn’t satisfy the proportionality test.
Proportionality requires that any restriction imposed on fundamental rights should adopt the
least restrictive or most appropriate measure necessary to achieve the legitimate aim of the
legislation or administrative action.52 This principle ensures that the adverse effects on rights,
liberties, or interests are balanced against the purpose intended to be served by the action in
question.53 In this case, the measures taken are neither the least restrictive nor appropriate to
achieve the stated objective.54
(¶ 39) It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the assumption underlying the
enactment of the 2024 Act—namely, that dispute resolution through national courts would
result in decisions otherwise unfavourable to Public Sector Undertakings (PSUs) being
rendered in their favour—is speculative, overly remote, and lacks substantive basis.
Consequently, it fails to satisfy the requirements of the doctrine of proportionality.

[2.4] RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF THE SPPLA, 2024 IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
(¶ 40) It is submitted that the retrospective application of the SPPLA is unconstitutional as it
violates the principles of fairness, legal certainty, and the protection of vested rights. Such
retrospective operation undermines the sanctity of existing contracts and alters the legal

49
Id. at page no. 1114.
50
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, Act no. 26 of 1996, § 34 (1996).
51
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, § 37 (1996).
52
Om Kumar And Ors v. UOI, AIR 2000 SC 3689.
53
See Id.
54
Supra note 54.
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framework retrospectively without justifiable cause. The counsel for the petitioner submits that
the SPSDR Act, 2009, created inefficiencies as PSUs failed to defend themselves in multiple
arbitrations. This reflects the inadequacy of existing state policies to address complex
commercial disputes effectively thereby necessitating enactment of SPPLA, 2024 as awards
which had been passed against the PSUs and pending enforcement exceeded 20% of the total
GDP of Suvarnadwipa.55
(¶ 41) It is submitted that Black’s Law Dictionary defines retrospective law as: “A law which
looks backward or contemplates the past; one which is made to affect acts or facts occurring,
or rights accruing, before it came into force.”56 Every statute which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or
attaches a new disability in respect of transactions or considerations already past.57
(¶ 42) It is submitted that a statute is regarded as retrospective if it operates on cases or facts
coming into existence before its commencement, in the sense that it affects, even if for the
future only, the character or consequences of transactions previously entered into or of other
past conduct.58 The idea behind the rule is that a current law should govern current activities.
Law passed today cannot apply to the events of the past.59 Our belief in the nature of the law
is founded on the bed rock that every human being is entitled to arrange his affairs by relying
on the existing law and should not find that his plans have been retrospectively upset.60 This
principle of law is known as lex prospicit non respicit- law looks forward not backward.61
(¶ 43) It is submitted that retrospectivity should be reasonable and not excessive or harsh,
otherwise it runs the risk of being struck down as unconstitutional.62 Another aspect of legal
policy is the principle that law should not operate retrospectively.63 However, because
procedural changes are assumed to be beneficial and not punitive, the principles against
retrospectivity do not apply to them. Put more broadly, the principle against retrospectivity
applies only where retrospectivity would inflict hardship.64

55
Moot Proposition, ¶ 20.
56
Retrospective, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
57
Samuel Kamau Macharia and Ors. v. Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. and Ors., MANU/KESC/0002/2012 (India).
58
K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala (1994) 5 SCC 593.
59
EWP Ltd. v. Moore [1992] QB 460 (UK).
60
Phillips v. Eyre [1870] LR 6 QB 1 (UK).
61
Commissioner of Income Tax v. Vatika Township Private Limited, MANU/SC/0810/2014 (India).
62
Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar (1963) 50 ITR 171 (SC).
63
L'Office Cherifien des Phosphates v. Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd. (1994) 1 AC 486.
64
FRANCIS BENNION, UNDERSTANDING COMMON LAW LEGISLATION: DRAFTING AND INTERPRETATION 23 (1st ed.
2004).
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(¶ 44) In the present case, S. 9 of SPPLA, 2024 provides for retrospectivity where the result
would be to create new disabilities or obligations, or to impose new duties in respect of
transactions already accomplished.65 A statute which not only changes the procedure but also
creates new rights and liabilities shall be construed to be prospective in operation.66
(¶ 45) It is respectfully submitted that the retrospective application of this Act is unjustifiable.
Applying the Act to contracts entered into after January 1, 2020, and invalidating arbitration
proceedings initiated under such contracts disrupts legal certainty and fairness. Parties entered
into agreements based on the legal framework in place at the time, and retroactively altering
dispute resolution mechanisms imposes unnecessary burdens and undermines the sanctity of
contractual obligations. Therefore, the retrospective application of this Act should be deemed
invalid.

[2.5] LEGITIMATE EXPECTATION OF PETITIONERS HAS BEEN VIOLATED.

(¶ 46) It is respectfully submitted before this Hon’ble Court that the Doctrine of Legitimate
Expectation is applicable in the present case, as the petitioners are challenging the breach of a
promise made by the public authority without reasonable justification. Legitimate expectation
refers to the expectation of a benefit, relief, or remedy that typically arises from a promise or
established practice.67 In this case, the expectation stems from the explicit promise made by
the authority through the statutory provision of S. 5 of the SPSDR, 2009 wherein it was
mentioned that Arbitration clause should mandatorily be included in every Public Procurement
Contract.68
(¶ 47) In the case of Army Welfare Education Society New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma and
Ors.,69 the Court emphasized key features of the doctrine, all of which are satisfied in the
present case. First, legitimate expectation must be based on a right, not a mere hope or wish.
The petitioners’ expectation arises from a statutory right, not from an unfounded desire.
Second, the expectation is founded on an express promise made by the authority. Third, the
petitioners’ expectation is not based on sporadic or random acts but is rooted in consistent legal
provisions. Fourth, the legitimate expectation extends to both substantive and procedural
matters, and here it pertains to the procedural fairness of upholding statutory promises. Fifth,

65
Moot Proposition, Annexure-IV, Sec. 9.
66
Amit Prasad, Tax and its Retrospectivity: An Appraisal 19 ITR 452 (2023).
67
UOI v. Hindustan Development Corporation, (1993) 3 SCC 499.
68
Moot Proposition, Annexure-1, Sec. 5.
69
Army Welfare Education Society New Delhi v. Sunil Kumar Sharma and Ors., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1683.
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as the matter involves a public authority, the plea of legitimate expectation is valid only when
the authority breaches its promise without a reasonable basis.
(¶ 48) The petitioners, being parties with direct dealings under the relevant legal framework,
are entitled to invoke this doctrine as they are directly affected by the authority’s deviation
from established practice. Furthermore, S. 7 of the SPSDR, 2009 provided that an arbitral
award can be challenged on grounds such as fraud, bias, or violation of public policy.70 In light
of this comprehensive provision, the introduction of a new Act to invalidate all previous arbitral
awards under the pretext of serving public interest is unjustifiable.
(¶ 49) It is submitted that companies, once established within a country, rely on the stability
and predictability of the domestic legal framework. Petitioner has requested an arbitration
clause, given the high-stake and complex nature of the disputes, to ensure effective resolution
and equitable treatment of parties.71 Therefore, the petitioners’ legitimate expectations must be
respected, and any deviation by the public authority without justifiable cause constitutes a
breach of their rights under this doctrine.

[2.6] THE SPPLA, 2024 IS AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.

(¶ 50) It is submitted that “Public policy” is a concept not statutorily defined, though it has
been used in statutes, rules, notification etc. since long, and is also a part of common law.72 It
is observed that there are two conflicting positions which are referred to as the “narrow view”
and the “broad view”.73 According to the narrow view, courts cannot create new heads of public
policy whereas the broad view countenances judicial law making in these areas. The enactment
of the SPPLA, 2024 and its retrospective application undermine the very essence of public
policy by negating the principles of contractual sanctity and legitimate expectations of foreign
investors like the petitioner.
(¶ 51) Public policy or the policy of the law, as elucidated by Lord Atkin, is an elusive concept;
it has been described as untrustworthy guide, variable quality, uncertain one, unruly horse, etc.
The primary duty of a court of law is to enforce a promise which the parties have made and to
uphold the sanctity of contracts which formed the basis of society, but in certain cases, the court
may relieve them of their duty on a rule founded on what is called the public policy.74

70
Moot Proposition, Annexure-1, Sec. 7.
71
Moot Proposition, ¶ 24.
72
OPG Power Generation (P) Ltd. v. Enexio Power Cooling Solutions India (P) Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2600.
73
Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 1994 Supp (1) SCC 644.
74
Gherulal Parakh v. Mahadeodas Maiya, AIR 1959 SC 781.
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(¶ 52) Though the heads are not closed and though theoretically it may be permissible to evolve
a new head under exceptional circumstances of a changing world, it is advisable in the interest
of stability of society not to make any attempt to discover new heads in these days.75 Here, the
government’s blanket assertion that arbitration has caused unsustainable financial burdens
lacks evidentiary substantiation and does not meet the threshold of clear harm to public interest.
In Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v. General Electric Co.,76 Court observed that the doctrine of
public policy is somewhat open- textured and flexible.
(¶ 53) Arbitration, ensures impartiality and efficiency in high-stakes, complex disputes.
Forcing entities like MantraTech Ports into an unequal playing field under the national courts,
where the other party is a powerful PSU, undermines the principles of fairness and equality
central to public policy. The assertion made by JayP that private parties exploit the arbitration
system to obtain favourable awards fails to acknowledge these statutory safeguards. 77 The
existing legal provisions strike a balance between minimal court intervention and the need for
accountability, thereby preserving the integrity of arbitration while preventing abuse.78
(¶ 54) Lastly, it is submitted that the retrospective nullification of arbitration agreements creates
harmful tendencies by eroding investor confidence, destabilizing established legal norms, and
deterring foreign investments essential for Suvarnadwipa’s economic growth. Therefore, the
claim that the SPPLA 2024, is necessitated to address systemic exploitation lacks a sound basis,
given the comprehensive mechanisms already in place under the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act, 1996.

ISSUE 3: WHETHER THE SUVARNADWIPA PUBLIC PROCUREMENT

LITIGATION AND ADJUDICATION ACT, 2024 (SPPLA) IS VIOLATIVE OF
ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF SUVARNADWIPA?
(¶ 55) It is most humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that Suvarnadwipa Public
Procurement Litigation and Adjudication Act, 2024 (SPPLA) is violative of Article 14 of the
constitution of Suvarnadwipa as (3.1) There is no intelligible differentia in the classification
(3.2) There is no rational nexus between the means and end (3.3) The action taken is arbitrary
in nature and (3.4) The action by the government is violative of Article 21 of the constitution.

75
See Id.
76
Supra Note 72.
77
Moot Proposition, ¶ 23.
78
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, § 5 (1996).
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[3.1] THERE IS NO INTELLIGIBLE DIFFERENTIA IN THE CLASSIFICATION

MADE.
(¶ 56) The petitioners contends that the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and
Adjudication Act, 2024 (SPPLA), violates Article 14 of the Constitution by lacking intelligible
differentia in its classification of public procurement contracts. Under Article 14, the principle
of reasonable classification permits distinctions in law only if there is an intelligible differentia
that separates those grouped together from others left out and if such differentia bears a rational
nexus to the objective of the law79.
(¶ 57) In the instant case, the SPPLA Act does not provide any substantive basis to treat PSU
contracts differently from private contracts, especially when both categories involve similar
commercial considerations. As noted in Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar80, classifications
must rest on real and substantial distinctions, which are absent in the SPPLA, 2024. Both public
and private contracts often necessitate the use of arbitration for efficient resolution of disputes,
making the exclusion of arbitration for PSU contracts arbitrary81.
(¶ 58) In Karimbil kunhikoman v. State of Kerala 82 the impugned act gave certain benefits to
those who owned plantation of rubber, tea and coffee, but left out those who owned pepper and
areca plantation. Since no reasonable distinction between those two classes of plantation
owners could be pointed out, the Supreme Court held the act ultra vires Article 14 83. In Ram
dial v. State of Punjab84 , P. Rajendram v. State of Madras85 and John Vallamattom v. Union of
India86 the court reiterated the same stance of intelligible differentia.
(¶ 59) In the instant case before the bench, the SPPLA, 202487 in its preamble provides for
adjudication of public procurement contracts involving PSUs and private or other entities
through the National courts of Suvarnadwipa is made compulsory, however it nowhere
mentions the basis upon which this distinction was drawn.88. Furthermore, PSU’s under JayP
government failed to defend themselves as were run by persons not competent and a number

79
Supra Note 18.
80
Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, 1955 AIR 191.
81
Ananya Bali, Doctrine of Reasonable Classification as an Exception to the Right to Equality: Critical Analysis
in Light of the Legal Provisions and Relevant Case-Laws, 4 ISSUE 1 INT'L JL MGMT. & HUMAN. 1414 (2021).
82
Karimbil Kunhikoman v. State of Kerala, AIR 1962 SC 723.
83
VN SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA 60 (13th ed. 2017).
84
Ram dial v. State of Punjab, AIR 1965 SC 1518.
85
P. Rajendram v. State of Madras, AIR 1968 SC 1012.
86
John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611.
87
Moot Proposition, Annexure IV.
88
Moot Proposition, ¶ 14.
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of arbitral awards were passed against them which exceeded 20 % of the total GDP of
Suvarnadwipa89.
(¶ 60) The maxim “Fiat Justitia Ruat Caelum” (Let justice be done though the heavens fall)
underscores that justice and accountability must prevail, irrespective of the consequences for
powerful state actors. The SPPLA, 2024 seeks to shift dispute resolution to national courts,
which are under the influence of the state, thereby shielding the government’s cronyism and
PSUs from fair and independent scrutiny. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh90, the Court held
that legislative power cannot be used as a tool for arbitrary or fraudulent purposes. The SPPLA,
2024 is an example of such legislative fraud, designed to shield the government’s inefficiency
and cronyism from the scrutiny of independent arbitration.
(¶ 61) This abuse of legislative power violates the principles laid down in Shreya Singhal v.
Union of India91 , where the Court struck down laws that indirectly suppressed scrutiny of
government actions.
[3.2] THERE IS NO RATIONAL NEXUS BETWEEN THE MEANS AND END.
(¶ 62) In order to pass the test for permissible classification, two conditions must be fulfilled.
Firstly, the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes
persons or things that are grouped together from others left out of the group and secondly, the
differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute in
question92. In the instant case both the conditions are not fulfilled.
(¶ 63) Mandating litigation, as opposed to arbitration, burdens the judiciary, leading to delays
and inefficiencies, which contradict the Act's stated goal of timely resolution. The Objectives
of SPPLA act states that it aims to Protect public resources, address inefficiencies in arbitration,
which the government claims led to an unsustainable burden on PSUs and ensure disputes
involving public entities are resolved through judicial scrutiny in national courts93.
(¶ 64) In Subramanian Swamy v. CBI94 a constitution bench of the court unanimously held that
“if the object itself is discriminatory, then explanation that classification is reasonable having
rational relation to the object sought to be achieved is immaterial”.

89
Moot Proposition, ¶ 20.
90
State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, AIR 1980 SC 319.
91
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, 2015 5 SCC 1.
92
Motor General Traders v. State of A.P., (1984) 1 SCC 222; Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P, (1984) 4 SCC 251;
Raj Pal Sharma v. State of Haryana, AIR 1985 SC 1263.
93
Moot Proposition, ¶ 23.
94
Subramanian Swamy v. CBI, (2014) 8 SCC 682.
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(¶ 65) The Act is justified on the premise that arbitration led to significant financial losses for
PSUs 95
. However, no evidence is provided to demonstrate that arbitration, rather than
mismanagement or poor decision-making, caused these losses. Arbitration provides a neutral
platform, particularly crucial in disputes involving state-owned entities and private investors.
MP’s concerns about potential bias in Suvarnadwipa's courts due to the influence of PSUs96.
[3.3] THE ACTION TAKEN IS ARBITRARY IN NATURE.
(¶ 66) The petitioner, contends that the SPPLA, 2024 is arbitrary in its enactment and
implementation, violating the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14 of the
Constitution. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India97, the Court expanded the scope of Article
14 to include non-arbitrariness in all state actions. The SPPLA’s provisions contradict this
principle. In E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu98 ,the Supreme Court held that arbitrariness
is the antithesis of equality and that Article 14 strikes at arbitrary state action.
(¶ 67) The SPPLA, 2024 arbitrarily targets disputes involving PSUs while allowing private
contracts to retain arbitration. This selective application is not supported by any objective
reasoning, violating the standard set in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar99 ,where the
Court invalidated legislation that lacked a rational basis.
(¶ 68) Retrospectively nullifying arbitration clauses100 disrupts existing legal agreements,
undermining the principle of certainty in law. This retroactive application imposes undue
hardships on private entities, violating the principles set in K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of
Karnataka101 . Retrospective legislation is permissible only when it serves a compelling public
purpose.102
(¶ 69) Foreign investors like MP entered agreements expecting disputes to be resolved through
arbitration. The SPPLA’s arbitrary nullification of these agreements undermines their
legitimate expectations103. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress104 , the
Court held that fairness is a core aspect of Article 14, and actions that disrupt legitimate
expectations are arbitrary and unconstitutional. Furthermore, Arbitrary legislation that

95
Moot Proposition, ¶ 20.
96
Moot Proposition, ¶ 25.
97
Supra note 25.
98
Supra note 21.
99
Supra note 18.
100
Moot Proposition, ¶ 21.
101
K.T. Plantation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2011 SC 3430.
102
Moot Proposition, ¶ 20.
103
Moot Proposition, ¶ 26.
104
Delhi Transport Corporation v. DTC Mazdoor Congress, 1991 AIR 101.
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undermines investor confidence damages the national economy. In Vodafone International

Holdings BV v. Union of India105, the Court emphasized the need for a stable and predictable
legal framework to attract foreign investment.
(¶ 70) Moreover, manifest arbitrariness arises when a law is so unreasonable that it is
disproportionately harsh, lacks a rational foundation, or is enacted without any logical
justification106. The Supreme Court struck down the practice of Triple Talaq (instant divorce)
in Shayara Bano v. Union of India107 as manifestly arbitrary. The Court held that laws or
practices are manifestly arbitrary when they Exhibit capriciousness or irrationality and are
enacted without adequate justification or proportionality to the objectives sought to be
achieved. Justice Nariman, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that such laws violate the
fundamental right to equality under Article 14.
(¶ 71) The SPPLA, 2024 mandates litigation for disputes involving public sector undertakings
(PSUs) and retrospectively nullifies arbitration clauses. This disrupts ongoing arbitration
proceedings and imposes significant hardships on parties like MP, who relied on the legitimacy
of pre-existing agreements. Hence the state action in the instant case violates the principle of
non-arbitrariness.

[3.4] THE ACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 21 OF

THE CONSTITUTION.
(¶ 72) The petitioner, argues that the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and
Adjudication Act, 2024 (SPPLA) violates Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the
right to life and personal liberty. The retrospective and mandatory provisions of the Act infringe
upon the principles of procedural fairness, access to justice, and the right to a fair trial, which
are essential components of Article 21.
(¶ 73) The Indian Constitution enshrines the fundamental rights to equality, freedom, and life
under Articles 14, 19, and 21, respectively. These provisions form an inseparable trinity that
collectively safeguard individual liberty, prevent arbitrary state actions, and uphold the rule of
law. In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India108 , the Supreme Court held that these Articles must
be read together to ensure that any law affecting life or liberty is fair, just, and reasonable.

105
Vodafone International Holdings BV v. Union of India, 2012 6 SCC 613.
106
Yash Sharan, The Doctrine of ‘Manifest Arbitrariness’: Forestalling Its Arbitrary Use in the Indian Judicial
Landscape, 13 NIRMA ULJ 121 (2023).
107
Shayara Bano v. Union of India, AIR 2017 SC 4609.
108
Supra note 25.
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(¶ 74) Article 21, as expansively interpreted in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, mandates
that all procedures affecting life and liberty must be fair, just, and reasonable. The SPPLA Act’s
provisions fail this standard by eliminating arbitration, a globally recognized mechanism for
resolving disputes efficiently, and replacing it with litigation, which is inherently slower and
prone to delays. This imposition is especially detrimental to private parties like MP109, where
concerns about bias in domestic courts are raised. Litigation, burdened by state influence,
deprives parties of the impartiality offered by arbitration, undermining the right to a fair trial.
(¶ 75) The Act also violates the principle of access to justice, a core aspect of Article 21
recognized in Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India110 . By nullifying existing
arbitration clauses, the Act disrupts ongoing proceedings, forcing parties to restart disputes in
biased courts. This creates unreasonable delays and imposes financial and procedural burdens
on private entities, depriving them of effective remedies. The Supreme Court in A.R. Antulay
v. R.S. Nayak111 held that such delays and procedural disadvantages violate the fundamental
right to justice under Article 21.
(¶ 76) Furthermore, the retrospective application of the SPPLA Act breaches the principle of
legal certainty, a vital component of the rule of law112. Parties like MP, who entered contracts
under Suvarnadwipa’s arbitration-friendly framework, had legitimate expectations of a stable
legal regime. The SPPLA’s provisions fail this test, appearing to shield PSUs from liabilities
rather than promoting public welfare.
(¶ 77) The Act’s imposition of litigation also compromises the neutrality and fairness of dispute
resolution processes. National courts, perceived to favour PSUs, do not provide the impartiality
necessary for a fair trial. In Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat113 , the Court
underscored the importance of impartiality in ensuring a fair trial114. This bias undermines the
procedural fairness required for resolving disputes, further disadvantaging private entities and
foreign investors.
(¶ 78) Hence, the SPPLA Act violates Article 21 and procedure established by law by denying
procedural fairness, access to justice, and the right to a fair trial. Its retrospective provisions

109
Moot Proposition, ¶ 25.
110
Bihar Legal Support Society v. Chief Justice of India, 1986 AIR 380.
111
Supra note 27.
112
R. K. Sabarwal v. Union of India, (1979) 3 SCC 779; D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416;
Kehar Singh v. Union of India, (1989) 1 SCC 404; P. N. Dass v. State of Bihar, (1996) 8 SCC 535.
113
Supra note 26.
114
Shiv Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2016) 2 SCC 402; Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of
India, (1998) 4 SCC 409; Ramesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 13 SCC 564.
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disrupt legal certainty and impose undue hardships on private parties, prioritizing state interests
over constitutional principles. The petitioner urges the Court to strike down the SPPLA Act as
unconstitutional.

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PRAYER

Wherefore, in light of the Issues raised, Authorities cited and Arguments advanced, it is
most humbly and respectfully requested that the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Suvarnadwipa be
pleased to:

1. DECLARE, that the petition challenging the Suvarnadwipa Public Sector Dispute
Resolution Act, 2024 is maintainable before the Supreme Court of Suvarnadwipa;
&

2. HOLD, that the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication Act, 2024
(SPPLA) is violative of Article 19 of the Constitution of Suvarnadwipa;
&
3. HOLD, that the Suvarnadwipa Public Procurement Litigation and Adjudication Act, 2024
(SPPLA) is violative of Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of Suvarnadwipa;
&
4. ISSUE, a Writ of Mandamus to Suvarnadwipa Ports Trust (SPT) directing it to include an
arbitration clause in the Joint Venture Agreement between MantraTech Ports (MP) and SPT.

AND/OR

PASS ANY OTHER ORDER, DIRECTION, OR RELIEF THAT IT MAY DEEM FIT IN THE
BEST INTERESTS OF JUSTICE, FAIRNESS, EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE. FOR
THIS ACT OF KINDNESS, THE PETITIONERS SHALL BE DUTY BOUND FOREVER
PRAY.

Sd/-

(Counsels for the Petitioners)

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