JOINT LIABILITY
Introduction
A person who genuinely commits a crime is usually held legally accountable for
their actions and punished accordingly. The criminal responsibility concept states
that the individual who commits an offence is liable and may alone be declared
guilty. However, Sections 34 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, create an
exception to the norm, placing criminal culpability on the culprit and their
associates who collaborated in the commission of the crime in support of a
common intention or prosecution of a common aim. Each of them becomes
jointly accountable in such a scenario. The Supreme Court of India had viewed
the same in the notable case of Ramesh Singh alias Photti v. State of Andhra
Pradesh (2004).
Scope of joint liability under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 lays down the provision for joint
liability in cases where different persons share a common intention. Section 34
reads as, “acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention”. To
understand the term ‘act’ in this context, a look into its preceding section needs
to be made. Section 33 defines the term ‘act’ and ‘omission’.
Section 34 vis a vis Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Common intention under Section 34 is the foundation of culpability, whereas a
common object is the basis of liability in Section 149. Section 34 does not define
common intention and is thus unrestricted, but the common object is specified in
Section 149 and is confined to the five unlawful objects listed in Section 141 of
the Code. Acts under Section 34 must be carried out with a single purpose, but
criminal acts under Section 149 must be carried out with a common object.
Section 34 requires active engagement, no matter how minor or inconsequential,
whereas under Section 149, simply being a member of an unlawful assembly is
enough to bring criminal charges. The consequence of incorrectly prosecuting a
person under Section 149 IPC and afterwards substituting Section 34 does not
fatally impair the prosecution case, since the replacement must be regarded as a
formal issue and does not fundamentally affect the prosecution case unless
prejudice is given to the accused. This was held in Amar Singh v. State of Haryana
(1973), where the conviction for an offence under Section 302 read with Section
34, even though the accused was charged under Section 302 read with Section
149, was not illegal because the facts proved and evidence adduced would have
been the same if the accused had been charged under Section 302 read with
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
Landmark judgment
Courts have time and again interpreted the legislative intent behind Section 34 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860, in order to break down the provision in simple
terms. A list of three cases in recent times has been discussed hereunder, focusing
specifically on the ratio decidendi of the same.
Chhota Ahirwar v. the State of Madhya Pradesh (2011)
A bench of Justices Indira Banerjee and S. Ravindra Bhat of the Supreme Court
of India while discussing the case of Chhota Ahirwar v. The State of Madhya
Pradesh (2011), made the following observations:
1. Only the individual who really commits the crime can be found guilty and
sentenced in line with the law, according to established criminal law principles.
Section 34 is the only provision that establishes a principle of shared
accountability in criminal conduct, the core of which is found in the presence of
a common intention, inciting the primary accused to do the criminal act in pursuit
of that goal.
2. Even when different acts are performed by two or more people in the service
of a shared goal, each individual is responsible for the outcome of all the acts as
if they were all performed by all of these people. Section 34 is only a rule of
evidence that applies the idea of shared criminal culpability, but it does not
constitute a separate, substantive offence.
3. Acting in cooperation is what common intention entails. The existence of a
planned plot must be shown either by the accused’s actions, circumstances, or any
other damning information. It is insufficient to share the same intention
independently of one another.
Conclusion
Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 expresses the concept of joint
culpability. This provision just clarifies the notion of shared culpability and does
not impose any penalties. This section must be read in conjunction with other
provisions of the Code, such as Section 120A, which defines criminal conspiracy,
Section 120 B, which provides penalty for criminal conspiracy and Section 149,
which deals with unlawful assembly. Section 34 is ineffective on its own, it must
therefore be combined with other provisions to render a person jointly
accountable for an offence. The idea of joint criminal liability looks to be more
of a magical weapon in criminal prosecution. However, the theory not only adds
to conceptual ambiguity and clashes with several basic criminal law concepts, but
it also goes after the customary scope of command responsibility liability. This is
comprehensible if both concepts are used at the same time in instances involving
the accused in a superior position.
