North Korea’s

Military Strategy
HOMER T. HODGE
© 2003 Homer T. Hodge

S imply put, military strategies derive from national strategies intended to

achieve goals and conditions that satisfy national interests. Military strate-
gies reflect capabilities vis-à-vis potential opponents, resource constraints, and
desired end states. North Korea is no different; its military strategy is a reflection
of Pyongyang’s national goals. Military strategies also reflect what one might
call “cultural rules of engagement”; i.e., they are based on the socially con-
structed views unique to the nation.1
Pyongyang’s Foremost National Goal
Historically, Pyongyang’s foremost goal has been the reunification of
the Korean Peninsula on North Korean terms. The regime’s constitution de-
scribes reunification as “the supreme national task,”2 and it remains a consis-
tently pervasive theme in North Korean media. However, despite what the North
Koreans have continued to tell us for the past five decades, outside observers and
specialists differ greatly over exactly what North Korea’s goals really are.
Since at least the mid-1990s, there has been a widespread view among
Korea observers that, because of severe economic decline, food shortages, and
related problems, regime survival has replaced reunification as Pyongyang’s
most pressing objective.3 Further, these observers argue, despite its rhetoric,
North Korea realizes that reunification through conquest of South Korea is no
longer possible.4 There are also some who argue that the North Korean leadership
has recognized the need to initiate substantial change in order to survive in the in-
ternational community and is embarking on economic reform, reconciliation
with South Korea, and reduction of military tensions. In addition to the goals of
regime survival, reform, and reconciliation, there is another explanatory view
of North Korea’s foremost national goal that has been held by a minority of
observers for several decades (and has been a consistent theme of North Korean

68 Parameters
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media)—defense against foreign invasion by “imperialist aggressors and their
lackey running dogs.”5 Adherents of this view believe that the North Korean
leadership genuinely fears an attack by the United States and South Korea and
maintains a strong military purely for defense.6 President Bush’s reference to
the “axis of evil” in his January 2002 State of the Union address, announcement
of plans to adopt a “pre-emptive” military strategy, and increasing numbers of
statements by Administration officials about US intentions to employ military
force to remove Iraq’s Saddam Hussein from power have added support to the
“defense” explanation. Some have also argued that enhancement of the military
by Kim Jong Il7 serves primarily to strengthen his domestic political power base.
While there is an obvious element of truth in this proposition, it is an oversimpli-
fication that distorts the true role of military strength in the regime.
Others accept North Korea’s word that reunification remains the pri-
mary goal and argue that Pyongyang’s long-term strategy to dominate the penin-
sula by any means has not changed. They cite North Korea’s continued focus of
scarce resources to the military,8 development of longer-range ballistic missiles,
and the recent revelation by Pyongyang that it seeks a nuclear weapons capabil-
ity9 as indications that reunification remains the foremost goal.
The preponderance of evidence clearly supports the conclusion that re-
unification under the leadership of Kim Jong Il, by whatever means, remains
“the supreme national task.” North Korean media rhetoric continues to extol re-
unification under Kim. A parallel but closely related theme is that of completing
the socialist revolution. When North Korean leaders speak of achieving “social-
ist revolution in our country,” they mean unification of the entire peninsula on
their terms.10 The Kim regime in North Korea considers the entire peninsula as
constituting its sovereign territory. It does not recognize South Korea as being a
separate nation, nor the government of South Korea as legitimate. Therefore,
when North Korea refers to “our country” or the “fatherland,” they mean the en-
tire Korean peninsula. When read in the original Korean, the meaning of these
terms becomes much clearer. The North Korean leaders view the southern half of
their country as occupied by “US imperialists” and the government of South Ko-
rea as “puppets serving their imperialist masters.” “Defense” does not refer to de-
fending North Korea, but to defending all of Korea. Accordingly, “defense of the
fatherland” means (1) reclaiming that portion of Korea—i.e., South Korea—that

Homer T. Hodge is the Senior Intelligence Officer for Asia at the US Army National
Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC) in Charlottesville, Virginia. He is a retired Army officer
and former Northeast Asia Foreign Area Officer with active service in Korea and Japan. His
civilian service includes assignments with the National Security Agency in the United States
and Korea; the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade in Korea; and the Office of Special Advi-
sor to CINCUNC/CFC/USFK. Mr. Hodge has served in his current position with NGIC (and
its predecessor, the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center) since 1990, and has
written numerous intelligence studies on North Korea’s military forces.

Spring 2003 69
“Reunification of the peninsula remains the
foremost goal that drives North Korea’s
national strategy.”

is currently occupied and controlled by the “imperialists,” and (2) defending

against further encroachment by “US imperialists.” While they certainly see that
the possibility of a popular armed revolution in South Korea, particularly one
sympathetic to Pyongyang, is extremely remote,11 reunification through force of
arms appears to remain possible to the North Korean leadership.12
Without question, survival is a basic goal of incumbent regimes of all
nation-states; North Korea is no exception. However, in the long term, reunifica-
tion is essential to regime survival. In the near- to mid-term, North Korea may be
able to “muddle through” economically, based on donations from the outside, pri-
marily from the United States and South Korea. However, pursuit of such a course
can only lead to dependency and loss of control.13 Such dependency is inconsistent
with the ideological tenet of Juche (self-reliance).14 The alternative to control of
the entire peninsula is increasing dependence on South Korea, leading to complete
economic absorption by Seoul and a breakdown of isolation and information con-
trol. The result would be the awakening of the North Korean populace to the true
economic and social conditions of daily life in South Korea and, ultimately, the
demise of the Kim regime.15 Clearly, regime survival, national defense, and a self-
sufficient economy are logical goals; however, reunification of the peninsula
remains the foremost goal that drives North Korea’s national strategy.16
In the North, the fear of conquest and defeat through economic absorp-
tion by South Korea undoubtedly has outweighed any fear of attack. North Korean
leaders must know that time is on Seoul’s side; if the South Koreans bide their
time, the cost of slowly but steadily making inroads into North Korea through eco-
nomic means is obviously far smaller than the price in terms of blood and treasure
required to conquer the North militarily and then rebuild. South Korea enjoys an
increasing and irreversible economic lead over North Korea.17
A stronger case, based on recent events and statements of US officials,
could be made to support the argument that North Korean leaders increasingly
fear a US-led attack. The danger here is that as the North Korean leadership sees
US actions in the war on terror, they may conclude that the United States intends
to launch an attack to remove Kim Jong Il from power and decide to execute a
preemptive surprise attack on South Korea. US initiation of military action
against Iraq could prove to be the catalyst for a North Korean decision to go to
war. While such an attack would be a gamble, the North Korean leadership could

70 Parameters
judge that the US focus on and concentration of military power in operations
against Iraq would strengthen North Korea’s chances of success.
North Korea’s surprising admission to US Assistant Secretary of State
James A. Kelly during talks in Pyongyang on 16 October 2002 that it has a secret
ongoing nuclear weapons development program was probably prompted by in-
creasing North Korean concerns about possible US military action.
Historical Background
Knowledge of the 20th-century history of Korea is essential to under-
standing North Korean national interests and goals. Until the end of World War II
in 1945, Korea had remained a single, ethnically and culturally homogenous coun-
try for over a thousand years. Initially divided on a temporary basis by the United
States and Soviet Union along the 38th parallel to facilitate the surrender and de-
mobilization of Japanese forces stationed in Korea, this division quickly became
permanent as US-Soviet relations cooled. By 1948, two governments, each claim-
ing sovereignty over the entire peninsula, had been established: the Soviet-
supported communist Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in the north, and the
US-backed Republic of Korea in the south.18 The national policies of both Koreas
have been shaped by the underlying aim of eventual reunification.
The all-encompassing impact on North Korea of the character, person-
ality, life experiences, and thinking of its founder and first leader, Kim Il Sung, is
probably unique among modern nations. The past and current history, nature, and
direction of the country cannot be understood apart from Kim Il Sung; eight years
after his death, his influence remains dominant.19 Kim’s perspective on the world
and his view of the purpose of political power and the state were defined by his
early education in Chinese schools and ideological training by Chinese Commu-
nists, his experience as a guerrilla fighter with the Chinese Communists against
the Japanese in Manchuria, and his military training and further political educa-
tion in the Soviet Union during World War II. The wartime Soviet state became
the model on which the North Korean regime was created by Kim Il Sung.20
As a key element of his ideological models (Stalin, Mao), “militarism”
had a defining impact on Kim’s thinking in his early formative years. The experi-
ence of the Korean War further strengthened this view. Kim, reflecting Maoist
strategic thought, saw contradictory elements as driving history. Conflict did not
require a solution; it was the solution to political problems. Hence, politics and
international relations were processes by which contradictions were resolved
through conflict, and the nature of that conflict was zero-sum. Accordingly, to
Kim, the purpose of the state, like the anti-Japanese guerrilla unit, was to wage
war effectively. In his view, economic activity produced the means to wage war,
education produced soldiers to wage war, and ideology convinced the people of
the sociological and historical inevitability of war.21 For Kim, war in the near-
term meant reunifying the Korean peninsula on Pyongyang’s terms and, in the
long-term, continuing the global struggle against US imperialism.

Spring 2003 71
 From this thinking and Kim’s early experiences evolved a unique North
Korean nationalism that was not so much inspired by Korean history or past cul-
tural achievements as by the Spartan outlook of the anti-Japanese guerrillas. This
nationalism focused on imagined past wrongs and promises of retribution for
“national leaders” (i.e., South Korean officials) and their foreign backers (i.e.,
the United States). The nationalism of Kim Il Sung capitalized on historic xeno-
phobia, stressing the “purity” of all things Korean against the “contamination” of
foreign ideas, and inculcating the population with a sense of fear and animosity
toward the outside world. Most important, this nationalism emphasized “that the
guerrilla ethos was not only supreme, but also the only legitimate basis on which
to reconstitute a reunified Korea.”22
Militarism has remained an essential aspect of the character of the North
Korean state since its founding in 1948; it constitutes a key element of the strategic
culture of the regime. Accordingly, the maintenance of a powerful, offensive mili-
tary force has always been and remains fundamental to the regime. This perspec-
tive was inculcated into the thinking of Kim’s son and heir apparent, Kim Jong Il,
throughout his life and is reflected in the younger Kim’s policies, writings, and
speeches. This militarism was the primary instrument to which he turned in order
to deal with North Korea’s severe economic crisis of the 1990s. Kim adopted the
“military-first political method” as the means to survive and overcome this crisis.
Accordingly, “military-first politics”23 is the key element in the current theme of
creating a “strong and prosperous nation” that is capable of realizing completion of
the “socialist revolution”—i.e., reunification. “Military-first politics” is more
than the employment of military terminology to describe organization, discipline,
and perseverance in accomplishment of public tasks; it emphasizes the need for a
strong military even at the sacrifice of daily public needs. The abolition of the post
of state President and simultaneous elevation of the position of Chairman, Na-
tional Defense Commission, to the “highest post of state” in 1998 further under-
scores Kim’s ideological commitment to militarism as the fundamental basis for
regime survival. North Korea’s military strategy, as a component of national strat-
egy, reflects this commitment.
Pyongyang’s Military Strategy
North Korea’s military strategy is offensive and is designed to provide a
military option to achieve reunification by force employing surprise, over-
whelming firepower, and speed. It is shaped by the regime’s militarist ideology
and the strong influence of Soviet and Russian military thinking with historical
roots in the Korean nationalist resistance against Japanese colonialism, the Ko-
rean experience in the Chinese Civil War, and international events of the early
Cold War years as interpreted by the late Kim Il Sung. Continued emphasis on
maintaining this strategy, despite severe economic decline, suggests that Pyong-
yang continues to perceive an offensive military strategy as a viable option for
ensuring regime survival and realizing reunification on North Korean terms.

72 Parameters
 “US initiation of military action against Iraq
could prove to be the catalyst for a
North Korean decision to go to war.”

The offensive character of Pyongyang’s military strategy is demon-

strated by the organization and deployment of its forces. The primary instrument
of this strategy is North Korea’s armed forces, known collectively as the Korean
People’s Army (KPA).
The KPA of 2003 is an imposing and formidable force of 1.17 million ac-
tive personnel with a reserve force of over 5 million, making it the fifth largest
military force in the world.24 The ground forces are organized into eight infantry
corps, four mechanized corps, an armor corps, and two artillery corps. The KPA
air force consists of 92,000 personnel, and is equipped with some 730 mostly
older combat aircraft and 300 helicopters. The 46,000-man KPA navy is primarily
a coastal force.25 Additionally, the KPA maintains the largest special operations
force (SOF) in the world, consisting of approximately 100,000 highly trained, to-
tally dedicated soldiers.26 A long history of bloody incursions into South Korea un-
derscores the offensive mission of this force.
The overwhelming majority of active ground forces is deployed in three
echelons—a forward operational echelon of four infantry corps; supported by a
second operational echelon of two mechanized corps, the armor corps, and an ar-
tillery corps; and a strategic reserve of the two remaining mechanized corps and
the other artillery corps. These forces are garrisoned along major north-south
lines of communication that provide rapid, easy access to avenues of approach
into South Korea. The KPA has positioned massive numbers of artillery pieces,
especially its longer-range systems, close to the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) that
separates the two Koreas.27
Soviet concepts of deep operations required the employment of air forces
capable of achieving air superiority and air-deliverable ground forces; lacking the
resources to produce or deploy such forces, the KPA compensated by greatly in-
creasing deployment of conventional cannon and rocket artillery and tactical and
strategic SOF.
Key elements of Pyongyang’s military strategy include the employ-
ment of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear (as recently revealed by
Pyongyang), and missile systems including short- and medium-range and proba-
bly intercontinental missiles. The commander of US forces in Korea assesses
that North Korea has large chemical weapon stockpiles, is self-sufficient in the
production of chemical agents, and may have produced enough plutonium for at

Spring 2003 73
least two nuclear weapons.28 North Korea has now demonstrated the capability to
strike targets throughout the entire territory of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and
Japan, as well as large portions of China and Russia. In an attack on South Korea,
Pyongyang could use its missiles in an attempt to isolate the peninsula from stra-
tegic reinforcement and intimidate or punish Japan. North Korea’s inventory of
ballistic missiles includes over 500 SCUD short-range ballistic missiles that can
hit any target in South Korea and medium-range No Dong missiles capable of
reaching Japan and the US bases there. While they have not flight-tested long-
range missiles—at least, in North Korea—they have continued research, devel-
opment, and rocket engine testing.29
Although this is an offensive strategy, there are defensive aspects to it.
An army must protect its flanks whether attacking or defending. This principle
takes on added importance for a peninsular state such as Korea. Both geography
and history have taught the North Koreans the vital necessity of protecting their
coasts; during the Korean War, United Nations forces conducted two major am-
phibious operations in Korea, one on each coast.30 The KPA continues to improve
coastal defenses, especially in the forward area. They have established or
strengthened air defense positions around airfields, near major ports, and along
the primary highway between Pyongyang and the DMZ. Additionally, there is a
corps-size capital defense command responsible for the defense of Pyongyang.31
However, KPA force deployment lacks defensive depth at the operational level of
war. The North Koreans have not constructed defensive belts across the penin-
sula similar to Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA) Alfa, Bravo, and Charlie
in South Korea.32 While there are local defensive positions along lines of commu-
nication and key intersections manned by local militia and reserve units, they
have not established an operational-level network of defensive strong points in-
terlocked with obstacles and planned defensive fires. The forward-deployed ar-
tillery is sufficiently close to the DMZ that, in a defensive role, it would be
vulnerable to surprise and early destruction by attack from South Korea.33
Taken together, these facts strengthen the judgment that Pyongyang’s
military strategy is not defensive but offensive. A strong argument can probably
also be made that North Korean military strategy would remain offensive even if
defense against a feared attack replaced reunification as the foremost goal of the
regime. North Korea’s “militarist” culture advocates offense as the most effec-
tive means of defense.34
Evolution of the Korean People’s Army
KPA military doctrine—or, to use the North Korean (and Russian) term,
military art—has followed the former Soviet (and current Russian) model very
closely throughout its evolution.35 The KPA, although claiming lineage to the
anti-Japanese guerrilla force of pre-World War II days, was established on 8 Feb-
ruary 1948, under Soviet military tutelage, as the primary instrument for carrying
out Pyongyang’s military strategy of reunifying the peninsula. Although efforts to

74 Parameters
liberate the southern half of Korea through armed insurgency and covert action be-
gan earlier, planning, organization, and training for military reunification was the
primary mission of the KPA from 1949 on. Veterans of the 1930s anti-Japanese
guerrilla operations and Koreans who had served with Chinese Communist mili-
tary formations against both the Japanese and later the Chinese Nationalists con-
stituted the core cadre of the new KPA; however, the organization, training,
doctrine, and military art closely mirrored the Soviet military thinking and prac-
tice of the period. The Soviets provided weapons and equipment as well as training
to the new force. Key KPA officers, including Kim Il Sung, had received training
and military experience in the Soviet Union during World War II. Additional-
ly, a cadre of Soviet army advisors assisted in training and in KPA tactical and
operational-level planning.36
On 25 June 1950, the KPA launched a military campaign to reunify Ko-
rea by force. However, despite impressive initial successes, the intervention of
United Nations (UN) forces, led by the United States, reversed the situation. By
October, UN forces had crossed the 38th parallel dividing the two countries and
were rapidly overrunning North Korea as they pursued the remnants of a defeated
and fleeing KPA. The intervention of 260,000 Chinese forces in November halted
and turned back the UN advance. By early summer of 1951, the front line had gen-
erally stabilized across the middle of the peninsula. Although two years of often
bloody fighting continued while the two sides negotiated, a military armistice was
concluded on 27 July 1953, separating the two military forces through the estab-
lishment of the DMZ roughly following the line of contact between the two oppos-
ing forces at the time.
After conclusion of the armistice, the KPA began rebuilding its military
capabilities, which had seriously weakened during the war. Economic recon-
struction was the most pressing task of the regime, and the military buildup ini-
tially took a lower priority; however, the KPA underwent an intensive program to
improve professionalism among its officers, implement a higher training stan-
dard, and attain and maintain greater battlefield capability. By mid-1958, the
KPA had reached a level of combat readiness that permitted the complete with-
drawal of all Chinese forces remaining in North Korea after the cessation of the
war. By 1960, KPA ground forces consisted of approximately 430,000 personnel
in 18 infantry divisions and five brigades.37
North Korea’s national strategy for reunification underwent significant
expansion and refinement beginning in 1960. Having failed to reunify the penin-
sula by purely military action, Kim Il Sung recognized the need to combine polit-
ical and diplomatic efforts with an offensive military strategy. He articulated this
approach in his “Three Fronts” strategy, which called for revolutions within
North Korea, South Korea, and internationally.38 In December 1962, the Fifth
Plenum of the Korean Workers Party Central Committee adopted a three-phase
plan to employ both conventional and unconventional means to affect reuni-
fication: (1) create a military-industrial base in North Korea, (2) neutralize the

Spring 2003 75
United States by subverting and destroying the US-South Korea alliance, and (3)
liberate South Korea through employment of insurgency and conventional
force.39 To implement the first phase, the leaders established four basic policies:
arming the entire population to prepare for protracted warfare, increasing the so-
phistication of military training, converting the entire country to a “fortress,” and
modernizing the armed forces. The second phase, which began in October 1966,
consisted of small-scale attacks against US and South Korean forces deployed
along the DMZ to break US national will. The third phase, based on Mao’s Peo-
ple’s War and the experience of the Vietnamese communist insurgency, began in
early 1968 and involved infiltration of SOF into South Korea to organize a social-
ist revolution among the populace. According to the plan, success in the third
phase would set the stage for a conventional military offensive to reunify Korea
under Pyongyang’s leadership.40
Despite a period of increased tension, violent clashes, and much blood-
shed during 1966-1969, the North Korean military strategy ultimately failed to
achieve its goals of breaking the US-South Korean alliance or creating an armed
revolution in South Korea. However, Pyongyang’s strategic objective of reunifi-
cation remained unchanged, and by the 1970s North Korean leaders modified
their military strategy to adopt a more conventional approach. This change was
probably driven not only by the failure of its 1960s policy, but also by the belief
that the United States was withdrawing its ground forces from Asia. This belief
was based on the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine in 1969, which called for a
draw-down of US forces in Asia, the withdrawal of the US 7th Infantry Division
from South Korea in 1971, and, later, the fall of South Vietnam and President
Carter’s plan to withdraw US ground forces from South Korea.
In the early 1970s, following the lead of Soviet military leaders and the-
orists who were rediscovering and beginning to apply the 1920s-1930s thinking
of Soviet military theorists Svechin, Tukhachevskii, Triandafillov, and others on
operational art and “deep operations,” the Soviet-trained officers of the KPA
were developing their version, termed “Two Front War.” As they envisioned it, a
very large conventional force, greatly reinforced with artillery, armor, and mech-
anized forces, employing surprise, speed, and shock, would break through the
DMZ, envelop and destroy South Korean forward forces, and rapidly overrun the
entire peninsula. This operation would be supported by a second front composed
of SOF infiltrated deep into the South Korean strategic rear to destroy, neutralize,
or disrupt South Korean and US air operations; command, control, and commu-
nications; and lines of communications.41 Throughout the 1970s, in the first of a
two-phased force expansion plan, North Korea emphasized the commitment of
scarce resources, development of industry, and military expansion and reorgani-
zation necessary to create such a force.42
During the 1970s, senior KPA officers writing in official journals echoed
Soviet military thinking as they characterized the nature of modern warfare
as three dimensional, with no distinction between front and rear, highly mobile,

76 Parameters
 “North Korea’s military strategy remains
an offensive strategy designed to
achieve reunification by force.”

and increasingly dependent upon mechanization, task organization, and im-

proved engineer capabilities.43 These articles presaged dramatic increases in
mechanized and truck-mobile infantry and self-propelled artillery battalions and
ultimately a major expansion, reorganization, and redeployment forward of KPA
ground forces.
Beginning in the early 1980s, North Korea began execution of phase two
of its force expansion plan by reorganizing its ground forces to form four mecha-
nized corps of five mechanized infantry brigades, an armor corps, and an artillery
corps. Most of the mechanized brigades were created from motorized infantry di-
visions in the forward corps. Two of the four mechanized corps, the armor corps,
and the artillery corps were deployed in the forward area along avenues southward
just behind the infantry corps located along the northern boundary of the DMZ. By
the mid-1980s, the KPA had activated a second artillery corps comprising
long-range artillery assets. Additionally, it had reconstituted those forward divi-
sions from which the mechanized forces had been formed.44 The ground forces had
increased from 720,000 in 1980 to 950,000 by 1994. Forward-deployed forces
(those within 100km, or about 60 miles, of the DMZ) had increased from 40 per-
cent to 70 percent of total troop strength.45
The end of communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the collapse of
the Soviet Union had a traumatic impact on Pyongyang. North Korea suddenly
found itself not only without significant ideological allies but also without essen-
tial economic and military assistance. In response to this profound predicament,
beginning in 1990 North Korea embarked on a comprehensive five-year program
to prepare the nation for war without outside assistance.46 This war preparation
campaign was much broader and more rigorous than any previous effort and had
the close attention of Kim Il Sung until his death in 1994. An effort to further im-
prove the capabilities of the KPA was an important element of this campaign.
This improvement included reorganization, redeployment, and reinforcement,
as well as quantitative and qualitative increases in training at all echelons. De-
spite serious resource shortfalls and a declining economy, these efforts continue
to the present.
Soviet military art has probably continued to be the dominant influence
on KPA strategy, operational art, and tactics. In 1978, Kim Il Sung directed that
“Military Foundation Day” be changed from 8 February to 25 April—the nomi-

Spring 2003 77
nal day of establishment of his anti-Japanese guerrilla army in 1932—to glorify
the supposed indigenous Korean origins of the KPA and obscure its Soviet ori-
gin. However, the KPA almost certainly remains a Soviet clone, despite North
Korean media statements to the contrary. Since at least late 1998, and possibly
earlier, the KPA has been in the process of increasing and concentrating tactical
and operational combat power well forward.47 This approach closely mirrors So-
viet theoretic and practical reaction to threats to their operational and strategic
depth posed by the US Army’s AirLand Battle doctrine and NATO Follow-On-
Forces Attack strategy of the 1980s.48 Lessons learned from studying the 1991
Gulf War, US operations in Kosovo, and current operations in Afghanistan have
probably inspired further KPA efforts in this direction.49
Initiation of a campaign to reunify Korea by force is a political decision
that may never be made. However, the KPA has had decades to develop a cam-
paign plan with a small number of military objectives that is probably extensively
scripted and war-gamed and would require limited flexibility and modification.
KPA forces are deployed optimally to launch an attack. The absolute need for sur-
prise dictates that an attack must be made when tensions on the peninsula are low
and preferably when the United States is engaged elsewhere—e.g., in Iraq—when
US forces in Northeast Asia are deployed out-of-area and when US stockpiles of
high-technology munitions are low. Although the possibility of a North Korean
victory seems counterintuitive, at least to outside observers, Pyongyang’s contin-
ued focus on maintaining and improving its offensive military capability at great
cost indicates that the leadership believes it is still possible.
Conclusion
The ideological underpinnings and strategic culture of North Korea’s re-
gime emphasize the dominance of militarism epitomized by a strong army. Reuni-
fication of the peninsula on North Korean terms remains the foremost strategic
goal of the regime. North Korea’s severe and probably irreversible economic de-
cline over the past decade places the regime’s survival in question. Therefore,
North Korean leaders must see reunification on their terms not only as their his-
toric purpose but also as essential to long-term survival. Continued investment in a
powerful military organized and deployed to execute an offensive military strat-
egy, despite its drain on a moribund economy, strongly suggests that North Korean
leaders perceive its military as probably the only remaining instrument for realiza-
tion of that goal. At the same time, they must realize that time is not on their side.
In his book, The Origins of Major War, Dale Copeland sets forth a strong
argument that a state facing irreversible economic decline but still possessing mili-
tary power vis-à-vis a competing state may resort to preventive war, especially if it
perceives its own decline as deep and inevitable.50 One might counter by arguing
that Pyongyang must know that it lacks any military superiority over the United
States, which guarantees the defense of South Korea through the security treaty.
This is no doubt true, as evidenced by the effective deterrence of a US military

78 Parameters
presence in South Korea for the past five decades. However, it is not so certain that
Kim Jong Il judges South Korean military forces alone as superior to the KPA.
North Korea’s continued insistence that the question of reunification can be settled
only among Koreans, and that the withdrawal of all foreign forces is essential to
that process,51 suggests that Pyongyang would prefer to deal militarily with the
South Korean army alone.
North Korea’s military strategy remains an offensive strategy designed
to achieve reunification by force. While the KPA has deployed forces to protect its
coasts, airfields, and especially the North Korean capital of Pyongyang, the overall
forward deployment of forces and, particularly, forward deployment of large num-
bers of long-range artillery underscore the offensive nature of its strategy.
Renunciation of reunification as its premier goal, shifting to a defensive
military strategy, or dismantling of the military force to achieve it would gravely
undermine the raison d’etre of the regime. North Korean leaders see the demise
of the Soviet Union as primarily the result of Gorbachev’s “New Thinking,”
which included the shift of the Soviet Union’s military strategy to “defensive de-
fense.” Therefore, regime survival depends on staying the course. Simply stated,
Pyongyang cannot abandon its offensive military strategy.

NOTES

1. Peter J. Katzenstein, “Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,” in The Culture of

National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 1996), p. 6. The author describes culture “as a broad label that denotes collective models of nation-state
authority or identity carried by custom or law. Culture refers to both a set of evaluative standards (such as norms
and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a
system, how they operate, and how they relate to one another.”
2. Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (Pyongyang: Foreign Language
Publishing House, 1998), p. 2. The current North Korean constitution was adopted in 1972; it was revised in
1992 and again in 1998. The paramount importance of reunification is a central theme in this constitution as
well as the first North Korean constitution adopted at the founding of the regime in 1948. The preamble to the
charter of the [North] Korean Workers’ Party declares that “the present task of the Party is to ensure the com-
plete victory of socialism in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the accomplishment of the revolu-
tionary goals of national liberation and the people’s democracy in the entire area of the country.”
3. National Intelligence Council Conference Report, North Korea’s Engagement—Perspectives, Outlook,
and Implications, 23 February 2001.
4. Victor D. Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction: Badges, Swords, or Shields?” Political
Science Quarterly, 117 (No. 2, 2002), 215.
5. This has been a continuous theme of North Korean media since the mid-1950s. For a recent example,
see Kim Chong-sun, “Military-First is Road to Victory of Anti-Imperialist, Independent Cause,” Nodong
Sinmun (Labor Newspaper), 19 June 2002, p. 6.
6. Prominent adherents of this view are Bruce Cumings and Selig S. Harrison. For example, see Cumings,
Korea’s Place in the Sun (New York: Norton, 1997), p. 461; Cumings, Parallax Visions: Making Sense of
American-East Asian Relations at the End of the Century (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1999), pp. 132-33;
Harrison, “The Missiles of North Korea, World Policy Journal, 17 (Fall 2000), 13-24.
7. Kim Jong Il is the current head of state and national leader of North Korea. He is the son of and successor
to Kim Il Sung, the founder of the regime, who died in July 1994.
8. North Korea invests 25 to 33 percent of GNP annually in its military. General Thomas A. Schwartz,
Commander, UNC/CFC/USFK, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 7 March 2000, 27
March 2001, and 5 March 2002.
9. Peter Slevin and Karen DeYoung, “N. Korea Reveals Nuclear Program,” The Washington Post, 17 Oc-
tober 2002, p. A1.

Spring 2003 79
 10. Socialist Constitution of the Democratic People’s Republic, p. 2. See also the “Study Material” for
North Korean military personnel entitled “On Eliminating Illusions about the Enemy and Sharpening the Bayo-
nets of Class” published by the Publication House of the Korean People’s Army and reprinted in Wolgan
Choson (Monthly Korea), 1 March 2002, pp. 72-81, hereinafter “Study Material.”
11. The high-ranking North Korean defector Hwang Jang Yop, described as the chief political ideologue
and principle regime authority of Juche, reportedly told Selig Harrison, in an interview in Pyongyang prior to
Hwang’s defection, that a communist revolution in South Korea was “completely out of the question.” Don
Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1998), p. 401.
12. “Study Material.” In this, Kim Jong Il is quoted as stating, “My view of reunification is armed reunifi-
cation in nature.” This point is further explained: “The history of the past half a century demonstrates that as
long as US imperialists and southern Korean puppets remain in our country, the fatherland’s reunification is ab-
solutely impossible. For the fatherland’s reunification, there exists only one method: force of arms.”
13. Nicholas Eberstadt, The End of North Korea (Washington: AEI Press, 1999), ch. 2, pp. 25-44. Recent
statements in the North Korean media have prompted some to speculate that Pyongyang may be initiating steps
to deal with chronic shortages; however, it is premature to conclude that North Korea is moving toward adop-
tion of a market-oriented economy. See “North Korea Ending Rationing, Diplomats Report,” The New York
Times, 20 July 2002; “Stitch by Stitch to a Different World,” Economist, 27 July - 2 August 2002.
14. Juche, also transliterated as Chuche, is Kim Il Sung’s application of Marxism-Leninism to North Ko-
rean culture and serves as a fundamental tenet of the national ideology. “Based on autonomy and self-reliance,
chuch’e has been popularized since 1955 as an official guideline for independence in politics, economics, na-
tional defense and foreign policy.” Mattes Savada, ed., North Korea: A Country Study (Washington: Federal
Research Division, Library of Congress, 1994), p. 324.
15. Stephen Bradner, “North Korea’s Strategy,” in Planning for a Peaceful Korea, ed. Henry D. Sokolski
(Carlisle, Pa.: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, February 2001), p. 48.
16. Ibid. Bradner’s “North Korea’s Strategy,” provides the most enlightening and comprehensive expla-
nation of North Korea’s national strategy of which I am aware.
17. South Korea, despite setbacks experienced during the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99, has continued
to achieve an incredible record of growth. North Korea, by contrast, faces desperate economic conditions with
little hope of relief or growth under the Kim regime. See data in CIA, The World Factbook, http://cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/geos.html. Cha, “North Korea’s Weapons of Mass Destruction,” describes an almost
20-fold gap in the GDPs of the two economies, p. 215.
18. Donald S. MacDonald, “The Role of the Major Powers in the Reunification of Korea,” The Washing-
ton Quarterly, 15 (Summer 1992), 135-53.
19. Adrian Buzo, The Guerrilla Dynasty: Politics and Leadership in North Korea (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1999), p. 1.
20. Ibid., p. 239.
21. Bradner, p. 24.
22. Buzo, p. 27.
23. Although the term, “military-first politics” was first pronounced officially in 1998, it is described as
“not the product of recent days. The overall political history of our socialism . . . can be called the history of
military-first leadership.” “In order to culminate the socialist cause in the long-term confrontation with imperi-
alism, we must naturally give importance to the military. The military-first political style . . . forges ahead with
the overall socialist cause by putting forward the military as the pillar for revolution.” Nodong Sinmun (Labor
Newspaper) and Kulloja (Worker) joint special article, “The Military-First Politics of our Party is Invincible,”
June 1999. Nodong Sinmun and Kulloja are both official publications of the North Korean government and, as
such, present the regime’s interpretation of events and direction of thought for the nation.
24. Schwartz testimony.
25. US Department of Defense, Country Handbook: North Korea (Washington: DOD, August 2000).
26. Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., North Korean Special Forces, Second Edition (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Insti-
tute Press, 1998), p. 1.
27. DOD, Country Handbook: North Korea.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. The US X Corps executed amphibious operations at Inchon on 15 September 1950 and at Wonsan on
25 October 1950.
31. Information derived from an unclassified briefing, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence J2, US
Forces Korea, as cited in Bradner, pp. 34-35.
32. FEBAs are concentric, fortified defensive belts situated across the peninsula as part of the defense of
the ROK. Bradner, p. 20.
33. Ibid., p. 35.

80 Parameters
 34. A constant theme in North Korean military writings is the requirement to take the offensive, even in the
defense. A typical example is found in a 15 June 1999 Nodong Sinmun article by Ch’e Song-kuk, “Strong
Self-Reliant Defense Capability is an Essential Guarantee for the Safeguard of Sovereignty”:
Defense for the sake of defense is a passive way of military action. With that sort of response, it is
absolutely impossible to bring on a favorable turn in a war situation. If we should cling to it, we
are bound to suffer tremendous damage and eventually be defeated. Only when we respond to a
preemptive attack with a more powerful counterattack, we can deal the enemy a devastating blow,
reverse the situation and win victory. Taking the initiative in military action by combining firm
defenses with powerful offensives is the way of combat to throw the aggressors into confusion,
force them on the defensive, and win final victory.
35. KPA organization, deployment, and operational and tactical doctrine have historically reflected, and
continue to reflect, a strong Soviet influence. See DOD, Country Handbook: North Korea. Many senior KPA of-
ficers have been trained in Soviet military schools, and Soviet military thinking has been the dominant influ-
ence in KPA military school curriculums and doctrinal writings.
36. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (June-November 1950), United States
Army in the Korean War series (Washington: GPO, 1986), ch. II.
37. Kiwon Chung, “The North Korean People’s Army and the Party,” in North Korea Today, ed. Robert A.
Scalapino (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), pp. 105-24.
38. Buzo, p. 60.
39. Ibid., pp. 68-69.
40. Ibid., p. 69. Bermudez and Daniel P. Bolger, Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low Intensity Conflict in
Korea, 1966-1969, Leavenworth Papers Number 19 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute,
1991) provide excellent, detailed overviews of this period.
41. Young Choi, “The North Korean Military Buildup and its Impact on North Korean Military Strategy in
the 1980s,” Asian Survey, 25 (March 1985), 341-42; David Reese, “North Korea: Undermining the Truce,” Con-
flict Studies, No. 69 (March 1976), pp. 2-3; Richard D. Stillwell, “Korea: The Implications of Withdrawal,” Asian
Affairs (September-October 1977), pp. 279-89; Joe Wood, “Persuading a President: Jimmy Carter and American
Troops in Korea,” Studies in Intelligence, 40 (No. 4, 1996), 98-100.
42. Choi, p. 342.
43. A typical example is Kim Chol-man, “The Characteristics of Modern Warfare and the Factors of Vic-
tory,” Kulloja (Workers), August 1976, pp. 34-40.
44. Information in this paragraph is taken from Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Founda-
tions of Military Strength (Washington: DIA, 1991).
45. Bradner, p. 34.
46. Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea: The Foundations of Military Strength, Update 1995 (rev.
ed.; Washington: DIA, March 1996), p. 13.
47. Schwartz testimony.
48. AirLand Battle and Follow-On-Forces Attack were strategies that emphasized applying long-range
weapons and precision-guided munitions to attack an enemy’s forward forces while striking and destroying re-
inforcing second- and third-echelon forces before they could reach the battlefield.
49. Schwartz testimony.
50. Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 2000), p. 20, writes:
A state . . . that is superior in military power but inferior in economic and potential power is more
likely to believe that, once its military power begins to wane, further decline will be inevitable and
deep. This is especially so if the trends of relative economic and potential power are downward as
well. The state will believe that there is little it can do through arms racing to halt its declining mil-
itary power: it would simply be spending a greater percentage of an already declining economic
base in the attempt to keep up with a rising state that has the resources to outspend it militarily.
Moreover, economic restructuring is unlikely to help, since the potential power that is the founda-
tion of economic power is also inferior and declining. Under these circumstances, a dominant
military power is likely to be pessimistic about the future and more inclined to initiate major war
as a “now-or-never” attempt to shore up its waning security.
51. Although Republic of Korea President Kim Dae-jung has said that, during private meetings in Pyong-
yang during the June 2000 ROK-North Korean Summit, North Korean leader Kim Jong Il agreed that the con-
tinued presence of US military forces in Korea was needed for regional stability (see, for example, Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, 3 March 2002, translation of interview with former ROK Unification Minister
Kang In-tok in Seoul Wolgan Choson in Korean), North Korean officials have continued to call for complete
withdrawal of US forces. For a typical example, see Pong Sun-Hwa, “Realization of National Independence
Idea Is Fatherland’s Reunification,” Nodong Sinmun (Labor Newspaper), 8 June 2002.

Spring 2003 81