The

 Ontology  of  Self  in  Three  Systems  of  Indian  Philosophy:  

A  Comparative  and  Veridical  Analysis  
 
Frank  Morales  -­‐  University  of  Wisconsin-­‐Madison  
 
The   over   three-­‐thousand   year   old   realm   of   traditional   Indian   philosophy   has,   historically,  
included   a   very   wide   array   of   schools,   concerns   and   philosophical   positions.   Many   of   the   very  
same  concerns  that  were  to  be  discussed  much  later  in  the  Western  philosophical  tradition  found  
their   first   systematic   expressions   in   India   centuries,   and   in   some   cases   millennia,   before   their  
Western  articulation.  These  include  many  of  the  issues  to  be  found  in  the  fields  of  epistemology,  
ethics,   aesthetics,   phenomenology,   politics,   ontology   and   psychology.   Of   the   many   topics  
discussed   in   Indian   philosophy   has   been   the   debate   over   the   exact   nature   of   the   human   self.  
Different  schools  have  held  very  dissimilar  views  on  this  question,  ranging  from  the  notion  that  
there   is   no   real   self   (Buddhism   and   Charvaka),   to   the   idea   that   the   self   is   nothing   less   than   the  
omnipotent,   unlimited   Absolute   (Advaita),   with   many   other   positions   lying   in   between   these   two  
extremes.    
 
While   there   have   been   a   wide   variety   of   opinions   about   the   nature   of   the   self,   however,   there  
have  historically  been  three  dominant  views  on  this  topic  in  India.  These  three  are:    
1)  the  anatta,  or  “no-­‐self”,  view  of  Buddhism,    
2)   the   non-­‐dualist   view   of   Advaita,   which   I   will   characterize   as   the   Tat   tvam   asi,   or   “you   are  
that  (Absolute)”,  view;    
3)  and  the  Vishishta-­‐advaita    (Qualified  non-­‐dualism)  view  of  Ramanuja.    
 
In  the  following  work,  I  will  accomplish  several  tasks.  These  include  a  brief  description  of  each  of  
the   Buddhist,   Advaitin   and   Vishishta-­‐advaitin   perspectives   on   the   true   nature   of   the   self,   a  
comparative  analysis  of  these  three  different  views,  and  finally  a  veridical  analysis  to  determine  
which  of  these  theories  holds  the  most  validity  and  truth  from  a  philosophical  perspective.    
 
Previous  to  the  arising  of  Buddhist  thought  in  the  sixth  century  B.C.E.,  the  prevalent  view  in  India  
on  the  nature  of  the  self  was  that  found  in  the  philosophical  treatises  known  as  the  Upanishads  
(2510-­‐600   B.C.E.).   The   portrait   of   the   self   presented   by   these   many   texts,   however,   seem   upon  
first  inspection  to  reveal  apparently  contradictory  accounts  of  the  nature  of  the  self.  On  the  one  
hand,  we  find  passages  that  seem  to  state  that  the  self  is  non-­‐different  from  the  Absolute.  Several  
such   verses   include   the   maha-­vakyas,   or   great   sayings,   such   as,   “tat   tvam   asi”   (“you   are   that”),  
“aham  brahmasmi”  (“I  am  Brahman”),  etc.  On  the  other  hand,  we  find  verses  in  these  works  that  
clearly  make  a  quantitative  distinction  between  God  and  the  individual  self.  One  such  passage  is  
found  in  the  Shvetashvatara  Upanishad  (6:  16):    
 
"The  all-­‐powerful  one,  the  omniscient  one,  the  selfborn,  as  the  (supreme)  spirit,  the  creator  
of  time,  possessing  gunas  [qualities],  the  all-­‐knowing  one,  the  Lord  of  the  primaeval  matter  
(pradhanam),   of   the   individual   selfs   and   of   gunas,   He   brings   about   a   standstill   condition  
(sthiti),  a  transmigration  (of  the  self),  deliverance  and  bondage."  
 
Such  seemingly  opposing  verses  have  led  to  a  great  deal  of  disagreement  as  to  the  actual  position  
of  the  Upanishads  on  the  question  of  whether  the  self  is  identical  with  the  Absolute  or  distinct.  
Despite   these   differences,   however,   many   traditional   Indian   philosophers,   as   well   as   a   number   of  
contemporary   scholars,   conclude   that   the   Upanishads   most   likely   taught   a   variant   of   Bheda-­‐
abheda,  or  simultaneous  difference  and  non-­‐difference,  philosophy.1  In  any  case,  all  philosophers  
and   scholars   have   agreed   that   at   a   bare   minimum,   the   Upanishads   certainly   uphold   the   eternal  
continuity,  imperishabilty  and  coherent  nature  of  the  self.    
 
This  was  not  to  be  the  case  with  the  later  school  of  Buddhism.  Gautama  Buddha  (ca.563  B.C.E.  -­‐  
ca.  483  B.C.E.),  in  an  attempt  to  construct  a  metaphysics  that  would  side-­‐step  the  Vedic  revelation  
altogether,   had   taught   a   doctrine   known   as   anatta,   or   no-­‐self.   According   to   Buddhism,   the  
empirical  reality  which  we  experience  about  us  consists  of  a  never-­‐ending,  ever-­‐fluctuating  field  
of  activity.  Everything  that  exists  is  in  perpetual  motion  and  is  constantly  changing.  Whether  we  
are   speaking   of   everyday   material   objects,   thoughts,   concepts,   or   even   our   own   bodies,  
everything   around   us   exists   in   a   perpetual   cycle   of   motion   which   involves   coming   into   being,  
persisting   momentarily   and   finally   disintegrating   into   non-­‐being.   This   world-­‐view   can   be  
summed   up   by   the   dual   Buddhist   doctrines   of   anityata,   or   the   universal   impermanence   of   all  
things,   and   kshanikavada,   or   the   momentariness   of   all   reality.   There   is,   according   to   Buddhism,  
no  continuity  or  permanence  in  anything  that  we  experience,  think  or  are.  Therefore,  neither  is  
there  any  continuity  of  the  self.    
 
The   human   person   consists   of   nothing   more   than   the   continuity   of   an   entity   which   is   in   itself  
ever-­‐changing.   The   so-­‐called   jiva,   according   to   the   Buddhist   account,   is   no   more   than   a  
conglomeration  of  five  separate  elements,  skandhas,  brought  together  in  the  human  person  as  a  
result  of  the  individual’s  own  karma,  and  giving  the  appearance,  at  least,  of  a  singular  continuous  
living  entity.  The  five  elements  of  which  every  human  being  is  constituted  are:    
1) body,    
2) feelings,    
3) perception,    
4) predispositions,    
5) consciousness.    
 
When  these  five  otherwise  disparate  elements  come  together,  we  then  have  the  illusion  of  there  
being  a  permanent  self,  an  “I”.  Beyond  these,  however,  there  is  no  self,  no  continuously  existing  
individual   living   being,   no   self.   Kenneth   Ch’en   summarizes   the   Buddhist   position   in   the   following  
manner.    
 
"At  any  moment,  according  to  him  [Gautama  Buddha],  we  are  but  a  temporary  composition  of  
the  five  aggregates,  and  as  these  change  every  moment,  so  does  the  composition.  Therefore,  
all  that  we  are  is  but  a  continuous  living  entity  which  does  not  remain  the  same  for  any  two  
consecutive  moments,  but  which  come  into  being  and  disappears  as  soon  as  it  arises."  (Ch’en,  
44)  
 
Thus,   there   is   no   self,   according   to   Buddhism.   Rather,   our   experience   of   selfhood   is   no   more   than  
a   series   of   momentary   semi-­‐organic   complexes   of   psycho-­‐physical   elements   continuously  
succeeding  one  another.  This  continuous,  ever-­‐born,  ever-­‐changing,  ever-­‐ceasing  entity  is  kept  in  
intact  motion  by  the  karma  that  it  accumulated  in  previous  momentary  existences,  with  the  hope  
of   someday   bringing   about   the   cessation   of   continuous   rounds   of   birth   and   death   by   achieving  
nirvana,   or   the   final   dissolution   of   its   ever-­‐continuous   ever-­‐momentary   existence.   Liberation  
consists  of  the  realization  that  there  is  no  one  in  need  of  liberation.    
  
Among   the   first   of   many   Indian   philosophers   to   point   out   the   inconsistencies   of   the   Buddhist  
position   on   the   nature   of   self   was   Shankara   (ca.200-­‐168   B.C.E.   or   800-­‐832   C.E.),   of   the   Advaita  
school.   One   flaw   in   the   Buddhist   scheme   which   Shankara   points   out   revolves   around   the   concept  
of   karma.   According   to   the   law   of   karma,   for   every   action   which   a   free-­‐volitional,   rational   human  
being   performs,   there   is   necessarily   an   equal   reaction.   For   each   morally   good   act   that   we  
perform,   we   will   eventually   have   to   experience   a   good   reaction;   and   similarly   for   morally   bad  
actions.   It   is   the   inescapable   need   to   experience   our   future   karma   which   necessitates   our  
continuous  presence  in  material  bodies.  This  is  a  doctrine  which  is  accepted  and  upheld  by  both  
Hindu  and  Buddhist  thinkers.    
 
The   problem   that   Shankara   points   out   with   the   Buddhist   position   is   that,   if   there   is   indeed   no  
enduring   being   -­‐   if   the   being   who   experiences   the   reaction   of   karma   is,   in   principle,   a   different  
being   from   the   one   who   caused   the   initial   action,   thus   creating   the   karma   -­‐   then   is   it   not   the   case  
that   an   innocent   being   is   suffering   for   the   crimes   of   another?   To   hold   that   a   person   is   nothing  
more   than   a   successive   chain   of   disparate   and   temporary   entities,   randomly   brought   together  
and  then  rent  asunder,  only  to  be  replaced  by  a  new  complex  set  of  elements,  all  in  the  blink  of  
any  eye,  means  that  a  being  is  not  the  same  volitional  entity  it  was  at  point  b  now  that  it  finds  
itself   in   point   c.   Consequently,   to   state   that   being   c   should   have   to   suffer   the   punishment   for  
crimes   performed   by   being   b,   even   though   they   are   in   actuality   two   separate   beings,   is   the  
equivalent   of   saying   that   I   should   suffer   a   punishment   for   a   crime   performed   by   my   ancestor.  
While   such   a   notion   of   inter-­‐generational   punishment   might   be   prevalent   in   religious   cultures  
which   teach   the   doctrine   of   original   sin   (Christianity,   Judaism   and   Islam),   such   a   view   is   not   in  
concert  with  the  Indian  view  of  ethics.  If  there  is  no  being  who  is  performing  an  action,  there  can  
certainly  be  no  being  to  experience  the  results  of  that  action.  Anything  short  of  such  a  rigid  causal  
requirement  would  be  unjust.    
 
A   similar   argument   is   made   by   Shankara   against   the   Buddhist   interpretation   of   liberation,   or  
nirvana.  Again,  according  to  the  Buddhist  account,  the  living  entity  is  experiencing  a  continuous  
cycle   of   pain   and   suffering.   In   order   to   attain   relief   from   the   perpetual   misery   of   samsara,   a  
human   being   must   cease   all   craving   and   desire,   realize   the   transitory   and   interdependent   nature  
of   all   reality   and   achieve   final   liberation   from   suffering   by   attaining   nirvana.   As   Shankara   and  
other   thinkers   have   pointed   out,   however,   if   there   is   no   one,   continuous,   unitary   entity   who   is  
craving,   performing   actions,   and   then   experiencing   the   resultant   suffering,   then   what   is   the  
meaning   and   purpose   of   the   liberation   of   such   a   non-­‐existent   entity?   To   state   that   a   non-­‐existent  
being   is   in   need   of   liberation   is   equivalent   to   saying   that   a   fictional   character   in   a   novel   or   the  
image  of  a  person  in  a  painting  needs  to  be  liberated  from  their  respective  aesthetic  confines.  If  
there  is  no  being  who  is  there  to  experience  the  final  bliss  of  nirvana,  then  what  is  the  ultimate  
value  of  nirvana?  Who  is  being  liberated?    
 
In  addition  to  these  critical  observations  about  the  Buddhist  no-­‐self  theory,  Shankara  offers  two  
positive   arguments   against   this   doctrine,   one   positing   the   existence   of   the   self,   the   other  
demonstrating  the  continuity  of  the  self.  In  the  first  argument,  Shankara  gives  an  argument  that  is  
very   reminiscent   of   DesCartes’   cogito   ergo   sum   (I   think,   therefore   I   am)   realization.   The   self   is   an  
experientially   and   logically   undeniable   fact,   states   Shankara.   And   if   one   attempts   to   deny   the  
existence  of  the  self,  then  in  that  very  denial,  he  is  asserting  the  existence  of  a  self  who  is  doing  
the  denying.  For  only  a  conscious,  thinking  being  can  make  such  a  self-­‐referential  statement.  In  
his   second   argument,   Shankara   denies   the   momentariness   and   non-­‐continuity   of   the   self   by   an  
appeal   to   the   faculty   of   memory.   In   memory,   there   is   the   presupposition   of   the   continual   identity  
and   persistence   of   the   individual   doing   the   remembering.   There   is   only   one   individual   who  
experiences  the  events,  persons,  objects  and  thoughts  of  a  particular  life.  We  do  not  remember  
the  memories  of  some  other  living  being,  but  our  own  experiences.  Thus  there  is  a  continuity  of  
the   experiencer.   There   is   only   one   continuous   experiencer,   not   many   extending   back   in   a  
randomly   assembled   causal   chain.   Through   these   and   similar   arguments,   Shankara   and   other  
Hindu  philosophers  succeeded  in  weakening  the  Buddhist  theory  of  there  being  no  continuity  of  
being,  and  reestablishing  the  ontological  integrity  of  the  self.    
 
Having   examined   his   reactions   towards   the   Buddhist   anatta   theory,   we   will   now   look   at  
Shankara’s  own  philosophical  views  on  the  nature  of  the  self.  Shankara  held  that  the  very  essence  
of   the   self   is   chaitanya,   or   pure   and   unadulterated   consciousness.   Additionally,   the   self   is  
unconditioned   by   such   factors   as   space   and   time,   being   itself   vibhu,   or   all-­‐pervasive.   “It   is   neither  
atomic  nor  intermediary  in  size.”,  according  to  Sinha,    
 
“If   the   self   were   atomic,   it   could   not   pervade   all   the   parts   of   the   body,   and   the   quality   of  
consciousness  could  not  be  perceived  in  the  whole  body”  (Sinha,  70).    
 
The  self,  for  Shankara,  is  one  unitary  entity.  There  is  not  a  plurality  of  selves,  but  only  one  eternal,  
omniscient   Self,   which   simultaneously   exists   in   all   beings.   Being   undivided,   and   thus   unchanging,  
it   is   devoid   of   qualities,   agency   and   the   ability   to   enjoy   or   suffer,   all   of   which   would   entail   a  
multiplicitous  being.    
 
For   Shankara,   the   self   (atman)   and   the   Absolute   (Brahman)   are   one   unitary   entity.   The  
temporary  instance  of  an  individual  self  viewed  as  being  separate  from  Brahman  is  no  more  than  
a   mistaken   perception   on   the   part   of   the   human   being   born   from   the   power   of   avidya,   or  
ignorance.   The   individual   self   is   in   actuality   no   more   than   an   illusory   limitation   imposed   upon  
Brahman   by   the   internal   organ   of   manas,   or   mind.   This   process   of   the   mistaken   limitation   of  
Brahman  has  been  compared  by  Shankara  to  the  illusion  of  the  limiting  of  space  in  a  jar  or  in  a  
house.   He   has   also   described   this   limitation   as   being   no   more   than   a   perverted   reflection   of  
Brahman   in   avidya,   somewhat   akin   to   the   reflecting   of   the   Sun   or   the   moon   in   the   water   of   a  
pond.   Thus,   Shankara’s   ultimate   conclusion   regarding   the   nature   of   the   individual   self   is   that  
there  is  no  such  entity  in  reality.  When  illusion  is  stripped  away,  all  that  is  left  is  Brahman.  We  are  
that  Brahman.  We  are  God.    
 
Shankara’s  attempt  to  equate  the  finite  atman,  or  individual  self,  with  the  infinite  Absolute  was  
not  an  original  project  on  his  part.  Indeed,  Gaudapada  and  several  others  formulated  similar  non-­‐
dual  theories  before  him.  Similarly,  throughout  the  history  of  Indian  philosophy,  we  have  found  
many   defenders   of   the   teaching   that   upheld   the   qualitative   dependence   and   quantitative  
distinction   of   the   atman   vis   a   vis   God.   Known   very   generally   as   the   Vaishnava,   or   Bhagavata,  
school  of  Vedanta,  these  theocentric  philosophers  have  included  such  individuals  as  Bodhayana,  
Tanka,  Dramida,  Nimbarka,  Madhva  and  Vallabha.  By  far,  however,  the  most  significant  of  these  
theistic  thinkers  was  Sri  Ramanuja  Acharya  (1017  C.E.-­‐1137  C.E.).  It  was  Ramanuja  who  was  the  
first   Vaishnava   Vedantist   to   respond   directly   and   forcefully   to   Shankara’s   notions   about   the  
nature  of  the  self.    
 
The   pronounced   differences   between   the   Advaitic   ideas   of   Shankara   and   the   Vishishta-­‐advaita  
position  of  Ramanuja  begin  at  the  very  question  of  what  is  the  essence  of  the  self.  Whereas  for  
Shankara,  the  self  is  of  the  nature  of  pure  consciousness,  Ramanuja  posits  consciousness  as  both  
the  inherent  nature,  as  well  as  one  of  the  distinguishing  attributes,  of  the  self.  The  example  that  
Ramanuja  gives  to  explain  the  distinction  between  consciousness  as  substance  and  consciousness  
as  attribute  is  that  of  the  flame  of  a  lamp.  The  flame  is  the  substantial  entity.  It  is  light  in  and  of  
itself.   In   addition   to   being   light,   however,   the   flame   has   a   distinct   property   and   attribute,   also  
known  as  light,  which  emanates  from  the  center  of  the  flame  to  then  influence  things  external  to  
the   flame   itself.   In   the   same   manner   in   which   we   view   the   relationship   between   light   and   its  
luminosity,   or   the   relationship   between   the   center   of   a   circle   and   its   circumference,   similarly   the  
self  and  consciousness,  while  being  logically  distinguishable  to  the  mind,  are  not  separable  in  any  
essential   sense.   The   atman   is   a   self-­‐illuminated   entity.   It   reveals   its   own   nature   without   the  
assistance   of   any   principle   external   to   itself.   It   is   consciousness   itself.   But   its   consciousness   is  
both   substantive,   as   well   as   adjectival,   or   attributive,   and   not   merely   substantive,   as   Shankara  
asserts.   Like   Shankara,   Ramanuja   holds   that   consciousness   is   definitive   of   the   self.   But   more,   it   is  
also  an  attribute  that  reveals  things  external  to  the  self.    
 
For  Ramanuja,  the  self  is  ultimately  the  ‘I’,  the  experiencer,  who  persists  even  after  all  attempts  at  
sublating  illusion  from  the  true  self  has  ceased  to  produce  results.  “Such  consciousness  of  the  ‘I’  
as   is   not   sublated   by   anything   else   has   the   self   for   its   object”,   says   Ramanuja   in   his   Shri-­‐bhashya,  
“while,   on   the   other   hand,   such   consciousness   of   the   ‘I’   as   has   the   body   for   its   object   is   mere  
Nescience”  (72).  The  true  self  cannot  be  the  body  composed  of  matter.  If  it  were,  then  how  do  we  
explain   the   fact   that   even   though   the   body   is   constantly   undergoing   irreversible   changes   on   both  
a   visual   and   molecular   level,   the   person   identifying   with   the   body   does   not   change?   The   self  
cannot   be   the   mind.   For   we   are   constantly   changing   our   minds,   sometimes   expanding   them,  
sometimes   even   losing   them.   The   self   is   not   the   intellect,   since   our   sense   of   selfhood   is   not  
dependent  upon  our  intellectual  capabilities.  An  uneducated  person  has  just  as  robust  a  sense  of  
self-­‐hood   as   does   the   most   well-­‐read   academician.   According   to   Ramanuja,   we   are   ultimately   the  
experiencer,  the  person  who  is  consistently  aware  of  all  these  external  changes  as  they  are  taking  
place.  This  sense  of  ‘I’  is  not  merely  attributive  of  the  self,  but  is  the  very  essence  of  the  self.  It  is  
the  self.  It  is  what  persists  during  the  infinite  number  of  transformations  that  take  place  in  the  
material   body   of   the   self,   after   the   death   of   the   body,   and   upon   the   cessation   of   avidya   and   the  
subsequent  attaining  of  liberation.2    
 
Moreover,   this   ‘I’   that   is   the   true   self   is   a   knowing   being.   Ramanuja   holds   that   there   are   two  
distinct   objects   of   knowledge   for   the   self.   One   is   substantive   knowledge,   svarupa-­bhuta-­jnana.  
The  other  is  attributive  knowledge,  or  dharma-­bhuta-­jnana.  It  is  through  the  former  that  the  self  
apprehends   itself.   Svarupa-­bhuta-­jnana   is   self-­‐knowledge.   Self-­‐consciousness   is   the   necessary  
foundation   and   the   substratum   of   whatever   knowledge   the   self   has   of   any   and   all   things   external  
to   itself.   Attributive   knowledge   (dharma-­bhuta-­jnana),   on   the   other   hand,   is   precisely   this  
apprehending  ability  on  the  part  of  the  self  of  all  things  that  are  non-­‐self,  whether  a)  matter,  b)  
other  finite  selves  or  c)  the  supreme  Self  (Param-­atman)  of  reality,  known  as  Brahman,  or  God3.  
Neither   of   these   two   forms   of   knowledge,   however,   are   ever   equated   by   Ramanuja   with   the  
essence   of   the   self,   unlike   the   case   with   Shankara.   Rather,   Ramanuja   holds   that   the   self   is   the  
knowing   subject   (gunin);   while   knowledge   itself   is   always   a   guna,   or   a   qualitative   function   of   the  
self.4    
 
Another   point   of   departure   for   these   two   great   Vedantins   is   on   the   question   of   the   finitude   of   the  
self.   According   to   Shankara,   the   self   is   all-­‐pervasive   and   omnipresent,   being   non-­‐distinct   from  
Brahman.   The   self   is   infinite   in   the   scope   of   its   knowledge,   presence   and   power.   Ramanuja,  
holding  the  position  that  the  self  is  monadic  in  nature,  and  therefore  finite  and  limited,  strongly  
disagrees  with  this  notion,  and  offers  the  following  arguments  to  support  his  position.    
 
If   it   were,   indeed,   the   case   that   the   self   were   all-­‐pervasive,   then   the   self   would   be   aware   of   all  
experiences,  all  the  pains  and  pleasures,  of  all  beings  at  all  times.  If  the  self  were  not  limited  in  
nature,   then   how   is   it   that   the   individual   self   is   only   aware   of   its   own   individual   experiences,   and  
not  that  of  all  beings?  I  am  not  even  aware  of  the  experiences  of  my  own  friends  unless  they  share  
those  experiences  with  me;  and  even  then,  I  would  know  of  these  experiences  only  by  my  friends’  
verbal   testimonies,   not   because   these   experiences   are   my   own.   What,   then,   to   speak   of   my  
inability   to   know   the   experiences   of   all   beings,   known   and   unknown   to   me?   This   ability   being  
absent   from   individual   selves,   Ramanuja   consequently   that   the   self   is   atomic   and   monadic   in  
nature.    
 
Shankara   would   counter   this   claim   by   asking   how   it   is   possible   for   a   minute   atomic   being   to  
control  an  instrument  as  large  as  the  human  body?  In  answer  to  this  query,  Ramanuja  says  that,  
though  the  self  is  atomic  in  nature,  consciousness,  as  an  attribute  of  the  self,  pervades  the  totality  
of  the  body  irregardless  of  how  large  or  small  the  body  might  be.  Ramanuja  offers  the  following  
example  in  support  of  his  contention:  
 
"As   a   drop   of   sandal-­‐ointment,   although   applied   to   one   spot   of   the   body   only,   produces   a  
refreshing   sensation   extending   over   the   whole   body,   thus,   the   self   also,   although   dwelling   in   one  
part  of  the  body  only,  is  conscious  of  sensation  taking  place  in  any  part  of  the  body."  
(Shri-­‐bhashya  2.3.24)  
 
The  self,  then,  though  finite  and  limited  in  its  inherent  nature,  does  have  the  ability  to  extend  its  
influence   beyond   the   confines   of   its   own   intrinsic   nature   by   means   of   its   chaitanya,   or  
consciousness  attribute.    
 
The  question  of  attributes  and  qualities  within  the  realm  of  spirit  itself  brings  up  another  point  of  
contention  between  Shankara  and  Ramanuja.  For  the  former  holds  that  consciousness,  whether  
we  are  speaking  of  either  atman  or  Brahman,  is  necessarily  devoid  of  attributes  (nirguna),  being  
in   a   position   of   ontological   transcendence   in   relation   to   matter.   There   also   seem   to   be   several  
passages  in  the  Upanishads  that  support  the  idea  that  spirit  does  not  have  attributes.  Ramanuja,  
however,   points   out   that   when   the   scriptures   declare   that   consciousness   is   without   qualities,   the  
qualities  that  these  passages  are  referring  to  are  the  temporal  qualities  that  arise  as  a  result  of  
prakriti,  or  matter.  The  existence  of  qualities  in  and  of  themselves  are  not  what  is  being  denied.    
 
As  is  becoming  apparent,  the  ultimate  truth  that  Ramanuja  wishes  to  establish  is  two-­‐fold:  1)  that  
there   is   a   clear   distinction   between   the   limited,   finite   self   on   the   one   hand,   and   the   unlimited,  
infinite  Absolute  on  the  other.  2)  The  relationship  between  these  two  is  one  of  dependence  and  
lordship,  respectively.  In  Ramanuja’s  account  of  reality,  there  are  three  distinct  Reals:  Brahman  
(the  Absolute),  atman  (the  plurality  of  living  beings)  and  jagat  (the  world  we  experience  around  
us).   Of   these,   jagat   is   insentient,   and   Brahman   and   atman   are   sentient.   Of   the   sentient   beings,  
atman   has   an   attributive   relationship   with   Brahman.   Both   atman   and   jagat   are   considered   by  
Ramanuja   to   be   parts   of   Brahman   in   the   limited   sense   that   they   are   qualities,   or   modes,   of   the  
latter.  He  describes  the  relationship  between  these  three  Reals  in  the  following  way  in  his  Shri-­‐
bhashya:  
 
 "The  individual  self  is  a  part  of  the  highest  Self;  as  the  light  issuing  from  a  luminous  thing  such  as  
fire  or  the  sun  is  a  part  of  that  body;  or  as  the  generic  characteristics  of  a  cow  or  horse,  and  the  
white  or  black  colour  of  things  so  coloured,  are  attributes  and  hence  parts  of  the  things  in  which  
those  attributes  inhere;  or  as  the  body  is  a  part  of  an  embodied  being."  (563)  
 
Both  jagat  and  atman  form  the  metaphorical  “body”  of  Brahman.  In  the  same  manner  in  which  
the  self  has  a  body,  which  it  is  superior  to,  and  controls  and  uses  for  its  own  higher  purposes,  God  
too  has  a  “body”  which  exists  for  the  sake  of  the  possessor  of  the  body,  the  Self,  or  God,  Whom  
Ramanuja   considers   to   be   the   Overself,   or   Self,   of   all   existence.   All   that   is   not   God   exists   in   a  
relationship  of  utter  dependence  on  God.    
 
One   analogy   that   can   be   given   in   order   to   further   understand   the   relationship   of   these   three  
ontological  Reals  in  Ramanuja’s  scheme  is  the  example  of  the  tree  and  its  roots.  Brahman  can  be  
compared   to   the   roots   of   a   mighty,   blooming   tree.   Jagat   and   atman   can   be   seen   as   being  
comparable   to   the   leaves   of   the   tree.   The   leaves   exist   as   fully   dependent   attributes   of   the   tree  
itself.  If  the  leaves  attempt  to  have  an  independent  existence  separate  from  the  tree,  let  us  say  by  
attempting  to  gain  nourishment  by  somehow  by-­‐passing  the  roots  of  the  tree,  the  fate  in  store  for  
the  leaves  is  certain  diminishment  of  their  own  sustenance  and  survival.  But  if  the  leaves,  instead,  
acknowledge  their  intrinsic  dependence  upon  the  root  of  the  tree  for  their  own  survival,  then  the  
leaves   will   flourish.   In   a   similar   manner,   not   only   is   the   self,   according   to   Ramanuja,   an   entity  
distinct  from  Brahman  due  to  its  inherently  finite  nature,  but  the  self  is  thoroughly  controlled  and  
supported   by   Brahman   for   its   existence.   This   is   in   marked   contrast   to   the   view   of   Shankara,  
which  states  that  the  individual  self  is  non-­‐distinct  from  Brahman  in  every  way.    
 
It   might   be   argued   by   some   that   at   the   very   least,   Shankara’s   views   on   the   nature   of   the   self  
served   as   a   bridge   between   the   Buddhistic   account   of   there   not   being   a   self   on   the   one   hand,   and  
the   actual   Vedic   account   of   the   self’s   ontological   dependence   upon   God,   on   the   other.   Such   an  
argument  is  negated,  however,  by  the  fact  that,  on  closer  inspection,  there  is  actually  very  little  
distinction   between   the   anatta   and   Advaita   perspectives.   For   the   former   says   that   we   have   no  
self,   and   consequently   no   surviving   individual   existence   after   we   achieve   nirvana.   Whereas  
Advaita   claims   that   we   have   no   individual   existence   or   personality   at   all,   are   merely   mayic  
instances   of   an   amorphous   Brahman,   and   loose   any   sense   of   self   upon   achieving   liberation.   In  
either   account,   the   underlying   assumption   is   that   there   is   no   actual   self.   Thus,   rather   than  
providing  us  with  an  account  of  the  self  that  preserves  the  eternality  of  the  self,  Shankara  gives  us  
the   prospect   of   realizing   that   we   are   in   actuality   eternally   a   non-­‐self.   It   is   only   in   the   pre-­‐
Shankara  Vedantic  teachings  of  Bodhayana,  as  well  as  in  the  post-­‐Shankara  works  of  Ramanuja,  
that  we  have  the  full  retrieval  of  the  self’s  ontological  integrity.    
 
As   we   have   seen,   there   have   been   several   diverse   theories   pertaining   to   the   nature   of   the   self  
posited   by   the   philosophers   of   India.   These   have   included   Gautama   Buddha’s   anatta   theory,  
Shankara’s  advaita  doctrine  and  the  vishishta-­advaita  teachings  of  the  Vaishnava  school.  Though  
seeming   on   face   value   to   be   an   improvement   over   the   self-­‐negating   doctrine   of   anatta,   advaita  
presents  us  with  no  more  than  a  crypto-­‐Buddhistic  outcome  when  compared  to  the  formulation  
presented  by  Ramanuja.  
 
Notes  
 
1.   Some   of   the   traditional   Indian   philosophers   to   have   held   this   view   include   Yadava   Prakasha   and   Jiva   Gosvamin.  
The  most  authoritative  twentieth  century  scholar  on  this  topic  is  P.N.  Srinivasachari.  See  the  latter’s  “The  Philosophy  
of  Bhedabheda”  for  further  details.  
2.   While   it   is   true   that   Shankara   appears   to   make   a   similar   “Cartesian”-­‐like   argument,   it   is   important   to   note   that  
Shankara’s  use  of  the  sense  of  ‘I’  is  employed  by  him  merely  in  order  to  demonstrate  the  self’s  existence.  Ramanuja’s  
use  of  the  term,  on  the  other  hand,  is  designed  to  make  a  very  clear  ontological  and  psychological  statement.    
3.   These   three   components   of   reality,   a)   jagat,   or   matter,   b)   atman,   or   finite   selves,   c)   Brahman,   or   the   Absolute,  
constitute  the  three  Reals  of  Vedantic  ontology.    
4.  Ramanuja  makes  the  following  distinction:  chaitanya  is  knowledge,  while  chetana  is  the  knowing  subject,  the  one  
endowed  with  knowledge.  While  knower  and  knowledge  are  in  actuality  inseparable,  like  a  flame  and  its  effulgence,  
they  are  at  the  same  time  logically  distinguishable.    
 
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Copyright  1999,  Frank  Morales