Creutzig Et Al. 2017
Creutzig Et Al. 2017
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s fifth assessment report emphasizes the importance of bioenergy and carbon
capture and storage for achieving climate goals, but it does not identify solar energy as a strategically important technology
option. That is surprising given the strong growth, large resource, and low environmental footprint of photovoltaics (PV). Here
we explore how models have consistently underestimated PV deployment and identify the reasons for underlying bias in mod-
els. Our analysis reveals that rapid technological learning and technology-specific policy support were crucial to PV deployment
in the past, but that future success will depend on adequate financing instruments and the management of system integration.
We propose that with coordinated advances in multiple components of the energy system, PV could supply 30–50% of electric-
ity in competitive markets.
T
o achieve the 2 °C goal of the Paris Agreement, fossil fuels schemes, non-monetary preferences, and rapid technological learn-
need to be phased out and replaced by low-carbon sources ing. Second, we analyse existing barriers to PV deployment, espe-
of energy. This requires the nearly complete decarboniza- cially the rising costs of integrating intermittent solar energy into
tion of the power sector by 2050, and an accelerated shift towards the electricity system and the up-front financing structure, which
electricity as a final energy carrier 1. The Intergovernmental Panel poses a challenge for countries with less-developed financial institu-
on Climate Change (IPCC) comprehensively evaluated mitiga- tions. We argue that these barriers can be overcome, pointing to the
tion pathways to stay within an atmospheric concentration of increasing option space to accommodate a high share of PV into the
430–480 ppm CO2 — roughly corresponding to the 2 °C target 2, grid and new financing schemes. Finally, we implement the lessons
and studied the specific contribution of renewable energy (RE) to learned from this analysis into the integrated assessment model
mitigation3,4. Surprisingly, solar energy emerges only as a minor REMIND and find that cost-optimal climate mitigation scenarios
mitigation option in most modelling studies. For example, a sce- include 30–50% PV market share in electricity generation.
nario comparison study that fed into the IPCC projected a global
solar electricity generation of 8–35 EJ per year in 2050 (25th–75th PV deployment has consistently exceeded expectations
percentile) for 2 °C consistent mitigation scenarios5, correspond- Direct solar energy has a technical potential of 1,500–50,000 EJ
ing to a ~5–17% contribution to electricity supply 6. In contrast, the per year (ref. 10), exceeding the projected global primary energy
same study projects biomass-based secondary energy production of demand of about 1,000 EJ per year in 2050 (ref. 11) (where tech-
50–90 EJ per year in 2050 (ref. 5). Reasons why the underlying mod- nical potential is defined as the achievable energy generation of
els prefer bioenergy include its higher versatility, making it more a particular technology given system performance, topographic
broadly applicable throughout the existing energy system, and the limitations, and environmental and land-use constraints). In
possibility of generating negative emissions from bioenergy by com- comparison, the global technical potentials for wind (85–580 EJ)
bining it with carbon capture and storage. However, sustainable bio- and biomass (100–300 EJ), are orders of magnitude smaller 3,7,8.
mass sourcing and the underlying land requirements are estimated Photovoltaics (PV) has become the dominant technology to tap
to limit primary bioenergy production to between 100–300 EJ per the solar potential for electricity generation. Indeed, PV is the RE
year in 2050 (that is, secondary energy production of 50–150 EJ), technology with the highest growth rate (more than 40% per year
whereas the technical potential for solar energy is many times that over the past decade12) and the steepest learning curve (about 22.5%
of bioenergy and exceeds total projected global energy demand in reduction in module price for each doubling in cumulative produc-
mid-century 7–9. Recent market developments point to rapid take- tion capacity over the last 40 years13). In 2015, China, Japan and the
up of solar energy in both established and emerging markets. That United States added the majority of new PV capacity and several
raises the question of why solar energy is only marginally repre- European countries (Germany, Greece, Italy) met more than 5%
sented in energy system futures so far. of their electricity demand from PV12. However, the past literature
In this Perspective, we first scrutinize historical scenarios and on energy supply scenarios is in stark contrast with these observed
find that solar energy has so far been systematically underesti- developments. In Fig. 1, we document a history of underestimation
mated in global energy and mitigation scenarios compared to of the growth in PV deployment within the scenario literature.
actual deployment. We investigate the reasons for this underes- Historically, annual growth of the cumulative installed capacity
timation and find that models have overlooked public incentive has varied between 20–72% between 1998 and 2015, corresponding
Mercator Research Institute on Global Commons and Climate Change, Torgauer Straβe 12–15, 10829 Berlin, Germany. 2Sustainability Economics of Human
1
Settlements, Technische Universität Berlin, Str. des 17. Juni 135, 10623 Berlin, Germany. 3Fraunhofer Institut für Solare Energiesysteme ISE, Heidenhofstraβe
2, 79110 Freiburg im Breisgau, Germany. 4Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Telegrafenberg, 14473 Potsdam, Germany. 5La Follette School of
Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin – Madison, 1225 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, USA. e-mail: creutzig@mcc-berlin.net
a 100 c
Growth (%)
75
50 104
25
0
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
b 103 103
102 102
101 101
Historic highest/lowest growth rates
LIMITS and AMPERE 5th–95th percentile
LIMITS and AMPERE 33rd–66th percentile
WBGU
Greenpeace
100 100 IEA
Real capacity
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Year Year
Figure 1 | Growth in PV capacity and scenario projections. a, Year-to-year increase of PV capacity as a percentage of the previously installed capacity.
b, Comparison of historic cumulative installed PV capacity with scenarios from the IEA, Greenpeace and WBGU. c, Scenarios of future cumulative PV
capacity by the IEA, Greenpeace and WBGU compared with an extrapolation of the historical range of growth rates (low, 18% versus high, 50%). Also
shown are results from the scenario comparison projects LIMITS and AMPERE on low climate impact scenarios, which study future transformation
pathways consistent with limiting warming to below 2 °C. Differences between IEA and Greenpeace scenarios and realized capacity is up to a factor of
10 in 2015. See Methods for data sources.
to an average annual growth of 38% (see Methods). Most scenar- in a fragmented international policy landscape23,24. Scenario results
ios underestimated historical growth by a wide margin. Between often mismatch 2015 real capacity because they are calibrated to
1998 and 2010 the International Energy Agency (IEA) has repeat- older historic data.
edly predicted PV annual growth of 16–30%, far below the actual Previous work has found limited predictive power in energy
rate14,15. Only the 2012 World Energy Outlook high-growth ‘new forecasting, including forecasts of technologies for energy supply 25
policies’ scenario predicted 32% annual growth through 2015, in and end use26 as well as overall demand27. Additional criticisms
line with actual development 16, but it then expects decelerated have been directed at integrated assessment models28,29 in which, for
growth of 12% for the next five years. Even in scenarios describ- example, uncertainties in forecast parameters, such as those on sup-
ing a transformation of the global energy system towards a fully ply assumptions30, can cascade and are often not fully expressed in
sustainable one, for example, by the German Advisory Council on the results. Further critiques of models have pointed out that they
Global Change (WBGU), the growth of PV has been underesti- lack increasing returns in technology improvement 31; however, this
mated with a growth rate of about 26% (ref. 8). This specific sce- has been partially addressed in a number of models developed over
nario was able to predict the growth a few years after its publication the last decade32.
in 2003, but, like many others, failed to foresee increasing growth
after 2007. The most advanced scenarios published by Greenpeace Explaining underestimates of models
from 2007–2010 underestimated the growth dynamics: their ini- In PV, the discrepancy between model-based estimates and real-
tially high growth rates were expected to fall to 24–32%, growth world developments can largely be attributed to three key fac-
rates that were surpassed by real development 17–19. The energy revo- tors: policy support; steep technological learning of PV; and cost
lution scenario published in 2012 by Greenpeace accurately cap- increases of competing technologies.
tures the 52% growth until 2015 (then assuming reduced growth
for the future)20. Policy support. Demand grew disruptively after the introduction
Similarly, integrated assessment models have severely underesti- of feed-in tariffs (FiTs) and other technology support schemes that
mated near-term PV growth. The vast majority of energy transfor- were not represented in global models33. After decades in which
mation scenarios documented in the 2014 IPCC fifth assessment solar PV was mostly adopted for space and off-grid applications
report (AR5) feature 2015 PV deployment levels of 50 TWh or less, in remote areas, policies targeted at supporting renewable energies
which is less than half of the global PV production that was actually were put into place accelerating PV deployment, especially since
achieved in 2014 (ref. 12). LIMITS compares future transformation 1998. The take-off was supported by high public acceptance and
pathways consistent with limiting warming to below 2 °C calculated valuing non-monetized attributes; PV adopters show a willingness-
with six integrated assessment models21,22. These pathways account to-pay of US$0.02–0.04 per kWh above traditional energy sources34,
for country-level CO2 reduction targets for 2020 as announced in a premium of about 20%, and higher than for other renewables35.
the Copenhagen pledges, and national renewable expansion tar- In Germany the FiT triggered a 400-fold growth between
gets announced until 2011. AMPERE studied possible pathways 2000 and 2016 (41 GW in 2016, generating about 6.5% of all elec-
toward medium-term and long-term climate targets at the global tricity 36). Crucial for enabling the rapid growth was that the FiT
and European levels and provided insights into the cost implica- guaranteed remuneration for a period of 20 years in combination
tions of policy delay, technology availability and unilateral action with streamlined permitting procedures; hence, PV was understood
10
0
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
b 30
German FiT (utility scale)
FiT/LCOE Germany (¢ per kWh)
15
10
0
2010 2015 2020 2025 2030
Year
c
BoS US
BoS Germany
101 Module
1992
Cost (€ per Wp )
1998
100
2007
2012
10–1
10–2 10–1 100 101 102
Cumulative global capacity (GWp )
Figure 2 | Rapid decline in levelized cost of PV electricity. a, Past, present and future solar LCOE. Past data taken from IEA91 for solar and coal, Lazard
consulting92 for utility-scale US projects with high irradiation and IRENA83 for global projects with systems >1 MW. The values assume a discount rate
of 10% for both coal and solar. The larger spread of the 2010 values in comparison to the 2015 values is due to the number of technologies included,
changes in fuel price, and other assumptions. The LCOE range does not contain technologies with CCS. IRENA data shows the range of LCOE utility-scale
PV projects from 2010 to 2015 (left-hand side) and the potential cost reductions from 2015 to 2025 (right-hand side) using a capacity-weighted average
LCOE with a weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) at 7.5% for OECD countries and China and 10% for the rest of the world83. The historic data from
Lazard92 is based on crystalline utility-scale solar with single-axis tracking in high-insolation jurisdictions (for example, southwest United States) at the
lower end, while the high end represents crystalline utility-scale solar with fixed-tilt design. Values for 1 MW utility-scale plants were taken from ref. 93.
The lower end corresponds to a high insolation region (Spain) with low WACC of 2%, whereas the higher end corresponds to low insolation and a higher
WACC of 8%. The set of achievable solar LCOEs based on recent purchase agreements was compiled by the World Bank and includes the UAE, Mexico,
the United States, Peru, Chile, India, South Africa and Zambia94. Future LCOE projections were taken from IRENA and Vartiainen et al.93. b, Evolution of the
German FiT95 along with the results of recent German solar tenders and LCOE projections for south Germany93. The LCOE projection for the insolation
level of Munich was taken with the range denoting WACC between 2% and 8%. c, Cost evolution as a function of global cumulative capacity for modules36
(global average), and BOS in the United States96 and Germany (EuPD; which is based on roof-top systems). The US BOS data costs were estimated as
the difference of install prices for each system but using nationally averaged module prices. Capacities of 0.1 GWp were reached in 1992, 1 GWp in 2000,
10 GWp in 2007, and 100 GWp in 2012.
as a long-term, low-risk investment. This led to an influx of private installations. In 2015 China took over as the largest PV market with
capital from home-owners and small interest groups. At the end of a generous FiT focusing heavily on utility scale38.
2012, 48% of the installed PV capacity was owned by citizens (private Electricity-market models and integrated energy models, by
persons or farmers), a higher rate than for any other modern power contrast, optimize the energy mix by minimizing system cost, and
technology, whereas only 3.5% was owned by utility companies, and assume that electricity is a homogenous good39,40. Typically, they only
the remaining capacity by companies, project developers, banks and represent stylized climate policies, such as carbon pricing. Thus they
investment funds37. Similar developments followed in other coun- were not able to foresee accelerated growth driven by the combina-
tries, such as Spain, Italy, Japan and China, after the introduction of tion of technology-specific policies and personal preferences that
FiT schemes, while in the USA an investment tax credit supports PV are not purely cost-minimizing. Only recently have IAMs started to
While R&D and industry-scale production have achieved fast reduction of module prices globally, decentralized deployment and supporting infrastructure (such as skills, financing and regulation) requires
country-specific and region-specific build-up and increased attention.
the technological learning rate underlines that financing and per- major factor for the economics of PV on the system level. Power sys-
mitting is a key variable in bringing down costs across geographical tems need to balance demand and generation continuously, and PV
locations worldwide (Table 1). In most developing countries, how- cannot be dispatched according to demand. Instead, output is dic-
ever, the cost of capital is typically >10% due to (perceived) political tated by clouds, the diurnal cycle, and the seasonal cycle. However,
risk, uncertain financial and regulatory conditions, and exchange recent years have brought substantial empirical experience with
rate risks52. Already, for a capital cost of 9%, half of the cost of elec- high shares of PV and wind in existing power systems (>42% in
tricity from PV originates from financing or interest 53. In com- Denmark in 2015, >25% in Ireland in 2015, >20% in Spain in 2013,
petition with a low-capital-cost technology such as a gas turbine, and ~20% in Germany in 2015).
interest rates above 10% can render PV economically unattractive. The literature on system integration costs of PV shows two dif-
Thus, high financing costs can be considered a major obstacle for ferent strands. The first investigates the marginal change of inte-
the widespread application of PV in these countries. In addition, gration costs with increasing PV shares conditional on the current
the spread of PV deployment costs between Germany and other system. The first few percent of PV can be added to any power sys-
countries that have higher irradiation is based on the difference tem. Demand is variable in itself, and adding a small amount of
in bureaucratic costs and human capital54. To address these barri- uncorrelated additional variability does not create new challenges59.
ers, stable regulatory environments, finance solutions, and capacity Meeting peak demand around noon, adding PV can even benefit the
building could reduce the costs of financing PV installations sub- system. Yet, with higher PV shares, integration challenges become
stantially (Box 1). Together with the lower operational risks of PV more relevant and the marginal welfare benefits of adding one unit
compared to fossil fuels or nuclear, this could then translate into of solar capacity turn negative. With increasingly mismatched PV
comparatively lower costs of capital for solar 55. supply and demand, the economic wholesale value of PV decreases
Financial and related barriers are well-exemplified with micro- by up to 50–70% when PV share increases to about 30% (ref. 60).
grids. Microgrids are generally seen as an economically optimal A second set of studies have analysed national or regional power
option in relatively remote rural areas where the cost of grid exten- systems with high PV and wind shares using highly detailed hourly
sion is high56. Microgrids are also mostly preferable to solar home power sector models (see Supplementary Note 1). The results sug-
systems (which operate on an individual-household scale) for a gest that high penetration rates of PV in the range of 25–50% of
village having a flat geographic terrain and more than 500 densely electricity generation are possible and could — under cost assump-
located households using a few low-power appliances each, espe- tions plausible for the 2030–2050 period — even have lower total
cially in solar-rich locations57. However, the essential barrier is the costs than systems with less PV, especially if stringent climate poli-
high costs of capital of PV systems58, which can be best addressed cies are implemented61–64.
by capital subsidies or soft-loan facilities, for example, via the Green To facilitate achieving such high shares of variable renewable
Climate Fund. Where grids are close, providing grid access and reg- energies, a number of integration measures are needed (Table 2).
ulatory frameworks, such as feed-in tariffs, would allow injection Region-specific analysis suggests that for managing the variation
of surplus energy into the grid, increasing the financial viability of induced by cloudiness and the diurnal cycle, hydro-storage and
PV systems. battery-electric storage, and to lesser degree, demand response,
appear to be well-positioned to cost-effectively integrate high mar-
Overcoming the integration challenge. As PV starts to outbid ket shares of solar 65. While in some regions, like the US or India, PV
other electricity sources in terms of direct generation costs, the inte- is well-correlated with demand on a seasonal scale and thus mixing
gration of large amounts of variable renewable electricity becomes a with wind brings limited advantages, other regions such as Europe
a b 25,000
4
10
20,000
3
10
Installed capacity (GWp )
102
10,000
Historic highest/lowest growth rates
101 Greenpeace/IEA scenarios
LIMITS and AMPERE 5th–95th percentile
LIMITS and AMPERE 33rd–66th percentile 5,000
REMIND US$450 per kW floor cost
REMIND US$225 per kW floor cost
REMIND US$0 per kW floor cost
100
Real capacity
0
2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Year Year
Figure 3 | Updating the integrated assessment model REMIND with recent price information. a,b, New REMIND scenarios compared with historical
data and previous scenario projections on logarithmic (a) and linear (b) scales. The REMIND scenarios use recent PV price information and allow for
endogenous technological learning results in a continued rapid increase of PV, leading to 30–50% market share of PV in power supply. The floor cost in
US$ per kW denotes the cost level at which technological learning stops for the respective scenarios.
strongly benefit from combining solar and wind, as a mix of high range of levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) between US$0.02 per
PV irradiation in summer and high wind potential in winter pro- kWh (continued learning, Middle East and North Africa) and
vides a better seasonal match to demand66,67. US$0.06 per kWh (early saturation, Japan) agrees well with other
projections of future PV costs (see Methods) and seems very
Prospective scenarios with updated information feasible in the light of first projects reaching the projected range
The preceding discussion outlines the diverse set of options for more already now.
flexibly integrating large amounts of solar into the grid. However,
some models, whose results were included in AR5, imposed strict Conclusions
constraints on solar, such as requiring high levels of backup, limit- Scenarios and assessments have consistently underestimated the
ing total share of wind and solar to below 30% of the overall elec- growth of solar energy. PV costs have decreased faster and PV
tricity production5, or limiting growth rates. But recent assessments deployment increased faster than even the most optimistic mod-
argue that growth constraints and system integration constraints els expected. Many global models of energy supply are still using
used in models were too conservative68,69. To avoid these exogenous assumptions that were shown to be overly pessimistic towards PV
constraints, we performed scenario calculations with an improved by the real-world developments of the last years. Accordingly, these
version of the REMIND v.1.6 model that includes a newly devel- models propagate these assumptions and produce scenarios of
oped representation of the integration challenge and options to future energy use that underestimate solar electricity. Our updated
address it 67, the real-world PV capacity values in 2016, and endog- climate mitigation scenarios indicate that by 2050, PV could cost-
enous technological learning with updated cost assumptions (data optimally generate 67–130 EJ of electricity and thus be the dominant
from Figs 1,2). REMIND is a global inter-temporally optimizing electricity supply technology with a share of 30–50% in electricity
energy–economy model that has been extensively used for analy- generation even as the energy system will become more electricity-
ses of climate policies (see Methods). Clearly, this improved version intensive than today’s. This carbon-free solar electricity could bring
only contains a very aggregate description of the integration chal- a considerable boost to the decarbonization of other sectors like
lenges, and our results are informative, not conclusive. transport or industry 70–72.
The increased model detail results in a much more prominent Our study has important implications for research and policy-
role for PV in future cost-optimal electricity supply, especially making. First, the consistently underestimated potential of solar
under stringent climate policy (Fig. 3). In these scenarios — speci- energy — if continued — has implications for the future as deci-
fying a carbon price sufficient to achieve the 2 °C target (US$32 per sion-makers might treat PV too reluctantly. Specifically, policymak-
tCO2 in 2020, increasing by 5% per year until 2100) — we find that ers might fail to address the integration challenge and insufficiently
the results crucially depend on the future of technological learning. plan for adequate grid and storage infrastructure. As a result, low-
If the 20% learning rate slows until the costs reach a lower limit carbon energy sources could be under-deployed, imposing eco-
of US$450 per kWp (kWp, kilowatt-peak: peak power in kilowatts), nomic and societal costs, while instead energy system planning
the global share of PV in electricity generation reaches 30% around might rely too much on other, possibly more problematic, low-
2050. If the 20% learning curve persists longer and only comes to a carbon technologies such as CCS and nuclear. Second, the nature
stop when costs of US$225 per kWp are reached, PV surpasses the of PV upscaling is changing, with the long-term potential at high
30% mark in 2040, while a continuation of the 20% learning curve penetration rates depending less on technological costs of PV but
over the complete modelling period (equivalent to assuming no increasingly on the system integration costs, with storage (and less
floor costs) leads to a 30% PV share already in 2035, and almost 50% so demand response) being an important contribution at high PV
in 2050. In energy terms, PV generates 67–130 EJ of electricity in shares. Hence, realizing high PV scenarios requires not only sup-
2050 in the three scenarios, while the resulting PV technology costs port policies for fostering technological learning of PV, but also
in 2050 for the three learning assumptions are US$760 per kWp, concerted programmes to accommodate large shares of PV in the
US$590 per kWp and US$390 per kWp, respectively. The resulting power grid by modernizing power market regulations, expanding
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