G.R. No.

156879 January 20, 2004

FLORDELIZA CALPATURA FLORA, DOMINADOR CALPATURA and TOMAS CALPATURA,

JR., Heirs of TOMAS CALPATURA, SR., Petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO, ERLINDA, DANIEL, GLORIA, PATRICIO, JR. and EDNA, all surnamed PRADO and
NARCISA PRADO, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The property under litigation is the northern half portion of a residential land consisting of 552.20
square meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344 issued on August 15, 1963 by the Register of Deeds of
Quezon City in the name of Narcisa Prado and her children by her first husband, Patricio Prado, Sr.,
namely, Roberto, Erlinda, Daniel, Gloria, Patricio, Jr. and Edna, respondents herein.

The pertinent facts are as follows:

On December 19, 1959, Patricio Prado, Sr. died. Narcisa subsequently married Bonifacio Calpatura.
In order to support her minor children with her first husband, Narcisa and her brother-in-law, Tomas
Calpatura, Sr., executed on April 26, 1968 an Agreement of Purchase and Sale whereby the former
agreed to sell to the latter the northern half portion of the property for the sum of P10,500.00. On
1

July 28, 1973, Narcisa executed a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Tomas over the said property. 2

In 1976, Tomas’ daughter, Flordeliza Calpatura Flora, built a two-storey duplex with firewall on the
3

northern half portion of the property. Respondents, who occupied the southern half portion of the
land, did not object to the construction. Flordeliza Flora and her husband Wilfredo declared the
property for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes thereon. Likewise, Maximo
4 5

Calpatura, the son of Tomas’ cousin, built a small house on the northern portion of the property.

On April 8, 1991, respondents filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of sale and delivery of
possession of the northern half portion of the subject property against petitioners Flordeliza
Calpatura Flora, Dominador Calpatura and Tomas Calpatura, Jr. before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 100, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-91-8404. Respondents alleged that the
6

transaction embodied in the Agreement to Purchase and Sale between Narcisa and Tomas was one
of mortgage and not of sale; that Narcisa’s children tried to redeem the mortgaged property but they
learned that the blank document which their mother had signed was transformed into a Deed of
Absolute Sale; that Narcisa could not have sold the northern half portion of the property considering
that she was prohibited from selling the same within a period of 25 years from its acquisition,
pursuant to the condition annotated at the back of the title; that Narcisa, as natural guardian of her
7

children, had no authority to sell the northern half portion of the property which she and her children
co-owned; and that only P5,000.00 out of the consideration of P10,500.00 was paid by Tomas.

In their answer, petitioners countered that Narcisa owned 9/14 of the property, consisting of ½ as her
share in the conjugal partnership with her first husband and 1/7 as her share in the estate of her
deceased husband; that the consideration of the sale in the amount of P10,500.00 had been fully
paid as of April 1, 1968; that Narcisa sold her conjugal share in order to support her minor children;
that Narcisa’s claim was barred by laches and prescription; and that the Philippine Homesite and
Housing Corporation, not the respondents, was the real party in interest to question the sale within
the prohibited period.
On April 2, 1997, the court a quo dismissed the complaint. It found that the sale was valid; that
8

the Agreement to Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale were duly executed; that the
sum of P10,500.00 as selling price for the subject property was fully paid there being no demand for
the payment of the remaining balance; that the introduction of improvements thereon by the
petitioners was without objection from the respondents; and that Roberto and Erlinda failed to
contest the transaction within four years after the discovery of the alleged fraud and reaching the
majority age in violation of Article 1391 of the Civil Code.
9

Petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 56843. On October 3, 2002, a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals declaring that
10

respondents were co-owners of the subject property, thus the sale was valid only insofar as
Narcisa’s 1/7 undivided share thereon was concerned. The dispositive portion of the said decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the sale in
dispute is declared valid only with respect to the one-seventh (1/7) share of plaintiff-appellant
NARCISA H. PRADO in the subject property, which is equivalent to 78.8857 square meters. In all
other respects, the same decision stands. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED. 11

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in a Resolution dated January 14,
2003. Hence this petition for review on the following assigned errors:
12

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THAT, ASIDE FROM THE
DECLARATION OF THE VALIDITY OF THE SALE, THE PETITIONERS HEREIN HAVE
TAKEN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF THE SAID ONE-HALF (1/2) TO THE EXCLUSION OF
THE RESPONDENTS AND INTRODUCED IMPROVEMENTS THEREON.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN MODIFYING THE DECISION RENDERED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT WITHOUT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL
STATEMENT IN THE SALE THAT THE SAME PERTAINS TO THE CONJUGAL SHARE OF
RESPONDENT NARCISA PRADO AND THE OTHER RESPONDENTS HAD NO
FINANCIAL CAPACITY TO ACQUIRE THE SAID PROPERTY SINCE THEY WERE
MINORS THEN AT THE ISSUANCE OF THE SAID TCT NO. 71344 ON AUGUST 15, 1963.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN NOT DECLARING THE HEREIN RESPONDENTS GUILTY OF LACHES
IN FILING THE INSTANT CASE ONLY ON APRIL 8, 1991, THAT IS 18 YEARS AFTER
THE SAID SALE WITH THE PETITIONERS TAKING ACTUAL POSSESSION OF SAID
PORTION OF THE PROPERTY.
 IV

THAT THE DECISION OF THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS WILL UNDULY ENRICH THE
RESPONDENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE HEREIN PETITIONERS. 13

At the outset, it must be stressed that only questions of law may be raised in petitions for review
before this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. It was thus error for petitioners to ascribe to
14

the Court of Appeals grave abuse of discretion. This procedural lapse notwithstanding, in the interest
of justice, this Court shall treat the issues as cases of reversible error.
15

The issues for resolution are: (1) Is the subject property conjugal or paraphernal? (2) Is the
transaction a sale or a mortgage? (3) Assuming that the transaction is a sale, what was the area of
the land subject of the sale?

Article 160 of the Civil Code, which was in effect at the time the sale was entered into, provides that
all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that
it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. Proof of acquisition during the marriage is a
condition sine qua non in order for the presumption in favor of conjugal ownership to operate. 16

In the instant case, while Narcisa testified during cross-examination that she bought the subject
property from People’s Homesite Housing Corporation with her own funds, she, however admitted
17

in the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale that the property was her
conjugal share with her first husband, Patricio, Sr. A verbal assertion that she bought the land with
18

her own funds is inadmissible to qualify the terms of a written agreement under the parole evidence
rule. The so-called parole evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a
19

written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution
of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been
waived and abandoned. 20

Anent the second issue, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Narcisa in favor of Tomas is
contained in a notarized document. In Spouses Alfarero, et al. v. Spouses Sevilla, et al., it was held
21 22

that a public document executed and attested through the intervention of a notary public is evidence
of the facts in a clear, unequivocal manner therein expressed. Otherwise stated, public or notarial
documents, or those instruments duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may
be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. In order to contradict the
presumption of regularity of a public document, evidence must be clear, convincing, and more than
merely preponderant.

It is well-settled that in civil cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Except
23

for the bare allegation that the transaction was one of mortgage and not of sale, respondents failed
to adduce evidence in support thereof. Respondents also failed to controvert the presumption that
private transactions have been fair and regular. 24

Furthermore, Narcisa, in fact did not deny that she executed an Affidavit allowing spouses Wilfredo
and Flordeliza Flora to construct a firewall between the two-storey duplex and her house sometime
in 1976. The duplex was made of strong materials, the roofing being galvanized sheets. While the
deed of sale between Tomas and Narcisa was never registered nor annotated on the title,
respondents had knowledge of the possession of petitioners of the northern half portion of the
property. Obviously, respondents recognized the ownership of Tomas, petitioners’ predecessor-in-
interest.
Respondents belatedly claimed that only P5,000.00 out of the P10,500.00 consideration was
paid. Both the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale state that said
1âwphi1

consideration was paid in full. Moreover, the presumption is that there was sufficient consideration
for a written contract. 25

The property being conjugal, upon the death of Patricio Prado, Sr., one-half of the subject property
was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Narcisa, as her share in the conjugal
partnership. Particio’s rights to the other half, in turn, were transmitted upon his death to his heirs,
which includes his widow Narcisa, who is entitled to the same share as that of each of the legitimate
children. Thus, as a result of the death of Patricio, a regime of co-ownership arose between Narcisa
and the other heirs in relation to the property. The remaining one-half was transmitted to his heirs by
intestate succession. By the law on intestate succession, his six children and Narcisa Prado
inherited the same at one-seventh (1/7) each pro indiviso. Inasmuch as Narcisa inherited one-
26

seventh (1/7) of her husband's conjugal share in the said property and is the owner of one-half (1/2)
thereof as her conjugal share, she owns a total of 9/14 of the subject property. Hence, Narcisa could
validly convey her total undivided share in the entire property to Tomas. Narcisa and her children are
deemed co-owners of the subject property.

Neither can the respondents invoke the proscription of encumbering the property within 25 years
from acquisition. In Sarmiento, et al. v. Salud, et al., it was held that:
27

xxx The condition that the appellees Sarmiento spouses could not resell the property except to the
People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation (PHHC for short) within the next 25 years after
appellees’ purchasing the lot is manifestly a condition in favor of the PHHC, and not one in favor of
the Sarmiento spouses. The condition conferred no actionable right on appellees herein, since it
operated as a restriction upon their jus disponendi of the property they bought, and thus limited their
right of ownership. It follows that on the assumption that the mortgage to appellee Salud and the
foreclosure sale violated the condition in the Sarmiento contract, only the PHHC was entitled to
invoke the condition aforementioned, and not the Sarmientos. The validity or invalidity of the sheriff's
foreclosure sale to appellant Salud thus depended exclusively on the PHHC; the latter could attack
the sale as violative of its right of exclusive reacquisition; but it (PHHC) also could waive the
condition and treat the sale as good, in which event, the sale can not be assailed for breach of the
condition aforestated.

Finally, no particular portion of the property could be identified as yet and delineated as the object of
the sale considering that the property had not yet been partitioned in accordance with the Rules of
Court. While Narcisa could validly sell one half of the subject property, her share being 9/14 of the
28

same, she could not have particularly conveyed the northern portion thereof before the partition, the
terms of which was still to be determined by the parties before the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals on October 3, 2002, as well as the Resolution
dated January 14, 2003 is PARTLY AFFIRMED subject to the following MODIFICATIONS:

1) Narcisa Prado is entitled to 9/14 of the residential land consisting of 552.20 square
meters, more or less, situated at 19th Avenue, Murphy, Quezon City and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 71344;

2) the sale of the undivided one half portion thereof by Narcisa Prado in favor of Tomas
Calpatura, Sr. is valid.
 Furthermore, the case is REMANDED to the court of origin, only for the purpose of
determining the specific portion being conveyed in favor of Tomas Calpatura, Sr. pursuant to
the partition that will be agreed upon by the respondents.

SO ORDERED