America’s

Coast Guard
Safeguarding U.S.
Maritime Safety and
Security in the
21st Century

Captain Bruce Stubbs, USCG

Director, Operations Capability (G-OC)
Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard
Washington, D.C.
and
Scott C. Truver, Ph.D.
Executive Director
Center for Security Strategies and Operations (CSSO)
Systems Engineering Group, Anteon Corporation
Arlington, Virginia

with the assistance of

Edward Feege, Morgan Heavener, David Nelson,
Norman Polmar, Deepa Shukla, Tonya Tanks, and
Kelly Wurtz of the CSSO’s Research and Production Staff
CONTENTS
I. A New Perspective ............................................................................................................................1
U.S. Maritime Security Interests and Thre a t s ......................................................................................2
“Deepwater” Operational Enviro n m e n t ................................................................................................5
A Unique Instrument of M a r i t i m e S e c u r i t y ..........................................................................................7

II. A m e r i c a ’s Maritime Security

I n t e rests, Challenges and Thre a t s .......................................................................................9
Marine Enviro n m e n t .. 14
Marine Resourc e s ........ 18
Fisheries.............................
Non-Living Marine Resources..................................................................................................................22
Marine Resources Concerns......................................................................................................................25
Marine Transportation and Wa t e r b o rne Tr a d e .................................................................................26
America’s Marine Transportation System..................................................................................................27
Challenges and Developments..................................................................................................................34
Maritime Sovereignty and Homeland Security .................................................................................36
Illegal Commerce......... 39
Population Growth and Illegal Migration.................................................................................................41
Piracy and Organized Crime ....................................................................................................................45
Asymmetric Threats......... 48
Advanced Technologies......... 50
A Dangerous – If Uncertain – Future ...................................................................................................51

I I I . USCG Maritime Safety and Security Roles,

Missions and Functions ...............................................................................................................53
Maritime Safety .......... 55
Maritime Mobility ....... 58
Maritime Law Enforc e m e n t .....................................................................................................................61
Illegal Drugs .............. 62
Living Marine Resources ..........................................................................................................................66
Illegal Migrants................. 68
Partnering and Leadership ........................................................................................................................70
Maritime Environmental Pro t e c t i o n .....................................................................................................70
National Defense ........ 72
A Unique Instrument of M a r i t i m e S e c u r i t y ........................................................................................80

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I V. USCG Maritime Security Ope rational Co nstraints ................................................83
Deepwater Cutter Assessment ...............................................................................................................85
Deepwater Aircraft Assessment ............................................................................................................88
Deepwater C4ISR Assessment ................................................................................................................89
Sensor Shortfalls ........ 90
Command, Control and Communications Shortfalls ..............................................................................91
Command and Decision Shortfalls...........................................................................................................91
Operational Constraints Summary ........................................................................................................92

V. Enduring and Emerging Factors Shaping

USCG Maritime Security Systems .......................................................................................93
Integrated Deepwater System Acquisition Pro g r a m .......................................................................94
Deepwater Acquisition Strategy................................................................................................................94
Deepwater Force Structure Analysis..........................................................................................................96
“Reinvention Lab” ..... 98
A “National Fleet” ...... 99
A Common Aviation Vi s i o n ...................................................................................................................102
“Net-Centric” Deepwater Operational Concept ..............................................................................105
Total Ownership Aff o rd a b i l i t y .............................................................................................................108
Multimission and Operational Flexibility .........................................................................................109
“ Ta i l o red” for Multi-Agency Operations ...........................................................................................111
Expeditionary Mind-Set .........................................................................................................................113
Shaped for Joint and Combined Military Operations ...................................................................113
A Wo r l d “ S y s t e m - o f - S y s t e m s ” .............................................................................................................115

V I . Looking Ahead .. 119

A P P E N D I C E S ..................
A . Legislative Mandates for USCG Roles, Missions and Functions .........................................122
B . CinCSOUTH letter to Deputy Secretary of Transportation, 26 May 1999 .........................127
C . N ATIONAL FLEET – A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement .........................................131
D . A Unique Instrument of U.S. National Security .......................................................................133
E . Maritime Areas of Concern to the Deepwater Pro j e c t ...........................................................137
F. USCG Cutter and Aircraft Operational Characteristics ...........................................................139
G . Integrated Deepwater System Project Industry Teams, Phase I ..........................................141
H . G l o s s a r y ................ 142

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I. A N E W P E R S P E C T I V E
The new century finds the United States Coast Guard at a critical crossroads. Every
day, the men and women of the Coast Guard put their lives on the line to save others in
danger at sea, enforce the nation’s laws and treaties, protect the marine environment, ensure
a safe and efficient marine transportation system, and support America’s diplomatic and
defense interests world wide. However, despite the American public’s warm regard for its
“Coasties,” questions have been raised about the continued relevancy of the Coast Guard
for these mission areas. Furthermore, for some there is great uncertainty whether it would
be “good government” to make the significant investment in scarce public resources – even “There is a growing awareness
in an era of projected $1 trillion federal budget surpluses – for programs that would in among Americans of the many
effect recapitalize the Coast Guard for its third century of service to the United States, par- ways the oceans influence our
ticularly in the contributions that the Service can make to the nation’s maritime security. daily lives. Farmers in the
“Indeed, these are perplexing times for the Coast Guard,” James Kitfield noted in the nation’s heartland depend upon
October 1999 issue of National Journal. “In recent years, weather systems driven by the

the Coast Guard has seen a dramatic increase in its role of interdicting drug traffickers, interaction of the oceans and
enforcing fisheries legislation, and controlling alien migration at sea. Overseas, its atmosphere to nourish their
ships routinely operate alongside Navy vessels to enforce maritime embargoes. A crops. Citizens who have never
heavy hurricane season has highlighted the mission with which most Americans iden- seen an ocean may benefit from
tify the Coast Guard – saving lives at sea. Yet, because the Coast Guard resides in energy and food from the waters
the Department of Transportation during peacetime, and because it remains an oft- off our coasts. Marine organisms
neglected stepchild in terms of its significant law enforcement and national security provide the cure for many dis-
roles, it finds itself under severe budget strain.[1] eases and the promise of many
In that regard, as the debates over the allocation of federal resources continue, it is more cures. Ocean-going vessels
important to keep in mind that the Coast Guard is a military, multimission, maritime carry the bulk of our world trade,
service within the Department of Transportation and one of the nation’s five Armed linking us to the global market-
Services.[2] For more than two centuries, its core role has been to protect the public, the place and keeping our economy
environment, and U.S. economic and security interests, in America’s ports and inland strong. Our naval forces, which
waterways, along the nation’s coasts, on international waters, or in any maritime region in preserve the international free-
which U.S. interests may be at risk. Since its founding as the Revenue Cutter Service in
doms of navigation so crucial to
1790, the Coast Guard has continued to provide unique services and benefits to America’s
maritime commerce and global
maritime security because of its distinctive blend of humanitarian, law enforcement, diplo-
stability, use ocean data daily in
matic, and military capabilities, which undergird the Service’s five maritime security roles:
their worldwide operations. A
• Maritime Safety
strong national security is essen-
• Maritime Mobility tial to our nation’s ocean policy. ”
• Maritime Law Enforcement The Honorable Richard Danzig
Secretary of the Navy
• Marine Environmental The Honorable William M. Daley
Protection Secretary of Commerce
Turning to the Sea: America’s
• National Defense Ocean Future
September 1999

[1] James Kitfield, “The Stepchild Steps Out,” National Journal, October 1999.
[2] Coast Guard 2020: Ready Today...Preparing for Tomorrow (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast
Guard, 1998), pp. i, 1, 3. At his change of command ceremony in May 1998, Coast Guard
Commandant Admiral James M. Loy stated that “Since 1790, we have been a military, multimis-
sioned, maritime service. That simplicity offers great strength...Militar y...Multimissioned...
Maritime.... They remain great imperatives for us, not because they’re traditional, but because they
give us the discipline, the adaptability, and the focus to accomplish the difficult tasks America
demands of us.” Appendix A pr ovides a summary of legislative mandates for the Coast Guard’s
national maritime security roles, missions, and tasks. See also, “21st Century Hemispheric
Maritime Security: A USCG Deepwater Vision” (Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard G-OC, 30
October 1998), which ser ved as the foundation for this report.
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 The objective of this report is to help the Coast Guard, the Departments of
Transportation and Defense, other executive departments and agencies, the Congress, the
Service’s “partners” and “share-holders” – in state and local governments, U.S. and foreign
industry, foreign governments, and private organizations in the United States and overseas
– and the American public think broadly about future national security dynamics and
trends. Important issues have been addressed – how these dynamics and trends will affect
America’s maritime security and hence the Coast Guard’s current and future roles, mis-
sions, functions, and requirements. It discusses an expansive concept of U.S. maritime
security interests, focusing on current and future threats to America’s interests in its territo-
U.S. Coast Guard Maritime rial seas and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) as well as on the high seas. It provides an
Security Roles overview of the historical, strategic, policy, and operational contexts for the Coast Guard’s
maritime security roles, missions, functions, and tasks, and how the Service can most
• Maritime Safety: Save lives and
effectively and efficiently serve the United States in the 21st century. And it addresses the
property at sea platforms and systems capabilities needed to satisfy current and future requirements.
• Marine Environmental A key focus of this report is on the Coast Guard’s “Deepwater” operating environ-
Protection: Protect living and ment and enduring as well as emerging needs in this region. The Deepwater operational
non-living marine resources area has been defined by the Service as operations conducted 50 miles or more to sea,
• Maritime Mobility: Provide a although clearly Deepwater assets protect U.S. maritime security in regions much closer to
safe and efficient marine the shore. Many of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater capital assets are approaching or are at
transportation system
the ends of their service lives in block obsolescence. To deal with the need to modernize
and replace these assets, the Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater Systems (IDS)
• Maritime Law Enforcement: Capabilities Replacement Project has mapped out an innovative approach and
Uphold laws and treaties and program-plan to address all roles, missions, and functions and the subsystems, systems,
defend maritime borders and platforms needed to carry out the Service’s multiple mandates.[3] Thus, another
• National Defense: Conduct important objective of this paper is to inform U.S. and possible foreign industry partners
military and defense operations
about the full spectrum of Coast Guard Deepwater requirements, operations, and
programs for the future.

U.S. Maritime Security

I n t e rests and Thre a t s
America’s maritime interests – its reliance upon the seas for food, commerce, and
defense – have endured since colonial days. Today, on the cusp of a new millennium,
the United States remains a major maritime nation, with a broad array of interests and
concerns in the Arctic Ocean and Bering Sea, the Pacific Ocean, the Caribbean and Gulf
of Mexico, and the Atlantic, which wash some 95,000 miles of coastline – in addition to
many thousands of miles of river, lake, and navigable waterway shorelines throughout
the United States. (Figure 1 illustrates the extent of U.S. territorial seas and exclusive
economic zones.) America’s future will remain tied inextricably to the seas. The seas link
the nation with world commerce and trade, and allow us to project military power far
from our shores to protect important U.S. interests and friends. But the seas also serve as
highways for a bewildering variety of transnational threats and challenges that honor no
national frontier.

[3] Specific system- and platform-level performance requirements for the Integrated Deepwater
Systems elements has been pr ovided by the Deepwater Project Office (G-ADW), “System Performance
Specifications (SPS) for the Integrated Deepwater System,” Attachment 0001/DTCG23-98-R-
ADW0001, PRF-ADW-0001, 21 September 1998. Rather than replicate that information, this report
addresses overarching strategic and operational concepts that the Operations Capability Directorate
(G-OC), Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, believes are important. For additional public information,
see the Deepwater Acquisition web page: www.uscg.mil/deepwater/.

2
 Figure 1. U.S. Territorial Seas and Exclusive Economic Zones

America’s Maritime
Security Interests
• Living marine resources –
protection of fisheries and
other living marine resources

• Marine environment –
protection of living marine
resources’ habitats, pollution
prevention and control,
response to and remediation of
pollution incidents
As the Coast Guard looks to its third century of service, a complex mosaic of • Marine transportation and
maritime users, interests, and transnational dangers – including pollution, illegal migration,
trade – safe and efficient ports,
drug-smuggling, international terrorism, and weapons proliferation, to name but a few –
harbors, and waterways; aids
will challenge America as never before. To deal with these threats and challenges, the
to navigation, domestic and
Service must continue to carry out several fundamental tasks that have been constant
throughout the Coast Guard’s history: international ice-breaking and
patrol, safety of life at sea,
• Provide credible presence in and conduct surveillance of critical maritime regions
search and rescue, response to
• Detect, classify, and identify targets of interest maritime tragedies
• Intercept and prosecute those targets • Maritime sovereignty and
At the dawn of the 21st century, the Coast Guard carries out its Deepwater tasks defense – protection of
through routine patrols and focused, time-critical sorties conducted by high- and medium- maritime borders, law enforce-
endurance cutters, patrol boats and fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. The success of these ment, military and defense
operations, in turn, depends upon Coast Guard, Joint-Service, and national-level com- operations
mand-and-control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance (C4ISR) systems. Much of what the Coast Guard does is aimed at deterring or
preventing dangers and threats from materializing in the first place, and responding quickly
and effectively to emergencies when deterrence and prevention are frustrated. These core
tasks will be the basis for the Coast Guard’s multifaceted contributions to the Nation’s
maritime security throughout the new century, whether the mission-objective is to rescue
the distressed, to ensure safe maritime transport, to protect America’s living marine
resources and environment, to uphold the law on the sea, or to support U.S. diplomatic
and military interests in far-flung regions of the world.
In essence, the Coast Guard will continue to provide maritime security that is a critical
element in ensuring a healthy and clean marine environment, robust living and non-living
marine resources, safe and efficient marine transportation and trade, homeland defense and
maritime sovereignty – protecting U.S. citizens, interests, and friends at home and, increas-
ingly, abroad. This is an expansive national security construct that reflects the realities of
the next century. Indeed, no longer focused solely on military threats to the United States,

3
 “national security” encompasses a rich tapestry of economic, social, environmental,
political, diplomatic, cultural, and military dimensions. Indeed, a much more expan-
sive construct has been articulated by the
President’s National Security Strategy, which rec-
ognizes that diverse and numerous threats –
regional or state-centered threats, transnational
threats, the spread of dangerous technologies,
foreign intelligence collection, and failed states
“Most threats to U.S. interests – must be countered through an integrated
were indigenous: voracious forces approach to defend the nation, shape the
of societal change tearing at the international environment, respond to crises,
fabric of developing societies;
and prepare for an uncertain future.[4]
Likewise, more than simply “guarding the
destablising overpopulation and
coast,” the Coast Guard has similarly broad
overurbanization, coupled with
responsibilities for safeguarding the global
underproductivity; new social,
commons, and brings unique capabilities to the nation’s full-spectrum, multi-agency
economic, and political ideas con-
response to America’s maritime security needs.
testing with centuries-old rigidi-
America’s need for maritime security does not limit Coast Guard operations to the
ties; radical nationalism and mili-
waters off U.S. coasts and the “near-abroad” of the Western Hemisphere. Without doubt,
tant sectarianism; clashes of ethnic
many – if not most – critical Coast Guard roles, missions, functions, and operations will
and religions prejudices; and stress
continue to be focused on safeguarding America’s interests and needs in U.S. inland
on educational systems wholly waters, territorial seas, and economic zones, as well as on the high seas areas of the regions
inadequate for dealing with the close by U.S. sovereign territory. Still, waters and resources under U.S. jurisdiction total
foregoing or with the onrush of nearly 3.4 million square miles in area and encompass some of the most inhospitable
new technologies compressing marine environments in the world. (The eight U.S. central/western Pacific EEZs –
travel time and opening media vis- surrounding the Hawaiian Islands and the Trust Territories of the Pacific – comprise
tas of distant lands of unimagin- more than 40 percent of the total U.S. EEZ area.) Even more importantly, the maritime
able wealth. ” security concept signifies that the Coast Guard must have the multimission capabilities to
Discriminate Deterrence,
serve U.S. policies and support U.S. interests – alone or in concert with other U.S. agen-
January 1988 cies, allied and friendly forces, and in support of international organizations – in home
Regional Conflict Working Group waters or in any maritime area in which the President and U.S. regional Commanders-in-
Commission on Integrated Long- Chief (CinCs) determine the Coast Guard can provide important benefits to the nation.
Term Strategy
In what has been called a “pivotal states strategy,” the Coast Guard must be seen as a key
U.S. actor in American foreign policy aimed at a select group of countries – “pivotal states”
– whose futures were poised at critical turning points, and whose fates would significantly
affect regional, and even international, stability:
The repercussions of rapid change in the developing world, including population
growth, disruptive migration, and popular fundamentalist movements, are increasing-
ly affecting industrialized countries, and even the United States can no longer isolate
itself from them. Because it argues for both bilateral (and, in a complementary form,
multilateral) cooperation to mitigate such pressures, a pivotal states strategy would
encourage American policy makers to face these challenges before they directly
threaten U.S. national security.[5]
General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern
Command, underscored this perception of the Coast Guard’s roles in U.S. foreign policy
in a 26 May 1999 letter to Mortimer L. Downey, Deputy Secretary of Transportation:

[4] White House, A National Security for a New Century (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October
1998).
[5] Robert Chase, Emily Hill, and Paul Kennedy, eds., “Introduction” to The Pivotal States: A New
Framework for U.S. Policy in the Developing World (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999), p. 6.

4
 The United States Coast Guard brings tremendous capabilities and contributions
across a wide spectrum or regional engagement activities. Its role in the Southern
Theater is a significant one, and will only grow as we continue to pursue a National
Security Strategy that directs us to engage and shape an extremely diverse, dynamic,
and expansive environment.[6]
However, compared to the threats confronting the Nation or to the technology avail-
able to the Service, the Coast Guard’s ability to carry out its core tasks has declined, in
some instances significantly. During the past half-century, the Service’s missions have U.S. Coast Guard
increased in number and complexity. As technology and the sophistication of the threats
Deepwater Operations
and challenges have increased, Coast Guard capabilities have remained constant, at best.
Moreover, in some military/defense operations areas – littoral anti-submarine warfare or • Generally 50 nautical miles or
naval gunfire support, for example – there has been marked degradation, if not abandon- more from U.S. shores
ment of capability. With this situation in mind, the Integrated Deepwater Systems Project
• Long transit distance to reach
is providing the opportunity to assess and prioritize all requirements so that the Coast
operating areas
Guard can respond with the right combination of capabilities in its shoreside command-
and-control systems, cutters, and aircraft. • Extended on-scene presence
independent of support
“Deepwater” Operational Environment • Sustained operations in severe
weather and high sea
Unlike Coast Guard operations in coastal and inland waterways, Deepwater missions
conditions
typically require a long-term, continuous presence away from home stations, sometimes for
months on end, and the ability to operate independently in severe environments – from • Forward-deployed, often with
Arctic to tropical and equatorial climates – 24 hours a day, every day, wherever the other U.S., allied, and coalition
demands of national maritime security require a Coast Guard humanitarian, law enforce- naval, and maritime forces
ment, or military presence. Certainly, other marine, coastal, and inland waterways are vital
to the Nation, and these will grow in importance as burgeoning and many times competing
demands are placed on these regions. And, the adaptable and multimission character of
Deepwater cutter, aircraft, and command-and-control systems allows them to make signifi-
cant contributions to the Service’s missions and tasks in virtually all operating areas.
However, the operational demands of the Service’s Deepwater missions and tasks can be
completely satisfied only with systems and platforms designed and engineered for this
daunting environment.[7]
Nevertheless, the Coast Guard’s existing systems and platforms capabilities to carry out
all of the current and future roles, missions, and tasks in support of America’s maritime
security in the Deepwater operating environment are increasingly in doubt. The Deepwater
demands are compelling, calling for a multi-dimensional capability to carry out numerous
missions and tasks – above, on, and perhaps even below the surface of the sea – simultane-
ously (e.g., prosecuting a search and rescue case while at the same time engaged in counter-
drug surveillance and fisheries enforcement) and often across vast areas of ocean space.
Although there are likely to be significant changes during the next 40 years, in 1996 the
then-nascent Deepwater Project identified 14 separate mission- and task-areas to “bound”
the Deepwater requirements “problem”:
• Search and rescue
• International Ice Patrol
• Humanitarian response to disasters
• General law enforcement

[6] General Wilhelm’s letter to Deputy Secretary D owney is included in its entirety in the
Appendix.
[7] For example, Deepwater cutters and command-control-and-communications (C3) systems
played key roles in the nation’s responses to the massiv e Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound,
Alaska, in 1989 and the Argo Merchant spill off Nantucket, Massachusetts in 1976, as well as the 1996
TWA Flight 800 tragedy.

5
 • Protection of living marine resources
• Maritime pollution enforcement and response
• Foreign vessel inspection
• Lightering zone enforcement
• Alien migrant, drug, and maritime interdiction operations
• Forward-deployed support to regional military commanders-in-chief in peacetime
engagement and crisis-response
• Military environmental response
• U.S. homeland defense
• Port security and force protection
• Joint/combined combat operations in smaller-scale contingencies and major
theater war
Understanding the block
obsolescence confronting much
of the Coast Guard’s Deepwater
forces, and the growing inability
to meet the Service’s Deepwater
requirements effectively and effi-
ciently, the Deepwater Project
continues to address the need to
upgrade, modernize, and replace the Service’s aging fleet of cutters and aircraft, as well as
its command and control infrastructure, with an integrated system of shoreside, afloat, avi-
ation, and information technology assets. The IDS Project is by far the largest acquisition
project ever undertaken by the Coast Guard. And, it is the first time that a federal agency
– other than the Department of Defense – has approached an acquisition program from
an entire mission perspective. The Deepwater Project has set in place an integrated,
“system-of-systems” approach that embraces today’s and tomorrow’s sensors, command-
and-control systems, shoreside facilities, boats and cutters, aircraft, and people in an
innovative “network-centric” concept of operations that encompasses all five core missions.
The Coast Guard’s Deepwater acquisition program approach has been so innovative
that in June 1999 it was designated a “Reinvention Laboratory” under the National
Partnership for Reinventing Government. As such, it was empowered to test new ways of
doing its job: “we’ve dramatically reformed the way we carry out the people’s business,”
Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation, stated. “The Deepwater project will
enhance America’s national security by helping the Coast Guard perform its duties with
maximum efficiency and savings to the taxpayer.”[8]
Key to the Deepwater Project’s philosophy is the need to leverage commercial and
military technologies and innovation to develop a completely integrated, multimission,
and highly flexible Deepwater operating system at the lowest possible total ownership cost
– including research and development, design and engineering, acquisition, and life-cycle
operations and support – to carry out the diverse and demanding roles, missions, and tasks
that lie ahead.
An important development for the Coast Guard’s Deepwater future was the approval
of the Joint U.S. Navy-Coast Guard Policy Statement on the National Fleet.[9] Signed by
the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, and Coast Guard Commandant

[8] “Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Project Designated as Government Reinvention

Laboratory,” Department of Transportation Press Release, CG 11-99, 24 June 1999.
[9] NATIONAL FLEET – A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy Statement, 21 September 1998. See
Appendix C for the full text of the policy statement, and also Vice Admiral Thomas Fargo, USN, and
Rear Admiral Ernest Riutta, USCG, “A ‘National Fleet’ for America,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
April 1999, pp. 48-51.
6
Admiral James Loy, the policy calls for both services to synchronize planning, procurement,
training, and operations to provide the highest level of joint maritime capability for the
nation’s investment – a “shared purpose and common effort” focused on tailored opera-
tional integration of the Navy’s and Coast Guard’s multimission surface platforms. As Vice
Admiral Thomas Fargo, then-Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Plans, Policy, and
Operations (N3/N5), and Rear Admiral Ray Riutta, Vice Commandant for Operations,
noted in the April 1999 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings:
The Navy-Coast Guard collective task is to build fully interoperable, multimission,
naval and maritime forces for tomorrow’s challenges. To do that, the Navy and Coast
Guard must work together even more closely if they are to continue to provide the
best maritime capabilities in the world at the best price for the U.S. citizen.[10]
In this way, the Coast Guard will recapitalize for its future, to ensure and sustain its
ability to meet the demands thrust upon it, especially in its Deepwater operating environ-
ment. The Service has put in place a comprehensive and objective program to assess
requirements and acquire the assets to ensure that it can continue to meet the Nation’s
needs, and fulfill its calling as a unique instrument of U.S. national security – in inland
waters, ports, and harbors; in America’s territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone; and
on the high seas.

A Unique Instrument of M a r i t i m e S e c u r i t y
Maritime security is the Coast Guard’s unique contribution to U.S. national security
in the nation’s inland waterways, ports, and offshore maritime domains.[11] It embraces all
elements of the cultural, social, environmental, economic, political, diplomatic, and mili-
tary dimensions that today shape America’s national security strategy, policies, and programs
for economic prosperity and global engagement. The Coast Guard’s unique status as a U.S.
Armed Service with broad law enforcement authorities and responsibilities makes it an
uncommon instrument of national security. The Coast Guard is not a navy, and strives to
remain the world’s best coastguard not the United States’ second-best navy, a view under-
scored by Secretary of the Navy, Richard Danzig, in mid-October 1999:
Clearly it is in the best interests of the Nation to promote the long and highly effective
relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard. Cutters have been always ready
to work with the Navy and answer the Nation’s call, in both peace and war. It is
essential that the Coast Guard remain a military service, properly equipped with ships
and aircraft that are interoperable with Navy ships and aircraft, and manned with
crews both trained in naval procedures and experienced in operating with the Navy.
By working together, each bringing our respective strengths and expertise to the sup-
port of the other, the Navy and Coast Guard can provide an increasing return for
America’s investment in response to growing demands of the upcoming century.[12]
The U.S. Coast Guard is a vital
element in the nation’s maritime securi-
ty future. It has put in place a plan and
program and is fostering wide-ranging
collaboration among U.S. departments
and agencies that together are the foun-
dation and linchpin for the next centu-
ry of Coast Guard service – Semper
Paratus ... Always Ready – to America.

[10] Fargo and Riutta, op.cit., p. 51.

[11] The Coast Guard’s 1999 policy paper, “The United States Coast Guard: A Unique Instrument
of National Security,” is included in the Appendix.
[12] Statement of the Secretary of the Navy and the Chief of Naval Operations to the Interagency
Task Force on the Roles and Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard, provided to the Deputy Secretary of
Transportation, Mortimer L. Downey, 12 October 1999, p. 7.
7
II. A M E R I C A’ S M A R I T I M E
SECURITYINTERESTS,
T H R E AT S A N D C H A L L E N G E S
America’s greatest liquid assets are the oceans on either side of the continent.[13] The
“liquid assets” adjacent to the some 95,000 miles of U.S. coastlines are enormous, encom-
passing five maritime and ocean areas – the Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, the Pacific Ocean,
the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean, and the Atlantic Ocean – and ranging from Arctic
to tropical and equatorial climates.[14] America’s maritime borders encompass almost 3.4
million square miles of territorial seas and exclusive economic zones, the largest in the
world. More than 95 percent of the nation’s trade tonnage – excluding that transported
over land bridges with Canada and Mexico – is carried by ship (less than three percent of
which travels in U.S.-flag vessels), with important ports along Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific
coastlines serving as America’s gateways to the world. One-quarter of all domestic goods is
shipped by water, and half of all oil consumed in the United States arrives by sea. Fragile
living resources, with some fisheries in
crisis from overexploitation and pollu-
tion, support a $24 billion commercial
industry and tens of thousands of jobs.
Coastal tourism and marine recreation
– which in 1997 generated $71 billion
to state and local economies, 85 percent
of all U.S. tourism-related revenues –
are the fastest-growing sector of the
U.S. service industry and demand
clean shorelines and marine environ-
ments.[15] Courtesy of Don Leavitt

“Yet many people still consider the oceans as not only inexhaustible, but immune to
human interference,” Anne Platt McGinn noted in the Worldwatch State of the World,
1999 assessment. “In part,” she continued,
the vast seascape is far removed from everyday life and therefore remains separate and
disconnected from the more familiar landscape. Much of the ocean environment is
relatively inaccessible to scientists, let alone the general public. Because scientists have
only begun to piece together how ocean systems work, society has yet to appreciate –
much less protect – the wealth of oceans in its entirety. Indeed, our current course of
action is rapidly undermining this wealth. Overcoming ignorance and apathy is never

[13] From A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy, 1776-1976, quoted in Gregory
Hartmann and Scott C. Truver, Weapons that Wait, 2nd edition (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1991).
[14] The appendix provides basic data on maritime areas of interest to the Coast Guard, generally,
and particularly the Deepwater Project. The Great Lakes and inland waterways are likewise important
regions for Coast Guard operations, and Deepwater fixed-wing aircraft and helicopter assets provide
essential services for search and rescue, environmental protection, ice imagery for icebreaking, and control
of smuggling on the Great Lakes. However, the Coast Guard does not routinely operate Deepwater cutter
assets in the Great Lakes and virtually never in inland waterways. That said, the command-control-and-
communications infrastructure that supports Deepwater operations also supports operations in coastal,
Great Lakes, and inland operating areas, and Deepwater aircraft – fixed-wing and helicopter – assets are
employed to meet non-Deepwater needs.
[15] Richard Danzig and William M. Daley, Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future
(Washington, DC: September 1999), p. 12.
9
 easy, but educating people about our collective dependence on healthy oceans will
help build support for marine conservation. And that is just what the oceans
need.”[16]
At the dawn of the 21st centu-
ry, the Coast Guard stands as the
nation’s sole military, multimission,
maritime service that combines
humanitarian, law enforcement,
“America is surrounded by one of diplomatic, and military capabilities
the largest, richest, and most in a single organization focused on
diverse marine territories of any safeguarding and enhancing
nation. From the Arctic Ocean bor- America’s maritime safety and securi-
dering Alaska to the Atlantic, ty. In all five core Coast Guard mar-
Courtesy of NOAA
Caribbean, and Pacific oceans itime security roles, the enduring
framing the mainland, Americans tasks of providing a meaningful, credible presence; conducting surveillance; detecting,
enjoy and prosper from an abun-
classifying, and identifying targets of interest; and intercepting and engaging those targets
dance of marine resources and
remain at the fulcrum of its operations to defend important U.S. maritime security
interests:[17]
activities, including productive
fisheries, global trade, coastal • Maritime Safety: Saving lives and property at risk on the seas – search and rescue,
recreation, mineral and energy response to maritime tragedies, ensuring seaworthy vessels
production, and diverse marine • Maritime Mobility: Providing a safe and efficient marine transportation system –
ecosystems. ” ports, harbors, waterways, aids to navigation, domestic and international ice-
Our Ocean Future, May 1998
breaking and patrol
• Maritime Law Enforcement: Upholding laws and treaties and defending
maritime borders and sovereignty
• Marine Environmental Protection: Protecting living and non-living marine
resources – fisheries and endangered marine species, and offshore mineral resources
– and the control, response, and remediation of pollution incidents
• National Defense: Conducting military and defense operations in peacetime,
smaller-scale contingencies, and major theater war
Meanwhile, the nation’s maritime borders are under increasing siege from a broad
spectrum of threats and challenges, most of which have a pronounced law-enforcement
component – illegal alien migration, for example – and then transition to a national
security problem. Indeed, U.S. national security and maritime security can no longer be
defined solely in terms of direct military threats to America and its allies. The United
States can expect no “peer competitor” to emerge until 2015, if not beyond. In such a
geopolitical environment in which no single power holds the United States at risk of
imminent attack and destruction, “national security” has come to embrace broad eco-
nomic, social, environmental, political, cultural, and military factors, trends, and dynamics
that are not readily apparent or obvious as Americans go about their daily lives. Indeed, a
much more expansive construct has been articulated by the President’s National Security

[16] Anne Platt McGinn, “Charting a New Course for Oceans,” S tate of the World 1999: A
Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, 1999), p. 79.
[17] For discussions of Canadian maritime security concerns, see: Rear Admiral Fred Crickard
(Ret.), “Canada’s Ocean and Maritime Security,” Marine Policy, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 335-342;
Crickard and Peter T. Haydon, Why Canada Needs Maritime Forces (Ontario: Napier Publishing for The
Naval Officers’ Association of Canada, 1994); Crickard, et alia, ed. Multinational Naval Cooperation and
Foreign Policy into the 21st Century (Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 1998); Ann L. Griffiths
and Peter T. Haydon, Maritime Forces in Global Security: Comparative Views of Maritime Strategy as We
Approach the 21st Century (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Dalhousie University,
1995); and Colin S. Gray, Canadians in a Dangerous World (Toronto: The Atlantic Council of Canada,
1994).
10
Strategy, which recognizes that diverse and numerous threats – regional or state-centered
threats, transnational threats, the spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence
collection, and failed states – must be countered through an integrated approach to defend
the nation, shape the international environment, respond to crises, and prepare for an
uncertain future:
The goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of our nation’s
fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans, maintain
the sovereignty of the United States with its values, institutions and territory intact,
and promote the prosperity and well-being of the nation and its people.... Our
strategy is based on three national objectives: enhancing our security, bolstering our
economic prosperity and promoting democracy abroad.[18]
Similarly, the Department of Transportation’s Strategic Plan 1997-2002 recognizes that
“we must be prepared to face global mar-
kets, environmental challenges, transna-
tional security threats, and a communica-
tions and information revolution.”[19]
Secretary of Transportation Rodney
E. Slater, warning of “terrorist threats,
the increasing dependence on high-
technology transportation systems and
communications networks, and increasing
illegal immigrant transportation and smuggling,” clearly echoed the concerns of numerous
observers who have called out for scrutiny of and the ability to counter a broad spectrum of
threats to U.S. maritime security.[20] The specific national security “Outcome Goals” iden-
tified by Secretary Slater, which (especially Goals 4 and 5) will shape the operational needs
for all Coast Guard assets, are as follows:
• Goal 1. Reduce the vulnerability and consequences of intentional harm to the
transportation system and its users.
• Goal 2. Ensure readiness and capability of all modes of commercial transportation
to meet national security needs.
• Goal 3. Ensure transportation physical and information infrastructure and tech-
nology are adequate to facilitate military logistics during mobility, training exercises,
and mobilization.

[18] A National Security for a New Century , op.cit., p. 5. The May 1997 edition of the National
Security Strategy, at p. 7, is much more expressive: “...the dangers we face are unprecedented in their
complexity. Ethnic conflict and outlaw states threaten regional stability; terrorism, drugs, organized
crime, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are global concerns that transcend national
borders; and environmental damage and rapid population growth undermine economic prosperity and
political stability in many countries.”
[19] Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation, U.S. Department of Transportation Strategic Plan
1997-2002 (Washington, D.C.: Department of Transportation, 30 September 1997), p. 1. See also pp.
33-35 for an expansion of DoT ’s national security strategic goal.
[20] See generally: Coast Guard 2020, op.cit., pp. 4-5; Office of Naval Intelligence, Worldwide
Challenges 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, March 1997); U.S.Navy Office of Naval
Intelligence and U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, Threats and Challenges to Maritime
Security 2020 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Coast Guard, 1 March 1999); William S. Cohen, Secretary of
Defense, 1998 Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), pp. 2,
24-26; Cohen, 1999 Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1999),
pp. 1-3; Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures (Washington, D.C.: GPO, October
1997), especially Chapter Three, “New Vulnerabilities, Shared Threats, Shared Responsibility,” pp. 11-
20; National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Centur y (Washington,
D.C.: GPO, December 1997), pp. i-iii, 1-7, 11-22; Robert Mandel, The Changing Face of National
Security: A Conceptual Analysis (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994); William J. Perry and Ashton B.
Carter, “Preventative Defense,” Hoover Digest, Number 4, 1999, pp. 84-92; and the annual Strategic
Assessments prepared by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University.
[21] 1999 Annual Report to the President and the Congress, op.cit., pp. 1-3.
11
 • Goal 4. Maintain readiness of resources including operating forces and contingency
resources owned, managed, or coordinated by DOT necessary to support the
President’s National Security Strategy and other security-related plans.
• Goal 5. Reduce flow of illegal drugs and of illegal aliens entering the United States.
Likewise, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen explained in early 1999 that “the
world remains a complex, dynamic, and dangerous place.” While admitting that “there is
great uncertainty about how the security environment will evolve,” the Defense Secretary
Department of Transportation outlined six projected security challenges – large-scale, cross-border aggression; flow of
National Security Strategic Goal potentially dangerous technologies; transnational dangers; threats to the U.S. homeland;
failed states; and adversary use of asymmetric means – that will certainly affect the need
Advance the Nation’s vital security
for a full spectrum of maritime security and military capabilities, including the Coast
interests in support of national Guard’s contributions to protecting U.S. national security – not just military security –
strategies such as the National interests.[21]
Security Strategy and National
Finally, the Phase I Report of the Hart-Rudman Commission, released in September
Drug Control Strategy by ensuring
1999, outlined a future of crisis, terror, and conflict that will directly attack America in
that the transportation system is
ways against which military superiority cannot entirely deter or protect.[22] The first of
secure and available for defense 14 prominent themes warned that “America will become increasingly vulnerable to hostile
mobility and that our borders are attack on our homeland, and our military superiority will not entirely protect us.
safe from illegal intrusion.
The United States will be both absolutely and relatively stronger than any
U.S. Department of Transportation other state or combination of states. Although a global competitor to the United
Strategic Plan 1997-2002
States is unlikely to arise over the next 25 years, emerging powers – either singly or
in coalition – will increasingly constrain U.S. options regionally and limit its strategic
influence. As a result, we will remain limited in our ability to impose our will, and
we will be vulnerable to an increasing range of threats against American forces and
citizens overseas as well as at
home. American influence will
increasingly be both embraced
and resented abroad, as U.S.
cultural, economic, and political
power persists and perhaps
spreads. States, terrorists, and
other disaffected groups will
acquire weapons of mass destruc-
tion and mass disruption, and
some will use them. Americans
will likely die on American soil, Courtesy of Don Wilson/Port of Seattle
possibly in large numbers.[23]

[22] New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, Major Themes and Implications
(Washington, D.C.,The Commission, established by the Department of Defense as a result of congres-
sional activism and language included in the Fiscal Year 1998 DoD Appropriations Act, was renamed
The United States Commission on National Security/21st Centur y. See also, “Homeland Terrorism,
More ‘Kosovos’ Ahead, Security Panel Warns,” Inside the Navy, 9 August 1999, pp. 1, 12-13. The
report is available at: http://www.nssg.gov/Reports/ New_World_Coming/new-world-coming.htm.
[23] Ibid., p. 4.
12
Other key themes identified by the Hart-Rudman Commission were as follows:
• Rapid advances in information and biotechnologies will create new vulnerabilities
for U.S. security.
• New technologies will divide the world as well as draw it together.
• The national security of all advanced states will be increasingly affected by the
vulnerabilities of the evolving global economic infrastructure.
• Energy will continue to have major strategic significance.
• All borders will be more porous; some will bend and some will break.
• The sovereignty of states will come under pressure, but will endure.
• Fragmentation or failure of states will occur, with destabilizing effects on
neighboring states.
• Foreign crises will be replete with atrocities and the deliberate terrorizing of civilian
populations.
• Space will become a critical and competitive military environment.
• The essence of war will not change.
• U.S. intelligence will face more challenging adversaries, and even excellent
intelligence will not prevent all surprises.
• The United States will be called upon frequently to intervene militarily in a time of
uncertain alliances and with the prospect of fewer forward-deployed forces.
• The emerging security environment in the next quarter century will require different
military and other national capabilities.
It must be admitted that a good deal of uncertainty is involved in predicting the world
situation next year, much less 20 years into the future, and assessing the implications of that
future for U.S. maritime security interests and the Coast Guard. In 1988 for example, few
pundits and futurists had the foresight – or chuztpah! – to predict that by the end of 1989
the Berlin Wall would be torn down and the Soviet Union would be in disarray. Several
issues or events may have a great effect on America’s maritime security in 2020, but the
specific occurrences and implications cannot be predicted with any degree of accuracy.
Regional conflicts, natural disasters, asymmetric warfare carried out by hostile states or
non-state actors, and technological surprises are all examples of “wild cards” that will affect
maritime security in 2020. Even with these uncertainties, however, certain trends shaping
America’s maritime security interests can be illuminated. Indeed, if past is prologue, U.S.
national and maritime security will increasingly be challenged in diverse and sometimes
surprising ways. As Secretary Cohen warned in mid-1999:
This is not hyperbole. It is reality. Indeed, past may be prologue. In 1995 the
Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo used Sarin gas in its attack on the Tokyo subway and
also planned to unleash anthrax against U.S. forces in Japan. Those behind the 1993
World Trade Center bombing were also gathering the ingredients for a chemical
weapon that could have killed thousands. In the past year, dozens of threats to use
chemical or biological weapons in the United States have turned out to be hoaxes.
Someday, one will be real.[24]

[24] William S. Cohen, “Preparing for a Grave New World,” The Washington Post, 26 July 1999, p. 19.

13
 Marine Enviro n m e n t
America’s marine waters and their ecosystems are vital to the health, well-being, and
economy of the Nation. Along with increased use of the oceans for recreation, fishing,
minerals development, and transportation, the potential is growing for greater stresses on
the marine environment to pose grave risk to U.S. interests.
As discussed in the following section, the natural resources of the marine environ-
ment include biologically and economically important marine life, energy resources, and
“The task of rescuing the seas is minerals. Presidential Decision Directive-36 outlines the national policy “for providing
far from hopeless, given their stewardship of the marine resources under U.S. jurisdiction and for U.S. leadership in
amazing resilience. State and local promoting international cooperation to care for the high seas.”[25] The marine ecological
efforts to restore the health of system itself is perhaps the most important “resource,” having great aesthetic as well as
large estuaries like Long Island economic value. The marine coastal environment, which for the United States can extend
Sound and Chesapeake Bay are to the full expanse of the Nation’s 200-nautical mile EEZ, is among the most valuable and
moving forward. Washington has productive natural resources on Earth.
begun to focus on the problem of It is also the most threatened by man’s activities – on the land as well as above, on,
agricultural runoff of poisonous and under the water. Harland Cleveland, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and
wastes, and has embarked on an ambassador to NATO, warned that the “poor and the rich, we are cooperating to destroy –
ambitious project to clean up the in different but mutually reinforcing ways – the environment we share.”[26] There is
Mississippi River and help prevent growing concern about the damage to coastal fish-
the “dead zones” in the Gulf of ing stocks by both local and long-distance fishing
Mexico. But none of these efforts fleets, as well as threats of pollution from ships car-
confront the larger menace of
rying hazardous materials and from offshore ener-
gy exploration and development. Waste and pollu-
overfishing. That is a global prob-
tion loads have increased, vital habitats have been
lem, on which Washington can
degraded or destroyed, and water quality has
and must take the lead. ” decreased. Chemicals and debris from all sources
The Troubled Seas are presenting severe problems – acute and chronic
New York Times
13 September 1998
toxicity that threatens the food chain (including
humans) through uptake, while marine debris
often harms or kills marine organisms, damages
fishing gear, and reduces the appeal of recreational
beaches. Coastal pollution can have a significant
effect on marine travel and tourism, and can pose
severe risk of contamination to shellfish and other
living marine resources. As oceanographer Scott W. Nixon explained, with “little cause for
celebration” despite increased awareness and scientific research:
Part of the problem will come directly as a result of population growth. With
the occupancy of the planet expected to reach more than nine billion by 2050, there
will be that many more mouths to feed, more fields to fertilize, more livestock to
raise and more tons of waste to dispose of. Many experts predict that the release of

[25] PDD-36, 15 April 1995. The five principal objectives are: Promoting Sustainable Fisheries;
Promoting the Conservation of Whales and Other Protected Species; Becoming a Party to the Law of the
Sea Convention; Supporting Integrated Coastal Resource Management and Reducing Marine Pollution,
and Supporting Critical Scientific Research. It continues by listing the priorities in these efforts to
include: vessel construction and safety standards; promoting navigational standards; curbing the spread of
aquatic nuisance species through ballast water; raising maritime personnel training and certification stan-
dards; promoting insurance requirements; and reducing air pollution from ships – all important priorities
on which the Coast Guard will continue to focus.
[26] Cleveland, “The Global Commons,” The Futurist, May-June 1993, pp. 9-13, at p. 9. See
also, Linda Starke, ed., Vital Signs 1998: The Environmental Trends that are Shaping Our Future (New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1998, Worldwatch Institute), for several essays that outline the nation’s
environmental challenges.
[27] Scott W. Nixon, “Enriching the Sea to Death,” Scientific American Presents The Oceans, Fall
1998, pp. 48-53 at p. 53. In his analysis of the effects of eutrophication on near-shore oceanic regions,
Nixon noted that the developing countries of Western Europe and the United States produce 100 times
14
 nutritive nitrogen from fertilizer and fossil-fuel combustion will double in the next 25
years, most of that increase occurring in the developing world...
With large stretches of the coastline exposed to unprecedented levels of nitrogen,
it seems inevitable that ocean waters around the world will become greener, browner
and redder and that there will be more frequent periods when the bottom of the sea in
vulnerable locations becomes lifeless.[27]
Coastal population growth will play an important role in the health of the marine
environment through 2020 and beyond. Human activity degrades the environment
through non-point-source pollution – pollutants originating from non-distinct sources –
“...man’s fingerprint is found
everywhere in the oceans.
and the physical alteration of habitats. Already, 66 percent of the world’s people live within
Chemical contamination and litter
60 miles of the ocean, and, because of migration from inland areas to the prosperous coasts,
populations in coastal zones are increasing at a can be observed from the poles
much faster rate than overall population. As to the tropics and from beaches
much as 85 percent of the U.S. population lives to abyssal depths.... But condi-
near the coast, where population densities are tions in the marine environment
five times the national average, and coastal pop- vary widely. The open sea is rela-
ulations are growing more rapidly than other tively clean.... In contrast to the
populations: in the late 1990s, 17 of the 20 open ocean, the margins of the
fastest growing states were located along the sea are affected by man almost
coast, and America’s coastal population had been everywhere, and encroachment
increasing by 3,600 people per day.[28] This on coastal areas continues world-
continuous coastal growth poses a threat to the
wide.... If unchecked, this trend
natural resources in the surrounding waters.
Courtesy of Don Leavitt will lead to global deterioration
While the United States is likely to expend the
in the quality and productivity of
necessary resources to combat degradation of the marine environment resulting from
coastal population growth, most developing countries will not have the means to do so. the marine environment. ”
The State of the Marine
The degradation of the marine environment will remain a substantial concern. Environment
However, there will be a great disparity in the actual health of the seas from region to Group of Experts on the Scientific
region around the world. Because of the high value that developed countries will place on Aspects of Marine Pollution, 1990
preserving as pristine a marine environment as possible, they will continue the trend toward
more regulation and stricter standards in shipping and environmental protection, and will
devote the resources necessary to obtain their goal. The result will be healthier marine
environments near most developed states by 2020. Conversely, the developing states will
not have the means, even if they have the will, to enact effective measures to protect the
seas adjacent to their countries. Waters abutting most developing states will, therefore, be
more polluted in 2020 than today. Several factors will contribute in varying degrees to the
degradation of the marine environment.
The monitoring of U.S. waters and high seas regions that are held in common with
the world is necessary to ensure the well-being of their vast natural resources, and has
implications for both conventional and customary international law.[29] Actions including
the unauthorized or accidental discharge of oil and other petroleum products, hazardous

the amount of nitrogen per square kilometer of land than much of Africa. In the fall 1999, the United
Nations reported that the rate of population growth was slowing such that by 2050 world population
will be approximately 8.9 billion. This is 500 million fewer people than the U.N. had predicted at the
1994 world population conference in Cairo. Still, the 20th century has experienced the fastest popula-
tion growth in history, with the number of people quadrupling since 1900. “Population Growth Slows
Worldwide, U.N. Report Says,” The Washington Post, 23 September 1999, p. A22.
[28] Our Ocean Future: Themes and Issues Concerning the Nation’s Stake in the Oceans (Washington,
D.C.: The H. John Heinz II Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, May 1998), pp. 11-
16; Coast Guard 2020, op.cit., p. 13; Richard D. Kohout, et alia, Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to
the Coast Guard (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CIM499/February 1997), pp. 123-154: and
“Threats and Challenges, 2020,” op.cit., pp. III-43 - III-48.
[29] On the various law of the sea issues, particularly the exploitation of seabed resources, see
National Intelligence Council, Law of the Sea: End Game (Washington, D.C.: National Technical
Information Service, March 1996).
15
 substances, or human waste can result in far-reaching effects to not only the local environ-
ment, but to the economic viability and personal health of maritime communities and
regions. Likewise, the inadvertent introduction of alien marine species, transported in
ships’ ballast water, as well as other foreign
species, already pose severe threats to local U.S.
ecosystems. Every minute, 40,000 gallons of
foreign ballast water that may contain exotic
species and pathogens are pumped into U.S.
harbors, threatening to displace or eliminate
native species and damaging important fish-
eries. More than 240 non-indigenous species
are now found in San Francisco Bay, for exam-
ple, while foreign viruses reduced U.S. aquacul-
ture shrimp production by half in 1996 and
may cost the Great Lakes commercial and sport fisheries more than $500 million by the
year 2005. Current estimates indicate that control measures alone can cost communities
more than $6 billion each year to reduce problems caused by non-indigenous species.[30]
Maritime commercial activity will expand greatly during the next 20 years, resulting
in larger amounts of petroleum and chemical products being transported by ship and
produced in maritime regions. However, the adoption and enforcement of stricter safety
standards will ensure that both the number of devastating incidents and the volume of
contaminants spilled will decrease substantially. This trend is already evident in the United
States, where the amount of oil and chemicals shipped through U.S. waters has steadily
increased during the past 15 years, from 259.9 million gallons in 1982, to 307.8 million
gallons in 1990, and to 333.1 million gallons in 1995. During same period, however, the
amount of oil and chemicals spilled per million gallons shipped dropped dramatically,
from 13.5 gallons to 5.96 gallons. Actions of developed states to effect a safer shipping
industry will contribute to safer shipping in developing countries and therefore help
reduce the threat of pollution from maritime accidents. Efforts such as the U.S. Port State
Control program will grow, reducing if not eliminating loopholes exploited by shipping
companies to save money through the use of flag states with lax shipping regulations and
little ability to enforce the standards they do have. For these reasons, environmental
damage caused by marine accidents should decrease worldwide over the next 20 years.
The number of significant spills from oil production and transportation in U.S. and
nearby waters has been relatively low for some time.[31] But when a large-scale oil spill
does occur, as in the 1989 Exxon Valdez accident in Alaska, the short-term effects can be
devastating. In addition to the long-term destruction of habitat and local economies, the
spill killed some 350,000 marine birds, 2,800 sea otters, 300 harbor seals, 250 bald eagles,
and 22 killer whales. Ten years later, Exxon had spent $113 million in Cordova, alone,
including $80 million for clean-up and $26 million compensating the town of 2,500
people for lost income; added to this was the $900 million settlement Exxon paid to the
state and federal governments.[32] Another $5 billion in punitive damages ordered by a
U.S. District Court have been appealed. (Figure 2 illustrates the immense expanse of the
Exxon Valdez oil spill, transposed off the U.S. east coast.)
Both the number of incidents and volume of hazardous waste materials intentionally
dumped into the marine environment will likely decline in the years ahead, a result of
stricter regulation of the shipping industry. Whether vessels wish to transport toxins,

[30] Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future, op.cit., pp. 50-51.
[31] For example, on 28 June 1999, a tanker unloading oil at the Tosco refinery near Ferndale,
Washington, north of Puget Sound, became untethered and spilled slightly more than 1,000 gallons of
crude oil. The flow of oil was stopped immediately, but the spill touched land in two locations, posing a
threat to wildlife.
[32] “Spill’s Residue Still Sticks in Alaska’s Craw,” The Washington Post, 23 March 1999, pp. A3,
A4.
16
dump nuclear or other industrial waste, or Figure 2. Equivalent Area Covered by the
EXXON VALDEZ Oil Spill
deballast tanks, doing so will remain explicitly
prohibited without the possession of a permit.
The likelihood of obtaining such permission,
however, will decrease as restrictions tighten and
are expanded to more types of chemicals and
waste products. Consequently, the present
declining trend in ocean dumping, in both vol-
ume and number of incidents, internationally “As we approach the new mil-
and within waters under U.S. jurisdiction, is lennium, it is more evident than
likely to continue. Detecting and apprehending ever before that the oceans are a
ocean dumping violators will remain an enforce- common asset of humanity as a
ment challenge, however, as great incentive will
whole. The oceans are a privi-
exist to try to avoid legal but expensive disposal
leged space for the strengthening
requirements.
of relationships between states:
With maritime trade expected to as much relationships forged on a spirit of
as triple by 2020, the threat of invasive species
cooperation, understanding and
entering the United States through seaborne
solidarity. With an economic
trade will increase significantly. Invasive species
approach prevailing in these days
are ones intentionally or unintentionally intro-
of harsh competition, the impor-
duced into an area outside of their natural
ranges. Invasive species affect marine, estuarine, freshwater, and terrestrial ecosystems tant capital that are the oceans
throughout the world and have strong economic and environmental consequences. Nearly represent to humanity is often
every part of the United States faces at least one highly damaging invasive species. For overlooked, particularly their
example, in June 1999 colonies of “killer bees” were found at the port of Jacksonville, non-material aspects. This capital
Florida; officials were con- has no price, no replacement and
cerned that the Africanized no exchange value. We must
honey bees had been brought preserve it for the benefit of
in by ship and, if they spread,
could threaten Florida’s $20
present and future generations. ”
Mario Soares
million annual honey industry. The Ocean Our Future
Another example of the range Independent World Commission
and cost of damage from on the Oceans, 1998
invasive species can be derived
by examining the effects of the
introduction of the zebra
mussel into U.S. waters. These
effects range from clogged
municipal and industrial water
intake pipes to the decline and
perhaps extinction of native mussel populations. The minimum cost to industries and
municipalities to repair zebra mussel damage from 1993 through 2003 is estimated to be
more than $3 billion.
Thus, for waters under U.S. jurisdiction, the challenge will be to ensure the safety and
seaworthiness of increasingly larger ships, many of which will not be able to berth at U.S.
ports because of draft limitations. This will drive the need for farther-offshore lightering,
vulnerable offshore facilities, and transshipment of hazardous materials through long and
exposed pipelines, and, in the event of a large spill, enhanced Deepwater response and
mediation capabilities.

17
 Marine Resourc e s
The demand for food, minerals, and energy from the oceans will continue to
increase, especially as world populations continue to grow. Globally, critical fish stocks are
under great pressure as overfishing and habitat destruction continue. Meanwhile, new
technologies are permitting more remote exploration and development of minerals and
petroleum resources in ever-greater depths and farther out to sea.

Fisheries
In the mid-1990s the United States had an annual commercial fish catch of nearly
five million metric tons, 90 percent of which was harvested within 200 nautical miles of
the coast – an industry worth some $24 billion each year. The U.S. EEZ is estimated to
hold some 20 percent of the world’s fishery resources. About 110,000 commercial fishing
vessels operate from U.S. ports; in addition, the fishing fleets of numerous countries ply
the waters adjacent to – and sometimes venturing into – America’s EEZ in search of pro-
tein. Moreover, saltwater sport fishing is popular in many states and contributes greatly to
local economies. Nevertheless, these fishery resources, the ecosystems that support them,
and the communities that depend on them are under increasing pressure from consumers
who spend some $46 billion each year on fish products.[33]
Marine species dominate U.S. commercial landings, with freshwater fish representing
only a small portion of the total catch. Shellfish
account for only one-sixth of the weight of the
total catch but nearly one-half of the value.
Alaskan pollock makes up about one-third of all
landings by weight but only one-tenth of the
catch by value. Menhaden, a species used in the
manufacture of oil and fertilizer, accounts for
nearly one-fifth of the tonnage landed but only
about three percent of the value. The most valu-
able species caught are crabs, salmon, and shrimp,
each representing about one-sixth of the total
value. Other important species include lobsters,
clams, flounders, scallops, Pacific cod, and oysters.
Alaska leads all states in both the volume
and value of the catch; important species landed
at Alaskan ports include salmon, king crab, hal-
ibut, and pollock. Other leading fishing states are Courtesy of Don Wilson/Port of Seattle
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Texas, Maine, California, Florida, Hawaii, Washington, and
Virginia. Measured by value of the catch in the mid-1990s, Dutch Harbor, Alaska, is the
nation’s leading fishing port, followed by New Bedford, Massachusetts. Other important
U.S. fisheries include high-seas tuna landings in American Samoa and Guam.
The U.S. National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) has estimated that of the
approximately 300 fish stocks that are economically valuable to the United States, 62
stocks in the U.S. EEZ are currently overfished or are at risk.[34] Another 28 highly
migratory fish stocks with commercial value to the United States are also overfished. The
overexploitation of these stocks represents hundreds of millions of dollars lost to the U.S.
economy each year. For example, NMFS data provided to the President’s Interagency Task

[33] Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future, op.cit., p. 16.

[34] Assistant Administrator for Fisheries, National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration, National Marine Fisheries Service, Briefing to the Interagency Task Force on the Roles
and Missions of the Coast Guard, June 1999.

18
Force on the Roles and Missions of the Coast Guard in late spring 1999 indicated that if
the New England groundfish fishery were operated at maximum economic yield (MEY),
the industry would be worth more than $500 million annually, not the $50 million in
1998 resulting from severe overexploitation. Species such as the Gulf of Maine codfish are
greatly overfished and would require draconian management efforts to avoid economic
extinction and complete closure, as has been the fate of the Grand Banks cod stocks just
to the northeast. The U.S. fishing fleet generally is overcapitalized; there are far too many
boats trying to catch increasingly fewer fish. In addition to creating personal crises,
financial hardships, and enforcement challenges, this situation has driven up demand for
more imports of overseas-caught species.
Ongoing analysis indicates a trend of increasing U.S. imports of fishery products,
at increasingly high cost, as U.S. fisheries remain stagnant or decline. “This increasing
dependence on imports can be explained,” another assessment concluded,
...by greater demand in the United States for fish and non-edible fishery products, a
declining domestic fishing industry that is unable to catch sufficiently greater amounts
of fish, the decreasing availability of domestic fishery stocks, and the inability of
inland fisheries or aquaculture to compensate for the difference between available
supply and increasing domestic demand.[35]
Similar trends are expected worldwide, according to the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO).[36] World commercial fish catch has more than quadru-
pled since 1950 and was 93 million tons in 1996, down from the peak level of more than
100 million tons in 1989. Between 1970 and 1990, the world’s fishing fleet grew twice as
fast as the rate of the global catch, doubling in total tonnage and number of vessels.
Harvesting is so intense that in some fisheries as much as 90 percent of the stock is
removed each year. The FAO estimates that 70 percent of the world’s marine fish stocks
are fully fished, overfished, depleted, or recovering, and by the turn of the century no
additional increases will be possible. (Table 1 presents data on world fisheries depletion;
Figure 3 shows the projected demand for fish for human consumption.)
Table 1.
Depletion of World Fisheries
(Harvests in Thousands of Metric Tons)
Year Maximum Maximum Most Recent Percent Change
Fishing Area Harvest Reached Harvest Harvest* In Catch*
Atlantic, NW 1967 2,588 1,007 - 61%
Antarctic 1971 189 28 - 85%
Atlantic, SE 1972 962 312 - 68%
Atlantic, W/Central 1974 181 162 - 11%
Atlantic, E/Central 1974 481 320 - 33%
Atlantic, NE 1976 5,745 4,575 - 20%
Pacific, NW 1987 6,950 5,661 - 19%
Pacific, NE 1988 2,556 2,337 - 9%
Atlantic, SW 1989 1,000 967 - 3%
Pacific, SW 1990 498 498 –
Pacific, SE 1990 508 459 - 10%
Mediterranean 1991 284 284 –
Indian Ocean, W 1991 822 822 –
Indian Ocean, E 1991 379 379 –
Pacific, W/Central 1991 833 833 –
*Peak year to most recent harvest for which data are available, 1995-1997.
Sources: FAO Fisheries Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (Rome: Food and Agriculture
Organization, 1995), pp. 9-12; Washington Post, 25 July 1998, p. A17; and Carl Safina, “The World’s Imperiled
Fish,” Scientific American Presents The Oceans , Fall 1998, p. 59.

[35] Looking Out to 2020: Trends Relevant to the Coast Guard, op.cit. , p. 75.
[36] “The Catch of Fishing,” Washington Post, 25 July 1997, p. A17. See also, F AO Fisheries
Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture (Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, 1995); Michael Parfit, “Diminishing Returns: Exploiting the Ocean’s Bounty,”
National Geographic, November 1995, pp. 2-37; Carl Safina, “The World’s Imperiled Fish,” Scientific
American Presents The Oceans, Fall 1998, pp. 58-63; “Threats and Challenges 2020,” op.cit., pp. III-1 -
III-6, and Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future , op.cit., pp. 18-21.
19
 Figure 3. Projected Demand to the Year 2010 of Fish for Human Consumption

Today, on the average, people receive about six percent of their total protein and 16
percent of their animal protein from fish. Nearly one billion people, primarily in Asia,
relay on fish for at least 30 percent of their animal protein supply.[37] The FAO expects
demand for edible fish products to increase from 80 million tons in 1998 to 91 million
tons by 2010 (with 115 million tons anticipated in 2015) as world populations continue
to increase, primarily in the developing countries, and commercial catches remain stable,
at best, if not continue to decline. This demand can be satisfied only if aquaculture can be
doubled from approximately 26 million tons in 1996 and overfishing is brought under
control so that depleted stocks can recover. The FAO concludes that both are unlikely,
and, if so, the result will be a further depletion of stocks, crisis, and even conflict among
nations.
Indeed, “fish wars” over access to and protection of fisheries might ultimately engulf
U.S. interests and demand a Coast Guard (if not a U.S. Navy) response, especially if world
fishing fleets look to U.S.-managed fisheries as sources of protein and income. (See Figure
4, which shows areas of “prime conflict” over scarce fishery resources.) In the past four
years, there were at least 13 incidents between fishing fleets and naval forces, at times with
shots fired and people killed:[38]
• March 1995: Canadian coastguard forces chase down and seize a Spanish trawler
poaching in Canada’s Grand Banks fishery conservation/management zone
• November 1995: Malaysian naval vessel fires on a Thai trawler, killing the vessel’s
captain and his son
• December 1995: Australian forces seize eight Indonesian fishing boats near
Ashmore Reef
• Summer 1996: In the northeast Atlantic, Iceland authorizes the use of force to
exclude Danish trawlers from disputed waters
• August 1996: Ireland arrests a Japanese tuna-boat captain
• August 1996: The Philippine navy arrests 91 Chinese fishermen

[37] Anne Platt McGinn, op.cit., p. 80.

[38] Tim Zimmerman, “If World War III Comes, Blame Fish,” U.S. News & World Report, 21
October 1996, pp. 59-60. Also, “South Korea Claims to Sink North Korean Boat in Disputed Waters,”
The Washington Post, 15 June 1999, pp. A21; and “U.S. Protests Seizure of Boat by Canada,” The
Washington Post, 3 July 1999, p. A7. Bronwen Maddox, in his 30 August 1994 Financial Times article,
“Fleets Fight in Over-Fished Waters: Fishing Disputes Have Risen up the Diplomatic Agenda,” catalogs
28 incidents of fishing disputes and clashes between August 1993 and August 1994.

20
 • August 1996: Russian coastguard units fire on two small Japanese fishing craft near
the disputed Kuril Island
• September 1996: Two Spanish fishermen are injured in Portuguese waters when a
Portuguese naval patrol boat opens fire
Figure 4. Potential for ”Fish Wars“ Is Increasing

• October 1996: Vietnamese maritime authorities kill three Thai fisherman and detain
two Thai trawlers accused of fishing in Vietnamese waters
• June 1998: Crew of a Russian border guard vessel kills two fishermen aboard
Chinese high-seas driftnet vessel
• June 1999: South Korean naval vessels sink a North Korean torpedo boat and badly
damage a second during a confrontation regarding jurisdiction over crab-rich waters
of the Yellow Sea off the northwest coast of the Korean peninsula
• July 1999: Canadian coastguard forces seize an Alaska-based U.S. fishing boat for
fishing in a disputed zone, prompting a State Department protest, demand for an
explanation, and warning that “we plan to take appropriate action”
• August 1999: Russian factory trawler Gissar is discovered fishing within U.S. EEZ
off Aleutian Islands in the Bering Sea, near the U.S.-Russian maritime boundary
line, and a Coast Guard law-enforcement boarding team is put aboard[39]
If these incidents and controversies grow as expected, there will be an increasing
demand for Coast Guard services to help protect U.S. – and perhaps even regional or world
fisheries – in support of United Nations or international management programs through
effective enforcement of fishery regimes.[40] This is, to be sure, not a new problem, as
Thomas Jefferson observed in his Message to the First Congress on 2 February 1791: “The
rapid view of the [cod] fishery enables us to discern under what policy it has flourished or
declined in the hands of other nations, and to mark the fact, that it is too poor a business
to be left to itself, even with the nation the most advantageously situated.” With the U.S.
cod fishery severely depressed in the late 1990s, and other stocks under great pressure as

[39] This incident followed a series of uncooperative actions by Russian fishing vessels along U.S.-
Russian maritime boundary line during the summer. A large, 15-person boarding team from USCG
Hamilton (WHEC-715) was put aboard Gissar because of intimidating actions from the Russian crew.
Meanwhile, the Russian Federal Border Guard vessel Antius watched the incident from the Russian side
of the maritime border, and its crew helped to translate Hamilton’s warnings and requests to the fishing
vessels, but otherwise took no other action. After 18 other Russian fishing vessels surrounded Hamilton
and threatened to “shoulder” – i.e., run into the cutter at a glancing angle – and impede the seizure,
Coast Guard District 17 decided to allow the Russian border patrol vessel to escort Gissar to Russia.
The Russians subsequently levied a fine on Gissar for fishing violations. Simultaneously, the State
Department urged the Russian government to take action against the other Russian fishing vessels that
21
 well, the Coast Guard’s responsibili-
ties in the at-sea enforcement of living
marine resources laws and regulations
will continue to be great. As Vaughn
C. Anthony, a scientist formerly with
the U.S. National Marine Fisheries
Service, exclaimed: “Any dumb fool
knows there’s no fish around.”[41]
Courtesy of MarAd
Non-Living Marine
Resources
Exploitation of non-living marine resources likely will increase decades to come.[42]
The world increasingly will probe and exploit the oceans for energy and minerals to fuel
economic growth. Furthermore, exploration, drilling, and mining operations will move
farther offshore as new technology advances the ability to operate in deeper waters. More
facilities and operations in deeper waters will create more maritime safety and security
challenges.
Oil and Natural Gas Exploitation. Offshore oil and gas exploitation currently
accounts for about 20 percent of all domestically produced oil and more than a quarter
of the nation’s domestic production of natural gas. (In all, as much as one-third of the
world’s petroleum reserves lie offshore, and will be increasingly exploited in the years ahead
as resources on land are depleted or become too costly to exploit.) This activity is an
important source of federal revenues, generating more than $1.4 billion in bonuses, $68
million in rents, and $3.5 billion in royalties in 1997. It is an important employer, with
some 38,000 workers offshore, and another 46,000 workers on-shore. Recent projections
indicate that offshore production will increase as much as 100 percent in the Gulf of
Mexico alone by the year 2010.[43] Still, about half of all petroleum consumed in the
United States comes from overseas sources, a proportion that is likewise expected to
increase in the decades ahead.
This increased offshore exploitation will be affected by two factors: continued
government restriction and a push to deeper waters. A 1998 presidential directive under
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, which limits offshore oil and natural gas develop-
ment to the Gulf Coast and parts of Alaska through 2012, will continue to stem industry
growth in most of the U.S. EEZ. Oil and natural gas developments in water depths greater
than 1,000 feet will become an increasingly important part of future production in the few
areas where drilling is permitted. At the turn of the century, more than 4,000 platforms
were operating in waters as deep as 3,900 feet, and some 30 drilling rigs were operating in
waters more than 1,000 feet deep, one deeper than 7,700 feet.[44]
Thus no longer confined to near-shore areas, discoveries of oil and gas resources are
increasingly far from shore, in waters as much as 10,000 feet deep, well beyond the U.S.

had acted so recklessly. Ironically, as the Hamilton-Gissar drama was unfolding, the Coast Guard was
requested to respond to a search and rescue case involving six Russian boaters whose craft had become
separated from their companions, a total of 37 people in 14 skiffs, during a crossing of the 65-nautical
mile Bering Strait from St. Lawrence Island. “Coast Guard, Freighter Save 6 Mission Russian Boaters,”
The Washington Post, 9 August 1999, p. A4.
[40] In the aftermath of the June 1999 Korean fisheries crisis, two U.S. Navy Aegis guided missile
cruisers – the USS Vincennes (CG-49) and Mobile Bay (CG-53) – were ordered to the Yellow Sea to help
stabilize the situation. See, “2 Koreas’ Navy Vessels Circle Cautiously; U.S. Sends Ships,” The New York
Times, 18 June 1999, p. A1.
[41] Safina, “The World’s Imperiled Fish,” op.cit., p. 60.
[42] “Threats & Challenges 2020,” op.cit., pp. III-7 - III-18.

22
EEZ. In 1997, for example, the Ram-Powell and Mensa projects in the Gulf of Mexico
came on-line in water depths of 3,200 and 5,300 feet, respectively. The MARS project in
the Gulf illustrates the potential scale of future activity. Located 130 miles offshore, MARS
is projected to produce 100,000 barrels of oil and 100 million cubic feet of natural gas
daily, which will be pumped to the shore or an offshore gathering platform through a
pipeline. The vulnerability of this system to sabotage should not be discounted, nor the
environmental damage that an attack or accident might cause.
U.S. Department of Energy forecasts indicate U.S. offshore oil production will
increase through 2006 and then decline to current levels through 2020. The projected
initial increase is a result of deepwater activities and technological advances. By 2020,
offshore production will be characterized by wells located in deeper waters and, as it is
today, will be focused in the Gulf of Mexico. Increased production in the Gulf, however,
will be offset by reduced production in Alaska, which is expected to decline at an average
annual rate of 4.3 percent through 2020. The decrease in Alaska’s oil production will be
driven by the continued decline in production
from Prudhoe Bay, the largest producing field,
which historically has produced over 60 percent
of Alaskan oil. Overall U.S. oil production is
projected to decline at an average annual rate of
1.1 percent through 2020, while the demand
for petroleum products in the United States is
expected to grow by an average annual rate of
1.2 percent. The resulting gap between rising
demand and declining production will be
satisfied with an increase in foreign imports.
Thus, another environmental concern is
oil transport and transfer operations. Fears of
large oil spills along fragile coastal areas, com-
bined with increased imports by large tankers
may raise pressure to force oil transfer opera-
tions offshore. However, the high cost of off-
shore oil transfer facilities will limit future
Courtesy of MarAd
progress. Projects such as the Louisiana Offshore
Oil Port (LOOP) have been only marginally successful from a fiscal perspective, despite the
environmental benefits the LOOP offers by being so far from shore. The port of Corpus
Christi, Texas, attempted a similar venture on a slightly smaller scale, but after analysis
revealed it would take 20 to 25 years to break even, the project was halted. Future
prospects for offshore port development are considered unlikely.
America’s use of natural gas will increase significantly within the next 20 years in order
to meet an increased demand for electricity and to offset an expected continued reliance on
nuclear power. Projections for natural gas production through 2020 indicate an average
annual growth rate of 1.5 percent. Natural gas consumption, however, is expected to

[43] Our Ocean Future, op.cit., pp. 20-21.

[44] Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future, op.cit., pp. 24-25.

23
 increase at a slightly higher rate, 1.6 percent per year. Like the oil industry, the difference
between domestic demand and supply will be met with increased foreign imports. Net
natural gas imports are expected to grow from 12.4 percent of total gas consumption in
1996 to 15.2 percent in 2020. Most of the imports will come from expanded pipeline
growth between the United States and Canada. While most of the imports will come
across land, some offshore imports are expected from locations such as Sable Island, Nova
Scotia. Liquified natural gas (LNG) will continue to be another source of energy,
although less significant. Even so, LNG shipments will remain a maritime safety concern.
Ocean Minerals. The marine mineral industry will be substantially more robust in
the next 20 years. Currently, the industry is active in exploration offshore, but production
is limited to a few commodities such as sand and diamonds. In the short term, prohibitive
costs and environmental concerns will hinder significant industry expansion beyond
exploration. However, technological advances derived from deepwater oil exploration and
production and, in some cases, increasing mineral prices may make marine mining ven-
tures in several minerals profitable, including diamond mining – which in South Africa
and Namibia has become more profitable than diamond mining on land. Technology
developed in sophisticated marine diamond mining operations may be applied to mining
for other minerals as well, decreasing development costs.
The most sought-after mineral commodities from the U.S. outer continental shelf
during the next 20 years will continue to be sand and gravel, which are used primarily for
beach restoration, coastal protection, and construction material. Through 2020, the
demand for offshore sand and gravel likely will increase as land supplies begin to diminish
and storms continue to erode beaches. Moreover, recovery operations will move farther
offshore to avoid damaging coastal areas. There are immense sand and gravel reserves on
the outer continental shelf, with estimates of more than one trillion cubic meters on the
Atlantic shelf, alone. Already, six large sand-dredging projects are operating on the outer
continental shelf along the Gulf and Atlantic coasts. In addition to sand and gravel, the
oceans surrounding the United States contain a wide variety of mineral resources. These
minerals are found on the continental shelf, in ocean basins, or dissolved in ocean waters.
In the U.S. EEZ, potential mining prospects include:
• Phosphate beds from North Carolina to northern Florida
• Titanium-rich heavy mineral sands from New Jersey to Florida
• Gold-bearing sand and gravel deposits off the Alaskan shore
• Barite deposits off Southern California
• Manganese offshore along the Southern California and Georgia coasts
• Cobalt and platinum-rich seabeds in the Hawaiian EEZ
While mining of these marine minerals in U.S. waters is not currently active, they
would almost certainly be exploited once price levels rise to the point where offshore
operations become profitable.
Ocean Energy. Harnessing ocean energy for commercial applications in the next 20
years likely will remain economically unfeasible for large-scale operations, but the potential
for small-scale development does exist. Ocean energy does offer a significant source of
energy supply, but unless other, currently cheaper sources of energy rapidly diminish, there
is little incentive for any significant growth in the industry. Ocean Thermal Energy

24
Conversion (OTEC) is one energy conversion process with several applications.[45] These
include:
• Generating electricity
• Desalinating water
• Supporting deep-water mariculture
• Providing air-conditioning and refrigeration
• Assisting mineral extraction
The Department of Energy’s National Renewable Energy Laboratory in Golden,
Colorado, sees the OTEC potential as enormous. The Lab has concluded that, on an
average day, 23 million square miles of tropical seas absorb an amount of solar radiation
equal in heat content to about 250 billion barrels of oil. Assuming no more than one-tenth
of one percent of this stored energy could be converted into electric power, it would still
supply more than 20 times the total
amount of electricity consumed in the
United States each day.
Two other types of energy conver-
sion, tidal and wave power, involve the
mechanical motion of the ocean to
generate electricity. Specially designed
turbines mounted in dams or on moor-
ings can capture the energy manifested
in elevated sea levels, high tidal ampli-
tudes, and strong currents.[46] Courtesy of Tidal Eectric, Inc.

Marine Resource Concerns

The growth in marine natural resource exploitation, particularly in the far-offshore
deep-water environment, will bring about new marine safety and security challenges in the
years ahead. The year 2020 will likely see more oil and natural gas platforms in deeper
waters, more pipelines offshore, increased ocean-based mining and dredging operations,
and the possibility of ocean energy conversion facilities. Building, maintaining, and servic-
ing these capital projects will greatly expand the amount of vessel traffic and human activity
on the seas. While there will be strict regulation of these activities in U.S. waters, regulation
alone will not guarantee the safety and security of life at sea nor the preservation of the
environment. Substantial monitoring, enforcement, and response capabilities will be
required.
There will be significant growth in U.S. offshore oil and natural gas platforms and
pipelines. According to the U.S. Department of Energy, the number of oil and natural gas
wells, both at sea and on land, is expected to increase by as much as 2.2 percent per year,

[45] OTEC is the process of converting solar radiation to electric power using the ocean’s natural
thermal gradient to drive a power-producing cycle. Warm seawater from the ocean’s surface and the cold
deep water below are pumped through a surface and the cold deep water below is pumped through a
heat exchanger that employs a working fluid, such as ammonia, propane, or freon, in a closed cycle. The
warm water vaporizes the working fluid, which turns a turbine, thus producing energy. In order for
OTEC plants to work efficiently, the warm surface temperature must differ by about 20 degrees Celsius
from the cold deep water. OTEC facilities can be built on land, submerged on the continental shelf, or
designed to float on the surface. Although some projections show that OTEC plants could be competi-
tive during the next 5-10 years in three particular markets, OTEC competitiveness is highly dependent
on other energy source prices.
[46] One such concept, offered by Tidal Electric of West Simsbury, Connecticut, envisions an
impoundment structure comprising a two-directional dam and conventional dam techniques. Projects
are being planned for the United States (Alaska), the United Kingdom (Cornwall and Wales), and
Mexico, at 10 megawatt to 500 megawatt power-generation capacity. For more information see:
http://tidalelectric.com.
25
 depending on oil price levels. The greatest growth of offshore platforms will occur on the
outer continental shelf of the Gulf of Mexico where the innovative use of cost-saving tech-
nology and expected continuation of recent huge finds have encouraged greater interest.
The growth in these oil and gas infrastructure and operations will have major impli-
cations for maritime safety and security. Wells will be significantly more remote, increasing
emergency response time. The operations may be technically more sophisticated and
produce at much higher rates, increasing the scope of potential marine accidents, such as
spills. Specific pipeline concerns include greater environmental risks associated with longer
pipelines, as well as more complex oil-spill contingency plans required for larger pipelines.
The concomitant increase in people working offshore, particularly in the commercial
energy sector, is another safety concern that figures in Coast Guard planning. More acci-
dents at sea could occur as larger crews begin operating farther from shorelines and Coast
Guard facilities. Several projections indicate that development in the Gulf of Mexico alone
could create as many as 100,000 new jobs, with up to 70 percent of these sustained
beyond 25 years. The response time in the event of an accident will increase as support
structures and vessels begin operating farther from shore. The Minerals Management
Service estimates that many of the new facilities will be beyond a two-hour helicopter
flight.
In general, the safety and security concerns brought on by offshore oil and gas
exploitation can be applied to other marine industries as well. While the future for marine
mineral mining and ocean energy conversion is less certain, operations in any of these
fields pose their own risks to the marine environment and place more lives at risk on the
seas. New technologies and larger, more complex facilities associated with far-offshore
activities could also create conflict with interests ashore. Projected resource development
will place increased demands on coastal ports and communities for support facilities and
services. And, with an increasing number of actors seeking to exploit ocean resources,
conflicts among users could arise. In the late 1990s, moreover, numerous communities are
opposed to offshore development because of environmental and land-use concerns. Finally,
such development will almost certainly be opposed by environmental activist groups, who
may protest ashore or at sea.

Marine Transportation and

Wa t e r b o rne Tr a d e
Waterborne trade remains the lifeblood of the American economy, whose arteries
carry raw materials and finished goods to and from every corner of the world. In 1997,
more than 95 percent of U.S. foreign trade by tonnage – 1.1 billion metric tons valued at
nearly $626 billion – moved by ship, less than 3 percent of which was carried in vessels
flying the American flag, a proportion
expected to decline even as U.S. ocean-
borne trade increases in the years
ahead.[47] U.S. oceanborne exports
have increased 50 percent since 1990, a
trend that is expected to continue into
the next decade. Ironic for a country so
tied to the sea and dependent upon sea
power to protect national interests, the
U.S. merchant marine is quite small,
ranked only 15th in the world.

[47] MARAD 98, 1998 Annual Report of the Maritime Administration (Washington, D.C.:
Department of Transportation, May 1999), pp. 44, 49.

26
 Driven by global economic growth and flourishing international commerce, ocean-
borne trade will at least double if not triple by 2020. Significant trade growth is expected
between the United States and Asia during the next two decades. Nearly 75 percent of the
world trade expansion during this period will come from emerging economies, especially
those of the Pacific Rim and Asia. Several South American economies, particularly Brazil,
and the Soviet successor states also will increase trade with the United States but not at the
same level as Asia. Increased trade with these countries does not necessarily mean more
ships, but rather larger ships carrying more cargo. Increased foreign trade also raises the
potential for increases in smuggling of illegal goods hidden within legitimate cargo.
The most explosive growth will be in the container shipping industry, with the trend
toward larger ships carrying more containers. The volume of cargo and size of ships will
require U.S. ports to expand their infrastructure and deepen their channels to remain com-
petitive. Smaller but faster container ships, travelling at speeds of up to 40 knots, will ply
the coastal trade routes between U.S. ports. The movement of these relatively large vessels
at such high speeds could create safety concerns in the coastal shipping lanes, particularly as
recreational use will increase in addition to commercial traffic. Tanker traffic in U.S. waters
will increase substantially by 2020 as U.S. oil imports rise. The increasing energy demand
in the United States and decreasing domestic petroleum production will drive oil imports
from half of U.S. domestic petroleum consumption in 1999 to some two-thirds in 2020.
During this period, the number of cruise ships will likely double, and some of the newest
cruise ships will be twice the size of cruise ships built in past few years. The Caribbean will
remain the busiest region for these ships, but more routes to ever-remote areas such as
Antarctica will open. High-speed ferries will be a burgeoning transportation business in
2020, with speeds expected to increase as ferry companies compete with other forms of
transportation, such as commuter airlines. Ferry speeds may reach 80 or even 100 knots,
posing significant safety challenges in busy coastal zones.

A m e r i c a ’s Marine Transportation System

Today, America’s aging and fragmented marine transportation system (MTS) infra-
structure is stressed and that stress continues to increase steadily, as Admiral James M. Loy,
Coast Guard Commandant, and Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Administrator of the U.S. Maritime
Administration (MarAd), outlined during a 13 May 1999 hearing on near- and far-term
future MTS needs. In prepared testimony for the House Committee on Transportation
and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation,
Admiral Loy and Mr. Hart noted that “the challenge is clear.[48] Ports must be prepared
to respond to the mounting pressures of growing trade, more noncommercial waterways
users, the development of new means to harvest and preserve marine resources, and increas-
ingly aggressive efforts by criminals and adversaries intent on doing societal harm. At the
Federal level,” Loy and Hart concluded, “we must include eliminating the gaps, overlaps,
and stovepipes among government agencies. Government and the private sector must
continue to work together if we want the very best MTS possible for the future.”
The U.S. MTS is much more than the waterways and ports through which nearly all
of America’s foreign and one-quarter of its domestic trade moves every day. It is also the
intermodal links to rail, truck, and pipeline services that support U.S. economic and mili-
tary security. In particular, the marine infrastructure facilitates America’s global outreach
into overseas markets and the Nation’s engagement in world affairs, including protection of

[48] U.S. Department of Transportation, Statement of Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant,

United States Coast Guard, and Clyde J. Hart, Jr., Maritime Administrator, on The Future Needs of the
U.S. Marine Transportation System, before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, U.S. House of Representatives, 13
May 1999. See also the Department of Transportation report to Congress, An Assessment of the U.S.
Marine Transportation System (Washington, D.C., September 1999). The September 1999 MTS
Assessment was relied upon for much of the data presented in this section.
27
 U.S. national security interests. The MTS includes, as well, the national and international
regulatory framework that governs trade and commerce. In short, it is the intricate and in
some instances delicate web of relationships and systems that link the farmer in Iowa to
customers in Russia, China, and other U.S. trading partners throughout the world.
In the late 1990s, there were 336 seaports and 3,726 marine terminals in the United
States, 150 of which handled about 95 percent of all marine cargo tonnage. Linked by
some 25,000 miles of federally and
privately maintained navigation chan-
nels, they serve thousands of miles of
rail, highways, and pipelines that criss-
cross the nation. More than 90 percent
of the U.S. population is served by
domestic shipping, which moves
nearly one-quarter of the nation’s
freight (by ton-mile) for less than two
percent of the total freight bill.
Courtesy of American Waterways Operators
In peacetime, more than 95
percent of U.S. trade (measured by tonnage) is carried in ships, including the 3.3 billion
barrels of oil that fuel the American economy – more than half of our annual consump-
tion. And in war – as witnessed during the 1991-92 Persian Gulf war – some 95 percent
of everything carried to and from conflict theaters will be moved by ships. At the height
of the shipping movement in Operation Desert Shield, a “Steel Bridge” of ships linked
U.S. ports with in-theater facilities in a continuous movement of “beans and bullets”
needed to defeat Saddam Hussein’s forces.
Overall, the national economic impact of the U.S. marine transportation system is
enormous. According to the U.S. Maritime Administration, U.S. coastal and inland ports
in 1996 generated 13.1 million jobs and personal income of $494.2 billion, resulted in
sales of $1.5 trillion, contributed $742.9 billion to the nation’s Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), and generated nearly $200 billion in federal, state, and local taxes. Focusing just
on the port industry, that sector of the U.S. economy was responsible for generating more
than 1.4 million jobs and directly and indirectly responsible for some $53 billion in
personal income and more than $140 billion in sales revenues each year during the late
1990s. More than $20 billion in federal, state, and local tax revenues were generated. In
1996, the public port industry’s capital expenditures amounted to $1.3 billion, and gener-
ated some 45,600 jobs, $1.7 billion in personal income, and $3.9 billion in sales revenues.
Looking at the users of America’s ports, those business that make significant use of water-
borne commerce and infrastructure for shipping or receiving goods, they accounted for
11.7 million jobs, $439.8 billion in personal income, and sales approaching $1.4 trillion.
U.S. waterborne trade in 1996 totalled 2,072 million metric tons (mmt), of which
998.5 mmt (48.2 percent) was in domestic commerce (Coastwise, 242.6 mmt; Lakewise,
104.2 mmt; Internal/Riverine, 564.3 mmt; Intraport, 80.7 mmt; and Intraterritorial, 6.7
mmt). U.S. oceanborne foreign trade comprised 1,073.5 mmt (51.8 percent), of which
664.6 mmt were imports and 408.9 mmt were exports. Compare that to 1960, in which
total U.S. waterborne commerce was just 997.5 mmt, of which 30.8 percent comprised
foreign trade and 69.2 percent U.S. domestic trade (226.5 mmt of which was on coastwise
and river systems). In 1996, the Mississippi and Ohio rivers and the Gulf Intercoastal
Waterway moved the bulk – nearly 611 mmt (76 percent) – of all inland and coastal
waterway tonnage.[49]

28
 The leading 50 U.S. coastal and inland ports handled 89.4 percent of the total
waterborne trade in 1996. The top five – Port of South Louisiana (172.2 mmt), Houston
(134.4 mmt), New York/New Jersey (119.4 mmt), New Orleans (76 mmt), and Baton
Rouge (73.5 mmt) – accounted for about 28 percent. (Charleston, number 50, moved
slightly more than 10 mmt that year.) Even with this high degree of concentration, there
were 145 ports, or 40 percent of all U.S. ports handling waterborne commerce, that
accounted for more than one million metric tons of cargo each in 1996.
In terms of movement of containerized cargoes, for 1996 the top 25 ports handled
98.3 percent of U.S. foreign container cargoes; the leading 10 ports accounted for about 80
percent, with the Los Angeles/Long Beach port complex accounting for nearly one-third of
all containers. The top five container ports in 1997 were: Long Beach (2.7 million Twenty-
foot Equivalent Units or TEUs), Los Angeles (2.1 million TEUs), New York/New Jersey
(1.7 million TEUs), Charleston (955
thousand TEUs), and Seattle (843
thousand TEUs). Number 25 in 1997,
Honolulu, accounted for about 37
thousand TEUs.
Commercial vessels make approxi-
mately 70,000 port calls in the United
States each year. At the same time,
Americans operate about 20 million
recreational craft. With both commer-
Courtesy of Port of Long Beach
cial and recreational traffic and compe-
tition for access to U.S. waterways expected to increase dramatically in the years ahead, the
potential for disaster and increased demand on Coast Guard maritime safety and search and
rescue capabilities, from inland waters to the high seas, will grow as well.
Estimates for 1999 indicate that as much as three billion metric tons of cargo valued
at more than one trillion dollars would transit U.S. waters and arrive in/leave from U.S.
ports. In addition, some 78 million recreational users, 140 million passengers, and 110
thousand fishing vessels would compete for access to a fixed area of water space. Looking
out a quarter century, the Coast Guard’s 1998 strategic vision publication, Coast Guard
2020, identified key challenges facing America’s MTS. Specifically focusing on “economic
globalization,” CG 2020 forecast:
America will become more dependent upon international trade, the vast majority of
which will be transported on the water. U.S. maritime trade will double, if not triple,
by 2020. Trade with Asian-Pacific and Latin American countries will increase more
than with other regions. Efficient maritime transportation will become more critical
to America’s economy and competitiveness. Global seaborne trade will bring larger
numbers of ultra-large, deep-draft, and minimally crewed ships. America’s inland and
coastal commerce will experience increased barge and tow traffic. Higher volumes of
oil, hazardous materials, and bulk commodities are likely. Just-in-time delivery of raw
materials and finished goods will become the norm, magnifying the consequences of
disruptions and emphasizing the importance of the marine transportation system’s
reliability. Furthermore, growing numbers of people will have the resources and
leisure time to spend on cruises and recreational boating. Collectively, this congestion
on America’s waterways will create a greater need for a well-integrated intermodal
transportation system with close links among the sea, land, and air components.

[49] Summary data for 1997 indicate that growth continues: U.S. waterborne foreign trade totalled
1.07 billion tons valued at $625.7 billion. MARAD 98, op.cit., p. 49.

29
 In the coming decades, the United States will become even more dependent upon
international seaborne trade, as well as the domestic ocean, intercoastal, and inland water-
ways commerce, to ensure economic well-being. U.S. oceanborne trade is expected to at
least double – some projections show a tripling of America’s maritime commerce – by
2020. “Mega-ships” carrying 6,000-plus containers or more than 5,000 passengers and
crew are already on computer “drawing boards,” as are high-speed ferries capable of 80
knots, if not more. Inland waterways systems anticipate similar growth trends; forecasts
for the Upper Mississippi barge traffic, for example, show a more than 60 percent increase
during the next 50 years.[50] Inland and coastal commerce will need to accommodate
increased traffic and demands on aging infrastructure; more than half of all the locks and
dams on the inland waterways will be more than 50 years old by the turn of the century.
Similarly, U.S. recreational boating activities will continue to increase, by perhaps as much
as five percent per year through 2020. In short, America is at a critical juncture with
respect to its MTS future. There will continue to be an increasing demand on our ports
and waterways. Unfortunately, there is no coordinated public and private sector plan in
place to address the challenge. Collectively, the increased likelihood of congestion on and
competition for America’s waterways will create growing demand for a well-integrated,
intermodal transportation system with close links and cooperation among the sea, land,
and air components. This is troubling, as the port
infrastructure of the United States is being pushed
to the limits of its capacity in the late 1990s, with
major modernization decisions and investments
looming on the horizon. National leadership is
needed now to ensure our waterways keep pace
with the shoreside infrastructure. In short, an
efficient marine transportation system, linking
ships, ports, transshipment points, and inland
waterways will be crucial to the U.S. economy
and international competitiveness in the decades
to come.
Container Shipping. The container ship-
ping industry will undergo enormous growth
through 2020, highlighted by larger ships carry-
ing more cargo. Container ships are already
growing in size, with the newest versions too large
Courtesy of MarAd
to enter most U.S. ports. These large container
ships, sometimes referred to as “mega-ships,” are increasingly capable of carrying 4,500
TEUs or more and require channel depths of nearly 50 feet. Industry experts believe about
one-third of the world’s container ship fleet will be 4,500 TEU capacity and larger within
15 years. The Regina Maersk, 1,043 feet long with a 6,000-TEU cargo capacity and 47.5-
foot draft, is just one example of the mega-ships that will transit U.S. waters in the future.
The push toward larger container ships is being driven by profit considerations; simply,
more containers carried by a vessel decreases the cost per container. Mega-ships will prima-
rily call at a few major load centers, which can handle the ship size and cargo volume. As a
result, feeder ships transiting from the load centers to smaller ports will increase coastwise

[50] The total direct economic activity generated by the domestic trade is approximately $10 bil-
lion per year, of which some $4 billion results from wages paid to vessel crews and shoreside managers.
The principal products moving in the domestic ocean trade are crude and refined petroleum, residual
fuel, and coal, while containerized cargoes – including textiles, manufactured and household goods, and
groceries move between the contiguous 48 states and Alaska, Hawaii, and Puerto Rico. In the inland
waterways, the barge and towing industry is a vital element in America’s intermodal transportation sys-
tem that moves more than 600 million tons of cargoes annually.

30
movements, which could also
produce a concomitant increase
in the number of ships engaged
in cabotage, or coastwise trade,
reserved for U.S.-flag ships
under the 1920 Jones Act.
With the move toward
extremely large container ships
calling on a few major load
centers, another possible
development in the container
industry will be the “Fast Ship” working between the load centers and feeder ports. In the
“Fast Ship” scenario, smaller, 1,200-TEU container ships traveling at speeds of up to 40
knots rapidly move containers to the feeder ports. The movement of these relatively large
vessels at such high speeds could create safety concerns in coastal shipping lanes.
Bulk and Break-Bulk Shipping. While the growth in containerized cargo will have
the greatest impact on future U.S. shipping trends, bulk and break-bulk cargo will remain
extremely important through 2020. Bulk cargo vessels carry large quantities of cargo, such
as grain or iron ore, in large, uncompartmented cargo holds. Break-bulk cargo vessels carry
their shipments in barrels, bags, pallets, or other units. Bulk and break-bulk cargoes make
up half of all cargo (by volume) entering or leaving the United States, and will continue to
account for a large portion in 2020. The outlook for bulk and break-bulk cargo vessels
should be stable for the foreseeable future, and these services will remain critically impor-
tant in U.S. maritime trade. Thus, because no major changes in this field are expected, the
demands on port infrastructure, vessel safety, and law enforcement efforts, from this sector
of the market, will remain relatively stable.
Tankers. Tanker traffic in U.S. waters will increase substantially by 2020 as U.S. oil
imports rise. Increasing energy demand in the United States and decreasing domestic petro-
leum production will drive oil imports from about half of U.S. petroleum consumption in
1996 to two-thirds in 2020. The demand for increased oil imports will be met with more
transits rather than growth in tanker size. Domestically, Alaskan oil production will
decrease, while oil drilling in the Gulf of Mexico will move farther offshore. These trends
will bring accompanying changes in tanker movement patterns. By 2020, more foreign
tankers will be entering U.S. waters, especially the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf will be the
area of primary activity for two reasons. First, most of the U.S. oil refining capacity is in or
near Gulf ports. Second, increased deepwater oil production in the Gulf likely will require
tankers as well as pipelines to move oil ashore. On the West Coast, fewer U.S. tankers will
be transiting from Alaska to refineries in Southern California, because of the drop in
Alaskan oil production.
Liquefied natural gas imports into the United States will continue to grow through
2020, but will represent only a small portion of U.S. energy imports. Still, the volatile
characteristics associated with LNG will present a significant safety concern during vessel
transits. Two U.S. ports (Everett, Massachusetts and Lake Charles, Louisiana) likely will
continue to import LNG through 2020. LNG imports into Everett and Lake Charles are
projected to increase nine-fold, reaching a level of 360 billion cubic feet in 2020, compared
to just 40 billion cubic feet in 1996.

31
 Cruise Ships and Ferries. Tremendous growth in the cruise line industry and the
emergence of high-speed ferries will be the key developments in the maritime passenger
transport business through 2020. Both developments will pose challenges to maritime
transportation in the United States.
The cruise line industry will exhibit strong growth throughout the next two decades.
Since 1980, the average annual growth of the industry has been almost eight percent, and
with the world fleet of 230
cruise ships operating at 90 per-
cent capacity,there are no signs
of this growth slowing. North
America is the largest market,
and surveys indicate that nearly
60 percent of Americans want
to take cruises, although only
11 percent have done so
through 1998. The number of
cruise line passengers worldwide
is projected to triple to 15 Courtesy of Victoria Clipper
million by 2020.
The cruise line industry will respond to this increasing demand with new ships and
new markets. The number of cruise ships will likely double before 2020, and the industry
already is building or has plans to build 44 ships. Many of these new ships will be larger as
well, with Leviathans such as the 142,000-ton Voyager of the Seas coming on line by 2001.
Industry specialists indicate that the overriding trend in the worldwide cruise industry will
be the significant increase in global capacity as older ships are retired from the North
American arena.
New cruise markets will emerge as these older vessels reposition to other areas. The
Caribbean will remain the top destination of cruise ships, with approximately 60 percent
of such traffic (a 1992 study found that half a million cruise passengers would likely visit
Cuba in the first two years after the lifting of the U.S. economic embargo, followed by 1.2
million in the subsequent few
years), but more routes will open
to remote areas such as South
Pacific islands, the Amazon, and
Antarctica. The Coast Guard has
already had to respond to a virtual
explosion of small cruise ships ply-
ing ever-remote areas of Alaska’s
Inside Passage, venturing where the
Courtesy of Royal Carribbean International larger ships cannot go. About 50
small (between 50 feet and 200 feet in length) vessels carried some 200,000 passengers in
1999, at times getting into so much trouble that Coast Guard assistance and that of other
nearby vessels were needed.[51] Some of the areas have not been surveyed since 1890,
prompting a close liaison among the Coast Guard, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the Alaska Small Vessel Task Force. This trend toward ever-more
remote destinations has significant implications for Coast Guard search and rescue opera-

[51] During the 1999 cruise season, four vessels got into extremis and needed assistance. “Safer
Ships Urged, Panel Targets Small Vessels,” Associated Press/Anchorage Daily News, 28 August 1999.

32
tions, including the increasingly likely need for emergency medical evacuations of stricken
passengers and crew members from cruise ships far offshore.[52]
Another maritime transportation industry expected to grow significantly by 2020 is
the high-speed ferry business. In certain world markets, high-speed ferries are already com-
petitive with other forms of transportation, particularly commuter airlines. High-speed
passenger ferries already have begun to ply U.S. waters and will increase in number and
speed during the next two decades. With speeds perhaps exceeding 80 knots, such ferries
will pose significant safety challenges as they encounter other maritime traffic. The
challenge will be to maintain adequate separation between these high-speed ferries and
other vessels, thereby reducing the risk of human error.
Nuclear Waste. The need to move and secure shipments of spent nuclear fuel and
waste from reprocessing will increase. This trade is now predominately between the Far East
and reprocessing facilities in Europe. Concerns about an environmental catastrophe and
security of the nuclear waste may lead to increased demands for storage in or transit
through U.S. hands, particularly from the Russian Far East. At the same time, increased
numbers of plants will generate a growing surplus of spent fuels to be transported. Because
of some states’ environmental concerns, moreover, shipments may also be detoured away
from optimum shipping routes into more dangerous areas, thus increasing the risk to the
vessel, its cargo, and the environment.
Port Infrastructure. U.S. ports will
continue to face intensifying pressure to
expand to meet the growing volume of
shipping and to combat the threat of
foreign competition. The container
industry, in particular, because of the
increasing volume of cargo and the
growing size of the ships themselves,
will divide ports into two categories: load
centers with deep harbors and world-class
inland intermodal infrastructure, and
feeder ports that cannot accommodate
Courtesy of MarAd
the new generation of ultra-large vessels.
The more numerous feeder ports still will play an important role in maritime trade,
even though they will not handle volumes of cargo nearly as large as those moved through
the load centers. Unlike the load centers, feeder ports will be less affected by global develop-
ments in the shipping industry. These ports will strive to diversify into the bulk and
break-bulk trades to avoid dependence on the container industry. However, lower profit
margins in bulk and break-bulk, and competition from other transportation modes (rail-
roads, pipelines and canals/waterways), may prevent ship owners and operators from
driving expensive capital development the way they can in the containerized sector.
While U.S. ports will compete among themselves for positions as load centers, their
greatest competition may very well come from foreign ports. Vancouver and Halifax,
Canada, and Freeport, Bahamas, already compete with American ports for U.S.-bound
container cargo, and by 2020 Mexican ports could challenge as well, if planned improve-
ments to the Mexican transportation infrastructure are completed. Halifax, where the main
channel is 60 feet deep, has captured ten percent of New York’s midwest-bound traffic

[52] See, for example, “Getting Sick on the High Seas: A Question of Accountability,” The New
York Times, 31 October 1999, pp. 1, 34-35. Although focused on legal issues of accountability for poor
health care, the article underscores what might become a new element of USCG SAR requirements –
emergency MedEvacs.

33
 annually since 1994. The deep harbor and intermodal infrastructure in Halifax make
the port a strong competitor for eastern U.S. ports. The North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) further enhanced the competitiveness of Halifax and other non-U.S.
North American ports, expanding their access to U.S. markets. While more than 95 per-
cent by weight of all cargo leaving or entering the United States currently passes through
U.S. ports, the challenge from foreign ports, particularly for containerized cargo, could
reduce that figure.

Challenges and Developments

With global maritime trade perhaps tripling by 2020, larger numbers of ultra-large,
deep-draft, and minimally crewed ships – many carrying hazardous cargoes – plying U.S.
waters and economic zones, and cruise ships capable of carrying 5,000 or more people
heading for ever-more remote areas, there will be a critical need for effective vessel
identification and tracking in all weather conditions, throughout the year. The potential
for disastrous environmental harm and loss of life from even a single incident will
continue to grow. Likewise, the need will increase for more effective prevention of and
rapid response to accidents, including those in the Deepwater environment, as increasing
globalization and ever-larger vessels affect U.S. commercial, environmental, recreational,
and security interests farther out to sea.
The future also has potentially grave implications for U.S. military readiness, in addi-
tion to global economic competitiveness, as current Defense Department and Navy projec-
tions show that almost all of the equipment, ordnance, and supplies needed to support any
sizeable projection of military power must move by sea.[53] During the 1990-1991 Gulf
War, nearly 95 percent of all material, supplies, and equipment sent to the combat theater
– and returned to the United States once peace was restored – was carried on ships.
Efficient ports are critically important for U.S. military combat operations, as well as to
respond to regional crises and humanitarian needs, in America’s strategy of engagement to
enhance security, bolster economic prosperity, and promote democracy.
The vulnerability of the maritime transport system to interruption, whether from
natural and man-made disasters or direct attack, must not be underestimated. In the wake
of recent bombings within the United States, the susceptibility of ships and key infrastruc-
ture elements to terrorist attack is a problem that begs for a multifaceted solution, as
identified by the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.[54] “The
physical distribution infrastructure is critical to the national security, economic well being,
global competitiveness, and quality of life in the U.S.,” the Commission noted in its
October 1997 Critical Foundations report. “It includes 1,900 seaports and 1,700 inland
river terminals on 11,000 miles of inland waterways carrying grain, chemicals, petroleum
products, and import and export goods.... Tomorrow – perhaps next year, perhaps in ten
years – critical transportation systems could be vulnerable to such attacks and crippled
unless action is taken now.” Likewise, piracy remains an international scourge that costs
the world economy millions of dollars in losses each year; while pirates are absent from
U.S. waters, the Coast Guard can play a strong leadership role in working with other

[53] Admiral Jay Johnson, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Vision...Presence...Power: A Program
Guide to the U.S. Navy (Washington, D.C. Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, May 1998), p. 25,
hereafter cited as VPP98; Secretary of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (Washington,
D.C.: Department of Defense, May 1997), http://www.dtic.mil/ defenselink/pubs/ qdr/sect5.html, pp.
7-8, where the results of the 1995 Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update were con-
firmed. Also, an unpublished history of the Military Sealift Command’s operations during the Gulf War,
“Desert Sealift: The Military Sealift Command in Desert Shield, Desert Storm, and Desert Sortie” (pre-
pared for the Commander, MSC, by Dr. Scott C. Truver and Norman Polmar, TECHMATICS, March
1993), described the sometimes severe challenges and difficulties of moving defense cargoes, particularly
ordnance and ammunition, and especially through commercial ports. In Desert Shield Phase I, for exam-
ple, only one layberth was available in Savannah, Georgia, for loadout of MSC’s Fast Sealift Ships.
[54] Critical Foundations: Protecting America’s Infrastructures, op.cit. The vulnerabilities of the
34
countries’ naval and maritime defense forces to defeat piracy jure gentium – a crime against
all nations. Thus, the security of the sources of supply and the maritime routes and gate-
ways through which America’s imports and exports must pass will continue to be a key U.S.
maritime interest. Failure to plan now for these challenges will reduce U.S. competitiveness
and increase risks to safety, security, and the marine environment, a perspective driven
home by Admiral Loy and MarAd Administrator Hart. “These challenges will continue to
require both public and private sector efforts,” the nation’s marine transportation leaders
told the Congress in May 1999.[55]
“These challenges” are exacerbated by competing interests and demands, which often
have pitted one element of the MTS against another, as well as the fragmented responsibil-
ity for management, oversight, and promotion of the overall system – if, indeed, “system” is
not an oxymoron. More than 20 federal agencies have responsibilities for elements of the
U.S. MTS. Varied jurisdictions, overlapping responsibilities, and a lack of overall leadership
for the development of a national maritime transportation system vision, plan, or policy
characterize the situation today. But there is hope, if a series of regional “listening sessions”
that culminated in the fall 1998 National MTS Conference bear fruit. For the first time,
every element of the MTS community was brought together, which allowed all participants
to air concerns and identify possible solutions.
The seven “listening sessions’ that MarAd and the Coast Guard conducted at coastal
and inland ports during the spring and summer of 1998 resulted in several key issues and
imperatives. These included: the need to develop consensus on a vision for the MTS of
2020; inter-agency coordination at the national, regional, and local levels; and recom-
mendations to improve safety, security, global competitiveness, infrastructure, and
environmental protection of the marine transportation system. These issues and imperatives
were the focus of the National MTS Conference held from 17-19 November 1998, at
which 144 representatives from all areas of the MTS community participated. “Two
overriding concerns cited were time and again,” Admiral Loy and Administrator Hart
acknowledged during their 1999 testimony: “the lack of a shared national vision for the
MTS and the lack of leadership and coordination among government agencies.”
At the outset of the conference, Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater put great
emphasis on the need for A clear and focused statement, noting that it “will enable us to
move forward to create a marine transportation system for the 21st century – one that con-
tinues to be safe, secure, and environmentally sound.” In the end, a consensus was crafted
that balanced virtually everyone’s interests in a compelling vision of the future MTS:
The U.S. Marine Transportation System will be the world’s most technologically
advanced, safe, secure, efficient, effective, accessible, globally competitive, dynamic,
and environmentally responsible system for moving goods and people.
Operationalizing that goal has already begun, but will not be an easy proposition, as
hundreds of millions of dollars, perhaps billions, will be needed to achieve a world-class
MTS. Simply by raising the visibility of the MTS, especially in the Administration and the
Congress, there is hope that this will encourage cooperation and sharing of information
among all MTS players, and result in the needed resources to achieve the vision.

“Physical Distribution” network and the Coast Guard’s role in transportation security are discussed at pp.
A-11 – A-23. See also, Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future, op.cit., pp. 32-33.
[55] Statement before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, op.cit., 13
May 1999.

35
 The Coast Guard and the Maritime Administration will remain key players in the
current and future health of the U.S. MTS. They have bound together to help craft a
vision for America’s Marine Transportation System, much as President Eisenhower’s vision
of the 1950s’ for an interstate highway system galvanized the nation into action. Working
closely with all elements of America’s MTS, the Coast Guard-MarAd team continues to
seek a strategy, plan, and integrated programs that embrace the waterways, ports, and
intermodal connections as a truly integrated, national system.

Maritime Sovereignty and

Homeland Security
The basic requirement for the Coast Guard is to protect U.S.citizens and interests in
inland waterways, territorial seas, and exclusive economic zones under U.S. jurisdiction, as
well as to detect, deter, and defeat threats to U.S. sovereignty that might arise on the high
seas. The marine areas under U.S. jurisdiction are enormous, covering 3.5 million square
miles of ocean space. The spectrum of possible threats is likewise very broad, spanning
economic, environmental, humanitarian, political, and military interests.
The salient factor in all of these, however, is that the Coast Guard – working with
numerous local, regional, national and international agencies – must safeguard domestic
security: Americans must feel secure within their own country. Indeed, as the National
Defense Panel underscored in its 1997 report, “protecting the territory of the United States
and its citizens from ‘all enemies both foreign and domestic’ is the principal task of
government.” More to the concern of the Coast Guard, the National Defense Panel
concluded that “coastal and border defense of the homeland is a challenge that again
deserves serious thought.”[56]
An expansive concept of “homeland security” is now being explored and is directly
related to the concept of maritime security. Former Under Secretary of Defense Fred C.
Ikle warned that “Until recently, we have not greatly worried about direct attacks within
the U.S. homeland – apart from the risk of nuclear war. The bombings of New York’s
World Trade Center and the Federal
building in Oklahoma City in the
United States to make evident that a
few determined terrorists can cause
enormous destruction almost anywhere
in the United States.”[57] The Sarin
gas attack in the Tokyo subway and
the bombings of the U.S. embassies in
Africa underscored the vulnerability
to terrorists.
Courtesy of FEMA

[56] National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, op.cit., pp.
25ff. More than advocating only “serious thought,” the National Defense Panel, at pp. 26-27, stated that
“The U.S. Coast Guard and the Department of Defense should work closely to ensure that new classes
of cutters are outfitted with a combat systems suite that gives these ships a robust capability in support of
homeland defense, including such missions as drug interdiction, immigration control, and anti-transna-
tional crime operations.”
[57] Fred C. Ikle, “An Argument for Homeland Defense,” The Washington Quarterly, Spring 1998,
p. 8.
[58] William Safire, “Team B vs. C.I.A.,” The New York Times, 20 July 1998, p. 17.
[59] Falkenrath, “Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism,” Survival, Autumn
1998, pp. 43-65, at p. 43. He concludes that intelligence is the first and most important line of defense
and, at. p. 65, that the “best action policy-makers can take...is to focus on the threat before it reaches
emergency proportions, and to begin implementing a balanced program of preventive and preparedness
measures.”
[60] Remarks of Deputy Secretary of Defense John J. Hamre, American Bar Association, National
Security Panel Breakfast, 29 April 1999; http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1999/s19990429-
depsecdef.html. More to the point of the Armed Services’ roles in homeland defense, Hamre noted that

36
 Moreover, the ease by which smugglers can clandestinely infiltrate U.S. maritime
borders, bringing in drugs, illegal immigrants, and contraband goods, gives pause for grave
concern. In some future crisis, or even in non-crisis situations when the United States
would least expect it, terrorist cells could infiltrate America’s ports and cities, armed with
weapons of mass destruction – chemical, biological, or nuclear devices. Essayist William
Safire posed a hypothetical problem for a future U.S. President in this way: “Saddam
Hussein invades Saudi Arabia. You warn of Desert Storm II; he says he has a weapon of
mass destruction on a ship near the U.S. and is ready to sacrifice Baghdad if you are ready
to lose New York. Decide.”[58] As Richard A. Falkenrath assessed the threat from nuclear, “But the government’s fear of
biological, and chemical terrorism: bioterrorism isn’t completely
All modern societies, however, are vulnerable to massive loss of life from an unfounded. Even if we don’t
attack involving a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) – nuclear, biological or chemi- know much about the terrorists,
cal (NBC). This vulnerability has existed for many years: it is a function of accessible there is a large and authoritative
weapons, porous borders, free and open societies, and high population densities in body of knowledge about the
cities. Yet while national-security leaders have generally recognized the military threat use and effects of biological
posed by NBC weapons, they have tended to downplay or disregard the possibility agents – and it is scary. This tech-
that these weapons might be used by a non-state or transnational actor in a campaign
nical data, much of it obtained
of mass-destruction terrorism....
prior to the cancellation of the
Something of a shift now appears under way, evident particularly in the United U.S. offensive biological program
States since the early 1990s. Senior U.S. officials, congressional leaders and non- in 1969, demonstrates that it’s
governmental experts now routinely call attention to the threat of WMD terrorism – possible to place large popula-
particularly biological weapons – and rank it among the most serious challenges to
tions at risk by releasing appro-
U.S. security.[59]
priately prepared pathogens into
That future may already be here. In late April 1999, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense the air. Even relatively small
John Hamre noted that quantities of biological agents
...during the last year, there have been over 100 alleged or implied terrorist incidents can have catastrophic results: a
involving chemical or biological weapons in the United States. Most of them have panel of World Health
been fraudulent.... I think they’re happening virtually once a week now in California. Organization experts calculated
It is a sad reality that we had the first threat of anthrax attack a year and a half ago and that 50 kilograms of anthrax
that we have had over 100 in the last 12 months. At some point, one of them will be
released over a city of half a mil-
real.[60]
lion people would kill 95,000 and
But these concerns are not limited to terrorist threats, although the Coast Guard is incapacitate another 125,000.
likely to be a critical “first-responder” to an attack in a crowded roadstead or harbor, and Some experts believe that, pound
Coast Guard men and women must be trained and equipped to handle such a crucial for pound, biological weapons
task.[61] Other important U.S. interests – a clean marine environment, healthy fish stocks,
are potentially more lethal than
protected species, safe offshore production and lightering facilities, and secure maritime
transport – are also “targets” needing protection. In short, America’s maritime security and
thermonuclear warheads. ”
W. Seth Carus
Assessing the Bioterrorism Threat
New Republic, August 1999

there was no desire to change Posse Comitatus, which he saw as “an enormously important protection for
the Department of Defense as well as for Americans.” In his July 1999 “Grave New World” commentary,
Secretary of Defense Cohen likewise noted that “our military response efforts will be grounded primarily
in the National Guard and Reserve. In contrast to their more familiar role of reinforcing active-duty
forces overseas, our Guard and Reserve are the forward-deployed forces here at home. Special National
Guard teams are being positioned around the nation to advise and assist communities upon request....
The Posse Comitatus Act and the Defense Department’s implementing policies are clear – the military is
not to conduct domestic law enforcement without explicit statutory authority, and we strongly believe no
changes should be made to Posse Comitatus.” Both Secretary Cohen and Deputy Secretary Hamre seemed
to ignore the Coast Guard’s role in homeland security. Unlike the other four Armed Services, the Coast
Guard is not constrained by Posse Comitatus and has strong and comprehensive law-enforcement man-
dates, responsibilities, and capabilities.
[61] In addition to carrying out emergency response, containment, and remediation efforts, the
Coast Guard will almost certainly be a critical command-and-control element, linking together local,
regional, and national assets. See “Readying Emergency Teams for Terrorist Attacks,” The New York
Times, 3 July 1999, p. A9.

37
 interests can be challenged in numerous ways, as Secretary of Defense Cohen summarized
in his 1999 Annual Report to the President and the Congress:
Transnational Dangers. The variety of actors that can affect U.S. security and the
stability of the broader international community will continue to grow in number
and capability. Increasingly capable and violent terrorists will continue to threaten
the lives of American citizens and their institutions and will try to undermine U.S.
policies and alliances. Over the next 15 years, terrorists will become even more
sophisticated in their targeting, propaganda, and political action operations. State-
sponsored terrorism will continue to provide support to a disparate mix of terrorist
groups and movements. The illegal drug trade and international organized crime,
including piracy and the illegal trade in weapons and strategic materials, will persist,
undermining the legitimacy of friendly governments, disrupting key regions and sea
lanes, and threatening the safety of U.S. citizens at home and abroad. Finally, envi-
ronmental disasters, uncontrolled flows of migrants, and other human emergencies
will sporadically destabilize regions of the world.
Threats to U.S. Homeland. The proliferation of advanced information and military
technology increases the likelihood that a growing array of actors could attack the
United States, using ballistic missiles, NBC weapons, or information warfare (which
could include attacks on U.S. infrastructure through computer-based information
networks). Together with the continued threat of illegal drugs, organized crime, and
migrant flows, and the threat inherent in the remaining strategic nuclear arsenals of
other countries, direct threats to the United States are significant, albeit dramatically
smaller in scale than during the Cold War.[62]
It is, therefore, in America’s strategic interest to engage these threats to the U.S.
homeland as far away from the United States as possible. This has generated within the
Coast Guard a novel strategic opera-
tional concept called simply “Pressing
Out Our Borders.” This envisages
close planning liaison and operational
teaming with the Navy, not unlike the
“National Fleet” initiative championed
by Admiral Johnson, the Chief of
Naval Operations, and Admiral Loy,
Coast Guard Commandant (see
Appendix C and the “National Fleet”
discussion in Chapter V). It calls for a
“layered defense” comprising surveillance, detection, identification, sorting, and intercep-
tion and engagement of threats in four areas of approach to the United States: overseas
source departure zones, trans-oceanic route zones, U.S. coastal route zones, and U.S. port
zones. In this way, threats that do materialize can be thwarted well before they can be in
position to deliver an attack against America. As strategist Lawrence Freedman recognized,
If a conflict is close to home, there is a risk that its effects will be felt within Western
societies. There are good reason to be way of situations that allow gangsters and
drug-traffickers to flourish, prompt extremist to export violence or encourage local
bullies and predators. Substantial population movements, collapsing local currencies,
disrupted markets and sources of important commodities such as oil can all have sub-
stantial knock-on effects. Images of human distress on a massive scale and violations

[62] William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1999
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999), p. 2.

38
 of human rights can prick Western consciences and discredit passivity. If non-military
remedies such as diplomatic missions and economic sanctions are inadequate, the
calculable losses of intervention can be outweighed by the less calculable damage
resulting from non-intervention.[63]

Illegal Commerce
Just as the world’s oceans are avenues for the nation’s overseas commerce, they are also
the highways for the import or export of illegal or untaxed commodities. Clearly, the smug-
gling of illegal drugs, aliens, the import of untaxed cargoes, and the export of unauthorized
technologies will remain a major threat to the nation’s security in the next 100 years of
Coast Guard service, just as was the case during the first 200 years of its history. The
permeability of international borders and the inability of governments to address effectively
these transnational threats continue to lure both individuals and organizations looking for
enormous profits. The sale of illicit drugs in the United States during 1993 alone was
estimated at $49 billion, while the trafficking of illegal immigrants throughout the world is
likewise a multibillion dollar enterprise.
With more than a quarter-million visits by commercial ships to U.S. ports, movement
of more than four million maritime shipping containers, and six million sea passengers
embarking and debarking annually, the complexity of ownership, registration, and opera-
tion of commercial merchant vessels provides a deep thicket from which those intent on
breaking laws can operate. These complexities impede the ability to establish quickly who
controls the movements of a vessel and its cargo. A ship’s true owner may be camouflaged
through multiple layers that involve multinational corporations. The ship itself will more
than likely be registered under a “flag of convenience” that does not represent a ship’s
true nationality. The use of separate corporations for chartering ships, a separate vessel
mortgagee, and multinational crews all provide opportunities for exploitation and “cover”
for movement of contraband. Forward-operating Coast Guard forces executing interdiction
operations must increasingly be supported by timely and focused intelligence, as well as
effective command, control, and communications systems if they are to unravel successfully
these complex relationships as a critical part of executing their missions.
Nowhere is this more true than with regard to the Nation’s “war on drugs.” Drug
trafficking will continue to plague the United States through 2020, driven by Americans’
demand for illicit drugs. Traffickers in the future will rely increasingly on commercial
transportation systems to move their products. They also will use successful noncommercial
means, remaining flexible in altering methods in response to law enforcement tactics. It is
a “cat-and-mouse” game with lethal consequences.
Control of the processing and sale of illicit drugs worldwide is a continuous challenge
that has no short-term solutions. The U.S. General Accounting Office has estimated that
law enforcement, corrections, and public health costs of the illegal drug problem total $67
billion annually. Given that there will be a future illicit drug market, there also will be
sources of supply and transportation methods to deliver drugs to market; the maritime
trafficking of illegal drugs is expected to remain a global threat. While numerous studies

[63] Lawrence Freedman, The Revolution in Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Paper 318 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1998), p. 35.

39
 have not attempted any specific conclusions concerning the scope of the U.S. drug market
in 2020, they do suggest that:
• The number of chronic cocaine users will not significantly change. The number of
chronic cocaine users has not significantly changed in seven years. Given that any
program attempting to alter perceptions of drug use will require time to take effect,
(reversing perceptions of tobacco use took 20 years, for example) the number of
chronic users will not be significantly altered by 2020.
• Cocaine market demand will not significantly change. Given that chronic users
account for three-quarters of the total cocaine market, the number of chronic users
is unlikely to change significantly.
• The global use of illicit drugs may increase if social mores change significantly. Such
changes could develop as a result of improved methods of drug ingestion, revived
attempts to legalize controlled drugs, greater concern over personal freedoms, the
lax enforcement of current drug
laws, or a general global acceptance
of drug abuse as an uncontrollable
issue.
Worldwide illegal drug production is
expected to continue to expand well into
2020. Illegal drug producers will be
increasingly flexible in circumventing
international enforcement efforts. They
will be able to weather law enforcement
attacks on specific drug production nodes
and survive. This flexibility will be largely Courtesy of Corbb
due to an increased use of technology to support highly mobile operations and to improve
both operational security and production methods. Organized crime syndicates will pro-
vide effective business planning and will make use of their significant financial power to
corrupt the authorities in a growing number of countries. Moreover, links between drug
traffickers and rebel groups within source countries can pose significant threats to regional
stability and peace.[64]
During the past decade, illicit drug production has spread to places where law
enforcement poses the least threat. That trend will continue. By 2020 major drug
producing nations such as Afghanistan (heroin), Colombia (cocaine, heroin), and Mexico
(marijuana, heroin, and synthetic drugs) will likely be competing with other countries to
supply major U.S. and European markets. Countries most vulnerable to being over-
whelmed by drug producers are those that have weak central governments, access to
regional or global drug markets, and remote areas where illegal drugs can be cultivated
without detection. These conditions exist in many Eurasian countries of the former Soviet
bloc, as well as some developing African nations. With the drug trade’s significant profit
potential, several of these countries will likely fall into the ranks of those where drug
production is already endemic.
Future producers will use technology at least as efficiently as today’s narco-
businessman. Tools such as portable computers, handheld satellite phones, and increas-
ingly “miniaturized” equipment make highly mobile production facilities an easily
attainable goal. Where mobility is not required, producers can use technology to reduce
operating expenses. Large-scale cannabis growers use computer-controlled, warehouse-sized

[64] For example, the line between Colombia’s thriving narcotics trade and the Marxist
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which earns tens of millions of dollars each year pro-
tecting illicit crops, has faded in recent years, prompting concerns about the stability of the Colombian
government and sparking rumors about imminent U.S. military intervention. “Colombia Abuzz with
Talk of Intervention,” The Washington Post, 23 August 1999, p. 13.

40
hydroponics hot houses to grow thousands of plants in optimum growth conditions,
decreasing labor costs and improving productivity and operational security. Other
improvements in the technical process have increased plant yields in both coca leaves and
marijuana. In Colombia, chemical process improvements have yielded higher purity heroin
than that of rival producers in Mexico. In the future, technology may allow producers to
increase plant yields, cheaply produce synthetic versions of organic drug components, or
even mask indicators of drug use.
While technology may significantly improve raw production capabilities, organized
crime will provide many producers the business acumen, political leverage, and funds with
which to expand their enterprise effectively.
High-profit potential will continue to
attract crime syndicates to the drug produc-
tion business in 2020. For
producers, the diversification these partners
bring could provide ready-made distribu-
tion networks, money laundering services,
and even venture capital, which could be
used to purchase and incorporate new tech-
nology. This union of complementary
criminal enterprises inextricably links the drug trade to a host of other crimes such as smug-
gling (drugs, weapons, people) gambling, prostitution, and corruption.
Drug trafficking will continue to plague the global community well into the next
century. Future traffickers will increasingly rely on commercial transportation systems to
move their products. The relatively low cost of maritime bulk transshipment and good
product security, as well as limited personal risk, will entice a number of future drug
transporters away from traditional noncommercial maritime methods. Smugglers moving
smaller loads by speedboat will have more capable platforms than vessels currently in use,
and future amateur smugglers will be able to use traditional smuggling techniques with
some degree of success. Speedboats or “go-fasts” will likely continue to improve beyond
today’s impressive standards – capabilities to carry a metric ton of drugs at speeds of 35
knots or more. Future boats may triple the speed and cargo capacity of current platforms,
while virtually “disappearing” from surveillance and tracking sensors through the use of a
variety of low-observable technologies. Innovations such as super efficient engines or jet
drives may significantly increase their operating range, and new computers may allow for
the remote operation of high-speed delivery vehicles from an airplane or remote site.

Population Growth and Illegal Migration

World population apparently reached 6 billion on or about 12 October 1999, is
expected to reach 8.9 billion by 2050, and more than 10 billion sometime after 2100,
according to United Nations projections.[65] Although such growth will continue to fuel
naturally occurring migration, the occurrence of sudden, uncontrolled migrations will grow
as large numbers of people are affected by ethnic and sectarian strife. In addition, popula-
tion growth stresses already limited resources for water, energy, basic health care, and
education in the emerging nations of the world and influences the basic desire to improve
one’s economic position. These levels of migration also place enormous economic and social
burdens on targeted destination countries. Today, the speed and size of migrations have
been directly impacted not only by improved means of transportation, but by the increased

[65] “6 Billion and Counting – but Slower,” The Washington Post, 12 October 1999, pp, A1, A16.

41
 level of information now available nearly worldwide as a result of the information revolu-
tion. People will continue to seek better lives for themselves and their families and given
an external impetus will move rapidly, as the Worldwatch Institute recognized in 1995:
A volatile cocktail of pressures has boiled over into wars, famine, and wrenching
poverty to drive four million new refugees from their countries last year. These pres-
sures also compel about `125 million people to live outside their countries of birth,
and cause tens of millions to move from countryside to city inside their own coun-
tries every year – vast human migrations
“Violence within states...could that have become a barometer of our
reach unprecedented levels. changing, and sometimes declining,
Generated by ethnic, tribal, and prospects for global security.[66]
religious cleavages, and exacer- Most – approaching 95 percent – of the
bated by economic fragmentation world’s population growth during the next 20
and demographic shifts, such years will be in developing countries. The rela-
violence will form by far the most tionship between population growth and its
common type of conflict in the potential to disrupt the international security
next century.... environment, however, is not simply a function of population increases. Instead, popula-
tion growth becomes a security concern when the effects of such growth clash with stand-
While such conflicts need not dis-
ing economic resources and political institutions. The huge population increases in many
rupt the core strategic interests of developing countries will overburden their labor markets, public systems, and social
major powers, they will do so if services, creating unrest and incentives for migration.[67]
they trigger larger interstate con-
Fueled by tremendous population increases in developing countries and uneven
flicts, grossly violate international-
global economic growth, international migration will be one of the most important factors
ly accepted norms, or create mas-
affecting maritime security through 2020. This is particularly true for the United States,
sive flows of refugees, disease, long a preferred destination for migrants the world over. While it is impossible to predict
and environmental degradation. how many people from individual countries will attempt to migrate to the United States
The latter is particularly likely in the 2000-2020 time frame, the migration issue will be of great concern to U.S. national
since such conflicts often generate security. Furthermore, illegal migration via maritime means will be the most visible and
humanitarian disasters that are problematic, and may generate the highest political levels of attention.[68]
hard to ignore in an age of mass Of concern is the potential for recurrences of mass migrations by sea similar to those
communications. Yet major pow- from impoverished Caribbean nations that were experienced in the mid-1990s. During
ers cannot intervene for humani- seven months of 1994 alone, nearly 60,000 Haitian and Cuban immigrants were interdict-
tarian purposes without also inter- ed while attempting to make their way to the United States by sea in overcrowded and
vening in the underlying politics poorly outfitted vessels. Ernest Preeg has estimated that there were about one million peo-
that create such troubles in the ple of Haitian origin in the United States in the mid-1990s, and “hundreds of thousands if
first place. The Somalias, Bosnias, not millions more would quickly migrate to the United States if U.S. immigration laws
Rwandas, Kosovos, and Haitis of and the U.S. Coast Guard permitted it.”[69] Only the dedicated efforts of Coast Guard
the world will not disappear, and
neither will the dilemmas they [66] Hal Kane, The Hour of Departure: Forces that Create Refugees and Migrants, Worldwatch Paper
pose. ” 125, Jane A. Peterson, ed. (Washington, D.C.: Worldwatch Institute June 1995), p. 1.
[67] For example, U.S. State Department officials in July 1999 worried that worsening economic
New World Coming: conditions and political violence in Colombia would combine to create an immigration crisis and mass
American Security in the movements of people into the United States. In the first six months of the year, some 65,000
21st Century Colombians left the countr y, and officials projected that another 300,000 could leave in the next six
15 September 1999 months. But fewer than 15,000 Colombians each year are permitted to enter the United States as legal
immigrants, according to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. “Colombians Fleeing Homeland:
U.S. Officials Worry about Tide of Immigration Flowing North,” The Washington Post, 28 July 1999,
p. A14.
A looming illegal immigration threat is also felt by Canada, among others. In a one-month period
in the summer 1999, more than 250 illegal immigrants from China’s Fujian province landed on Canada’s
Pacific shores, having made the crossing in two filthy, unmarked vessels run by smugglers. At the end of
August, the Canadian Coast Guard was put on alert after military aircraft detected a third ship believed
to be carrying illegal Chinese migrants to Canada. “Third Mystery Ship Headed Toward Canada,”
United Press International, 30 August 1999.
[68] The unfortunate example of the “Miami Six” on 29 June 1999 illustrates the public-political
potential of illegal migration incidents. It was, clearly, a situation that no one wanted – the drama of
U.S. Coast Guard personnel using fire hoses (not “water cannons” as the media reported) and pepper
spray to subdue six Cubans who were intent on making it to the United States and were intercepted just
42
men and women operating in the
Caribbean approaches to the United States
have prevented what could have been a
loss of life on an unprecedented scale.
Future Coast Guard forces, operating in
the offshore approaches to our nation,
must therefore be capable and suitably
equipped to respond to this kind of
transnational challenge.
The movement of people between
countries is driven by the interaction of
two forces: the negative reality of life at home (often because of political violence, social
instability, economic problems, or a combination of these), and the perception that a better
life exists elsewhere. International migration spurred by a decline of social welfare or inter-
nal political unrest has become more common over the past decades and will continue to
drive the movement of many people. As a result, migration, the most natural economic
response to population explosions and worsening living conditions in developing states, will
remain a major challenge to global stability well into the 21st century.
The world of 2020 will see increasing disparities between the haves and the have-nots,
not only between the rich and poor in a given country, but also between the developed and
developing nations. Latin America, for example, has the highest income disparities in the
world; in Brazil, the top fifth of the population has 32 times the income of the bottom
fifth. This is only expected to worsen in the future. Income disparities between developed
and developing nations are expected to widen as well. In 1995, the average annual income
gap per person between developed and developing nations was approximately $18,000. By
2020, that difference will increase to about $30,000 (in 1995 dollars). These inequities in
the global economy will be primary incentives for international migration toward developed
nations such as the United States.
With emigration pressure from less developed countries expected to rise during the
next 20 years, thousands of potential immigrants will be unable to gain legal admission to
the United States because of quota-controls, travel costs, or other obstacles. For a variety of
reasons, many of these migrants will attempt to enter the United States illegally, and, with
more than 12,000 miles of continental U.S. maritime coastline, many of these attempts will
be by maritime means. While some migrants will make these attempts on their own or
en masse, others will receive assistance from family, friends, or paid smugglers to avoid
detection and capture by border control forces.

short of their goal. The six Cubans were clearly illegal immigrants attempting to circumvent the nation’s
immigration laws. They may, as well, have been pawns in an organized smuggling ring. Their physical
and mental conditions showed that they could not have been in the water for the several days it would
have taken to row a 15-foot rowboat the 90 miles between Cuba and Key West, much less all the way to
Miami. Following an intensive investigation of the event, the Coast Guard determined that the use of
pepper spray was authorized by existing policy guidance but that in retrospect its use against people in
the water could have had the unintended consequence of disabling a person. Likewise, although per-
mitted, the use of a fire hose to keep the migrants’ boat away from the Coast Guard patrol boat and to
keep the migrants’ boat from making shore was assessed as ineffective and unnecessary. The Service
announced a thorough review of use of force policy guidance and direction. “Miami Cubans Are
Outraged At Treatment Of 6 Refugees,” New York Times, 1 July 1999, p. A12; “Refugee Incident Spawns
a Tempest,” Washington Post, 3 July 1999, p. A3; and “Inquiry Clears Crew in Clash with Rafters,”
Miami Herald, 11 August 1999, pp. 1ff. See also “Release of Migrant Interdiction Incident of 29 June
1999 Investigation, Admiral Loy’s Statement,” U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 11 August 1999.
The incidence of violence has been increasing, as the situations in migrants’ home countries
becomes more desperate. In late September 1999, a group of Cuban migrants used machetes and knives
to attack Coast Guard authorities who intercepted their boat off Key Largo, prompting a renewed
interest in use-of-force doctrine and tactics.
[69] Ernest H. Preeg, The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study in Demographics, Development, and U.S.
Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Strategic & International Studies, 1996), p. 1.
43
 The United States has weathered five maritime mass migrations in the last two
decades, all from Cuba and Haiti. In the Cuban “boatlifts,” thousands of Cubans used any
boat or raft they could obtain – even inflated inner tubes lashed together – to sail toward
the United States. In the Haitian cases, thousands of people crowded onto dilapidated
wooden sailboats to leave Haiti for the United
States. The overwhelming demands of such
large groups of people strained U.S. societal
infrastructure and government resources so
severely that the U.S. government now rou-
tinely monitors events that may spark other
mass movements. The policies and actions of
the United States, such as routine Coast Guard
patrols north of Haiti and within the Mona
Passage, direct repatriation of migrants, and the
May 1995 Immigration Accords with Cuba
have helped deter mass migrations. With these
measures in place, the likelihood of future mass
migrations has been reduced, though certainly
not eliminated.
Interdicting illegal migrants at sea will continue to remain a serious challenge for the
United States. From 1980 through 1998, about 290,000 illegal migrants were interdicted
at sea, and with rapidly expanding regional
populations in the developing world, this
number is likely to increase. The high cost of
interdicting migrants at sea and repatriating
them will continue to challenge U.S. Coast
Guard and Navy forces. While interdiction
costs remain high, intercepting U.S.-bound
illegal migrants before they reach the border
saves the government significant sums.
Because migrants interdicted at sea are afford-
ed less legal recourse than those caught
within the U.S. border, the government avoids the cost of providing basic human services
and security as well as the expense of extended and costly appeals.
Increased populations and migration trends will also place greater pressure on the
ability of the planet’s inhabitants to feed themselves. Although the Malthusian principle –
“The power of population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce
subsistence for man” (“Essay on the Principle of Population,” 1798) – has proven to be
“very simple, attractive and arresting, and completely inconsistent with modern society
and economics,” according to Nicholas Eberstadt, a demographer at the American
Enterprise Institute,[70] there is growing concern. The Worldwatch Institute, for example,
points to “demographic fatigue” that has brought critical areas – water, food, fisheries,
climate, cropland, forests, energy – to the brink of collapse.
Thus, the protection and conservation of the maritime food supply from illegal
exploitation or contamination will play an even more critical role in the future. The

[70] “Will the World Be Too Crowded to Manage?” The Washington Times, 7 February 1999, pp.
A1, A7, at A7.
[71] The U.N. Law of the Sea Convention, 1982, defines “piracy” in article 101 as any of the
following acts:
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the
crew or passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed:
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such
ship or aircraft;
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any state;
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operations of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts
making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
44
United States has also enacted laws that delineate responsibilities for monitoring fishing on
the high seas. Enforcement of both U.S. EEZ and high seas fishery regimes requires the
ability to monitor large ocean areas, to determine vessels engaged in prohibited fishing
activities, and to intercept and engage those vessels.

Piracy and Organized Crime

Incidents of violent maritime crime – particularly piracy and maritime terrorism –
may change in both nature and frequency as advanced technologies are used in attacks
against ships and their cargoes. Consistent with contemporary experience, the vast majority
of incidents will occur within port areas, at anchor or in coastal waters.
Piracy, in any of its many modern forms, along with terrorism and other types of
maritime crimes, has flourished with the growth in global trade and exchange of commer-
cial goods, financial instruments, and people. Today’s pirate is a far cry from those of
yesteryear, and most “piratical” acts are carried out within territorial seas, not high seas,
which presents a problem of legal definition.[71] They are often well-equipped with heavy
weapons, high-speed craft, and advanced communications. One pirate ship captured in
Indonesian waters was outfitted with fraudulent immigration stamps, tools to forge ship
documents, and sophisticated radar, communications, and satellite-tracking equipment.
“We thought pirates belonged to history, but they are back and meaner than ever,”
remarked Yoshihiko Yamada, of the Nippon Foundation, a group that tracks piracy
incidents.[72]
Not only have the numbers of
these types of incidents increased
worldwide – partly as a result of an
improved worldwide reporting system –
but they have become more lethal, with
crews abandoned at sea in lifeboats or
murdered outright. In March 1999,
for example, the 5,600-ton freighter
Marine Master was attacked off
Thailand by 20 pirates in three fast
Courtesy of Worldwide Maritime Security Information
boats. Shooting and wounding one
crew member, the pirates set all 16 seaman adrift in small plastic life rafts; after six days
drifting, they were rescued by fishermen. Pirates killed at least 67 seamen last year, all but
one of them in Asia, and at least 40 are missing. Incidents of piracy tend to occur in four
regional areas: Southeast Asia, Africa, South America, and Central America. Furthermore,
most incidents of maritime crime occur in coastal waters, with nearly 80 percent of all
reported “piracy” incidents occurring in territorial waters, and thus should more properly be
called “sea robbery” rather than piracy per se. The majority of recent incidents have been
focused primarily in Southeast Asia, astride major maritime chokepoints, where these sea-
going criminals can easily observe potential prey. In 1998, one-third – 59 cases – of the
192 piracy incidents occurred in the Indonesian archipelago. But there have also been

(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating [piratical acts].

Acts of piracy can also be committed by a warship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew
has mutinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft.
This definition is somewhat narrow, as de jure piracy can occur only on the high seas, i.e., areas beyond a
state’s territorial sea, including Exclusive Economic Zones. As such, the suppression of piracy de jure gen-
tium is a responsibility of all states. However, as most “piratical” acts take place within EEZs or territori -
al seas, some coastal states may be highly sensitive of foreign states’ naval or coastguard forces pursuing
pirates into their EEZs (legally permissible) or territorial seas (impermissible without the permission of
the coastal state). See Richard Hill, “Piracy and Related Matters,” in Stephen Jermy, John Lippiett, and
Richard Hill, Maritime Operations in Peace: Drug Interdiction, Disaster Relief, Suppression of Piracy,
International Studies Centre, University of Plymouth, Plymouth International Papers No. 10 (undated),
pp. 33-37.
[72] “High-Tech Pirates Ravage Asian Seas,” The Washington Post, 5 July 1999, p. A18.
45
 increases in incidents along both coasts of Africa and the coast of Brazil. Estimates of the
total financial losses due to piracy worldwide have reached $16 billion per year. The
Nippon Foundation has estimated that pirates attack at least one ship every day and kill a
seaman each week. Thus, the confidence that the high seas and important coastal trade
routes are secure for commerce may increasingly be in doubt in this future, and should be
a national security concern for the United States and its allies. The case of Japan is com-
pelling. With nearly 100 percent of its domestic energy needs supplied by foreign oil,
much of it transitting the Indonesian archipelago infested by pirates, its petroleum lifeline
“In the anti-piracy role, there is a is at risk.
need for some larger ships each There is, moreover, a growing potential for catastrophic environmental disaster
with good endurance, sensors, resulting from piratical depredation. The trend is for pirates to board ships while underway
communications and action infor- at slow speeds in constricted straits and waterways; to detain, set adrift, or murder the
mation, having on board an elite crews; and then leaving the ships underway with no one at the helm. The prospect of a
corps ready to man at least two fully laden crude oil tanker ramming other ships or running aground, with a significant
boarding boats, an armed helicop- discharge of its cargo, cannot be ignored.
ter and discriminating shipboard Similarly, the potential for pirate groups to become politicized or hired out by
weapons; a larger number per- politically motivated groups and engaging in terrorism must also be assessed. For example,
haps of smaller vessels with as in the Philippines, the Abu Sayaff Islamic terrorist group and the Moro National Liberation
many as possible of the above Front’s “Lost Commandos” have engaged in maritime attacks to raise funds to carry out
qualities but without, for exam-
attacks against the government.
ple, a helicopter; fixed wing patrol While the number of piracy incidents will most likely remain constant during the next
aircraft with sufficient endurance, 20 years, there will likely be an increase in incident reporting. It is widely accepted among
sensors and communications; and the government and nongovernment organizations that track piracy worldwide – including
an operational command organi- the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), U.K. Defence Intelligence Service (DIS),
sation with access to all available
Australian Defence Intelligence Organization (DIO) and the International Maritime
Bureau (IMB) – that the annual number of piracy cases is seriously under-counted. DIS
information and intelligence, the
estimates the actual number of piracy cases could be 2,000 percent higher on an annual
ability to talk to other govern-
basis, while DIO assesses the under-reporting to be 20 to 70 percent. Since the establish-
ment departments and access to
ment of the IMB’s Regional Piracy Center in Malaysia in 1992 and its subsequent efforts
allies if these are part of the par- to publicize the piracy problem, there has been increased reporting on major incidents, but
ticular anti-piracy scene.” incidents involving fishermen and recreational boaters are still heavily under-counted. Also,
Richard Hill the average loss from a piracy incident does not cross the monetary threshold for insurance
Piracy and Related Matters action, further contributing to under-reporting. Most incidents will continue to go
Plymouth International Papers
Number 10 unreported except in cases where there is serious loss of property and life or damage to a
International Studies Centre foreign interest. One reason for this is that a ship owner/operator stands to lose tens of
University of Plymouth, U.K., 1998 thousands of dollars in revenue for each day that the vessel is idled for an investigation
of a piracy case.
The concentration of piracy and “sea robbery” incidents will continue to be located in
areas with little or no maritime law enforcement, political and economic instability, and a
high volume of commercial activity. Of greater concern is the awareness that these inci-
dents are now occurring within the once secure confines of harbors and anchorages.
Crowded harbors and deeper-draft vessels now require ships to often anchor in areas distant
from local marine security services. The criminal element is now exploiting various surveil-
lance and enforcement weaknesses and conducting the maritime equivalent of the “smash
and grab,” striking and disappearing before security forces can respond.
Organized crime will increase in influence and scope during the next 20 years as
organized criminal groups become increasingly entrenched in the international economy
and as demand for and profits from the illicit transportation of people, drugs, and contra-
band multiply. If left unchecked, international criminal organizations will continue to
expand their illegal activities in the 21st century. International criminal organizations will
increase in number and influence as they become more adept at manipulating and chal-

46
lenging local and national governments and international organizations and consolidating
their power bases. The expected growth of transnational criminal organizations will be
exacerbated by advances in communications and transportation technologies; a decrease in
governmental controls over the international flow of goods, services, and money; the
establishment of international
affiliations among immigrant
communities; and the projected
rates of unemployment in devel-
oping countries and in the Soviet
successor countries and Eastern
Europe. Relying on a myriad of
international connections to pro-
vide them with both human and
financial resources, by 2020
transnational criminal syndicates
will be as problematic for global
security as organized insurgent
groups and terrorists. The problem of organized crime will become more compelling as
these groups and even “rogue governments,” some running entire regions as virtual
“medieval feudal fiefdoms,” gain access to more sophisticated technologies. As Dr.
Kimberley Thachuk, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies, warned
the Transnational Issues Conference in mid-October 1998:
...it has been the explosion in new technology that has significantly abetted the growth
and proliferation of international organized crime groups and their capabilities. With
access to modern communications and weapons technologies, these enterprises now
have considerable coercive political and economic leverage. The use of electronic trans-
fers, unfettered internet access and high tech communications equipment has permit-
ted international criminal organizations to increasingly commit faceless crimes that
while they erode the state, are difficult to attribute to particular perpetrators. This
enables organized crime groups to run massive transnational economic empires mov-
ing their operations between states fluidly with less state-imposed constraints than ever
before. Some organizations, such as certain Russian or Colombian groups, now consti-
tute a “state within a state” or are equivalent to some of the smaller states.[73]
Future terrorist organizations will continue to use attacks on maritime targets as a
means of furthering their political goals. From the 1961 hijacking of the Portuguese flagged
passenger vessel Santa Maria to the numerous maritime attacks of the Sri Lankan Tamil Sea
Tigers during the 1990s, widely publicized incidents of terrorism in the maritime environ-
ment have drawn immediate concern and action. Trends seen in terrorism during the late
1980s and 1990s will likely continue in the future. The number of terrorist incidents
worldwide has decreased while the number of casualties inflicted has risen. The typical
terrorist tactic of holding hostages has declined, due in part to the growing sophistication
of counter-terrorist forces worldwide. Also, the number of terrorist groups espousing a
leftist ideology such as Marxism and Socialism has decreased, with a subsequent rise in the
number of groups based on nationalism, ethnicity and religion.
While terrorists would prefer to attack a target that is immobile and easy to survey,
there will continue to be a small number of attacks in the maritime environment. For
example, several Middle Eastern terrorist groups maintain a maritime attack capability
through diver and underwater warfare training provided by Iran and Libya. Other groups
with a cultural maritime heritage find it easier to develop a competent maritime attack
capability. The Sri Lankan Tamil Sea Tigers and the Filipino Abu Sayyang Group are

[73] Dr. Kimberley Thachuk, “International Organized Crime and Drug Trafficking,” paper pre-
sented at the Transnational Issues Conference, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, Washington, D.C., 14-15 October 1998, p. 3.
47
 examples of seafaring groups that have conducted multiple maritime terrorist attacks, as
well as piracy acts for fundraising purposes. The concern for the future is that terrorists
will shift emphasis and make the rapidly growing cruise line industry a new target of
opportunity.
Similar actions, employed against U.S. defense sealift forces, introduce an asymmetric
threat to America’s security that could effectively neutralize the flow of troops and materi-
als. The Nation must clearly address how it intends to protect not only this “steel bridge”
during times of crisis, but also the routine protection of forward-deployed strategic assets
such as the Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS) and Afloat Prepositioning Force (APF).

Asymmetric Threats
America’s adversaries will be more likely to engage in asymmetric warfare such as
terrorism, sabotage, information operations, and chemical or biological attacks – focused
against weaknesses of strategy, doctrine, tactics, and technology – than direct military
confrontation and attack. The proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons
will also remain a concern. Given that only a handful of countries will have the capability
to project substantial naval power beyond their own geographic regions, and that the vast
majority will remain unable to project power much beyond their own territorial waters, it
is highly unlikely that any “peer” foreign naval power will emerge by 2020 that will be
capable of challenging U.S. maritime superiority on a global basis. Rather, the vast
majority of future maritime challenges will originate from individual states and stateless
organizations. In order to defeat their adversaries, such countries and organizations will
only be able to achieve success against modern Western maritime forces through the use
of asymmetric warfare.
Asymmetric warfare concepts vary widely, and many types of warfare could be used
asymmetrically. According to the National Defense University’s Institute for National
Strategic Studies, there are four broad asymmetric warfare options available to potential
adversaries to combat foreseeable U.S. military superiority:[74]
• Acquiring weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and long-range ballistic or cruise
missiles
• Acquiring high-technology sensors, communications, and weapon systems
• Exploiting cyberweapons to disrupt military logistics systems or the U.S. national
strategic infrastructure
• Engaging the U.S. in environments that degrade U.S. ability to attack militarily sig-
nificant targets. For example, choosing to fight in urban areas, or purposely blurring
the distinctions between actions considered crimes and those viewed as warfare
In addition, small boat tactics, guerrilla warfare, terrorist activities, and the exploita-
tion of media coverage of events are other possible asymmetric options. Regardless of the
options employed, the asymmetric challenger, “unable or unwilling to confront U.S.
military power directly, and in kind, will pursue asymmetrical advantages designed to
negate the U.S. military’s comparative advantages.”[75] In this perspective, an adversary
will subscribe to an overall strategy that links political and military objectives in a manner
that thwarts any U.S. and allied hopes of a quick, “surgical” victory. He may even try to
inflict a level of damage on U.S. forces and facilities that will weaken U.S. domestic

[74] Hans A. Binnendijk and David C. Gompert, eds., Strategic Assessment 1998: Engaging Power
for Peace (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), pp. 170-171. See also Hans
Binnendijk and Richard Kugler, eds., Strategic Assessment 1999: Priorities for a Turbulent World
(Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1999), particularly Chapter One.
[75] William Rosenau, Kemper Gay, and David Mussington, “Transnational Threats and U.S.
National Security,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol. 6, 1997, p. 152.

48
political resolve for a protracted war, avoiding a direct confrontation with superior U.S.
military power and instead concentrating on inflicting unacceptably high levels of damage
and casualties by exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities.
The world’s littorals will continue to present the most challenging environment for
operations by maritime forces. In coastal areas, both long- and short-range, land-based sys-
tems, as well as maritime forces, ranging from those tied closely to the shore to those with
open-ocean capabilities, can be
brought to bear against U.S. mar-
itime forces. Moreover, with the
continually increasing range and
accuracy of standoff weapons, those
few states with any capability to do
so will seek to deny the United
States the sea area
necessary to conduct long-range
strike operations, while the rest will
seek at least to oppose those U.S. forces that must operate closer to shore.
Future conventional maritime weaponry that could present severe challenges in the
littoral include naval mines, aircraft, antiship and land-attack cruise missiles, patrol
combatants and larger naval surface combatants, advanced diesel/air-independent/nuclear
submarines, special operations forces, small craft, coastal artillery, and ballistic missiles
(including terminally guided weapons). Other nonconventional weapons, including biolog-
ical and chemical weapons, could also be encountered. Many military operations in times
of tension short of war – during sanctions enforcement, noncombatant evacuations or
shipping escort operations, for example – could take place very near the bases and routine
operating areas of potentially hostile foreign forces, allowing our adversaries to attack with
little warning at a time and place of their choosing, and in waters well known to them.[76]
Control of the littoral battlespace of the future will be won by those forces that best
combine surveillance, strike, and support capabilities. In many countries, improvement in
littoral surveillance capabilities will be driven by a need to patrol exclusive economic zones
and enforce sovereignty in them. In a few cases, an additional imperative will exist to
monitor and target hostile forces approaching or operating within standoff weapon range
of the country’s coast. Surveillance and targeting technology is becoming more complex
and capable, with space surveillance systems expected gradually to assume a more
important role in reconnaissance and target cueing.
With the growing availability of vital information in electronic form, accessible
through the Internet or private computer networks, the future security threat to informa-
tion and technology infrastructures will increase dramatically. Despite efforts to construct
“firewalls” and secure networks, critical military and economic data will be more vulnerable
to attacks by individual “hackers” and organized, focused sabotage operations. Key
functions of maritime operations, such as navigation, communications, and maritime sur-
veillance, have always had a significant information component. The obvious dependence
of maritime security and law enforcement on information makes the information itself a

[76] One critically important area of the not-so-distant future that demands innovation, far-sight-
edness, investment, and the willingness to reject the overwhelming tendency toward “business as usual” is
the need to counter the rapidly escalating threat of land-attack cruise missiles to U.S. forces overseas and
to the U.S. homeland. Whether armed with conventional high-explosive warheads, special devices
intended to defeat electrical/electronic grids, or Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD – nuclear, biologi-
cal, or chemical weapons), cruise missiles offer U.S. adversaries the ability to attack directly our will to
fight, to employ imaginative tactics and techniques, to deny our power-projection forces access to for -
ward operating areas, and to attack fixed installations and massed formations, including population cen-
ters in the U.S. homeland. In some future crisis or conflict, a containerized cruise missile armed with a
“chem-bio” warhead could be launched against U.S. and allied forces ashore – not to mention against
capitals and cities in America and overseas – from any one of hundreds of commercial containerships
plying offshore shipping lanes, a “shell-game” with potentially disastrous consequences.
49
 high-payoff target for adversaries, whether state-sponsored or not. Information warfare will
increase by 2020; the dependence of the United States on information networks makes it
especially vulnerable to information attack. Although the United States is strategically
placed to benefit from, and perhaps even to continue to dominate, information technolo-
gies, America’s ability to operate without fear of “cyber-attacks” against its information
infrastructure will erode as other states choose information over industry as an instrument
of national power.

Advanced Technologies
Technology development will be another overarching influence on the maritime
environment during the next two decades. Advanced military and, increasingly important,
commercial technologies will continue to spread worldwide, enabling state and non-state
actors to acquire information, command-and-control, communications, sensors, and
weapon systems that will decrease the United States’ technological advantage. The assess-
ment of the National Defense University is sobering: “From a national security perspec-
tive, the most salient trend in the new information environment is that the capabilities
DoD spent billions to build in the 1980s are increasingly available for other nations to
rent or buy at a fraction of that cost.”[77] Therefore, while the United States will
doubtlessly move forward with advancements in power sources, space systems, electronics
and materials, the overall edge that it has enjoyed during much of the 20th century will
begin to diminish.
Although America’s technological advantage will decrease by 2020, the United States
will remain one of the most technologically advanced states in both commercial/civilian
and military spheres. The American application of existing technological innovations will
continue to yield major advancements in defense systems and infrastructure, ensure
American technological progress, and reduce the cost of high-end technological products.
At the same time, these technological advancements will also produce benefits that can be
shared by the civilian sectors, although the more compelling “technology flow” will be
from the commercial/civilian sectors to the military. The trend evident in the late-1980s
will continue: the most advanced militaries around the world increasingly will rely on
commercially developed technologies for their highest-technology systems.
For example, the capabilities of space-
based ocean monitoring systems will greatly
increase through 2020, and these will
increasingly be available to anyone with the
cash to rent them or buy their output –
friend and foe, alike. The resolution and
availability of imagery from commercial elec-
tro-optical and synthetic aperture radar satel-
lites will improve dramatically. There will be
numerous applications for this technology,
such as navigation, surveillance, search and Courtesy of NOAA
rescue, and monitoring of oil spills. Surveillance and targeting technology will become
more complex and capable, with space surveillance systems expected to assume a more
important role in reconnaissance and target cueing.

[77] Strategic Assessment 1998, op.cit., p. 151.

50
 Although the United States will continue to be one of the biggest beneficiaries of
future technological advancements and their subsequent applications in the maritime arena,
other nations and non-state actors will be
able to acquire the same or similar capabil-
ities, and sometimes apply them in ways
that will surprise America. Through 2020
and beyond, the operational capabilities of
foreign naval and maritime forces will
increase as more sophisticated weapons
and maritime platforms enter service.
Allies and adversaries will be able to
acquire advanced systems through a
variety of avenues, including indigenous
and cooperative production, technology
transfers, legal arms sales, illegal arms
transfers, espionage, and the outright
purchase and military application of “
commercial off-the-shelf” – COTS –
civilian technologies. The appearance of Courtesy of NOAA
high-technology systems worldwide, as well as their application to a spectrum of contingen-
cies and conflict – from conventional operations to asymmetric warfare – will ensure that
the maritime environment continues to present a challenge to U.S. maritime forces, and
particularly the Coast Guard in its maritime security roles.

A Dangerous – If Uncertain – Future

Looking to this ambiguous yet potentially perilous future, the National Defense Panel
explained in late 1997 that “The United States enters the new millennium facing challenges
very different from those that shaped our national security policy during the almost 50
years of the Cold War.”[78] Many of these are clearly “coastguard-type” challenges, and the
United States, as well as our allies and friends, can benefit greatly from the Coast Guard’s
unique expertise in safeguarding maritime security. Although many of the missions, opera-
tions, and tasks necessary to defeat these challenges are clearly “non-traditional” missions
for the Defense Department, they are long-standing traditional Coast Guard missions that
are routinely carried out by the Coast Guard’s men and women across the spectrum of
operating areas – from America’s ports and coastal waterways to Deepwater environments.
In the future, there is likely to be a greater need for Coast Guard involvement in meeting
these challenges. Indeed, as the Institute for National Strategic Studies recognized:
Some threats of this kind seem to call for military forces to back up police forces
that are outgunned and out-maneuvered by international crime syndicates. Quasi-
police operations have been normal for armed forces in many nations and for U.S.
armed forces in times past. They have not, however played a major role since World
War II in the activities of most of the armed forces, other than the Coast Guard and
National Guard. There may well be resistance within the military [other than in the
Coast Guard and National Guard] to the use of increasingly scarce resources for quasi-
police functions.[79]

[78] Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, op.cit., p. 5.

[79] Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Strategic Assessment 1995
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1995), p. 11. William Rosenau, Kemper Gay, and David Mussington con-
clude that “The post-World War II armed forces have long declared that ‘fighting and winning the
nation’s wars’ was their raison d’etre. Such a vision is likely to conflict with the requirements posed by
transnational challenges. Developing human intelligence networks, enforcing embargoes and sanctions,
securing borders and other essentially police-like activities will be important features of the military com-
ponent of the U.S. response.” “Transnational Threats and U.S. National Security,” op.cit., p. 158.
51
III. USCG M A R I T I M E S A F E T Y
AND SECURITY ROLES,
MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS
Since the earliest days of the Republic, the Coast Guard’s roles and missions have
expanded so that they today touch upon virtually every facet of U.S. maritime life. The
Congress in 1790 established the forerunner of today’s Coast Guard, the Revenue Cutter
Terms of Reference...
Service, to protect America’s interests in waters under national jurisdiction: “so many boats
or cutters, not exceeding ten, as may be necessary to be employed for the protection of Role:
revenue,” as the act read. Secretary of the Treasury Alexander Hamilton’s vision was for “a Broad, enduring purpose speci-
few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a small fied by Congress in law
expense be made useful sentinels of our laws.”[80] Throughout the 19th century, a variety
Mission:
of federal organizations – Steamboat Inspection Service (1838), Federal Life-Saving Service
(1848), Bureau of Navigation (1884) – were created to protect lives and property at sea and Task assigned by the President,
to regulate vessel safety. Most of these were single-function services, and only the Revenue Secretary, or Commandant to
Cutter Service was assigned additional roles, a result of the inherent flexibility of cutters and field commanders
the fact that, along with the Navy, at the time it was the only federal service to operate on Function:
the high seas.
Specific responsibility assigned
Cooperation, interaction, and cross-fertilization among these and other predecessor by the Congress, President, or
services finally culminated with the birth of the U.S. Coast Guard on 28 January 1915, Secretary of Transportation to
which combined the Life-Saving Service with the Revenue Cutter Service. The new Coast fulfill legally established roles
Guard continued to have functions added to it in the years that followed. In 1939, the
Lighthouse Service was consolidated under the Coast Guard, and in 1942 the Bureau of Capability:
Marine Inspection and Navigation was temporarily (made permanent in 1946) added to Ability of a properly organized,
the Service’s portfolio. By 1967, which saw the Coast Guard moved into the newly created trained, and equipped force to
Department of Transportation, the Coast Guard had acquired numerous civilian law accomplish a particular mission
enforcement, maritime, and naval roles, missions, functions, and responsibilities. These or function
have continued to expand, so that on the cusp of the 21st century America demands five
maritime security roles of its “Guardians of the Sea”:
• Maritime Safety
• Maritime Mobility
• Maritime Law Enforcement
• Marine Environmental Protection
• National Defense
Throughout this history, however, in
peacetime, crisis, and war, the one constant has
been the Coast Guard’s essential mandate to protect and defend America’s citizens, interests,
and friends, in waters under national jurisdiction as well as in overseas areas of importance

[80] The act authorizing the Revenue Cutter Service became law on 4 August 1790, less than a
year after the establishment of the Treasury Department. Four general histories of the Coast Guard and
its predecessors are very useful: Stephan H. Evans, Captain, USCG, The United States Coast Guard,
1790-1915: A Definitive History (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Institute, 1949); Dennis L. Noble, That
Others Might Live: The U.S. Life-Saving Service, 1878-1915 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press,
1994); Irving H. King, The Coast Guard Expands 1865-1915: New Roles, New Frontiers (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1996); and Robert Erwin Johnson, Guardians of the Sea: History of the United States
Coast Guard, 1915-Present (Annapolis, MD: 1987). Two other Naval Institute Press books by historian
Irving H. King, George Washington’s Coast Guard and The Coast Guard under Sail, are no longer in print
but provide excellent insight into the foundation and early years of the Revenue Cutter Service. See also,
Captain Patrick H. Roth, USN (Ret.), and Richard D. Kohout, U.S. Coast Guard: Purpose,
Characteristics, Contributions, and Value to the Nation (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analysis, CRM
97-17.09/February 1997). Hamilton’s vision of a “few armed vessels” was articulated in Federalist Paper
12.
53
 to American security interests. This core mandate, at its most fundamental level, has four
elements:[81]
• a humanitarian element dedicated to the preservation of lives and property at risk
on the seas
• a policing element focused on national sovereignty, resource management, safety,
and the maintenance of law and order at sea
• a diplomatic element in which the Coast Guard’s people and platforms become
extensions of the United States in support of U.S. foreign policy
• a military element in which Coast Guard assets link with other U.S. Armed Forces,
as well as foreign militaries, in direct support of military operations and homeland
defense

Table 2. Geographic Reach of Coast Guard Roles and Missions

Deepwater Operating Enviroment

U.S. U.S. U.S. High Global International
Inland Coastal Territorial Seas Interfaces
Waterways Waters Sea and and Staff
and Great EEZ Coordination
Lakes
Maritime Safety & Mobility
Aids to Navigation
Search & Rescue
International Ice Patrol
Polar Ice Operations
Domestic Ice Operations
Waterways Management
Commercial Vessel Safety
Bridge Administration
Recreational Boating Safety
Port Safety & Security
Maritime Law Enforcement
Enforcement of Laws
and Treaties
Marine Environmental
Protection
Maritime Environmental
Response
National Defense
General Defense Operations
Port Operations Security
& Defense
Peacetime Military
Engagement
Maritime Intercept
Operations
Military Environmental
Response

Source: U.S. Coast Guard (G-OC), October 1999

[81] Ken Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy (London: Croom Helm, 1977), p. 16. Booth discusses
the latter three elements, but clearly the Coast Guard’s humanitarian service element – whether rescuing
boaters or interdicting Cuban, Haitian, Chinese or other illegal immigrants at risk – is a fundamental
element and core characteristic of the Service.

54
 All Coast Guard roles, missions, and functions, especially in the Deepwater operating
environment, have in common the tasks of providing credible presence in and conducting
surveillance of critical maritime regions; detecting, sorting, and identifying targets of inter-
est; and intercepting those targets – in short, exercising sea control over areas of importance
to the United States. (Table 2 illustrates the geographic reach of Coast Guard national
maritime security operations in the late 1990s.) The following discussions of the five core
roles illustrate the breadth and depth of the Coast Guard’s commitment of service to
America, and underscore the compelling need for an effective, efficient, and adequate force
structure comprising modern and highly capable systems and platforms and the highly
skilled and motivated men and women who are the Coast Guard.

Maritime Safety
America’s Lifesavers. The U.S. Coast Guard is renown worldwide for its search and
rescue – “SAR” – heroism and ensuring the safety of life and property – whether near the
shore or hundreds of miles at sea. Until 1832, the rendering of assistance to vessels in
distress was not a specific duty of the revenue cutters, although cutter sailors would offer
whatever aid they could. In that year,
however, the Secretary of the Treasury
directed several cutters to cruise during
the winter months solely for this purpose
and salvage duties. This had an immedi-
ate impact on the operations of the cut-
ters. The vessels would now stay in com-
mission year round rather than be laid
up during the winter. Crew professional-
ism and training improved as a result.
Moreover, the task of assisting vessels on
the Great Lakes was specifically assigned to cutters in 1870, while those stationed on the
Gulf and Pacific coasts assumed the roles as a matter of course. The connection between
the cutters offshore and the Life-Saving Service became strong, a bond made complete with
the advent of the Coast Guard in 1915.[82]
The Coast Guard’s “Surfmen” conducted beach patrols, rigged shotlines in faking
boxes, readied Lyle guns, deployed breeches buoys and lifecars, and muscled lifeboats
through angry surf – always ready to go out when no others could . . . or would. On the
threshold of the 21st century, with several revolutions in technology and systems – fixed-
wing aircraft, helicopters, global navigation and communications systems, radar, homing
devices – to aid them, America’s Lifesavers still need the personal courage, dedication, and
unique skills to protect lives and property at the mercy of angry seas. Some recent examples
underscore the need for effective – and
sometimes daring – Coast Guard SAR
capabilities.
Shortly after midnight on 4
October 1980, radiomen at the Coast
Guard stations in San Francisco,
California, and Kodiak, Alaska, received
a distress call from the cruise ship
Prinsendam. The engine room was on
fire and the ship was dead in the water

[82] Noble, That Others Might Live, op.cit., generally. Also, John M. Waters, Jr., Rescue at Sea, 2nd
ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989); and Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, op.cit., pp. 4-9.

55
 some 130 miles out in the Gulf of Alaska. At 5:12 AM, the captain gave the order to
abandon the ship; 50 crew members were detailed to keep fighting the fire as the other
469 passengers and crew crowded into one motor launch, six lifeboats, and four life rafts.
The first rescuer on the scene was a Coast Guard HC-130 Hercules long-range
aircraft out of Kodiak. Arriving at about 2:30 AM, the “Herc” stayed at the scene for
another eight hours and served as the on-scene coordinator to direct air traffic and ship
movements. The high-endurance cutter Boutwell (WHEC- 719) recalled its crew from
liberty and immediately sailed from Juneau. The first ship to arrive was the supertanker
“At 11:15 PM, October 29, a Williamsburg, which began picking up survivors at first light. An hour later, Coast Guard
freighter off Long Island picks up HH-3F helicopters out of Sitka began rescuing passengers and crew by hovering some 30
a woman’s terrified voice on the feet above the water and plucking survivors up one at a time, and flying them to the
VHF: This is the Satori, the Satori, nearby tanker. As the weather deteriorated and the fire could not be contained, the
39:49 north and 69:52 west, we remaining 50 crew members abandoned the stricken vessel. Boutwell arrived soon there-
are three people, this is a mayday. after and brought on board the remaining persons in lifeboats. A “joint” and “combined”
If anyone can hear us, please pass force of Coast Guard helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft, Boutwell, and U.S. Air Force and
our position on to the Coast
Canadian aircraft combined to rescue every passenger and crew member without a single
Guard. Repeat, this is a
loss of life or serious injury – one of the most successful rescues in the Service’s history.
mayday...” In late October 1991, a massive storm struck without warning, generating waves
Sebastian Junger
more than 100 feet high, and swamping the Andrea Gail, a swordfishing boat out of
The Perfect Storm, 1997 Glouscester, Massachusetts.[83] All six on board were lost. By the time the storm spent its
fury, another three ships and a National Guard helicopter had been stricken, putting in
motion one of the largest and most intense Coast Guard search and rescue efforts in the
history of the Coast Guard. The National Guard helicopter went down at 9:30 PM, and
the cutter Tamaroa (WMEC-166), a
48-year old ex-Navy fleet tug had
already been vectored to the area.
Coast Guard Deepwater assets from
Florida to Massachusetts were readied
to give aid, as were Navy ships and air-
craft. At 9:48, Air Station Cape Cod
launched an HU-25 Falcon jet and an
HH-3F Pelican SAR helicopter, while a
Navy P-3B Orion Maritime Patrol
Aircraft at New Brunswick, Maine,
stood by, ready for takeoff. Half a dozen aircraft, two ships, and some 200 rescuers were
focused on getting the four National Guard survivors to safety, and were ultimately
successful in a dramatic test of human courage and determination.
In January 1995, the S/V Mirage reported taking on water some 200 nautical miles
southeast of Wilmington, North Carolina. A Coast Guard HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter
surged to the scene, rescuing four of the five people on board; the master elected to remain
on board and safely navigated his ship to St. Thomas. During the operation, however, a
hoist cable on the helicopter failed, which prevented the recovery of a Coast Guard rescue
swimmer who had assisted getting the people off the ship. He stayed in a life raft
deployed from the helicopter for about five hours in 40-knot winds and 20-foot seas. A
second Jayhawk helo rescued the swimmer and transported him to the Navy Aegis guided
missile cruiser USS Ticonderoga (CG-47) for medical attention.
Much closer to shore, the Coast Guard established the initial command, control, and
communications capabilities for the multi-agency response to the TWA Flight 800 disaster

[83] Sebastian Junger, The Perfect Storm (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1997).

56
in July 1996, and continued to support the search and recovery efforts until the mission
was called off.[84] The heart-rending task of recovering bodies and personal effects was
carried off with dignity, but the danger from razor-sharp metal shards, literally miles of
electrical and hydraulic cables, and sharks was always present. During the eight-months’
search and recovery ordeal, the Coast Guard made its shore facilities available for use by the
victims’ families and other federal, state, and local organizations, and, as the investigation
progressed, Deepwater cutters kept the search areas clear of vessels that were not part of the
salvage and investigation efforts.
And the Coast Guard was called upon to coordinate the search and eventually recov- “...until just a couple of days
ery, not rescue, of the bodies of John F. Kennedy, Jr., his wife Carolyn Bessette Kennedy, ago, the recovery efforts, the res-
and her sister, Lauren Bessette, following the crash of his aircraft in the waters off Martha’s cue and recovery efforts that
Vineyard in the late evening of 16 July were undertaken, were consis-
1999. At 2:15 AM the next morning, tent with what would have been
a Kennedy family friend made an done in any other case. Because
urgent call to the Coast Guard, and the the Coast Guard felt that they
search got underway. Initially, there had the capacity to succeed in
was hope that they would be found at
this, if they had a few more days,
another airport, having turned back as
and because of the role of the
flying conditions worsened, or, later, to
Kennedy family in our national
have survived a crash at sea. For five
lives, and because of the enor-
days, Air Force, Navy, National
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, Federal Aviation Administration, state mous losses that they have sus-
and local governments, and private groups – all coordinated by the Coast Guard – scoured tained in our lifetimes, I thought
suspected areas of the Atlantic. The aircraft was found in 116 feet of water, and the bodies it was appropriate to give them a
recovered by Navy divers, ultimately to be committed to the deep on 22 July. few more days. And they – if

The lives of the searchers were not at risk in the Kennedy case; however, very often anyone believes that was wrong,
rescuers put themselves in grave danger without knowing the identities of the people they the Coast Guard is not at fault, I
are trying to save. In 1997, seven Coast Guardsmen were killed in two separate SAR cases am. It was because I thought it
involving private sailboats that had foundered in heavy weather. The federal government was the right thing to do under
spends at least $370 million each year for search and rescue, most of it for Coast Guard the circumstances. ”
operations, which handles close to 50,000 cases annually – some 400-500 of which are President William J. Clinton
aircraft crashes. “There is a tremendous amount of energy for search and rescue because it News Conference, 21 July 1999
is a human response,” Chuck Mills, of the non-profit, educational National Association for
Search and Rescue, noted. “It’s not based on who you are.”[85]
With maritime trade perhaps tripling by the year 2020, a virtual explosion in cruise
ship demand (with some ships already carrying 6,000 or more passengers and crew), fishing
vessels venturing farther offshore in search of productive fishing grounds, and a burgeoning
of personal watercraft and boats, the job of ensuring maritime safety will become even more
challenging. Prevention will be the watchword of the future, founded on risk assessments to
reduce the probability of mishaps. Despite the nation’s best efforts to prevent accidents,
however, the sea is an unforgiving environment, and mariners – like the ill-fated crew of the
Andrea Gail and the passengers on board the fire-struck MV Ecstasy off Miami in 1998 –
will find themselves in extremis. Indeed, about 3,500 ships are involved annually in acci-
dents, and human error is the cause of approximately 80 percent of those accidents.[86]
Although advanced technologies will continue to be embraced, they will not eliminate the
inherently dangerous – and intensely humanitarian – work of rescuing people and protect-
ing property. The Coast Guard’s Deepwater assets and capabilities will continue to be the
foundation for success in this demanding mission area, which entails of cost of just 10

[84] U.S. Navy Salvage Report, TWA Flight 800 (Washington, D.C.: Commander, Naval Sea
Systems Command, S0300-BZ-RPT-010/0910-LP-015-6130, May 1998), pp. 2-3.
[85] “Initial JFK Jr. Search Called Typical of Thousands,” Los Angeles Times, 22 July 1999, A1.
[86] Turning to the Sea: America’s Ocean Future, op.cit., p. 10.

57
 percent of the Service’s annual budget. The question – “Who you ‘gonna call?” – will con-
tinue to be answered: “The Coast Guard!” (Table 3 provides summary Coast Guard SAR
data, which include all “lives saved,” even those in connection with a law-enforcement
activity.)

Table 3.
USCG Search & Rescue Activities
1992-1998

Fiscal SAR Lives People Property Loss USCG SAR

Year Cases Saved Assisted Prevented* Program Costs*

1992 52,645 5,547 131,537 $ 539 $417

1993 52,455 4,689 118,190 $ 909 $421
1994 53,266 7,889 115,622 $1,452 $423
1995 49,136 4,411 100,425 $2,449 $431
1996 42,956 4,992 84,284 $2,214 $416
1997 40,639 3,836 74,740 $ 878 $368
1998 37,215 3,192 66,141 $ 997 $385
*Millions of then-year dollars
Source: USCG (G-OPR), October 1999

Maritime Mobilit y
Prior to the creation of the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, Secretary of the Treasury
Alexander Hamilton sought ways to protect the vital cargos – and collect their associated
taxes – of the American merchant marine, the foundation of the colonial economy. As a
preventive measure, he proposed the creation of a federal Lighthouse Service to protect
American shipping from the wide range of coastal hazards, including rocks and shoals. In
1789, President George Washington signed the ninth Act of Congress, the first to provide
for any public work, making the federal government responsible for the establishment and
maintenance of aids to navigation, including “...lighthouses, beacons, buoys, and public
piers ... at the entrance of or within any bay, inlet, harbor, or port of the United States, for
rendering the navigation thereof easy and safe.”[87]
As U.S. seaborne commerce continued to flourish, the recognition of the need to
enforce maritime safety and provide for aids to navigation became increasingly evident.
For example, the harbor cutter Manhattan was directed to enforce anchorage regulations in
New York harbor in 1888, a responsibil-
ity soon assigned to other ports and
waterways. Safety of navigation soon
included the responsibility to deal with
derelicts that posed maritime hazards.
So critical was the need, that Congress
directed the Secretary of the Treasury to
build a steam cutter specifically designed
and outfitted “...for service at sea in bad
weather, for the purpose of blowing up
or otherwise destroying or towing into Courtesy of Don Wilson/Port of Seattle
port wrecks, derelicts, and other floating
hazards to navigation.”[88]

[87] Evans, The United States Coast Guard 1790-1915, op.cit., pp. 4-5.
[88] Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, op.cit., p. 10

58
 Regular Revenue Cutter Service cutter operations in the Arctic began in 1879, when
the cutter Corwin was sent north to search for two whalers and the exploring cruiser
Jeannette. Ultimately unsuccessful, as the three ships had already been lost, Corwin’s cruise
nonetheless became an annual event. The Coast Guard soon built a reputation for giving
aid to whaling crews whose vessels were trapped in the ice. The Service’s domestic icebreak-
ing responsibilities were subsequently codified by law in 1936, when President Franklin
Roosevelt signed an executive order directing that the Service assist in keeping channels and
harbors open to navigation.
The mission of safety at sea became internationally important with Titanic’s sinking in
1912. This tragic event saw the Service assume ice patrol duties the following year.[89]
The assumption of this seemingly natural function reflected what the cutters had long been
doing in the Bering Sea as an adjunct to their law enforcement, search and rescue, and
presence missions. As a result of this mission, which was formally instituted in the wake of
the Titanic tragedy, there have been no sinkings attributed to icebergs, and it remains an
important Deepwater task.
Since 1917, when a merchant ship carrying ammunition exploded in port in Halifax,
Nova Scotia, virtually leveling the city, the Coast Guard has regulated the handling, storage,
and carriage of dangerous materials in the nation’s ports. Coast Guard men and women
inspect vessel and port facilities and operations involving hazardous cargoes to ensure their
safe handling. The Service also regulates anchorages as well as deepwater ports, offshore
terminals, and deep seabed mining and ocean thermal energy conversion projects.
Moreover, to ensure compliance with domestic and international laws, the Coast Guard
examines and certifies/licenses U.S. merchant mariners and inspects foreign vessels and
their crews.
In 1939, as part of President Roosevelt’s reorganization plans, the U.S. Lighthouse
Service was placed under the Coast Guard, which gave the Coast Guard an all-encompass-
ing role in the safety of the nation’s waterways. This combination added nearly 50 percent
more civilians to the Service and caused a district reorganization as well as provisions to
bring many of the lighthouse personnel into the military organization. Additional responsi-
bilities continued to accrue. In 1940, for example, the Coast Guard was tasked with
weather patrol duties, a service it would perform for nearly 40 years until advanced satellite
technology superseded cutters at sea.
Today, the Coast Guard is the lead agency for a variety port safety and security, water-
ways management, commerce and vessel safety inspection and certification missions and
tasks, and weather observations, all conducted while simultaneously focusing on prevention
and response measures to man-made and natural disasters. The Coast Guard is also respon-
sible for providing a safe and efficient navigable waterways system to support domestic
commerce, international trade, and the military sealift requirements for national defense –
both at home and in overseas operating areas. In general, the mobility services provided by
the Coast Guard and its partners include:
• Aids to navigation (ATON) – maintaining nearly 50,000 Federal navigation aids
(lights, lighted/unlighted buoys, and daybeacons), seagoing/coastal/inland waters
buoytenders, Aids to Navigation Teams (ANTs), and radio-navigation systems
including Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) and LORAN sites
• Charting, pilot/tide/current information

[89] U.S. Coast Guard, International Ice Patrol (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of
Transportation, July 1984). Except for the World War I/II years, the cutter patrols were conducted every
ice season since 1913. The Service has not dedicated a cutter to the international ice patrol mission since
Evergreen (WAGO-295) was decommissioned in 1990. The Coast Guar d’s International Ice Patrol duties
in early 2000 are carried out by long-range HC-130 aircraft.

59
 • Vessel traffic services, transportation system information, and management informa-
tion systems – Vessel Traffic Information Systems (VTIS), Enhanced Automatic
Identification Systems (EAIS), and the future Ports and Waterways Safety System
(PAWSS) program
• Domestic and international ice operations – ice-breaking and patrol services
• Dredging and channel maintenance
• Technical assistance and advice
“A large number of aids to navi- • Infrastructure development
gation buoys are being installed assistance
throughout the RVN [Republic of
• Vessel safety standards and
Vietnam] in conjunction with inspection
channel dredging and port
• Bridge administration, standards,
improvement projects.
and inspection – oversees the regula-
Maintenance and servicing
tion and maintenance of some
requirements for these aids to 18,000 bridges throughout the
navigation are beyond the capa- United States, which aims to maintain free access for navigation on navigable waters
bility of the RVN Directorate of and a fair balance between the interests of water, road, and rail traffic
Navigation. The U.S. Coast Guard
• Law enforcement and port safety/security and environmental protection
has performed these functions on
a temporary basis since December
One element of this MTS security role that touches on homeland defense and mili-
tary operations is the Coast Guard’s contribution to controlling access of certain vessels to
1966. Recommend the U.S. Coast
all U.S. ports, territorial seas, and inland waters. On 5 April 1999, for example, as the
Guard be tasked with the interim
conflict in Yugoslavia and NATO forces stepped-up Allied Force operations,the Assistant
responsibility for installation,
to the President for National Security Affairs declared that vessels flying the flag or under
maintenance, and servicing of the effective control of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia were to be denied access to the
U.S.-sponsored aids to navigation United States. This prohibition applied to commercial cargo, passenger, fisheries and fish-
in RVN until RVN Directorate of eries support vessels, public vessels, and private yachts – not a new or an unusual mission
Navigation, with USAID [U.S. for the Coast Guard. The Service has long had the authority and responsibility to track
Agency for International and control such “Special Interest Vessels” (SIVs) of certain flags, designs, and cargoes, and
Development] assistance, can the SIV program has included operations aimed at Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea,
assume responsibility. ” Sudan, and Syria. Activated in 1999 to prevent Yugoslav vessels the opportunity to attack
Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN
U.S. security, the principal objective of this control remains the protection of U.S. vessels,
Commander-in-Chief ports, harbors, waterfront facilities, and people from sabotage or other unlawful activities,
U.S. Pacific Command, including intelligence-gathering from sensitive waterfront activities and defense operations.
27 August 1967
As quoted in The Coast Guard at In the international arena, the Coast Guard often serves as America’s principal point
War: Vietnam, 1965-1975 of contact in a variety of organizations. The International Maritime Organization (IMO),
for example, is a United Nations agency with 157 member states. The IMO’s purpose is
to improve the safety of international shipping and prevention of pollution from ships.
The Department of State has delegated responsibility to the Coast Guard the lead agency
for U.S. representation at the IMO. The Coast Guard leads the U.S. delegations to the
Assembly, the Maritime Safety Committee, the Marine Environmental Protection
Committee, the Legal Committee, the Facilitation Committee, and all technical commit-
tees. The Facilitation Committee especially affects mobility interests through its initiatives
to improve port infrastructure worldwide to facilitate the rapid movement of cargoes.
Other international mobility duties include Coast Guard representation in the
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA), the International Telecom-
munications Union (ITU), and the International Electro-Technical Commission (IEC), as
well as conducting the International Ice Patrol since 1913, in the wake of the Titanic

60
tragedy. Under the 1972/1984 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) convention, the United States is responsible for the international ice patrol in the
North Atlantic and marginal seas, and is reimbursed for services by the 17 signatories using
the service. The Coast Guard operates long-range HC-130H Hercules aircraft from
Elizabeth City, North Carolina, deployed to Newfoundland on a rotational basis, usually
from February through July of each year.[90] The Canadian government cooperates with
the Coast Guard in this patrol, including the provision of services and equipment and
reporting on ice conditions.

Maritime Law Enforc e m e n t

The Coast Guard traces its heritage to the compelling need to safeguard the Nation’s
revenue laws and to prevent smuggling in the first years of the fledgling Republic. But the
need to defend America’s maritime borders and its sovereignty from a variety of threats and
to enforce laws and treaties has also been a constant since 1790.
In 1799, the fear of contagious diseases that might be transmitted in vessels led to the
decision to direct the Revenue cutters to aid the enforcement of health and quarantine
measures. This became a periodic concern, as in 1884-1885 when cutters imposed a virtual
blockade of ship movements into the Delaware and Chesapeake Bays, as well as Gulf of
Mexico ports, working with the Public Health and Marine-Hospital Service to prevent
the spread of yellow fever and cholera. And in 1905, six cutters and seven chartered craft
manned by Revenue Cutter Service personnel boarded some 1,500 vessels – and fumigated
more than 250 – during a yellow fever epidemic in New Orleans.
International issues led to further additions to the Service’s missions in its early years.
The Revenue Service assumed duties in 1807 to detect and intercept ships engaged in the
foreign slave trade. Also that year, President Thomas Jefferson turned to the Service to
enforce the short-lived embargo that forbade American trade with foreign countries.
During 1819-1820, moreover, several cutters were engaged in anti-piratical duties, with the
cutters Louisiana and Alabama showing great zeal and enthusiasm for this duty against Gulf
coast pirates.
Beginning in 1818, the Service enforced the nation’s neutrality laws, and a 1833
mandate of Congress directed the Service to protect live-oak forests on public lands to
safeguard the Nation’s critical supplies of wood for vessels, extended to other trees later,
against illegal logging. And from the mid-19th century on, the Service has been tasked with
defending America’s shores from illegal traffic in firearms and weapons, liquor, and other
illegal substances and contraband. Following World War I, the Coast Guard faced a few
lean years and then experienced its greatest peacetime growth. The catalyst was the 1920
Volstead or Prohibition Act that prohibited the manufacture, sale, and transportation of
alcoholic beverages. With no other federal agency prepared to enforce the new law, much
of the enforcement fell on the shoulders of the Coast Guard.
The Coast Guard began its enforcement efforts – along the east and west coasts, in the
Gulf of Mexico, and in the Great Lakes – with approximately 100 vessels. By building
special craft, and transfers of ships from the Navy, the Service peaked at some 330 vessels of
75 feet or longer. An average of no more than 200 vessels were at sea, guarding the coast at
any time. In order to fill this deficiency, the Coast Guard combated smugglers by using
aircraft to cover more territory and to report suspicious vessels – the genesis of Coast Guard
aviation – and also the beginning of a dedicated Coast Guard intelligence service.

[90] The Coast Guard allocates about 400 aircraft resource hours per year to the International Ice
Patrol. In 1994, the latest year for which comprehensive data are available, the cost of the International
Ice Patrol to the United States was $646,821 and the estimated annual benefit to U.S. shipping was
$3,552,600.

61
 Illegal Drugs
Today the influx of illegal drugs is one of America’s foremost national security prob-
lems. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee’s subcommittee on emerging
threats and capabilities in April 1999, Barry R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National
Drug Control Policy, warned of the persistent flow of illegal drugs that kills 15,000
Americans and costs the public more than $110 billion each year. In addition to the social
costs of drug use, McCaffrey stated that the $57 billion which Americans spend annually
means that “in any given year drug use saps over $167 billion for our nation’s economic
strength.”
The Coast Guard is the Nation’s lead maritime agency in protecting America from
the drug threat and, despite the vast complications in enforcement, this task is performed
with little extra allocation.[91] But this involvement with the interdiction of drugs occu-
pies and consumes a tremendous amount of assets. Drug interdiction remains difficult
because it is tasked to multiple agencies, smugglers have a higher mobility, and there is a
need of more vessels, aircraft, and personnel to patrol the vast coastlines of the United
States and even greater expanse of the “transit zone.” This six-million square-mile transit
zone is roughly the size of the continental United States, and includes the Caribbean, Gulf
of Mexico, and Eastern Pacific. (Figure 5 shows the major routes of the South American
international drug trade into the United States.)
The Coast Guard has established Campaign Steel Web, a multi-year strategy, plan,
and operations aimed at reducing the supply of drugs to the United States. In 1997, the
Figure 5. South America International Drug Routes

[91] Presidential Decision Directive 14, Western Hemisphere Counter-Drug Strategy, established
the Coast Guard as the lead agency for maritime interdiction; the Coast Guard shares lead agency
responsibilities for air interdiction with the U.S. Customs Service.
[92] Office of National Drug Control Policy, The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998: A Ten-Year
Plan (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1998), p. 42. The pressure on Puerto Rico, however, has resulted in drug
traffickers returning to older routes between the Bahamas and Florida. In May 1998, for example,
Federal official scored their greatest cocaine seizure from a pleasure boat – 4,000 pounds with a street

62
Coast Guard’s cutters and aircraft for-
ward-deployed off South America and in
the Caribbean/eastern Pacific transit zone
interdicted more than 103,600 pounds
of cocaine, keeping nearly more than
500 million “hits” of cocaine – two
months’ consumption – off America’s
streets and out of its schools. The “street
value” of the cocaine seized, estimated at
$3.65 billion, exceeded the Coast
Guard’s entire operating budget of $3.15
billion in 1997. Marijuana seizures in
1997 were valued at an additional $324.8 million. But only 32 percent of estimated 430
metric tons of cocaine that entered the transit zone was actually seized, pointing to the
critical need for more effective intelligence, surveillance, and interdiction assets. During
1997, Coast Guard-led interagency surge operations reduced the flow of cocaine to Puerto
Rico – once a prime transshipment point – by 46 percent.[92] That success, however, led
the drug-runners to seek other ways to ensure safe transit of their “commodities.” For

Table 4
USCG Drug Seizures, 1986-1999*
(Drug Seizures in Pounds)
Vessels
Fiscal Year Cases Cocaine Marijuana Hashish/Oil Heroin Arrests Seized
1986 307 8,499 2,074,282 2,135 0 721 165
1987 257 22,454 1,390,864 15 0 626 171
1988 276 38,955 755,352 86,052 0 528 216
1989 259 34,792 328,623 40,069 0 385 206
1990 207 78,731 57,078 12,700 0 321 134
1991 156 90,335 44,023 141,547 0 245 79
1992 133 48,951 116,849 0 0 218 52
1993 68 49,014 80,300 2 0 143 31
1994 67 47,333 33,895 0 0 73 28
1995 44 33,629 40,164 0 1,306 56 34
1996 35 28,585 31,000 0 6.5** 23 41
1997 122 103,617 102,538 50,587 343 233 64
1998 115 82,623 31,365 25 3** 297 75
1999 107 111,689 28,872 33,006 0 189 50
*Includes USCG assistance to other agencies; 1999 data are as of June 1999
**Gallons
Note: Each pound of cocaine results in approximately 4,500 “hits” or doses.
Source: U.S. Coast Guard (G-OPL), October 1999

example, because of a weak police force and notoriously corrupt judiciary, Haiti has become
one of the hemisphere’s busiest conduits.[93] U.S. officials estimate that almost about 60
tons of cocaine – 20 percent of the total reaching the United States – passed through Haiti
in 1998, an increase of more than nine tons from 1997. In the 12 months ending in
September 1999, the Coast Guard seized a record 111,689 pounds of cocaine with a street
value of $3.9 billion, an increase of 35 percent compared to the previous year. More than
67 percent of the cocaine seized in fiscal year 1999 was in the Miami-based Coast Guard
Seventh District, which includes Florida, South Carolina, Georgia, Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and much of the Caribbean. (Table 4 provides data on recent Coast Guard
drug seizures.)

value of $34 million found hidden throughout a 62-foot luxury yacht. Mireya Navarro, “Upgraded Drug
Traffic Flourishes on Old Route,” The New York Times, 31 May 1998, p. 12.
[93] “Flow of Colombian Cocaine Through Haiti Turns to Flood,” The Washington Post, 4 May
1999, pp. A11, A20.

63
 The threat of illegal drugs to America will become more difficult to counter as
advanced equipment and technology are increasingly employed by global and regional
drug cartels. In response to the Coast Guard’s efforts, smugglers have begun investing in
high-speed (70-plus knot) craft and low-observable/radar-evading “stealth” vessels – even
semi-submersibles – and aircraft in an attempt to evade detection at sea. According to
General McCaffrey’s April 1999 testimony, innovations have included the development of
hard-to-detect “black cocaine” – mixing the drug with chemicals and fashioning it into
bricks that look like metal moldings – and producing the altered drug in a range of other
“The age of the Coast Guard’s colors to throw off the whole inspection methodology.[94] Other capabilities include
assets seriously undermines our sophisticated counter-information technologies that will enable criminal organizations to
nation’s ability to stop the flow of challenge U.S. and world law enforcement organizations with greater boldness and daring.
drugs on the high seas and within There is little doubt, then, that the Coast Guard is a key element in the President’s
our territorial waters. We are fac- National Drug Control Strategy to detect, deter, control, and engage the drug trade.
ing a DVD or CD-ROM threat with Indeed, in his foreword to The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998, McCaffrey implicitly
8-track tape technology – gradu- acknowledged the importance of the Coast Guard’s enforcement and international engage-
ates, ask your parents what an 8-
ment activities in halting the flow of drugs into the United States:
track tape is. ” By closing the door on drugs at our borders, we increase the security of all
General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA Americans. The stream of commerce and culture across our borders represents
(Ret.) tremendous opportunity for our great nation. Expanding the exchange of industry
Director, Office of National Drug and ideas, while stemming the flow of illegal drugs, allows us to prosper. Similarly,
Control Policy
USCG Academy Commencement
reaching beyond our borders to foster multinational cooperation diminishes the drug
Address threat America faces.[95]
19 May 1999
But achieving success in these
areas is not cheap. In 1998, for
example, the Coast Guard expended
more than 113,500 cutter hours in
anti-drug operations, compared to
about 96,700 hours in policing inter-
national and domestic fishing fleets
and nearly 30,800 hours in alien
migrant operations. This is a signifi-
cant change from just 1994, when
the Service expended about 39,800
cutter hours in counter-drug law
enforcement and more than 90,300
hours in migrant efforts. Similarly, in 1995 the Coast Guard’s almost 59,500 counter-
drug cutter hours were dwarfed by the 110,700 hours devoted to fisheries law enforcement
tasks. Little wonder that General McCaffery concluded that “Counter-drug efforts are
now clearly the primary law enforcement role of the Coast Guard.”[96]

[94] “Cartels Shipping ‘Black’ Cocaine,” The Washington Post, 28 April 1999, p. A2. See also,
“Drug Cartels Hold Tech Advantage,” The Washington Post, 15 November 1999, pp. A1, A18.
Increasingly the cartels are using highly sophisticated encryption and communications technologies that
are frustrating U.S. enforcement actions. In a recent case, it required some 24 hours to crack the code of
a 30-second transmission by the traffickers, making the attempt pointless, according to a U.S. law-
enforcement official.
[95] The National Drug Control Strategy, 1998, op.cit., p.v. Goal 4 – “Shield America’s air, land, and
sea frontiers from the drug threat – calls for “flexible operations to detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal
drugs in transit to the United States and at U.S. borders.” Goal 5 – “Break foreign and domestic drug
sources of supply” – calls for the disruption and dismantling of major international drug trafficking
organizations and the arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of their leaders. In all, the strategy has set
aggressive goals to reduce the supply of drugs in the United States 25 percent by 2002 and 50 percent by
2007. For an analysis of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of counterdrug efforts, see William
W. Mendel and Murl D. Munger, Strategic Planning and the Drug Threat (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, August 1997).
[96] General Barry R. McCaffrey, USA (ret.), Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy,
“Semper Paratus – Readying Your Service and Yourself,” Commencement Address, U.S. Coast Guard
Academy, 19 May 1999.
64
 In addition to at-sea interdiction operations, the Drug Control Strategy envisions
much-improved bilateral and multilateral cooperations, especially with Mexico.[97] In this
regard, the Coast Guard has already been working very closely with the Mexican navy, as
well as the naval/coastguard forces of Panama, Jamaica, and Nicaragua, to keep up pressure
against drug movements in the Caribbean and the eastern Pacific, and collaborating to
interdict so-called “shark boats” or “go-fasts” – high-speed, low-profile boats that speed up
the Gulf of Mexico and eastern Pacific and dump loads of marijuana for pickup and even-
tual distribution. The cooperation has extended to training in search and seizure tech-
niques, and the establishment of a communication system with Mexico that allows the “Overseas law enforcement
Coast Guard and Mexican navy to communicate at the tactical level – ship-to-ship and -air- presence leverages resources and
craft – across the maritime and landward borders.[98] fosters the establishment of
Similarly, a growing cooperation between the Coast Guard and other nations’ navies, working relationships with for-
coastguards, and drug-control authorities, including in-country training teams, has generat- eign law enforcement agencies....
ed results. While U.S.-Cuban relations continue to be strained, and the countries have not In addition, training foreign law
had diplomatic ties since 1961, on occasion the practical need to stem the flow of drugs enforcement officers is critical to
transcends politics and rhetoric.[99] Moreover, the United States, the United Kingdom, combating international crime.
The Netherlands, and France routinely engage in counter-narcotics sweeps through the
Such training helps create profes-
Caribbean. Working with the Royal Navy and
sional law enforcement organiza-
Puerto Rico’s Forces United for Rapid Action in
tions and builds citizen confi-
May 1999, Coast Guard and other U.S. coun-
dence in law enforcement offi-
terdrug agencies seized more than 11 tons of
cocaine – some 103 million street-level doses – cers who operate under the rule
in six seizures. In the two largest incidents, the of law. ”
HMS Marlborough, carrying Coast Guard law A National Security for a
enforcement detachments, intercepted and New Century, October 1998
seized the China Breeze (of Panamanian registry,
found to have 8,800 pounds of cocaine on
board, the 11th largest single seizure on record)
and the Castor (also under the Panamanian flag,
with 5,687 pounds of cocaine, the 12th largest
seizure).[100] British Defence Secretary George
Robertson noted that “One drug bust of four
tons of cocaine is good. Two in one week is
even better. And we will not give up here.”
Finally, but perhaps most importantly for future Deepwater systems, the Strategy calls
for increased funding for the Coast Guard, to “...provide for capital improvements to
enhance the Coast Guard’s interdiction capabilities, particularly in the Caribbean.” As
Representative Wayne T. Gilchrest, Chairman, Subcommittee of Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation, remarked at a June 1998 hearing:
Before 1992, our national drug control strategy was balanced between supply
reduction and demand reduction. It worked – drug use in this country consistently

[97] Ibid., pp. 42-44. See also, Office of National D rug Control Policy, United States/Mexico Bi-
National Drug Strategy (Washington, D.C.: February 1998).
[98] Scott C. Truver, “The World is Our Coastline,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1998,
pp. 45-49, at p. 47.
[99] “Cuba Wages a Lonesome Drug War,” Washington Post, 25 May 1999, pp. A1, A12; also, “In
This Case, Cuba-U.S. Teamwork Netted Big Score,” idem., p. A12. See, also, “The Disputatious
Diplomacy of Drugs,” The Economist, 11 September 1999, pp. 37-38, where it was noted, “Despite their
irreconcilable differences on almost everything else, fighting illegal drugs is one subject on which the gov-
ernments of Cuba and the United States agree.” That judgment has pr oven contentious, as Lincoln Dias
Balart, a Cuban-American Republican congressman from Florida, has called Castro “one of the biggest
drug traffickers in the world.”
[100] “U.S. Partners Make Cocaine Seizure,” Associated Press, 4 June 1999, 5:15 PM EST.

65
 declined during the Reagan-Bush years. President Clinton changed our national
strategy to emphasize demand reduction, especially drug treatment for hard-core
addicts. I support effective drug treatment, but creating addicts while leaving our
borders vulnerable is a reactionary strategy that will always leave us one step behind
the drug cartels. By reducing the supply of drugs on our streets through effective
interdiction, we can drive prices up, which deters our must vulnerable citizens,
teenagers, from using drugs. If we can stop teenagers from starting a drug habit, we
will win the War on Drugs in this country.
TV ads alone won’t keep drugs off our streets and out of the hands of our
children. Now is the time to renew our commitment to slashing drug availability and
use. Now is not the time to slash the Coast Guard’s drug interdiction budget. Our
task is to find the money to get the job done.[101]
The Coast Guard, moreover, provides a level of “acceptable” presence that sometimes
is not apparent when other national assets are involved in drug interdiction efforts. During
1990, the U.S. Navy suggested using the USS John F. Kennedy (CV-67) aircraft carrier
battle group in a forward-presence/maritime interdiction/blockade role off Colombia. That
proposal was rejected as a politically unacceptable level of military presence, and the uproar
threatened all sea-based operations. Meanwhile, Coast Guard assets, strained as they might
have been, stayed in place.
The Coast Guard has thus played a critical role on the front line of the nation’s war
on drugs. Cutters and aircraft have been the primary forces in the identification and
interdiction of ships and aircraft used for smuggling illicit goods, and have worked in close
cooperations with other U.S., regional, and international agencies. But, as Stephen Jermy
concluded in an analysis of the Caribbean drug interdiction problem:
It would be a mistake to measure the value of such deployments purely on their
interdiction capability – regime development is the other implicit task. And one can
argue that, in the longer view, this task is as important, and possibly more important,
than the interdiction task. The ships are highly visible demonstrations of their coun-
tries’ views on the drugs trade, and of their willingness to commit resources in its
suppression. The vessels play a key role in the coalescing of norms and values within
the regime. At the moment, this is achieved simply by their “being there,” and being
involved in the interdiction efforts. But with a slight change in focus and training,
there is the capacity to do more.[102]

Living Marine Resources

Protection of the living marine resources also came
early in the service’s history, when protection of the Bering
Sea fur seal and sea otter herds became a cutter responsibil-
ity. Later, protection of salmon and other fish and game
species was added to the service’s duties. The years follow-
ing World War II saw and explosive expansion in both the
size and efficiency of global fishing fleets. Distant-water
fleets from several countries ventured to within sight of
U.S. coastlines. Exploitation of living marine resources by
these foreign fishermen was so great that, by the early
1970s, the United States had grave concerns about the
health of its coastal ecosystems.

[101] Statement of the Honorable Wayne T. Gilchrest, Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard
and Maritime Transportation, Hearing on Drug Interdiction and Other Matters Relating to the National
Drug Control Policy, 19 June 1998, mimeo, p. l .
[102] Stephen Jermy, “Regional Prohibition Regimes: Drugs Trafficking in the Caribbean,”
Maritime Operations in Peace, op.cit., p. 26.

66
 As a result, Congress passed the Magnuson Fisheries Conservation and Management
Act in 1976, a watershed event in the expansion of both Coast Guard responsibilities and
areas in which the Coast Guard was directed to apply its scarce resources, which eventually
all-but eliminated foreign fishing within 200 nautical miles of the coast. Unfortunately, the
1996 Magnuson Act encouraged the rapid growth of a domestic fleet to a size equal to, if
not greater than, the foreign fleets it replaced, with an end result of continued fisheries
depletion in many regions. Congress amended the Magnuson Act in 1996 in an attempt
to reverse these trends, setting stringent guidelines for ending overfishing and rebuilding
depleted stocks. Four key objectives are outlined:
• Rebuilding overfished stocks
• Reducing bycatch of overfished species
• Conserving fisheries habitats
• Safeguarding the economies of coastal communities
In all regions today, the Coast Guard faces daunting challenges of patrolling and
protecting great expanses of ocean under the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States, as
well as patrolling even greater high seas areas in support of an increasing number of interna-
tional fishery regimes. In the northwest
Atlantic, Coast Guard Deepwater fisheries
enforcement patrols contribute greatly to
the eventual renaissance of groundfish
stocks, while sustained at-sea law enforce-
ment presence in the Bering Sea has result-
ed in increased deterrence and apprehen-
sion of illegal foreign fishing in the nearly
3.4 million-square-mile U.S. EEZ that
extends from some 95,000 miles of coast-
line – a vast area to patrol and control.
And yet every day the Service is on duty in these Deepwater operating areas, which include
some of the world’s most valuable fisheries that support a more than $24 billion American
commercial industry, as well as a recreational fishery estimated to be worth some
$10 billion and growing.
In the Bering Sea, a region notorious for severe weather and sea conditions, a sus-
tained, year-round Coast Guard presence with surface and long-range air assets provides
long-endurance law enforcement presence to detect and deter illegal fishing activity.
“It’s not just an ocean – it’s a battlefield” Coast Guard helicopter pilot Lieutenant Eric
Vogelbacher remarked about patrolling the Russian-U.S. maritime line.[103] Additionally,
these same assets simultaneously provide fishermen with a lifeline to safety and rescue.
These important fisheries and industry are at risk as a result of international exploita-
tion and over-fishing by America’s own fleets. The Coast Guard is the Nation’s only on-
scene enforcement resource to protect these distressed fisheries and to help rebuild stocks
for the future. As Alaska Governor Tony Knowles wrote to Secretary of Transportation
Rodney Slater in June 1998, pleading for assistance in enforcing the ban on the use of high
seas drift nets – “curtains of death”:
I recently wrote Secretary of State Madeline Albright about the need for renewed
efforts to pressure other nations to join in the Convention for the Conservation of

[103] Todd Lewan, “U.S. Fish Patrol Guards Perilous, Frigid Frontier,” Washington Post, 1 June
1999, p. A13.

67
 Anadromous Fish in the North Pacific. In addition to these diplomatic efforts, the
State of Alaska supports continued financial support for the Coast Guard’s monitor-
ing and enforcement efforts. The United States needs to maintain a fleet of ships and
long-range aircraft to patrol the distant waters of our jurisdiction and beyond, where rene-
gade fishing fleets that threaten our stocks operate. Maintaining the Coast Guard’s deep-
water patrol capability is important to the State of Alaska and our national interest.[104]
Indeed, the enforcement requirements of several international treaties are principal
drivers for a much-enhanced Deepwater capability, especially in the western Pacific. This
must be done with ocean-capable vessels, able to take on the roughest seas in the world,
and long-range aircraft able to cover vast distances to surveill critical boundaries and
fishery areas. Under the aegis of a UN resolution and U.S. law, the High Seas Driftnet
Fisheries Enforcement Act, the Coast Guard patrols and protects a great expanse of the
Pacific Ocean, averaging approximately 75 days at sea and 250 flight hours per year
focused on detecting, controlling, and engaging illegal driftnet fishing. Then, when
violations are detected, Coast Guard cutters pursue the violators, sometimes for a week or
more, before they are brought to justice, or escape.
In late June 1997, for example, a Coast Guard HC-130H Hercules search aircraft
from Hawaii responded to a call to investigate a possible international driftnet fishing
violation by a Chinese fishing vessel Cao Yu 6025 and to monitor the vessel’s movement.
Because no high-endurance cutter was immediately available, a World War II-vintage buoy
tender based in Guam, the Cutter Basswood (WLB-388), was ordered to take up the
surveillance of the Cao Yu. Capable of making a top speed of only 12 knots, Basswood
nonetheless kept up the vigil for some 1,500 miles until the Cutter Chase arrived on the
scene to stop, board, search, and seize the Cao Yu and arrest its crew. Basswood then towed
the vessel back to Guam, where the illegal catch was sold and the ship publicly auctioned.
As increasing stress is placed on U.S. waters and marine resources, the Coast Guard
will aggressively work to preserve healthy stocks of fish and other living marine resources
and to keep the waterways free of oil, chemicals, and other marine pollution, as well as
invasive species. Shifts in offshore fishing
trends, the enforcement of international
agreements, and the increase in global trade
will cause the Coast Guard to conduct its
diverse environmental protection missions
over greater distances than ever before,
necessitating modern and interoperable
Deepwater platforms and systems with
long-range surveillance and intercept capa-
bilities. Not only will the areas and distances to cover be greater, but, as recent trends indi-
cate, the level of activity will increase, as well. The number of fisheries law enforcement
boardings has increased, from 9,440 cases in fiscal year 1994 to 12,449 in fiscal year 1997.

Illegal Migrants
U.S. Coast Guard migrant interdiction operations are as much humanitarian efforts
as they are law enforcement missions. Migrants typically take great risks and endure signif-
icant hardships in their attempts to flee their countries and enter the United States. In
many case, migrant vessels interdicted at sea are overloaded and unseaworthy, lack basic
safety equipment, and are operated by inexperienced mariners. The majority of alien
migrant interdiction cases handled by the Coast Guard actually begin as search and rescue

[104] Letter from The Honorable Tony Knowles, Governor, State of Alaska, to The Honorable
Rodney Slater, Secretary of Transportation, 12 June 1998. Emphasis added.

68
cases, most occurring in high seas, Deepwater areas of operations. Many of the migrants
who have been rescued by the Service would most likely have perished at sea.
While the Coast Guard interdicted some 288,000 migrants from 43 countries
between 1980 and 1998, the largest flows have been from Cuba, Dominican Republic,
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Haiti. Maritime illegal migration and alien smug-
gling threaten the United States from all sides – along the entire east and west coasts,
Hawaii, Guam, and Puerto Rico. Economics and quality of life continue to be the primary
factors driving people to brave the seas in the hope of reaching America. The Coast Guard
has seen a marked increase in organized alien smuggling ventures, especially from Cuba,
Dominican Republic, and PRC.
In the late 1990s, China has become the single greatest source of human trafficking by
sea, with intelligence sources estimating
that as many as 20,000 illegal PRC immi-
grants reach the Western Hemisphere by
sea each year, most ultimately destined for
the United States. And, maritime immi-
grant smuggling is becoming economical-
ly more attractive. One large boatload of
PRC aliens is worth some $6 million to
the smugglers, with some PRC migrants
paying $45,000 or more for the haz-
ardous voyage, which might last as long as
four months. In late August 1998, for
example, the Coast Guard intercepted a converted Chinese fishing vessel literally crammed
full of illegal migrants, many of whom were in very poor health and in desperate need of
food and water.[105] Moreover, the U.S. territory of Guam has become a target of Chinese
smugglers known as “snakeheads,” who know that illegal migrants, once on shores consid-
ered to be American soil, are eligible to apply for political asylum.[106] “It really is an inva-
sion,” a U.S. immigration official noted.
To summarize the Coast Guard’s major migrant interdiction accomplishments:
• In 1980, Coast Guard men and women stemmed a mass migration from Cuba,
interdicting 125,000 illegal migrants who flooded toward south Florida; U.S. Navy
surface forces played key roles in supporting Coast Guard afloat operations.
• In 1990-1991, Coast Guard Deepwater assets responded quickly and effectively to
another mass migration, interdicting more than 37,600 Haitian migrants attempting
to enter the United States illegally.
• In 1994, Coast Guard cutters and aircraft responded to two nearly simultaneous
mass migrations from Cuba and Haiti, working closely with Navy and other Defense
Department assets. An afloat Coast Guard task force commander directed operations
for the largest fleet of cutters since World War II, interdicting more than 25,300
Haitian migrants in Operation Able Manner and nearly 38,600 Cuban migrants in
Operation Able Vigil.

[105] William Branigin, “Coast Guard Discovers 150 Chinese Aboard Suspected Smuggler’s Ship,”
Washington Post, 29 August 1998, p.A4. About three weeks later, the 185-foot Chih Yung fishing boat
docked in San Diego, and a total of 174 (not 150) migrants were led off, most to be returned to China.
The main compartment had filled with water, oil, and sewage, and all migrants, as well as the crew, were
in great need of food and medical care. “Chinese Migrants Arrive in San Diego,” Washington Post, 19
September 1998, p. A16. For a more comprehensive assessment of the Chinese “threat” to U.S. immi-
gration policies, see Paul J. Smith, ed., Human Smuggling: Chinese Merchant Trafficking and the Challenge
to America’s Immigration Tradition (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies,
1997).
[106] William Branigin, “Guam’s Own ‘China Beach’,” The Washington Post, 6 May 1999, pp. A3,
A4. See also, Craig S. Smith, “ Wanna Leave China? Just Make It to Guam and the U.S. Beckons,” Wall
Street Journal, 4 August 1999, pp. A1, A6.
69
 • Between June 1994 and September 1999, the Coast Guard interdicted 81,727
undocumented migrants from 26 countries attempting to enter the United States
by sea. This included 12,454 migrants from the Dominican Republic and another
2,092 from the Peoples’ Republic of China.
The expected increase in number of illegal migrants seeking entry into the United
States by sea will create difficult social, economic, and political issues for the nation and
generate demands for effective Coast Guard interdiction operations further out to sea, in
waters under U.S. jurisdiction and beyond.
Successful landings of illegal migrants in the United
States create public discontent, further strain
the healthcare and social-assistance systems
of coastal states, and overwhelm limited detention
facilities. The need is great, therefore, for a
cost-effective capability to interdict, and through
successful interdiction efforts, to enhance the
deterrence of illegal migrant attempts, including
smuggling. The nation can expect that in the
future, as was the case in the 1980 Mariel crisis,
foreign leaders might manipulate local crises and
generate mass migrations.[107] The Coast Guard
is the nation’s first line of defense against illegal
migration from the sea. Indeed, Presidential Courtesy of Immigration and
Decision Directive–9 states that the U.S. govern- Naturalization Service
ment will take the necessary measures to preempt,
interdict, and deter alien smuggling, as well as to interdict and hold smuggled aliens as far
as possible from the U.S. border and to repatriate them when appropriate.

Partnering and Leadership

Interagency cooperation has been the key to the increasing U.S. effectiveness in
maritime law enforcement and protection of America’s maritime borders. These operations
involve the Departments of State, Defense, Justice; the Coast Guard, Customs Service,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency, Environmental Protection
Agency, National Marine Fisheries Service, and the Immigration and Naturalization
Service, as well as numerous international, state, and local agencies. The Coast Guard is
the only federal law enforcement agency with jurisdiction in both U.S. waters and on the
high seas. In these arenas, the Coast Guard is the primary enforcer of U.S. laws and
treaties that include customs and border control, protection of living marine resources,
safeguarding the marine environment, fighting piracy, interdicting illegal immigrants and
contraband, counter-drug operations, and helping to stem the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction.

Marine Environmental Pro t e c t i o n

The Coast Guard’s role in environmental protection dates back more than 175 years
to the 1822 Timber Act that tasked the Revenue Cutter Service with protecting govern-
ment timber from poachers. Most of the early statutory protection was in industries where
profits were made from natural resources, such as fur bearing animals, whales, fish, and

[107] Mario Antonio Rivera argues that the Cuban boatlift of 1980 was a catastrophic event for
the United States and that the Cuban government “manipulated the boatlift for its own purposes, not
least in forcing onto the flotilla thousands of individuals considered undesirable by the regime, in the
place of relatives Cuban-Americans had spent and risked much to retrieve.” Decision and Structure: U.S.
Refugee Policy in the Mariel Crisis (New York: University Press of America, 1991), at p. 1. Rivera con-
cludes, at p. 2, that the Carter Administration’s “...failed policy became all but inevitable once the Cuban
government succeeded in challenging American sovereignty over its borders and controlling the exodus.”
70
timber. However, the Oil Pollution Act of 1924, which forbade the discharge of oil into
American coastal waters, set a new course for the Coast Guard. The legislation tasked the
Service to monitor a single environmental issue, one that did not protect a specific resource
but the environment as a whole. During the next 50 years, additional legislation further
mandated the enforcement of laws to
protect against harmful oil pollution, fol-
lowing large-scale oil spills from Torrey
Canyon off the coast of England in 1967
and Argo Merchant off Nantucket,
Massachusetts, in 1976. However, fol-
lowing the 1989 grounding of the Exxon
Valdez , which spilled 10.1 million gal-
lons of oil into Prince William Sound,
Alaska, and caused more than $2 billion
in economic damage, Congress passed Courtesy of Eric Hill/Anchorage Daily News
the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 that gave the Coast Guard greater oversight powers, includ-
ing increased response, inspection, and investigation responsibilities.
Environmental protection thus has been and remains a constant concern for the
Coast Guard. Service men and women are involved in all aspects of safeguarding the critical
natural resources located in the U.S. 3.4 million square mile territorial sea and EEZ. This
includes a wide range of prevention, protection, containment, and recovery activities and
operations, all in support of the Coast Guard’s three primary environmentally related
mission areas: maritime pollution enforcement, lightering zone enforcement, and foreign
vessel inspection.
Today, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater assets also provide mission-critical command-
and-control support and first responding forces to a wide range of environmental disasters
and humanitarian tragedies. The Service was the first “on-scene” force in the response to
the Exxon Valdez oil spill, and the Narragansett Bay/Point Judith, Rhode Island, oil spill in
1996, thereby facilitating timely response and recovery. Although these situations occurred
within 50 miles of the shore, Coast Guard Deepwater assets provided critical support and
capabilities to mediate the crises.
To this end, three well-trained and well-equipped Coast Guard National Strike Teams,
located on the East, West, and Gulf coasts, are at the ready to respond to major oil or
hazardous materials spills in the waterways and coastal regions of the United States. (These
Strike Teams may also comprise the nation’s maritime “first-responders” to a terrorist attack
using chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in a crowded port or roadstead.) In recent
years, Coast Guard prevention efforts, namely through improved methods, education, and
enforcement of penalties, have reduced steadily the number of large oil spills. In 1997,
for the first time, there were no spills in the “major” category (more than 100,000 gallons)
caused by maritime facilities, and the total amount spilled was less than one-third the
average of the preceding four years. In total, however, more than 7,000 oil and hazardous
substance spills occur in U.S. waters each year, totaling some 2.53 million gallons in the
water and costing $48 million in clean-up operations.
Patrols by Coast Guard Deepwater surveillance aircraft of offshore lighterage areas
have detected and deterred illegal dumping of waste oil, thereby greatly lessening the poten-
tial for environmental harm in sensitive marine areas. Such policing of offshore lighterage
areas by Deepwater assets, which also includes the deployment of inspection teams, will
increase in the years ahead, as international maritime commerce continues to grow and the
requirement remains for single-hull tankers to operate either in deepwater ports or in
designated lightering zones 60 nautical miles offshore.

71
 Coast Guard regulations implementing the National Invasive Species Act of 1996 are
in effect, and nearly all foreign vessels entering U.S. waters after voyages from foreign ports
are subject to ballast sampling and reporting requirements.[108] Effective enforcement
may also hinge upon Coast Guard Deepwater interceptions/inspections of target vessels
before they enter U.S. ports.
As increasing stress is placed on U.S. waters, the Coast Guard will aggressively work
to keep the waterways free of oil, chemicals, and other marine pollution, including alien
species. Shifts in offshore activities, the enforcement of international agreements, and the
“I would like to express my increase in global trade will cause the Coast Guard to conduct its diverse environmental-
thanks to U.S. Coast Guard protection missions over greater distances than ever before, necessitating modern and
Commandant James M. Loy and interoperable Deepwater platforms and systems with long-range surveillance and intercept
the Coast Guard men and women capabilities.
who played an invaluable role in The Coast Guard’s prevention, enforcement, and response roles in marine environ-
bringing about today’s guilty plea mental protection help to reduce the amount of pollution entering America’s and the
of Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines world’s waterways. In response to marine environmental security challenges, and as a world
(RCCL) for environmental crimes. leader in marine environmental protection, the Coast Guard shapes the safety and pollu-
tion-control standards for international and domestic maritime transportation through its
The Coast Guard’s investigation,
policy-making and enforcement of laws and treaties, especially in the areas of lightering
during which it observed RCCL’s
zone enforcement and Port State Control and inspection of U.S. and foreign commercial
Sovereign of the Seas dumping oil vessels. When prevention and enforcement fail, however, the Coast Guard maintains a
off the coast of Puerto Rico in rapid-response capability to contain and recover from pollution incidents in the inland
October 1994, led to the criminal waterways and coastal regions of the United States. And data collected by the Coast
prosecution resulting in today’s Guard are critical elements of successful litigation. In July 1999, Royal Caribbean Cruise
record $18 million fine and the Lines agreed to pay $18 million – a record fine – and to plead guilty to 21 felony counts
company’s guilty plea to 21 counts from dumping oil and dangerous chemical and illegally storing hazardous waste in loca-
for dumping waste oil and haz- tions from Alaska to Florida.
ardous chemicals and lying to the
Coast Guard. National Defense
Today’s plea agreement sends the
For much of its history, the Coast Guard has served alongside the U.S. Navy. Indeed,
message that harming the envi-
the first “ancillary” duty thrust upon the Revenue Cutter Service came in 1797, when the
ronment does not pay, and that
impending Quasi-War with France caused the cutters to be assigned responsibility for
the Coast Guard stands, in the coastal defense and protection of shipping and, the next year, to be placed at the disposal
words of its motto, “Always of the Secretary of the Navy.[109] There is a connection, for example, between the cutter
Ready” to preserve the safety and Vigilant (WMEC-617) supporting the United Nations’ embargo of Haiti in 1994 and the
environmental health of our Revenue Cutter Harriet Lane off Charleston, South Carolina in 1861 – both cutters fired
waterways. ” warning shots to force a ship to heave to. Likewise, there is a link between the actions of
The Honorable Rodney E. Slater the Revenue Cutter Hudson in Santiago harbor during the Spanish-American War and the
Secretary of Transportation cutter Ocracoke (WPB-1307) off Cap Haitien in 1994 – both towed Navy ships out of
July 1999 harm’s way.

[108] This concern is not limited to ballast water-borne species, as other non-native species,
especially insects, can be introduced to the United States by the vessels, themselves, as well as the cargoes
they carry, potentially causing millions of dollars of damage to U.S. agriculture.
[109] Eight of the ten Revenue Cutter Service cutters served within the Navy during the Quasi-
War, taking 15 armed French vessels, assisting in the capture of five others, and recovering at least ten
American ships from French captors. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, op.cit., p. 2.
[110] Three Navy Department strategic-concept papers – ...From the Sea (1992), Forward...From
the Sea (1994), and Operating Forward...From the Sea (1997) – point to the dramatic shift of strategic
and operational focus from open-ocean/blue-water operations to what is now called “littoral warfare,”
i.e., operations relatively close to an adversary’s shoreline with the objective of directly contributing to
“power-projection” operations ashore. All, moreover, envision the need for Joint operations with other
elements of the U.S. militar y, including the Coast Guard, as well as Combined operations with allied and
friendly navies and maritime defense forces.

72
 Indeed, in every major conflict in which the United States has been engaged, the
Coast Guard has served with the Navy and Marines. In early World War II, Coast Guard
forces carried out critical convoy escort duties and were responsible for sinking several Nazi
U-boats during the Battle of the Atlantic; in the Pacific Theater, they were important
“force-multipliers” for pivotal
amphibious operations that helped
turn the tide of the conflict. During
the Vietnam War, the Coast Guard
honed military skills in operational U.S. Coast Guard
environments that are particularly and the Nation’s Defense
apropos for post-Cold War U.S. The U.S. Coast Guard’s national
strategic concepts of littoral war- security, military, and defense
fare.[110] Almost from the start of roles, missions, and functions are
overt U.S. involvement in that con-
based in U.S. law:
flict, the U.S. Navy studied the
problem of assuring that a critical coastal interdiction mission could be carried out.[111] In • The Coast Guard is “a military
early April 1965, then-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral David L. McDonald met with service and a branch of the
Admiral Edwin J. Roland, Coast Guard Commandant, to discuss the Coast Guard’s possi- Armed Forces of the United
ble contribution to coastal patrol. Acknowledging that the Navy had no suitable ships for States at all times” (14 USC 1).
the mission, McDonald asked in the Coast Guard had any “leftover” 83-foot patrol boats,
which as a young officer McDonald had seen doing rescue work off Normandy beaches. • The Coast Guard is required to
Roland told the CNO that the 83-footers had been retired, but modern, steel-hulled 82- “maintain a state of readiness
and 95-foot boats were available on short notice. Accordingly, on 16 April, Secretary of the to function as a specialized
Navy Paul H. Nitze formally asked Henry W. Fowler, the Secretary of Treasury, about the service in the Navy in time of
availability of Coast Guard cutters for Vietnam: war” (14 USC 2).
At the present time, Seventh Fleet units are being employed to prevent sea infiltration • The Coast Guard is authorized
into South Vietnam. However, we find such ships suffer major disadvantages in con- to assist the Department of
ducting patrols against shallow-draft Defense (as well as any federal,
junks. We are therefore attempting to
state, or local agency) in per-
locate a source of more suitable patrol
forming any activity for which
craft. Such characteristics as high
the Coast Guard is especially
speed, shallow draft, sea-keeping abili-
ty, radar and communication equip- qualified (14 USC 141).
ment are important considera-
tions.[112]
On 29 April 1965, President Lyndon
Johnson committed the Coast Guard to
service in Vietnam under the operational
control of the U.S. Navy.

[111] Alex Larzelere, The Coast Guard at War: Vietnam, 1965-1975 (Annapolis, MD: Naval
Institute Press, 1997), pp. 7-8.
[112] The joint Department of Defense–Department of the Treasury memorandum, prepared to
support President Johnson’s decision to commit the Coast Guard to wartime service in Vietnam, read, in
part: “...the Coast Guard has operating forces which are well-suited to the mission.... They are equipped
and trained to prevent sea infiltration.... In view of the counter-sea infiltration mission assigned the U.S.
Navy and the availability of U.S. Coast Guard forces, it is requested that you approve the Treasury
Department assignment of Coast Guard craft to assist the Department of the Navy.” Ibid. Two years
later, Navy Secretary Nitze requested the assignment of five Coast Guard high-endurance cutters
(WHEC) to augment Operation Market Time forces, specifically to free up Navy destroyers more
urgently needed for Naval Gun Fire Support (NGFS) tasks. The general inter-operability characteristics
– high speed, sea-keeping, radar and communications – required in the mid-/late-1960s are even more
critical for Coast Guard Deepwater forces operating alongside Navy and Marine Corps forces under the
National Fleet concept articulated in the fall 1998.

73
 And so the close relationship between the Navy and
Coast Guard has evolved, culminating in the landmark 1995
agreement between the Secretaries of Defense and Transpor-
tation, which assigned four major national defense missions to
the Coast Guard in support of U.S. regional Commanders-in-
Chief (CinCs). These missions – Maritime Intercept
Operations, Military Environmental Response Operations,
Port Operations/Security and Defense (POSD), and
The success of maritime interdic-
Peacetime Engagement – require Deepwater assets to execute
tion force operations was due in essential military tasks in support of joint and combined
no small measure to the experi- forces in peacetime, crisis, and war.[113] (Figure 6 illustrates a notional spectrum of oper-
ence and training provided by the ational collaboration between the Coast Guard and Department of Defense assets at the
Coast Guard Law Enforcement dawn of the 21st century.)
Detachments... They were invalu- In recent years, the U.S. CinCs have requested and been provided cutters to conduct
able. Maritime Intercept Operations, Peacetime Engagement, and other supporting warfare
Vice Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, USN tasks for all three forward-deployed Navy Fleets, cogent illustrations that “national mar-
Commander, U.S. Naval Forces
Central Command, March 1991 Figure 6. Spectrum of Coast Guard Defense Missions

itime security” is not confined to nearby-U.S. waters: the Fifth Fleet in the Arabian
Gulf/Middle East, the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, and the Seventh Fleet in the

[113] Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of
Transportation on the Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of the National
Military Strategy, 3 October 1995.
Annex A defines Maritime Interception Operations as operations conducted to enforce the sea-
ward portion of certain sanctions against another nation or group of nations. It may include stopping,
boarding, searching, diverting, or redirecting vessel traffic.
Annex B defines Military Environmental Response Operations as those responding to incidents
of marine pollution, such as the Iraqi-generated crude oil spill during Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm, which have the potential to adversely affect U.S. and allied/coalition defense operations.
Furthermore, responding to significant marine pollution incidents in the cessation of hostilities phase of
a campaign is critical to successful war termination and the restoration of critical infrastructure. The
Coast Guard is to participate in operational planning (including anticipation of environmental exploita-
tion during hostilities and the development of related intelligence to facilitate response and minimize
operational interference and environmental damage), training, and the deployment of Coast Guard assets
in support of CinC environmental response needs.
Annex C defines Port Operations, Security and Defense as operations conducted to ensure por t
and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats, terrorist actions, and safety deficiencies which
would be a threat to support and resupply operations. Pointedly, this function focuses on both Sea Ports

74
Western Pacific. Additionally, Coast Guard cutters
have supported NATO operations in the Baltic
Sea. For example, the USCG Cutter Chase
(WHEC-718) in May 1998 completed a four-
month deployment to the Arabian Gulf, and,
among her tasks, seized four ships attempting to
violate United Nations sanctions against Iraq.[114]
Chase’s and other cutters’ deployments in recent
years show that, just as it has for more than 200
years, the Coast Guard is an integral
element of the Nation’s Armed Forces.
During Operations Support Democracy
(November 1993-August 1995) and Uphold
Democracy (October 1994-March 1995), Coast
Guard Deepwater assets as well as buoy tenders,
patrol boats, and port security units supported
United Nations-led operations to restore democratic institutions in Haiti. Two port security
units, a harbor defense command unit, five law enforcement detachments, and 13 cutters
carried out operations that included maritime surveillance and interdiction, search and res-
cue coverage for in-transit U.S. aircraft, and establishing and restoring aids to navigation.
Beyond U.S. coastal waters, the Coast Guard’s role as an instrument of national policy
and maritime security is becoming even more important. A central focus of U.S. national
security strategy is to promote democracy abroad, to build trust and friendship among
former adversaries, and to promote economic prosperity at home and overseas. The same
transnational dangers that threaten U.S. interests at home will be felt by America’s friends
overseas. The Coast Guard’s involvement in the elimination of regional security threats, the
promotion of regional cooperation, and the protection of maritime interests are key ele-
ments in America’s policy of global engagement and active and acceptable presence.[115]
Working with interested countries, for example, the Coast Guard has drafted a Model
Maritime Service Code to serve as a “template” for legislative frameworks to help the
“maritime forces” of a foreign government to provide “enhanced security and safety, protect
the mariner as well as the environment, and allow a maritime state to exercise the variety
of maritime rights and obligations recognized under international law.”[116] The Coast
Guard’s international role-model activities can be more direct, as Captain John E. Crowley
recounted the summer-1997 deployment of the USCGC Legare (WMEC-912) to the U.S.
European Command:
...Legare was a role model for developing countries’ maritime services, but her crew
also continued the U.S. sea service tradition of being role models as concerned citizens
of a democratic nation.... Our peacetime engagement efforts resulted in meeting 400

of Embarkation and Debarkation, in the United States and o verseas. POSD also ensures the safe and effi-
cient operations of all vessels and facilities within the port, harbor, and harbor approach environment.
POSD are resource-intensive operations which require special training and a continued, sustained pres-
ence within the area of operations and include: port safety and security, marine environmental protec-
tion, waterways management, and search and rescue.
Annex D defines Peacetime Military Engagement as all military activities involving other nations
intended to shape the security environment in peacetime, and which serve to: demonstrate U.S. political
and military commitment; improve interoperability; reassure allies, friends, and coalition partners; pro-
mote transparency; convey democratic ideals; deter aggression; and help relieve sources of instability
before they can become military crises. As a multimission law enforcement, humanitarian, and regulatory
agency, as well as a military service, the Coast Guard is well-suited to perform maritime engagement
roles. As a model maritime service, Coast Guard participation in CinC engagement strategies can
improve mission effectiveness and efficiency through the employment of trained Coast Guard assets.
[114] David Rodney, “Coast Guard MIO in a High-Threat Environment,” Center for Naval
Analyses, CAB 98-56/June 1998.
[115] Vice Admiral James Loy and Captain Bruce Stubbs, U.S. Coast Guard, “Exporting Coast
Guard Expertise,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1997, pp. 55-57.
[116] United States Coast Guard Model Maritime Service Code, 1995 Edition (Washington, D.C.:
Department of Transportation, U.S. Coast Guard, 1995), p. iii.
75
 professionals in 56 sessions – held as round tables in the wardroom, personal defense
exercises on the flight deck, herding oil in an aquarium, and hoisting rescue swim-
mers and combat divers. The chiefs’ mess led the crew in experiences that directly
reached another 208 people. In
Kaliningrad, more than 5,000 visitors
lined the pier to see the Legare and
speak English to the crew; all in all,
we introduced the U.S. Coast Guard
to more than 26,000 people over the
summer.[117]
Moreover, a forward-deployed posture
of active and acceptable presence, which
integrates Coast Guard forces more com-
pletely with Navy and Marine Corps forces,
can generate enhanced effectiveness and
greater efficiencies than one that focuses solely on increasingly hard-pressed Navy and
Marine Corps elements. In some situations, Navy and Marine Corps forces may be barred
from some future situation even as Coast Guard forces continue to be invited in – the
hallmark of active and acceptable presence. During the Haitian political crisis of the
early/mid-1990s, for example, a volatile crowd turned away a Navy amphibious ship from
Port-au-Prince. Meanwhile, Coast Guard cutters continued to return illegal Haitian
migrants rescued on the high seas, and at the same time kept intact an important commu-
nications channel to Haitian political and security officials.
Much more than a “force multiplier,” then, the Coast Guard offers unique capabili-
ties and performs a vital, complementary role that is increasingly relied upon by service
chiefs and the CinCs. Coast Guard Deepwater assets are an important part of the CinCs’
“tool kits” as they pursue their responsibilities in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives
of engagement and enlargement. Beginning in 1995, the Coast Guard has deployed four
cutters – USCGC Dallas (WHEC-716), Gallatin (WHEC-721), Legare, and Tahoma
(WMEC-908) – to the Mediterranean, Black, and Baltic seas each year, again as a comple-
ment to the more routine forward-presence operations of Navy ships. In spring and sum-
mer 1999, the cutter Bear (WMEC-901) was deployed to the Mediterranean to support
NATO Operation Allied Force, and in June the cutter Dallas departed its Charleston,
S.C., home port for the Adriatic to help enforce the NATO-led peace efforts in Kosovo.
Dallas was also scheduled to work with the navies and coastguard forces of Greece, Israel,
Spain, and Turkey. Coast Guard Port Security Units and aviation squadrons have been sent
to Turkey, the northern Red Sea, South Korea, and the Persian Gulf. Coast Guard assets
have taken part in numerous exercises with other nation’s maritime forces, and have made
hundreds of port visits worldwide.

[117] Captain John E. Crowley, Jr., USCG, “What is a Coast Guard Cutter Doing in Europe?”
U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 1998, pp. 48-49. Captain Crowley was Legare’s commanding offi-
cer during the 1997 deployment.
[118] “Coast Guard, Navy Become Sea-Worthy Partners,” Navy Times, 6 September 1999.
[119] Truver, “The World is Our Coastline,” op.cit., pp. 45-49. Rear Admiral Jay A. Campbell,
USN, then-Director of Plans and Policy (J5), European Command, noted that “The Coast Guard is the
right force to reach the majority of these navies, especially the Partnership for Peace navies. What these
countries need and can afford is Coast Guard-type missions and associated force structures. The Coast
Guard is an excellent example of how to merge together an agency with military and civilian duties.”
Ibid. at p. 46. Loy and Stubbs, op.cit., p. 56.
[120] Jeremy Ginifer and Michael Pugh, in Michael Pugh, ed. Maritime Security and Peacekeeping:
A Framework for United Nations Operations (Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press,
1994), at p. 237. See also, Harold J. Kearsley, Maritime Power and the Twenty-first Century (Aldershot,
U.K: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1992), who, at pp. 76-79, explains “maritime domain mainte-
nance” as a peacetime activity focused on ensuring its maritime security is safeguarded. Others have
expanded on the subject of UN missions and maritime agendas for peace, including Jeffrey I. Sands,
“W(h)ither the Maritime Agenda for Peace?” in Ann L. Griffiths and Peter T. Haydon, op.cit., pp. 39-56,

76
 During the summer 1997 Foale Eagle exercise, for example, the USCGC Hamilton
(WHEC-715) was an integral element of the USS Independence (CV-62) carrier battle
group in western Pacific operating areas. And in the summer 1999, the cutter Midgett
(WHEC-726) provided essential and unique capabilities during the WestPac deployment of
the USS Constellation (CV-64) carrier battle group and the USS Peleliu (LHA-5) amphibi-
ous ready group.[118] Coast
Guard liaison personnel on
board Peleliu conducted train-
ing on visit, board, search and
seizure (VBSS) tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures for
Sailors and Marines prior to the
ARG’s arrival in the Persian
Gulf to enforce U.N. sanctions
against Iraq.
The striking element in these and other linkages with many foreign navies and
maritime forces is the similarity between the Coast Guard and the host-governments’
forces, resulting in the recognition that the Coast Guard is the “right force” to reach the
majority of these navies.[119] Inasmuch as some 70 percent of the world’s navies are in fact
coastguards in all but name, the continued and enhanced peacetime international engage-
ment by the Coast Guard will continue to generate great benefits to the United States.
There is, moreover, the growing challenge of working with international organizations,
the United Nations and its specialized agencies, in support of national principles in the use
of ocean space, maritime security, and peacekeeping. The Coast Guard, for example, may
be the ideal U.S. actor to provide naval/maritime defense assistance to international civilian
authorities in drug interdiction, piracy suppression, disaster relief, and “maritime house-
keeping.”[120] Furthermore, the Coast Guard, because of its humanitarian and civilian law
enforcement stature, and its culture of partnership with diverse agencies and organizations,
may work more easily with Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), many of whom
regard the military as out of touch with the values and members of the society they seek to
protect.[121] On the other hand, the military can see the NGOs as undisciplined and an
impediment to their work. The Coast Guard seems ideally situated to bridge this chasm
between the NGOs and the military – another example of the Service’s ability to provide
acceptable presence overseas.
Looking ahead, the United States is facing far different threats than those experienced
during the previous 45 years of Cold War. Not until sometime after 2015 is a “peer com-
petitor” expected to emerge, although the U.S. Armed Forces in the meantime must still be
able to meet the operational requirements of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous

who (at p. 41) identifies nine UN naval missions and supporting tasks: humanitarian assistance, mar-
itime peacekeeping, maritime enforcement, humanitarian inter vention, protect sea and air traffic, inter-
dict sea and air traffic, make a show of force, control armaments/demilitarization, and respond to aggres-
sion. Others have been even more explicit, identifying the Coast Guard as having a “high degree of cred-
ibility” to support a new United Nations Maritime Agency; see Robert Stephens Staley, II, The Wave of
the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping (New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.,
1992). Strategist Geoffrey Till argued for “something of a rag-bag, but an increasingly important one” of
international maritime assistance to maintain good order at sea; see “Maritime Strategy and the Twenty-
First Century,” in Till, ed. Seapower: Theory and Practice (Essex, UK: Frank Cass & Co. LTD, 1994), at
pp. 193-194. Robert B. Oakley and Michael J. Dziedzic argue that national “constabulary forces” – such
as the Coast Guard – would be “better suited for law enforcement functions” and for interaction with
“CIVPOL” [a standby international force of Civilian Police] forces than regular military forces in sup-
porting international peace operations. Oakely, ed. Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations
and Public Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1998), pp. 513-520.
[121] Michael C. Williams, Civil-Military Relations and Peacekeeping (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Adelphi Paper 321, August 1998), p. 38.

77
 major theater wars. Also, small-scale contingencies of varying size and intensity – as well as
noncombat Operations Other Than War (OOTW) – will demand effective and flexible
U.S. forces that can be forward-deployed and tailored to support peacetime diplomacy and
crisis-response operations in key world regions. Local and regional crises will continue to
proliferate and become more dangerous as sophisticated weapons are increasingly available
to nations and sub-national groups intent on challenging the United States and its allies
and friends. As Don Daniel and Andrew Ross of the U.S. Naval War College explained:
Although the U.S. military must be prepared to deter, fight, and win the nation’s
“At sea, it is force, not reason, “real wars,” that will not be its exclusive function. It must also be prepared, when
that confers sovereign rights.” possible, to prevent, manage, and resolve nontraditional conflicts. Ultimately, as
Cardinal Richelieu former President Bush observed [in his 1991 National Security Strategy of the United
1626 States], “security is not indivisible. The safety, freedom, and well-being of one people
cannot be separated form the safety, freedom, and well-being of all.”[122]
The threat from domestic and international terrorism will continue to proliferate,
placing premiums on the nation’s ability to surveill, sort, identify, and intercept terrorists
before they can act. A critical need will be to safeguard America’s ports and waterways
from attack and sabotage – in peacetime or in war – especially by groups employing chem-
ical, biological, or even
nuclear weapons of mass
destruction. Likewise, in over-
seas crises and contingencies, a
terrorist attack may focus on
disrupting U.S. access to vital
ports and waterways. In many
such scenarios, the Coast
Guard will be the Nation’s
“first-responder” to such threats.[123]
Most fundamentally, the President and the Unified Commanders-in-Chief require a
full spectrum of naval capabilities to meet tomorrow’s maritime challenges. And, the Coast
Guard will have important Deepwater assets to help satisfy the CinCs’ needs. But it will
not be a “Small Navy.” In this regard, the comments of Captain/Coast Guard Comman-
dant Ellsworth P. Bertholf 80 years ago remain instructive, despite the recent blurring of
peacetime-crisis-wartime roles and missions that show a greater commingling of Coast
Guard-Navy responsibilities:
...the fundamental reasons for the two services are diametrically opposed. The Navy
exists for the sole purpose of keeping itself prepared for...war. Its usefulness to the
Government is therefore to a large degree potential. If it performs in peace time any
useful function not ultimately connected with the preparation for war, that is a by-
product. On the other hand, the Coast Guard does not exist solely for the purpose of
preparing for war. If it did there would then be, of course, two navies – a large and a
small one, and that condition...could not long exist. The Coast Guard exists for the
particular and main purpose of performing duties which have no connection with a
state of war, but which, on the contrary, are constantly necessary as peace functions.
It is, of course, essentially an emergency service and it is organized along military

[122] Donald C. F. Daniel and Andrew L. Ross, “U.S. Strategic Planning and the Pivotal States,”
in The Pivotal States, op.cit., p. 405, emphasis added by the authors. For a British perspective on the use
of navies in non-war situations, see Eric Grove, “Navies Play Their Part in Peace Support Operations,”
Jane’s Navy International, March 1999, pp. 26ff.
[123] In a paper presented at the October 1998 Transnational Issues Conference, W. Seth Carus
warned of the threat from Nuclear-Biologic-Chemical weapons proliferation and called for a focused and
coherent civilian-Defense Department capability to respond to and manage the consequences of such ter-
rorist incidents. Clearly, the requirements for the Coast Guard’s multidimensional capabilities must be
addressed as a key element of ensuring the maritime dimension of U.S. security against these threats.
Carus, “Transnational Threats and NBC Proliferation,” op.cit., especially pp. 8-9.
78
 lines because that sort of organization best enables the Coast Guard to keep prepared
as an emergency service, and by organization along military lines it is invaluable in
time of war as an adjunct and auxiliary to the Navy...while peace time usefulness is a
by-product of the Navy, it is the war time usefulness that is a by-product of the Coast
Guard.[124]
Unlike the other four Armed Services, warfare is not the Coast Guard’s raison d’etre.
However, because of the special multimission capabilities of Coast Guard cutters and their
crews, Coast Guard units play critical roles in peacetime forward presence, humanitarian
support, peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, crisis-response, and combat operations, “The USCG is without a doubt
across the spectrum of U.S. global engagement, including smaller-scale contingencies and my most valuable resource for
major theater wars. The Coast Guard maintains a high state of readiness to function as a maritime engagement in the
specialized service within the Navy – meaning the employment of Coast Guard resources Caribbean basin, making robust
and capabilities in a national emergency based on their peacetime applications – and has security assistance, military-to-
command responsibilities for the U.S. Maritime Defense Zones. The Coast Guard’s military contact, and exercise
involvement in routine peacetime engagement – a posture of active and acceptable presence contributions. They are the lead
– reaches out to all elements of other countries’ maritime interests and agencies, and in agency for maritime interdiction;
some situations is much less threatening, and more politically acceptable, than a purely
however, increased Detection &
naval or military presence. The Coast Guard’s extensive involvement in coastal and port
Monitoring support is inefficient
maritime functions in peacetime provides capabilities to support peacetime international
without critical linkages to USCG
engagement and naval warfare operations in littoral regions, such as port security and safety,
forces assigned for Intercept &
harbor defense, military environmental defense, maritime interception and coastal sea con-
trol, and force protection. Throughout its military and defense operations, the Coast Guard Apprehension. Presently, the
remains a full partner with the Navy and the other Armed Services in support of America’s number of cutters available to
national security and military strategies. support the counterdrug effort is
significantly less than what we
All of these enduring attributes of the Coast Guard’s direct support to U.S. national
security strategy and policies were driven home in a 26 May 1999 letter from General will need to achieve our opera-
Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, to the tional counterdrug objectives.
Deputy Secretary of Transportation, Mortimer Downey. (See Appendix B.) Building upon Migrant surges will also
a brief explanation of the trends and dynamics within the Southern Command Area of inevitably place a greater strain
Responsibility (AOR), General Wilhelm cataloged the Coast Guard’s many contributions on the aging USCG fleet. ”
to effective regional engagement: General Charles E. Wilhelm, USMC
Commander-in-Chief
• The Coast Guard has earned and enjoys an unprecedented level of trust and credibil-
U.S. Southern Command
ity with the countries and organizations within the AOR. USCG forces and mis- May 1999
sions closely match those of the region’s navies, and through a multitude of engage-
ment activities and initiatives the Coast Guard is the ideal mentor and role model.
• The Coast Guard’s robust Resident and Mobile Training Teams continue to pay
huge dividends in shaping our theater for the new century.
• The Caribbean Support Tender is a new initiative that clearly highlights the
synergism of the SOUTHCOM-USCG partnership.
• The Coast Guard also participates heavily in the SOUTHCOM theater exercise
program, adding an important dimension that Latin American navies appreciate and
with which they can easily identify.

[124] Private letter to Captain Robert O. Crisp, USCG, 18 April 1919. During this period imme-
diately following World War I, sentiment ran strong for keeping the Coast Guard within the Department
of the Navy, in a position analogous to that of the Marine Corps. Not all agreed, and about 25 officers,
many on duty at Coast Guard headquarters, favored a return to the Treasury Department,
Captain/Commandant Bertholf among them. Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, op.cit., p. 59.

79
 • The Coast Guard generally works with a broad cross-section of host government
ministries, which in turn creates additional opportunities for further diplomatic and
military contacts.
• Success of SOUTHCOM engagement strategies is also linked directly to our
counterdrug mission. We cannot conduct an effective counterdrug campaign with-
out Coast Guard support.

“The Coast Guard will play an A Unique Instrument of

increasingly important role in the Maritime Security
future. The strategic value provid-
ed by the Coast Guard is reflected
At the dawn of a new century, the U.S. Coast Guard is an increasingly important
in the following:
element in America’s multifaceted security strategies and responses to a complex array of
threats and challenges at home and abroad. U.S. citizens and interests, and America’s allies
• The Coast Guard is the only and friends throughout the world, are at increasing risk from extreme nationalism, terror-
Federal law-enforcement agency ism, international organized crime, illegal alien migration, drug trafficking, weapons smug-
with jurisdiction both inside U.S. gling, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental damage, complex flows
territorial waters and on the of trade and investment, and state aggression – transnational threats that honor no nation-
open oceans. al frontier. As the President’s October 1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century
report makes clear, “to move against the threats of this new global era, we are pursuing a
• Possessing open-ocean, high-
forward-looking national security strategy attuned to the realities of our new era.... Its
endurance cutters, the Coast
three core objectives are:
Guard, with its uniquely trained
• To enhance our security.
crews, plays increasingly impor-
tant roles in enforcing UN sanc- • To bolster America’s economic prosperity.
tions and international embar- • To promote democracy abroad.”
goes at sea. Operating along- A critical need is for the “tools necessary to carry out this strategy” and “close coordi-
side the Navy, the Coast Guard nation across all levels of government – federal, state and local – and across a wide range of
provides trained and experi- agencies, including the Departments of Defense and State, the Intelligence Community,
enced boarding teams. law enforcement, emergency services, medical care providers, and others,” as the National
• The Coast Guard, along with Security Strategy makes clear. Since its founding as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, the
Navy assets, provides harbor
Coast Guard has had increasingly expansive responsibilities for safeguarding national mar-
itime security – the Coast Guard’s unique contribution to America’s national security –
defense and maritime traffic
that is a crucial element in ensuring homeland defense and protecting critical infrastruc-
management for strategic ports.
tures, safeguarding U.S. maritime sovereignty, and defending American citizens and inter-
Both are vital services for power
ests worldwide. It embraces all elements of the cultural, social, environmental, economic,
projection. political, diplomatic, and military dimensions that today shape America’s national security
• In the important military-to-mili- strategy, policies, and programs of global engagement. The Coast Guard’s unique status as
tary contact program between a U.S. Armed Force with law enforcement authorities and responsibilities makes it an
U.S. and former Warsaw Pact uncommon instrument of national security. As a military, multimission, maritime service,
navies, the Coast Guard often is the Coast Guard provides singular, non-redundant, complementary capabilities to
more compatible with coastal
safeguard U.S. security interests – today and in the 21st century.
navies than the Navy. ” One of the most basic operational requirements for the Coast Guard’s roles, missions,
Strategic Assessment 1999: and functions in the protection of U.S. maritime security is well-grounded, focused strate-
Priorities for a Turbulent World gic, operational, and tactical intelligence linked to comprehensive surveillance and recon-
Institute for Strategic Studies
naissance of critical marine areas. Coupled with practiced teamwork, coordination and
National Defense University, 1999
integration of efforts by key federal, state, and local agencies, focused surveillance and
reconnaissance linked to all-source intelligence will enable the Coast Guard to provide
credible presence in and to conduct surveillance of critical maritime regions; to detect,
identify, and sort targets of interest; and to intercept and engage those targets – the essence
of maritime security.[125] In the most fundamental sense, the Coast Guard must be able
to maintain a credible presence in key maritime regions, to deter potential threats to U.S.
sovereignty, and to exercise sea control and projection of law enforcement and naval power

80
should deterrence fail. (Figure 7 provides comparison of Coast Guard and Navy missions.)
All that said, however, success in countering future threats and challenges to America’s
maritime security will depend upon increasingly obsolescent Coast Guard capabilities, espe-
cially in the Deepwater operating environment, which must be upgraded, modernized, or
replaced beginning in the next few years. Unless the Coast Guard’s Deepwater cutters, air-
craft, and C4ISR systems are able to meet the challenges of the new century, the Coast
Guard will be all but sidelined in some future crisis or conflict, “Hardly Ready” to make the
valuable contributions that will be needed to protect U.S. interests.

Figure 7. Application of U.S. Maritime Power

U.S. Navy – Naval Power

Naval Power Projection Naval Sea Control Naval Support to

Civil Authorities
• Nuclear Deterrence • Operations Against Enemy • Drug Interdiction
• Combat Operations Forces Support
Against Land • Protection of • Maritime Counter-
• Combat Operations in Maritime Trade Terrorism
Defense of Land Forces • Disaster Relief
• Naval Force in Support • Assistance to Refugees
of Diplomacy • Search and Rescue
• Peace-Making Operations • Pollution Support
• Peace-Keeping Operations • Mass Migration Support
• Embargo, Sanctions, • Humanitarian Assistance
and Quarantine
Enforcement
• Support to Counter-
Insurgency Operations
• Military Assistance to
Foreign Governments
• Evacuation Operations

U.S. Coast Guard – Maritime Power

Maritime Security Maritime Safety National Defense Maritime Services

Operations
• Enforcement of • Search and Rescue • Maritime Interception • Pollution Control
Maritime Laws and Treaties • Disaster Relief Operations and Response
• Embargo, Sanctions, and • Vessel Traffic • Military Environmental • Regulation of
Quarantine Enforcement Services Response Operations Merchant Marine
• Peacekeeping • Assistance to • Port Operations, • Maritime Aids to
• Drug Interdiction Refugees Security, and Defense Navigation
• Protection of Natural • Peacetime Military • Humanitarian
Resources (Living and Engagement: Assistance
Non-Living) - Military Assistance
• Counter-Smuggling Operations to Foreign Governments
• Oilfield and Gasfield Monitoring - Peace Building Operations
• Maritime Counter-Terrorism - Maritime Force in Support of Diplomacy
• Migrant Interdiction Operations • General Defense Operations:
• Protection of Maritime Trade - Force Protection
• Environmental Protection - Evacuation Operations
- Littoral and Coastal Operations

[125] All forms of intelligence, at national and service-specific levels, serve to ensure that the Coast
Guard can carry out critical missions: technical and encyclopedic, human (HUMINT), imagery
(IMINT), signals (SIGINT), and electronic (ELINT) intelligence can provide the means for the intelli-
gence preparation of the maritime security “battlespace” – whether the targets are illegal foreign fishing
vessels operating within the U.S. EEZ, international criminal syndicates transporting illegal migrant,
drug-runners, or foreign naval threats in time of war.
81
I V. USCG M A R I T I M E S E C U R I T Y
O P E R AT I O N A L C O N S T R A I N T S
As the United States left the 20th century, the Coast Guard had modernized its patrol
boats and near-shore assets. However, the Service in early 2000 is hamstrung by, first, obso-
lescent equipment and the fact that, among the world’s 41 deepwater fleets, it is the 39th
oldest and would, absent the Deepwater Project, soon be number 41; second, a younger
and inexperienced workforce; and, finally, an unsustainable operational tempo exacerbated
by budget constraints. Existing Deepwater assets are nearing the ends of their service lives.
Performance is increasingly hampered and operational costs are increasing, even as the
threats the Service must counter are becoming more sophisticated and capable and the
implications of poor mission performance more dire to U.S. maritime security interests.
(Appendix F provides data on in-service Coast Guard Deepwater cutters and aircraft.
Figures 8 and 9 show cutter and aircraft projections.) There is a compelling need to
modernize and enhance the Coast Guard’s assets and capabilities to ensure that national
maritime security requirements can be satisfied and that the Service’s core mission areas can
be supported. For example, the Coast Guard’s internal Deepwater Mission Analysis Report
concluded that
...capability improvements must be made, particularly as new mission requirements
are added to our workload. Increases in our C4I [Command, Control, Communi-
cations, Computers, and Intelligence] capabilities, our ability to classify targets, our
abilities to dispatch boarding parties more effectively, and the speed of our surface
assets must be addressed.[126]

Figure 8. Projected Inventory USCG Legacy Cutters

[126] Deepwater Mission Analysis Report, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, 6 November 1995, p. ii.
See also, Deepwater Capabilities Project Mission Need Statement, U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters, Office
of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations (G-O), 3 May 1998, pp. 10-21. Two other functions have
been added to the C4I arena: Surveillance (S) and Reconnaissance (R), making the “full-spectrum
acronym” usually cited as C4ISR.
83
 Figure 9. Projected Inventory of USCG Legacy Airfcraft

Recent cases illustrate the dilemma the Coast Guard faces every day. In December
1997, the cutter Storis (WMEC-38), built in 1942 and nearing 56 years of service, was on
drug patrol off southern California. Lacking modern sensors and the ability to embark hel-
icopters, and capable of maximum speed of 14 knots, the Storis was simply no match for
the well-funded “high-tech” drug smugglers, armed
with satellite telephones, precision navigation sys-
tems, and night-vision goggles, who literally could
have run rings around the cutter. But Storis was all
that was available at the time, and the cutter’s crew
did the best it could.[127] For that matter, the rela-
tively “low-tech” stealthy boats that the Colombian
cartels, especially, have used can easily frustrate inter-
diction efforts. These fiberglass vessels with World
War II-type camouflage are virtually invisible to radar
and the “Mark-One” eyeball – a cheap boat that
defeats U.S. counter-drug operations.
In a late April 1999, a Navy surveillance aircraft
detected an unmarked 120-foot trawler about 60
miles off Guam, but a Coast Guard cutter – one of
only two assigned to Guam (a 55-year old buoy ten-
der and a 110-foot patrol boat) – could not make the
interception because of an engine fire.[128] As the trawler neared Guam and was headed
toward a reef, a Coast Guard inflatable boat raced out to put a boarding party on the ship
and steer it away from the danger at the last minute. A cutter later towed the trawler, with
120 Chinese migrants on board, to nearby Tinian, where they were held at an abandoned
World War II air field. It was the third such interception in as many weeks; the first came
on 17 April, when a cutter diverted a trawler carrying 147 Chinese to Tinian. With the
Coast Guard fully engaged in that case, another smuggling ship with 105 Chinese on
board sailed unchecked into Guam’s Apra Harbor. “It sailed right into port,” Ginger
Cruz, a spokesperson for Governor Carl Gutierrez, said. “It was rather embarrassing.”
Nor are such challenges experienced by the Coast Guard, alone; the Navy’s support
to America’s war against the drug cartels can at times be stymied, as well.[129] On 4

[127] Storis also figured in a September 1997 incident in which it had detected the Japanese fish-
ing vessel Yoshi Maru No. 38 illegally fishing within the U.S. EEZ in the Bering Sea. As Storis
approached the vessel and ordered it to stop, the Japanese vessel fled, leaving the U.S. cutter in its wake.
See also Navarro, “Upgraded Drug Traffic,” op.cit., where the drug-runners’ sophisticated technologies
and operational concepts are reviewed.
[128] “Guam’s Own ‘China Beach’,” op.cit.
[129] Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, “Just What the Smugglers Ordered,” The
Washington Post, 2 August 1998, pp. A1, A38.
84
March 1998, for instance, a U.S. maritime patrol aircraft spotted a “go-fast” boat, loaded
with what appeared to be cocaine, speeding northward near the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan
border. The Navy’s nuclear-powered, guided missile cruiser California (CGN-36) was dis-
patched to intercept the 40-foot craft, cleared to use “minimum force necessary, including
warning shots and disabling fire” to force the boat to stop. But the “go-fast” refused, even
after the U.S. warship fired 15 shots from its 5-inch guns. California was granted permis-
sion to pursue the “go-fast” into the Nicaraguan territorial sea, but played “cat-and-mouse”
around Corn Island until the clearance expired at midnight, allowing the drug-runners to
evade capture.

Deepwater Cutter Assessment

Although the Coast Guard’s mainstay Deepwater Reliance (WMEC-615) 210-foot
and Hamilton (WHEC-715) 378-foot cutter classes, built in the 1960s and early 1970s,
have been modernized, they operate with relatively large and expensive crews, are becoming
more difficult to maintain, do not
incorporate modern technology, and
are to be retired beginning in
2008.[130] One of the Coast Guard’s
premier Deepwater “over-achievers” in
recent years, the high-endurance cutter
Chase, shows the challenge of sustain-
ing needed capabilities in this demand-
ing mission area. Propelled by a com-
bined diesel (cruise) or gas-turbine
engine (sprint) plant, the cutter’s per-
formance is becoming more difficult to maintain. (Always innovative, perhaps, the Coast
Guard was the first U.S. service to use gas turbines and controllable-pitch propellers in its
ships and led in the post-World War II development of shipboard helicopter operations.)
The cutter’s turbines are converted Pratt & Whitney FT4A-6s originally used in the 1950s-
era Boeing 707 airliner, and have been out of production for more than two decades. The
Coast Guard, therefore, had to turn to the used-aircraft market for spares, a factor that
continues to impact the class’ operating and support costs.[131]

[130] When the Hamilton cutters received Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization (FRAM)
upgrades in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the notional manning standard was increased from 152 to
171 people. Naval analyst Norman Polmar stated that if these cutters “...are not replaced, the Coast Guard
will in fact as well as name evolve into a coastal patrol force. Unfortunately,” he continued, “the
Hamilton-class modernization included the removal of the ships’ 5-inch/38-cal DP [Dual Purpose] guns,
which were very useful weapons.” Although the 5-inch weapons were replaced by 76-mm Oto Melara,
they are not the equivalent to the larger weapons in many naval tasks. A critical shortcoming is the lack of
modern electronic countermeasures systems as well as advanced radars and communications capabilities.
Polmar, Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet , 15th ed. (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1993), p. 551.
[131] James B. Thatch, “USCG’s Urgent Need for Deepwater Replacements,” Sea Power, April
1998, pp. 82-86, at p. 85. See also Norman Polmar, Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, 16th ed.
(Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 503-505.
The Nichols Advanced Marine “Evaluation of the 378’, 270’ and 210’ Class Cutters” report, dated
15 July 1999 and undertaken in support of the Deepwater Project, noted that the Coast Guard in mid-
1999 maintained ten spare turbines acquired from Canada to support the Hamilton as and Polar class cut-
ters. At the time of the evaluation, five of the ten turbines were awaiting overhaul and two were in the
rework facility, leaving only three available for use. One important conclusion was that the difficult and
labor-intensive nature of providing replacement and support for the Pratt & Whitney gas turbines were
indicative of an obsolete system. The cost to replace each turbine and the level of support to operate and
maintain the turbines were firm indicators of an increased level of risk to these cutters. Other increased
maintenance costs derived from the fact that original supply sources in many instances no longer exist,
and as a result available substitutes may match original equipment in function and performance but not
in fit, requiring extensive engineering work-arounds and costly modification to existing plants.
Likewise, the engines on the Coast Guard’s medium-range patrol aircraft in late 1999 were antiquat-
ed, unsupported, and failing at an alarming rate. As a result of such age-driven challenges, the overall
logistics effort demands a significant amount of labor hours, leading to increased maintenance costs and
85
 From an operational perspective, the 12 Hamilton and 16 Reliance cutters are
labor-intensive, which drives up operating costs and places strains on the Service’s person-
nel quality of life programs. As
much as 70 percent of a cutter’s
life-cycle cost is attributed to its
crew. Chase and the other
Hamilton -class cutters normally
operate with 19 officers and 152
enlisted personnel, two or three
times as many as required in a
modern, highly automated, and
more capable cutter of similar size. These ships possess surface/air search radars and night
vision equipment that aid in a variety of missions and tasks, but more modern and capable
equipment is available (a critical need is for inverse synthetic aperture radars that would
aid in detection, identification, and interception tasks).[132]
The 210s, moreover, show the signs of “mission creep” and advancing age. Designed
in the early 1960s with a crew of only 60 and commissioned between 1963 and 1969 for
SAR patrol and standby operations, they have assumed almost all Deepwater missions
and crew size has grown to 77. Still, at that size the ship’s combat information center is
manned only by the bridge watchstanders. They have a relatively slow maximum speed of
18 knots, and their maximum range of 6,100 nautical miles at 13 knots is significantly less
than the 378s or the 270s. The Reliance cutters are fitted with only a surface-search radar,
and they have no electronic countermeasures or electronic support measures equipment
installed. The 210s can land but not hangar helicopters.
Of more recent vintage are the 13 Famous or “Bear” (WMEC-901)-class cutters built
between 1979 and 1990, but those ships, designed and engineered for a specific north
Atlantic fisheries law enforcement
mission, have demonstrated short-
comings in almost every other
Deepwater mission and task. The class
has only a nominal 14-day (maximum
21-day) endurance (food stores, fuel,
garbage retention), slow maximum
speed (20 knots), limited range (9,900
nautical miles at 12 knots; 3,850 nau-
tical miles at top speed), and poor sea-keeping. Planned national defense features have
been foregone, most notably in the anti-submarine warfare area. Key ASW systems were
tested but never deployed, for example, because the class’ self-generated noise is so great
that the intended Tactical Towed Array Sonar System (TACTASS) would have been virtu-
ally worthless, especially in the “noisy” and cluttered littoral ASW environment.[133]
Other operational shortcomings include:
• Limited berthing for additional personnel
• Poor boat launch/recovery system

decreased cutter and aircraft operational availability.

[132] At 378 feet length overall, the Hamiltons displace 3,050 tons full load. Several NATO navies
have corvette or frigate-sized surface ship programs, with missions that are similar to the Coast Guard’s
Deepwater mission set and operating profiles (albeit not equivalent to the U.S. Coast Guard’s evolving
international engagement/defense mission), but which have smaller crews. For example, the in-service
Danish Thetis -class offshore patrol vessel (OPV) has a 369-foot length, displaces 3,500 tons, has a 90-
day endurance, and operates with a crew of 60. The in-service Nor wegian Nordkapp - class OPV has a
346-foot length, displaces 3,240 tons, has a 90-day endurance, and operates with a crew of 62. The Sea
Wraith Stealth Corvette, under development by Vosper Thornycroft has a 377-foot length, displacement
of 2,500 tons, and cr ew of 105. See, Surface Matrix Project Team, USCG Deepwater Capability

86
 • Limited ability to maintain real-time video and data links between Coast Guard
assets, and no Link-11/16 capability for tactical data links with other U.S.forces
• No close-in weapons system to defend against air threats (a severe constraint given
the class’ passive-only SLQ-32(V)1 electronic countermeasures system)
• Limited ability to deploy with HH-60 helicopter (only the short-range HH-65 or
the out-of-service Navy SH-2F LAMPS can be accommodated in the “A” Class,
although the “B” Class can deploy with the HH-60 and also land/refuel the Navy
SH-60B LAMPS helicopter)
• No air-search radar for civilian law-enforcement and military tasks
The Deepwater Project’s 1999 evaluation of the high- and medium-endurance cutter
classes concluded that
...the Coast Guard historically keeps their cutters in service far longer than their Navy
and foreign service counterparts. Our opinion is that this policy brings with it high
life cycle costs for manning, maintenance and logistics. It also prohibits the Coast
Guard from taking advantage of modern control, sensor and communication technol-
ogy that would allow the cutters to not only reduce crewing levels significantly,
perhaps by half, but also increase operating effectiveness.
It is apparent...that the Coast Guard incurs a very real and significant oppor-
tunity cost by keeping cutters with inadequate and outdated mission equipment out
on patrol, rather than replacing or significantly upgrading their capabilities. Given
that most of the costs of cutter
ownership are crew, fuel, and
maintenance, these costs are
essentially constant whether the
cutter has a modern, up to date
sensor and communications
capability, or an inadequate one.
Further, newer, less mainte-
nance-intensive cutters would
allow a greater number of days
on patrol.[134]
In addition to the high- and medium-endurance cutters, the service’s 49 Island-class
(WPB-1301) 110-foot patrol boats, built between 1986 and 1990, have also been assigned
Deepwater missions despite their constraints. These small cutters were designed primarily
for near-shore/coastal drug interdiction, and cannot meet the full spectrum of Deepwater
requirements. Range and endurance (Island A Class) are limited to 3,300 nautical miles at
13 knots and 900 nautical miles at 29.5 knots. The class cannot tow at low speeds because
of poor seakeeping and handling, and the poor boat launch/recovery configuration prevents
small boat operations in anything greater than sea state 4. Organic sensors and communica-
tions links (voice, video, data) are poor. There is very limited space for additional personnel,
and they cannot accommodate 50-50 male/female crew mixes.

Replacement Project, “Comparative Practices of European Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels,” Naval
Architecture Branch/USCG Engineering Logistics Center, September 1997.
[133] See, for example, Lieutenant Commander William L. Ross, USCG, “Semper Paratus? The
Coast Guard is Not Equipped to Fight,” Naval War College Review, Winter 1990, pp. 113-130; the Bear-
class criticisms are discussed at pp. 120-122. Interviews with U.S. Coast Guard Headquarters staff cutter
requirements officers confirmed that the shortcomings discussed in this 1990 article were still the norm
at the close of 1999.
[134] Nichols Advanced Marine, op.cit., Executive Summary, p. 5.

87
 Deepwater Aircraft Assessment
The Coast Guard’s maritime, multimission, and military character will be its foun-
dation for operations in the 21st century, and these same core values will continue to
influence the employment strategy
of all future Coast Guard aviation
assets. Likewise, core aviation capabil-
ities will continue to consist of
USCG Fixed- & Rotary-Wing
surveillance and reconnaissance,
Aircraft Mission Classifications
search and rescue, logistics support,
Long-Range Search: marine environmental response, and
Multimission, radius of action detection, classification, identification
greater than 750 nautical miles, and interdiction in support of law
total sortie time greater than four
enforcement and defense missions. In
addition to several logistics support
flight hours, significant cargo
(C-20B, VC-4) and special mission (RU-38) aircraft, the current aviation asset mix
capacity
consists of the following operational aircraft:
Medium-Range Search: • 80 short-range rescue and recovery (SRR) HH-65A Dolphins, which are nearing
Multimission, radius of action of the ends of their service lives
750 nautical miles, total sortie
• 35 medium-range rescue and recovery (MRR) HH-60J Jayhawks, which are
time of four flight hours
approaching the mid-point of their service lives
Medium-Range Recovery: • 20 medium-range search (MRS) HU-25 Guardians, the first of which entered
Multimission, radius of action Coast Guard service in 1982
greater than 150 nautical miles,
• 26 long-range search (LRS) HC-130 Hercules, some acquired as early as 1972
total sortie time greater than 3.5
flight hours, ability to recover four
While the current SRR, MRR,
MRS and LRS designations are derived
or more people from the water,
from an attempt to match platform capa-
cargo sling capacity greater than
bilities with mission requirements, limita-
2,000 pounds
tions in current platform capabilities sub-
Short-Range Recovery: optimize multimission employment.[135]
Multimission, radius of action of For example, while the HH-65A is com-
150 nautical miles, total sortie patible with all WHEC and WMEC
time of 3.5 flight hours, ability to
flight decks, it is extremely weight critical,
which limits its range, precludes its potential use-of-force and logistics-support applica-
recover three people from the
tions, as well as its ability to carry a state-of-the-art radar and sensor package. On the other
water, cargo sling capacity of
hand, while the HH-60J has Deepwater-capable range and endurance, it is compatible
2,000 pounds
only with the 270-foot WMEC flight decks. Deployment capability is further impaired by
limited shipboard maintenance and logistics support capability and restrictive pitch and
roll limitations, especially at night. Additionally, sensors on the HH-60J consist of a
weather radar and an antiquated, stand-alone forward-looking infrared (FLIR) sensor
system. The fact that the FLIR, primarily an identification device, is not integrated with
the radar, a detection and classification device, severely limits its utility.

[135] The Coast Guard has identified an investment strategy and program that will help overcome
some of the more critical operational capabilities in the existing aircraft platforms and systems and to
ensure that a capabilities “gap” is avoided as the Service looks ahead to acquiring future Deepwater avia-
tion platforms and systems. See LCDR Thomas Cullen, USCG, “Aviation Near-Term Support Strategy”
Briefing, Office of Aeronautical Engineering, Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, 4 September 1998.
Eight other “special mission” classifications are: Long-Range Command and Control (LRCC),
Long-Range Detection (LRD), Medium-Range Intercept (MRI), Medium-Range Apprehension (MRA),
88
 With regard to fixed-wing capability, the dash speed of the Falcon, when combined
with the APG-66 radar, makes it a suitable air intercept platform. This capability exists on
only eight operational HU-25C aircraft, however. Moreover, use of this platform in search
and rescue or maritime patrol applications is suboptimized due to the poor surface search
capability of the APG-66 radar. Likewise, range and endurance (maximum range of 1,940
nautical miles at 250 knots), and especially sensor limitations on the HU-25A and the HU-
25B models limit their effectiveness in these same mission areas. And, the 20 Falcon aircraft
are all more than 14 years old and have
major engine supportability problems.
Seventeen other Falcons are in storage in
early 2000 and would require significant
funding to upgrade and return them to
operational status.
The ongoing HC-130 sensor
upgrade, consisting of an integrated, state-
of-the-market FLIR/EO (electro-optical)
device and a palletized, roll-on/roll-off
advanced tactical workstation, will signifi-
cantly enhance its multimission utility and
provide near real-time data transmission
capability.[136] This upgrade, in conjunction with Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS) navigation improvements on all platforms and night vision goggle implementation
on helicopters, constitutes Coast Guard aviation’s only significant capabilities advance in
more than a decade. Thus, while each of these aircraft perform yeoman service across the
full spectrum of Coast Guard missions, scrutiny of individual platform capabilities reveals
an unintegrated system that falls well short of optimum tactical employment.

Deepwater C4ISR Assessment

The Coast Guard is unique among the U.S. Armed Forces in that the Commandant
serves as both the Service Chief and the Service’s senior Operational Commander. As such,
the Coast Guard Commandant is responsible for providing trained, ready, and equipped
forces for the Coast Guard Field Organization and exercises both Administrative Control
and Operational Command of Coast Guard forces for the accomplishment of assigned mis-
sions. The Commandant receives national policy direction from the President, Secretary of
Transportation, and Secretary of Defense. (See Figure 10.) The Commandant’s principal
operational commanders, the Commanders, Atlantic and Pacific Areas, also serve as the
Commanders, Maritime Defense Zones, Atlantic and Pacific, respectively. Thus, in peace-
time and war, the Commanders, Atlantic and Pacific Areas serve as the vital links between
the Commandant and subordinate District Commanders and with the Unified
Commanders in Chief. The Area Commanders exercise Administrative Control of all
Coast Guard Deepwater surface assets; Operational Control of Deepwater cutter forces is
exercised through the Coast Guard District Commanders. The District Commanders also
exercise both Administrative and Operational Control of Deepwater aviation forces. When
the President directs or upon declaration of war, the Coast Guard operates as a service with-
in the Navy.

Medium-Range Detection (MRD), Medium-Range Logistics (MRL), Medium-Range Covert

Surveillance (MRCS), and Short-Range Covert Surveillance (SRCS). The Coast Guard’s lease of the
Spanish CASA 212 in the early 1990s was targeted to meet the MRL mission demand.
[136] Since 1983 the Coast Guard has used the APS-135 Side-Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR)
and the APS-137 Forward-Looking Airborne Radar (FLAR); the SLAR is particularly useful for iceberg
detection. However, both systems are obsolescent, and the SLAR is no longer supportable.

89
 Figure 10. U.S. Coast Guard Operational Command Structure

Until recently, the Coast Guard had not taken an organizational, cross-mission area,
and inter-agency view regarding collecting, processing, and disseminating information
needed to perform its missions. Nevertheless, the 1995 Deepwater Mission Analysis
Report concluded that the “capabilities most in need of upgrading – areas where the
biggest improvements in effectiveness could be achieved – are in target classification,
boarding enhancements, and...C4I improvements.”[137] Since then, numerous shortcom-
ings have been identified for the Deepwater assets across all major mission areas that sup-
port national maritime security – the most significant,
given the Coast Guard Commandant’s dual adminis-
trative and operational command responsibilities,
being the lack of an overarching and rigorous com-
mand and control architecture linking Headquarters
with Area and District Commands and with individ-
ual units across mission areas.[138]

Sensor Shortfalls
The lack of effective radar and other all-weath-
er/24-hour sensors for aircraft and cutters precludes
these assets from covering larger areas with increased
probabilities of detection and classification of targets
of interest, particularly in high-threat/high-density areas, and at long/over-the-horizon

[137] Deepwater Mission Analysis Report, op.cit., p. I-39.

[138] More detailed and system-specific information is available in the publications that were
relied upon for this summary: Department of Transportation, United States Coast Guard, USCG C4I
Baseline Architecture, Enclosure (1) to COMDTINST 3090.6. See also, “USCG C4I Objective
Architecture and Transition Plan” (OATP), 24 November 1998.

90
ranges.[139] Likewise, there is a lack of effective capability to search for, detect, maintain
track, and locate, especially passively and at night or in inclement weather. This ranges
from large commercial vessels (in support of Port State Control program) to small targets-
of-interest, such as small-profile vessels, rafts, or individuals in the water. A significant gap
exists in the Coast Guard’s sensor capabilities in polar regions related to finding thin ice
areas. Moreover, there is a general lack of the capability to detect, assess, and monitor
oil/hazardous materials spills in all weather conditions and at night. There is also a
requirement for greater direct support from National Intelligence Community and
other intelligence assets, especially in direct, real-time support of tactical operations
(TENCAP – Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities).

Command, Control and Communications Shortfalls

The lack of reliable connectivity among cutters, aircraft, boats, and operational shore
facilities, especially at long/over-the-horizon ranges inhibits practically all operations, a situ-
ation that is exacerbated by the fact that communications suites and systems may vary by
geographic or operating area. The Service has only limited communications capabilities to
support multiple situations, crises, and operations simultaneously in all modes (voice, data,
imagery), and there is a lack of ability to receive all distress calls in some portions of U.S.
coastal areas where the majority of commercial or recreational traffic exists. Multi-agency
operations are made more difficult by the limited capabilities available to Groups, Small
Boat Stations, and other Coast Guard resources to interface effectively with the numerous
federal, state, and local agencies, as well as international and private organizations, that are
involved in various missions and tasks. There are, as well, only limited capabilities available
to Groups, Small Boat Stations, cutters, aircraft, and other Coast Guard resources to
interface effectively with Defense Department resources.
The Service is also challenged by limited and generally cumbersome interfaces for
using Coast Guard command-and-control systems, and there is a lack of effective interface
for exchanging information between mobile assets and shore facilities, especially high-speed
and reliable communications. The Coast Guard’s ability to protect sensitive/secure commu-
nications, particularly in coastal areas in which smaller Coast Guard resources/platforms are
used, needs enhancement, and there is a lack of ability to exchange sensor, intelligence, and
other tactical information among cutters, aircraft, and shore facilities. In addition to polar
sensor shortcomings, the lack of an effective communications transport path to get ice
surveillance information (satellite imagery or reconnaissance information from aircraft) to
operational planners and cutters constrains the Service’s international ice patrol operations.

Command and Decision Shortfalls

The lack of capability to maintain situational awareness and effective tactical display
of an area of responsibility at the District or Group level, including status of reporting
resources and monitoring of actions of Coast Guard resources has continued to create
problems for effective force allocation. This, plus a general lack of interoperable decision
support tools, effective situational risk assessment tools, and access to remote mission
reporting information at Groups, has at times resulted in an inability to maintain
situational awareness and effective tactical display by units involved in Joint-force opera-
tions. Similarly, there is a general inability to provide real-time tactical information and a
situational picture on aircraft, small cutters and boats, and at Small Boat Stations. The

[139] In September 1999, the Coast Guard reported excellent results in the use of the S-band
AN/SPS-73 surface-search radar in detection and monitoring of fisheries activities in Coast Guard
District 1. Ranges out to nearly 49,000 yards were documented, performance that will enhance not only
Coast Guard roles and missions but interoperability with Navy warships. CG Message R 280130Z SEP
99 SUI ASN-D00271000065

91
 Coast Guard cannot easily share tactical information effectively on a real-time basis among
disparate levels of Coast Guard resources and with other agencies and private organiza-
tions. Finally, the limited capability to collect data effectively and to evaluate the effective-
ness of operations can either result in too many assets being allocated or too few, as well as
decisions to call off operations prematurely.

O perational Constraints Sum mary

“...the USCG’s ships and aircraft Thus, because of the impending block obsolescence of much of its Deepwater
often can neither hear nor see the force structure, the Coast Guard’s ability to continue to meet current, much less future,
ships, boats and aircraft they are maritime security requirements is becoming increasingly problematic. For this reason, the
looking for – and even when they Integrated Deepwater Systems Capability Replacement Project has assumed a central role
do succeed in establishing initial in planning and programming for the Coast Guard of the 21st century. And, although
contact they have trouble commu- experiments in 1999 that focused on armed helicopters and very high-speed Deployable
nicating this important informa- Pursuit Boats link to motherships indicated much potential, particularly in drug
tion to those who have a need to
interdiction operations, much more needs to be done to increase and enhance Coast
know. The cutters now in the
Guard capabilities across all maritime safety and security missions.[140]
Coast Guard inventory have no
air-search radars, no modern syn-
thetic-aperture radars, no sonar
systems, no infrared sensors, and
no night-vision equipment. They
also lack the equipment needed to
allow the analysis and sharing of
tactical information between
Coast Guard units. With the best
equipment the Coast Guard now
has, a cutter may be able to iden-
tify a 60-foot vessel at 2,000 yards
– but that means that the 25-foot
“cigarette boats” favored by drug
runners have little to fear. ”
James B. Thatch
Sea Power, April 1998

[140] Commander Mike Emerson, “Coast Guard Helos: A Call to Arms,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, October 1999, pp. 30-33; Jack Dorsey, “New High-Powered Boats Help Coast Guard Level
Playing Field,” The Virginia Pilot, 10 November 1999.

92
V. E N D U R I N G A N D E M E R G I N G
FACTORS SHAPING USCG
MARITIME SECURITY
SYSTEMS
The Coast Guard’s Integrated Deepwater System comprises the in-service/legacy and
future/new-acquisition surface, air, shoreside infrastructure, and C4ISR assets and logistics
support systems required to meet all current and future maritime security missions and
tasks. The IDS assets must be able to support peacetime routine, civilian emergency, crisis-
response, and wartime operations, in an affordable, efficient, and effective manner. In so
doing, the Coast Guard will continue to provide the nation the inherent attributes of
maritime power:[141]
• strategic and tactical mobility
• versatility and flexibility in response
• adaptability in roles, missions, and functions
• sustained reach and presence, and freedom of movement on the high seas
These Deepwater assets, moreover, must envision operations with a broad spectrum
of “partners”: U.S. civilian and military agencies and forces; Non-Governmental Organi-
zations (NGO) and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVO), especially in humanitarian
responses; other countries’ civilian and military agencies; and international governmental
organizations (e.g., United Nations and International Maritime Organization). At their
most fundamental level, these humanitarian, civilian law enforcement, and defense missions
and tasks require the capabilities to provide appropriate levels of presence and surveillance,
and to detect, classify, identify, intercept, and engage targets of interest.[142]

[141] These attributes are shared by all naval forces in varying degrees, and are the basis for both
the U.S. Coast Guard’s and Navy’s strategic visions and operational concepts for the 21st century. For
other views, see Directorate of Naval Staff Studies, British Maritime Doctrine (London: HMSO, BR1806,
1995), pp. 57-63; Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea Power (London: Brassey’s Defence Publishers, 1987), pp.
169-171; C. E. Callwell and Colin S. Gray, Military Operations and Maritime Preponderance: Their
Relations and Interdependence (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1996); and Andrew Droman,
et alia, eds. The Changing Face of Maritime Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1999).
[142] Although specifically focused on anti-piracy requirements, the listing of operational require-
ments by Richard Hill, “Piracy and Related Matters,” op.cit., at pp. 39-40, is instructive for the Coast
Guard’s future maritime security systems, as any of the various challenges and threats confronting
America in the next century – e.g., drug traffickers, weapons smugglers, terrorists – can be substituted for
“pirate” in Hill’s analysis:
“First, they need intelligence. This includes information as to pirates’ bases; their craft – speed,
profile, manoerverability, sensors; their manpower – numbers in crew, discipline, weapon proficiency;
their weaponry – small arms or worse; their methods – day or night attacks, preliminary manoeuvres,
ways of boarding, degree of brutality; and their objectives – just money, valuables, cargo or whole ship
and cargo.
“Second, they need operational information. Their own sensors must be capable, tracking facilities
must be adequate, the position of friendly forces known and maintained. Aircraft whether shore or ship
based are likely to be essential to give broad cover.
“Third, they need communications. The ability to speak to one another, to detached craft, to co-
operating aircraft and to shore headquarters, in real time, is essential.
“Fourth, they need organization. The co-ordination of anti-piracy operations is likely to be a mat-
ter for high command, able to speak to a variety of non-naval authorities, in a shore headquarters or,
more rarely in distant waters, in a force flagship. Adequate, well-informed staff work is needed. This
will include the production of clear directives to, and rules of engagement for, forces at sea and in the air.
“Fifth, the need training. Small elite groups for anti-piracy initiatives at the ‘sharp end’ or in reac-
tion to piratical attacks, need to be backed by well-trained operators in parent craft, particularly those
manning sensors, combat centres, weapons and communications equipment.
“Sixth, they need endurance. Patient watching is likely to be a large part of anti-piracy work and it
is no good having short-legged forces that must return to harbour just as things are hotting up.
93
 Integrated Deepwater System
Acquisition Pro g r a m
As the largest and most innovative acquisition
effort ever undertaken by the Coast Guard, the
Deepwater Project has been tasked with delivering the
tools the men and women of the 21st-century Coast
Integrated Deepwater System Guard need to stand an effective
Missions and Tasks and efficient watch on the frontline of America’s mar-
itime safety and security.[143] With the Deepwater
• Search and Rescue Project however, the Service has
• International Ice Patrol broken the traditional (non-DoD) federal acquisition
paradigm and is implementing an innovative Mission-
• Humanitarian response Based Performance Acquisition approach. Rather than
• General law enforcement
focusing on specific hardware, e.g., a specific a class of
cutter or aircraft, the Coast Guard has developed a
• Protection of living marine performance specification that describes the funda-
resources mental capabilities the Service needs to perform all of
its maritime security missions in the deepwater opera-
• Maritime pollution enforcement
tional environment.
and response
The overwhelming benefit of the Mission-Based Performance Acquisition approach
• Foreign vessel inspection is that industry is empowered with tremendous flexibility to leverage proven as well as
• Lightering zone enforcement leading-edge technologies and new processes to maximize the Coast Guard’s deepwater
operational effectiveness at the minimum total ownership cost. The Project’s scope
• Alien migrant, drug, and includes the entire range of Coast Guard deepwater assets – cutters, aircraft, sensors,
maritime interdiction operations communications, and logistics. The Coast Guard seeks to replace and or modernize these
• Forward-deployed support to
assets in order to gain the capabilities to effectively and efficiently perform its deepwater
missions. The Project’s encompassing scope affords industry vast trade-off spaces to
CinCs in peacetime engagement
develop the optimum type and mix of assets to comprise their proposed Integrated
and crisis-response
Deepwater System.
• Environmental defense
operations Deepwater Acquisition Strategy
• U.S. homeland security The Deepwater acquisition strategy is patterned after the successful DoD model of
• Port security and force
contracting with competing industry teams for an eventual down-selection to a substantial
contract award to a single team. The benefits of this approach include: industry is moti-
protection
vated to cost-share system development, competition encourages innovation and fair
• Joint/combined combat pricing, and collaborative teaming between government and industry reduces overall
operations in smaller-scale project risk. The end result is a contract award that ultimately yields the best value for the
contingencies and major government.
theater war As shown in Figure 11, throughout 1999 the Project was Phase 1 Conceptual
Design, which began in August 1998 with the award of contracts to three industry
teams each led by a single prime contractor. (Appendix G lists all Phase 1 industry team

Operational replenishment is a capability that must be provided and practised.

“Finally, they need Rules of Engagement. These must be based on the two great principles govern-
ing all activities in the realm of self-defence (which after all, by extension to third parties, is the purpose
of all anti-piracy operations). They are necessity and proportionality.”
[143] This overview of the Deepwater Acquisition Program was derived from “The Deepwater
Project – A Sea of Change for the U.S. Coast Guard,” a paper prepared by LCDR Michael Anderson,
Ms. Dianne Burton, LCDR Steve Palmquist, and LCDR Mike Watson, presented at the 1999 ASNE
Day conference and published in the May 1999 issue of Naval Engineers Journal (pp. 125-131), as well as
numerous internal USCG (G-OC and G-ADW) materials. For additional public information, see the
Deepwater Acquisition Program’s web page: www.uscg.mil/deepwater/. Another source for general IDS
information is Ronald O’Rourke, “Coast Guard Integrated Deepwater System: Background and Issues
for Congress,” Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 98-830F, 4 November 1998.

94
members.) During this phase of the project, participating industry teams were asked to
conceive and engineer their proposed integrated Deepwater system concepts to approxi-
mately 50 percent design complete. After Conceptual Design, the Coast Guard can
continue any or all of the participating teams into Functional Design. During Functional
Design, the selected teams essentially continue to evolve and refine their Integrated
Deepwater System concepts to approximately 80 percent design complete.

Figure 11. Deepwater Strategy and Plan

“We need to make a long-term
investment commitment to the
deepwater needs of the Coast
Guard. And, beyond the deep-
water needs, we need to ensure
that our people have the best
equipment possible – from the
latest computers to global-posi-
tioning technology. If we expect
them to do the job with all they
have to offer, then we have to
make sure that we are doing all
we can to ensure they the equip-
ment then need to do the job. ”
The Honorable Rodney E. Slater
Secretary of Transportation
Sea Power, August 1999

Also, in early 2000, the President’s Interagency Task Force on the Roles and Missions
of the Coast Guard was poised to report its findings. This group examined both current
and possible future slates of overall Coast Guard mandates and responsibilities. The
findings from this study will be incorporated into the Project as well as into industry’s
Integrated Deepwater System designs.
The commencement of Phase 2 marks another competitive decision point. The Coast
Guard may continue up to three teams to develop their Phase 2 proposals for actual
construction of their Integrated Deepwater System concept. The final award decision to
one team for the construction and implementation of the Coast Guard’s Integrated
Deepwater System is scheduled for January 2002.
The Coast Guard is thus at a critical stage of the Deepwater Project in early 2000.
The vast majority of the costs and capability of any proposed Integrated Deepwater System
are locked-in during early Conceptual and Functional Design efforts. During this stage
fundamental technical and cost risks are being identified and mitigated. Tradeoff studies are
underway, and early operational assessments and technical demonstrations are being con-
ducted to validate operational suitability and mitigate technical risk in system/subsystems.
Bottoms-up cost estimates will be developed to support reliable acquisition and life cycle
cost estimates. Essentially, the analysis and decisions made in Conceptual and Functional
Design drive the fundamental cost and capabilities of the Integrated Deepwater System the
Coast Guard will operate for the next 40 years, if not longer if past practice is any indica-
tion of future trends. It is critically important that a solid analytical foundation is in place
to make the correct force structure, force elements, and force mix decisions, and that, to the
maximum extent feasible, the Coast Guard take advantage of similar concept design and
engineering studies in the U.S. Navy.

95
 Deepwater Force Structure Analysis
Acquisition of cutters and aircraft typically takes a decade if not longer from the
time the project is underway to the delivery of the first unit to the operating forces. Even
with the full support of the Administration and Congress, for example, a new-design
Deepwater cutter could not begin to be delivered until late in the first decade of the 21st
century. Many of the Service’s “legacy” cutters will be approaching if not exceeding 50
years of service by the time they can be replaced. Few of the world’s navies or coastguards
operate ships this old or technologically obsolete; in fact, at the end of 1999 the Coast
Guard ranked 39th in age among 41 deepwater navies and coastguards. Yet, the American
public will continue to place its trust in these increasingly problematic assets to go out
when no one else can – or wants to – go.
A critical first step in this process therefore, is the determination of the optimum
Deepwater force structure necessary to address the nation’s maritime security roles, mis-
sions, and functions of today and the future that are to be satisfied by the Coast Guard’s
Deepwater forces. An effective force planning process must be based on a solid analytical
framework of assumptions and variables in order to eliminate individual preferences for
concepts or systems from impacting the analyses.[144] This analytical process must begin
with the understanding of fundamental strategic, policy, and operational requirements
placed on the expected force (which may include both legacy and new systems capabili-
ties). As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Henry H. Shelton, USA, wrote
in the fall 1998 with regard to translating Joint Vision 2020 concepts into capabilities,
“Determining the warfighting capabilities that the joint force will need in the next century
begins with defining the threats that our nation may face....”[145] These issues and
other strategic- and operational-level topics were addressed by the Coast Guard and the
President’s Interagency Task Force on the Roles and Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard,
and became the basis for additional studies and analyses.
As an integral element of the Deepwater Acquisition Project, the Coast Guard had
already begun to investigate various future force structure mixes and alternatives and their
effectiveness in meeting stated requirements. The use of scenarios and sensitivity assess-
ments provided the basis for Deepwater trade-off studies and a comprehensive, objective
evaluation of alternative systems, platforms, and force structure. These were, moreover,
being structured at the operational level of analysis in which future systems, platforms, and
integrated forces are arrayed against projected targets and threats; within operational situa-
tions in varying geographical, geophysical, and meteorological settings; and in response to
multiple and simultaneous demands for services within entire areas of operations.
Coast Guard 2020 clearly acknowledges the challenges of the uncharted future.
These challenges are significant variables in the force planning process that must be
accommodated by force planners. One viewpoint suggests:
In an uncertain and unpredictable world, as we have at the moment, prudence leans
towards maintaining a force structure built with a maximum flexibility so that a wide
range of tasks can be undertaken. Ideally, future force structures should be construct-

[144] J. East, A. Fritz, M. Grund, “Suggested Coast Guard Force-Planning Framework,” Center
for Naval Analyses, CRM 99-75/September 1999, prepared for the Director, Operational Capabilities
Directorate (G-OC).
[145] Henry H. Shelton, “Translating Concepts into Capabilities,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, September 1998, p. 29.
[146] Crickard, op.cit.
[147] See generally, John F. Troxell, Force Planning in an Era of Uncertainty (Carlisle, PA: Strategic
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 15 September 1997); Paul K. Davis, ed. New Challenges for
Defense Planning (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994); Paul K. Davis, David Gompert, and Richard
Kugler, Adaptiveness in National Defense: The Basis of a New Framework (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996);
Robert P. Haffa, Jr., “Planning U.S. Forces to Fight Two Wars: Right Number, Wrong Forces,” Strategic

96
 ed on the basis of a balanced mix of military capabilities that provides the necessary
flexibility to undertake a wide range of national and international tasks.[146]
Two basic approaches and methodologies were available for the IDS planners and
their industry teams.[147] The first is threat-based analysis, which is conceptually very
strong when the threats to U.S. maritime security interests can be identified. The analytical
task is to postulate reasonable scenarios, then determine the amount and mix of force to
prevail. Both static and dynamic modeling can be employed to derive a quantifiable ration-
ale for a specific policy/program alternative. The second basic methodology is capabilities-
based planning, which is a valuable tool when threats to U.S. interests are somewhat vague
or multifaceted and do not lend themselves to single-point scenario-based analysis. In this
approach, the analyst would take advantage of professional judgment to determine the
appropriate mix and level of Coast Guard Deepwater assets. It also focuses on end-state
objectives rather than scenarios, and forces are sized/force mixed determined either by a
resource constraint assumption (budget-limited) or by focusing on generic missions that are
required to protect U.S. maritime security interests. Another alternative (see Figure 12)
would be to combine both approaches, and to add performance plans and scenario alterna-
tives, as well as deployment analyses, to help “bound” future challenges and to quantitative-
ly rank potential force structures. “In fact,” Dr. William Kaufmann of the Brookings
Institution concluded in his study of conventional force planning,
...no one yet has devised a serious planning substitute for (a) the development and
analysis of plausible but hypothetical campaigns in specific theaters, (b) the determina-
tion of the forces needed to bring about the desired military outcomes in those specif-
ic theaters, and (c) difficult judgments about the number of contingencies for which
U.S. conventional forces should be prepared.[148]

Review, Winter 1999, pp. 15-22; and Richmond M. Lloyd, et alia, eds. Fundamentals of Force Planning,
Volume 1: Concepts (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1990), and idem., Strategy and Force
Planning (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1996). In the last, the article by Henry C. Bartlett
and G. Paul Holman, Jr., “The Spectrum of Conflict: What Can It Do for Force Planners?”, pp. 494-
504, is particularly instructive for Coast Guard planners addressing current and future force structure
demands.
[148] Kaufmann, Planning Conventional Forces, 1950-1980 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1982), p. 24, quoted in Dr. Harland K. Ullman, In Irons: U.S. Military Might in the New
Century (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995), at p. 111. Ullman continues by posing
three sets of questions that are important for consideration as the IDS Project moves forward:
• What forces are needed strategically and operationally; how does that force structure incorporate
the many independent and dependent variables of choice; and what are the assumptions and
criteria underwriting each choice?
• What level of capability and what types of force structure are politically and economically
sustainable and justifiable in this era of strategic uncertainty?
• How do we safely, sensibly, and affordably get from today’s force structure and capability to that
[sic] of tomorrow and properly balance the threat strategy, force structure, budget, and infrastruc-
ture relationships?
97
 Figure 12. Notional Deepwater Force-Planning Process

“Reinvention Lab”
The Coast Guard’s Deepwater Acquisition Project’s program approach is so
innovative that it has been designated a “Reinvention Laboratory” under the National
Partnership for Reinventing Government.[149] As such, it is empowered to test new ways
of doing the government’s business, and to take the lessons-learned across government
agencies. Deepwater was recognized for planning the entire Deepwater acquisition as a
single coordinated system rather than a series of distinct procurements.
“[W]e’ve dramatically reformed the way we carry out the people’s business,” Rodney
E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation, stated in an 8 June 1999 letter to Vice President Al
Gore. “The Deepwater project will enhance America’s national security by helping the
Coast Guard perform its duties with maximum efficiency and savings to the taxpayer.” It
will do so by employing a unique procurement method in which competing teams design
systems to meet a specified set of performance requirements. Instead of focusing on
specific equipment, the Coast Guard has described the capabilities needed to perform its
missions, thus permitting the three Deepwater contractor teams to determine which types,
numbers, and mix of assets best meet these requirements.[150]
The Coast Guard’s ability to remain Semper Paratus to carry out its daunting
Deepwater missions and tasks at a cost that is affordable in today’s and tomorrow’s fiscal
environment hangs in the balance. Without modernization or replacement of aging
Deepwater capabilities, the Coast Guard will not be “Always Ready” to meet tomorrow’s
challenges to national maritime security. However, based upon a careful assessment of the

[149] “Coast Guard Deepwater Acquisition Project Designated as Government Reinvention

Laboratory,” op cit.
[150] “System Performance Specifications (SPS) for the Integrated Deepwater System,” op.cit.

98
requirements to carry out current Deepwater missions, and recognizing that there may
well be other, yet-to-be-conceived mission sets that will be thrust upon the Coast Guard
during the next half-century and more of Deepwater operations, there are several core and
enduring – as well as emerging – factors that will help focus and shape the Coast Guard’s
Deepwater vision and programs.

A “National Fleet”
In his remarks at a November 1997 symposium, “The Role of Naval Forces in 21st “The shortfall in our surface
Century Operations,”[151] then-Coast Guard Chief of Staff Vice Admiral James M. Loy capabilities to meet the chal-
called for a “national” response by the three Sea Services – the Coast Guard, the Navy, and lenges and threats that lie ahead
the Marine Corps – to provide the full spectrum of naval and maritime capabilities needed demand a national response. The
to meet the challenges of the new millennium. “We need to think about coordinating and Navy-Coast Guard collective task
integrating our force planning activities,” Admiral Loy remarked, “so that we can field non- is to prepare now the maritime
redundant capabilities that are affordable, joint, interoperable, and multimission.” forces for tomorrow’s maritime
In early 2000, the Coast Guard and Navy are on the threshold of major recapitaliza- challenges. To do that, we must,
tions of their forces to meet tomorrow’s challenges. The Navy is committed to sustaining a frankly, shed service parochialism
near-term force structure of no fewer than 305 sophisticated, multimission warships – and a “not-invented-here” philos-
nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines, guided missile cruisers and destroyers, and ophy. We must look forward,
amphibious ships – that must be capable of fighting and winning in two nearly simultane- together, to providing the best
ous Major Theater Wars, accord- maritime capabilities in the
ing to the direction of the 1997
world, at a price Americans are
Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR). Of these warships, by
willing to pay. ”
2003 the Navy’s surface force Vice Admiral James M. Loy, USCG
Chief of Staff, November 1997
will comprise 116 multimission
surface combatants (112 in the
active forces and four Reserve
Force warships).
This has proved to be insufficient, and today’s Navy is increasingly under stress. As
Admiral Johnson explained at the June 1999 Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War
College, “Our forward-deployed carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups are
combat-ready and performing magnificently, as has been vividly demonstrated in recent
events in the Balkans and the Arabian Gulf. But,” he cautioned,
...today’s force is a rotational force, and I continue to be deeply concerned about the
readiness of units that are not forward deployed. To maintain the tip of the spear
readiness, we are exacting a toll from our non-deployed ships and squadrons. Since
the last Quadrennial Defense Review, I’ve said – and believed – that a force of 305
ships – fully manned, properly trained, and adequately resourced – would be sufficient
for today’s requirements within acceptable levels of risk. But...the mounting evidence
leads me to believe that 305 ships is [sic.] not likely to be enough in the future.[152]
In addition to quantity, which has a quality of its own, among other multiwarfare
needs, the Navy’s surface combatants must be able to prevail in major theater war and must

[151] This symposium was jointly sponsored by the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, and the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. Admiral Loy’s presentation
was later published as “Shaping America’s Joint Forces: The Coast Guard in the 21st Centur y” in the
Spring 1998 edition of Joint Force Quarterly, at pp. 9-16.
[152] Admiral Jay Johnson, “Shaping the Navy for a Changing World,” keynote address at the
Current Strategy Forum, U.S. Naval War College, 15 June 1999 (http://www.chinfo.navy.mil.). See also,
Admiral Jay L. Johnson, U.S. Navy, “Numbers Do Matter,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November
1999, p. 32.

99
 be armed with theater ballistic missile defense and massed, precision land-attack weapons
for direct support of land campaigns – capabilities that are clearly “high-end” and “high-
tech.” Additionally, these surface warships must have the capabilities to conduct the full
array of responses required for smaller-scale contingency operations, as well as routine
peacetime forward deployments, many of which will be conducted in concert with Coast
Guard assets. The reality of the situation is apparent to naval and maritime strategist,
Colin S. Gray, who recognized that
In this decade the U.S. Navy will be reduced and reconfigured to be most effective
in power projection against the shore, not for the conduct of blue-water campaigns
to secure control of the oceans. The First Law of Prudence in Defense Planning,
however, requires the making of provisions against the worst effects of unpleasant
surprises. A U.S. Navy politically correct for the 1990s would be reshaped for
modes regional conflicts and for constabulary duties in support of foreign policy.
Unfortunately, such a navy would be both barely adequate to cope with strictly
regional difficulties...and dramatically unfit to deliver the strategic effectiveness the
United States would need in the case of a new balance-of-power struggle in Eurasia.
It would be much better for the all but insular continental United States to have a
navy somewhat overprepared for regional commitments, rather than critically
underprepared for global scale of conflict.[153]
All current and future new-construction Navy surface warships – the Arleigh Burke
(DDG-51) Aegis guided missile destroyers and the new-design DD-21 Land-Attack/
Maritime Dominance destroyers – are clearly “high-tech, high-end” surface warships that
are not appropriate for the Coast Guard’s Deepwater missions. But there are growing
concerns that the relatively small numbers of ships that would at any time be available and
ready to deploy would be insufficient to satis-
fy the Nation’s commitments. In January
2000, the Coast Guard has 41 major cutters
that safeguard America’s maritime security and
to support the requirements of the National
Security and National Military strategies.
With a Cold War 600-ship Navy comprising
nearly 250 surface warships, 40 or so Coast
Guard cutters were sometimes not given an
appropriate consideration for their contribu-
tions to U.S. security needs. However, with
the 305-ship Navy including only 116 surface
combatants, and in a world plagued with
regional instability, strife, and the reality of
asymmetrical threats, the Coast Guard’s major
cutters along with several hundred coastal
patrol boats take on new significance.

[153] Colin S. Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea
Power (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994), pp. 163-164.

100
 Because of the growing sophistication of naval weapon systems and threats to
maritime forces, the Coast Guard will not perform “high-end” warfighting missions. This
does not mean the Coast Guard will not have a warfighting role, especially in Operations
Other Than War (OOTW) – crisis-response, humanitarian operations, nation-building,
peace-keeping and -enforcement, and counter-terrorism. In fact, the Chief of Naval
Operations, in his 21 October 1997 letter to the Coast Guard Commandant, underscored
that the Navy’s “policy has been and will continue to be to ensure the Coast Guard is
prepared to carry out assigned naval warfare tasks.” Likewise, in his September 1999 report
to the Interagency Task Force on the Roles and Missions of the Coast Guard, Secretary of “The U.S. Navy forces in
the Navy Richard Danzig was emphatic on the Coast Guard’s contribution to military Vietnam have an urgent require-
operations and the need for Navy-Coast Guard interoperability: ment for additional naval gunfire
America’s national security increasingly depends upon the successful completion support. To provide such support
of a wide variety of both maritime and naval missions. These range from the Coast it will be necessary to release
Guard’s maritime safety inspections and the protection of America’s waterways to U.S. Navy destroyers from other
Navy’s forward presence missions which help shape the security environment with a fleet missions. In order that the
credible combat capability while being ready to respond to crises, from sanctions overall defense posture of the
enforcement to war.
United States is not degraded, it
The Coast Guard focuses on one end of the maritime spectrum, conducting is planned to assign destroyer
operations that include law enforcement, search and rescue, environmental protection, escorts now on Market Time
and other peacetime missions. But it must maintain its readiness to operate with the operations to replace these
Navy and fulfill the Service’s responsibilities in our Nation’s defense at the other end destroyers. Liaison between rep-
of the spectrum by helping to supplement the Navy wherever it can, including in a
resentatives of the U.S. Navy and
major war.
U.S. Coast Guard has established
In this regard, Joint Coast Guard-Navy operations, perhaps under the nascent concept that five high-endurance cutters
for a “National Fleet,” are being taken into account by the Deepwater Program. This idea can be made available to relieve
calls for the two services to address all possible operational requirements, from peacetime
active and acceptable presence, to combat operations in major theater war. These opera-
the DERs [radar picket escorts]. ”
Paul H. Nitze, Secretary of
tional needs will shape current and future designs and operational concepts for multimis-
the Navy
sion surface warships and cutters that can mutually support the Nation’s maritime and Memorandum to the Secretary
naval roles, missions, and functions that will be required of both the Coast Guard and the of the Treasury
Navy. As Coast Guard Commandant Admiral Loy described in a 31 July 1998 letter to 10 March 1967

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Johnson, “I envision a ‘National Fleet’ with the
following attributes:
First, it is a fleet of surface combatants and major cutters that would be affordable,
interoperable, complementary, and balanced with minimum over-laps in their capa-
bilities. Second, it would comprise capable multimission Navy surface combatants
optimized for the full spectrum of naval operations, including Smaller Scale
Contingencies (SSC) and Major Theater War (MTW). Third, the Coast Guard’s
“frigate-sized” maritime security cutter – which is one element of my ongoing
Deepwater Project – would be optimized for peacetime and crisis-response Coast
Guard missions. This cutter would also be able to work side-by-side with its Navy
counterparts in many SSC and several MTW tasks, filling the requirement for a small,
general-purpose, low cost, shallow-draft warship. Fourth, this cutter would become an
attractive alternative for foreign military sales.

101
 The Joint Navy/Coast Guard USCG Maritime Security Cutter
Policy Statement on the National
Fleet signed out by the Chief of
Naval Operations and the Coast
Guard Commandant on 21
September 1998 commits the
Navy and Coast Guard “to shared
purpose and common effort
focused on tailored operational
integration of our multimission
platforms, meeting the entire
spectrum of America’s twenty-first
century maritime needs.”[154]
This partnership calls for the
Coast Guard and the Navy to
...work together to build a National Fleet of multimission surface combatants and
cutters to maximize our effectiveness across all naval and maritime missions. The
Navy and Coast Guard will coordinate surface ship planning, information systems
integration, research and development, as well as expanding joint concepts of opera-
tions, logistics, training, exercises, and deployments. The Coast Guard and the Navy
will work together to acquire and maintain future ships that mutually support and
complement each service’s roles and missions.
The likely benefits to such a coordinated and integrated approach are already
apparent. They include meeting operational support and upgrade requirements more
efficiently and economically; reduction of acquisition costs; standardized training and
cross-training in service-specific operational specialties; improved operational planning,
integrated doctrinal and tactical development; much-enhanced force and unit inter-
operability; and, where it makes sense to do so, commonality of technologies, systems,
and platforms. “To ensure that we are prepared to meet the full range of America’s
maritime challenges,” Secretary Danzig explained to the Interagency Task Force in
September 1999, “we are building surface combatants and major cutters that are
affordable, interoperable, and with complementary capabilities. These ships,” Danzig
continued, “will be designed around common naval equipment and systems where it is
needed and makes sense.” Such a joint-Service approach, moreover, could prove just as
important for future Deepwater aviation elements as for the maritime security cutter.

A Common Aviation Vi s i o n
The Coast Guard is also addressing current and future fixed-wing and rotary-wing
aviation requirements, again within the overall construct of the Service’s roles, missions,
functions, and task in support of America’s maritime security. As has been proposed with
regard to the Joint Navy/Coast Guard “National Fleet” initiative, the time is right to con-
sider a Joint Navy/Coast Guard “Common Aviation Vision” that focuses on Coast

[154] NATIONAL FLEET, op.cit. See Appendix C for the full text of the policy statement. See
also “Coast Guard Eyes Large Part-Time Role in Forward Deployments,” Inside the Navy, 29 November
1999, p. 2, where Admiral Loy noted that “Our intention is to create synergy among the Coast Guard
and the Navy’s multimission platforms, improving capability, interoperability, and affordability so that
our nation is well-ser ved acress the full breadth of this widened national security spectrum.” During the
summer and fall 1999, as this report was readied for publication, Coast Guard and Navy collaboration
continued, including sharing of information regarding the so-called “Streetfighter” surface warship con-
cept envisioned by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski at the U.S. Naval War College and a “Littoral
Warfare Craft” study sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. On Streetfighter and other “Navy-
after-next” ship concepts, see Vice Admiral A. K. Cebr owski, U.S. Navy, and Captain Wayne P. Hughes,
U.S. Navy (Retired), “Rebalancing the Fleet,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1999, pp. 31-
34; and Lieutenant Commander Dav e Weeks, U.S. Naval Reserve, “A Combatant for the Littorals,”
idem., pp. 26-30.
102
Guard/Navy coordinated planning, research and development, acquisition, and life-cycle
support – or, to paraphrase the “National Fleet” statement, the Sea Services should “work
together to acquire and maintain future aircraft and aviation support systems that
mutually support and complement each service’s roles and missions.”
Such an approach arguably would help ensure a force of aircraft and helicopters for
naval/maritime operations that is designed specifically to work together. It is likely that this
will also generate reductions in R&D and acquisition costs, as well as support costs through
coordinated logistics, training, and operational planning. Perhaps the worst example of
non-interoperability (not to mention non-commonality, which is different!) is the Coast
Guard HH-65 helicopter with a French airframe and an American engine, a combination
that makes it virtually insupportable anywhere in the world but a Coast Guard Air Station.
That said, these aircraft continue to deploy to the Arabian Gulf on board cutters, and –
until replaced – would deploy in significant numbers for crisis-response and wartime
operations.
During the past three years, the Navy and Marine Corps aviation communities have
undertaken a comprehensive assessment of current and future aviation requirements, and
in 1997 produced a strategic vision and roadmap for R&D, new-aircraft acquisition, and
modernization of existing land- and sea-based aviation assets[155] Specific Naval Aviation
initiatives, which seem at first blush to have broad applicability to the Coast Guard’s
Deepwater aviation needs, include:
• Manned and unmanned tactical platforms and systems that support both
operational- and tactical-level intelligence-gathering and real-time tactical
reconnaissance needs[156]
• A Common Support Aircraft that looks to a common airframe (and mission-specific
sensors and avionics) for a post-2010 initial operational capability
• The Helicopter Master Plan that addresses mission enhancements and moderniza-
tion of the H-60 force, which could also support the future needs of the Coast
Guard’s HH-60J fleet, as well as the Marine Corp’s MV-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft
that might be adapted for a variety of land- and high endurance cutter-based
operations
• Long-range/endurance
land-based patrol and
multimission aircraft
Cooperation and coordina-
tion between the Coast Guard
and Navy fixed- and rotary-wing
aviation programs and operating
forces could be extended to
primary, advanced, and refresher
training. Naval Aviation’s strategic vision makes it abundantly clear that the Navy will
pursue “integration of joint training where it makes sense.”[157] Other possible areas
include joint operational and depot-level maintenance. As the Coast Guard and the Navy
are likely to work much more closely together in support of the Nation’s maritime security,

[155] Director, Air Warfare (N88), Naval Aviation...Forward Air Power...From the Sea (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, September 1997). Specific Naval Aviation program goals
are outlined at pp. 16-21; aircraft and systems roadmaps and initiatives that have Coast Guard applica-
bility are discussed at pp. 35, 40-42, 46-47, 48-51, and 54-58.
[156] See David Mulholland, “New Roles, Reliability Boost UAV Demand,” Defense News, 14-20
September 1998, p. 12; Robert Holzer, “U.S. Navy Considers Vertical Takeoff UAVs,” ibid., p. 24; and
Mulholland, “Global Hawk, DarkStar Offer Strategic Promise,” ibid., p. 16.
[157] Naval Aviation Vision, op.cit., p. 67.

103
 it makes good business and operational sense to explore all areas in which a common
vision for land- and sea-based aviation can be fashioned.
Moreover, while the Service’s multimission employment strategy requires current
assets to serve, to at least some degree, in both coastal and deepwater environments, the
separation between coastal and deepwater applications will become increasingly blurred
with improvements in aircraft shipboard compatibility, DoT/DoD interoperability, stan-
dardization of cross-platform sensor capability and air-to-surface data link connectivity.
In other words, whereas the Coast Guard now uses four core platforms to cover short-,
medium-, and long-range mission requirements, it is both conceivable and economically
desirable to imagine an integrated air and surface capabilities system which maximizes
cross-platform, cross-deck, and cross-agency interoperability. This might ultimately permit
a single aircraft platform routinely and seamlessly to cross short-range rescue and recovery
(SRR), medium-range rescue and recovery/search (MRR/MRS) and even long-range
search (LRS) boundaries. Possible attributes of such a system include the following:

• Integration of cutter and aviation capabilities. All Coast Guard cutters must be
capable of embarking and maintaining all vertical take-off and landing (VTOL)-
capable aviation platforms, whether rotary wing, tilt-rotor, or unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). To optimize embarked aviation capability fully, detached aircrews
and all deployable aviation platforms must be capable of remaining aboard ship for
a minimum of two months without interruption. Because the vast majority of avia-
tion maintenance infrastructure will remain ashore, sustenance of deployed aviation
capability for prolonged periods will depend on: (1) improved individual aviation
component reliability resulting in expansion of periodic maintenance intervals; (2)
simplification of unit-level maintenance requirements; (3) maximum marinization
of critical electronic components; (4) increased and improved shipboard aviation
maintenance capability; and (5) flexible, reliable and economical logistics support
and air delivery systems.
• Standardization and integration of cross-platform sensor capability and air-to-
surface information connectivity. To the extent that sensor capability is standard-
ized across all aviation and surface assets, acquisition, maintenance and training
economies of scale will be realized while optimizing multimission utilization.
Likewise, the real-time air-to-surface exchange of detection, classification and iden-
tification data will optimize tactical employment of both air and surface assets.
• Interagency operability. On an increasing basis, the Coast Guard interfaces with
other agencies and DoD services. Whether as co-lead with Customs for air inter-
diction, as members of joint, interagency task forces, or in the Commandant’s role
as U. S. Interdiction Coordinator, the extent to which the Coast Guard can capital-
ize on a uniformed services acquisition strategy for aviation platforms and sensors
will directly impact reductions in total ownership costs and markedly enhance the
Coast Guard contribution to any interagency operation, to include national
defense operations in time of war when, at the direction of the President, the Coast
Guard functions as part of the Navy.
• Satellite communications. From short-notice requests for Statement of No
Objection (SNO) authorization, to requests for aircraft parts, reliable and timely
ship-to-shore and surface-to-air communications, both secure, non-secure, and
DoD-compatible, are essential to development of any state-of-the-art operational
capability.
• Consolidation/collocation of air stations. As advances in aviation technology
increase performance parameters (speed, range, endurance), consolidation of air
stations (or collocation with Navy/Marine Corps/DoD air stations) should be
considered to reduce shore facility overhead costs and optimize logistics support

104
 functions. While potentially a politically volatile issue, operational redundancy,
particularly with respect to the Coast Guard’s ability to meet its SAR program
standard, must be eliminated.
• Reduction of in-aircraft training. The current high percentages of programmed
flight hours dedicated to operational training suboptimizes tactical asset utilization.
Following the commercial industry model, the majority of training could be moved
from the cockpit to state-of-the-art, full-motion simulators, thus returning increased
aviation capability in the form of additional programmed flight hours to the Total Maritime Awareness
operational commander.
The basic mandate for the Coast
Determination of the number and types of different aircraft required to realize this
Guard in all its Deepwater mis-
integrated systems approach to the enhancement of Coast Guard aviation capability will
depend to a large extent on how many of the core attributes discussed above can be realized sion areas and tasks is the ability
in the anticipated austere fiscal environment. The ultimate success of the system itself, to conduct surveillance of critical
however, hinges primarily on the extent to which air and surface assets, information maritime regions; to detect, clas-
systems, and support infrastructure are successfully integrated in the developmental stages sify, and identify targets of inter-
of the Deepwater acquisition process. est; and to intercept and engage
those targets, quickly and effec-

“Net-Centric” Deepwat er tively. The Coast Guard will pro-

vide appropriate levels of credi-
Operational Concept ble, on-scene presence in critical

One implicit objective of the Integrated maritime areas, gather and dis-

Deepwater System Capabilities Replacement seminate in real-time information

Project is to deploy an integrated “system-of- about all targets, and exploit that
systems” of diverse surface, air, C4ISR, and information in the most effective
shoreside infrastructure assets.[158] Another way and efficient manner possible. If
to describe “system-of-systems” is by the phrase it “moves” in Deepwater operat-
“network-centric” as opposed to “platform-centric” ing areas, the Coast Guard will
operations, in which the focus of operations is on know about it and be able to
linking diverse platforms together in a “network” determine the appropriate course
of information. Clearly the Deepwater system of action, applying the right mix
“whole” is intended to provide much greater capa-
of forces to achieve mission
bility than the sum of its individual “parts.” In
objectives – quickly, effectively,
order to ensure this, all Coast Guard shore station
and safely.
and cutter/aircraft platform capabilities will be
linked together in a seamless “web” of strategic,
operational, and tactical data that supports
mission objectives. In its most succinct definition,
network-centric operations are focused on the
massing of effects rather than the massing of platforms.[159]

[158] See IDS “System Performance Specifications,” op.cit. In his prepared statement before the
House Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation, 19 May 1998, then-Commandant
Admiral Robert E. Kramek specifically used the “system-of-systems” concept to describe the IDS.
[159] This network-centric Deepwater concept will also be a key element in the Coast Guard’s
enhanced and expanded joint operations with the Navy, which itself has embraced the concept of
Network-Centric Warfare. See, for example: Admiral Jay Johnson, USN, “Anytime, Anywhere: A Navy
for the 21st Centur y,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1997, pp. 48-50; Vice Admiral Arthur
K. Cebrowski, USN, and John H. Garstka, “Network-Centric Warfare – Its Origins and Future,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998, pp. 28-35; Vice Admiral James R. Fitzgerald, USN (Ret.),
Raymond J. Christian, and Robert C. Manke, “Network-Centric Antisubmarine Warfare,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, September 1998, pp. 92-95; VPP98, op.cit., pp. 21-23; Vision...Presence...Power,
1999 ed. (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, March 1999), pp. 18-21; and “Interview with
CincPACFLT, Admiral Archie Clemins,” UNDERSEA WARFARE Magazine, Summer 1999, pp. 2-5. At
the request of Vice Admiral Cebrowski, in 1999 the Navy Warfare Development Command crafted a
concept paper, “Naval Operations in the Information Age: A Capstone Concept for Future Naval
Operations.” This outlined how U.S. naval forces will “influence events decisively in the 2015 time-
105
 No matter how successful the Coast Guard might be in garnering the necessary
resources for the IDS Project, it will be impossible to acquire sufficient surface and
airborne platforms to have on-scene presence in all areas of interest, all the time. (This
constraint is shared with the U.S. Navy, for example, which has seen its Cold War posture
of maintaining 100 percent coverage by aircraft carrier battlegroups of three critical AORs
in the Mediterranean, Western Pacific, and Southwest Asia cut back to 80 percent cover-
age in only two AORs.) The reality of current and likely future fiscal environments will
not support such a robust operational posture. Still, surveillance of the United States’
immense maritime zones, which will remain the prerequisite for national maritime securi-
ty, will require a full spectrum of national, shared, and Coast-Guard-specific space-based,
air, surface, undersea, and land-based sensors and platforms.
For the Coast Guard’s IDS systems, the nascent network-centric operations will ulti-
mately derive their power from a robust networking of well-informed but geographically
dispersed forces and command-and-control nodes. The enabling elements are a highly
webbed intelligence-surveillance-information service, demand-pull access to all appropriate
information and intelligence sources, enhanced command-and-control processes, and inte-
grated sensors – all linked to operating forces.[160] A Deepwater information “backplane”
could be developed for the Coast Guard’s network-centric integrated system, which will
support the information flow among sensor, command-and-control elements, and operat-
ing forces’ “grids” – no matter where the actual forces may be deployed. In this way, the
Coast Guard will enjoy a degree of “total maritime awareness” heretofore impossible to
achieve, but clearly a fundamental element of the novel “Pressing Out Our Borders” oper-
ational concept that undergirds the Coast Guard’s contribution to homeland defense.[161]
But, as Commander Darren Knight, of the Canadian Maritime Forces Command, warned
in 1994, C4ISR
...is more than just technology: it is a concept, a shared mental image binding several
interrelated components together. It is only through the understanding of the
concept as a whole and its constituent components that [C4ISR] technology, and all

frame” through the “use of information to monitor developments and forestall undesirable events...to
focus decisive effects on enemy vulnerabilities,” according to a late-1999 draft.
The “network-centric” concept is essentially identical for the Coast Guard and the Navy, and
relates to a concept of operations in which the various ship, aircraft, and unmanned systems are linked
within a “backplane” of information that can be accessed to support directly the specific operation, from
unit/tactical levels through campaign levels of force employment – whether the objective is “ordnance on
target” for the Navy (e.g., long-range Tomahawk Land-Attack Cruise Missile strikes against terrorist
training facilities) or a “boarding party on target” for the Coast Guard (e.g., surveillance, detection, clas-
sification, interdiction, search, and seizure of a drug-runner’s fast craft). Not all is rosy, however, as the
Navy continued to experience some frustrations in implementing IT-21 in the Fleet, particularly in train-
ing and support. See Bob Brewin, “Navy faces IT Training, Support Woes,” Federal Computer Week, 21
June 1999.
[160] The questions of “Plug-and-Play” linkage to, if not actual co-acquisition of, appropriate
Defense Department and Navy C4ISR systems must be addressed. For example, the Navy’s Global
Command and Control System-Maritime (GCCS-M, formerly known as the Joint Maritime Command
Information System, JMCIS) technologies, systems, and protocols will be important for Coast Guard-
Navy interoperability. Likewise, compatibility with the DoD Joint Tactical Information Distribution
System (JTIDS) must be ensured for future IDS assets. Moreover, as close integration with Navy/DoD
logistics systems is being investigated for future Coast Guard procurements, generally, compatibility with
the Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS) should be addressed. NTCSS is an integral ele-
ment of JMCIS/GCCS, with both afloat and ashore nodes, that provides the commander key mainte-
nance, supply, medical, and administrative information through migrated subsystems of the Shipboard
Non-tactical Automated Program (SNAP), the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management
Information System (NALCOMIS), and the Maintenance Resource Management System (MRMS). All
rely extensively on commercial- and go vernment-off-the-shelf (COTS/GOTS) technologies and systems.
[161] In this regard, a U.S. Army-led program for Joint Land-Attack Cruise Missile Defense
Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS) system could provide the needed sur veillance coverage of critical U.S.
maritime zones. JLENS exploits high-altitude (15,000 feet), tethered aerostats (on the size of Boeing
747s) or high towers atop coastal highlands – spaced along all coastlines and on critical inland borders –
equipped with large-aperture, look-down search and control radars and communications systems. The
JLENS aerostats are linked to mobile mooring systems and signal-processing stations, which then link to
other command-and-control-and-engagement systems. In addition to providing a crisis/wartime barrier
against cruise missile attacks, a Joint Army-Navy-Coast Guard JLENS system, linking to Coast Guard
106
 other technology, can be made to work to its full theoretical potential. Navies of the
world can be analyzed in terms of their ability to understand and implement a truly
integrated [C4ISR] concept.[162]
The Coast Guard’s leadership role in addressing current and emerging transnational
maritime security threats will require seamless C4ISR connectivity with not only its own
operating forces, but those of myriad governmental agencies and nations allied with
the United States in confronting those threats.[163] Effective linking of limited C4ISR
systems (necessary if stringent total cost of ownership goals are to be met) will be critical in
ensuring that the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of
information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s capability to do the same. This
premise of information superiority is fundamental if America’s military forces are to achieve
new levels of effectiveness in joint operations.[164]
Future deepwater C4ISR architectures, systems, and transitional technologies should
be adaptable across a wide range of surface and aviation platforms of varying sizes, and well
as land-based sites. They should provide a degree of flexibility that will address changes in
technologies or resources, as well as potential reconfiguration on-board operational plat-
forms in response to changing missions and threats. In this regard, the Navy’s Information
Technology for the 21st Century – IT-21 – Program is focused on accelerating the Navy’s
capabilities to achieve information superiority. IT-21 is a Fleet-driven information technolo-
gy strategy that provides Internet Protocol network connectivity for afloat, ashore, and
mobile naval forces. IT-21 architecture leverages preexisting programs to provide global
access to the Department of Defense’s classified and unclassified Wide Area Networks.[165]
The resulting information superiority will fundamentally change the nature of Coast
Guard operations, reduce work force requirements, and facilitate quality of life improve-
ments for the Coast Guard’s men and women. Indeed, former Commandant Admiral
Robert E. Kramek described a future in which “we will work to take the ‘search’ out of
‘search and rescue’.” (To do so, however, will require a cooperative boating public to use
available emergency-locator systems or to have advanced locating systems built into wireless

and Maritime Defense Zone (MARDEZ) Atlantic and Pacific command centers, would be a key element
in achieving the needed total maritime awareness to meet the nation’s Deepwater needs. Early indica-
tions were that a JLENS system could provide redundant, 24-hour surveillance and engagement support
at least out to 200 nautical miles from the coasts, capable of detecting and tracking very small surface
craft. See Paul Kaminski and Scott Truver, “Cruise Missile Lessons,” Defense News, 7 June 1999, p. 23.
For other perspectives on the need for total maritime awareness, see: Anders Lundqvist, “Civic
Security – A Combined Technological, Institutional, and Cost Perspective,” EEZ Technology, op.cit., pp.
123-126; F.W. Crickard, G.J. Herbert, and B.A. Hobson, “Canada’s Oceans Strategy: Surveillance and
Enforcement,” idem., pp. 153-158; and Orin E. Marvel, “C4ISR – The Big Picture,” idem., pp. 159-
162.
[162] Commander Darren Knight, Headquarters Maritime Forces Atlantic, “The Impact of
Technology on Maritime Security: A User Perspective,” in Griffiths and Haydon, Maritime Forces in
Global Security, op.cit., p. 81. Commander Knight, writing before the widespread use of more expansive
C4ISR term, specifically referred to “C3I” in his paper.
[163] For example, the Coast Guard is the lead counter-drug agency for maritime interdiction and
co-lead agency (with the U.S. Customs Service) for air interdiction of illegal drugs. Joint Pub 3-07.4,
Joint Counterdrug Operations (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1998), p. III-23.
[164] Concept for Future Joint Operations, Expanding Joint Vision 2010 (Washington, D.C.: Joint
Chiefs of Staff, May 1997), p.i. See also, “Sea Power 2030: Operational Concept” Brief, op.cit.
[165] VPP98, op.cit., pp. 21-22, and VPP99, op.cit., pp. 18-21. See also, Captain Renny Ide,
USN, OPNAV (N60B), “Information Technology for the 21st Centur y” Brief for the Director,
Operations Capability Directorate (G-OC), Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, 5 August 1998.
[166] Lucent Technology’s Bell Labs in June 1999 announced that it had developed a system that
can very closely locate a wireless phone indoors or out. The technique uses the Global Positioning
System (GPS) and “bare-bones” GPS technology in the wireless handset and linking to the existing GPS
constellation. The impetus for this was the Federal Communications Commission requirement that a
way be found by October 2001 to locate wireless phones placing calls to “911” emergency services.
Lucent Technology’s researchers have identified an additional feature that would make it possible to track
the location of a wireless phone whether it is in use or not. Grant Buckler, Newsbytes, 30 June 1999,
http://www.newsbytes.com.

107
 phone and other communications systems.[166]) Effectiveness of command and response
will be improved by transferring comprehensive operational, intelligence, and logistics
information to the right place at the right time. The implementation cycles for command-
ers’ directives will be accelerated, gaining operational initiative in virtually any situation,
and increasing the probability of mission success.
Information superiority – much of it achieved through harnessing commercial
technologies and systems – will result in the ability to share strategic, operational, and
tactical pictures, and thereby ensure the ability of all Deepwater system elements to
operate seamlessly together and to link with other civilian and Defense Department
elements and commands – in short, to achieve and sustain total maritime awareness and
security at the lowest total ownership costs. In short, a network-centric concept of
operations will result in an integrated Coast Guard maritime security force, which will
encompass national and Coast Guard-specific surveillance and reconnaissance assets, air-
craft, cutters, commands, and shore support facilities linked together by the information
network that focuses on the needs of the operators at sea.

Total Ownership Aff o rd a b i l i t y

Affordability of Deepwater elements will be critical in delivering the required capabil-
ities to tomorrow’s Coast Guard at cost acceptable to the American taxpayer. A principal
goal of IDS development is to minimize the total cost of ownership, those costs directly
associated with research, development, procurement, operations, logistics support, and
disposal – a “cradle-to-grave” approach. Total ownership costs also include indirect, but
linked costs associated with the overall supporting infrastructure that plans, manages, and
executes a system or program throughout its lifetime, as well as the costs associated with
common items or systems necessary to the introduction of the system.
Application of a methodology that establishes realistic fiscal objectives while meeting
operational requirements will allow routine components to work closely together as a
team. Areas with the greatest potential to minimize the life-cycle costs of individual
elements include reduced/optimal shipboard or aircraft manning levels, commonality
of components across platforms and systems, and the use of a common, open systems
architecture that will support insertion of future technologies. This will be particularly
true with the harnessing of commercial information technologies and systems that will not
only result in the ability to share common tactical pictures, but will enhance the synergy
required to achieve operational effectiveness at the lowest total ownership cost.
Unquestionably, there is a need for manpower affordability in operations, both ashore
and at sea, as personnel costs are the greatest contributors to total ownership costs. The
reduction of personnel through innovative application of technology, similar to the
approach being taken by the U.S. Navy as part of its “Smart Ship” program, combined
with restructuring of traditional organizations, can ensure desired capabilities are sustained
and even enhanced as the numbers or people afloat and ashore are reduced.[167]
In some regards, the future is already here for the Coast Guard. Its new Juniper
(WLB-201)-class ocean-going buoy tenders, the lead unit of which was delivered in
January 1996, have been described as being “wired for roughest seas” and the “cutter of the

[167] Certainly, many of the personnel reductions achieved in the USS Yorktown (CG-48) as the
Navy’s “Smart Ship” laboratory have been the result of procedural changes, but the application of mod-
ern systems, especially automation, has also contributed to the success of the program so far, according to
the Navy’s Surface Warfare Directorate (N86). This perception has driven the demand for ever-greater
technological infusion into future surface warships, with the “optimal manning” requirement for the
DD-21 Land-Attack/Maritime Dominance destroyer set at 95 people. See, Scott C. Truver, “Surface
Revolution: DD21 Redefines the Destroyer,” Jane’s Navy International, August 1998, pp. 12-18. Both
the Navy and the Coast Guard, moreo ver, are learning that in many instances the infusion of leading-
edge technologies throughout the ship, much originating in the commercial world, carry hidden mainte-
nance and upgrade costs not apparent at the outset.
[168] Matthew L. Wald, “Fast Ship Steered with a Joy Stick,” The New York Times, 2 February
108
future.”[168] They are minimally
manned vessels – no more than 40
crew members compared to about 55
on the older ocean-going tenders that
are being phased out – that rely heav-
ily on automation and technology to
reduce crew workloads. A single
watchstander carries out all propul-
sion evolutions, helping to reduce the
number of people needed on the
bridge. The Juniper class has some
4,000 sensors throughout each ship,
which continuously monitor the
operation of all principal equipment and spaces, and alert watchstanders if anything is
amiss. The new tenders also serve other Coast Guard missions – icebreaking, pollution
response, fisheries enforcement, and Juniper’s computerized navigation system helped to
direct some of the search efforts after the crash of TWA Flight 800. These and future
cutters will go far in achieving Secretary of the Transportation Rodney Slater’s vision that
the Coast Guard was “using technology to work smarter.” That said, the need for sufficient
numbers of skilled people in critical personnel-intensive tasks – boarding teams, boat crews,
oil-spill response teams – will not diminish in the decades ahead.
Although manning reductions will be critical to successful development of the IDS,
the Coast Guard will continue to place the recruitment of the highest quality individuals
as its foremost requirement. Clearly, the need for people with the philosophy, skills, and
dedication needed for Coast Guard service will be as important, if not more so, in 2020
and beyond as was the case at the turn of the century.

Multimission and
Operational Flexibility
Operational and mission flexibil-
ity, task agility, adaptability, and room
for growth must be designed and
built into every Deepwater system ele-
ment. Building to narrow design
characteristics – whether a future cut-
ter or aircraft or information-process-
ing/distribution system – to save dol-
lars in the near term will only increase
the risk of early obsolescence as
threats, roles, missions, and functions
change. This would be a false and dangerous economy from which there might be little
opportunity for affordable change later on. If the past is indeed prologue, the Coast Guard’s
Deepwater systems – indeed, all future Coast Guard systems and platforms – will almost
certainly be asked to assume potentially vastly different missions and tasks than what is in
the Service’s portfolio in 2000.

1997, METRO Section p. 34; and Adam Katz-Stone, “Farewell to Old Coast Guard, Hello New Cutter,”
Navy Times, 20 July 1998, p. 22. For a comprehensive engineering discussion, see Bernard F. Bentgen
and Frank McGrath, “WLB and WLM: The Next Generation of United States Buoy Tenders,” Marine
Technology, April 1996, pp. 141-163. The “jury” was still out in mid-1999, however, regarding whether
the Coast Guard has undercrewed and undersupported these new vessels.
[169] Polmar, Ships and Aircraft, 16th ed., op.cit., p. 505; Robert L. Scheina, U.S. Coast Guard
Cutters and Craft, 1946-1990 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1990), pp. 28-29; see also,
Johnson, Guardians of the Sea, op.cit., pp. 154-155, 230-239.
109
 The Coast Guard’s experience with the Secretary-class 327-foot cutter provides an
excellent illustration of the value of flexibility and versatility to carry out missions and
tasks not originally anticipated when the cutters were acquired.[169] Built to a modified
U.S. Navy Erie-class gunboat design, seven 327s were completed in 1936-37, with a
design requirement to carry floatplanes and missions that included hydrographic research,
general law enforcement, and search and rescue. An early example of Navy-Coast Guard
standardization to save costs, the machinery plant and hull below the waterline were
identical in the Secretary and Erie classes.
During World War II, they served as ocean escorts (WPG), protecting Allied convoys
from German U-boats, and also served as amphibious command ships (WAGC).[170]
One of the Secretary-class cutters, Alexander Hamilton (WPG-34), was sunk by the U-132
on 30 January 1942. By mid-1943 and the height of the Battle of the Atlantic, U.S.
warships had sunk only 11 U-boats, six of which were destroyed by Coast Guard cutters,
including three Secretary-class WPGs, Spencer, Ingham, and Campbell. When the Coast
Guard returned to Treasury control at the end of the war, Secretary of the Navy James
Forrestal stated, “During the arduous war years, the Coast Guard has earned the highest
respect and deepest appreciation of the Navy and Marine Corps. Its performance of duty
has been without exception in keeping with the highest traditions of the naval service.”
In the immediate post-WW II period, the six survivors returned to peacetime mis-
sions, expanded to include ocean station patrols for weather and SAR standby. As the U.S.
involvement in the Vietnam War grew, they conducted Naval Gun Fire Support tasks in
support of forces ashore and maritime interdiction operations aimed at stopping Vietcong
clandestine coastal movements. With the end of the war in 1975 and until the decommis-
sioning of the last member of the class, the USCGC Ingham (WHEC/WPG-33) on 27
May 1988, they served in law enforcement, alien migrant and illegal drug interdiction,

Figure 13. The ”Enduring Cutter“ 327 - Foot Secretary Class 1936 to 1989

[170] Guardians of the Sea, op.cit., pp. 230-255.

110
and protecting living marine resources. For more than 50 years, these highly versatile and
flexible cutters supported a broad spectrum of missions and tasks in both peace and war.
(Figure 13 illustrates the multimission flexibility of the Secretary-class WPGs, enduring
characteristics that must be embraced by the Deepwater project.)
Moreover, the Coast Guard usually conducts numerous distinct missions simultane-
ously, the heart of mission agility. A cutter on a fisheries patrol is prepared to divert to a
search and rescue operation, to respond to a pollution incident, or to interdict a suspected
drug smuggler – in many cases across thousands of nautical miles. A single cutter or aircraft
thus can expect to enforce U.S. sovereignty and safeguard national maritime security in
many ways through its active presence on the seas.
Operational flexibility, agility, adaptability, and the ability to carry out numerous mis-
sions simultaneously are enduring characteristics and will be important considerations for
the future Coast Guard. The ability to adapt quickly, easily, effectively, and affordably to
meet emergent requirements seems to invoke a design, systems engineering, and life-cycle
support philosophy. This philosophy, furthermore, looks to embrace modularity and open-
architecture systems designs that facilitate “plug-out/plug-in” of electronics, software,
doctrine, sensors, and weapons for future IDS hardware, firmware, and software. It will,
moreover, ensure that future Coast Guard Deepwater systems and platforms can be
“tailored” for specific operations ensuring mission success.
Although he wrote about navies, James Cable’s comments about an emerging
“principle” seems to offer great irony for the Coast Guard:
If anything approaching a principle emerges from the record of the past it may
be that the natural political environment for navies, their raison d’etre, is the unfore-
seen. A navy exists and chance or an imaginative leader finds an unexpected use for it.
This is at once the boon and the bane of naval force. In an appropriate emergency a
navy is uniquely mobile and adaptable to political improvisation. But nobody devotes
scarce resources to building a navy just because one day it might come in handy.[171]
In light of the Coast Guard’s history of always coming in “handy” for a wide variety of
tasks, it is remarkable how great the challenges have been to ensuring adequate resources for
all its mandates.

“ Ta i l o red” for Multi-Agency Operat ions

The Coast Guard has a history of anticipating and responding to America’s evolving
needs. From its very beginning, the Coast Guard has absorbed new responsibilities –
Revenue Cutter Service . . . Lighthouse Service . . . Lifesaving Service . . . Steamboat
Inspection Service . . . Bureau of Navigation. The ability to adapt to new and sometimes
daunting demands – such as far-offshore fishery enforcement (the Magnuson Act of 1976)
and much-expanded vessel safety inspection and regulation (the Oil Pollution Act of 1990)
– has been the hallmark of the Coast Guard. Perhaps more than any other federal agency,
the Coast Guard has a history of effectively and efficiently consolidating diverse missions
and additional responsibilities.
In most cases, the Coast Guard works with a wide range of organizations to accom-
plish its responsibilities. When other organizations have the resources and competencies,
the Coast Guard does not take action except to ensure that the missions are accomplished
effectively. More typically, the Coast Guard has primary responsibility for accomplishment
of responsibilities and must cooperate and/or coordinate with numerous agencies. Thus, in
all of its operations, the Coast Guard emphasizes cooperation and coordination with other

[171] James Cable, The Political Influence of Naval Force in History (New York, New York.:
St. Martin’s Press, 1998), p. 172.

111
 agencies and services. The Coast Guard stresses practical, local arrangements to get the job
done. In many mission areas, such as search and rescue and waterways management, the
Coast Guard leads the federal effort and coordinates operations of other federal, state, and
local governments as well as private groups and international organizations.
The Coast Guard as supporting partner, shares responsibility with, and provides over-
sight to other agencies in many diverse areas. For example, the National Marine Fisheries
Service regulates fisheries and living marine resources within the exclusive economic zone.
The Coast Guard enforces these regulations at sea in cooperation with the National
Marine Fisheries Service. The Office of Hazardous Material Safety is the lead agency for
establishing regulations concerning transportation of dangerous cargoes. The Coast Guard
enforces these regulations in the area of containerized or packaged cargoes in the marine
mode. It works with other agencies in areas where they have responsibilities for hazardous
material transportation. Its people enforce immigration law, but they act as maritime
enforcement agents only. The Service can carry Immigration and Naturalization Service
agents on its cutters, but it has no authority to initiate or process requests for asylum,
or to make determinations whether migrants have a credible fear of returning to their
homelands.
A recent analysis of the Coast Guard’s enduring characteristics and its value to the
nation concluded that a key aspect is its role as a coordinator and provider of maritime
services.[172] It provides essential services, where and when required, and it bonds,
focuses, and coordinates disparate actors, ensuring that the job gets done. No other agency
has the breadth of responsibility in the maritime arena; existing authority; varied skill sets;
international and domestic web of contacts, partnerships, and working relationships;
predilection for cooperation and coordination; or is as “results-oriented” on a day-to-day
basis.
Although most of the Coast Guard’s responsibilities are domestically focused, it must
operate and cooperate with international organizations and foreign agencies to perform its
duties. To serve America’s worldwide interests and provide U.S. leadership, the Coast
Guard is active in international maritime affairs, providing important links, for example,
to the International Maritime Organization (IMO), INTERTANKO, the North Atlantic
Fisheries Organization, United Nations regional Action Plans, conferences, and in delicate
multi- and bilateral negotiations.
The Coast Guard’s IDS operational concepts, platforms, and systems must, therefore,
anticipate the reality of planning and operations in close coordination with a variety of
local, regional, national, and international partners. For example, in the command-and-
control arena, alone, the Coast Guard will almost certainly have to link with local police
and rescue squads (domestically as in the TWA Flight 800 and internationally as in the
1998 Swissair Flight 111 tragedies); regional and national emergency response agencies;
state and federal law enforcement agencies, Department of Defense command elements and
forces, and foreign coastguards and naval forces. Likewise, in drug interdiction operations,
the Service works hand-in-glove with the U.S. Customs Service, Drug Enforcement Agency,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Navy, and state and local law-enforcement agencies.
Interoperability and compatibility, and the ability to “tailor” Coast Guard assets for the
tasks at hand, will be important factors to consider as the Deepwater Program proceeds.

[172] Roth and Kohout, op.cit., pp. 37-44. In their study of Coast Guard identity and enduring
characteristics, they relied upon the pioneering work of Carl Builder, who in his RAND study, The
Masks of War (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989), focused on frameworks of Armed
Service institutional personalities and identities as means to understand Service approaches to analysis,
strategy, and planning. In this way, the CNA analysts noted (at page 42) “...how different the Coast
Guard is from the other armed services. It is not a ‘small navy.’ The Coast Guard’s ‘altar’ – what the
service cherishes as the ideal – is its humanitarianism and multi-mission capabilities. This is very differ-
ent from the ‘tradition’ of the Navy and its concept of independent command at sea. The Coast Guard
is not preoccupied with ‘toys’ [i.e., platforms, systems, force structure] but rather passionately attached to
skills.... We observed that, unlike any other service, the Coast Guard measured its institutional health by
the accomplishment of its mission.”
112
Expeditionary Mind-Set
If Semper Paratus means anything today and in the next century, it is that the Coast
Guard will be ready and swift to respond to emergencies and crises in waters under U.S.
jurisdiction, on the high seas, and in distant regions of critical importance to the United
States. Deepwater assets will continue to deploy in both routine and emergency scenarios to
overseas areas, alone or in the company of other U.S. Armed Services and the maritime and
military forces of our allies and friends, to meet national and international needs.
This traditional expeditionary role of America’s sea services – included the Coast
Guard’s military/defense operations – is as old as the Nation itself. It has demanded the
perfection of unique operational skills and material requirements required of forces that
respond on short notice and initiate operations along the shores of the worlds oceans. The
challenges to expeditionary forces are at once environmental, technological, and
human.[173]
They must, therefore, be structured, trained, supplied, and maintained to enable them
to deploy with sufficient organic support to meet mission objectives – in Bering Sea SAR,
western Pacific fisheries law enforcement, Caribbean drug interdiction, or Arabian Gulf
sanction-enforcement operations. As with all naval and maritime forces, the Coast Guard’s
Deepwater surface cutters can
remain on station for extended
periods of time, and will be capa-
ble of being integrated into the
Navy’s at-sea underway replen-
ishment system. Likewise, unre-
stricted by the need for transit or
overflight approval from foreign
governments, they can provide
important levels of active, accept-
able forward presence to deter
threats from materializing in the
first place. However, if deterrence is not successful, the Coast Guard’s Deepwater forces
must be able to identify and target threats as appropriate, in civilian, law enforcement,
maritime, and national security/defense missions and tasks.
Readiness and sustainment – training, maintenance, spares, ordnance, equipment,
safety, survivability – must therefore be “designed and built-in” from the outset of planning
for future Deepwater assets, perhaps with the explicit objective of close working relation-
ships with the logistics, support, and training infrastructure of the Navy to support Joint
operations.

Shaped for Joint and Combined

Military Operations
Because the Coast Guard’s core maritime security role, missions, and tasks clearly
include military/defense operations, the IDS will embrace the common direction for all
U.S. Armed Services outlined by Joint Vision 2010 to meet the challenging and uncertain
future.[174] New and emerging technologies will be merged with innovative operational
concepts that will greatly improve the Coast Guard’s ability to conduct “joint” and “com-

[173] Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare 1997 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval
Intelligence, March 1997), pp. 1, 5.
[174] General John M. Shalikashvili, USA, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, July 1996). See also Concept for Future Joint Operations:
Expanding Joint Vision 2010, op.cit.; and Strategic Studies Group, U.S. Naval War College, “Sea Power:
2030 Operational Concept,” briefing dated 23 July 1998.
113
 bined”– multi-U.S. service, multinational, and coalition – operations across the full range
of peacetime, crisis, and wartime missions. Key to this future is information superiority.
This, along with operational and technological innovation and a critical eye on total
ownership costs, will ensure that the four new operational concepts, which are to serve as
“templates” for future forces, including the Coast Guard, will satisfy future requirements in
the most cost-effective manner possible:
• Dominant Maneuver is the multidimensional application of information, engage-
ment, and mobility capabilities to position and employ widely dispersed air, sea,
land, and space assets to accomplish operational tasks – whether civilian search and
rescue in peacetime or Joint combat operations in major theater war.
• Precision Engagement is a “system of systems” that enables Coast Guard and other
maritime assets to locate the objective, provide responsive command and control,
generate the desired engagement, assess the level of success, and retain the flexibility
to reengage the objective when required.
• Full-Dimensional Protection is the multilayered capability to protect U.S. and
coalition forces at all levels while maintaining freedom of action.
• Focused Logistics is the fusion of information, logistics, and transportation
technologies to provide rapid crisis response and to deliver tailored logistics
packages and sustainment
It is important to note that the Joint Vision 2010 “template” and novel operational
concepts are equally important for the peacetime humanitarian, civilian, and law-
enforcement tasks conducted by Coast Guard Deepwater forces as for their crisis-response
and wartime/defense missions. The ability to respond quickly and effectively to an alien
migrant interdiction task or a search-and-rescue mission – “precision engagement” – will
rely upon similar technologies, systems, and operational concepts as the Coast Guard’s
support to enforcing UN sanctions or providing harbor/coastal defense against special
forces attack in some future conflict. Likewise, “full-dimensional protection” might mean
the ability to defend individual Coast Guard units, Joint or coalition forces, or U.S. ports
and coastal cities against special operations forces, as well as to respond effectively against a
terrorist group armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons and intent on shutting
down a critical U.S. port when it is least expected.
In addition to these key attributes that should be embraced by the Coast Guard’s
Deepwater Project to meet humanitarian, civilian law enforcement, and defense require-
ments noted above, there are several other important considerations that must be taken
into account. Three are addressed here: Coast Guard-Navy discussions aimed at
articulating the requirements for a “National Fleet”; possible linkages with the Navy’s
Naval Aviation programs to achieve a common maritime/naval aviation vision; and the
potential attractiveness of the Deepwater Project for international participation and
subsequent foreign sales.

[175] Two reports are important in this regard: Richard D. Kahout and Captain Patrick H. Roth,
USCG (Ret.), Future Coast Guard Cutter Study: The National Defense Requirement (Alexandria, VA:
Center for Naval Analyses, CRM96-90, November 1996); and O. Kim Malmin, Commander Jeffery K.
Karonis, USCG, and Douglas A. Adams, Future Coast Guard Cutter Study: Candidate Cutters and their
Costs (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, CRM96-91, November 1996). Five alternative cutter
variants were analyzed, from very low-end/limited-defense missions cutters to multimission cutters capa-
ble of medium-threat operations: Deployable, Survivable, Sea Control, Littoral Warfare, and
Expeditionary cutters. The only current U.S. Navy surface warship programs are the Arleigh Burke
(DDG-51) Aegis guided missile destr oyers (57 acquired between 1983 and 2003) and the new-design
DD-21. To date, only the U.S. Navy and the Japanese Maritime Self Defense Force have acquired the
9,000-ton DDG-51s, although several other navies have either acquired (Spain) or are contemplating
acquiring (Australia, Norway, Germany, and Italy, among others) the Aegis SPY-1 multi-function radar
and weapon system. These highly capable and sophisticated multimission Navy surface warships, howev-
er, are not what most foreign navies or coastguards require or can afford.

114
A Wo r l d “ S y s t e m - o f - S y s t e m s ”
As a model maritime agency that interacts with foreign navies, coastguards, and
maritime agencies in ways unique to a U.S. military service, the Coast Guard supports
U.S. national security and foreign policies in similarly unique ways. The Coast Guard’s
Deepwater Project, coupled with the Service’s evolving international engagement activities,
provides an innovative opportunity for forging closer relationships with foreign navies and
maritime forces, especially in support of U.S. international programs, cooperative develop-
Coast Guard-Navy
ment, and foreign sales initiatives. Because the Coast Guard already works closely with the
Deepwater International
Department of the Navy International Programs Office (Navy IPO) in a variety of excess
defense articles transfers and international training programs, this relationship could be Collaboration
expanded to the potential benefit of U.S. foreign and security policy and strategy, • A joint Coast Guard-Navy inter-
naval/maritime interoperability, and U.S. defense industries. Indeed, a focused U.S. national Deepwater initiative is
Deepwater Systems International Program could address allied and friendly navies’ and one element in a multifaceted
coastguards’ needs for a similar “system-of-systems” approach to solving their own
effort to meet the core objec-
maritime security needs.
tives of the nation’s interna-
Certainly, a sustained Deepwater cutter program will be of great benefit to U.S. ship- tional and security assistance
yards, which are currently experiencing a significant down-turn in orders for both new- programs, which are to:
construction and repair of Navy ships. But the Deepwater cutter – or cutters if a “family” of
Deepwater surface platform designs is pursued – will be a different breed of ship than the • Support U.S. National Security
U.S. Navy wants.[175] Although the prospective Deepwater cutter program in the near Strategy, National Military
term can help to bridge the gap in Navy warship construction, and help keep U.S. ship- Strategy, and the Unified
yards afloat, a critical element of the Nation’s national security industrial base, there are Commanders-in-Chief’s regional
international implications for the Deepwater project. For example, a future cutter could be strategies and engagement
what some analysts are calling the “World Ship,” a design that more appropriately fills the plans
needs without bankrupting the budgets of other navies and coastguards.[176] A “frigate-
sized” cutter with modular features and • Enhance interoperability and
open-architecture systems is seen by cooperation with allies and
some observers as an attractive design partners
for many world naval forces.[177]
• Promote cost-effective modern-
Thus, possible foreign military sales or
ization of U.S. and friendly
cooperative development considerations
forces to increase coalition
for the future Deepwater system should
be pursued vigilantly.[178] military power

• Ensure the viability and effec-

tiveness of the U.S. and allied
industrial bases to support
shared political, economic,
technological, and security
objectives

[176] Dr. Robbin Laird, Stephen Keller, and Steven Walsh, “The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry and
the coming ‘Global’ Warship,” CSSO Critical Issues Paper (TECHMATICS, Center for Security
Strategies and Operations, March 1998), prepared for Rear Admiral Robert Sutton, then-Director, Navy
International Programs Office. See also the Coast Guard’s internal European naval shipbuilding market
survey “Comparative Practices of European Frigates and Offshore Patrol Vessels,” op.cit.
[177] Comments of Rear Admiral Robert Sutton, USN, then-Director, Navy International
Programs Office, 19 August 1998. Admiral Sutton also noted that U.S. and foreign industry that may
participate in the IDS program can readily identify the features and characteristics of ship, aircraft, and
C4ISR systems and platforms that make best operational sense for allied and friendly naval and coast-
guard forces.
[178] For example, the 18 August 1998 draft of the National Fleet Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy
Statement highlighted the foreign military sales (FMS) potential of the Deepwater cutter, which, “...if
acquired by allied and friendly navies and coastguards, could contribute greatly to meeting the Navy’s
international Program Office objectives of generating enhanced interoperability and cooperation with
allies and partners.” During subsequent development of the final statement, this explicit reference to
FMS was dropped, although U.S. shipyard and other naval/maritime defense industries see the future
maritime cutter as America’s “best bet” for overseas sales of advanced naval surface platforms.
115
 Common needs can be illuminated by looking at other countries’ approaches to their
“deepwater” challenges. As Rear Admiral Ray Riutta, USCG, Assistant Commandant for
Operations, noted at the October 1998 Euronaval Conference, “It will come to no one’s
surprise that the four principal challenges that we in the United States face – large-scale,
cross-border aggression; failed states; transnational dangers; and the flow of potentially
dangerous technologies – are in many respects identical to those confronting Western
Europe today and into the future.”[179]
This perspective was echoed by two European ship designers. “The protection of
“The interdependency of nations their rights on the Exclusive Economic Zone has recently assumed a very high priority in
is already enormous; what is still the policy of most countries,” V. Farinetti and E. Bonnetti, of Ficantieri, Genoa, Italy, have
lacking is global interoperability, explained.[180] Addressing the design requirements for three notional cutter/offshore
firstly of concepts (what do we patrol vessel (OPV) types – patrol vessels for sheltered waters, OPVs of mixed naval/com-
want the global society to look mercial design, and naval standard OPVs – they catalog numerous notional missions that
like), of fair distribution of scarce are nearly identical to the Coast Guard’s Deepwater needs: interdiction of smugglers and
resources, of fighting common aliens, fisheries and offshore oilfield protection, SAR, environmental protection, and gen-
threats (pollution, natural catas-
eral law enforcement. “However the more potentially simultaneous tasks that the vessel is
trophes, crime, non-state actors,
supposed to perform,” they stated, “the bigger should be the dimensions of the ship in
order to avoid, or at least minimize interference or conflict of priorities, thus enhancing
the occasional autocrat who defies
the level of functionality and efficiency.... EEZ protection requires vessels having real
the world community), and sec-
multipurpose capability and offering high levels of habitability for the crew who are
ondly, rather as a consequence,
intended to perform long missions at sea,” Farinetti and Bonetti concluded. “The ships
interoperability at the “nuts and should also present high reliability, maintainability, and a low through-life cost.”
bolts” level of systems, from tire-
nipples to computers.... Nations
ought to be interoperable in that
sense, fighting these risks togeth-
er, together seeking a better and
comprehensive use of the com-
mon mass of water that gives the
planet Gaia her prosperity. ”
Vice Admiral W.J.E. van Rijn,
Royal Netherlands Navy
Naval Forces, Volume 20
Number 4, 1999

[179] Rear Admiral Ray Riutta, USCG, Assistant Commandant for Operations, “Hemispheric
Maritime Security: The U.S. Coast Guard Vision,” Euronaval Conference, 18 October 1998; see also
Scott C. Truver, “Strategic Imperatives for NATO’s Navies: The Next 50 Years of Alliance Security,”
NATO 50th Anniversary, 1949-1999 (Essex, United Kingdom: The Winchester Group, 1999) pp. 359-
265, at p. 361.
For an example of another NATO state’s concerns, see “The State’s Action at Sea: French National
Maritime Responsibilities and Tasks,” published by the Premier Ministre Secretariat General de la Mer,
which enumerates the following roles and missions: Safety of People, Safety of Navigation, Information
of Seafarers, Maritime Leisure and Sporting Activities, Fight against Illegal Traffickings, Fishing Support
and Surveillance, and Keeping Public Order at Sea. Likewise, the Italian Navy was increasingly being
tasked to intercept and rescue people fleeing the misery of the Balkans. In July 1999, Italian authorities
rescued 60 Gypsy migrants from Serbia, 39 of them children, after smugglers dumped them into the sea
as their ship, which had sailed form the Albanian port of Vlore, neared Italy’s southern coast. “The ship
couldn’t get close enough to dock because of cliffs,” Gianluca Greco, chief of border police in Oranto,
noted, “so the smugglers threw the people out.” “Italians Rescue Serbian Gypsies from Sea,” Washington
Post, 28 July 1999, p. A18. See also, “Europe’s Borders: A Single Market in Crime,” The Economist, 16
October 1999, pp. 23-24, 28, in which the Italian navy’s challenges of interdicting smugglers of alien
migrants were further described: “Back in Otranto, the coastguards know they face a near-impossible
task. The Italian government has reinforced the numbers of boats on patrol, and sent more policemen to
the area. But, no sooner have they caught one lot of illegals and put them on the boat back to Albania
than another boat with its pitiful human cargo hidden perilously inside will be on its way towards the
coast again.”
[180] V. Farinetti and E. Bonetti, “ Vessel Design Considerations,” EEZ Technology, Edition
4/Winter 1999, pp. 117-120.

116
 Such considerations should also extend to other Deepwater system elements, including
prospective manned fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, as well as a variety of unmanned
aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles that might be envisioned. Likewise, the Deepwater
C4ISR system can benefit from the broadest possible U.S. and overseas participation, both
to ensure that the resulting system has the best capabilities world – not solely U.S. –
industries have to offer and to brighten the prospects for overseas sales.[181]
Looking to America’s allied and friendly countries’ requirements to upgrade their naval
and maritime forces during the next 25 years, the prospect for an international elements in
the Deepwater Project could be a vital factor in enhancing the U.S. security assistance
“two-way street” philosophy. Perhaps most importantly, it could go far in enhancing U.S.-
allied interoperability, especially in the maritime domain, which would overcome some of
the negative “lessons” of the spring 1999 NATO Operation Allied Force air campaign
against Yugoslavia. NATO political and military authorities noted that the lopsided divi-
sion of labor between the United States and Europe. With the United States so far ahead
in the use of precision-guided weapons, satellite reconnaissance, and other leading-edge
technologies, NATO leaders admitted that Allied Force demonstrated that the alliance is in
danger of becoming a “two-tier organization.”[182] If not resolved, this could distort
NATO’s ability to respond to future crises and conflicts, and could even lead to serious
friction regarding how to share defense burdens. Deepwater involvement by foreign,
particularly NATO, navies, coastguards, and industries seems to offer solutions to both
allied maritime interoperability and burden-sharing.

[181] Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, then-Director, Space Information Warfare,
Command and Control (N6), in 1997 envisioned a “Maritime Partners” initiative, which would help
ensure that the naval and maritime-defense forces of U.S. allies and future coalition partners would have
the most appropriate C4ISR interoperability with U.S. naval forces. See Scott C. Truver, “Harnessing the
C4ISR Revolution,” Jane’s Navy International, October 1997, pp. 29-37, where the challenges for
enhanced allied C4ISR interoperability are discussed.
[182] “War Showed U.S.-Allied Inequality,” The Washington Post, 28 June 1999, pp. A1, A14.

117
VI. L O O K I N G A H E A D
The spirit and discipline of a military service, combined with flexibility, readiness,
and a commitment to law enforcement, humanitarian service, and safety, have been the
powerful blend that contributed to the Coast Guard’s success during its first two centuries
of service to America. It is this tradition that will enable the Service to meet the demands of
the next century: far-offshore drug interdiction and law enforcement, long-distance search
and rescue, combatting terrorism and defending the homeland, protecting the environment
and the living resources of the seas, and supporting foreign policy goals and defense opera-
“The U.S. Coast Guard has a
complex range of missions and
tions worldwide. As a military, multimission, maritime service, the Coast Guard provides
duties. The service is military and
singular, non-redundant, complementary capabilities to safeguard U.S. national security
civilian, humanitarian and war-
interests – today and in the 21st century.
rior, policeman and war fighter.
The Coast Guard has rarely – if ever – had to seek roles, missions, functions, and
All too often, these dualisms hin-
tasks, especially in its Deepwater operating area. Throughout its 210-year history, new
der public appreciation of the
mandates have been routinely added to the Service’s portfolio, usually in response to some
Coast Guard viewed as a whole.
specific national policy need and usually without additional resources being allocated for
Whenever the Coast Guard
their accomplishment. The Service has received its numerous additional jobs because
they either “fit” better under the Coast Guard or were more expensive to administer comes to widespread public
independently. notice – which is often – the cir-
cumstances are very specific. The
Indeed, in the late-1990s, this trend has continued, but has been exacerbated by ruth-
Coast Guard is seen rescuing
less streamlining to increase Service “efficiencies.” The Coast Guard was directed to cut
some 4,000 people from its 1994 roster by the end of 1998 (a more-than ten percent mariners in distress, arresting
reduction) to save $400 million in operating costs, despite the increasing demands for all of drug smugglers, or combatting
its services, particularly the need to ensure maritime security in both nearby and overseas pollution....
maritime regions. This created severe challenges for the Coast Guard, as Admiral Loy out- The Coast Guard functions as an
lined in his 1999 “State of the Coast Guard” remarks:[183]
integral part of a national fleet as
...streamlining should not be a continuous activity. The logical extension of doing guardian of maritime security on
more with less is doing everything with nothing. And because we know we can’t take behalf of national security. The
that final step, by logical necessity we also know there is some point beyond which case for modernization and
further attempts to create additional savings are counterproductive. The goal of
replacement of the deepwater
streamlining should not be minimal staffing; it should be optimal staffing, and optimal
fleet with a character of force
staffing is possible only with proper equipment and training. Streamline too much,
structure that emphasizes utility
and the Coast Guard begins to consume itself, degrade its readiness, and endanger
for national defense is com-
both its own people and the American people who depend on our being Always Ready.
How do we know when we’ve reached the limit of streamlining?
pelling indeed. ”
Dr. Colin S. Gray
I would offer that you’re beyond the limit when 81 percent of small boat stations are A Coast Guard for the Future:
standing 24 hour duty days for three days straight. You’re beyond the limit when only America’s Maritime Guardian
Comparative Strategy, Vol. 18,
70 percent of VTS [Vessel Traffic System] Radarman billets are filled. You’re beyond No. 2, 1999
the limit when HU-25C [Falcon aircraft] not-mission-capable hours are on pace to
double their rate from 1997. You’re beyond the limit when the availability rate for 41-
footers [patrol boats] drops 20 percent in four years and the availability rate for 44-
footers drops 35 percent over the same period. You’re beyond the limit when hull,
machinery, and electronics casualties on cutters increase by almost 50 percent in a
decade. Dull knives have to work harder to cut, and they don’t produce clean slices.

[183] Admiral James M. Loy, Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, “State of the Coast Guar d
Address,” 4 May 1999.

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 More important. A dull knife is a dangerous tool.... [L]ess than half of our surfmen
billets are filled by certified surfmen, and the average boat crew experience through-
out the Coast Guard has dropped to less than one year. Lost workdays from shore
injuries are up 29 percent. Mishap rates for forty-one footers and RHIs [Rigid-Hull
Inflatable boats] have risen. Our aircraft ground mishap rates are up almost 50
percent from previous years.... A dull knife is dangerous both to Coast Guard people
and to the American people who depend on us.
Streamlining not withstanding, there are going to be more missions in the next 20
to 25 years that are non-traditional missions for the other four Armed Services, but are
traditional missions for and will be best addressed by the Coast Guard – assuming it can
be honed to razor-sharp readiness. Moreover, there are certain to be variations and
mutations of the Coast Guard’s traditional mission set that demand new capabilities.
Finally, new missions and tasks, only dimly perceived in early 2000, will certainly be
thrust upon all of the Nation’s military services in the next century.
This is especially true for the protection of America’s maritime safety and security –
a focused vision for the U.S. Coast Guard of the 21st century. Tomorrow’s Coast
Guard must have the technologies, systems, platforms, and trained and highly motivated
people to meet the threats and challenges to U.S. maritime security interests at home and
abroad. For America’s “Guardian of the Seas,” this means that the nation’s Deepwater
forces must be sufficient in number, effective, affordable, multimission, flexible, tailored
for multi-agency operations, expeditionary, and shaped for Joint and multi-national
operations within the Service’s five core maritime security roles:
• Maritime Safety
• Maritime Mobility
• Maritime Law Enforcement
• Marine Environmental Protection
• National Defense
Toward the end of 1999 there was some uncertainty about the prospects for success
in meeting these needs and carrying out these roles, unless the Administration and the
Congress came to recognize the full “value-added” that the Coast Guard brings to
America’s maritime safety and security. The report of the Interagency Task Force on the
Roles and Missions of the Coast Guard, signed out in late December, underscored the
compelling national needs for a robust Coast Guard for the 21st century.[184] But there
were concerns that this report would in fact do no more than “kick the can down the
road,” leaving the next Administration and Congress after the fall 2000 election to deal
with the inevitable, bottom-line implication of the Task Force’s recommendations – the
need for sufficient funding for America’s Guardian of the Seas. Without adequate
resources, and most importantly the dedicated and skilled men and women who are the
Coast Guard, the danger is great that critical capabilities will go wanting and missions
unfulfilled, making a parody of the Coast Guard’s Semper Paratus creed.

[184] The report, “A Coast Guard for the 21st Century,” was called for in Presidential Executive
Order 13115.
120
APPENDICES
A. Legislative Mandates for U.S. Coast
G u a rd Roles, Missions, and Functions

B. CinCSOUTH Letter to Deputy Secre t a r y

of Transportation, 26 May 1999

C. N ATIONAL FLEET – A Joint Navy/Coast

G u a rd Policy Statement, 21 September
1998

D. The United States Coast Guard: A

Unique Instrument of U.S. National
S e c u r i t y, October 1999

E. Maritime Areas of Concern to the

Deepwater Pro j e c t

F. Design and Operati onal Characteristics

of Coast Guard Deepwater Cutters and
A i rc r a f t

G. Integrated Deepwater System Pro j e c t

Industry Teams, Phase 1

H. Glossary

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 A. Legislative Mandates for U.S. Coast
G u a rd Roles, Missions, and Functions [ 1 8 5 ]
The following authorities mandate the Coast Guard to conduct operations within its five
principal roles and supporting mission areas. There are a significant number of other
statutory authorities that, although not written in mandatory terms, nevertheless assign
responsibilities to the Coast Guard.

Alien Migrant Interdiction Operations

14 U.S.C.§ 2 - requires Coast Guard to, among other things, enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to “engage in maritime air surveillance
or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States.”
E.O. 12807 - directed the Secretary of Transportation to issue instructions to the Coast
Guard to enforce the suspension and entry of undocumented aliens into the United States
by sea and to interdict defined vessels.
Presidential Decision Directive 9 (PDD-9) - addresses the need to combat the problem of
criminal alien smuggling, and provides guidance on the Coast Guard’s role on combating
alien smuggling as well as the roles of the other U.S. government agencies. It specifically
tasks the Coast Guard with the interdiction of smuggling vessels and with transporting the
migrants to the flag state of the vessel or to another non-U.S. country.
46 U.S.C. § 2304 - outlines that it is a violation of both U.S. Law and of a recognized
duty under international law not to aid mariners in need assistance at sea.

Drug Interdiction
14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to, among other things, enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to “engage in maritime air surveillance
or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States.”
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic
Substances, 1988 - Article 17 requires all States party to cooperate to the fullest extent pos-
sible to suppress illicit traffic by sea, in conformity with the international law of the sea.
The United States has entered into numerous bilateral agreements to implement this
binding international legal obligation. Many of these agreements expressly identify the
U.S. Coast Guard as the relevant U.S. law enforcement agency under the agreement.
National Drug Control Strategy - The classified annex to the National Drug Control
Strategy assigns specific missions to the USCG to secure the attainment of Goal 4 (Shield
America’s Air, Land, and Sea Frontiers from the Drug Threat) and 5 (Break Foreign and
Domestic Drug Sources of Supply) of the Strategy.
National Interdiction Control Plan, 9 October 1997 - assigns to the Coast Guard
responsibility for intercepting/apprehending maritime targets of interest detected in
international waters and airspace.

Defense/Military Operations
10 U.S.C. § 101 - defines “armed forces” to include the Coast Guard, with the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.

[185] This summary is based upon an internal Coast Guard memorandum, Robert S. Horowitz,
Deputy Chief Counsel, “Mandatory Authorities for Mission Areas,” Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, 17
February 1998, and additional input from Headquarters legal staff.
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14 U.S.C. § 1 - establishes the Coast Guard as a military service and a branch of the armed
forces of the United States “at all times.”
14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to maintain a state of readiness to function as a
specialized service in the Navy in time of war, including the fulfillment of Maritime
Defense Zone responsibilities.
14 U.S.C. § 3 - requires the Coast Guard to operate as a service in the Navy upon
declaration of war or when the President directs.
Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of Defense and the Department of
Transportation on the Use of U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities and Resources in Support of
the National Military Strategy, 3 October 1995 - identifies the following activities:Annex A
defines Maritime Interception Operations as operations conducted to enforce the seaward
portion of certain sanctions against another nation or group of nations. It may include
stopping, boarding, searching, diverting, or redirecting vessel traffic.
Annex B defines military Environmental Response Operations as those responding to
incidents of marine pollution that have the potential to adversely affect U.S. and
allied/coalition defense operations.
Annex C defines Port Operations, Security and Defense as operations conducted to
ensure port and harbor areas are maintained free of hostile threats, terrorist actions, and
safety deficiencies that would be a threat to support and resupply operations. DPOSD also
ensures the safe and efficient operations of all vessels and facilities within the port, harbor,
and harbor approach environment.
Annex D defines Peacetime Military Engagement as all military activities involving
other nations intended to shape the security environment in peacetime, and which serve to:
demonstrate U.S. political and military commitment; improve interoperability; reassure
allies, friends, and coalition partners; promote transparency; convey democratic ideals; deter
aggression; and help relieve sources of instability before they can become military crises.

Foreign Vessel Inspection

14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to administer laws and promulgate and enforce
regulations for the promotion of safety of life and property on and under the high seas and
waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
33 U.S.C. § 1223 - provides the Coast Guard the authority to direct the movement of any
vessel on U.S. waters that the Coast Guard has reasonable cause to believe does not comply
with any applicable law or treaty.
33 U.S.C. § 1228 - requires the Coast Guard to deny entry into the U.S. territorial sea to
tanker vessels that are in violation of any U.S. treaty, law, or regulation, or that meet other
criteria as posing a threat to port safety or the marine environment.
46 U.S.C. § 601 and 6301 - requires the Coast Guard to investigate marine casualties to
tank vessels in the EEZ resulting in significant environmental harm or material damage
affecting the seaworthiness or efficiency of the vessel. Also requires investigation of marine
casualties to certain foreign passenger vessels operating out of the U.S. ports or carrying
U.S. passengers if the casualty occurs on the high seas south of 75N, south of 60S, west of
35W, and east of the International Date Line.
46 CFR 4.01 - requires the Coast Guard to investigate all reportable marine casualties.

General Law Enforcement

14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to, among other things, enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to “engage in maritime air surveillance
or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States.”

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 Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976, P.L. 91-651, 84 Stat. 1941 - requires the
Coast Guard to assist the Secret Service by providing service, equipment, and facilities,
when requested, to assist the Secret Service in discharging its duties.
42 U.S.C. § 268 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce quarantine rules and regulations.
43 U.S.C. § 1333 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce all matters related to safety of life
and property on artificial islands, installations and other devices on the Outer Continental
Shelf.
43 U.S.C. § 1348 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce safety and environmental
regulations promulgated under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-1356.
46 U.S.C. Apps. § 87 - requires the Coast Guard, when requested by the Federal
Maritime Commission, to assist the Commission in the enforcement of sanctions which
the Commission is empowered to impose, including, when requested, denying entry to
the United States to vessels flagged in States subject to such sanctions.
46 U.S.C. Apps. § 1710a - requires the Coast Guard, when requested by the Federal
Maritime Commission, to assist the Commission in the enforcement of sanctions which
the Commission is empowered to impose, including, when requested, denying entry to
the United States to vessels flagged in States subject to such sanctions.
48 U.S.C. § 1494b - requires the Coast Guard to station a patrol vessel in St. Croix, U.S.
Virgin Islands.

International Ice Patrol

14 U.S.C § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to engage in oceanographic research on the high
seas and in water subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
46 US.C. Apps. § 738a - requires the Coast Guard to maintain an ice patrol during the ice
season in the North Atlantic Ocean in the vicinity of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland
and to provide enumerated services to mariners including issuing radio warnings to vessels
transitting the area informing them of ice conditions; assisting vessels and crews requiring
aid; studying ice and current conditions in the region; and removing and destroying
derelicts.
Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Chapter V, Regulation 5 - requires
contracting governments to continue the international ice patrol. Pursuant to U.S. law,
the Coast Guard is the only agency authorized to accomplish this international obligation.

Lightering Zone Enforcement

14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to, among other things, enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable Federal laws, on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to “engage in maritime air surveillance
or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States.”
33 U.S.C. 1221 - the Port and Waterways Safety Act provides the basis for our port state
actions, and general management of ports and waterways to minimize deaths, injuries,
property damage, and environmental damage. It authorizes the establishment of safety
zones, Captain of the Port Orders, issuance of permits, and additional subpoena authority
for investigations.

Living Marine Resources Enforcement

14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to, among other things, enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to “engage in maritime air surveillance
or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States.”
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16 U.S.C. § 1861 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce the provisions of the National
Fishery Management Program – The Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and
Management Act (MSFCMA) – “to prevent overfishing, to rebuild overfished stocks, to
insure conservation, to facilitate long-term protection of essential fish habitats, and to
realize the full potential of the Nation’s fishery resources.” The Act tasks the “Secretary of
the department in which the Coast Guard is operating” with enforcement “of the
provisions of this Act.”
16 U.S.C. § 1540 - The Endangered Species Act - is written to protect America’s
endangered species. It charges the Secretaries of Commerce and Interior, and the Coast
Guard, with enforcing its provisions.
16 U.S.C. § 3375 - The Lacey Act - prohibits the possession of and commerce in illegally
taken fish, wildlife, and plants. It charges the Secretary of Transportation with enforcement
of the Act’s provisions.
16 U.S.C. § 1156 - requires the Coast Guard, when requested by the Secretary of State, to
deliver to the cognizant State Party those persons and vessels seized for violating the
provisions of Article III of the Interim Convention on the Conservation of North Pacific
Fur Seals.
16 U.S.C. § 1826 - declares it to be the policy of Congress that the United States should
secure a permanent ban to destructive high seas fisheries practices, in particular, the use of
large-scale driftnets and requires the Coast Guard to cooperate with the Departments of
State and Commerce in securing international agreements which would implement this
policy. It also tasks the Coast Guard, among others, to work with international organiza-
tions, such as the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission, to implement and enforce
the UN High Seas Driftnet Moratorium. The statue would, by implication, effectively
require Coast Guard enforcement of such agreements, as it mandates that such agreements
include provisions which would permit officials of the United States to board and inspect
vessels of States-Party while such vessel is operating beyond the exclusive economic zone of
any nation.
16 U.S.C. § 3607 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce the provisions of the North
Atlantic Salmon Fishing program.
16 U.S.C. § 3637 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce provisions of the Pacific Salmon
Fishing program.
16 U.S.C. § 5504 - requires the Coast Guard to cooperate with the Commerce
Department in developing a report providing information regarding any activities of high
seas fishing vessels that undermine the effectiveness of international conservation and
management measures. The Coast Guard is, by implication, required to assemble such
information in order to effectively discharge its duty to cooperate.
16 U.S.C. § 5606 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce provisions of the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Convention, which regulates fishing outside any country’s EEZ in the
Northwest Atlantic, particularly on the Grand Banks and Flemish Cape off the coast of
Newfoundland. Marine Mammal Protection Act - While it does not specifically task the
Coast Guard, prohibits the taking or possession of marine mammals in the U.S. territorial
sea and EEZ. Because of the area defined, this is a Coast Guard enforcement responsibility
under 14 U.S.C. 2.

Maritime Pollution (MARPOL) Enforcement

14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to, among other things, enforce or assist in the
enforcement of all applicable Federal laws on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, and to “engage in maritime air surveillance
or interdiction to enforce or assist in the enforcement of the laws of the United States.”

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 33 U.S.C. § 1254 - requires the Coast Guard, in cooperation with Environmental
Protection Agency, to conduct surveillance to monitor the water quality of the contiguous
zone and the oceans.
33 U.S.C. § 1321 (c)(1) - as amended by the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, requires the
President to ensure effective and immediate removal of a discharge of oil or hazardous
substance in the exclusive economic zone and for natural resources under the exclusive
management authority of the United States. Pursuant to E.O. 12777, Coast Guard is
delegated responsibility for removal of a discharge, or mitigation or substantial threat of a
discharge, of oil or hazardous substances in the coastal zone.
33 U.S.C. § 1417 - requires the Coast Guard to conduct surveillance and appropriate
enforcement activity to prevent the unlawful transportation of material for dumping, or
unlawful ocean dumping.
33 U.S.C. § 1901-12 - Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships implements the MARPOL
Convention in U.S. Law and authorizes the development of implementing regulations.
Annexes cover the discharge of oil and noxious liquid substances, and prohibits of the
dumping of plastic trash anywhere in the ocean or the navigable waters of the United
States. Additional prohibitions are directed against dumping of other types of garbage in
water subject to U.S. Jurisdiction; regulations also cover the discharge of sewage.
33 U.S.C. § 1903 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce the provisions of the MARPOL
Convention and the Act to Prevent Pollution from Ships.
42 U.S.C. § 9118 - requires the Coast Guard to enforce procedures with respect to any
ocean thermal energy conversion facility in order to (1) promote the safety of life at sea;
(2) prevent pollution of the marine environment; (3) clean up any pollutants which
may be discharged; and (4) otherwise prevent or migrate any adverse impact from the
construction and operation of such ocean thermal energy conversion facility or plantship.
42 U.S.C. § 9119 - requires the Coast Guard to promulgate and enforce regulations
governing the movement and navigation of ocean thermal energy conversion plantships so
as to prevent interference with other uses of the high seas.
42 U.S.C. § 9153 - with respect to ocean thermal energy conversion enforcement, gives
the Coast Guard exclusive responsibility for enforcement measures which affect the safety
of life and property at sea.

Search and Rescue

14 U.S.C. § 2 - requires the Coast Guard to develop, establish, maintain and operate
rescue facilities for the promotion of safety on, under, and over the high seas and waters
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.
46 U.S.C. Apps. § 738a - requires the Coast Guard to render assistance to persons and
property in distress in the vicinity of the Grand Banks of Newfoundland during ice season
and as long as may be advisable throughout the remainder of the year.
Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), Chapter V, Regulation 15 - mandates
that contracting governments make necessary arrangements to rescue persons in distress at
sea for waters off of their coast. Pursuant to U.S. law, the Coast Guard is the only agency
authorized to accomplish this international obligation.

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B. C o m m a n d e r-in-Chief, U.S. Souther n
Command Letter to Deputy Secretary of
Transportation, 26 May 1999

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
3511 NW 91ST AVENUE
MIAMI, FL 33172-1217

May 26, 1999

Mr. Mortimer L. Downey

U.S. Deputy Secretary of Transportation
U.S. Department of Transportation
400 Seventh Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20590

Dear Secretary Downey,

I appreciate this opportunity to comment on the many vital contributions of the
United States Coast Guard in Southern Command’s Area of Responsibility (AOR). I also
look forward to meeting with you and the other distinguished members of the Interagency
Task Force on the Roles and Missions of the U.S. Coast Guard on 28 May 1999 in
Washington D.C. Before I address the Coast Guard in specifics terms, let me set the stage
by providing some background on the Southern Command Theater and underscoring
some fundamental facts that will frame the Coast Guard’s role in this region in a practical
context.
The reality that events in the Southern Theater are vital to U.S. strategic interests is
becoming increasingly apparent. U.S. economic prosperity is increasingly linked to the
economic prosperity of the Latin American and Caribbean regions. The level of trade with
these regions will, within a year, exceed the level of trade with all of Europe, and in the next
10 years, with Europe and Japan combined. Four countries in the region together have
sufficient oil resources to be competitive with the countries of the Middle East. Venezuela
alone can produce as much oil as can all the Persian Gulf states combined. Colombia
recently discovered major oil reserves, while both Trinidad-Tobago and Ecuador are already
significant oil suppliers.
Our cultural ties to the region are growing exponentially. By the year 2010 Hispanics
will comprise the largest minority in our country and by mid-century may account for as
much as a third of the population. We also have burgeoning populations of English and
Creole-speaking Caribbean people. As these new Americans grow in number, as well as
political and economic strength, they will demand that our leaders pay increased attention
to our affairs and interests in this hemisphere.
Measured against the goals of our National Security Strategy, the Southern Command
AOR is a “good news story.” Over the past two decades the theater has changed from one
dominated by military dictatorships and communist regimes to one in which democracies
are the norm. For the first time in history, virtually every nation in the theater is a democ-
racy of 32 nations, only intransigent Cuba remains outside the embrace of democratic rule
and the prosperity possible only through a free market economy.

127
 The picture is not all rose-colored, however. Many of these democracies are fragile
and susceptible to transnational threats which have emerged as the greatest hazards to
regional stability and democratic and economic development. Throughout the region the
corrupting influences of narcotics trafficking, domestic and international terrorism, illegal
migration, illicit arms sales, money laundering, and organized crime are threatening the
foundations of democracy and impeding economic development.
It is against these transnational threats that we have framed our regional engagement
strategy, a strategy that embodies the basic concepts of U.S. national strategy: shape the
environment, respond to crises, and prepare for an uncertain future. Our regional engage-
ment strategy stresses the first concept. If we skillfully shape the hemispheric security
environment, we will not have to respond to crises, and the future will be far less uncer-
tain.
We strive to shape the environment in a variety of ways. We take advantage of
exercises and confront operational threats such as drug trafficking and crises like natural
disasters. We proactively support military-to-military contacts and disaster relief and foster
multilateral security cooperation among security forces in the region. We assist the
countries of the region in building military forces appropriate to the current geopolitical
environment, to help develop mutual confidence in their ability to work together for
the common good and to resolve disagreements peacefully. Our efforts help to create
opportunities for enhancing military acceptance of the professional concepts of military
subordination to civilian leadership, respect for human rights, and support for democratic
institutions.
With the understanding that regional engagement and counterdrug operations are
our primary missions, let me lend form and substance to these concepts by citing some
examples of specific Coast Guard activities and contributions that are vital to the pursuit
and achievement of our strategic aims.
From the start line to the finish line the Coast Guard is an active partner essential to
effective regional engagement. They are integral to our Theater Engagement planning
process, providing unique perspectives and invaluable expertise. First and foremost,
however, I must convey a key observation(our United States Coast Guard has earned and
enjoys an unprecedented level of trust and credibility with the countries and organizations
within the Southern Command AOR. Coast Guard forces and missions closely match
those of the region’s navies, particularly in the Caribbean basin, and through a multitude
of engagement activities and initiatives, the Coast Guard has fully emerged as the ideal
mentor and role model for many of the regional maritime services. Their prominent role
in the development of the Haitian Coast Guard with a full time, multi-year presence of
two to four trainers working closely with Canadian counterparts, is the most significant
engagement success story in a country bedeviled with endemic political, social and
economic crises. Similar training initiative successes are evident in Panama (development
of their maritime capabilities), Antigua (RSS Training Center), Bolivia and Peru (riverine
training).
The Coast Guard’s robust Resident and Mobile Training Teams continue to pay huge
dividends in shaping our theater for the new century. This past year the International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program included 111 students from 22 coun-
tries. The Coast Guard also completed 62 Mobile Training Team (MTT) missions for 299
weeks of training and enrolled eight cadets at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy. As a side
note, the Commander of the Barbados Coast Guard is an Academy graduate from the
Class of 1984. The engagement value of these activities are immeasurable and can be
linked directly to strengthened regional trust, cooperation, and stability.

128
 The Caribbean Support Tender (CST) is a new initiative that clearly highlights the
synergism of the SOUTHCOM - USCG partnership. This program will utilize an 180
foot, 1000 ton tender to provide practical “hands on” training and technical assistance for
the regional maritime services of the Caribbean. Its multinational complement of officers
and crew will foster teamwork and encourage information exchange to help improve their
operational readiness and capabilities, and achieve our strategic aim of greater regional
cooperation and confidence.
The Coast Guard also participates heavily in the SOUTHCOM theater exercise
program. As my Executive Agent for the maritime phase of the annual Caribbean exercise
Tradewinds, they have performed superbly in bringing together a majority of the region’s
maritime services in an operational environment that is both challenging and extremely
productive. They are also regular participants in the annual UNITAS exercise which
provides cooperative operational training opportunities with the navies of South America.
Their participation always adds an important dimension which Latin American navies
appreciate and identify with, and generally crosses multiple ministries of host governments,
which in turn creates additional opportunities for further diplomatic and military contacts.
The success of these engagement activities is also linked directly to our counterdrug
mission, as the relationships, trust, cooperation, and improved operational capabilities they
build are key to the multinational effort required to effectively conduct counterdrug
operations in this region. Direct Coast Guard support to include cutters (deep-water assets),
aircraft and law enforcement detachments are imperative to our counterdrug effort. We
cannot conduct an effective counterdrug campaign without Coast Guard support; they are
infused in every counterdrug operation conducted in the Caribbean and are intimately
involved in the strategy formulation process.
I can personally attest to the difference in “value added” that the Coast Guard makes
each and every day in this theater. I observe them first hand in key staff billets right here
in my headquarters and in key operational billets throughout the AOR as Chiefs of
our Military Liaison Offices (MLO’s). Our primary counterdrug organization, Joint
Interagency Task Force – East, is superbly commanded by a Coast Guard Flag Officer,
Rear Admiral Ed Barrett. From the most junior to the most senior, these professional
Coast Guardsmen are extremely effective in their highly visible and critical roles, and their
substantial contributions to regional engagement and our counterdrug mission make the
difference.
In closing, let me offer these final observations. The USCG is without a doubt my
most valuable resource for maritime engagement in the Caribbean basin, making robust
security assistance, military-to-military contact, and exercise contributions. They are the
lead agency for maritime interdiction; however, increased Detection & Monitoring support is
inefficient without critical linkages to USCG forces assigned for Intercept & Apprehension.
Presently, the number of cutters available to support the counterdrug effort is significantly
less than what we will need to achieve our operational counterdrug objectives. Migrant
surges will also inevitably place a greater strain on the aging USCG fleet. The USCG is the
right fit for managing many of my downrange efforts, as evidenced by the outstanding
results produced by my three Coast Guard Security Assistance Office (SAO) Chiefs. My
staff is exploring options for additional USCG manpower to support other regional SAO
positions.
In summary, my message is a simple one. The United States Coast Guard brings
tremendous capabilities and contributions across a wide spectrum of regional engagement
activities. Its role in the Southern Theater is a significant one, and will only grow as we
continue to pursue a National Security Strategy that directs us to engage and shape an
extremely diverse, dynamic and expansive environment.

129
 Secretary Downey, thank you again for this opportunity to provide my perspective
regarding the Coast Guard and its importance to Southern Command. I look forward to
discussing in greater detail some of the points I have raised in this letter with you and the
task force members during our session on Friday.

Sincerely,

// signed //

Charles E. Wilhelm
General, United States Marine Corps
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command

130
C. N ATIONAL FLEET
A Joint Navy/Coast Guard Policy
Statement, 21 September 1998

131
132
D. The Uni ted States Coast Guard:
A Unique Instrument of U.S. National
S e c u r i t y, October 1999
At the dawn of the 21st century, America’s citizens and interests and its allies and
friends throughout the world are at increasing risk from a variety of transnational threats
that honor no frontier: extreme nationalism, terrorism, international organized crime,
illegal alien migration, drug trafficking, conventional weapons smuggling, proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, environmental damage, complex flows of trade, and state
aggression. “To move against the threats of this new global era,” the President’s October
1998 National Security Strategy for a New Century explains, “we are pursuing a forward-
looking national security strategy attuned to the realities of our new era.... Its three core
objectives are:
• To enhance our security.
• To bolster America’s economic prosperity.
• To promote democracy abroad.”
America’s national security is thus no longer focused solely on military threats to
the nation. Indeed, the dividing line between domestic and foreign policy is increasingly
blurred by globalization – the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural, and
political integration. “More and more we as a nation are affected by events beyond our
borders,” the National Security Strategy recognizes. As U.S. national security interests
embrace a rich tapestry of cultural, social, environmental, economic, political, diplomatic,
and military dimensions, we must examine critically the tools necessary to carry out this
strategy effectively. Further, the National Security Strategy makes clear that a “close
coordination across all levels of government – federal, state and local” will be fundamental
to success.
In this regard, the Coast Guard is an increasingly important and, indeed, a unique
asset in America’s multifaceted security strategies at home and abroad. The Coast Guard is a
military, multimission, maritime service within the Department of Transportation and
one of the five U.S. Armed Services. Its fundamental roles are to protect the public, the
environment, and U.S. economic and security interests in America’s inland waterways, ports
and harbors; along some 47,000 miles of U.S. coastlines; in the U.S. territorial seas and our
nearly 3.4 million square miles of exclusive economic zones; on international waters and in
other maritime regions of importance to the United States. Interagency cooperation has
been crucial in meeting the nation’s needs in these critical regions, with the Coast Guard in
many instances a lead coordinator of activities involving the Departments of State, Defense,
Justice, and Transportation; the Customs Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug
Enforcement Agency, Environmental Protection Agency, National Marine Fisheries Service,
the Immigration and Naturalization Service; and numerous local, state, and international
agencies and nongovernmental organizations.
Since its founding as the Revenue Cutter Service in 1790, the Coast Guard has
unfailingly provided services and benefits to America’s security because of its distinctive
blend of humanitarian, law enforcement, diplomatic, and military capabilities. The
Coast Guard has broad responsibilities for safeguarding maritime security – the Coast
Guard’s unique contribution to America’s national security. Today these capabilities ensure
homeland defense, protect critical infrastructures, safeguard U.S. maritime sovereignty, and
defend American citizens and interests worldwide. The Coast Guard’s five maritime
security roles and their importance to America, today and in the future, are as follows.
National Defense. Notions of homeland defense and maritime sovereignty shape the
Coast Guard’s law enforcement roles, missions, and tasks to defend U.S. maritime borders
and offshore zones as well as participating in global military and defense operations. Coast
Guard units play critical roles in peacetime forward presence, humanitarian support,
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 peacekeeping and enforcement, crisis-response, and combat operations, across the
spectrum of U.S. global engagement in support of the National Military Strategy’s
concepts of Shape, Respond, and Prepare. The Coast Guard’s involvement in shaping
the international environment is important and growing. Coast Guard peacetime
engagement in a posture of active and acceptable presence reaches out to all elements of
other countries’ maritime interests and agencies, and in some situations is much less
threatening and more politically acceptable than a purely naval or military presence. The
Coast Guard’s people and assets support in-country mobile training teams and interna-
tional training at Coast Guard facilities in the United States, and have helped to establish
maritime codes of law in several countries emerging from authoritarian rule. Coast Guard
support to international initiatives, including bi- and multilateral search-and-rescue and
environmental exercises, helps to underscore America’s commitments to regional stability
and peace.
The Coast Guard’s extensive peacetime responsibilities in coastal and port maritime
functions and a variety of country-to-country operations provides broad-spectrum capabil-
ities to respond to threats and crises. In defending against transnational threats, the
Coast Guard provides the maritime element in homeland defense against drugs, other
contraband, illegal migrants, and weapons proliferation. A robust command and control
network rings the nation to direct responses across the mission spectrum. Coast Guard
operational capabilities for these needs figure importantly in smaller-scale contingencies,
providing humanitarian assistance in natural disasters, boarding teams for maritime inter-
diction operations in support of United Nations sanctions, and port security in overseas
theaters. Finally, Coast Guard tasks in Maritime Theater Warfare are embracing more
facets of naval warfare operations in littoral regions, including port security and safety,
harbor and environmental defense, maritime interception and coastal sea control, and
force protection.
The United States clearly confronts a dilemma as to what form its naval and
maritime forces should take in the future to deal with a variety of challenges: U.S. support
to U.N.-sponsored global security operations; the security and defense implications of the
U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea; the need for naval arms control, disarmament,
and confidence-building regimes; the proliferation of naval forces and weapons, partic-
ularly weapons of mass destruction; and the increasing significance of nonmilitary threats
to U.S. maritime security. Thus, to prepare now for an uncertain future, the Coast
Guard maintains a high state of readiness to function as a specialized service within the
Navy and has command responsibilities for the U.S. Maritime Defense Zones. Its
strategic vision document, Coast Guard 2020, underscores the need to embrace both the
Revolutions in Military Affairs and Business Affairs to support robust investment in
modernization and to transform Coast Guard strategy, doctrine, and organizations to
meet the daunting challenges of the 21st century. In this regard, the National Fleet Policy
Statement, signed in September 1998 by the Chief of Naval Operations and the Com-
mandant of the Coast Guard, signaled a new era of close collaboration in planning,
acquisition, training, and operations.
Maritime Law Enforcement. The Coast Guard is the only federal law enforcement
agency with jurisdiction in both U.S. waters and on the high seas, and is the only U.S.
Armed Service not constrained by the Posse Comitatus Act. In these arenas, the Coast
Guard is the primary enforcer of U.S. laws and treaties that include customs and border
control, protection of living marine resources, safeguarding the marine environment, fight-
ing piracy, interdicting illegal immigrants and contraband, counter-drug operations, and
helping to stem weapons proliferation. Its counter-drug operations are critical to achieving
the goals of the National Drug Control Strategy, which calls for “flexible operations to
detect, disrupt, deter, and seize illegal drugs in transit to the United States.” General Barry
R. McCaffrey, Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy, has warned of the persist-
ent flow of illegal drugs that kills 15,000 Americans and costs the public more than $110
billion each year. From 1992 through 1998, for example, Coast Guard law-enforcement

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teams conducted 597 drug-interdiction cases, seizing more than 393,000 pounds of cocaine
and nearly 436,000 pounds of marijuana, and arresting 1,043 narco-traffickers. In 1999
alone, the Coast Guard interdicted more than 106,000 pounds of cocaine, keeping some
481 million “hits” with a value of $3.7 billion off America’s streets and out of its schools.
Similarly, fisheries enforcement boardings have increased from 9,440 in 1994 to
14,173 in 1998, a critically important factor in helping to rebuild and maintain fish stocks
threatened by overfishing. The economic value of these fisheries to America is approxi-
mately $24 billion, annually, and the U.S. economic zone holds some 20 percent of the
world’s commercial fishery resources. And the Coast Guard interdicted nearly 290,000
illegal immigrants from 43 countries between 1980 and 1998. Although illegal migration
from Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and other Central American countries contin-
ues to pose the greatest demand for Coast Guard interdiction assets, in 1998 China became
the single greatest source of human trafficking by sea. Intelligence agencies estimated that
as many as 20,000 illegal Chinese immigrants attempted to reach America by sea. The
Coast Guard’s at-sea interdiction operations save more than $15 million each year – the
estimated cost of Immigration and Naturalization Service agents apprehending illegal
migrants once ashore; the costs-avoided from the interdiction of Haitian refugees alone
from 1990 through 1998 have been estimated at nearly $140 million.
Maritime Safety. The Coast Guard is renown worldwide as “America’s Guardian of
the Seas” – a reputation for personal courage and selflessness that goes back to the earliest
days of the Revenue Cutter Service. The National Security Strategy has this role in mind
when it states that “the safety of our citizens” is a vital national interest. From 1992 through
1997, Coast Guard search and rescue (SAR) assets conducted 291,094 SAR operations,
saving 31,364 people from injury or death, assisting another 624,762 people in non-life-
threatening situations, and preventing some $16.8 billion in property losses. With more
than 85 percent of U.S. population living near the coasts, oceanborne trade perhaps tripling
during the next two decades, a virtual explosion in cruise ship demand, fishing vessels and
offshore platforms venturing farther offshore, and a dramatic increase in personal watercraft
and recreational boats, the job of ensuring maritime safety and security will become even
more challenging. Prevention, founded on expert risk assessments to reduce the probability
of mishaps, will be the watchword of the future and advanced technologies will continue
to be embraced to increase the probability of success. When lives and property are in
jeopardy on the sea, in coastal areas, and in inland waters, the Coast Guard will be “Always
There…Always Ready.”
Marine Environmental Protection. The Coast Guard’s prevention, enforcement,
and response functions in marine environmental protection help to reduce the amount
of pollution entering America’s and the world’s waterways. Coastal tourism and marine
recreation – which in 1997 generated $71 billion to state and local economies, 85 percent
of all U.S. tourism-related revenues – demand clean shorelines and marine environments.
In response to marine environmental security challenges, and as a world leader in marine
environmental protection, the Coast Guard shapes the safety and pollution-control stan-
dards for international and domestic maritime transportation. This is especially evident in
the areas of Port State Control and the inspection of U.S. and foreign commercial vessels.
The Coast Guard’s polar ice-breaking fleet supports scientific and environmental investiga-
tions in both Arctic and Antarctic regions. The Service’s ice-breaking efforts facilitate
navigation and prevent flood damage, at a economic value of more than $93 million.
World and coastal shipping will continue to grow, while offshore exploitation of oil
and gas resources will continue to expand at ever greater distances from shore and in deeper
waters – both trends increasing the need for effective enforcement of laws and regulations.
The Coast Guard’s prevention of oil spills from all potential sources and activities saves as
much as $5.8 billion each year in oil losses, cleanup costs, and environmental damage.
When prevention and enforcement fail, however, the Coast Guard maintains a rapid-
response capability to contain and recover from pollution incidents such as the massive
1989 Exxon Valdez spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska. Three well-trained and
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 well-equipped Coast Guard National Strike Teams, located on the East, Gulf, and West
Coasts, are at the ready to respond to major oil or other hazardous materials spills in the
inland waterways and coastal regions of the United States. In some future crisis, moreover,
these Strike Teams may be the nation’s “first-responders” to a terrorist attack using
chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons in a crowded port or roadstead.
Maritime Mobility. Mindful of its mandate to ensure a safe, efficient, and effective
marine transportation system, the Coast Guard is charged with regulating and inspecting
commercial and private vessels, licensing merchant mariners, managing waterways, and
protecting the security of America’s ports. The U.S. marine transportation system encom-
passes some 13 million Americans employed in domestic shipping-related activities, which
includes seafaring and non-seafaring positions related to coastwise and inland waterways
operations. It also supports a chain of economic activities that contributes more than
$742 billion to America’s economy.
The Service’s Aids to Navigation Program and Vessel Traffic Services, moreover, help
to ensure safe vessel movements, a critical need as global maritime trade is expected to a
triple by 2020 and larger numbers of ultra-large, deep-draft, and minimally crewed ships,
many carrying hazardous cargoes, will ply U.S. waters and exclusive economic zones.
Today, 95 percent of all U.S. overseas trade – in 1998 more than 8,000 foreign-flag vessels
called at U.S. ports – and 25 percent of U.S. domestic/intercity trade moves by water.
Furthermore, 134 million passengers transit U.S. waters each year in ferries, cruise/tour
ships, and gaming vessels; 110,000 commercial fishing vessels harvest waters under U.S.
jurisdiction; and millions of Americans and foreign tourists use 16 million recreational
craft and frequent thousands of miles of U.S. beaches. In the not-too-distant future, cruise
ships carrying 6,000 or more people will head for evermore remote areas. Fewer “mega-
ports” along U.S. coasts will serve greater numbers of ships, while smaller “feeder ports”
will contribute to burgeoning vessel densities in offshore areas – all of which will increase
the requirement for effective vessel identification and tracking. Additionally, U.S. military
strategy and operations will depend upon efficient inland waterways and multimodal
transport nodes, safe ports, and secure sealift for some 95 percent of material sent to over-
seas conflicts.
Thus, maritime security is the Coast Guard’s unique contribution to U.S.
national security in the inland waterways and maritime domains. It embraces all elements
of the cultural, social, environmental, economic, political, diplomatic, and military dimen-
sions that today shape America’s national security strategy, policies, and programs of global
engagement. Indeed, maritime security begins at America’s inland waterways and river
transport systems that channel commerce to and from the rest of the world. And it
encompasses roles, missions, and tasks that seek to safeguard U.S. citizens, interests, and
friends increasingly at risk from a broad spectrum of threats and challenges.
A military, multimission, maritime service, the Coast Guard provides singular,
non-redundant, and complementary capabilities to protect America’s maritime security
interests. As America’s Guardian of the Seas and the only U.S. Armed Service with broad
law enforcement authority, the Coast Guard truly is a unique instrument of U.S.
national security.

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 E. Maritime Areas of Concern to the
Deepwat er Pro j e c t
The Arctic Ocean is by far the smallest of the Earth’s oceans; the deepest sounding
obtained in Arctic waters is 18,050 feet, but the average depth is only 3,240 feet. All Arctic
waters are cold. The Arctic water from the surface to a depth of 650 feet is the most
variable because of the continual freezing and thawing cycle and because of additions of
fresh water from rivers and from precipitation. Warmer Atlantic water underlies this layer
to a depth of about 3,000 feet. Bottom water extends to the ocean floor; it is somewhat
colder but similar in salinity. An inflow of Pacific water of warmer temperature and greater
salinity may be observed in the Chukchi Sea, flowing as a wedge between the Arctic and
Atlantic waters. Between about 60 N and 75 N the occurrence of sea ice is seasonal; above
75 N it is relatively permanent.
The Bering Sea may be divided into two nearly equal parts: a relatively shallow area
along the continental and insular shelves in the north and east and a much deeper area in
the southwest. In the shelf area, which is an enormous underwater plain, the depths are, in
most cases, less than 500 feet. The deep part in the southwestern portion of the sea is also a
plain, lying at depths of 12,000 to 13,000 feet and divided by separate ridges into three
basins: the larger Aleutian Basin to the north and east, the Bowers Basin to the south, and
the Komandor Basin to the west. The sea’s deepest point, 13,442 feet, is in the Bowers
Basin. Although the Bering Sea is situated in the same latitude as Great Britain, its climate
is much more severe. The southern and western parts are characterized by cool, rainy
summers with frequent fogs and comparatively warm, snowy winters. Winters are extreme
in the northern and eastern portions, with temperatures of -31 to -49 F and high winds.
The summers in the north and east are cool, with comparatively low precipitation.
The Pacific Ocean extends the length of the Americas’ western coast, the narrow
Bering Strait separates it from Russia and Asia to the northwest, the Arctic Ocean and
several of the continent’s major islands lie to the north. The Pacific occupies about one-
third of the surface of the Earth and is by far the largest of the world’s oceans. Its area,
excluding adjacent seas, encompasses approximately 63.8 million square miles. It has twice
the area and more than twice the water volume of the Atlantic – the next-largest ocean. Its
area exceeds that of the whole land surface of the globe, Antarctica included. The mean
depth of the Pacific (excluding adjacent seas) is 14,040 feet. The Pacific and Arctic systems
mingle their waters in the Northern Hemisphere at the shallow Bering Strait. Except for its
extreme northern and southern sections, which are characterized by fjords and numerous
off-lying islands, and except for the deeply indented Gulf of California, the coastal
boundary is relatively regular and the continental shelf narrow.
The Atlantic Ocean and its marginal seas constitute the world’s second largest ocean
after the Pacific and have an area of 41.1 million square miles; the Atlantic proper has an
area of 31,830,000 square miles. The average depth (with marginal seas) of 10,925 feet is
somewhat less than that of the Pacific and Indian Oceans because of extensive continental
shelves in the north and the shallowness of the marginal seas. These seas include the Baltic,
North, Black, and Mediterranean seas to the east and Baffin Bay, Hudson Bay, the Gulf of
St. Lawrence, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean Sea to the west.
The Gulf of Mexico is a partially landlocked body of water on the southeastern
periphery of the North American continent. To the northwest, north, and northeast it is
bounded by the southern coast of the United States, while to the west, south, and southeast
it is bounded by the east coast of Mexico. It is connected to the Atlantic Ocean by the
Florida Strait, running between the peninsula of Florida and the island of Cuba, and to the
Caribbean Sea by the Yucatán Channel, which runs between the Yucatán Peninsula and
Cuba. Both these channels are about 100 miles wide. The Gulf’s greatest east-west and
north-south extent are approximately 1,100 and 800 miles, respectively, and it covers an
area of some 600,000 square miles.

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 The Caribbean Sea is a partially landblocked body of water, roughly situated
between 10 degrees North/64 degrees West and 23 degrees North/85 degrees West. It is
bounded by the east coasts of Mexico (Yucatán Peninsula), Belize, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica; the northern coastlines of Panama, Colombia, Venezuela,
and Trinidad and Tobago; and is ringed to the north and east by Cuba, Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, the U.S. and British Virgin Islands, and the Leeward
and Windward Islands chains. It is approximately 1.063 million square miles in area, and
the maximum depth is 25,200 feet.

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F. Design and Operati onal Characteristics
of Coast Guard Deepwater Cutters and
A i rc r a f t

F-1. Cutter Operating Characteristics

CLASS Secretary Famous Reliance Mature Mature Mature Island Island (C)
(230) (213) (282) (A &B)

Class Type WHEC WMEC WMEC WMEC WMEC WMEC WPB WPB
LOA (ft.) 378’ 4.5” 270 210 230 213 282 110 110
Beam (ft.) 42 38 34 43 41 50 21’ 1” 21’ 1”
Draft (ft.) 18’ 9.25” 14 10.5 15 15 15 7’ 3” (A) 7’ 3”
7’ 1” (B)
Masthead Height 113 91 72.4 90 90 104 43 43
(ft.)
Displacement 3,340 1,820 1,020 1,920 1,750 2,929 162 (A) 154 (B) 152
(tons)
Propellers 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2
Propulsion Type CODOG Diesel Diesel Diesel/ Diesel/ Diesel Diesel Diesel
Electric Electric
Engines 2 Fairbanks- 2 Alco 18V-251E 2 Alco 16V 3 Fairbanks- 4 Cooper- 4 Caterpillar 2 Alco- 2
Morse 38TD8 diesels -251B Morse 38D Bessemer 3516 diesels Paxman Caterpillar
1/8 diesels, 2 diesels diesels, GSB-8 diesels, Valenta 16 3516 diesels
Pratt & Whitney Electric Drive Electric Drive RP200-1
FT4 gas turbines CM diesels
Horsepower 7,254/36,000 7,290 5,000 UA UA UA 5,760 5,460
Officers 19 14 12 10 9 7 2 2
Enlisted 147 86 65 68 66 92 14 14
Flight Deck HH-65/HH-60 HH-65 HH-65 None None HH-65 None None
Capability HH-60 (B only)
Fuel Capacity 212,665 79,875 48,645 82,500 75,000 210,300 9,306 (A) 10,382
(gallons) 10,382 (B)
Maximum Range 14,000 nm @ 9,900 nm @ 6,100 nm @ UA UA UA 3,300 nm @ 3,500 nm @
11 kts 12 kts 13 kts 13 kts (A) 10 kts
2,960 nm @
13 kts
Stores Endurance 45 21 21 21 21 25 5 5
(days)
Maximum Speed 29 19.5 18 14 15 18 29.5 26
(knots)
Cruising Speed 19 15 14 UA UA UA UA UA
(knots)
Maximum 24 19 17 10 14 16 26 26
Continuous
Speed (knots)
Economic Speed 11 12 13 8 10 13 13 10
(knots)
RHIB 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1
MSB 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
Personnel Evacuees 500 450 325 UA UA UA 150 150
Additional Personnel 25 9 9 UA UA UA 2 2
Support

UA – Unavailable
Source: U.S. Coast Guard (G-ADW), September 1999.

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 F-2. Aircraft Operating Characteristics

Class Name HC-130 HU-25 (A) HU-25 (B) HU-25 (C) C-20B HH-60J HH-65A

Manufacturer Lockheed Falcon Jet Falcon Jet Falcon Jet Gulfstream Sikorsky Aerospatiale
Wing Span/Rotor Diameter 132’ 7” 54’ 54’ 54’ 77’ 10” 54’ 39’ 2”
Height 38’ 3” 18’ 18’ 18’ 24’ 6” 17’ 13’
Length 97’ 9” 56’ 56’ 56’ 83’ 65’ 44’ 5”
Wing Area (sq ft) 1,734 450 450 450 UA
Max GrossWeight (lbs) 175,000 32,000 32,000 33,510 70,200 21,884 9,200
Empty Weight (lbs) 76,780 25,500 25,500 19,000 40,400 14,500 6,092
Number Engines 4 2 2 2 2 2 2
Propulsion Type Allison Garrett Garrett Garrett Rolls Royce General Lycoming
T56-A15 ATF3-6-2C ATF3-6-2C ATF3-6-2C Spey 511-8 Electric LTS-101-
Turboprop Turbofan Turbofan Turbofan Turbofan T700-401C 750B-2 Gas
Gas Turbines Turbines
Fuel Capacity (lbs) 62,900 10,431 10,431 10,431 28,300 6,460 1,900
Max Endurance (hrs) 14 5.45 5.45 5.45 8 7 3.5
Max Speed (kts) 330 450 450 450 501 180 165
Cruising Speed (kts) 290 410 410 410 459 140 120
Economical Speed (kts) 248 250 250 250 442 127 120
Max Range (nm) 4,500 1,940 1,940 1,940 3,691 700 300
Radius of Action (nm) 1,600 800 800 800 3,000 300 150
Service Ceiling (ft) 33,000 41,000 + 41,000 + 41,000 + 45,000 5,000 (hover) 7,510
(hover)
Take-Off Power (hp) 4 x 4,508 2 x 5,440 2 x 5,440 2 x 5,440 2 x 11,400 2 x 1,662 2 x 680
shp lbs thrust lbs thrust lbs thrust lbs thrust shp shp
Sea Level Climb (fpm) 2,570 UA UA UA 3,000 576 UA
Number Officers 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Number Enlisted 5 3 3 3 or 5 2 2 3
Number Operational 26 9 3 8 1 35 80
Storage or Support 4 16 4 1 0 7 14
Total Airframes 30 25 7 9 1 42 94
Programmed Flight(hrs) 22,400 7,200 2,400 6,400 500 24,920 48,000
Cargo Sling Capacity 6,000 lbs 2,000 lbs
Rescue Hoist Capacity UA 600 lbs

UA – Unavailable
Source: U.S. Coast Guard (G-ADW), September 1999.

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G. Integrated Deepwater System Pro j e c t
Industry Teams, Phase 1

Avondale Industries, Inc.

Newport News Shipbuilding
Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Corporation
John J. McMullen & Associates, Inc.
DAI, Inc.
Raytheon Systems Company

Science Applications International Corporation

Marinette Marine Corporation
Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation
Soza & Company, Ltd.
Bath Iron Works
CTM Automated Systems
AMSEC
Fuentez Systems Concepts, Inc.
Gibbs & Cox, Inc.
Interactive Television Corporation
Clark Atlanta University

Lockheed Martin Government Electronic Systems

Ingalls Shipbuilding, Litton PRC, M. Rosenblatt & Son, Sperry Marine, Inc., Litton Data
Systems,University of New Orleans
Halter Marine
Bollinger Shipyards Inc.
Bell Helicopter Textron
Lockheed Martin Information Systems
Lockheed Martin Radar & Surveillance Systems
Lockheed Martin Sanders
Lockheed Martin Aeronautical Systems
Lockheed Martin Federal Systems
Lockheed Martin Management and Data Systems
LOGICON Syscon
L-3 Communications, Inc.
PROSOFT

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 H. Glossary
ADW .........................USCG Deepwater Acquisition Project Office
AMIO........................Alien Migrant Interception Operation
AOR..........................Area of Responsibility
APF............................Afloat Prepositioning Force
ASCM .......................Anti-Ship Cruise Missile
ASW..........................Anti-Submarine Warfare
ATON.......................Aids to Navigation
C3..............................Command, Control, and Communications
C4ISR........................Command, Control, Communications, Computers,
IntelligenceSurveillance, and Reconnaissance
CG/CGN..................guided missile cruiser/nuclear-powered guided missile cruiser
CinC..........................Commander-in-Chief
CNO.........................Chief of Naval Operations (U.S. Navy)
COTS ........................Commercial Off-The-Shelf
CV/CVN...................aircraft carrier/nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
DEA ..........................Drug Enforcement Agency
DER..........................radar picket destroyer escort
DGPS........................Differential Global Positioning System
DoD..........................Department of Defense
DoT...........................Department of Transportation
DD-21.......................Land-Attack Destroyer for the 21st Century (U.S. Navy program)
DDG.........................guided missile destroyer
DIO...........................Defence Intelligence Organization (Australia)
DIS............................Defence Intelligence Service (United Kingdom)
DP.............................dual-purpose
EEZ...........................Exclusive Economic Zone
ELT............................Enforcement Laws and Treaties
EO.............................electro-optical
FAO...........................Food and Agriculture Organization (United Nations)
FBI.............................Federal Bureau of Investigation
FEMA........................Federal Emergency Management Agency
FF..............................frigate
FFG...........................guided missile frigate
FLAR.........................Forward-Looking Airborne Radar
FLIR..........................Forward-Looking Infrared sensor
FMS...........................Foreign Military Sales
FRAM .......................Fleet Rehabilitation and Modernization
GCCS........................Global Command and Control System
GDP..........................Gross Domestic Product
GOTS........................Government Off-The-Shelf
GPS...........................Global Positioning System
IALA..........................International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
ICC............................Intelligence Coordination Center (U.S. Coast Guard)
IEC............................International Electro-Technical Commission
IDS............................Integrated Deepwater Systems
IMB...........................International Maritime Bureau
IMO..........................International Maritime Organization (United Nations)
IPO............................International Programs Office (Department of the Navy)
IR...............................InfraRed
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ITU ...........................International Telecommunications Union
J5...............................Director of Plans and Policies, Joint Staff
JLENS.......................Joint Land-attack cruise missile defense Elevated Netted Sensor
JTIDS........................Joint Tactical Information Distribution System
JV2010......................Joint Vision 2010 publication
LAMPS......................Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (helicopter)
LHD..........................Landing Helicopter Dock (amphibious assault ship)
LNG..........................Liquified Natural Gas
LORAN.....................Long-Range Navigation system
LRR...........................Long-Range Rescue and Recovery
LRS............................Long-Range Search
MarAD......................Maritime Administration
MDZ.........................Maritime Defense Zone
MEY ..........................Maximum Economic Yield
MIO..........................Maritime Intercept Operations
MPS...........................Maritime Prepositioning Ships
MRR..........................Medium-Range Rescue and Recovery
MRS..........................Medium-Range Search
MSY ..........................Maximum Sustainable Yield
MLE..........................Maritime Law Enforcement
mmt...........................millions of metric tons
MTS ..........................Marine Transportation System
MTW ........................Major Theater War
MV............................Motor Vessel
N6.............................Director, Space Information Warfare, Command and Control (U.S. Navy)
NAFTO.....................North Atlantic Free Trade Organization
NATO .......................North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC..........................Nuclear, Biological, Chemical weapons
NGFS........................Naval Gun Fire Support
NGO.........................Non-Governmental Organization
nm.............................nautical mile
NMFS.......................National Marine Fisheries Service
OC ............................USCG Operational Capabilities Directorate
OPL...........................USCG Office of Law Enforcement
ONDCP....................Office of National Drug Control Policy
ONI...........................Office of Naval Intelligence (U.S. Navy)
OOTW .....................Operations Other than War
OPA...........................Oil Pollution Act
OPV..........................offshore patrol vessel
OTEC .......................Ocean Thermal Energy Conversion
PAWSS ......................Ports and Waterways Safety Program
PME..........................Peacetime Military Engagement
POSD........................Port Operations/Security and Defense
PRC ...........................People’s Republic of China
PVO ..........................Private Volunteer Organization
QDR .........................Quadrennial Defense Review
R&D.........................Research and Development
RVN..........................Republic of Vietnam
SAR ...........................Search and Rescue, also Synthetic Aperture Radar
Semper Paratus..........Always Prepared (U.S. Coast Guard motto)
SLAR.........................Side-Looking Airborne Radar
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 SNO..........................Statement of No Objection
SOLAS ......................Safety of Life at Sea convention
SOUTHCOM..........U.S. Southern Command
SPS............................Systems Performance Specifications
SRR...........................Short-Range Rescue and Recovery
SSC............................Smaller-Scale Contingencies
TACTASS..................Tactical Towed-Array Sonar System
TEU ..........................Twenty-foot Equivalent Units
UN............................United Nations
USAID......................U.S. Agency for International Development
USC...........................U.S. Code
USCG........................U.S. Coast Guard
USCGC.....................U.S. Coast Guard Cutter
USMC.......................U.S. Marine Corps
USN..........................U.S. Navy
VTIS..........................Vessel Traffic Information System
VTOL........................Vertical Take-Off or Landing (aircraft)
WAGB.......................USCG icebreaker
WAGC.......................USCG amphibious command ship
WMD........................Weapons of Mass Destruction (nuclear, chemical, biological)
WPG.........................USCG patrol boat
WHEC......................USCG high-endurance cutter
WHO........................World Health Organization
WLB..........................USCG buoy tender
WMEC......................USCG medium-endurance cutter

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