Tamil Nadu

The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

P.G. Rajamohan∗

The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed a

resurgence of different religions around the world. This
resurgence has been marked by a revival in religious
consciousness as also a rise in fundamentalist movements.1 The
origin of the idea of ‘fundamentalism’ is ironically distanced from
its most urgent current associations, and, as the Webster’s
dictionary notes, “fundamentalism was a movement in American
Protestantism that arose in the earlier part of the 20th century. It
was a reaction to modernism, and stressed the infallibility of the
Bible, not only in matters of faith and morals but also as a literal
historical record. It stressed on belief in the Bible as the literal
word of God.”2 Fundamentalism, consequently, originally
referred to certain trends in within American evangelism
proclaiming the infallibility of the revelations of the Bible, but
was eventually widened to include all belief systems that asserted
or advocated a return to the ‘fundamentals’ of their religion or
ideology. It is characterized as a “worldview or movement

∗
P. G. Rajamohan is a Research Associate at the Institute for Conflict
Management, New Delhi.
1
Samuel Huntington, Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World
Order, New York: Simon and Schuster, p. 45.
2
Random House Webster's College Dictionary, New York: Random House,
1997, p. 526.
P.G. Rajamohan

centred on restoring religious tradition or sacred text as guiding

force in society, usually in opposition to ideas or practices
considered modern.”3 Fundamentalists in various religious
traditions believe that there was a ‘perfect moment’ in the past,
and that the human endeavour should seek to recover or re-
establish the character and values of that moment among
mankind. Such an enterprise often involves a reaction – possibly a
violent reaction – against developments, groups and individuals
that are seen to threaten or obstruct the realization of the projected
ideal – even if the ideal has never actually existed at any point in
history.
Religious fundamentalism surfaced at the threshold of the
th
20 century as a prominent trend or as habit of mind found within
religious communities and paradigmatically embodied in certain
representative individuals and movements.4 The notion only came
to be associated with Islam after the ‘Islamic Revolution’ of Iran
in 1979, when Ayatollah Khomeini led a movement that toppled
the Shah’s regime and sought to restore ‘traditional Islamic
values’ in society and governance.
Religious fundamentalists, by and large, view history as a
cosmic struggle between good and evil, using stark binary
dichotomies to describe the opposing camps.5 Several forms of
fundamentalism have sought to promote revivalist movements
within various religions, but Islamist fundamentalism has had the
most far-reaching impact in the contemporary era. The Islamist
fundamentalist seeks to ‘Islamize’ society in its entirety and to
establish a state based on Shariat (the law ordained by God and
based on the Holy Quran and Hadith). To this end, all Islamist
fundamentalists are united, irrespective of sectarian divisions or
disagreements. Differences between Islamist fundamentalists,
nevertheless, do exist and are most often located in the means
employed or considered acceptable to achieve these goals. In
Afghanistan, fundamentalism was the natural attitude of the

3
“Globalization Glossary”, The Globalization Website,
www.emory.edu/SOC/globalization/glossary.html.
4
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott, eds., Fundamentalism Observed, Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1991, p. 3.
5
Lionel Caplan in Caplan, ed., Studies in Religious Fundamentalisms,
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1987, pp. 18- 19.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

dominant urban clergy, the ulema, whereas the village mullahs,

who had not mastered the whole corpus of the law, tended to be
traditionalists, not fundamentalists.6
If fundamentalism means a return to the scriptures, the
question of interpretation of the scriptures becomes a valid and
urgent concern. In Islam, it is the ulema who exercise control over
the interpretation of the text. Sunni Islam lacks an organized or
textually ‘authorized’ clergy and does not accord any special
status to the clergy. It is in Shiite Iran that the clergy enjoys an
institutional dominance. The ulema in Sunni Islam have no
special power or position, and must refer all judgements and
prescriptions to their original sources in the sacred texts and
within the traditions of their interpretation. Indeed, for some of
the dominant streams of contemporary Sunni thought, only the
scriptures matter – the extended commentary and the various
‘schools’ of interpretation that have been established through the
ages have no force or validity. The fundamentalists – including,
for instance, Gaddafi of Libya – believe only in the Qur’an, but
the classical alim (pl.: ulema) considers classical texts – the
Qur’an, Hadith, and an established tradition of interpretation,
which would be unrecognizable except through the exegesis of
the ulema. In Nasser’s Egypt, Sharia remained an option, but was
not mandatory. The Sharia, in this case, was considered a retreat
from the modern world, whereas to the orthodox Muslim, Islam is
inseparable from Sharia: ‘any attempt to deflect the connection
was tantamount to blasphemy.’7 The classicist fundamentalism of
the ulema is juridical in nature and not a common or mass
political phenomenon. For all the current focus on fiery Islamist
extremists, it must be noted that they remain a minority in most
Muslim societies and states. However, their insistent and
vehement discourse has had much effect on the Muslim world,
moving into the vacuum created by the failure of secular regimes,
redefining orthodoxy, reconstituting the boundaries of political
power relations, limiting the borders of the permissible,

6
Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986, p. 3.
7
R. Scott Appleby and Martin E. Marty, “Fundamentalism”, Foreign Policy,
January/February 2002, p. 1.

119
P.G. Rajamohan

resonating in the hearts of impoverished masses, and appealing to

a new strata of literate and technically educated devout.8
Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, the number of
fundamentalist movements of all religious affiliations tripled
worldwide.9 Further, as noted by Bruce Hoffman, there has been
a virtual explosion of identifiable religious terrorist groups from
none in 1968 to over 250 in the 1990s, as designated under US
Executive Order 13224 of December 20, 2002, which identified
nearly a quarter of all terrorist groups active throughout the world
as being predominantly motivated by religious concerns.10
The evolution of religious terrorism has neither occurred in a
vacuum nor does it represent a particularly new phenomenon. It
has, however, been propelled to the forefront in the post-Cold
War world, and has been exacerbated by the explosion of ethnic-
religious conflicts all over the world, especially in Eastern Europe
(the Balkans), Africa and Asia.
If we look at the relationship between fundamentalism and
terrorism, the former uses terror as an important instrument for its
growth, but the latter cannot always serve or coincide with
religious fundamentalism. Consequently, the bond between
fundamentalism and religion at large is stronger than the
connection between terrorism and religion.
In the post-Cold War period, an overwhelming majority of
terrorist groups have been religion-based and the greatest
proportion of these is Islam-centric. Islamic movements and
Islamist terrorist groups operating in West Asia, Central Asia and
South Asia uphold the placard of Islam to secure broad-based
support against Western nations, especially the US and Britain.
Unlike the West Asian and Central Asian scenario, however,
Islamic movements in India have not been pronouncedly anti-
Western in temper, in some measure because of India’s colonial
past.

8
Salwa Isma‘il, Discourse and Ideology in Contemporary Egypt, unpublished
Ph.d thesis, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Canada,
1992, pp. 1-2.
9
Magnus Ranstorp, “Terrorism in the Name of Religion,” Journal of
International Affairs, vol. 50, no. 1, Summer 1996, p. 44.
10
Bruce Hoffman, Holy Terror: The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a
Religious Imperative, Santa Monica: Rand, 1993, p. 2.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

In India, Islamic revivalism started well before Independence

through various movements like Syed Ahmad Khan’s Aligarh
movement, Maulana Hussain Ahmad’s Dar-ul-Uloom (Deoband
movement), Maulana Syed Nazir Hussain’s Ahl-i-Hadis (people
of the Hadis), Maulavi Abdullah Chakralavi’s Ahl-i-Quran
(people of the Quran), Maulana Ahmad Riza Khan’s Barelwi
movement and Mirza Ghulam Ahmad’s Ahmadia movement,
during the latter half of the nineteenth century. These
organizations advocated the revival of Islamic religious practices,
the resuscitation of classical Islam and the need to defend the
faith against Christian missionaries and Hindu revivalists. Islamic
revivalism turned into fundamentalism when radical Islamists like
Maulana Abu Ala Maududi, who founded the Jamaat-e-Islami on
August 26, 1941, took up the purification of the faith as their
prime agenda. Islamist fundamentalism has also been periodically
invigorated by the religious assertiveness of movements in other
Faiths and violence connected with inter-faith (communal)
tensions, including in more recent instances, the resurgence of
Hindu fundamentalism through the Rashtriya Swayamsevak
Sangh (RSS), the Jan Sangh (predecessor of present day
Bharatiya Janata Party or the BJP), the Vishwa Hindu Parishad
(VHP), the Bajrang Dal and others in India.
From Independence to the early 1980s, Southern India,
particularly the State of Tamil Nadu, remained relatively free
from communal violence and religious fundamentalism. In fact, in
the south, religious fundamentalism was widely regarded as an
affliction peculiar to North India. Nevertheless, despite a
generally harmonious relationship between the Hindu and Muslim
communities, there have been many instances of communal
disharmony and violence between the two communities in South
India, including Tamil Nadu. Data recorded by the Gopala
Krishna Commission Report (1985) showed that communal
violence in India was highest between 1961 and 1971. During this
decade, 11 out of 14 districts in Tamil Nadu witnessed communal
violence.11

11
Abdul Azeez Saheb, Muslims in Tamil Nadu: Some Aspects of their Inter-
Relationship with the Social Environment, Delhi: Anthropological Survey of
India, vol. 46 (93-104), 1997, p. 101.

121
P.G. Rajamohan

The victimization of minorities during these communal riots

resulted, in some measure, in the germination of Islamist
fundamentalist organizations in Tamil Nadu during the late 1980s
and the early 1990s. Funded by local sympathizers and foreign
agencies, these organizations were gradually motivated and
mobilized for terrorist activities.

Fundamentalism and Subversion in Tamil Nadu

According to the police, Tamil Nadu has been witnessing

Islamist fundamentalist activities since 1983.12 Initially, during
the early 1980s, Islamist fundamentalist organizations were
noticeable in the State, through some violence did occur as a
result of the activities of recalcitrant individuals. However, during
the early 1990s, especially after the demolition of the Babri
Masjid (Babri Mosque),13 Muslim fundamentalist and extremist
organizations mushroomed all over India, and Tamil Nadu was no
exception.
The stated objective of a majority of these organizations was
the ‘need to protect Islam’ and the interests of Muslims,
especially from what was then articulated as a ‘Hindu onslaught.’
During the latter half of the 1990s, Islamist fundamentalists
resorted to planned attacks primarily targeting rival Hindu
fundamentalists, as also state structures and institutions perceived
to be supporting the latter. These fundamentalist groups – both
small and big – began to organize Muslims and to articulate
‘Muslim grievances’, both real and perceived. Among others, in
Tamil Nadu such organisations included Al Ummah, the All India
Jihad Committee (AIJC), Al Mujahideen, Tamil Nadu Muslim
Munnetra Kazhagam (TMMK), Islamic Defence Force (IDF),
Jamaithul Ahlul Quran-o-Hadis (JAQH), Sunnat Jamaat Peravai,
Sunnat Jamaat Ilaingnar Peravai and the Students Islamic
Movement of India (SIMI). While some of these organizations are
primarily conservative or revivalist movements that seek to order
life in keeping with the tenets of the Holy Quran and the

12
Press Note on 5.5.1999, Office of the Inspector General of Police, Crime
(SIT), CBCID, Admiralty House, Chennai, (Coimbatore Camp).
13
The Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in the State of Uttar Pradesh was demolished
by extremist Hindus on December 6, 1992.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

Sunnah,14 others like the Al Ummah, Jihad Committee and the

IDF adopt and espouse violence, extensively using coercion,
extortion and intimidation to achieve their goals.
Among these organisations, Al Ummah has been the most
prominent, and by 1997 it had spread its tentacles all over Tamil
Nadu. Formed in 1993, Al Ummah owes its genesis to a number
of private armies supported by Muslim businessmen. It is a well
structured organisation, with 11 member groups, each under an
Amir (chief).15 The organization’s activities reached their zenith
under the guidance of its founder and President, Syed Ahmad
Basha, who was a timber merchant in Coimbatore, and its prime
motive was to ‘protect Muslim interests’ and to strike against
those who spoke against Islam.16 Basha masterminded the attack
at Coimbatore in 1984 on Jana Krishnamurthy, a State Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) leader, who later became national President of
the party and a Union Minister in the late 1990s. However, Basha
was projected as a ‘defender of Islam’ and Muslim interests only
after the attack on the Hindu Munnani leader Rama Gopalan at
the Madurai Railway Station in 1987. In both the cases, he was
acquitted because of a lack of evidence. Soon after the 1987
incident, Basha organized Muslim youngsters under the Islamic
Youth Association to continue attacks on Hindu Munnani
leaders.17 Basha and his vigilante fundamentalist group also
started extorting money from leading businessmen and imposed a
‘tax’ on residents and shop keepers in and around the Muslim-
dominated areas of Coimbatore. They later fashioned Kangaroo
courts (the Kattai Panchayats) and settled disputes outside the
state’s judicial process, engineering a fundamentalist ascendancy
in civil society.18 Police sources indicate that, at one point, some
fundamentalist groups ordered the people to withhold taxes due to

14
The Sunnah is the second source of Islamic jurisprudence, the first being the
Qur'an.
15
Press Note on 28.09.98, Office of the Inspector General of Police, Crime
(SIT), CBCID, Admiralty House, Chennai, (Coimbatore Camp).
16
J.B. Das Gupta, Islamic Fundamentalism and India, Haryana: Hope India
Publications, 2002, p. 12.
17
Thakur Kuldip S Ludra, “Inter Services Intelligence Directorate’s Fourth
Leg in India – The Al Ummah”,
http://members.tripod.com/israindia/isr/may22/simi.html
18
T. S. Subramnanian, “A Time of Troubles,” Frontline, Chennai, vol. 15 no.
5, March 7-20, 1998.

123
P.G. Rajamohan

the city corporation and Muslim populated areas, especially in

Coimbatore city, became ‘out of bounds’ for Tamil Nadu
Government officials, including the Police.19
Sporadic and targeted violence by both Hindu and Muslim
extremist formations continued, as in the case of the retaliation
for the murder of Muslim platform speaker (platform speakers are
official speakers of the party who generally participate in all the
meetings) Abdul Latheef by Hindu fundamentalists, two Hindu
Munnani platform speakers, Veera Ganesh and Veera Sivakumar,
were stabbed to death on August 30, 1989, and September 5,
1991, respectively.
Meanwhile, the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya
in Uttar Pradesh on December 6, 1992, which is regarded as a key
development in polarizing the Hindu and Muslim communities,
injured Muslim sentiments even in distant parts of India,
extending even to the furthest Southern parts of the country, and
led to a wave of radical mobilisation.20 Soon after the demolition,
Islamist fundamentalist forces began to exploit the incident to fuel
anti-Hindu sentiments and a sense of siege among Muslims, even
as they connived to extract money – voluntarily and coercively –
from populations in their areas of influence, to fund their
subversive activities. In 1993, the first anniversary of the Babri
Masjid demolition was marked by disturbances in Tamil Nadu,
with Islamist fundamentalists in Coimbatore expressing their
resentment by picketing and arson. Police records indicate that, it
was in 1993 that Basha along with Ahmed Pasha and
Jawahirullah started the Al Ummah with its headquarters at
Coimbatore.21
Gradually, Al Ummah became popular among Islamist
fundamentalists and radicals in Tamil Nadu, and eventually came
under the national spotlight after the bomb blast at the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) office in Chennai on August 8, 1993,
in which 11 persons were killed.22 Basha and 15 others were

19
Author’s interview with a police officer in Coimbatore, August 11, 2003.
20
Author’s interview with media persons at Coimbatore, August 13, 2003.
21
Press Note on 28.09.98, Office of the Inspector General of Police, Crime
(SIT), CBCID, Admiralty House, Chennai.
22
Subramanian, “A time of troubles,” Frontline, vol. 15 no. 5, March 7-20,
1998.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

arrested under the National Security Act, 1980 (NSA) and the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987,
(TADA), in connection with the blast and were imprisoned.
However, after the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’s (DMK) ascent
to power in the 1996 election, they were released in January 1997,
as the regime did not want to ‘hurt the sentiments’ of the Muslim
minority and dilute its ‘vote bank’.
After the bomb blast at the RSS office at Chennai, the police
became more alert and raided Muslim-dominated areas,
particularly at Kottaimedu in Coimbatore, where the Al Ummah
headquarters was situated. This densely populated area had long
been used by terrorists and criminals as a safe-haven and a hub
from where they launched violent and criminal activities
elsewhere. The vigilante groups operating from Kottaimedu came
under the scrutiny of security agencies after the recovery of a
large cache of petrol bombs, gelatine sticks and country-made
explosives. Check posts were erected in certain areas by the
enforcement agencies to curtail underground activities and the
movement of terrorists to other parts of Tamil Nadu.23
In 1995, suspected Islamic Defence Force terrorists lobbed
grenades on noted film director Mani Ratnam’s house in Chennai
on the grounds that his film, Roja, had projected Muslims as
spearheading terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). A series of
bomb blasts were also carried out in many hotels owned by liberal
Muslims in Chennai during 1996, and these attacks were also
linked to the actions of Islamist fundamentalists. Hindu Munnani
activists were also murdered in Melapalayam, which is
predominantly populated by Muslims – five were killed in August
1997, one in 1998, and another on January 11, 2002. Islamist
terrorists also planted bombs in three trains: the Pandyan Express
at Trichy, the Cheran Express at Erode and the Alleppey Express
at Thrissur, on the fifth anniversary of the Babri Masjid
demolition on December 6, 1997. The IDF of Kerala and the
AIJC, while claiming responsibility for these blasts, said that
these were carried out to protest the Government’s failure to
punish those responsible for the demolition of the Babri Masjid.

23
Author’s interview with a senior police officer in Coimbatore on August 12,
2003.

125
P.G. Rajamohan

On January 31, 2000, police arrested 10 terrorists belonging to the

IDF and the AIJC.24 On the same day, there was a bomb blast at
Anna flyover in Chennai to condemn these arrests.25
Subsequently, the Al Ummah made preparations to launch
massive attacks in Coimbatore to avenge the death of 18 Muslims
in the riots in the city during November-December 1997, in which
the RSS, the Hindu Munnani and the Hindu Makkal Kathchi are
alleged to have played a prominent role. Subsequent to the
murder of a police constable, violence erupted on a large scale,
accompanied by looting and arson. Al Ummah chief Basha and
his cadres also plotted to assassinate prominent BJP leader L. K.
Advani, who was on an election campaign in Tamil Nadu.
However, due to a delay in his flight, Advani escaped the
assassination bid, although subsequent events created unrest
among the masses.
A series of bomb blasts, code-named Operation Alla-hu-
Akbar, was executed through the outfit’s suicide squad Shaheed
Padai on February 14, 1998, in 18 places, causing the death of 58
persons and injuring more than 200.26 According to intelligence
reports, senior Al Ummah leaders instigated and exploited
Muslim youngsters by showing them photographs and videos of
bloated bodies with post-mortem stitches, of Muslims killed
during previous riots.27 The Government proscribed the Al
Ummah and the Jihad Committee within three hours of the
incident. Police investigations later revealed that the terrorists
acquired explosives from the neighbouring States of Karnataka
and Kerala through authorized Government dealers for large sums
of money and transported them via Kerala to Coimbatore. Speedy
investigation of this case led to clues which assisted in further
probes of several unsolved cases in the State involving Islamist
militants, including the murder of Hindu Munnani leaders
Rajagopalan and Dr. Sridharan.

24
Press Note on 12.01.01, Office of the Addl. Director General of Police,
Crime (SIT), CBCID, Admiralty House, Chennai.
25
Ibid.
26
“Conviction in blasts case,” Frontline, vol. 20 no. 4, February 15-28, 2003.
27
Author’s interview with police officers and media personnel in Coimbatore
city.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

In addition to these incidents, fundamentalists also sparked

trouble in 1998 through various incidents like the grenade attack
on police personnel in Trichy (1998); the petrol bomb attack on
the Coimbatore Ukkadam police station (December 11, 2000); the
seizure of explosives at suburban areas of Vepperi and Tambaram
in Chennai (1998); the parcel bomb blast in Nagore; and the
lacing of sweets sent to the police station in Coimbatore with
cyanide (August 5, 2000).28 The seizure of a large cache of arms
and ammunition from the Mohammadiya Mill at Saliyamangalam
near Thanjavur on February 8, 1998, a week before the
Coimbatore blasts, was a portent of things to come.29 There were,
in fact, 34 important cases of fundamentalist violence in districts
and cities other than Coimbatore between 1990 and February 14,
1998, which constitute the back-drop of the serial bomb blasts
that occurred at Coimbatore on that date.30
Another important terrorist who made a mark in Tamil Nadu
was Imam Ali, who was subsequently killed during an encounter
with the police in Bangalore, capital city of Karnataka, on
September 29, 2002. Imam Ali was a member of the AIJC, a
terrorist group founded by the late Palani Baba, and was a prime
accused in the bomb blast at the RSS office in Chennai in August
1993 in which 11 persons were killed.31 Ali, a school drop-out,
was allegedly trained by Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) and later by the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen, a terrorist organisation
active in Jammu and Kashmir.32 He had also visited Bangladesh
and continued to maintain links with terrorist groups there and
specialised in making remote controlled bombs with the objective
of assassinating political leaders in India. He escaped twice from
police custody in Tamil Nadu and was finally killed during an
encounter along with four of his associates in Bangalore on
September 29, 2002.33 Intelligence reports revealed that Ali had
28
Press Release, Office of the IGP (Crime), Special Investigation Team,
CBCID, Chennai, Dated 5. 5. 1999.
29
Press Note on 28.09.98, Office of the Inspector General of Police, Crime
(SIT), CBCID, Admiralty House, Chennai.
30
Press Release, Office of the IGP (Crime), Special Investigation Team,
CBCID, Chennai, Dated 5. 5. 1999.
31
“The end of a chase,” Frontline, vol. 19 no. 21, October 12-25, 2002.
32
Ibid.
33
“Imam Ali shot dead in Bangalore,” The Hindu, Chennai, September 30,
2002.

127
P.G. Rajamohan

plans to assassinate Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani, Union

Human Resource Development Minister Murli Manohar Joshi
and leaders of Hindu religious organizations. According to
Ashutosh Shukla, Deputy Inspector-General of Police
(Coimbatore Range), Imam Ali had allegedly made plans to
trigger a series of blasts in major temples in South India,
including the Meenakshi Amman temple in Madurai and the
International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON)
temple in Bangalore, in order to trigger communal riots; as well
as to blow up bridges and destroy strategic installations such as
the headquarters of the Indian Space Research Organisation
(ISRO) in Bangalore.34
Other prominent Islamist fundamentalists in Tamil Nadu
included Palani Baba, Abdul Nasser Madani, Kunnangudi Hanifa
and Kichan Buhari. Ahmad Ali alias Palani Baba, who formed the
AIJC in 1987, was an ardent advocate of the ideology of militant
Islam and gained popularity in the early 1990s after the
demolition of Babri Masjid. The AIJC under his leadership
operated in Tamil Nadu and he had instructed his followers to
work in coordination with the All India Milli Council, a major
propagator of radical Muslim interests in India. Palani Baba was
allegedly killed by some Kerala-based RSS activists on January
28, 1997, at Pollachi near Coimbatore.35

Growth of Fundamentalism in Tamil Nadu

Tamil Nadu caught the national attention after the February

14, 1998, serial bomb blasts in Coimbatore, which in a sense
reflected the magnitude of religious fundamentalism in the State.
The final report of the Justice P.R. Gokulakrishnan Commission
of Inquiry, set up by the Tamil Nadu Government on February 22,
1998, to inquire into the causes and circumstances that led to the
Coimbatore serial blasts of February 14, 1998, noted:
It has been categorically established that Muslim
fundamentalist organizations, especially the Al-Ummah,
headed by S.A. Basha, hatched a deep-rooted conspiracy

34
“The end of a chase,” Frontline, vol. 19 no. 21, October 12-25, 2002.
35
“A Time of Troubles,” Frontline, vol. 15 no. 5, March 7-20, 1998.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

to explode bombs to avenge the death of 18 Muslims

killed in the 1997 police firings and communal riots.36
It is, at this point, pertinent to analyze the reasons for the
emergence of fundamentalist forces in Tamil Nadu, which had,
till 1980, remained immune to their activities.
The influence of the ‘Dravida’ ideology in Tamil Nadu well
before Independence left little space for religious fundamentalism
in the State. When the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)
came to power in 1967, it was considered to be the party that
would accommodate the concerns of the minority community, as
well as of the various marginalised castes that were its primary
constituency.
The roots of communal tension in the State are generally
believed to date back to the early 1980s, when more than 1,200
Dalits (the poorest and most oppressed in the Hindu caste system)
of Meenakshipuram, a village in the Kanyakumari district,
embraced Islam on February 19, 1981, and even changed their
village name to ‘Rehmatnagar’. Thereafter, there was a wave of
conversions in many places, including Tirunelveli,
Ramanathapuram and Thanjavur districts, as also stray incidents
of conversion or threat to conversion in some other districts such
as Madurai, Madras (Chennai) and North Arcot as well.
Conversion was generally seen as a means register protest by, and
to uplift the social status of, the Dalits. The converted Dalits felt
that the caste system in Hinduism was responsible for their low
status, whereas Islam purportedly provided liberation from this
stigma as it did not recognize social divisions on the basis of
caste. Hindu activists wanted to stop these conversions and many
national-level Hindu leaders visited the tiny hamlet of
‘Rehmatnagar’ and other areas affected by the conversions in
order to ‘bring back’ the converted Dalits into their fold. It was
these incidents of conversion and the Hindu response that are
believed to have ignited tensions between the two main religious
groups in Tamil Nadu.
Communal riots first broke out at Mandaikadu in the
Kanyakumari district in March 1982, ironically between the
Hindu and Christian communities, though again due to the alleged

36
Interview with Police Officer.

129
P.G. Rajamohan

conversion activities undertaken by Christian missionaries. The

growing religious tensions in Tamil Nadu had already manifested
themselves in violence, when, in the first such recorded incident,
Islamist fundamentalists assaulted Tirukovilur Sundaram, a Hindu
Munnani leader, at R. S. Puram in Coimbatore in 1981, after he
was accused of delivering speeches against Islam and the Prophet
Mohammed. Soon afterwards, radical elements of the Hindu
Munnani are said to have publicly abused and reviled Islam.
Within the Hindu community, a more radical element had
crystallized with the formation of the Hindu Munnani in 1981 by
Rama Gopalan, who had received training from the RSS.37 Much
later, the Hindu Makkal Katchi (Hindu People’s Party) formed in
1993 as an offshoot of the Hindu Munnani, also joined forces
with the Hindu fundamentalists. Analysts observe that Islamist
and Hindu fundamentalists were emboldened by each others’
actions and repeatedly accused each other of wrongdoing in
public meetings.38
Meanwhile, during this period, the long surviving ‘Tamil
identity’ was gradually being overrun by competing religious
identities.39 The All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam’s
(AIADMK) bid to secure more Hindu votes by curbing Islamist
fundamentalist organizations and the DMK’s strategy of
appeasing the Muslims led to a further polarization in the State’s
political spectrum. The RSS office bomb blast in 1993, during
AIADMK rule, resulted in a heavy crackdown on fundamentalist
organizations, especially the Al Ummah. But after the DMK’s
victory in the 1996 elections, all the 16 accused – including S.A.
Basha – in connection with the incident were released
immediately. The result was a sudden revival of Islamist
fundamentalist activities in the immediate aftermath of the release
of Basha and the other accused. Large-scale celebrations and
processions by a certain section of the Muslim community were
organized to welcome the released Al Ummah activists.

37
Press Note on 28.09.98, Office of the Inspector General of Police, Crime
(SIT), CBCID, Admiralty House, Chennai.
38
Author’s interaction with columnists and media personnel in Trichy on
August 16, 2003.
39
Hasan Mansur, “Nationalism and the Nuclear Bomb,” Islamic Voice, June
1998; www.islamicvoice.com/june.98/features.htm#NAT

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

Thereafter, attacks on police personnel and police check posts by

these fundamentalist groups were stepped up in Coimbatore, with
the objective of looting arms and ammunitions.40
The Gokulakrishnan Commission Report while establishing
the ‘deep-rooted conspiracy’ of the ‘Muslim fundamentalist
organisations’, particularly the Al Ummah, also indicted the
police force for its apparent laxity. According to the Commission,
"Due to lapse on the part of police personnel in discharging their
duty more vigorously, vigilantly and intelligently, the Muslim
fundamentalists more especially, Al-Ummah cadres were able to
explode the bombs at various places.”41
Despite detailed intelligence reports on January 31 and
February 12 about the possibility of violence during L.K.
Advani’s visit, proper arrangements were not made to avert the
incident.42 Police sources alleged that the then ruling DMK
Government did not want to dilute its Muslim vote bank by
initiating a police raid in the Muslim-dominated areas – Muslims
constituted seven per cent of Coimbatore’s population. The
communalization of the police forces had a direct bearing on the
psyche of the minority population, sections of which supported
fundamentalist organizations. The state’s inability to protect
Muslims during communal violence further enabled Islamist
fundamentalists to bring certain sections of the Muslim youth into
their fold.43
The absence of a popular political front to represent the
Muslim community was also a significant reason for the
inclination among Muslims towards fundamentalism, or their
vulnerability to extremist mobilisation. There are more than 15
Muslim political parties claiming to represent Muslim interests in
Tamil Nadu, where the community represents 13 per cent of the
population. The fragmentation of the vote means that no Muslim
group secures significant clout in State politics, and a general
complaint among Muslim political parties is that they are not

40
T. S. Subramanian, “Fundamentalism and a Flare-up,” Frontline, December
18, 1998.
41
“Probe confirms plot to kill Advani,” The Tribune, Chandigarh, May 19,
2000.
42
“Prior Warning not taken seriously,” Hindu, February 19, 1998.
43
Author’s interview with SOCO Trust secretary Lajpatrai and People’s Watch
rights activists in Madurai on August 21-23, 2003.

131
P.G. Rajamohan

given due importance in the State’s political alliances. Other

political parties do, of course, enter into electoral alliances with
the Muslim parties, but this is essentially to exploit the ‘vote
bank’, and there has been a steep decline in the representation of
Muslim parties in the cabinet and legislature over the past 15
years, resulting in deep frustration within the Islamic
community.44 A divided Muslim leadership has consequently led
to the community being divided across the political spectrum.
Thus, for instance, the falling out of two front-ranking Muslim
leaders in Tamil Nadu, Indian Union Muslim League president
A.K.A. Abdus Samad and the general secretary M.A. Lateef, in
1987 led to the splitting of the Muslim vote-bank in favour of
whichever major electoral partner (the DMK and AIADMK) they
aligned themselves with, and the community gradually lost its
electoral clout.45
Extremist groups such as the Al-Umma and the AIJC have
filled the void left by the fragmentation of Muslim parties, and by
the actual or perceived failure of mainstream political formations
to reflect Muslim aspiration, particularly in the post-Babri
Mosque demolition era in Tamil Nadu. As the inclusive capacities
of political parties were gradually diluted by the compulsions of
realpolitik, fundamentalist groups were successful in weaning
away a section of Muslim youth who earlier supported the
mainstream formations. Significantly, this occurred despite the
fact that radicalisation has been disowned by an overwhelming
majority of Muslims in the State. Nevertheless, “local factors,
lack of credible leadership and frustration among the youth, not to
mention the unseen hands of Islamic fundamentalists and the
alleged inspiration of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence
directorate are said to have activated the increased communal
violence in the southern state.”46
The Muslim leadership's silence over the demolition of the
Babri mosque also unnerved a section of the Muslim youth and
unsettled the community at large. The result was that the

44
Author’s interview with columnist and reporter, Pandiyarajan, in Trichy on
August 16, 2003.
45
Ibid.
46
N Sathiya Moorthy, “Fear and loathing in Tamil Nadu,”
www.rediff.com/news/dec/15tn.htm.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

community saw itself as confronted with a stark choice between

various neo-political moderate groups and radical, violence-prone
entities like Al Ummah and the AIJC.47
According to official sources in the State, the main areas of
fundamentalist activity are centred in Melapalayam, Dindigul,
Madurai, Sivakasi, Tirupur, Chennai and Coimbatore. Poverty,
illiteracy and social backwardness have also contributed to the
vulnerability of the youth to the radicalization. In these and
several other areas, poverty and the absence of job opportunities
have been significant motivating elements for religious
extremism, and have created the opportunities that were
eventually exploited by extremist leaders like Basha, Palani Baba,
Kundrakudi Hanifa, Kitchan Buhari and Imam Ali to recruit for
the Al-Ummah, AIJC, Islamic Defence Force and Al-
Mujahideen.48
An important aspect of Islamist fundamentalist mobilisation
in Tamil Nadu is that it has often been directed more towards
countering the activities of Hindu extremist organizations, and is
not entirely impelled by an independent vision, or by the mischief
of external agencies. Many Muslims, for instance, mentioned49
that extravagant and aggressive celebrations of Vinayaka
Chaturthi, direct verbal attacks on Islam and Muslims by the
Hindu Munnani and Hindu People’s Party leaders, contributed to
a sense of insecurity among the Muslims. Every year the
Vinayaka Chaturthi celebrations create large-scale disturbances
within the local community. Every year there is tension during
these festivals, especially with regard to securing permission for
the procession. In recent times, the security agencies have become
more conscious about such problems and provide maximum
security during this period in order to avert the growing tension
between the two communities. On September 3, 2003, a clash
occurred between Hindus and Muslims during the Vinayaka
Chaturthi procession and eight people were injured during the
incident at Nelpettai in Madurai city, where the Hindu Munnani
and BJP is trying to gain ground.

47
Ibid.
48
“Extreme measures in Tamil Nadu,” The Indian Express, Delhi, October 5,
2002.
49
Author’s Field Notes, August 2003.

133
P.G. Rajamohan

According to a White Paper presented in the State Legislative

Assembly on April 23, 1998, “Provocative speeches made by
some persons offended the religious sentiments of others.
Conflicts arose when processions of followers of one religion
passed in front of the places of worship of another.”50 After
analyzing communal clashes between Hindus and Muslims all
over India, Abdul Azeez Saheb a former employee in the
Anthropological Survey of India, Mysore, observed, “… in
general, the reasons for the outbreak of small communal
disturbances are the Hindu religious processions which play
music before the mosque during prayer time.” This applies
substantially to events in Tamil Nadu as well. What is often
witnessed is a retaliatory cycle in which Hindu and Muslim
extremists compete to inflict humiliation on their antagonists, and
it is often difficult to locate specifically what the original
triggering event was – whether the provocation came from Hindu
fundamentalists abusing, provoking or attacking the Muslim
community, or Islamist extremists targeting Hindus in a like
manner. There have, in this cycle of retaliatory violence, for
instance, been many reports of Hindu idols damaged in many
places, including Chennai, Melapalayam, and Coimbatore.
Economic rivalry between Hindu and Muslim traders is
another major reason for the growth of fundamentalist
organizations in Tamil Nadu. Since 1991, Coimbatore, a city with
a substantial high-tech industrial infrastructure has seen a
translation of economic competition into fundamentalist
confrontation. The business community uses these hardliners for
their own economic and political benefits. It is much more
prevalent in the small scale business enterprises which are active
in the common Bazaars. For instance, the considerable textile
industry in the city is organised along communal lines, and there
is little cooperation, collaboration or interdependence between
Hindu and Muslim textile traders. The intense competition
between Hindu and Muslim traders has often exploited
‘misguided youth’ of each community to unleash hooliganism
against each other. Indeed, after the formation of fundamentalist

50
See for instance, T.S. Subramanian, “Human bombs and human error,”
Frontline, vol. 15 no. 10, May 9-22, 1998.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

organizations, the business class in both the communities is

known to have heavily financed these organizations for their own
vested interests.51 While the extremist gangs did engage in
extortion and petty crimes, landlords, traders and merchants also
channelled funds into rival communal groups. Shopkeepers and
pavement vendors, divided not only communally but also
geographically, also found it necessary to obtain the ‘protection’
of extremist elements, though this was especially the case with
Muslim traders who were repeatedly at the receiving end in riot
situations.52 According to Subramanian, “Muslim businessmen
felt threatened when Hindu Munnani speakers appealed to Hindus
not to patronise Muslim-owned shops. Even worse, the Hindu
Munnani organised Hindu traders into associations.”53 According
the Police, when the Hindu Munnani posed a threat to their
businesses, Muslim businessmen nurtured Basha, who began his
career as a footpath trader in the Ukkadam and Oppanakkara
areas. When the sequence of stabbings and counter-stabbings
intensified, youth on either side of the divide joined the Hindu
Munnani or Al-Ummah, leading to increasing communal
polarisation.54
The Gokulakrishnan Commission noted that the Islamist
fundamentalist groups also received finances and support from
Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), and some Middle Eastern countries. Further,
the Commission report confirmed that Al-Ummah cadres’ video
recorded the dead bodies of Muslims in communal clashes and
sent the recordings to Muslim countries to mobilize sympathy and
finances for their jihad in India. Fundamentalism also emerged as
big business, with frustrated youth, left out of the Gulf-jobs
boom, falling easy prey, particularly if ideological moorings and
financial incentives were merged in organisational membership.55

51
Author’s discussion with general public in Coimbatore on August 14, 2003.
52
Jaishankar Karuppannan and Balamurugan Venkatesh, Patterns of Crimes of
Communal Violence and Terrorism in Coimbatore City: A GIS Analysis in
India, www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/maps/Conferences/02conf/Karuppannan.doc.
53
T. S. Subramanian, “A time of troubles,” Frontline, vol. 15 no. 5, March 7-
20, 1998.
54
Ibid.
55
N Sathiya Moorthy, “Fear and loathing in Tamil Nadu,”
www.rediff.com/news/dec/15tn.htm.

135
P.G. Rajamohan

A regular money channel from Gulf countries and frequent

visits of Islamist fundamentalists to these countries ensured many
recruits and sympathizers for these terrorist groups. When Imam
Ali floated the ‘Al Mujahideen’ group in March 2002, after his
escape from police custody, he recruited people from the Madurai
and Trichy districts. Al Mujahideen was funded by the Indian-
born Saudi Arabia-settled Abu Hamsa alias Abdul Bari with the
objective of extending Islamist fundamentalism to the extreme
southern part of India. 20 Islamist fundamentalists were arrested
following a tip-off in the wake of a bomb explosion at the Sai
Baba Temple at Hyderabad on November 21, 2002. They had
allegedly developed contacts with Abu Hamza and sought to open
branches of the Saudi-based Muslim Defence Force (MDF) in
Tamil Nadu to carry out explosions in important Hindu temples,
and to foment communal violence.56 Meanwhile, the connection
of Tamil Islamists with other terrorists groups like the Tamil
Nadu Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Tamil National Retrieval
Troops (TNRT) helped the former to procure arms and
ammunition.57 It was reported that Imam Ali took rigorous arms
training at Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Lashkar-e-Toiba camps near
Srinagar in 1992. Tamil Islamists also had links with Islamist
groups in Andhra Pradesh, Kerala and Maharashtra.
The influx of Kerala Muslims into Tamil Nadu was another
contributory factor in the extremist spiral. Police records reveal
that, out of the 168 accused in the Coimbatore bomb blast case,
13 were arrested from Kerala and most of the other accused were
also found to be original inhabitants of Kerala.58 Apart from
these, the presence of 10 accused from Andhra Pradesh, two from
Karnataka and one from Kolkata demonstrated the inter-State
linkages of the perpetrator groups. Crucially, Muslims from
Mallapuram, Thrissur and Palakkad in Kerala were found to be
involved in these fundamentalist activities. These three districts
border with Tamil Nadu, and have high rates of population
growth, particularly among the Muslim community. High levels

56
Tamil Nadu Police, Policy Note on Demand 21, 2003-2004.
57
Author’s interview with a senior police officer in Chennai on August 29,
2003.
58
Press Note, 5.5.1999, Office of the Inspector General of Police, Crime (SIT),
CBCID, Admiralty House, Chennai.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

of unemployment force people across the border into Tamil Nadu,

where they often secure menial jobs for very low remuneration, in
various towns in the State, particularly in Coimbatore. Former
president of the banned Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS) and leader of
the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), Abdul Nasser Madani, is
now facing charges for facilitating the acquisition of arms and
ammunition by the terrorists, as well as in enabling the financial
transactions between foreign fund providers and local terrorists.59
There was also a spill-over effect in Kerala, with seizures of huge
quantities of explosives and the arrest of at least 10 persons from
various parts of the State following the Coimbatore blasts.
According to the police, one person who was arrested in Palakkad
had also been involved in the bomb blast at the Hindu Munnani
office in Chennai, and a group of nine persons arrested in Thrissur
on their arrival from Coimbatore were suspected to have had a
role in the Tamil Nadu bomb blasts.60 Significantly, as early as in
March 1997, soon after a haul of explosives was made in
Chennai, the then Kerala Chief Minister E.K. Nayanar told the
State Legislative Assembly that five to eight Islamist extremist
groups were operating in northern Kerala and that they received
funds and other forms of support from foreign countries,
especially Iran and some countries in West Asia.61
The majority of Muslim youth involved in fundamentalist
activity is either uneducated or unemployed or living in poor
conditions. Initially, these youngsters are often enticed into
associations with radical groups by the lure of money, but are
later indoctrinated by radical religious leaders in secret meetings.
Police sources indicate that the Al-Ummah conducted such secret
meetings in mosques on every Friday.62 The Principal of the
Arabic College in Kayalpattinam, Noohu Thambi Hamid Pakkiri,
a member of the IDF and brother-in-law of Imam Ali, was
arrested on December 1, 2002, for securing money from Gulf
countries to conduct terrorist activities in Tamil Nadu. Pakkiri

59
“Kerala a haven for subversive forces”, The Hindustan Times, New Delhi,
September 7, 2001.
60
R. Krishnakumar, “Concern in Kerala,” Frontline, vol. 15 no. 5, March 7-20,
1998.
61
Ibid.
62
Author’s interview with police officers in Coimbatore on August 12, 2003.

137
P.G. Rajamohan

reportedly attended the International Islamic Conference held in

Sri Lanka in 2002 where he is suspected to have held meetings
with benefactors from Gulf countries. The Arabic College, along
with other similar seminaries focus on the teaching of Islamic
literature, and modern educational curricula and tools are
conspicuously absent. Their students, consequently, are
particularly vulnerable to extremist mobilisation.
Islamist fundamentalism in Tamil Nadu, at the moment, is in
a dormant stage since most of the most prominent protagonists,
numbering around 300, are in prison, while some of the most
dangerous actors have been killed. The result is a current and
severe curtailment of their activities. The state’s timely responses,
especially the police department’s immediate action to curb
fundamentalist activities after the Coimbatore blast, have led to an
erosion of the Islamist fundamentalist ranks in Tamil Nadu. This
is reflected in the fact that while 45 persons died in communal
clashes in the State during 1997, the numbers have been
decreasing rapidly, with only a few deaths reported since then.

Year Number of Deaths

1997 45
1998 2
1999 2
2000 1
2001 1
2002 2
2003 (till February 28) Nil
Source: Tamil Nadu Police, Policy Note on
Demand 21, 2003-200463

Nevertheless, the dangers persist. There are some reports of

efforts to revive some of the organisations that have been
neutralised by strong police action, and the fundamental dynamic
that created the spaces for the operation of these groups has not
been addressed.
The death of Imam Ali and four others during an encounter
with the police in Bangalore in September 2002 was generally
63
Can also be accessed at http://www.tn.gov.in/police/homepolice2003.pdf.

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 Tamil Nadu: The Rise of Islamist Fundamentalism

considered to have been an end for the fundamentalists’ activity

in this part of the State. However, recent intelligence reports have
indicated a regrouping of the fundamentalists in the southern
districts. The Cuddalore police claim to have busted a
fundamentalist outfit – Manitha Neethi Pasarai (MNP) located at
Nellikuppam – which has been allegedly converting Dalits into
Islam and imparting training to them in handling weapons and
martial arts.64 The MNP was suspected to have links with other
terrorist groups inside and outside the country and also allegedly
received funds from foreign countries.
The increasing vigilance of security agencies in Tamil Nadu,
particularly in pockets of radical and terrorist concentration, has
helped contain the Islamist militancy in the State. The pressure on
patrons, particularly from the business community, a major source
of funding, and the loss of political support have also contributed
to the decline of radical movements. A purge of Hawala transfers
to the key personalities in the movements and their prominent
supporters also undermined the capacities of these groups to
extend or sustain activities. Nevertheless, the danger has not been
completely eliminated, and the potential for a resurgence abides.
Whether or not such a potential is realized will, however, depend
substantially on the measure of political stability in the State, and
the harnessing of communal issues and religious polarization in
the processes of electoral and political mobilisation.

64
“Fundamentalist outfit busted at Nellikuppam”, Hindu, October 29, 2004.

139