Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies

Vol. 13, no. 2 (2023), pp. 279-306, doi : 10.18326/ijims.v13i2. 279-306

From radical labels to moderate

Islam: the transformation of the
Salafism movement in Indonesia
Roni Tabroni
Research Center for Treasures of Religion and Civilization, BRIN
E-mail: roni.tabroni@brin.go.id

Idham
Research Center for Treasures of Religion and Civilization, BRIN
E-mail: idham@brin.go.id

DOI:10.18326/ijims.v13i2. 279-306

Abstract
The contemporary Salafist movement in Indonesia began to develop in the
1970s. In its development, the Salafist movement later gave rise to various
factions. One of the results of the dynamic and contestation of these various
factions was the emergence of religious moderation movements of Salafists.
This article tries to explain the role of The Islamic Propagation Council of
Indonesia (DDII) and the Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA) in
the dynamics of the Salafist movement and to trace and describe the dynamics
and the religious moderation movements of the Salafist groups, particularly in
Jakarta, Indonesia. The research methods used are historical research methods
and qualitative methods with a case study approach. The results show that there
are adaptations emerging from the contemporary Salafist movement. These

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adaptations can be seen in the acceptance of the concept of the unitary state
of the Republic of Indonesia and democracy even within the framework of
Sharia and the presence of moderation or anti-violence ideas. This shows the
flexibility of the movement which arises from the need for the sustainability of
the organization or movement. In addition, cities present different challenges.
This then requires an organization to adapt, either in terms of strategy, method,
or proselytizing approach.

Gerakan Salafi kontemporer di Indonesia mulai berkembang pada tahun

1970-an. Dalam perkembangannya, gerakan tersebut kemudian memunculkan
berbagai faksi. Salah satu hasil dari dinamika dan kontestasi berbagai faksi ini
adalah munculnya gerakan moderasi beragama kaum Salafi. Artikel ini mencoba
menjelaskan peran Dewan Dakwah Islam Indonesia (DDII) dam Lembaga Studi
Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) dalam dinamika gerakan Salafi dan untuk menelusuri
dan menggambarkan dinamika dan gerakan moderasi beragama kelompok Salafi,
khususnya di Jakarta, Indonesia. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah
metode penelitian sejarah dan metode kualitatif dengan pendekatan studi kasus.
Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa ada adaptasi yang muncul dari gerakan
kaum Salafi kontemporer. Adaptasi-adaptasi ini dapat dilihat dari penerimaan
konsep Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia dan demokrasi walaupun dalam
kerangka Syariah dan adanya gagasan moderasi atau anti-kekerasan. Hal ini
menunjukkan adanya fleksibilitas gerakan yang muncul dari kebutuhan akan
keberlanjutan organisasi atau gerakan. Selain itu, kota menghadirkan tantangan
yang berbeda. Hal ini kemudian menuntut sebuah organisasi untuk beradaptasi,
baik dari dari segi strategi, metode, maupun pendekatan dakwah.

Keywords: Salafi movement; Moderate Islam; Urban Muslim; Al-Sofwah Foundation;

Wahdah Islamiyah

Introduction
One of the factors influencing the dynamics of Islamic movements in
Indonesia was the influx of various Islamic movements from the Middle
East in the 1980s. These movements are dominated by movements that
carry the idea of the rise of Islam. The movement became known as the

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puritanical Islamic movement, which is theoretically interpreted as a

movement that has an uncompromising belief in absolutism. In many ways,
its authority tends to be purist or intolerant of competing for different
points of view and views plural reality as a form of contamination of the
true truth1. The embryo of this movement refers to the pre-modernist
revivalism movement—a term proposed by Fazlur Rahman—which is
represented by the Wahabi movement and neo-revivalism associated
with the Salafist community. The two movements of the group- Wahabi
and Salafist were then considered to have formed the current puritanical
Islamic theology.
The term Salafist was first used by Muhammad Abduh and Rasyid
Ridho when it came to building a renewal movement in Egypt. The term
Salafist is then referred to as the model of understanding of the earliest
adherents of Islam, the Prophet, and companions. The term was later re-
popularized by Nashirudin Albani in the 1980s in Medina. The community
is known for al-Jamaah al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasib2. Salafi itself according to
Jahroni3 is a word that refers to religious thought that is leaned on the
companions or successors of the Prophet who lived in the three good early
periods of Islam or al-salaf al-salih. This emphasis on the early period of
Islam is to show the authenticity of the sources to be used.
The definition of Salafi as a movement according to Nashirudin Albani
is a movement to re-purify the teachings of Islam by promoting a campaign
of extermination of everything that is considered a heresy. Albani does not
use Wahhabism because it is considered that there is a cult impression of

1
Khaled M. Abou Fadl, Selamatkan Islam Dari Muslim Puritan, Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu
Semesta, 2006.
2
As’ad Said Ali, Ideologi Gerakan Pasca-Reformasi: Gerakan-Gerakan Sosial-Politik Dalam
Tinjauan Ideologis, Jakarta: LP3ES, 2012, 105.
3
Jajang Jahroni, “The Salafi Movement in Indonesia: From Muhammadiyah to Laskar
Jihad” In Islamic Thought and Movements in Contemporary Indonesia, edited by Rizal Sukma and
Clara Joewono, Jakarta: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007, 105.

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the character4. In addition, the Salafi movements can be seen from the
ideology or manhaj they espouse. According to Hasyim5, Salafist manhaj
can be formulated within two principled constraints. One is the purity
of the aqidah (tawhid al-rububiyah, tawhid al-uluhiyah, and tawhid al-asma wa
al-sifat); second is ittiba, or following the generation of al-salaf al-salih. This
is what then underlies that anything different from the Salaf generation,
is said to be a heresy.
The consequences of the strict application of these two principles
make the face of the Salafist movement in Indonesia different. Radical
movements such as Darul Islam and Laskar Jihad cannot be said to follow
the Salafist manhaj even though they are influenced by the ideology of
tawhid al-asma wa al-sifat or the issue of the qualities of Allah. This is because
they have another ideology, namely tawhid mulkiyah. An ideology related
to Islamic rule and the application of Allah’s law. The same is happening
to Salafist groups influenced by Muslim Brotherhood thought, such as
those who later chose to be active in politics. This unifying of Salafi’s
steps and forms provoked the emergence of different categorizations.
Wiktorowicz divided the contemporary Salafist movement or community
into three: the purists, the politicos, and the jihadists6. Din Wahid is in
harmony with Wiktorowicz, who also distinguishes this movement into
three; puritans, haraki, and jihadists7. Hasyim8 divides the Salafist group
into two major groups: pure Salafists and mixed Salafists or influenced
Salafists or modernists Salafists.

4
As’ad Said Ali, Ideologi Gerakan Pasca-Reformasi…
Arrazy Hasyim, Teologi Muslim Puritan: Geneologi Dan Ajaran Salafi, Banten: Yayasan Wakaf
5

Darus-Sunnah, 2019, 205-206.

6
Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
Volume 29, Number 3 (2006), 208.
7
Din Wahid, “Nurturing Salafi Manhaj A Study of Salafi Pesantrens in Contemporary
Indonesia”, Wacana, Volume 15, Number 2 (2015), 367.
8
Arrazy Hasyim, Teologi Muslim Puritan: Geneologi Dan Ajaran Salafi…

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The contemporary Salafist movement in Indonesia itself originated

from the desire of M. ‘Abd al-’Aziz Ibn Baz, a disciple of Muhammad
ibn Ibrahim, a prominent Saudi cleric, to his students in the al-Jamaah
al-Salafiyya al-Muhtasib community to expand his influence outside the
country of Saudi Arabia in 1980, one of which was to Indonesia9. This
desire was then manifested in a collaboration with the Islamic Propagation
Council of Indonesia (DDII) through Rabithah ‘Alam Islami and the
construction of the Arabic Language Teaching Institute (LPBA) in Jakarta.
LPBA is an institution that is the forerunner of the Institute for the Study
of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA). This movement then culminated in the reform
period. In its development, this movement was then near and identified
with the problems of radicalism, extremism, and terrorism. An issue that
later made this movement considered to have no role in the religious
moderation movement.
The religious moderation movement or Islamic moderation or
Washatiyyah Islam according to Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi is a view or attitude
that always tries to take the middle position of two opposing and excessive
attitudes so that one of the two attitudes in question does not dominate
in one’s mind and attitude10. The middle ground and balance are two
important points of this concept of Islamic moderation. The middle
way is defined as consistent practice to always find a middle ground in
a difference that arises in every aspect of human life11. As for balance, it
means taking a balanced position in faith and tolerance12.

9
Arrazy Hasyim, Teologi Muslim Puritan: Geneologi Dan Ajaran Salafi…
10
Yusuf al-Qaradhawi, Fiqh Alwasat}i>yah Al-Isla>mi>yah Wa-Altajdi>d: Ma’a>lim Wa-Mana>ra>t,
Cairo: Dar-Al-Syuruq, 2007, 56.
11
Ardiansyah, “Islam Wasat}îyah Dalam Perspektif Hadis: Dari Konsep Menuju Aplikasi”,
MUTAWATIR, Volume 6, Number 2 (2018).
12
M. Zaidi Abdad, “Analisis Dan Pemetaan Pemikiran Fikih Moderat Di Timur Tengah
Dan Relasinya Dengan Gerakan Fikih Formalis”, ESENSIA: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Ushuluddin,
Volume 12, Number 1 (2011), 39–62.

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The absence of the role of the Salafist movement in religious moderation

can be seen in various studies that discuss radicalism, extremism, or
terrorism. A plethora of research studies have discussed this theme,
especially after the collapse of President Soeharto in 1998. The year in
which the condition of internal and interfaith harmony in Indonesia
was at a critical juncture. This condition was then recorded in studies
that addressed violence in the name of religion that occurred in various
regions with various motivations and conditions that surrounded it13. The
outbreak of radicalism then encouraged the government to facilitate the
establishment of Religious Communication Forums (FKUB) in various
regions which were contained in the Joint Regulation of the Minister of
Religious Affairs number 9 of 2006. The establishment of these forums
was followed by religious moderation movements, particularly those carried
by the two largest Islamic organizations in Indonesia, Nahdlatul Ulama
and Muhammadiyah. Since then, religious moderation movements have
mushroomed in various corners of the country.
The definition, concept, and movement of Islamic moderation in
Indonesia have then become the theme and focus of research that attracted
researchers. Starting from research on the definition, principles, and
concepts of moderate Islam14 to research on the various forms of religious

13
J. Bertrand, “Legacies of the Authoritarian Past: Religious Violence in Indonesia’s
Moluccan Islands”, Pacific Affairs, Volume 75, Number 1 (2002), 57–85; Jajang Jahroni
and Jamhari, Gerakan Salafi Radikal Di Indonesia, Jakarta: Rajawali Press, 2004; H. Jubba,
“Reproduksi Kekerasan”, Jurnal At-Tafkir, Volume 4, Number 2 (2012); Zuly Qodir, Radikalisme
Agama Di Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2014; Alexander de Juan, Jan H. Pierskalla,
and Johannes Vüllers, “The Pacifying Effects of Local Religious Institutions: An Analysis
of Communal Violence in Indonesia”, Political Research Quarterly, Volume 68, Number 2
(2015); Sumanto al-Qurtuby, Religious Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia, Routledge, 2016.
14
Idham, Moderasi Beragama dalam Masyarakat Islam, Jakarta: Badan Litbang dan Diklat
Kementerian Agama RI, 2019; Mohammad Deny Irawan, “Islam Was}atiyyah: Refleksi
Antara Islam Modern dan Upaya Moderasi Islam”, TAJDID: Jurnal Ilmu Ushuluddin, Volume
16, Number 2 (2018); Haslina Ibrahim, “The Principle of Wasatiiyyah (Moderation) and
the Social Concept of Islam: Countering Extremism in Religion,” AL-ITQAN: Journal Of

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moderation movements and the challenges that accompany them.15

The studies that address the Islamic moderate movement above give rise
to a form of vacuum about the role of Salafists. Salafists themselves in various
studies are considered to have the potential to be able to carry out religious
moderation movements. One of them is based on research by Sunarwoto,16
which states that theology is not a decisive aspect of Salafist sectarianism,
but identity, authority, and good citizens. The emergence of a good citizen
behavior gave rise to the assumption that there was an opportunity for
their role in caring for Indonesia or in bringing a moderate face of Islam
to Indonesia. This opportunity will provide knowledge about the dynamics
of puritanical Islamic groups, particularly Salafists–a group that has been
positioned as perpetrators of acts of violence in the name of religion.
Based on the above background, the purposes of this article are to
explain the role of The Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia (DDII)

Islamic Sciences And Comparative Studies, Special Issue (2018); Iffaty Zamimah, “Moderatisme
Islam Dalam Konteks Keindonesiaan,” Jurnal Al-Fanar, Volume 1, Number 1 (2018); Zainun
Wafiqatun Niam, “Konsep Islam Wasathiyah Sebagai Wujud Islam Rahmatan Lil ‘alamin:
Peran NU Dan Muhammadiyah Dalam Mewujudkan Islam Damai Di Indonesia,” Palita:
Journal of Social Religion Research, Volume 4, Number 2 (2019); Muhammad Khairan Arif,
“Moderasi Islam (Wasathiyah Islam) Perspektif Al-Qur’an, As-Sunnah Serta Pandangan Para
Ulama Dan Fuqaha,” Al-Risalah, Volume 11, Number 1 (2020).
15
Roni Tabroni, “Ma’had Al-Zaytun Indramayu Movement: A Historical Inquiry”, Journal
of Advanced Research in Dynamical and Control Systems, Volume 12, Number 08 (2020); Amy L.
Freedman, “Civil Society, Moderate Islam, and Politics in Indonesia and Malaysia”, Journal
of Civil Society, Volume 5, Number 2 (2009); Nostalgiawan Wahyudi, “Between Islam,
Politics, and Democracy: The Political Ideology of Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS)”, Journal of
Indonesian Social Sciences and Humanities, Volume 5, Number 1 (2017); Zaimul Asroor, “Islam
Transnasional vs Islam Moderat: Upaya NU dan MD Dalam Menyuarakan Islam Moderat Di
Panggung Dunia”, AT-TURAS: Jurnal Studi Keislaman, Volume 6, Number 2 (2019); Wahyudi
Akmaliah, “The Demise of Moderate Islam: New Media, Contestation, and Reclaiming
Religious Authorities,” Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 10, Number 1
(2020); Hasse Jubba, Jaffary Awang, and Siti Aisyah Sungkilang, “The Challenges of Islamic
Organizations in Promoting Moderation in Indonesia,” Wawasan: Jurnal Ilmiah Agama Dan
Sosial Budaya, Volume 6, Number 1 (2021).
16
Sunarwoto, “Online Salafi Rivalries in Indonesia: Between Sectarianism and ‘Good’
Citizenship,” Religion, State and Society, Volume 49, Number 2 (2021).

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and the Institute for the Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA) in the dynamics
of the Salafist movement in Jakarta, Indonesia, and to trace and to describe
the dynamics and the religious moderation movements of the Salafist
groups, particularly in Jakarta, Indonesia.

The role of DDII and LIPIA

Talking about the development of the contemporary Salafist movement
in Indonesia, there are two organizations that play an important role in
it: the Islamic Propagation Council of Indonesia (DDII) and the Institute
for Study of Islam and Arabic (LIPIA). DDII was founded by Mohammad
Natsir in 1967 with the purpose of organizing Islamic proselytizing as
opposed to Christianization and secularization, including the development
of Javanese philosophy (Islam abangan, kejawen).17 This organization is
known for the role of its founder, M. Natsir, who was one of the prominent
figures in the Indonesian independence movement. Natsir is known
as a former prime minister and former leader of the Masjumi Party. In
addition, Natsir is also known as vice president of the Karachi-based World
Muslim Congress (Mutamar al-Alam al-Islami) in 1967 and a member of
the Jiddah-based World Muslim League (Rabithah al-Alam al-Islami) in
1969. Through Natsir, DDII then established cooperation with Rabithah
al-Alam al-Islami, an organization that receives funding from the Saudi
Arabian government.
One form of collaboration between DDII and Rabithah is the
opportunity to study in the Middle East. This can be seen when in the early
1970s, DDII opened its office in Riyadh to facilitate this. The leader of the
office is Abdul Wahid, an alumnus of the Persis pesantren in Bangil, East

17
R.W. Liddle, “Media Dakwah Scripturalism: One Form of Islamic Political Thought and
Action in New Order Indonesia,” In Toward a New Paradigm: Recent Developments in Indonesia
Islamic Thought, edited by M.R. Woodward. Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University Program
for Southeast Asian Studies, 1996.

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Java.18 In addition to academic cooperation, another form of cooperation

is the provision of funds for Indonesians who want to become mujahideen
in Afghanistan.
The important role of DDII in the development of Salafi can be seen
in the movement of translation and distribution of Salafist thinker works
and campus-based proselytizing activities. This is in line with the three
targets of Natsir and DDII proselytizing activities; pesantrens, mosques,
and university campuses.19 DDII started its campus-based proselytizing
activities in 1974 under the name Bina Masjid Kampus (Nurture a Campus
Mosque) and an important product of this activity is the Training for
Islamic Propagation Warriors centered at the Salman Mosque of the
Bandung Institute of Technology.
In 1978 Bina Masjid Kampus became popular because the Soeharto
administration made a policy of burying deeply in campus political life.
This then had an impact on becoming the center of the campus mosque
for activists. A few years later, DDII began to introduce and distribute
translations of books by Hasan al-Banna, Yusuf al-Qardawi, Sayyid Qutb,
and Abu A’la Maududi. Intellectual development centered on campus
mosques, the translation movement, and the availability of scholarships
to the Middle East were some of the important factors in the recruitment
and development of the Salafist movement in Indonesia in the 1980s.
In addition to DDII, an organization that has an important role in
the development of Salafists is LIPIA, the relationship between DDII
and LIPIA was seen at the time of the establishment of LIPIA. At that
time, the DDII figure M. Natsir was one of the people who welcomed
the instructor assigned by Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud University to

18
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder: Why Salafism and
Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix,” Asia, 2004.
19
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder…

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LIPIA, namely Sheikh Abdullah bin Baz’s student, Sheikh Abdul Aziz
Abdullah al-Ammar.20
LIPIA is an educational institution in Indonesia sponsored directly by
Saudi Arabia and is a branch of Al-Imam Muhammad bin Saud University
in Riyadh. The institute was founded in 1980 in Jakarta under the name
of The Arabic Language Teaching Institute (LPBA) with its main instructor
being Shaikh Abdul Aziz Abdullah al-Ammar, a disciple of the famous
Salafist cleric, namely Sheikh Abdullah bin Baz.
At the beginning of its establishment, the institution was aimed at the
development of Islamic science and the Arabic language. In its development
LIPIA then had two main programs, namely Arabic preparation and higher
education. All lectures are also carried out in Arabic with the majority of
teachers coming from the Middle East. This then became the attraction
of the Indonesian people in addition to scholarships in the form of free
tuition fees, pocket money in accordance with Indonesian standards, and
scholarships to continue studying up to the Ph.D. level in Riyadh.
This institution can be said to have received a good response from the
Indonesian people. There are about 1000-2000 applicants annually with
only 200 students admitted. By June 1998, LIPIA had graduated 3,726
students and in 2004 its graduates were almost close to 5000 students.21
Until 2005 the number of graduates of this institution had then reached
6598 students or about 200 people every year. A total of 87 graduates came
from abroad, including Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Cambodia,
Korea, and Singapore.22
The relationship between LIPIA and the contemporary Salafist

20
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder…
21
Mimbar Ulama, “No.238,” Mimbar Ulama, 1998.
22
Ahmad Sujai, “Pengaruh Paham Wahabi Di Indonesia: Studi Atas Pengaruh Paham
Keagamaan Wahabi Terhadap Praktek Keagamaan Mahasiswa Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan
Islam Dan Arab (LIPIA) Jakarta,” Tesis, Depok: Universitas Indonesia, 2008.

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movement in Indonesia can be seen in the curriculum used, the Saudi

standard curriculum, which is a combination of the Salafist curriculum
and the specific orientation of its faculty staff.23 Many of its teachers were
Salafist scholars brought directly from Saudi Arabia.24 In addition to
being Salafist in character, LIPIA, according to Anthony Bubalo and Greg
Fealy,25 was also heavily influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood. This can
be seen from the background of the teacher. LIPIA’s linkage to the Muslim
Brotherhood was also echoed by Sidney Jones, who said that in the early
2000s, LIPIA was dominated by the Muslim Brotherhood.
The majority of the Muslim Brotherhood itself can actually be said to
be Salafists. This is what Wiktoriwictz later called Salafi politicos.26 The
difference between pure Salafists and the Muslim Brotherhood itself can
be seen in political activism. The Muslim Brotherhood’s political activism
is more open and accommodating to political pluralism and religious
diversity. Pure Salafists, have a tendency to distance themselves from
politics and are intolerant of religious practices that they consider to be
full of superstition, heresy, and khurafat.
LIPIA’s role in seeding the Salafi movement in Indonesia can be
seen in the role of its alumni. Some of LIPIA’s first alumni later became
important and influential figures in the Salafist movement in Indonesia.
Starting from Ja’far Umar Talib-Founder of Ahlussunnah Wal Jamaah
Forum and Laskar Jihad, Abdul Hakim Abdat-ulama hadith from Jakarta,
Abdul Qadir Jawwaz-founder of Minhaj as-Sunnah, Farid Okbah-Al-Irsyad,
Ainul Harits- Nida’ul Islam Surabaya, Abubakar M. Altway- As-Sofwah

23
Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, Jejak Kafilah: Pengaruh Radikalisme Timur Tengah Di
Indonesia, Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka, 2007.
24
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder: Why Salafism and
Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix,” Asia, 2004,8.
25
Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, Jejak Kafilah…
26
Quintan Wiktorowicz, “Anatomy of the Salafi Movement”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,
Volume 29, Number 3 (2006), 208.

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Foundation Jakarta, and Yusuf Utsman Baisa- Al-Irshad Tengaran leader.

They indict Salafist ideology through various means, both conventional
and information technology trends. The chosen professions also vary from
dai (on campuses), teachers, politicians, establishing book publishing,
translators, and pesantren caregivers.
In the early 1980s or the year, the Salafist movement began to flourish,
one of the important strategies that emerged was to increase the intensity of
the translation of Salafist and Brotherhood texts from Arabic to Indonesian.
This is a response to the large public interest since the 1980s for Islamic
books.27 These activities then peaked in the period of the 2000s. This is
where the role of LIPIA alumni becomes important. Some LIPIA alumni
later became translators. This role is then supported by the translation
and distribution carried out by DDII. The number of Salafist-oriented
publishers has also increased sharply with wide distribution including
through large store networks such as Gunung Agung and Gramedia.28
Another strategy that makes Salafist proselytizing more widespread is
the maximum use of mass media technology and digital technology. This
can be seen from the research of Muhammad Ali Chozin,29 who stated
that in the early millennium or the 2010s, the Salafi proselytizing strategy
had entered the mass media and telecommunications, such as television,
radio, websites, blogs, mailing lists, and social networks. The development
of digital technology with the internet as the main vehicle can also be
maximized by this group. Proselytizing materials are easy to obtain on the
internet, downloaded, and then circulated through a network of mosques,

27
Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, Jejak Kafilah: Pengaruh Radikalisme Timur Tengah Di
Indonesia, Jakarta: Mizan Pustaka, 2007.
28
Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, Jejak Kafilah…
29
Muhammad Ali Chozin, “Strategi Dakwah Salafi Di Indonesia,” Jurnal Dakwah, Volume
14, Number 1 (2013).

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student groups, Qur’anic study classes, and the like.30 Its transmission and
dissemination have became more resonant with the emergence of social
media such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram.
In addition to social media, pesantren is a medium that has a very
significant influence in terms of the growth trend or effectiveness of the
spread of Salafist ideology. According to Bubalo and Fealy,31 pesantren
have a good mechanism in terms of spreading Salafist ideas through social
activities, training of teachers, and local Salafist dai. In quantity, pesantren
affiliated with Salafist ideology increased dramatically from those that
could be counted fingers in the 1980s to numbering in the hundreds now.
Apart from being a place for the sowing of Salafist ideas, LIPIA is also
a place for the emergence of the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood. Many
of its alumni adhere to the thinking of the Muslim Brotherhood. Some of
them later became leaders of the Social Justice Party (PKS), such as Anis
Matta, Hidayat Nur Wahid, and Ahmad Heryawan. The strengthening
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology triggered a reluctance and ban on
pure Salafist groups from studying at LIPIA in the mid-1990s.32 This is
due to the assumption that LIPIA was compromised excessively with the
ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood, in particular about hizbiyah thought.33
The notion that LIPIA compromised with the Ideas of the Brotherhood
began when the concept of the usroh community developed in the early
1980s. This concept, which literally means family, is a political movement
(harakah) developed by the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan
al-Banna. This movement aims to transform Muslim society based on
the construction of model communities, ranging from 10 to 15 people.
This concept was later adopted by campus study groups and some self-

30
Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, Jejak Kafilah…
31
Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, Jejak Kafilah…
32
Anthony Bubalo dan Greg Fealy, Jejak Kafilah…
33
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder…

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declared anti-government groups, such as the Abdullah Sungkar and

Abu Bakar Ba’asyir groups. In LIPIA itself, the influence of the Muslim
Brotherhood began to appear when some teachers took up the principles
of the Brotherhood, and books by Muslim Brotherhood leaders began
to be scattered in LIPIA libraries. The feud between these two Salafist
groups culminated when pure Salafists began to urge supporters not to
go to LIPIA in 1995-1996.34

The dynamics and the religious moderation movements of Salafist

groups in Jakarta
The role of DDII and LIPIA, especially in Jakarta, then led to the
emergence of organizations or foundations with a Salafi perspective that
became the estuary of the flow of aid funds. The grant came from The
Rabitah al-Alam al-Islami (World Muslim League) and its organizational
sibling, the Haitaul Ighatsah (International Islamic Relief Organisation
(IIRO)), based in Jiddah. Among the organizations and foundations that
later received financial assistance was the al-Sofwah Foundation.
Al-Sofwah Foundation is a foundation founded by several Indonesians,
one of whom is Muhammad Yusuf Harun on November 25, 1992. The
foundation was later supported by a Saudi named Muhammad Khalaf
of Unaizah, Al-Qasim. Khalaf is a close friend of one of Saudi Arabia’s
greatest Salafist teachers, Sheikh Utsaimin. Khalaf’s existence in Indonesia
has not escaped the role of DDII. The contact between the two then led to
Khalaf’s meeting with Abu Bakr Muhammad Al-Altway, a LIPIA graduate.
Altway then supported Khalaf’s program to promote Salafism in Indonesia
through donor agencies. At first, the name of this foundation was the
al-Muntada Foundation. The name of an Islamic charity foundation
established in 1985 in Britain.

34
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder…

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 From radical labels to moderate Islam: the transformation of the Salafism... (Roni Tabroni, et.al)

This foundation is then committed to science and proselytizing based

on the aqidah ahlussunnah wal jamaah and the manhaj (path) of the as-salaf
as-salih (predecessors of the good people).35 The purpose of this foundation
is to realize development and help each other in virtue and taqwa in
order to achieve a proper birth and mental life for humans, especially in
Islamic society in the broadest sense to achieve the blessings of Allah.36
The implementation of these principles and goals is the existence of an
attitude of hating fanaticism (groups and groups) that persecutes the as-
salaf as-salih so that Muslims are divided into several groups. This desire
for Islamic unity then sought to be realized by not being bigoted to one
of the clerics.
There were three main programs of the Al-Sofwah Foundation at
its inception: proselytizing, education, and solving social problems.
Proselytizing activities are the main activities of this foundation. One
of its activities was to recruit 100 preachers and fund them and their
families to travel around Indonesia indicating the basics of Salafism.37
In addition, this foundation also organizes daurah tauhid shari’a (training
for Islamic knowledge) for teachers of tawhid science in various pesantren
and institutions who want to make the book of tawhid as a curriculum
at the institution.38
The education program is a program based on distance learning or the
Open Islamic Studies (KIT) program through the post and the Internet.39
This non-face-to-face learning is based on consulting or learning with the
instructor by fax, telephone, email, or regular post. This program, in 2004

35
Badan Pelaksana Yayasan, n.d, “Tentang Kami,” https://Alsofwa.Com/Profil-Yayasan/
Tentang-Kami/.
36
Badan Pelaksana Yayasan, n.d, “Tentang Kami”, …
37
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder…
38
Badan Pelaksana Yayasan, n.d, “Tentang Kami”, …
39
Badan Pelaksana Yayasan, n.d, “Tentang Kami”, …

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already had 2000 alumni and was able to establish a Ma’had Ali for high
school graduates. An institution intended to train prospective preachers.40
In addition to these activities, the al-Sofwah Foundation also has an
important role in distributing translations of Saudi Salafist scholars’ works.
From its inception in 1992 until 2004, the foundation has distributed
approximately 1 million free books throughout Indonesia.41
The activities of the early al-Sofwah Foundation can be categorized
as pure Salafist movements. This can be seen from the proselytizing
activities or programs they carry out. This ideology of Salafism was later
transformed. Relations and cooperation with Islamic institutions and
foundations began to be established, especially Islamic foundations that
walked on the basis of aqidah salaful ummah ahlussunnah wal jama’ah.42
Obedience and relations with the people of the government also began
to be initiated. The assessment of the policies of the government or the
people of the government is based on what appears and treats them with
a good attitude.43 In addition, the foundation then chose to focus its
activities on social and community actions, such as disaster response,
ambulance services, and the provision of clean water and public facilities.
This attitude indicates the existence of a change and transformation of
ideologies and movements. Salafism not only became a single principle
but was also accompanied by accommodating attitudes towards other
Islamic foundations, and even the government and activities that focused
on socio-social activities, as was the caze with NU and Muhammadiyah.
These accommodating attitudes were then accompanied by the
emergence of moderate attitudes promoted by the Al-Sofwah Foundation.
The emergence of moderate Islamic attitudes is really not new to them.

40
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder…
41
Badan Pelaksana Yayasan, n.d, “Tentang Kami”, …
42
Badan Pelaksana Yayasan, n.d, “Tentang Kami”,…
43
Badan Pelaksana Yayasan, n.d, “Tentang Kami”,…

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 From radical labels to moderate Islam: the transformation of the Salafism... (Roni Tabroni, et.al)

Abu Bakr Muhammad Al-Altwy explained that

Moderation is the attitude of each religion to respect others or tolerate.
If moderation is defined as tolerance, then Islam has taught. Islam
forbids insulting the religion of others. Prophet Muhammad SAW
told us to treat religions outside of us well. This can be seen even in
the conditions of war. We are forbidden to disturb the people who
worship in their worship.
(Personal Communication with Abu Bakar Muhammad Al-Altway,
2022).
Moderate attitudes are attitudes that arise from an understanding of
differences and diversity. Difference and diversity is one of the attitudes
that the Al-Sofwah Foundation then seeks to carry. Abu Bakr Muhammad
Al-Altwy explained that
Islam is diversity. There are four schools in Islam and all of them are
recognized by Ahlusunnah wal jama’ah. Washatiyah Islam itself is the
teaching of Ahlusunnah wal jama’ah. What is wrong is to assume all
religions are equal and force a Muslim to say all religions are the same.
(Personal Communication with Abu Bakar Muhammad Al-Altway,
2022).
This moderate attitude then led to a religious moderation movement.
One of them can be seen in their response to radicalism and extremism.
Although it often intersects with jihadist Salafist figures, it does not make
this foundation into jihadist Salafist activities. This can be seen from Al-
Sofwah’s response to extremist events that occurred in Jakarta. One of
them is the Cimanggis Bombing, which was the event of the explosion of
a house in Cimanggis in March, 2004. The house was used as a place of
study by Aman Abdurrahman.
The connection between Aman Abdurahman and the Al-Sofwah
Foundation can be seen when Aman Abdurahman became the imam

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of the mosque at the foundation in June 2000. Aman’s radical-leaning

existence later became a point of objection from the al-Sofwah Foundation
which asked him to resign in 2003. This cross-section then ended with
the participation of dozens of foundation students in the study founded
by Aman.44 Al-Sofwa’s rejection of the violent ideas brought by Aman was
also corroborated by Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Altwy. Al-Altwy says that:
At first, the study of Ustaz Aman was scientific but later poisoned with
hard ideas. One of them is to fictionalize the earlier scholars. This is
what makes the Al-Sofwa Foundation opposed to Ustaz Aman. Ustaz
Aman had tried to be invited to dialogue but to no avail. Therefore, the
foundation made him resign. Even the foundation made an announce-
ment in the wall magazine not to attend the recitation of Ustaz Aman.
(Personal Communication with Abu Bakar Muhammad Al-Altway,
2022).
In addition to the rejection of the ideas of radicalism and violence, the
Al-Sofwah Foundation also spreads the ideas of moderation through the
publication of books. There are two books published by this foundation
that address it. First, a book titled Islam Is Not a Religion of Violence
(Rejecting Accusations of Terrorism Against Islam) was published in 2011.
Second, a book entitled Terrorism in an Islamic Perspective was published
in 2011. The book contains the fatwas of scholars, among them Abdul
Aziz bin Baz and Muhammad al-Utsamain, two Salafi figures. In the
book, an example of tolerance is given by the prophet Muhammad and
the companions of Prophet Muhammad. In addition, in the book, it is
explained that the greatest jihad is the jihad against ourselves.
DDII’s association with Salafist organizations is also evident in its
closeness to Wahdah Islamiyah. The founder of DDII, M. Natsir is
known for his efforts to protect and facilitate Islamic religious activities.

44
ICG (International Crisis Group), “Indonesian Backgrounder…

296
 From radical labels to moderate Islam: the transformation of the Salafism... (Roni Tabroni, et.al)

One of them is by establishing an Islamic foundation called the Fathul

Muin Foundation.45 This foundation later became the forerunner of the
establishment of the Wahdah Islamiyah organization. In addition, M.
Natsir sent Mohammad Zaitun Rasmin, Muhammad Ikhwan Jalil, Yusran
and Rahmat Abdurahman to Saudi Arabia to study with the help of the
Muslim World League and the Middle East network. The existence of
Mohammad Zaitun Rasmin and Muhammad Ikhwan Jalil in Wahdah
Islamiyah became important in terms of ideological transformation.
Wahdah Islamiyah was originally an Islamic movement initiated
by a Muhammadiyah cleric in South Sulawesi, Fathul Muin Daeng
Magading (Muin). Muin is known as a critic of the Soeharto government’s
authoritarianism policy towards Muslims. In addition, Muin is also known
for rejecting Muhammadiyah’s decision that accept Pancasila as the basis
of the state. This can be seen when he threatened to leave Indonesia if
Muhammadiyah accepted Pancasila as a basic principle.46 His puritanism
and rigorous understanding of Islam arose from his relationship with Kahar
Muzakar, DI/TII amir (chairman) in South Sulawesi. This relationship also
led him to the principle that Muslims would be used as an instrument
of elite power if they did not implement Islamic beliefs.47 This principle
then developed into a vision of integrating Islam into all aspects of life.
The integration of Islam into all aspects of life ushered in the early
Wahdah Islamiyah (1988-1994) being identified as a movement that
adopted transnational ideologies, such as the Muslim Brotherhood and

45
Andar Nubowo, “Indonesian Hybrid Salafism”, In Leonard C. Sebastian, Syafiq Hasyim
and Alexander R. Arianto (eds.), Rising Islamic Conservatism In Indonesia, London & New York:
Routledge, 2020, 181-197.
46
S. Jurdi, Wahdah Islamiyah Dan Gerakan Transnasional: Hegemoni, Kompromi Dan Kontestasi
Gerakan Islam Indonesia, Yogyakarta: Labsos UIN Sunan Kalijaga, 2012; Syandri, Salahuddin,
and M. Darwis Muhdina, “Pemurnian Ajaran Islam KH Fathul Muin Dg Maggading,” Jurnal
Diskursus Islam, Volume 5, Number 1 (2017), 89–110.
47
Andar Nubowo, “Indonesian Hybrid Salafism”,…

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Salafism in its methods of proselytizing strategy and education. This

ideology later developed when Mohammad Zaitun Rasmin became the
leader. Not just a Salafi-oriented movement, but later blended eclectically
with Muhammadiyah dan NU-inspired social, humanitarian, and
educational activism.48 This ideological change broadly does not change
their original goal of integrating Islam in all aspects of life by means of
upholding tauhid (monotheism), living in accordance with sunnah (the
Prophet’s traditions), and building Islamic solidarity to achieve a good
society.49 This can be seen from the attitude taken by Wahdah Islamiyah
led by Zaitun Rasmin who accepts Pancasila and democracy but within a
framework of Islamic sharia.
This sharia framework is then combined with a moderate approach.
Wahdah Islamiyah began to open up with various other Islamic
organizations and began to actively participate in democracy. This can be
seen when Zaitun Rasmin actively participates in various Islamic activities,
especially those related to advocating the enactment of sharia such as the
Indonesia Muslim Congress (Kongres Umat Islam Indonesia, KUII) on
November 1998 in Jakarta and the establishment of a committee for the
preparation of sharia’s enactment (Komite Persiapan Penegakan Syariah
Islam Indonesia, KKPSI) on April 2001 in Makassar.
Wahdah Islamiyah also seeks to enter and be involved in national
organizations, such as the Indonesian Council for Ulama (Majelis Ulama
Indonesia, MUI) and the Indonesian Council of Youth Intellectuals and
Ulama (Majelis Intellectual Ulama Muda Indonesia, MIUMI). In addition,
the organization’s involvement in the 212 Action for Defending Islam
in 2016 made its popularity rise, among Muslims, political parties, and

Andar Nubowo, “Indonesian Hybrid Salafism”…

48

PP Wahdah Islamiyah, Anggaran Dasar Dan Anggaran Rumah Tangga Wahdah Islamiyah,
49

Makassar: PP Wahdah Islamiyah, 2007.

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 From radical labels to moderate Islam: the transformation of the Salafism... (Roni Tabroni, et.al)

some of the prominent elites of local and national bureaucracy.50 This is

what then helped Wahdah Islamiyah become an organization that at first
became a local standard and then became national.51
As an organization that has a national reach, Wahdah Islamiyah then
opened regional representatives throughout Indonesia. One of them is
in DKI Jakarta Province. The presence of representatives in the region is
estimated to have existed since the 2010s with a not-yet-strict organizational
structure. The development of a more advanced organization then began
in 2015. Since 2016 this organization has been chaired by Ilham Jaya
bin Abdur Rauf, a graduate of Medina, with the number of members
reaching 114 people in 2022. The Regional Representative Council (Dewan
Pimpinan Wilayah, DPW) in the region oversees 7 DPDs; 6 in Jakarta and
one in Depok. The DPW office is located in Pesantren Al-Hijaz Kelapa
Dua, Depok.
As a regional organization, DPW Wahdah Islamiyah Jakarta has a
policy that supports its central organization in Makassar. This then has
implications also on the programs created. Although there are central
programs or policies, each region has its own dynamics. According to Ilham
Jaya, this is due to the flexibility of each regional or regional representative
to regulate their respective programs. Not much different from the parent
organization, the DPW Wahdah Islamiyah Jakarta programs also use a
moderate approach. Ilham Jaya explained that:
Wahdah Islamiyah Jakarta region has programs with a moderate
framework. Although it is not explicitly written, it flows naturally. As
in the institution of regeneration of dai, both the curriculum system
50
IPAC (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict), “After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in
Indonesia,” Jakarta, 2018.
51
S. Jurdi, Sejarah Wahdah Islamiyah: Sebuah Geliat Ormas Islam Di Era Transisi, Yogyakarta:
Kreasi Wacana, 2017; M.S. Aldjufri, Wahdah Islamiyah Di Gorontalo: Studi Tentang Corak
Pemikiran Dan Respons Masyarakat, Jakarta: Ministry of Religious Affairs, Republic of Indonesia,
2011.

299
IJIMS: Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies, Volume 13, Number 2, December 2023: 279-306

and teachers will naturally and automatically be conceptualized to stay

away from radicalism and violence.
(Personal communication with Ilham Jaya, 2022)
Programs that reflect the religious moderation carried out by Wahdah
Islamiyah can be seen from the involvement of this organization in
promoting the concept of Wasatiyah Islam, a terminology of Islamic
moderation (Wasatiyah Islam) used by the MUI, Muhammadiyah, and NU.
This can be seen in the theme of the 3rd Congress of Wahdah Islamiyah
in 2016, namely Realizing a Peaceful and Civilized Indonesia with Islamic
Wasathiyah. The Wasathiyah Islamic theme is still used at the 4th Congress
in 2021. The theme in the congress was Realizing Indonesia Jaya with
Plenary Education in Wasathiyah Islam.
The moderation practice carried out by Wahdah Islamiyah does
not only appear in muktamar pamphlets. Like its predecessors, NU
and Muhammadiyah, Wahdah Islamiyah also tried to implement this
movement in their activities or programs. This can be seen in the series
of the 3rd Muktamar in 2016, DPD Wahdah Islamiyah Depok held a
Tabligh Akbar with the title A Million Love for Indonesia.52 An activity
that contains mubaligh lectures on the foundations and reasons why the
Islamic ummah should love this country. This attitude has consequences
for not causing damage and divisions in this country.
The programs of DPW Wahdah Islamiyah can be said to be an extension
of their ideology and identity, whose nature already attaches to in their
parent organization. In its constitution (AD/ART), this organization
describes itself as an Islamic organization based on the Qur’an, Sunnah,
and as-salaf as-salih (pious Muslims and Muhammad companions) with the

Abu Faiz, n.d, “Wahdah Islamiyah, Sejuta Cinta Untuk Indonesia.” https://Muktamar.
52

Wahdah.or.Id/Wahdah-Islamiyah-Sejuta-Cinta-Untuk-Indonesia/.

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 From radical labels to moderate Islam: the transformation of the Salafism... (Roni Tabroni, et.al)

method of Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jamaah (Sunni Islam).53 This is not much
different from the explanation from Ilham Jaya who said that
The main axis of discourse is the Qur’an and hadith. Scholars, be it
Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab, Ibn Taimiyah, or whomever the clerics
were the tools to understand the two main axes.
(Personal communication with Ilham Jaya, 2022).

Conclusion
The ideological transformation and movements of Al-Sofwah Foundation
and Wahdah Islamiyah show that Salafist manhaj, whether religious views
or daily practices will not always be one-faced or monolithic. In addition
to showing the development of a movement, it also reflects the adaptation
of various movements or groups identified with the Salafi. Adaptation is
needed in relation to the sustainability of the organization or movement.
In addition, cities present different challenges, in relation to mobility and
technological challenges. This then requires an organization to adapt,
either in terms of strategy, method, or proselytizing approach.
Al-Sofwah Foundation adapted and developed from an institution
closely related to Salafist proselytizing to an institution that is
accommodating to cooperation with other parties, government policies,
and technological developments. In addition, the choice to focus on
socio-civic activities makes this foundation try to follow in the footsteps
of major Islamic organizations that have existed in Indonesia, such as
NU and Muhammadiyah. The ideas of moderation spread by NU and
Muhammadiyah were also later adopted as one of the choices of activities
carried out by this foundation.
Not many different things also happened to Wahdah Islamiyah, both
in Jakarta and their parent organization in Makassar. Wahdah Islamiyah
53
PP Wahdah Islamiyah, Anggaran Dasar…

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at the beginning of its emergence was known as one of the movements

that strongly rejected Pancasila. Salafist ideas manifest in the vision of an
organization that seeks to integrate Islamic values into all aspects of life.
These Salafist ideas then developed along with the existence of Zaitun
Rasmin as the leader. Ideas of moderation, love of the motherland, and
democracy began to enter and be implemented.
Although Salafist ideas have developed and mixed with other ideologies,
the basic ideas are not necessarily abandoned. In the case of the Al-
Sofwah Foundation, the Salafi idea can be seen in the principles of the
organization. Wahdah Islamiyah’s adaptation also did not abandon the
idea of Salafism. This can be seen from Wahdah Islamiyah’s desire to unite
Islam, the Republic of Indonesia with Sharia, and Washatiyah democracy.

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