SBSPCR, Buddhist Studies

Handouts for Classes on Theories of Error

G. Mishra

Erroneous Perception: (Khyativada)

A few pints to ponder over:
1. Every cognition has a cognitum, whether it is veridical or illusory and thus there is no content-
less cognition. (nirvisayakam jnanam nasti).
2. Assuming that there is a negative entity, its cognition through aupalabdhi in the form of
knowing the absence of something say pot. The absence of a pot (ghatabhava) is the cognitum
for this perception.
3. The word "khyati" in Sanskrit stands for cognition. Traditionally in Indian Philosophy it is
used in the sense of a perceptual error.
4. In the case of perceptual errors, the object perceived is directly present before the perceiver
and in all perceptual knowledge belongs to objects present immediately. It is not only
immediate, but there is also a cognition of that immediate object.
5. This cognized object is private or subjective and this cognition suffers sublation later. It can
be public also like that of a blue sky.
In case of rope-snake, the first cognition is "This is a snake" which is sublated by the second
cognition This is not a snake, this is a rope. In the first cognition, the snakeness was predicated
of this and in the second, the "this" is negated of the snake-ness. Since the first cognition suffers
sublation, the content viz. "snake" is also sublated.
Ontological status of the Object of Error
Now what is the ontological status of the content of this Erroneous perception. Or in other
words how real is a rope-snake? Some schools of Indian Philosophy say that it is existent (sat)
and some others feel that it is non-existent (asat)).
Thus there is a broad division of theories of error into two: 1. Satkhyati 2. Asatkhyati.
Madhyamika school of Buddhism advocates asatkhyati. For them everything is non-existent
and so cognition is always of something which is non-existent. Rope in front is non-existent
what to talk of rope-snake.
Other schools of Indian Philosophy do not agree with the view of the Buddhists. They say that
we cannot perceive something non-existent. The simple rule is that if something is perceived
it is not non-existent. For Buddhists also, the pragmatic possibility is the reality and that should
involve existence in some form or other.
Secondly, what is cognized (affirmed) alone can be negated. You can say; A rose is Red and
then negate it saying that Rose is not red. Every negation presupposes affirmation. So

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 Madhyamika cannot account for either perception nor for sublation. Therefore, from the
standpoint of other schools of Indian Philosophy, this view is not accepted.
The Satkhyati is further divided into three/four types.
Atmakhyati - Vijnanavada –Yogacara school advocates this view. For them, the only reality that
exists is the mental reality - cognition, i.e. cognition is the only reality and it is ksanika
(ksanika-vijnana-vada). It is momentary. They speak of series of cognitions. There is no
other external object besides cognition. The subjective cognition appears as the object outside.
They speak of this as (sahopalambha-nyaya) and say that cognition and cognitum are
perceived together and therefore one thinks that for every cognition there should be a
cognitum. It is not the case always since dream experience violates such notion.
Criticizing this view other schools say that that epistemology should be realistic. There has
never been any cognition where triputi (three-fold criteria) is not there and there is no case
where both jnana and artha are identical. Cognition only reveals the external object, it does not
produce the object. (jnanam visayikaroti na tu visayam utpadayati.)
If the cognitions are momentary, how do we distinguish between one cognition and other
cognition?
If you say cognition 1 is pot, cognition 2 is pan cognition 3 is table and thus they are
distinguishable, then would this argument be valid? You call something a pot cognition only
when pot is the cognitum. In other words, unless there are external objects existing outside,
you cannot talk of cogn.1, 2, etc.
So you should accept that in addition to the internal cognition, there are external objects also.
There are adjectives (visesanas) which refer to external objects.
Considering an erroneous perception, the cognition is revealed in the form “This is a snake”
where the snake is immediately present. This means that the cognition itself does not appear
as snake or silver. But only comprehends what is presented in front. At the time of cognition,
it is necessary to say that the snake/ silver exists.
So it is not that cognition itself appears as the external object. Hence Vijnanavadin is not able
to give a satisfactory answer for the pratiti or appearance of the external object. Not only that,
he would not be able to explain sublation (badha) properly. Always the negation is with regards
to the predicate of the proposition and not the subject of the proposition. In the statement `This
is a snake` the denial is with regard to snake and not with regard to `this`. Vijnanavadin says
that denial is with regards to the subject itself since there is nothing external.
Akhyati of Prabhakaras
Coming to Akhyati Non apprehension, propounded by Prabhakaras, they say that perceptual
knowledge can be divided into two, valid cognition and recollection. They say there is nothing
called erroneous cognition. Every cognition is valid for them. The so called erroneous-
cognition of other systems is not a unitary cognition - not the one cognition. It is a complex of
two cognitions.
In case of shell-silver, the person says that it is silver. Every object has two characteristics.
General characteristics (samanyamsa) and special characteristics (visesamsa). “This-ness” is
the general characteristic of all the cognition and what refers to the special characteristics. In

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 the case of error, the man fails to see the special characteristics and brings silver from the
memory.
He forgets the memory aspect of the silver. So the subject of the perception `this` is incomplete
and predicate memory is also incomplete. The else-where and else-when silver is not
recognized. White conch looking yellow, there is the complex of two incomplete perceptions.
The yellowness is perceived by him but is not recognized to belonging to jaundiced eye or
bilious matter.
So Prabhakara's position is that there is non-apprehension of difference between what is
perceived and what is remembered or the difference between two objects which are perceived.
Other schools criticize this view saying that there is incompleteness in perception is acceptable.
But it is not so in memory. If memory is what it is, it is illogical to say that the remembered
object is not recognized as an object of memory.
Anyatha-khyati - Cognition otherwise. Bhattas call this differently as Viparitakhyati.
According to Nyaya, we see the silver in the shop in the sea-beach. The cognition is the
cognition of a thing which is not here. Now the problem would be if that is the case when I
know it is not silver, the silver in the shop will disappear. However it is not so and hence this
view is also not acceptable.
Anirvacaniya khyati of Advaita –
The ontological status of the erroneous perception is neither existent (sat) nor non-existent (asat),
but it is indeterminable (anirvacaniya). For Advaitin that is existent (sat) which is not subject
to sublation. Considering the case of rope-snake or a dream-lion, they suffer sublation.
Therefore they are not sat. Now considering the objects in this empirical world, they too are
not sat because they are liable to sublation at the advent of the self-knowledge.
(badhyamanatvat na sat).

It is Brahman-Atman which is sat since it does not suffer sublation. The asat is that which is
opposed to real, not being, totally non-existent. For this, there is no corresponding object, like
square- circle or sky flower (atyanta-abhavavatvam asatvam) and such an entity cannot be
cognized. (asat cet na pratiyate). From this what follows is that anything that is totally non-
existent can never be cognized. Therefore an illusorily seen object is not non-existent.
(pratiyamana-tvat na asat); but it is also not sat since it is subleated. (badhyamanatvat na sat)
Advaitin introduces a third category of substance apart from sat and asat which would include
rope-snake and such other cases. It is anirvacaniya or mithya category constituted of
pratibhasika and vyavaharika objects. It is sadasad-vilaksana. This does not mean that it is
absolutely indescribable. It is only indescribabale as either sat or asat. Everything other than
Brahman and those of square-circle belong to this category. This sadasadvilaksana is termed
as mithya. Mithya does not allude something totally non-existent, not available for cognition.

Advaitin says
The conditions for erroneous perceptions are
1. Defect in the pramana

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 2. Defect in the prameya
3. Defect in the pramata
4. There is the knowledge of the object in a general way
5. There is ignorance about the nature of the object
6. The impression born out of the prior experience of the object.
7. Ignorance (avidya)

The Implications of Avidya-maya

1. No error in the absence of substratum
2. Presence of Avidya
3. Role of substratum and Avidya (Theory of causation)

Ontological perspectives
1. Rope snake is mithya
2. Ontological status of rope is empirical reality
3. The three levels of reality

With this in the background, we shall see how the Buddhists have defended their theories of
illusion.

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