Social Media: Content Dissemination and

Moderation Practices

Updated January 8, 2025

Congressional Research Service

https://crsreports.congress.gov
R46662
 SUMMARY

R46662
Social Media: Content Dissemination and
January 8, 2025
Moderation Practices Clare Y. Cho
Social media platforms disseminate information quickly to billions of global users. One of the Specialist in Industrial
main features of social media is the primacy of user-generated content: users can act as producers Organization and Business
and consumers of content. Users can create individual profiles; post text, images, or videos; and Policy
interact with content by commenting on, reacting to, and sharing it with others. Thus, social
media platforms benefit from network effects—an increase in the number of users of a platform Ling Zhu
increases its perceived value for users. Analyst in
Telecommunications
Social media operators (i.e., companies that operate social media platforms) have economic Policy
incentives to increase the number of users on their platforms and to increase user engagement,
such as clicking links or commenting on posts. Most operators do not charge users to establish
accounts and use at least portions of the platform. Instead, these operators rely on revenue from
online advertising (ads). Operators may be able to increase their online advertising revenue by
incentivizing users to spend more time on the platform. By increasing user engagement with content, operators can collect
more data about each user and offer personalized ads.

Social media operators disseminate and moderate content on their platforms to enhance user engagement, expand their active
user base, strengthen their network effects, and increase their revenue through online advertising. Operators manage and
distribute the continuous influx of user-generated content through their network structure and algorithms. Users can establish
connections to other users of the platform, creating social networks or communities that can be based on common interests,
relationships that exist offline, employment, or other factors. While some platforms prioritize content from a user’s network
connections, they also typically use algorithms to prioritize content based on its potential relevance to the user’s interests,
regardless of whether the content was generated by someone in the user’s network.

Algorithms identify and filter content that violate social media platforms’ policies. Operators balance the goal of prioritizing
content that increases user engagement and moderating content that violate their policies, such as content that may be illegal,
harmful, or objectionable, including child sexual abuse material, content that may incite violence, misinformation, and spam.
Algorithms also prioritize content on social media platforms based on users’ online behavior, such as content that is clicked
on or shared with other users.

Operators may choose to moderate content differently across platforms; there is no uniform standard for content moderation.
Content that violates social media platforms’ policies is identified by users and automated systems, such as algorithms and
machine learning techniques. Some of the content is subsequently reviewed by human content moderators. Automated
systems can quickly review large volumes of content but might not always remove content in accordance with stated policies.
Some operators have altered their content moderation practices in efforts to balance trade-offs between free expression and
removing objectionable content that might be harmful.

Some Members of Congress have considered addressing concerns related to social media platforms’ content moderation
practices. Some bills would have incentivized platforms to moderate content and prevent the spread of harmful content,
misinformation, or other objectionable content. Other bills would have discouraged or prevented platforms from certain
forms of content moderation. Introduced legislation has largely focused on Section 230 of the Communications Act of 1934
(47 U.S.C. §230). Section 230 protects interactive computer services providers and users from liability for publishing—and
in some instances, restricting access to or availability of—another user’s content.

Congress might consider various options to address content moderation practices on social media platforms. Congress might
choose to take no action, in which case social media operators may continue to voluntarily adjust their algorithms and content
moderation practices. Options to address content moderation practices could include urging operators to implement changes
(e.g., by holding hearings or sending letters to operators), which may or may not lead operators to implement changes
sufficient to address congressional concerns. Legislative actions could include amending Section 230, requiring operators to
increase transparency about their content moderation practices, regulating operators’ content moderation practices, or
implementing federal advisory or regulatory oversight of social media platforms. Any legislative efforts might raise a range
of legal, social, and economic considerations.

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 Social Media: Content Dissemination and Moderation Practices

Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Overview of Social Media ............................................................................................................... 2
U.S. Social Media Use .............................................................................................................. 4
Social Media Revenue: Online Advertising .............................................................................. 6
Content Dissemination and Moderation .......................................................................................... 8
Social Media Network Structure ............................................................................................... 9
Algorithmic Filtering and Prioritization .................................................................................. 10
Content Moderation .................................................................................................................11
Context for Congressional Consideration ..................................................................................... 14
Section 230 .............................................................................................................................. 15
Federal Proposals to Amend Section 230 ......................................................................... 15
Policy Considerations for Congress .............................................................................................. 17
Potential Options for Congress ............................................................................................... 17
Concluding Thoughts .............................................................................................................. 19

Figures
Figure 1. Social Media Users in the United States by Platform ...................................................... 5
Figure 2. Social Media Advertising Revenue in the United States.................................................. 7

Tables

Table A-1. Selected Legislation Related to Content Moderation Practices of Social

Media Platforms ......................................................................................................................... 20

Appendixes
Appendix. Legislation Related to Content Moderation Practices of Social Media
Platforms .................................................................................................................................... 20

Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 27

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 Social Media: Content Dissemination and Moderation Practices

Introduction
Social media platforms have become major channels for the dissemination, exchange, and
circulation of information to billions of users around the world over the internet. For years,
Congress has been concerned with the use of the internet to host, distribute, and exchange content
that may be illegal, harmful, or objectionable, including child sexual abuse material, content that
may incite violence, and foreign propaganda. Attention has often focused on social media
platforms’ ability to disseminate information quickly and widely, their use of algorithms to
identify and amplify content that is likely to generate high levels of user engagement, and their
practice of restricting certain content.1
Social media platforms have received scrutiny for their content moderation practices, specifically
for removing certain content and allowing harmful content to spread. For example, some
policymakers have expressed concern about censorship of conservative viewpoints,2 while others
have expressed concern about the spread of misinformation and material harmful to minors.3
Some studies and internal documents suggest that some minors, particularly girls, may be harmed
from using social media platforms, although others may benefit from using the platforms.4
Some Members of Congress have considered addressing concerns related to social media
platforms’ content moderation practices. Some bills would have incentivized platforms to
moderate and prevent the spread of misinformation, harmful, or otherwise objectionable content.5
Other bills would have discouraged or prevented platforms from certain forms of content
moderation.6 Introduced legislation has largely focused on Section 230 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. §230, hereinafter Section 230), enacted as part of the Communications

1 Algorithms are computer processes that set rules for the data social media platforms receive. They help operators sort
and prioritize content and can be used to tailor what a user sees at a particular time.
2 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications

and Technology, Preserving Free Speech and Reining in Big Tech Censorship, hearing, 118th Cong., 1st sess., March
28, 2023, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=115561.
3 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications

and Technology, Fanning the Flames: Disinformation and Extremism in the Media, hearing, 117th Cong., 2nd sess.,
February 24, 2021, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=111229; and U.S. Congress,
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Big Tech and the Online Child Sexual Exploitation Crisis, hearing, 118th Cong., 2nd
sess., January 31, 2024, https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/committee-activity/hearings/big-tech-and-the-online-child-
sexual-exploitation-crisis.
4 For example, see National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Social Media and Adolescent Health

(Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 2024), https://doi.org/10.17226/27396; and Georgia Wells et al.,
“Facebook Knows Instagram is Toxic for Teen Girls, Company Documents Show,” Wall Street Journal, September 14,
2021, https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-instagram-is-toxic-for-teen-girls-company-documents-show-
11631620739.
5 For example, see CASE-IT Act (H.R. 573, 118th Congress). In this report, “misinformation” refers to incorrect or

inaccurate information, regardless of its origin or the intent of the individual who disseminates it. Others sometimes use
misinformation to mean incorrect or inaccurate information spread by someone believing it to be true, as distinct from
disinformation, a term reserved for false information deliberately spread to gain some advantage. For additional
information on the definitions of misinformation and disinformation, see CRS In Focus IF10771, Defense Primer:
Operations in the Information Environment, by Catherine A. Theohary; and Caroline Jack, Lexicon of Lies: Terms for
Problematic Information, Data & Society Research Institute, August 9, 2017, https://datasociety.net/pubs/oh/
DataAndSociety_LexiconofLies.pdf.
6 For example, see DISCOURSE Act (S. 921, 118th Congress).

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Decency Act of 1996.7 Section 230 protects interactive computer service providers,8 including
social media platforms, and their users from liability for publishing—and in some instances,
restricting access to or availability of—another user’s content.
This report provides an overview of social media platforms and their content moderation
practices. It provides a brief overview of social media use and online advertising—currently the
main source of revenue for many social media platforms. It also discusses how content is
disseminated on the platforms, specifically discussing social media network structures and the use
of algorithms to filter and prioritize content, as well as how content is moderated on the
platforms. The report concludes with a discussion of Section 230 and potential options for
Congress.

Overview of Social Media

In the Trafficking Victims Prevention and Protection Reauthorization Act of 2022,9 Congress
defined social media platform as
a website or internet medium that—
(A) permits a person to become a registered user, establish an account, or create a profile
for the purpose of allowing users to create, share, and view user-generated content through
such an account or profile;
(B) enables 1 or more users to generate content that can be viewed by other users of the
medium; and
(C) primarily serves as a medium for users to interact with content generated by other users
of the medium.
This definition includes one of the main features of social media—the primacy of user-generated
content.10 The definition might also include platforms that host user-generated content but
typically are not considered to be social media (e.g., Roblox, an online platform hosting
multiplayer video games,11 and Tinder, an online dating app).
Social media users can act as both producers and consumers of online content. They can post text,
images, and videos as content producers and may also view, share, or react to others’ content as
consumers.12 Users can include individuals, organizations, government agencies, and business

7 47 U.S.C. §230. While this provision is often referred to as “Section 230” of the Communications Decency Act of
1996 (P.L. 104-104), it was enacted as Section 509 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which amended Section
230 of the Communications Act of 1934. For more information about Section 230, see CRS In Focus IF12584, Section
230: A Brief Overview, by Peter J. Benson and Valerie C. Brannon.
8 47 U.S.C. §230(f)(2) defines an interactive computer service as “any information service, system, or access software

provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, including specifically a
service or system that provides access to the Internet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or
educational institutions.”
9 42 U.S.C. §1862w; P.L. 117-348, Title I, §124.

10 Jonathan Obar and Steve Wildman, “Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge: An Introduction to the

Special Issue,” Telecommunications Policy, vol. 39, no. 9 (2015), pp. 745-750, https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.telpol.2015.07.014 (hereinafter Obar and Wildman, “Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge,” 2015).
11 Fortnite and Roblox are also considered to be “proto-metaverses” (e.g., Edd Gent, “What Can the Metaverse Learn

from Second Life?,” IEEE Spectrum, November 29, 2021, https://spectrum.ieee.org/metaverse-second-life). For more
information about the metaverse, see CRS Report R47224, The Metaverse: Concepts and Issues for Congress, by Ling
Zhu.
12 Users can react to content by commenting on it or by “liking” it, indicating that the user supports or “likes” the post.

(continued...)

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entities, including traditional news media (e.g., Washington Post, Fox News, and New York
Times). A 2024 Pew Research Center survey found that 25% of U.S. adult respondents often get
their news from social media and an additional 29% sometimes get their news from social media;
46% of U.S. adult respondents rarely or never get their news from social media.13
Users typically access social media platforms through websites and mobile apps. Social media
operators—that is, companies that operate social media platforms—host user-generated content
on their platforms and “organize it, make it searchable, and [ ... ] algorithmically select some
subset of it to deliver as front-page offerings, news feeds, subscribed channels, or personalized
recommendations.”14 Many social media platforms enable connections to other sites and apps and
allow third-party developers to build apps and services that integrate with platforms. This practice
could provide third parties access to some user data and potentially increase traffic between a
platform and third-party websites.15
Social media platforms benefit from network effects; that is, an increasing number of users
increases the value of a platform as perceived by users.16 This means that as the number of active
users on the platform increases, existing users are more willing to stay on the platform, and more
individuals are willing to start using it. Many operators strive to achieve network effects, which
often results in one or a small number of operators gaining a competitive advantage. Some
experts argue that when network effects are present, “they are among the most important reasons”
users will pick one platform over another.17
A social media platform can strengthen its network effects by facilitating the exchange of
information and user engagement. Expanding the number of users increases the number of
possible connections between users and content recommendations, which can encourage more
individuals to join and provide more opportunities to deliver advertisements (ads) that generate
revenue for the operator. A greater number of users might also result in more user-generated
content that can be shared with other users. A user can have accounts with multiple social media
platforms, which means increased usage of one platform may reduce the amount of time the user
spends on another, although some users may use different platforms for different purposes.
Operators have economic incentives to increase the number of users and their engagement with
social media platforms. Most social media operators do not charge users to establish accounts and
access at least portions of the platform. Instead, these operators rely on revenue from ads that are

Some social media sites allow users to express different reactions as well. For example, Facebook allows users to select
an emoji (an icon expressing the emotion of the user), including a thumbs-up, smiling face, frowning face, and a heart.
13 Pew Research Center, “Social Media and News Fact Sheet,” September 17, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/

journalism/fact-sheet/social-media-and-news-fact-sheet/. For more information on the relationship between newspapers

and social media platforms, see CRS Report R47018, Stop the Presses? Newspapers in the Digital Age, by Dana A.
Scherer and Clare Y. Cho.
14 Tarleton Gillespie, “Platforms Are Not Intermediaries,” Georgetown Technology Law Review, vol. 2, no. 2 (2018),

pp. 198-216, https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2.2-Gilespie-pp-198-216.pdf.

15 L. DeNardis and A.M. Hackl, “Internet Governance by Social Media Platforms,” Telecommunications Policy, vol.

39, no. 9 (October 2015), pp. 761-770, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2015.04.003; Tarleton Gillsepie, “The Politics of
‘Platforms,’” New Media & Society, vol. 12, no. 3 (May 1, 2010), pp. 347-364, https://doi.org/10.1177/
1461444809342738; and Anne Helmond, “The Platformization of the Web: Making Web Data Platform Ready,” Social
Media + Society, July 2015, https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305115603080.
16 Arjun Sundararajan, “Network Effects,” author’s website, New York University (NYU) Stern School of Business,

http://oz.stern.nyu.edu/io/network.html. For more information on the evolution of online content and the characteristics
of online platforms, see “Online Platform Concepts and Characteristics” in CRS Report R47662, Defining and
Regulating Online Platforms, coordinated by Clare Y. Cho.
17 John Gallaugher, Information Systems: A Manager’s Guide to Harnessing Technology, 10th ed. (Boston, MA:

FlatWorld, 2024), p. 329.

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targeted to certain users based on a user’s data, as discussed under “Social Media Revenue:
Online Advertising.”
Some operators offer their platforms or additional features on their platforms through subscription
services. For example, X (formerly Twitter) offers three paid subscription options: (1) Basic,
which includes features such as allowing users to edit posts and upload longer posts and videos
for $3/month; (2) Premium, which includes the Basic features in addition to others, such as
placing a checkmark next to the user’s name and offering fewer ads for $8/month; and (3)
Premium+, which includes the Premium features in addition to others, such as providing the
largest reply prioritization and offering no ads, although occasional promoted content may appear,
for $16/month.18 In November 2024, Meta Platforms announced that users of its social media
platforms—Facebook and Instagram—who are located in the European Union would have the
option to choose between a paid subscription “for an ad-free experience” or to continue accessing
the platforms with personalized ads at no cost.19

U.S. Social Media Use

The majority of Americans use social media, according to estimates from various firms. In May
2024, the market research firm eMarketer forecast that about 232 million Americans (about 68%
of the U.S. population) would use social media during 2024.20 The firm estimated that of those
users, about 178 million Americans (52%) would use Facebook, 143 million (42%) would use
Instagram, and 112 million (33%) would use TikTok (Figure 1).21 A 2024 Pew Research Center
survey of 5,626 U.S. adults revealed that 85% of respondents reportedly use YouTube, 70% use
Facebook, 50% use Instagram, and 36% use Pinterest.22 The results showed that platform usage
varied based on the user’s age. For example, a greater percentage of U.S. adults ages 30-49
reported using Facebook (78%) compared with adults ages 18-29 (68%), 50-64 (70%), and over
65 (59%).23 In contrast, a greater percentage of U.S. adults ages 18-29 reported using Instagram
(76%) compared with adults ages 30-49 (66%), 50-64 (36%), and over 65 (19%).24

18 X, “About X Premium,” X Help Center, https://help.x.com/en/using-x/x-premium.

19 Meta Platforms, “Facebook and Instagram to Offer Subscription for No Ads in Europe,” Meta Newsroom, November
12, 2024, https://about.fb.com/news/2024/11/facebook-and-instagram-to-offer-subscription-for-no-ads-in-europe/.
20 EMarketer Forecast, “Social Network Users, US,” May 2024.

21 The percentages were calculated by CRS using the number and percentage of U.S. social media users reported by

eMarketer. Specifically, based on eMarketer’s estimate that 232,149,715 U.S. social media users made up 67.92% of
the U.S. population in 2024, CRS determined that eMarketer estimates the U.S. population in 2024 to be 341,798,756.
CRS used this value to estimate the percentages for each platform.
22 Pew Research Center, “Social Media Fact Sheet,” November 13, 2024, https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/fact-

sheet/social-media/.
23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.

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Figure 1. Social Media Users in the United States by Platform

in millions, 2024

Source: eMarketer Forecast, “Social Network Users, by Platform, US,” May 2024.
Notes: eMarketer reports that the “estimates are based on the analysis of survey and traffic data from research
firms and regulatory agencies; the growth trajectory of major social networks; historical trends; internet and
mobile adoption trends; and country-specific demographic and socioeconomic factors.” The estimates indicate
the number of “internet users of any age who use social networks via any device at least once a month.”

Some social media operators are publicly traded companies that report estimates for the number
of users of their platforms in their annual filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
examples include the following:
• Meta Platforms, Inc., reported an average of 205 million daily active users and
272 million monthly active users on Facebook or Messenger in the United States
and Canada in December 2023.25
• Snap Inc. reported an average of 100 million daily active users on Snapchat in
North America during the third quarter of 2024.26
• Pinterest, Inc., reported an average of 99 million monthly active users on its
namesake platform in the U.S. and Canada during the third quarter of 2024.27
Companies use different methods to estimate the number of active users; a uniform industry
standard does not exist. For example, Meta Platforms reports the number of registered users who
visit Facebook or Messenger through a website or mobile app; it does not include duplicate and

25 Meta Platforms, Inc., U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 10-K for the year ending December 31,
2023, pp. 67-68. Meta Platforms does not report monthly or daily active users for Facebook and Messenger in its 2024
SEC quarterly reports; it reports estimates for daily active users for its “Family” of products, which includes Facebook,
Instagram, Messenger, and WhatsApp.
26 Snap Inc., SEC Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2024, p. 29. North America includes Mexico, the

Caribbean, and Central America.

27 Pinterest, Inc., SEC Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2024, p. 23.

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false accounts identified by the user’s data (e.g., identical IP addresses, similar usernames) and
behaviors that appear to be inauthentic.28 Snap reports the number of registered users who visit its
namesake platform through a website or mobile app and has implemented technical measures to
prevent, detect, and suppress individuals from creating accounts for malicious purposes but does
not estimate the number of these accounts.29 Pinterest reports the number of authenticated users
that visit the website, open the mobile app, or interact with one of the Pinterest browser or site
extensions, such as the save button.30

Social Media Revenue: Online Advertising

Online advertising has been the primary source of revenue for most social media operators. In
2023, global online advertising provided about 98% ($132 billion) of Meta Platforms’ annual
revenue,31 77% ($238 billion) of Alphabet’s,32 and all of Snap’s ($5 billion) and Pinterest’s ($3
billion).33 A report from the Interactive Advertising Bureau, an industry trade association,
estimates that total revenue from advertising on social media in the United States increased from
$35.6 billion in 2019 to $64.9 billion in 2023 (Figure 2). Based on data provided in the report,
social media made up about 29% of U.S. internet advertising revenue in 2023.34 EMarketer
estimated that spending on social media ads would be about $90 billion in 2024.35

28 Meta Platforms, Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2023, pp. 5, 67-68.
29 Snap Inc., SEC Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2024, pp. 5, 28.
30 Pinterest, Inc., SEC Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2024, pp. 7, 23.

31 Meta Platforms, Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2023, p. 75. Other sources of revenue

include the sale of consumer hardware products (e.g., Meta’s virtual reality headset), revenue from its WhatsApp
Business Platform, and fees from developers using Meta’s payments infrastructure.
32 Alphabet Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2023, p. 35. Alphabet Inc. is the parent company of

Google LLC. Other sources of revenue include Google subscriptions, the sale of consumer devices, and Google Cloud.
33 Snap Inc., SEC Form 10-K for the year ending December 31, 2023, pp. 59, 61; and Pinterest, Inc., SEC Form 10-K

for the year ending December 31, 2023, pp. 51-52.

34 This estimate was calculated by CRS using the estimate for total internet advertising revenue reported on p. 13 and

the estimate for social media advertising revenue reported on p. 20 in Interactive Advertising Bureau, Internet
Advertising Revenue Report, April 2024, prepared by PwC, https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/
IAB_PwC_Internet_Ad_Revenue_Report_2024.pdf.
35 EMarketer Forecast, “Social Network Ad Spending, US,” November 2024.

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Figure 2. Social Media Advertising Revenue in the United States

in billions

Source: Interactive Advertising Bureau, Internet Advertising Revenue Report, April 2024, prepared by PwC,
https://www.iab.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/IAB_PwC_Internet_Ad_Revenue_Report_2024.pdf, p. 20.
Note: Revenue includes advertisements that reach targeted audiences through social media platforms, messaging
apps, and social media news feeds. CRS calculated the total for the year by adding together the estimate for the
first six months and the estimate for the last six months.

Ads on social media platforms are often displayed as posts, generally distinguishable through
labels such as “sponsored.” Social media operators can use various pricing models, including a
cost-per-click (CPC) and cost-per-impression (CPM) model.36 Many text-based ads are billed
under the CPC model—advertisers pay the operator each time a user clicks on the ad. Most
graphical display ads are billed under the CPM model—advertisers pay a specific rate for every
1,000 impressions of the ad, that is, every 1,000 times the ad appears on users’ screens, regardless
of whether the users click on the ad.
To provide users with online ads, operators run instantaneous auctions through services such as
Meta Ads and Snapchat Ads. Advertisers provide information such as their budget and target
audience; operators provide information such as how many people are expected to view the ad
and metrics about the ad’s performance.37 Based on the auction results and user profiles, different
users may receive different ads. Targeted advertising has made it possible for advertisers to
customize their messages and reach potential consumers more easily and quickly, potentially
advertising products differently to different individuals.38 Some advertisers may also partner with
“influencers” (i.e., users with a large number of followers) to endorse their products.
Social media operators may be able to increase their online advertising revenue by incentivizing
users to spend more time on the platform. By amplifying content that increases the amount of
time a user spends on the platform, operators can increase the time during which a user is able to
view ads through the platform. Operators may be able to better predict content that is of interest

36 John Gallaugher, Information Systems: A Manager’s Guide to Harnessing Technology, 10th ed. (Boston, MA:
FlatWorld, 2024), pp. 298-299.
37 For more information, see Meta, “Meta Ads,” https://www.facebook.com/business/ads; and Snapchat, “Reach Gen Z

and Millennials with Snapchat Ads,” https://forbusiness.snapchat.com/.

38 Todd Powers et al., “Digital and Social Media in the Purchase Decision Process,” Journal of Advertising Research,

vol. 52, no. 4 (December 2012), pp. 479-489, https://doi.org/10.2501/JAR-52-4-479-489.

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to each user if they can increase user engagement, such as when users comment on, react to, or
share content. Increasing user engagement allows operators to collect more data about each user.
Collecting user data allows operators to personalize ads, which means offering different ads to
different users based on potential relevance to the specific user.39 User data can include personally
identifiable information provided by users when setting up accounts and information about an
individual’s characteristics, preferences, and opinions based on posted content and online
behaviors. The data amassed by social media operators enable them to build complex profiles for
each user’s characteristics and revealed preferences and sell advertising spaces targeting specific
user categories to companies, organizations, and political campaigns.40 This can increase the
likelihood that the user will click on the ads. It also gives established operators an advantage over
market entrants, as entrants are likely to have less user data and therefore may be less effective
with their targeted advertising.
Some social media platforms allow users to promote their posts for a fee. For example, Facebook
and Snapchat allow users, including commercial entities, to “boost” or “promote” a post by
turning it into an ad that can be spread to those who do not follow their accounts, increasing the
likelihood that the post is shared, liked, or commented on.41 Some platforms—including
Facebook and Snapchat—allow users to adjust their ad preferences, including opting out of
targeted ads.42 While this option means that users may not see targeted ads, it does not change the
number of ads the user sees and does not ensure that a social media operator is no longer
collecting the user’s data.

Content Dissemination and Moderation

A user’s experience on a social media platform is shaped by the structure of the platform’s user
networks and content dissemination techniques, such as algorithmic filtering, which often drive
user engagement. Through network structure and algorithms, operators manage the continuous
influx of user-generated content and its distribution to other users.
Social media operators disseminate and moderate content to enhance user engagement, expand
the active user base, achieve network effects, and ultimately increase revenue, often through
online ads. Enabling and facilitating users to post, comment, and share content, sometimes virally
(characterized by the rapid and widespread dissemination of information and content), may
increase the risk of spreading harmful content and misinformation online. Operators may strive to
balance the goals of prioritizing content that increases user engagement and revenue and
moderating harmful content, particularly when they receive scrutiny from the public and
policymakers, such as in hearings, comments to the press, and letters to the companies.

39 Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape
Social Media (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2018).
40 Brian O’Connell, “How Does Facebook Make Money? Six Primary Revenue Streams,” The Street, October 23, 2018

https://www.thestreet.com/technology/how-does-facebook-make-money-14754098; Johannes Knoll, “Advertising in

Social Media: A Review of Empirical Evidence,” International Journal of Advertising, vol. 35, no. 2 (2016), pp. 266-
300, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02650487.2015.1021898.
41 Meta Platforms, “About Boosted Posts,” Business Help Center, https://www.facebook.com/business/help/

240208966080581; and Snapchat, “Grow Your Following with Snap Promote,” https://forbusiness.snapchat.com/
advertising/snap-promote.
42 Meta Platforms, “About Ad Preferences and How You Can Adjust Them on Facebook,” https://www.facebook.com/

help/247395082112892; and Snapchat, “How Do I Change My Advertising and Interest Preferences on Snapchat?,”
Snapchat Support, https://help.snapchat.com/hc/en-us/articles/7012345515796-How-do-I-change-my-advertising-and-
interest-preferences-on-Snapchat.

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Social Media Network Structure

A social media network structure refers to the ways in which users connect with one another and
information spreads on a social media platform. Users can establish connections to other users of
the platform, creating social networks or communities that can be based on common interests,
relationships that exist offline, employment, or other factors. The structure of these networks
affects how individuals search for one another and how connections are initiated and
established.43 Operators may provide users with various levels of privacy control, allowing them
to choose how much personal information to share. For example, some social media platforms
allow users to choose whether to make their profiles open to the public or only to those who have
established connections by mutual consent.
On some social media platforms, users can control the content they see through the networks they
choose to build. Each user can choose to follow or unfollow other users; some users might choose
to unfollow those who post or share content with which a user disagrees. This networking feature
enables users to “quickly find like-minded people and perspectives,” which facilitates an
information exchange phenomenon called “echo chambers,” where users predominantly
encounter “information or opinions that reflect and reinforce their own.”44 Some research has
shown that the overlap in network connections between two users increases the likelihood that
one user will share content from the other user through the network.45 Echo chambers can
therefore enhance the spread of information, including misinformation.46
Due to the benefits of network effects and potential to increase revenue, social media operators
are often incentivized to facilitate the expansion of users’ network connections. For example,
some social media platforms recommend new connections based on peripheral relationships (e.g.,
someone on a network connection’s contact list) and allow users to search names, email
addresses, occupations, or other personal or demographic information to find new connections. 47
A user’s network connections were a fundamental aspect of social media platforms, particularly
in the 2000s and early 2010s.48 Users would see only content posted or shared by their network
connections. Nowadays, while some platforms continue to prioritize content from a user’s
network connections, platforms typically use algorithms to prioritize content based on its
potential relevance to the user’s interests, regardless of whether the content was generated by
someone in the user’s network.49

43 Michael Bosetta, “The Digital Architectures of Social Media: Comparing Political Campaigning on Facebook,
Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat in the 2016 U.S. Election,” Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, vol. 95,
no. 2 (2018), pp. 471-496, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699018763307 (hereinafter Bosetta, “The Digital Architectures
of Social Media,” 2018); and Danah Boyd, “Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: Affordances, Dynamics, and
Implications,” in A Networked Self: Identity, Community, and Culture on Social Network Sites, ed. Zizi Papacharissi
(New York, NY: Routledge, 2011) (hereinafter Boyd, “Social Network Sites as Networked Publics,” 2011).
44 “Digital Media Literacy—What Is an Echo Chamber?,” Goodwill Community Foundation Inc.,

https://edu.gcfglobal.org/en/digital-media-literacy/what-is-an-echo-chamber/1/.
45 Jing Peng et al., “Network Overlap and Content Sharing on Social Media Platforms,” Journal of Marketing

Research, vol. 55 (August 2018), pp. 571-585, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1509/jmr.14.0643.

46 Petter Törnberg, “Echo Chambers and Viral Misinformation: Modeling Fake News as Complex Contagion,” PLOS

ONE, vol. 13, no. 9 (2018); Michela Del Vicario et al., “The Spreading of Misinformation Online,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, vol. 113, no. 3 (January 19, 2016), pp. 554-559, https://www.pnas.org/content/113/3/
554.
47 Boyd, “Social Network Sites as Networked Publics,” 2011.

48 Obar and Wildman, “Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge,” 2015, pp. 745-750.

49 For example, see Ramya Sethuraman, “Why Am I Seeing This? We Have an Answer for You,” March 31, 2019,

https://about.fb.com/news/2019/03/why-am-i-seeing-this/.

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Algorithmic Filtering and Prioritization

Social media platforms host vast amounts of user-generated content.50 Operators use algorithmic
filtering to determine what content to deliver to users.51 Specifically, operators use algorithms to
sort, index, curate, and prioritize content, as well as to identify and moderate illegal and other
content that operators do not wish to publish.52 These algorithms rely on data such as a user’s
online behavior and revealed preferences (e.g., a user’s profile, clicks, likes, shares, and search
history). Operators can modify or fine-tune their algorithms to meet evolving business goals
driven by internal incentives (e.g., maximizing engagement and advertising revenue) and external
pressures (e.g., user complaints and stakeholder demands). As a result, these algorithms affect
what content is promoted and removed, as well as what rapidly spreads across the platform (i.e.,
“goes viral”).
While detailed information about these algorithms and their parameters are considered
proprietary and not publicly disclosed, academic research, industry analyses, and information
released by operators provide a general understanding of how they work.53 For example, a social
media platform can measure its users’ online activities and use algorithms to analyze the
associated quantitative data and customize the selection, order, and visibility of posts for each
user to increase user engagement.54 Some studies suggest that social media platforms prioritize
content, regardless of its veracity, that is likely to prompt user engagement by eliciting strong
emotions, which may contribute to divisiveness and polarization.55 In a 2018 presentation, a
Facebook team reportedly told senior executives that its algorithms “exploit the human brain’s
attraction to divisiveness” and that these algorithms could promote “more and more divisive
content in an effort to gain user attention and increase time on the platform.”56 Meta Platforms
states that its Facebook News Feed prioritizes recent, relevant content for the user, based on
factors such as the user’s previous engagement with the content provider.57

50 Obar and Wildman, “Social Media Definition and the Governance Challenge,” 2015, pp. 745-750.
51 For more information on the use of algorithms to filter or moderate content, see Giovanni Sartor and Andrea
Loreggia, The Impact of Algorithms for Online Content Filtering or Moderation, European Parliament’s Policy
Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, September 2020, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2020/657101/IPOL_STU(2020)657101_EN.pdf.
52 For more information on social media algorithms, see CRS In Focus IF12462, Social Media Algorithms: Content

Recommendation, Moderation, and Congressional Considerations, by Laurie Harris and Clare Y. Cho.
53 See, for example, Jose van Dijck and Thomas Poell, “Understanding Social Media Logic,” Media and

Communciation, vol. 1, no. 1 (2013), pp. 2-14, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2309065; and

Hannah Trivette, “A Guide to Social Media Algorithms and SEO,” Forbes, October 14, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/
councils/forbesagencycouncil/2022/10/14/a-guide-to-social-media-algorithms-and-seo/.
54 Taina Bucher, “Want to Be on the Top? Algorithmic Power and the Threat of Invisibility on Facebook,” New Media

& Society, vol. 14, no. 7 (2012), pp. 1164-1180, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1461444812440159;

Bosetta, “The Digital Architectures of Social Media,” 2018, pp. 471-496, https://doi.org/10.1177/1077699018763307.
55 For example, see Daniel Mochan and Janet Schwartz, “The Confrontation Effect: When Users Engage More with

Ideology-Inconsistent Content Online,” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, vol. 185 (November
2024), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2024.104366; Paul M. Barrett, Spreading the Big Lie: How Social Media Sites
Have Amplified False Claims of U.S. Election Fraud, NYU Stern Center for Business and Human Rights, September
2022, https://bhr.stern.nyu.edu/publication/spreading-the-big-lie-how-social-media-sites-have-amplified-false-claims-
of-u-s-election-fraud/; and Ahmed Al-Rawi, “Viral News on Social Media,” Digital Journalism, vol. 7, no. 1 (2019),
pp. 63-79, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/21670811.2017.1387062.
56 Jeff Horowitz and Deepa Seetharaman, “Facebook Executives Shut Down Efforts to Make the Site Less Divisive,”

Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/facebook-knows-it-encourages-division-top-

executives-nixed-solutions-11590507499.
57 Facebook, “How Feed Works,” Facebook Help Center, https://www.facebook.com/help/1155510281178725.

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Some operators have incorporated users’ preferences or choices into their algorithms. For
example, in 2018, Meta Platforms announced that it was prioritizing “meaningful posts,” or those
shared by the user’s family and friends, in its Facebook News Feed.58 In 2021, Meta announced a
new filter bar tool for users to adjust their preferences, such as prioritizing posts from specific
people or pages.59
Internet bots—software applications that can automate tasks such as rapid posting, liking, and
recirculating content through inauthentic accounts on social media platforms—can affect content
prioritization by algorithms and may be used to spread harmful content.60 To amplify
misinformation, for example, a bot can be programmed to search for and respond to relevant
posts containing specific words or phrases. Users and operators can identify certain internet bots
by the syntax and user profiles used by the bot or other abnormal account activity.61 Users may
opt not to engage with content created by bots (e.g., avoid sharing or reposting it), and some
operators may seek to remove this content. Bots are becoming increasingly sophisticated, making
it more difficult for users and content moderators to recognize them, particularly if a post has
gone viral. Users may inadvertently engage with content created or shared by an internet bot.62
Some studies have shown that bots can contribute to the long-term spread of misinformation.63

Content Moderation
Social media operators maintain policies that prohibit users from posting certain content, such as
content that exhibits graphic violence, nudity and sexual content, and hateful speech.64 An
operator may temporarily or permanently ban users that violate its policies, depending on the
operator’s perspective on the severity of the user’s violation(s). There is no uniform standard for
content moderation; operators may choose to moderate content differently across platforms. For
example, Meta Platforms states that it prohibits bullying and content that promotes eating
disorders on Facebook and Instagram.65 This content is not prohibited on Parler, a privately
owned social media platform that is marketed as a promoter of free speech with minimal content
moderation.66 Certain content—such as spam and pornographic content—are prohibited on both

58 Adam Mosseri, “Bringing People Closer Together,” Facebook Newsroom, January 11, 2018, https://about.fb.com/
news/2018/01/news-feed-fyi-bringing-people-closer-together/.
59 Ramya Sethuraman, “More Control and Context in News Feed,” Facebook Newsroom, March 31, 2021,

https://about.fb.com/news/2021/03/more-control-and-context-in-news-feed/.
60 Fake, or inauthentic, accounts are profiles impersonating other individuals or organizations. An internet bot is

software that runs automated computer programs over the internet, generally capable of performing simple, repetitive
tasks faster than an individual can. Some websites use a “Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers
and Humans Apart,” or CAPTCHA test, to try to identify internet bots. More information on CAPTCHA tests is
available at https://www.cloudflare.com/learning/bots/how-captchas-work/.
61 Will Knight, “How to Tell if You’re Talking to a Bot,” MIT Technology Review, July 18, 2018,

https://www.technologyreview.com/2018/07/18/141414/how-to-tell-if-youre-talking-to-a-bot/; and Ryan Detert, “Bot

or Not: Seven Ways to Detect an Online Bot,” Forbes, August 6, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
forbesagencycouncil/2018/08/06/bot-or-not-seven-ways-to-detect-an-online-bot/.
62 Kate Starbird, “Disinformation’s Spread: Bots, Trolls and All of Us,” Nature, vol. 571 (July 25, 2019), p. 449,

https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02235-x.
63 For example, see Marina Azzimonti and Marcos Fernandes, “Social Media Networks, Fake News, and Polarization,”

European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 76 (January 2023), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2022.102256.

64 For example, see Meta Platforms, “Community Standards,” Transparency Center, https://transparency.meta.com/

policies/community-standards/; and YouTube, “Community Guidelines,” Rules and Policies,

https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/community-guidelines/.
65 Meta Platforms, “Community Standards,” Transparency Center, https://transparency.meta.com/policies/community-

standards/.
66 Parler, “Community Guidelines,” May 8, 2024, https://www.parler.com/community-guidelines.

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Parler and the platforms operated by Meta Platforms.67 Some operators disclose information on
their content moderation practices, such as the amount of content removed and the number of
appeals;68 operators are not required to publish this information.
Social media operators rely on several sources to identify content that violates their policies:
(1) users, (2) operator-designated human content moderators, and (3) automated systems, such as
those using algorithms and machine learning techniques.69 Users and automated systems can flag
or mark inappropriate posts for content moderators to review and remove when applicable. Some
automated systems may also remove content that is not reviewed by a content moderator unless
the user appeals its removal. Content moderators, primarily contractors for the platform, may be
able to identify nuanced violations of content policy, such as by taking into account the context of
a statement.
Automated systems may be better at identifying certain types of objectionable content, although
data limitations make it difficult to conduct an assessment. For example, Meta Platforms reports
that, of the content that was removed for violating its policies, automated systems removed 94%
of violent and graphic content, 86% of bullying and harassment, and 4% of child nudity and
physical abuse on Instagram in the European Union between April 1, 2024, and September 30,
2024.70 This may be the result of several factors, including (1) automated systems may be better
at identifying violent and graphic content, bullying, and harassment than identifying child nudity
and physical abuse; (2) content that is flagged as child nudity and physical abuse requires
additional review from content moderators; or (3) fewer users are reporting violent and graphic
content, bullying, and harassment, resulting in a higher percentage that are removed by automated
systems rather than content moderators. There may also be content that violates the platform’s
policies that is never identified and removed.71
To moderate content on their platforms, some social media operators may rely more on automated
systems than human content moderators. For example, Reddit reports that of the content removed
by moderators from January 2024 through June 2024, about 72% was removed by automated
systems and about 28% was removed manually.72 Automated systems can quickly review large
volumes of content “when scale problems make manual curation or intervention unfeasible.”73
Additionally, repeatedly reviewing graphic, explicit, and violent material may harm content

67 Ibid.
68 For example, see Meta Platforms, “Community Standards Enforcement Report,” Transparency Center,
https://transparency.meta.com/reports/community-standards-enforcement/; and Reddit, “Transparency Reports,”
Transparency, https://redditinc.com/policies/transparency.
69 For example, see Reddit, “Content Moderation, Enforcement, and Appeals,” updated September 2024,

https://support.reddithelp.com/hc/en-us/articles/23511059871252-Content-Moderation-Enforcement-and-Appeals; and
YouTube, “How Does YouTube Enforce its Community Guidelines?,” Community Guidelines,
https://www.youtube.com/howyoutubeworks/policies/community-guidelines/#enforcing-community-guidelines.
70 Meta Platforms, Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 Digital Services Act Transparency Report for Instagram, October 25,

2024, pp. 11-12. The automated systems flagged 1,213,764 out of 1,351,522 items of violent and graphic content;
1,015,909 out of 1,176,634 items of bullying and harassment content; and 5,927 out of 133,229 items of child nudity
and physical abuse content. CRS calculated the percentages based on these estimates.
71 The percentages are similar to the proactive rates that are reported by Meta Platforms (for more information, see

Meta Platforms, “Proactive Rate,” updated February 22, 2023, https://transparency.meta.com/policies/improving/

proactive-rate-metric/).
72 Reddit, “Transparency Report: January to June 2024,” https://redditinc.com/policies/transparency-report-january-to-

june-2024.
73 Robert Gorwa et al., “Algorithmic Content Moderation: Technical and Political Challenges in the Automation of

Platform Governance,” Big Data & Society, vol. 1, no. 15 (January-June 2020), p. 3, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
10.1177/2053951719897945 (hereinafter Gorwa et al., “Algorithmic Content Moderation,” 2020).

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moderators’ mental health.74 Some content moderators have filed class action lawsuits against
operators for psychological trauma and post-traumatic stress disorder from reviewing disturbing
content, such as child sexual abuse, rape, and torture.75
Automated systems used by social media operators might misidentify content as violating their
policies. For example, Facebook’s automated systems have reportedly removed ads from small
businesses, improperly identifying them as content that violates its policies and causing the
businesses to lose money during the appeals process.76 A wide range of small businesses
reportedly have been affected by these automated removals, including a seed company that shared
a photo of Walla Walla onions, which was flagged as being overtly sexual, and a solar roof
company that used acronyms that are similar to cryptocurrency tokens.77 Executives at Meta
Platforms have reportedly stated that the company has mistakenly removed too much content on
its platforms.78 Increased reliance on automated systems might exacerbate, rather than alleviate,
some concerns related to operators’ content moderation practices, including the lack of
transparency and fairness of what content is removed.79
Some social media operators have altered their content moderation practices in efforts to balance
trade-offs between free expression and removing objectionable content that may cause harms. For
example, in October 2023, Meta Platforms initially responded to an increase in violent and
graphic content depicting the Israel-Hamas conflict by lowering the threshold for its automated
tools—that is, used its automated tools more aggressively—to remove the content from its
platforms for violating its policies.80 Meta subsequently restored the posts with a warning
screen.81 Some organizations criticized Meta’s removal of content as censoring human rights
violations.82 Meta’s CEO Mark Zuckerberg announced on January 7, 2025, that Meta would be
replacing its fact-checking program, which began in December 2016 to “identify and address

74 Paul M. Barrett, “Who Moderates the Social Media Giants? A Call to End Outsourcing,” NYU Stern Center for
Business and Human Rights, June 4, 2020, https://bhr.stern.nyu.edu/publication/who-moderates-the-social-media-
giants-a-call-to-end-outsourcing/.
75 For example, see Bobby Allyn, “In Settlement, Facebook to Pay $52 Million to Content Moderators with PTSD,”

NPR, May 12, 2020, https://www.npr.org/2020/05/12/854998616/in-settlement-facebook-to-pay-52-million-to-content-

moderators-with-ptsd; and Maia Spoto, “Reddit Agrees to Pay California Workers $525,000 Settlement,” Bloomberg
Law News, April 30, 2024, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/litigation/reddit-agrees-to-pay-california-workers-525-000-
settlement.
76 Sarah Frier, “Facebook’s AI Mistakenly Bans Ads for Struggling Businesses,” Bloomberg, November 27, 2020,

https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-11-27/facebook-s-ai-mistakenly-bans-ads-for-struggling-businesses.
77 Ibid.

78 Alex Heath, “Meta Says It’s Mistakenly Moderating Too Much,” Verge, December 3, 2024,

https://www.theverge.com/2024/12/3/24311513/meta-content-moderation-mistakes-nick-clegg.
79 Gorwa et al., “Algorithmic Content Moderation,” 2020, p. 3.

80 Oversight Board, “Oversight Board Issues First Expedited Decisions About Israel-Hamas Conflict,” December 19,

2023, https://www.oversightboard.com/news/1109713833718200-oversight-board-issues-first-expedited-decisions-
about-israel-hamas-conflict/. For more information about the Israel-Hamas conflict, see CRS Report R47754, Israel
and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), coordinated by Jim Zanotti, Jeremy M. Sharp,
and Christopher M. Blanchard.
81 Oversight Board, “Oversight Board Issues First Expedited Decisions About Israel-Hamas Conflict,” December 19,

2023, https://www.oversightboard.com/news/1109713833718200-oversight-board-issues-first-expedited-decisions-
about-israel-hamas-conflict/.
82 For example, see Human Rights Watch, “Meta’s Broken Promises: Systemic Censorship of Palestine Content on

Instagram and Facebook,” December 21, 2023, https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/12/21/metas-broken-promises/

systemic-censorship-palestine-content-instagram-and.

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viral misinformation,”83 with a community notes system and adjusting its content filters to focus
on “illegal and high-severity violations” of their policies, relying on users to report minor
violations.84 As another example, after Elon Musk acquired Twitter (now X) in 2022, content
moderation on the platform decreased as the importance of free speech was emphasized, resulting
in several advertisers pulling their ads.85
Despite social media operators’ content moderation efforts, harmful content can spread before it
is discovered, reviewed, and removed. Additionally, users can repost or share harmful content
across platforms, meaning content can spread on another platform after the original content is
removed, particularly if platforms use moderation practices that vary in scope and efficacy.
Conversely, operators may remove content that most users do not consider to be objectionable,
including content that some users find valuable.86 As some social media platforms have grown in
popularity, their ability to determine what speech is allowed on a platform has created some
unease among policymakers.87 As private entities, social media operators have certain legal
protections that apply to decisions about what content is available on their platforms.88

Context for Congressional Consideration

Companies that provide content, apps, and services over the internet, including social media
operators, are not broadly regulated as an industry. However, some federal agencies enforce laws
and regulations applicable to social media platforms, in addition to other entities in other
industries.89 Congress has also enacted legislation that specifically addresses certain websites and
mobile apps.90 For example, the 118th Congress enacted the Protecting Americans from Foreign
Adversary Controlled Applications Act,91 which prohibits foreign adversary controlled apps, such
as TikTok, from being distributed, maintained, or updated in the United States.92 TikTok and its

83 Meta Platforms, “Understanding Meta’s Fact-Checking Program,” October 20, 2023, https://www.facebook.com/
government-nonprofits/blog/misinformation-resources.
84 Joel Kaplan, “More Speech and Fewer Mistakes,” Meta Newsroom, January 7, 2025, https://about.fb.com/news/

2025/01/meta-more-speech-fewer-mistakes/.
85 Ryan Mac and Kate Conger, “X May Lose Up to $75 Million in Revenue as More Advertisers Pull Out,” New York

Times, November 24, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/24/business/x-elon-musk-advertisers.html; and Brad

Adgate, “With Concerns About Brand Safety, More Advertisers Have Left X,” Forbes, December 7, 2023,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bradadgate/2023/12/07/with-concerns-about-brand-safety-more-advertisers-have-left-x/.
86 For example, see “Social Media’s Struggle with Self-Censorship,” The Economist, October 22, 2020,

https://www.economist.com/briefing/2020/10/22/social-medias-struggle-with-self-censorship.
87 Ibid.; Zeynep Tufecki, “Twitter Has Officially Replaced the Town Square,” Wired, December 27, 2017,

https://www.wired.com/story/twitter-has-officially-replaced-the-town-square/.
88 CRS Report R47986, Freedom of Speech: An Overview, by Victoria L. Killion; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11224,

Moody v. NetChoice, LLC: The Supreme Court Addresses Facial Challenges to State Social Media Laws, by Peter J.
Benson.
89 For example, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) protects consumers from deceptive and unfair acts or practices in

or affecting commerce (15 U.S.C. §45). The FTC has conducted investigations and filed charges against companies for
conducting deceptive practices on the internet.
90 For example, the 105th Congress enacted the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (15 U.S.C. §§6501-6506),

which sets requirements for operators that are directed to or collect data from children under age 13.
91 P.L. 118-50, Division H.

92 For more information about TikTok and the Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications

Act (PAFACCA), see CRS Report R48023, TikTok: Frequently Asked Questions and Issues for Congress, coordinated
by Michael D. Sutherland.

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Chinese parent company ByteDance have challenged the law and its enforcement in federal
courts.93
Some Members of Congress have proposed amending Section 230 to address their concerns about
social media operators’ content moderation practices. This section provides a brief discussion of
Section 230 and some federal proposals to amend Section 230. For a more in-depth discussion of
Section 230, see CRS Report R46751, Section 230: An Overview, by Valerie C. Brannon and Eric
N. Holmes.

Section 230
Section 230 broadly protects social media operators from liability for publishing—and in some
instances, restricting access to or availability of—another user’s content.94 Specifically, Section
230(c)(1) states that interactive computer service providers and users may not “be treated as the
publisher or speaker of any information provided by another” person. Section 230(c)(2)(A) states
that interactive computer service providers and users may not be “held liable” for any “good
faith” action “to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to
be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”
The term interactive computer service is defined as any “information service, system, or access
software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer
server,” which includes social media platforms.95
Former Representative Chris Cox and former Representative and current Senator Ron Wyden,
who drafted Section 230, have each stated that their intent was to enable free speech and allow
interactive computer service providers to moderate content without government intervention.96
Social media operators may also have constitutionally protected rights to moderate content on
their platforms.97

Federal Proposals to Amend Section 230

In May 2020, then-President Trump issued an executive order instructing federal agencies to take
certain actions with respect to Section 230, such as clarifying the scope of the immunity provision
for online platforms.98 In accordance with the executive order, in July 2020, the National
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) filed a petition with the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) requesting rulemaking to clarify provisions of Section 230,
including the circumstances under which an interactive computer service provider restricting

93 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11252, TikTok v. Garland: Constitutional Challenges to the Protecting Americans from
Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act, by Peter J. Benson, Valerie C. Brannon, and Joanna R. Lampe.
94 47 U.S.C. §230.

95 47 U.S.C. §230(f)(2).

96 Testimony of Christopher Cox in U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,

Communications, Technology, Innovation, and the Internet, The PACT Act and Section 230: The Impact of the Law
that Helped Create the Internet and an Examination of Proposed Reforms for Today’s Online World, 116th Cong., 2nd
sess., July 28, 2020, https://www.commerce.senate.gov/services/files/BD6A508B-E95C-4659-8E6D-106CDE546D71;
Christopher Cox, “Policing the Internet: A Bad Idea in 1996–and Today,” RealClear Politics, June 25, 2020,
https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2020/06/25/policing_the_internet_a_bad_idea_in_1996_—_and_today.html;
and Ron Wyden, “I wrote this law to protect free speech. Now Trump wants to revoke it,” CNN Business Perspectives,
June 9, 2020, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/09/perspectives/ron-wyden-section-230/index.html.
97 CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11224, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC: The Supreme Court Addresses Facial Challenges to State

Social Media Laws, by Peter J. Benson.

98 White House, “Executive Order on Preventing Online Censorship,” May 28, 2020,

https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-preventing-online-censorship/.

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access to content would not receive immunity.99 In addition, in September 2020, the Department
of Justice sent draft legislation to Congress that would have reformed Section 230 by narrowing
the scope of liability protection.100 In October 2020, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai released a statement
that the agency would be moving forward with rulemaking to clarify the meaning of Section 230,
after the FCC’s general counsel concluded that the FCC has the legal authority to interpret
Section 230;101 the FCC has not proceeded with rulemaking on Section 230 since then.
Commissioner Brendan Carr, President-elect Trump’s nominee to chair the FCC beginning in
2025, has stated that the FCC should issue an order that interprets Section 230.102 If the FCC were
to take action, it might face legal challenges, as some organizations responded to NTIA’s 2020
petition to argue that the FCC lacks authority to interpret Section 230.103
Congress has held hearings and bills have been introduced to amend Section 230 (Appendix).104
Some bills would remove liability protection for interactive computer service providers that
promote or suppress certain content or use an automated process to target and amplify content.105
Other bills would allow providers to be held liable for not removing objectionable content.106
Amending Section 230 may incentivize social media platforms to alter their content moderation
practices, potentially addressing some commentators’ concerns. Some have argued for amending
Section 230 to remove liability protection for dominant technology firms censoring content,107 as
well as to provide individuals who are harmed on the platform with leverage against operators.108

99 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, In the Matter of Section 230 of the Communications
Act of 1934, July 27, 2020, https://www.ntia.gov/files/ntia/publications/ntia_petition_for_rulemaking_7.27.20.pdf.
100 Department of Justice (DOJ), “Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act

of 1996,” press release, September 23, 2020, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-unveils-proposed-

section-230-legislation; DOJ, “Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act of
1996,” https://www.justice.gov/ag/department-justice-s-review-section-230-communications-decency-act-1996.
101 Federal Communications Commission (FCC), “Statement of Chairman Pai on Section 230,” October 15, 2020,

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-367567A1.pdf; and Thomas Johnson Jr., “The FCC’s Authority to

Interpret Section 230 of the Communications Act,” FCC, October 21, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/
2020/10/21/fccs-authority-interpret-section-230-communications-act.
102 Brendan Carr, “Federal Communication Commission,” in Project 2025 Presidential Transition Project: Mandate

for Leadership: The Conservative Promise, ed. Paul Dans and Steven Groves (Washington, DC: The Heritage
Foundation, 2023), pp. 845-860, https://static.project2025.org/2025_MandateForLeadership_FULL.pdf.
103 For example, see John Bergmayer and Harold Feld, “Comments of Public Knowledge,” in In the Matter of National

Telecommunications and Information Administration Petition to ‘Clarify’ Provisions of Section 230 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, RM-11862, September 2, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/
109020607125130/1; and Emma Llanso et al., “Comments of the Center for Democracy & Technology Opposing the
National telecommunications and Information Administration’s Petition for Rulemaking,” in In the Matter of Section
230 of the Communications Act, RM-11862, August 31, 2020, https://www.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/10831957605823/1.
104 For example, see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications

and Technology, Where Are We Now: Section 230 of the Communication Decency Act of 1996, hearings, 118th Cong.,
2nd sess., April 11, 2024, https://docs.house.gov/Committee/Calendar/ByEvent.aspx?EventID=117099.
105 For example, DISCOURSE Act (S. 921, 118th Congress), COLLUDE Act (S. 1525, 118th Congress).

106 For example, see CASE-IT Act (H.R. 573, 118th Congress).

107 For example, see Craig Parshall, “Big Tech and The Whole First Amendment,” Federalist Society, August 14, 2020,

https://fedsoc.org/commentary/fedsoc-blog/big-tech-and-the-whole-first-amendment; and Jonathan Tepper, “Facebook

and Google Must Be Regulated Now,” The American Conservative, May 13, 2019,
https://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/facebook-and-google-must-be-regulated-now/.
108 For example, see Danielle Keats Citron and Benjamin Wittes, “The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad

Samaritans §230 Immunity,” Fordham Law Review, vol. 86, no. 2 (2017), https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=5435&context=flr; and Center for Countering Digital Hate, “Understanding Section 230 –
Social Media Companies’ Get Out of Jail Free Card,” May 17, 2024, https://counterhate.com/blog/understanding-
section-230-social-media-companies-get-out-of-jail-free-card/.

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Others highlight the general lack of transparency regarding operators’ content moderation
decisions.109 One study recommends pairing Section 230 liability protections with new public
obligations for social media operators, including transparency and moderation standards and
advisory oversight from regulators.110
Some commentators have argued against amending Section 230, raising concerns about potential
unintended consequences.111 Amending Section 230 to encourage moderation of objectionable
content or to limit liability protections for removing content would affect all interactive computer
services (e.g., search engines, internet service providers) and their users, unless legislative
language would explicitly specify a subset of interactive computer service providers and users.
Social media operators might adjust their content moderation practices, ranging from aggressively
screening content to not moderating any content unless it is illegal, including content that may be
objectionable or obscene to most users. Increased exposure to liability might also limit
competition, as nascent firms may not have sufficient resources to address regulatory compliance
and potential litigation.112

Policy Considerations for Congress

Some Members of Congress have introduced bills to address their concerns about social media
operators’ content moderation practices, including some that would amend Section 230 (see
Appendix). Some states have enacted legislation related to social media, although challenges to
the validity of many of these laws are being litigated in federal courts as of the date of this
report.113
This section provides a selection of potential options for Congress. For additional legislative
considerations, see CRS Report R47662, Defining and Regulating Online Platforms, coordinated
by Clare Y. Cho.

Potential Options for Congress

Congress might choose to take no action to address social media operators’ content moderation
practices, potentially in light of free speech concerns. Operators have voluntarily adjusted their
algorithms and content moderation practices and may continue to do so in response to pressure

109 For example, see Joan Donovan, “Why Social Media Can’t Keep Moderating Content in the Shadows,” MIT
Technology Review, November 6, 2020, https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/11/06/1011769/social-media-
moderation-transparency-censorship/; and Mark MacCarthy, Transparency Recommendations for Regulatory Regimes
of Digital Platforms, Centre for International Governance Innovation, March 8, 2022, https://www.cigionline.org/
publications/transparency-recommendations-for-regulatory-regimes-of-digital-platforms/.
110 Tarleton Gillespie, “Platforms Are Not Intermediaries,” Georgetown Technology Law Review, vol. 2, no. 2 (2018),

pp. 198-216, https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/2.2-Gilespie-pp-198-216.pdf.

111 For example, see Daniel Lyons, “Beyond 230: Reframing the Conservative Debate Over Social Media Regulation,”

AEIdeas, American Enterprise Institute, November 4, 2020, https://www.aei.org/technology-and-innovation/beyond-

230-reframing-the-conservative-debate-over-social-media-regulation/; and Kate Ruane, “Dear Congress: Platform
Accountability Should Not Threaten Online Expression,” American Civil Liberties Union, October 27, 2020,
https://www.aclu.org/news/free-speech/dear-congress-platform-accountability-should-not-threaten-online-expression/.
112 Jeff Kosseff, “The Gradual Erosion of the Law That Shaped the Internet,” Columbia Science & Technology Law

Review, vol. 18, no. 1 (2016), pp. 1-41, https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/cstlr18&collection=

journals&id=1&startid=&endid=41; and Jennifer Huddleston, Competition and Content Moderation: How Section 230
Enables Increased Tech Marketplace Entry, Cato Institute Policy Analysis, no. 922, January 31, 2022,
https://www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2022-01/policy-analysis-922.pdf.
113 For example, see CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11224, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC: The Supreme Court Addresses Facial

Challenges to State Social Media Laws, by Peter J. Benson.

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from their users, advertisers, government bodies, and other external stakeholders. It is unclear
whether operators will continue to do so and whether the changes implemented by operators
would always align with the public interest and be sufficient to address congressional concerns.
Congress might seek to incentivize operators to implement changes by, for example, holding
hearings or conducting investigations. Some operators have voluntarily joined an industry
group—the Tech Coalition—to take coordinated action to combat child sexual exploitation and
abuse.114 Operators could similarly create a coalition to determine what types of content should be
allowed on their platforms. Different operators have established different priorities and
approaches to balancing free expression and removing objectionable content; it is unclear whether
operators would be able to reach a consensus and whether Congress would agree with guidance
or standards recommended by the industry coalition.
If Congress chooses to take legislative action, it might consider amending Section 230, as
discussed in the previous section. It might also consider requiring social media operators to
provide information about their content moderation practices. Some operators voluntarily publish
reports about their content moderation practices, which include estimates for the amount of
content removed for violating the platforms’ policies.115 Congress might consider whether these
reports provide sufficient information, whether additional information would be beneficial, and
the potential costs associated with obtaining the information required in the reports, particularly
for operators with limited resources. Legislation requiring private entities to disclose certain
information could raise First Amendment concerns.116
Another legislative option might be regulating content moderation practices, particularly for
platforms with many users. For example, legislation could focus on the platform’s use of
algorithms or other platform features (e.g., auto play, notifications). Congress might also
determine that certain objectionable content or moderation practices are sufficiently detrimental
to the public to warrant legislative action. Legislation addressing specific types of content or
regulating content moderation could raise First Amendment concerns.117
Congress might consider implementing federal advisory or regulatory oversight of social media
platforms. Some commentators have proposed oversight that would provide the regulatory
authority with access to algorithms and data used by operators and allow it to establish disclosure
requirements, such as requiring operators to disclose the data they collect, tests they conduct,
prevalence of objectionable content, and actions taken to moderate content.118 For this option,
Congress may need to determine the regulatory authority’s jurisdiction, specific objectives, and
the authorities it would exercise.

114 For more information about the Tech Coalition, see Tech Coalition, “Working Together to End Online Child Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse,” https://www.technologycoalition.org/.
115 For example, see Meta Platforms, “Community Standards Enforcement Report,” https://transparency.meta.com/

reports/community-standards-enforcement/; and Reddit, “Transparency Reports,” https://redditinc.com/policies/

transparency.
116 CRS Report R47986, Freedom of Speech: An Overview, by Victoria L. Killion.

117 Ibid.; and CRS Legal Sidebar LSB11224, Moody v. NetChoice, LLC: The Supreme Court Addresses Facial

Challenges to State Social Media Laws, by Peter J. Benson.

118 Transatlantic Working Group, Freedom and Accountability: A Transatlantic Framework for Moderating Speech

Online, University of Pennsylvania Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2020,

https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/feature/transatlantic-working-group-freedom-and-accountability/; and
Paul M. Barrett, Regulating Social Media: The Fight Over Section 230—and Beyond, NYU Stern Center for Business
and Human Rights, September 2020, https://bhr.stern.nyu.edu/publication/regulating-social-media-the-fight-over-
section-230-and-beyond/.

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Legislation could indirectly affect content moderation. Some commentators, for example, have
focused their concerns on the scope and reach of large social media platforms and proposed
legislative options to increase competition.119 One article, for instance, proposes solutions that
include defining rules for operators based on their size and requiring dominant platforms to allow
others to build customizable content feeds that users may choose from.120 This may allow users
displeased with the content moderation practices of one platform to move to another, particularly
if there are numerous interoperable platforms. This would depend on technical feasibility,
whether operators would still invest in the underlying infrastructure, and whether network effects
and economies of scale would make it difficult for new operators to compete.
Congress might also consider legislation unrelated to content moderation. For example, some
Members have introduced bills seeking to promote digital literacy, which might empower users to
make informed decisions about their use of social media platforms.121 This might improve users’
interactions on social media platforms, but platforms might continue to promote harmful content
or impede free expression due to their use of algorithms or their content moderation practices.

Concluding Thoughts
Some overarching questions regarding content moderation practices on social media platforms
include the following:
• Might Congress or the executive branch take action to address social media
operators’ content moderation practices?
• What is the appropriate balance between free expression and preventing
objectionable content that might cause harm?
• If action to address the spread of objectionable content and promote free
expression is deemed necessary, which institutions—public or private—are to
bear the primary responsibility for it?
• Who is to determine whether certain content is objectionable?
If Congress chooses to address social media operators’ content moderation practices, it might
consider the intended scope of proposed actions; under what conditions they would be applied;
and the range of potential legal, social, and economic consequences, both intended and
unintended, that may result. It might consider whether any potential action would impose costs,
monetary or otherwise, that further entrench the market power of incumbent operators. It might
also consider how U.S. actions, such as regulating social media companies’ content moderation
practices, would align with an international legal and regulatory framework.

119 For example, see Tom Wheeler et al., New Digital Realities, New Oversight Solutions in the U.S.: The Case for a
Digital Platform Agency and a New Approach to Regulatory Oversight, Harvard Kennedy School Shorenstein Center
on Media, Politics, and Public Policy, August 2020, https://shorensteincenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/New-
Digital-Realities_August-2020.pdf; and Daphne Keller, “Who Do You Sue? State and Platform Hybrid Power Over
Online Speech,” Hoover Institution, Aegis Series Paper no. 1902, January 29, 2019, https://assets.documentcloud.org/
documents/5735692/Who-Do-You-Sue-State-and-Platform-Hybrid-Power.pdf (hereinafter Keller, “Who Do You
Sue?,” 2019).
120 Keller, “Who Do You Sue?,” 2019.

121 For example, see Digital Citizenship and Media Literacy Act (H.R. 9584, 118th Congress) and Investing in Digital

Skills Act (S. 4391, 118th Congress).

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Appendix. Legislation Related to Content

Moderation Practices of Social Media Platforms
Table A-1. Selected Legislation Related to Content Moderation Practices of
Social Media Platforms
Introduced in the 118th Congress
Bill No. Title Summary

H.R. 573 CASE-IT Act This bill would have limited Section 230 immunity for a user or
provider of an interactive computer service based on certain
content moderation decisions.
The bill would have removed Section 230 immunity from being
treated as the publisher of information provided by another content
provider for one year if a user or provider facilitates (1) illegal
online content; (2) certain exploitive contact between adults and
minors; or (3) content that is indecent, obscene, or otherwise
harmful to minors.
Further, to retain Section 230 immunity, an interactive computer
service that is dominant in its market (i.e., has gained substantial,
sustained market power over any competitors) would have had to
make content moderation decisions pursuant to policies or
practices that are consistent with the First Amendment. However,
the bill would not have limited the application of Section
230(c)(2)(B) immunity for actions taken to enable or make available
the technical means to restrict access to objectionable material.
H.R. 1231; SAFE TECH Act This bill would have limited Section 230 immunity to claims arising
S. 560 from third-party speech rather than third-party information.
Additionally, Section 230 immunity would not have applied if a user
or provider (1) accepts payment to make the speech available, or
(2) creates or funds (in whole or in part) the speech.
The bill would have changed legal procedures concerning Section
230 by (1) requiring a defendant in a lawsuit to raise Section 230 as
an affirmative defense, and (2) placing the burden of proving that the
defense applies on the defendant.
Some courts have held that Section 230 bars claims for civil
penalties and injunctive relief. The bill would have expressly
excluded requests for injunctive relief arising from a provider’s
failure to remove, restrict access to, or prevent dissemination of
material likely to cause irreparable harm. However, the bill would
have protected a provider from liability for actions taken to comply
with such injunctions.
Under current law, Section 230 does not apply to federal criminal
law, intellectual property law, and other designated areas of law.
The bill would have added additional exceptions for civil rights law;
antitrust law; stalking, harassment, or intimidation laws; international
human rights law; and civil actions for wrongful death.

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Bill No. Title Summary

H.R. 2635 The Big-Tech Accountability This bill would have removed Section 230 immunity for providers of
Act of 2023 social media services (e.g., Facebook and TikTok).
Additionally, the bill would have prohibited a provider of social
media services from suspending or otherwise restricting the account
of a U.S. citizen based on that citizen’s social, political, or religious
status. The prohibition would have applied even if the citizen clearly
violates the provider’s policies related to hate speech, sexual
harassment, discrimination, or violent or threatening speech. A
provider that violates the prohibition would have been subject to
civil penalties.
H.R. 4624; Algorithmic Justice and This bill would have established requirements for certain
S. 2325 Online Platform commercial online platforms (e.g., social media sites) that withhold
Transparency Act or promote content through algorithms and related computational
processes that use personal information.
The platforms would have been required to
• make disclosures about their collection and use of personal
information and their content moderation practices;
• retain specified records that describe how the algorithms use
personal information and assess whether the algorithms
produce disparate outcomes based on race and other
demographic factors in terms of access to housing,
employment, financial services, and related matters;
• employ algorithms safely and effectively; and
• allow users to access and transfer their personal information.
If a platform uses algorithms to publish or sell advertising, it would
have been required to maintain a library of the advertisements. The
Federal Trade Commission would have also been required to adopt
rules concerning deceptive advertising.
A platform’s chief executive officer or other senior officer would
have been required to certify compliance with disclosure
requirements.
Additionally, platforms would have been prohibited from (1)
employing algorithms or other design features that result in
discrimination or similar harms based on demographic or biometric
factors, or (2) processing information such that it impairs voting
rights. Further, users of a platform would have been prohibited from
violating civil rights laws using the platform’s algorithms.
The bill would have prohibited waivers or other methods that limit
rights under the bill; provided whistleblower protections for
individuals who report violations; and authorized enforcement by
specified federal agencies, states, and private individuals.
The bill would have also provided funding for an interagency task
force to study the discriminatory use of personal information by
platforms’ algorithms.
H.R. 4910 Deplatform Drug Dealers This bill would have specified that Section 230 immunity does not
Act apply to the illegal advertisement or distribution of controlled
substances on the internet.

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Bill No. Title Summary

H.R. 7891; Kids Online Safety Act This bill would have set out requirements to protect minors from
S. 1409 online harms.
The requirements would have applied to covered platforms, which
are applications or services (e.g., social networks) that connect to
the internet and are likely to be used by minors. However, the bill
would have exempted internet service providers, email services,
educational institutions, and other specified entities from the
requirements.
Covered platforms would have been required to take reasonable
measures in the design and operation of products or services used
by minors to prevent and mitigate certain harms that may arise from
that use (e.g., sexual exploitation and online bullying).
Additionally, covered platforms would have been required to
provide (1) minors with certain safeguards, such as settings that
restrict access to minors’ personal data; and (2) parents or
guardians with tools to supervise minors’ use of a platform, such as
control of privacy and account settings.
Covered platforms would have also been required to
• disclose specified information, including details regarding the
use of personalized recommendation systems and individual-
specific advertising to minors;
• allow parents, guardians, minors, and schools to report certain
harms;
• refrain from facilitating advertising of age-restricted products
or services (e.g., tobacco and gambling) to minors; and
• annually report on foreseeable risks of harm to minors from
using the platform.
Additionally, the bill would have required large (based on specified
revenue, employment, or user criteria) websites, internet
applications, and search engines (including social network sites) to
meet certain requirements before using algorithms that prioritize
information furnished to the user based on user-specific data. For
example, such platforms would have been required to (1) provide
users with notice that the website uses such algorithms, and (2)
make available a version of the platform that uses algorithms that do
not prioritize information based on user data.
The bill would have provided for enforcement through the Federal
Trade Commission and states.
Further, the bill would have required the commission to seek to
contract with the National Academy of Sciences to study the risks
of harm to minors by the use of social media and other online
platforms.
The bill would have established a council to advise on implementing
the bill. It would have also required guidance for market and
product research focused on minors and an evaluation of options to
verify a user’s age.

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Bill No. Title Summary

S. 147 See Something, Say This bill would have required a provider of an interactive computer
Something Online Act of service to submit an activity report to the Department of Justice if it
2023 detects the transmission of any post, message, comment, tag, or
other user-generated content or transmission that commits,
facilitates, incites, promotes, or otherwise assists the commission of
a major crime.
The activity report describing the transmission would have been
required to contain (1) the name, location, and other identification
information submitted by the user; (2) the date and nature of the
user-generated content or transmission detected for suspicious
activity; and (3) any relevant text, information, and metadata related
to the suspicious transmission.
If a provider fails to report a known suspicious transmission, the bill
would have eliminated Section 230 immunity for claims related to
that transmission.
S. 483 Internet PACT Act This bill would have required providers of interactive computer
services to publish their policies explaining the types of content that
is permissible on their services and provide a system for users to
submit complaints about content that may violate the policies or
involve illegal content.
Further, providers would have been required to establish a process
for removing certain content that violates their policies and
notifying the information content provider about the removal,
including a mechanism to appeal the removal. Providers would have
also been required to publish a report every six months that details
the instances in which the company took action with respect to
content, including removing content, deprioritizing content, and
suspending content provider accounts. The bill would have removed
Section 230 immunity for providers if the provider has actual
knowledge of illegal content on its service and does not remove the
content within specified time frames.
The bill would have provided for enforcement of these
requirements by the Federal Trade Commission.

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Bill No. Title Summary

S. 921 DISCOURSE Act This bill would have limited Section 230 protections for a user or
provider of an interactive computer service related to content
provided by third parties. It would have also required a provider
that offers its service through a mass-market offering to the public
to disclose information about its content moderation activities.
The bill would have removed Section 230 protection for a provider
with a dominant market share if the provider
• promotes or suppresses a viewpoint through its content
moderation, including by affecting a content creator’s revenue;
• uses automated processes (e.g., algorithms) to target and
amplify content provided to a user who has not requested or
searched for the content; or
• solicits, funds, modifies, or otherwise contributes to content.
Currently, a provider retains Section 230 immunity even when it
restricts access to materials that it considers objectionable. Under
this bill, a provider would have retained protections if restricted
materials fall, based on an objectively reasonable belief, into a
prescribed list of harmful or unlawful categories.
Additionally, the Section 230 immunity would not have applied to
providers that (1) restrict access to content in a manner that
burdens the exercise of religion, or (2) fail to comply with an
existing requirement to notify customers of options for limiting a
minor’s access to harmful online content (e.g., parental controls).
The bill would have also changed legal procedures related to the
liability protections, including by specifying that the protection
serves as an affirmative defense.
S. 941 Removing Section 230 This bill would have eliminated Section 230 immunity for particular
Immunity for Official social media platforms related to content generated or shared by
Accounts of Censoring adversarial foreign governments that restrict access to or censor
Foreign Adversaries Act social media platforms.
The Department of State would have been required to compile a
list of such governments, and the list must include China, Cuba, Iran,
North Korea, Russia, Syria, and Venezuela.
Under Section 230, a social media platform is generally not liable for
content generated by third parties. Under this bill, if a social media
platform knowingly hosts or distributes the content of a verified
account controlled by or working on behalf of a listed government,
the social media platform would have lost Section 230 immunity for
that content. (A verified account is one that displays a badge or
other identifier that indicates the authenticity or validity of the
account holder or has more than 500,000 followers.)
The provisions of the bill would have applied to any domestically
headquartered internet website, application, or platform that (1) is
open to the public, including citizens from any country; (2) primarily
enables users to communicate with each other by posting
information, comments, messages, or images; and (3) has more than
50 million monthly users in the United States. The provisions would
not have applied to email services or services where content is
preselected by the provider (i.e., not user generated) and any chat,
comments, or interactive features that depend on the preselected
content.

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Bill No. Title Summary

S. 1525 COLLUDE Act This bill would have removed Section 230 immunity if a provider
restricts access to or availability of content containing political
speech because of a governmental request unless the request serves
a legitimate law enforcement or national security purpose.
In addition, the bill would have changed legal procedures for
applying Section 230. Currently, Section 230 serves as broad
immunity that typically allows the early dismissal of lawsuits, thereby
preempting lawsuits and statutes that impose liability for third-party
content. This bill would have made the protection an affirmative
defense, which would have meant the provider or user must prove
that the protection applies before the lawsuit may be dismissed.
S. 1671 Digital Platform This bill would have established a commission to regulate digital
Commission Act platforms. These are online services that facilitate interactions
between users and between users and entities (including online
services) that offer goods and services.
The bill would have provided the commission with rulemaking,
investigative, and related authorities to regulate access to,
competition among, and consumer protections for digital platforms.
This would have included setting standards for age verification and
age-appropriate design. The bill would have also provided for
administrative and judicial enforcement of the regulations.
The commission would have been required to establish a council of
technical experts, representatives of digital platforms, and other
experts (e.g., representatives of nonprofit public interest groups and
academics) to recommend standards for algorithmic processes and
other policies.
Additionally, the commission would have had the option to
designate systemically important digital platforms. The bill would
have included criteria for the commission to use when designating a
platform as systemically important (e.g., whether its operations have
significant nationwide economic, social, or political impacts).
The bill would have also required that the commission receive pre-
merger notifications concerning designated platforms. The
commission would have been allowed to provide recommendations
about such mergers to the Department of Justice and the Federal
Trade Commission, and those agencies would have been required
to give the recommendations substantial weight when reviewing
such mergers.
The bill would have also required the commission and any relevant
federal agency to consult each other when investigating or
regulating the effects of digital platforms on certain matters,
including competition and consumer protection.
The President would have been required to appoint an independent
panel to evaluate the commission after five years and recommend
whether to extend the commission.

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Bill No. Title Summary

S. 2314 PRESERVE Online Speech This bill would have required interactive computer services (e.g.,
Act of 2023 social media companies) to issue a public disclosure containing
specified information related to a request or recommendation by a
government entity that the service moderate content on its
platform. Examples of such moderation include eliminating the
ability of a user to comment upon information or terminating or
limiting a user’s account.
Failure to comply with this requirement would have resulted in a
fine of $50,000 per day, which would have been deposited in the
Rural Digital Opportunity Fund. The Federal Communications
Commission would have been required to submit an annual report
that included the contents of each such public disclosure.
S. 4213 Kids Off Social Media Act This bill would have limited children’s access to social media
platforms and required both platforms and schools to implement
certain restrictions on children’s social media usage and screen time.
Specifically, the bill would have prohibited social media platforms
from knowingly allowing children under the age of 13 to create or
maintain accounts. Platforms would have been required to delete
existing accounts held by children and any personal data collected
from child users. Platforms also would have generally been
prohibited from using automated systems to suggest or promote
content based on personal data collected from users under the age
of 17. The bill would have directed the Federal Trade Commission
to enforce these provisions. States would have been allowed to
bring civil actions against platforms whose violations of these
provisions had adversely affected residents of the state.
Further, as a condition of receiving discounted telecommunications
service under the Schools and Libraries Universal Service Support
(E-Rate) program, schools would have been required to use
blocking or filtering technology to prevent students from accessing
social media platforms on school networks and devices. Schools
receiving E-Rate support would have also been required to
implement policies that specify permitted device usage and screen
time by grade. Schools would have been required to submit copies
of their internet safety and screen time policies to the Federal
Communications Commission, and the commission would have
been required to make those policies publicly available in a database.
Under the bill, social media platforms would have been defined as
consumer-facing sites that function primarily as forums for user-
generated content. Some categories of online platforms would have
been explicitly excluded, including sites that provide primarily
videoconferencing, emailing, and educational services.

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Bill No. Title Summary

S. 4977 Digital Integrity in This bill would have required large social media platforms to
Democracy Act promptly remove from their sites false information about election
logistics and voter eligibility.
Specifically, platforms notified of potential false election information
would have been required to investigate the veracity of the flagged
information and, if it were false, remove it. Covered information
includes false information about the time and place of, or voter
eligibility for, an election. Platforms generally would have been
required to remove false information within 48 hours of receipt of
notification of its existence. If notification is received on the day of
an election, including during an early or absentee voting period,
platforms would have been required to remove the information
within 24 hours.
The Department of Justice would have been allowed to bring a civil
suit against a social media platform that violated the timely removal
requirement. States would have been allowed to bring suit against a
platform if the false information at issue related to an election in the
state, and candidates would have been allowed to bring suit against a
platform if the candidate were aggrieved by the false information.
Such suits would have been allowed to seek money damages and
injunctive relief.
The bill would have also specified that Section 230 immunity does
not apply to false election information that is knowingly hosted on a
social media platform. However, platforms that comply with the
timely removal requirements with respect to false election
information would have retained Section 230 immunity.

Source: Congress.gov.
Notes: Bills are ordered by bill number, with the House bills listed first. The summaries are adapted from the
summaries provided on Congress.gov, specifically by changing the tense used to discuss the bill and the phrasing
used to discuss amendments to Section 230 for greater clarity (e.g., rewording “federal liability protection” as
“Section 230 immunity”).

Author Information

Clare Y. Cho Ling Zhu

Specialist in Industrial Organization and Business Analyst in Telecommunications Policy
Policy

Acknowledgments
Jason Gallo, former CRS section manager, co-authored the original version of this product.

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Congressional Research Service R46662 · VERSION 9 · UPDATED 28