De Lima vs Gatdula/Writ of Amparo

Principle: A writ of Amparo is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular
fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action as such the rules on summary procedure will not apply.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Pampilo is correct in applying the Rules in Summary Procedure to a Petition for a
Petition for a Writ of Amparo.

Rullng:

No, Judge Pampilo is not correct. The 1991 Revised Rules of Summary Procedure is a special rule that
the Court has devised for the following circumstances:

SECTION 1. Scope. This rule shall govern the summary procedure in the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases falling within their jurisdiction:

A. Civil Cases: (1) All cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, x x x (2) All other cases, except
probate proceedings, where the total amount of the plaintiff’s claim does not exceed x x x.

B. Criminal Cases: (1) Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations (2) Violations of the rental law (3)
Violations of municipal or city ordinances (4) All other criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged is imprisonment not exceeding six months, or a fine not exceeding one
thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, x x x.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the rules on summary procedure will only apply in cases filed in the
MTC/MTCC/MCTCs. On the other hand, a writ of Amparo is a special proceeding. It is a remedy by which
a party seeks to establish a status, a right or particular fact. It is not a civil nor a criminal action, hence,
the application of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is seriously misplaced.

Case Title: JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION vs. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA, SR.

Doctrine: Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive
period where the crime charged involved is an ordinance.

Case Title: Alliance for Rural and Agrarian Reconstruction, Inc., also known as ARARO Party-list vs.
Commission on Elections

Principles: Civil Procedure; Real Party in interest: A real party in interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgement in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.” The
party’s interest must be direct, substantial, and material.
Case Title: LUI ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. ZUELLIG PHARMA CORPORATION.

2. Whether the Regional Trial Court of Makati erred in denying Lui Enterprises’ motion to set aside order
of default.

2. No. The Supreme Court held that after notice of the declaration of default but before the court
renders the default judgment, the defendant may file, under oath, a motion to set aside order of default.
The defendant must properly show that his or her failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence. The defendant must also have a meritorious defense. Excusable negligence is
"one which ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against." The circumstances should
be properly alleged and proved.

In this case, Lui Enterprises had discovered its default before the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered
judgment. Thus, it timely filed a motion to set aside order of default, raising the ground of excusable
negligence. Lui Enterprises’ counsel filed its motion to dismiss four days late. It did not immediately take
steps to remedy its default and took one year from discovery of default to file a motion to set aside
order of default. In its motion to set aside order of default, Lui Enterprises only "conveniently blamed its
counsel for the late filing of the answer" without offering any excuse for the late filing. This is not
excusable negligence under Rule 9, Section 3, paragraph (b) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus,
the Regional Trial Court of Makati did not err in refusing to set aside the order of default.

3. Whether the annulment of deed of dation in payment pending in the Regional Trial Court of Davao
barred the subsequent filing of the interpleader case in the Regional Trial Court of Makati.

3. No. The Supreme Court held that Litis pendentia is Latin for "a pending suit." It exists when "another
action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action." The subsequent action is
"unnecessary and vexatious" and is instituted to "harass the respondent [in the subsequent action]."
The requisites of litis pendentia are:

(1) Identity of parties or at least such as represent the same interest in both actions;

(2) Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; and

(3) The identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment that may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other.

All of the requisites must be present. Absent one requisite, there is no litis pendentia.

In this case, there is no litis pendentia since there is no identity of parties in the nullification of deed of
dation in payment case and the interpleader case. Zuellig Pharma is not a party to the nullification case
filed in the Davao trial court.

There is also no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Lui Enterprises filed the first case to
nullify the deed of dation in payment it executed in favor of the Philippine Bank of Communications.

Zuellig Pharma subsequently filed the interpleader case to consign in court the rental payments and
extinguish its obligation as lessee. The interpleader case was necessary and was not instituted to harass
either Lui Enterprises or the Philippine Bank of Communications.

Thus, the pending nullification case did not bar the filing of the interpleader case.
VIVENCIO B. VILLAGRACIA vs. FIFTH (5th) SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT and ROLDAN E. MALA.

ISSUE: Does the Shari’a District Court has jusrisdiction over real action where one of the parties is not a
muslim even if it decides the action applying the provisions of the Civil Code?

RULING:

The Shari’a District Court has NO jurisdiction over real action where one of the parties is not a Muslim.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is "the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to
which the proceedings in question belong." This power is conferred by law, which may either be the
Constitution or a statute. Since subject matter jurisdiction is a matter of law, parties cannot choose,
consent to or agree as to what court or tribunal should decide their disputes. If a court hears, tries, and
decides an action in which it has no jurisdiction, all its proceedings, including the judgment rendered, are
void.

The law conferring the jurisdiction of Shari’a District Courts is the Code of the Muslim Personal Laws of
the Philippines. Under Article 143 of the Muslim Code, Shari’a District Courts have concurrent original
jurisdiction with "existing civil courts" over real actions not arising from customary contracts wherein
the parties involved are Muslims. However, this concurrent jurisdiction over real actions "is applicable
solely when both parties are Muslims". When one of the parties is not a Muslim, the action must be filed
before the regular courts.

MADARANG vs. SPOUSES MORALES.

Petition for Relief

ISSUE: Whether the failure of petitioners’ former counsel to file the notice of appeal within the
reglementary period is excusable negligence.

RULING: The double period required under Section 3, Rule 38 is jurisdictional and should strictly comply
with two reglementary periods:

(a) the petition must be filed within sixty (60) days from knowledge of the judgment, order or other
proceeding to be set aside; and

(b) within a fixed period of six (6) months from entry of such judgment, order or other proceeding. Strict
compliance with these periods is required because provision for a petition for relief from judgment is a
final act of liberality on the part of the State, which remedy cannot be allowed to erode any further the
fundamental principle that a judgment, order or proceeding must, at some definite time, attain finality
in order at last to put an end to litigation.

The double period rule, as an exception rather than the rule, must be strictly observed. Thus, the
decision became final 15 days after January 29, 2010, or on February 13, 2010. Petitioners had six (6)
months from February 13, 2010, or until August 12, 2010, to file a petition for relief from judgment.

Since petitioners filed their petition for relief from judgment on September 24, 2010, the petition for
relief from judgment was filed beyond six (6) months from finality of judgment. The trial court should
have denied the petition for relief from judgment on this ground.
CATHAY METAL CORPORATION vs. LAGUNA WEST MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC./SUMMONS

ISSUE: Whether there is valid service of summons thru registered mail.

RULING: Respondent was not validly served with summons.

The Rules of Court provides that summons may be served upon a juridical entity only through its officers.
Sec. 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. – When the defendant is a corporation,
partnership or association organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary,
treasurer, or in-house counsel.

Service of summons upon persons other than those officers enumerated in Section 11 is invalid. If
summons may not be served upon these persons personally at their residences or offices, summons may
be served upon any of the officers wherever they may be found.

CITY OF DAGUPAN vs. ESTER F. MARAMBA/Petition for Review on Certiorari

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether the City’s legal counsel on lack of notice of hearing in a motion for reconsideration is
excusable negligence that allows the filing of a petition for relief of judgment?

RULING: Grounds Fraud, Accident, Mistake, or Excusable negligence (FAME)

A petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is an equitable remedy which allows courts to review a
judgment tainted with neglect bordering on extrinsic fraud. In this case, total damages in the amount of
P11 million was awarded in spite of the evidence on record. The motion for reconsideration of such
judgment filed by the legal officer of the City of Dagupan inexplicably omitted the required notice for
hearing. Considering the damage that would be suffered by the local government, such mistake was so
glaring as to raise suspicion that it was contrived to favor the plaintiff.

Rule 38 of the Rules of Court allows for the remedy called a petition for relief from judgment. This is an
equitable remedy “allowed in exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy”
that will allow for substantive justice.

Section 1 of Rule 38 provides for the grounds that warrant the filing of a petition under Rule 38:

When a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is thereafter taken against a party in
any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence, he may file a petition in such court
and in the same case praying that the judgment, order or proceeding be set aside. Courts may set aside
final and executory judgments provided that any of the grounds for their grant are present.

Excusable negligence as a ground for a petition for relief requires that the negligence be so gross “that
ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against it.” This excusable negligence must also
be imputable to the party-litigant and not to his or her counsel whose negligence binds his or her client.
2. When to reckon the 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment?

The 60-day period to file a petition for relief from judgment is reckoned from actual receipt of the denial
of the motion for reconsideration when one is filed.

A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this Rule must be verified, filed within sixty
(60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment, final order, or other proceeding to be set aside, and
not more than six (6) months after such judgment or final order was entered, or such proceeding was
taken; and must be accompanied with affidavits showing the fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
negligence relied upon, and the facts constituting the petitioner’s good and substantial cause of action
or defense, as the case may be. The double period required under this provision is jurisdictional and
should be strictly complied with. Otherwise, a petition for relief from judgment filed beyond the
reglementary period will be dismissed outright.

OLIVAREZ REALTY CORPORATION and DR. PABLO R. OLIVAREZ vs. BENJAMIN CASTILLO

SSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in rendering summary judgment for non-existence of genuine
issue.

RULING: NO. The trial court correctly rendered summary judgment, as there were no genuine issues of
material fact in this case.

Under Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a trial court may dispense with trial and proceed to
decide a case if from the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact. In such a case, the judgment issued is called a summary judgment. A
motion for summary judgment is filed either by the claimant or the defending party. The trial court then
hears the motion for summary judgment. If indeed there are no genuine issues of material fact, the trial
court shall issue summary judgment.

An issue of material fact exists if the answer or responsive pleading filed specifically denies the material
allegations of fact set forth in the complaint or pleading. If the issue of fact "requires the presentation of
evidence, it is a genuine issue of fact". However, if the issue "could be resolved judiciously by plain
resort" to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers on file, the issue of fact raised is sham,
and the trial court may resolve the action through summary judgment.

A summary judgment is usually distinguished from a judgment on the pleadings. Under Rule 34 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, trial may likewise be dispensed with and a case decided through judgment
on the pleadings if the answer filed fails to tender an issue or otherwise admits the material allegations
of the claimant's pleading.

Considering that Olivarez Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez's answer tendered an issue, Castillo
properly availed himself of a motion for summary judgment. However, the issues tendered by Olivarez
Realty Corporation and Dr. Olivarez's answer are not genuine issues of material fact. These are issues
that can be resolved judiciously by plain resort to the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and other papers
on file; otherwise, these issues are sham, fictitious, or patently unsubstantial.
ABOITIZ EQUITY VENTURES, INC. vs. CHONGBIAN

AEV filed a motion to dismiss the second complaint on the following grounds: (1) forum shopping; (2)
failure to state a cause of action; (3) res judicata; and (4) litis pendentia.

ISSUE:

I. Whether the second complaint constitutes forum shopping and/or is barred by res judicata and/or
litis pendentia

RULING:

I. Yes. The second complaint constitutes forum shopping and is barred by res judicata. FORUM
SHOPPING is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.

Prior judgment or res judicata bars a subsequent case when the following requisites concur: "(1) the
former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the
parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and the second
actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.

II. Whether AEV is bound by an agreement to arbitrate with CAGLI with respect to the latter’s claims
for unreturned inventories delivered to WLI/WG&A/ATSC

II. No. There is no agreement binding AEV to arbitrate with CAGLI on the latter’s claims. An agreement to
arbitrate is a contract, the relation of the parties is contractual, and the rights and liabilities of the
parties are controlled by the law of contracts. It is elementary that contracts are characterized by
relativity or privity, that is, that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs."
As such, one who is not a party to a contract may not seek relief for such contract’s breach. Likewise,
one who is not a party to a contract may not be held liable for breach of any its terms. While the
principle of privity or relativity of contracts acknowledges that contractual obligations are transmissible
to a party’s assigns and heirs, AEV is not WLI’s successor-in-interest. The obligation animating CAGLI’s
desire to arbitrate is rooted in Annex SL-V. AEV was never a party to Annex SL-V. Rather than pertaining
to AEV, Annex SL-V pertained to a different entity: WLI (renamed WG&A then renamed ATSC). AEV is,
thus, not bound by Annex SL-V.

MIGUEL CIRERA USTELO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/Credibility of witnesses despite their
inconsistent statements

RTC convicted Cirera with 2 counts of frustrated murder. The CA confirmed the conviction. Cirera claims
that treachery was not present. He also questions the credibility of the witnesses because their
statements are inconsistent.

ISSUE: Are the witnesses credible despite their inconsistent statements?

The settled rule is that a judgment of conviction based purely on circumstantial evidence can be upheld
only if the following requisites concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which
the inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The combination of the circumstances in this case constitutes an unbroken chain which leads to one fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the petitioner, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

RAMON CHING vs. JOSEPH CHENG

CA: dismissed the first certiorari. It ruled that the"two-dismissal rule" involves two motions for
dismissals filed by the plaintiff only. In this case, it found that the dismissal of the first case was upon the
motion of the defendants, while the dismissal of the second case was at the instance of the plaintiffs.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the trial court’s dismissal of the second case operated as a bar to the filing of a third case, as
per the "two-dismissal rule"?

2. Whether Chengs and Lucina Santos committed forum shopping when they filed the third case while
the motion for reconsideration of the second case was still pending?

RULING:
I. No, it does not operate as bar to the filing of the third case,
According to Rule 117
SEC. 1. Dismissal upon notice by plaintiff. — A complaint may be dismissed by the plaintiff by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service of the answer or of a motion for summary judgment. Upon
such notice being filed, the court shall issue an order confirming the dismissal. Unless otherwise stated in
the notice, the dismissal is without prejudice, except that a notice operates as an adjudication upon the
merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in a competent court an action based on or
including the same claim.

SEC. 2. Dismissal upon motion of plaintiff. — Except as provided in the preceding section, a complaint
shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon approval of the court and upon such terms
and conditions as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defendant prior to
the service upon him of the plaintiff’s motion for dismissal, the dismissal shall be limited to the
complaint. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his
counterclaim in a separate action unless within fifteen (15) days from notice of the motion he manifests
his preference to have his counterclaim resolved in the same action. Unless otherwise specified in the
order, a dismissal under this paragraph shall be without prejudice. A class suit shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court.
SEC. 3. Dismissal due to fault of plaintiff. — If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the
date of the presentation of his evidence in chief on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the court's own motion, without prejudice to the
right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action. This dismissal
shall have the effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise declared by the court.

The first section of the rule contemplates a situation where a plaintiff requests the dismissal of the case
before any responsive pleadings have been filed by the defendant. It is done through notice by the
plaintiff and confirmation by the court. The dismissal is without prejudice unless otherwise declared by
the court.
The second section of the rule contemplates a situation where a counterclaim has been pleaded by the
defendant before the service on him or her of the plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. It requires leave of court,
and the dismissal is generally without prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.

The third section contemplates dismissals due to the fault of the plaintiff such as the failure to
prosecute. The case is dismissed either upon motion of the defendant or by the court motu propio.
Generally, the dismissal is with prejudice unless otherwise declared by the court.

In Yap v. Chua, the court ruled that forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or
proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable disposition. To
determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicata in another.

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which
party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.

When respondents filed the third case, petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the
second case was still pending. Clearly, the order of dismissal was not yet final since it could still be
overturned upon reconsideration, or even on appeal to a higher court.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. DELOS REYES, JR.

FACTS: Proceeds from lotto sales were not promptly deposited to a bank; it caused the loss of P387,879.
Respondent was criminally charged with malversation of public funds and administratively charged with
dishonesty and gross neglect of duty. The Office of the Ombudsman found him guilty of grave
misconduct and gross neglect of duty. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court with the CA assailing the said decision of the Office of the Ombudsman. CA granted the
petition and reversed the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman.

ISSUE/S: WON CA erred in taking cognizance of the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 despite
availability of the remedy under Rule 43
RULING: YES. Appeals from decisions in administrative disciplinary cases of the Office of the
Ombudsman should be taken to the CA by way of petition for review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended. Thus, certiorari under Rule 65 will not lie, as appeal under Rule 43 is an
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

BUENA vs. BENITO

The Regional Office argues that the trial court erred in taking cognizance of respondent Dr. Benito’s
petition for mandamus. A petition for mandamus, according to the Regional Office, is filed only when
there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In this case, appeal
to the Civil Service Commission proper was still available. Worse, the petition for mandamus was
allegedly filed as a substitute for a lost appeal. Consequently, the Regional Office’s action on the
attestation had already become final and executory, “bar[ring] . . . resort to any judicial action.” The trial
court should not have entertained the petition for mandamus.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the Regional Office’s appeal for its failure to file the
required memorandum.

2. Whether respondent Dr. Benito correctly availed himself of a petition for mandamus against the Civil
Service Commission’s refusal to attest to his appointment.

RULING: 1. No. Failure to comply with the Rules or with any order of the court is a ground to dismiss
the action.

Specifically, on the appellant’s failure to file a memorandum with the Court of Appeals, Rule 44, Section
10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 10. Time for filing memoranda in special cases. — In certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto and habeas corpus cases, the parties shall file, in lieu of briefs, their respective memoranda
within a non-extendible period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice issued by the clerk that, all
evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.

The failure of the appellant to file his memorandum within the period therefor may be a ground for
dismissal of the appeal.

Rule 50, Section 1 reiterates that the appellant’s failure to file the required memorandum within the
reglementary period is a ground for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal:

SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. — An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on
its motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
(e) Failure of the appellant to serve and file the required number of copies of his brief or memorandum
within the time provided by these Rules.

In this case, the Court of Appeals ordered the parties to file their respective memoranda. Instead
of filing the memorandum, the Regional Office requested additional 30 days to file the pleading. The
additional period requested lapsed without the Regional Office filing the required memorandum. The
Court of Appeals, therefore, correctly dismissed the appeal.
Further, Associate Solicitor’s “overwhelming workload” do not justify counsel’s failure to file the
memorandum on behalf of the Regional Office. We have ruled that heavy workload is no excuse for
failure to comply with the reglementary periods under the Rules.

2. Yes. A petition for mandamus is the proper remedy to compel the Civil Service Commission to attest
to the appointment of respondent.
Under Rule 65, Section 3 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition for mandamus may be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station. It may also be filed when any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment
of a right or office to which such other is entitled. For mandamus to lie, the act sought to be enjoined
must be a ministerial act or duty. An act is ministerial if the act should be performed “[under] a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of [the tribunal or corporation’s] own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of
the act done.” The tribunal, corporation, board, officer, or person must have no choice but to perform
the act specifically enjoined by law. This is opposed to a discretionary act wherein the officer has the
choice to decide how or when to perform the duty.
In the context of attestation of appointments in the civil service, this court has ruled that the Civil
Service Commission’s attestation is a ministerial duty once it finds the appointee eligible for the position.
The Commission “is limited only to the nondiscretionary authority of determining whether or not the
person appointed meets all the required conditions laid down by the law.” If the appointee possesses
the required civil service eligibility, the Commission has “no choice but to attest to the appointment.”
In this case, respondent Dr. Benito availed himself of the correct remedy. Given his claim that he
possesses the required civil service eligibility for the position of Assistant Schools Division
Superintendent, he correctly filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Civil Service Commission to
approve his appointment.
The Regional Office argues that respondent Dr. Benito availed himself of the wrong remedy considering
that the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of appeal to the Civil Service Commission proper was still
available. The trial court should have dismissed respondent Dr. Benito’s petition for mandamus.
True, the general rule is that there be no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law when filing a petition for mandamus. Moreover, the rule on exhaustion of administrative
remedies requires that a party “exhaust all administrative remedies to give the administrative agency an
opportunity to decide the matter and to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.”
Nevertheless, there are exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. A party may
directly resort to judicial remedies if any of the following is present:
1. when there is a violation of due process;
2. when the issue involved is purely a legal question;
3. when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
4. when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned;
5. when there is irreparable injury;
6. when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bear the
implied and assumed approval of the latter;
7. when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable;
8. when it would amount to a nullification of a claim;
9. when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings;
10. when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; and
11. when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
In this case, the question is whether the position for which he was appointed requires career executive
service eligibility. This is a purely legal question which is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies. All told, respondent Dr. Benito did not err in filing a petition for mandamus
with the trial court.