VNU.JOURNAL OF SCIENCE, soc., SCI., HUMAN.

, Nq5E, 2006

THE 1954 GENEVA AGREEMENT ON VIETNAM AND THE 1973

PARIS AGREEMENT: DIPLOMACY AND THE TRIUMPH OF
THE VIETNAMESE REVOLUTION

Pierre Asselin

During the French and American were determ ined a t the negotiating
m ilitary interventions in Indochina, table. While the Geneva and Paris
Vietnamese revolutionary leaders waged agreem ents did not formalize victory,
a three-pronged resistance involving they created conditions th a t made it
m ilitary struggle (<dau tranh quan su)f untenable for the French and the
political struggle (idau tranh chinh tri), Americans, respectively, to sustain
and diplomatic struggle (idau tranh them selves and th eir allies and policies
ngoai giao). Of the three modes of in Vietnam, th u s allowing for the
struggle, the diplomatic one was eventual fulfillm ent of revolutionary
ultim ately most consequential in objectives.
cementing the victory of the
This paper offers a comparative
Revolution.(1) The m ilitary and political
analysis of the origins and implications
struggles were certainly significant as
of the Geneva A greem ent on Vietnam of
they helped revolutionary forces secure a
1954 and the P aris Agreement of 1973.
variety of gains on and off the
Beyond considering and assessing the
battlefield. U ltim ately, however, the fate
circumstances under which they were
of the French and the Americans in
forged, the paper discusses the
Vietnam, the outcome of the F irst and
ram ifications of both settlem ents as they
Second Indochina wars, and, most
affected the situation in Indochina
im portantly, the achievem ent of national
generally and in Vietnam specifically.
liberation and reunification (that is, the
The Geneva and P aris settlem ents, this
trium ph of the V ietnam ese Revolution)
paper concludes, were key milestones in
n Ph.D., Assistant Professor of History, University of
the trium ph of the Vietnamese
Hawaii - Kapiolani. Revolution.
(1) The term “Revolution” refers to the effort
spearheaded by the Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP) In the afterm ath of the Japanese
and initiated by its previous incarnation, the Indochinese
Communist Party (ICP), during World War II. That effort surrender a t the end of World W ar II in
had three objectives: “liberate" Vietnam from the Asia, on 2 Septem ber 1945, Ho Chi Minh
clutches of the Japanese invaders, French colonialists,
and, subsequently, Vietnamese reactionaries and proclaimed the advent of the
American neo-imperialists; achieve national reunification independent Democratic Republic of
from three territories (Tonkin, Annam, Cochinchina)
under French rule and two polities after 1954; lastly, Vietnam (DRVN). His proclamation
institute socialism. The most pressing objectives, m arked the culm ination of a relatively
national liberation and reunification, were essentially
achieved simultaneously in April 1975 with the fall of peaceful process known in Vietnam as
Saigon; the march to socialism is, by official accounts,
ongoing.
the '‘A ugust Revolution,” during which

29
30 Pierre Asselin

communist nationalists seized the reins struggle, the second prong, entailed the
of governm ent in Hanoi from the conduct of propaganda activity among
Japanese and forced the abdication of the masses to recruit and retain fighters
the last Nguyen emperor, Bao Dai, thus and other partisan s and supporters. The
ending the ten-centuries old dynastic diplomatic struggle, the resistance's
system in V ietnam . Although its third front, involved enlisting
jurisdiction over Vietnam and the rest of international support through diplomacy
Indochina had been effectively abolished and propaganda, and engaging the
by Jap an in M arch 1945, France never enemy in public fora and media to
assented to th e end of its mission expose its neocolonial designs and
ciuilisatrice in Indochina, and was pressure the French government to pull
working to repossess the peninsula even its forces out of Indochina and acquiesce
as Ho Chi M inh spoke. Unwilling to in Vietnam ese self-determination. The
accept the reim position of French diplomatic struggle m ight eventuate in
authority, Ho mobilized Vietnamese serious negotiations w ith the enemy at
nationalist forces and spearheaded a opportune tim es to ratify gains achieved
revolutionary movement called the through the political and/or m ilitary
“Resistance against French Colonial struggles/3*
Aggression” (cuoc khang chien chong
Throughout the w ar of resistance,
thuc dan Phap xam luoc)P
revolutionary leaders relied on the
Following the re-occupation of m ilitary and political modes of struggle,
Indochina by th e French m ilitary and with mixed results. In November 1953,
the prom pt outbreak of a new war Ho Chi M inh told a Swedish newspaper
against the occupation in December the DRVN was prepared to negotiate an
1946, the newly-formed DRVN end to the w ar with France. If Paris
government retreated to the m ountains w anted “to negotiate an arm istice in Viet
of northern V ietnam a t Pac Bo, on the Nam and solve the Viet Nam problem by
Chinese border. From th a t position it peaceful m eans,” Ho said, “the people
coordinated a three-pronged resistance and Government of the Democratic
to achieve national liberation. The Republic of Viet Nam are ready to meet
m ilitary struggle aim ed to w ear down this desire.”(4) A few weeks later, in
French forces by attrition and thereby response to domestic pressures, the
induce dem oralization. The political Laniel governm ent agreed to peace talks

<2) David G. Marr, “World War II and the Indochinese

Revolution" in Alfred w . McCoy (ed.), Southeast Asia
Under Japanese Occupation (New Haven: Yale
University Southeast Asia Studies Monograph no. 22, {3) Bo Quoc phong - Vien lich su quan su Viet Nam, Lich
1980), 126-58; and Philippe Devillers, Histoire du Việt- su nghe thuat chien dich Viet Nam, 1945-1975 (Ha Noi:
Nam, de 1940 à 1954 (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1952), Nha xuat bap. Quan doi nhan dan, 1995), 14-253.
81. For a comprehensive account of the events of 1945 (4> That portion of the interview is reproduced in Ho Chi
see David. G. Marr, Vietnam 1945: The Quest for Power Minh, Selected Writings (Hanoi: Foreign Languages
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995). Publishing House, 1976), 154.

VNU, Journal of Science, Soc., Sci., Human., No5E, 2006

The 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. 31

with DRVN and other representatives in W ar.(8) In the “A greem ent on the
Geneva to begin on 8 May 1954.(5) Cessation of H ostilities in Vietnam ,”
signed by France and the DRVN, the two
In an ironic tw ist of fate, Vietnamese
parties agreed to an im m ediate cease­
nationalist forcesoverwhelmed the
sizeable French garrison a t Dien Bien fire, the independence of V ietnam , the
tem porary division of the nation into two
Phu on the eve of th a t day, 7 May
1954.<6) Less th an twenty-four hours regroupm ent zones separated by a
later, the international conference on the dem ilitarized zone a t the seventeenth
future of Indochina convened in parallel, a m andatory regroupm ent of all
Geneva.(7) Jointly chaired by forces loyal to France south of th a t line
representatives from B ritain and the and to the DRVN north of it w ithin 300
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics days, and a voluntary regroupm ent of
(USSR), the conference aim ed at ending individual Vietnam ese along the same
hostilities in Indochina • by finding lines.(9) The two parties also agreed to
political solutions to the conflicts prohibit the introduction of additional
between French colonialists and their foreign m ilitary forces into V ietnam and
indigenous opponents in Vietnam, Laos, refrain from retaliating against former
and Cambodia. Besides B ritain and the enemy com batants. To supervise the
USSR, participants included delegations im plem entation of these processes and
from France, the DRVN (representing provisions and monitor violations of
V ietnam ese nationalists), and the royal them, the settlem ent created a Joint
governm ents of Laos and Cambodia. Commission for V ietnam with
representatives from France and the
A fter weeks of bargaining, DRVN, and an International
negotiators on 20 July 1954 reached Commission for Supervision and Control
three separate agreem ents, one for each (ICSC) w ith representatives from India,
of the Indochinese states - Vietnam, Poland, and Canada.
Laos, and Cambodia - which, among
other results, ended the F irst Indochina In view of the balance of forces in the
country in the sum m er of 1954, the
DRVN inherited jurisdiction over the
northen regroupm ent zone, and France
(5) On the prelude to the Geneva talks see Robert F.
Randle, Geneva 1954: The Settlement o f the
Indochinese War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, (8) The French national assembly ratified the Geneva
1969), 3-156. agreements on 23 July 1954 by a vote of 462 to 13, with
(6) The best account of the battle is Bernard B. Fall, Hell 134 abstentions (Arthur J. Dommen, The Indochinese
in a Very Small Place: The Siege o f Dien Bien Phu Experience o f the French and the Americans:
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1966). One of the most Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and
recent is Martin Windrow, The Last Valley: Dien Bien Vietnam (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001),
Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam (London: 251).
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003). {9) The text of the agreement is reproduced in United
(7) The Geneva Conference officially opened in April States Senate - Committee on Foreign Relations,
1954 to discuss the postwar situation on the Korean Background information Relating to Southeast Asia and
peninsula. At the conclusion of those talks, on 8 May, Vietnam, 90th Congress, 1* Session (Washington, D.C.:
the focus shifted to Indochina. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), 50-62.

DVNU, Journal o f Science, Soc., Sci., Human., NJE, 2006

32 Pierre Asselin

received jurisdiction below the war in Korea, the Geneva Conference,

seventeenth parallel. As the partition of according to this view, presented an
the nation was m eant to be temporary, opportunity to effect a thaw the Soviets
the Geneva negotiations produced an and Chinese then needed in the Cold
additional document entitled “Final War. By one Vietnamese account, the
Declaration of the Geneva Conference: Soviets w ent to Geneva “w ith the
On Restoring Peace in Indochina, 21 intention of rapidly ending the only hot
July 1954” which called for consultations w ar rem aining in the world after the
between “the competent representative flames of the Korean w ar were
authorities of the two zones” to begin in extinguished.” Their aim in doing so was
April 1955 to set the term s for nation­ “to bring about favourable conditions for
wide elections leading to reunification detente” and “international
under a single government by July 1956, cooperation.”*12* At the same time, the
at which point all French forces were to Chinese w anted to play a prom inent role
be w ithdrawn from the country.(10) in settling a major international problem
In accepting the Geneva Agreement, in order for the only recently founded
the DRVN seemed, uncharacteristically, communist government there to
to compromise, to place a t risk the establish its credibility as a major player
achievement of substantive in world politics.(13) According to the
revolutionary goals. It has often been same V ietnam ese source, the Chinese
suggested th a t it did so reluctantly and were so eager to make a deal satisfactory
under pressure from the USSR and the to the W est th a t they acquiesced in “a
PRC.(11) According to th a t reasoning, the Korea-type solution for the Indochina
Soviets and the Chinese “sold out” their war, namely / a m ilitary arm istice
Vietnamese allies by insisting th a t they w ithout a full political settlem ent.”*14*
accept a partition of the country and a According to another, more problematic,
highly problematic plan for its Vietnamese source, the Chinese
reunification because Moscow and pressured the DRVN delegation in
Beijing w anted to improve their own Geneva to accept the partition of the
relations with western-bloc countries, nation because Beijing feared
including the U nited S tates (US). W ashington would intervene m ilitarily
Coming on the heels of the end of the
(12) Le Kinh Lich (ed.), The 30-Year War, 1945-1975 -
Volume I: 1945-1954 (Hanoi; The Gioi Publishers,
{10) The text of the Final Declaration is reproduced in 2000), 368. See*also Ban chi dao Tong ket chien tranh
United States Department of state, The Department of - True thuoc Bo chinh tri, Tong ket cuoc khang chien
State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, no. 788 (Washington, D.C.: chong thuc dan Phap: Thang Id va bai hoc (Ha Noi:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2 August 1954), 164. Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 1996), 216-17.
(11) See Marilyn B. Young, The Vietnam Wars, 1945- (13) For an elaboration of the Chinese position at Geneva
1990 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991) 38-9; Gary R. see Francois Joyaux, La Chine et le règỉement du
Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and premier conflit d'lndochine - Genève 1954 (Paris:
Legacy o f War (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998), Publications de !a Sorbcnne, 1979) and Qiang Zhai,
48; and George c . Herring, Am erica’s Longest W ar The China and the Vietnam Wars, 1950-1975 (Chapel Hill:
United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New York: John University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 49-63.
Wiley & Sons, 1979), 39-40. (14) Le Kinh Lich (ed.), 30-Year War, 368.

VNU, Journal o f Science, Soc., Sci., Human., NJE, 2006

 The 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam.. 33

in Vietnam if it found the outcome of the told the participants. “We m ust not be
Geneva talks objectionable.(15) self-complacent” because the
While Soviet and Chinese pressures revolutionary struggle “may be long and
may have affected the outcome of the hard” before “complete victory can be
Geneva talks by m aking the DRVN more achieved.”(18)
accommodating to the proffered More im portantly, Hanoi signed the
settlem ent, Hanoi had reasons of its own Geneva Agreement and endorsed the
to enter in the Geneva Agreement. Dien Final Declaration of the Geneva
Bien Phu may have been a spectacular Conference because those documents
victory for V ietnam ese nationalists, but created favorable conditions for the
it was also a bloody and costly climax to trium ph of the Revolution in the whole
a long and devastating war. D uring the of Vietnam. In compelling France to
siege, revolutionary forces suffered more recognize the sovereignty and territorial
than 20,000 casualties, including integrity of V ietnam and to w ithdraw all
perhaps 10,000 killed in action, and in its forces from Vietnam , Cambodia, and
the afterm ath, those forces were in Laos, they effectively ended French
desperate need of re sp ite /16’ colonial rule in Indochina. In the area
Furtherm ore, though the outcome of the above the provisional military
battle definitively underm ined the demarcation line a t the seventeenth
French position in northern Vietnam, it parallel, the two documents provided for
did little to affect its strength or the the complete disengagem ent of France
strength of the indigenous allies of the and its arm ed forces w ithin 300 days,
French in southern Vietnam. In fact, the thus formalizing the liberation of the
colonial ap p aratu s there rem ained North by revolutionary forces. T hat was
virtually intact. At Dien Bien Phu, the “a major victory for our people’s struggle
French, anticom m unist side lost a battle, for liberation,” read a Vietnamese
not a w ar.(17> DRVN president Ho Chi W orkers’ P arty (VWP) pronouncement,
Minh recognized th a t reality in a letter as it allowed for th e establishm ent of a
in May 1954 addressed to participants in “solid base” (d a t CO so vung chac) to
the Dien Bien Phu campaign. The “achieve peace, unity, independence, and
victory m arked “only the beginning,” he prosperity in [all of] Vietnam .”(19) With

<,5J Su that ve quart he Viet Nam-Trung Quoc trong 30 (ie) The letter is reproduced in Vo Nguyen Giap, Dien
nam qua (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Su that, 1979), 32. Biert Phu (Hanoi: The Gioi, 2000), 8. In a recent
(16) Jules Roy, La bataille de Dien Bien Phu, (Paris: René interview, Giap himself admitted that the victory at Dien
Julliard, 1963), 568 and Phillipe Devillers and Jean Bien Phu was important only to the extent that it
Lacouture, End o f a War (New York: Praeger “contributed to the success of the Geneva Conference,
Publishers, 1969), 149. which recognised Viet Nam as an independent and
,17) “We emerged victorious from that war” with the unified nation and completely liberated North Viet Nam
French, one cadre later commented, “but his forces had and the capital city of Ha Noi" (Vietnam News Service, 5
not been completely destroyed. That is why we signed May 2004).
the Treaty of Geneva” (quoted in J.J. Zasloff, Political (19) Quoted in Vien nghien cuu chu nghia Mac-Lenin va
Motivation o f the Vietnamese Communists: The tu tuong Ho Chi Minh, Lich su Dang cong sari Viet Nam,
Vietminh Regroupees (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Tap II: 1954-1975 (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc
Corporation, 1968), 53). gia, 1995), 27.

oVNU, Journal o f Science, Soc., Sci., Human., NJE, 2006

34 Pierre Asselin

respect to the South, th e Final whose statem ent on the subject made no
D eclaration’s em phasis on th e fact th a t reference to the u s , the Central
the m ilitary dem arcation line betw een Committee voiced definitive concern
the two V ietnam s did not constitute a about American purposes.
political or territo rial boundary and the Acknowledging th a t the French position
imposition of a Ju ly 1956 deadline for in Indochina generally and Vietnam
nation-wide elections portended its specifically had been critically
reintegration under peaceful conditions. underm ined by Dien Bien Phu and the
In the m eantim e, prohibitions on the Geneva Agreement, the Central
introduction of other foreign troops and Committee nevertheless warned th a t the
the establishm ent of additional m ilitary future of the Revolution rem ained
bases constituted strong legal uncertain because American intentions
guarantees against outside - i.e., were unclear. The people, the army, and
American - interference in th e process. the P arty m ust rem ain vigilant as the
Ho Chi M inh justifiably heralded the US m ight endeavor to sabotage the
Geneva A greem ent as a “big victory” peace process established by the
0thang loi Ion). T h at settlem ent, Ho settlem ent. Only by keeping “their
insisted, had compelled the governm ent fighting spirit” well honed could the
of France to “recognize the future of the Revolution be assured.(22)
independence, sovereignty, unity and Despite a num ber of flaws, the
territorial integrity of our country.”(20) Geneva Agreement indeed represented a
The C entral Com m ittee of the VWP significant success for the Vietnamese
subsequently reiterated th is view, Revolution as it secured w hat no
adding th a t the Geneva A greem ent was m ilitary endeavor had managed to
a “great victory” (ithang loi vi dai) for the achieve: mainly, the liberation of half
people and the arm ed forces of Vietnam . the nation and a commitment from the
The victory w as doubly pleasing since it French to recognize the independence
not only m arked the collapse of French and territorial integrity of Vietnam and
m ilitary power in Indochina, but pull out of Indochina completely. The
signaled “the defeat of th e American Geneva Agreement thus portended more
im perialists's plan to transform th an the end of a conflict; it portended
Indochina into an A m erican colonial the end a century of French interference
outpost and m ilitary base.”(21) U nlike Ho, and domination in Vietnam. The
outcome of the Geneva talks m arked a
(20) “Loi kieu goi sau khi Hoi nghi Gionevo thanh cong,
ngay 22 thang 7 nam 1954," in Dang cong san Viet
Nam, Van kien Dang - Toan tap, Tap 15: 1954 (Ha Noi:
Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2001) [hereafter French from Indo-China and turn Indo-China into an
referred to as VKD 1954], 229. American colony" (quoted in American Imperialism’s
(21) “Loi kieu goi cua Ban chap hanh Truong uong Dang Intervention in Viet Nam (Hanoi. Foreign Languages
lao dong Viet Nam, ngay 25 thang 7 nam 1954," VKD Publishing House, 1955), 21).
1954, 234. “By their intervention in Indo-China," Prime (22) “Loi kieu goi cua Ban chap hanh Truong uong Dang
Minister Pham Van Dong added later, “the American lao dong Viet Nam, ngay 25 thang 7 narn 1954," VKD
imperialists pursued the aim to gradually oust the 1954,236.

VNU, Journal of Science, Soc., Sci., Human., N^E, 2006

 The 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam.. 35

culmination and significant trium ph for leaders rejected th a t approach in the

the anticolonial struggle. While the struggle against th e A m ericans and
Revolution itself was not complete, the th eir allies as they believed they could
VWP took an im portant step forward defeat W ashington m ilitarily. In an
through signing the Geneva Agreement. article in Hoc tap, a P arty journal,
In the late 1950s, after it became Politburo m em ber Le Due Tho, who was
obvious to Hanoi th a t the Ngo Dinh also head of th e VWP O rganizational
Diem regime in Saigon - which had Comm ittee, openly denounced those in
forcefully asserted itself as the new the P a rty and governm ent who
government of South Vietnam following supported negotiations.(24) Consumed by
the demise of the French - and its the desire to lib erate the South quickly
American backers would never honor the and reunify th e nation while building
letter or spirit of the Geneva Agreement socialism in th e N orth, H anoi decided
and allow for peaceful reunification of th a t it w as im possible to compromise
the nation, the VWP leadership w ith A m erican aggressors and their
endorsed the p ursuit of arm ed struggle Saigon collaborators, and th u s sought
in the South to precipitate the collapse of decisive victory on th e battlefield.(25)
the southern polity and bring about Moreover, H anoi did not believe the
national reunification.(23) By 1965, th a t A m ericans would negotiate honestly.
arm ed struggle had turned into a major, From the VWP’s perspective, nothing
two-front war directly involving the u s short of m ilitary defeat would disabuse
and an assortm ent of other parties. the A m ericans of th e idea th a t they
In response to the deployment of could m ain tain th e ir presence and power
American ground forces in the South and in Indochina. In a speech before the
the sustained bombing of the North, the N ational Assem bly in April 1965, Pham
VWP organized and coordinated an Van Dong explained th a t in the
effort called the “Anti-American afterm ath of th e G eneva Agreement,
Resistance for N ational Salvation” (cuoc “the U.S. im perialists [had] gradually
khang chien chong My, cuu nuoc) replaced the French colonialists in South
modeled after the previous effort against Vietnam , set up th e Ngo D inh Diem
the French. Although diplomacy puppet adm inistration, wiped out one by
generally and negotiations with the one th e opposition groupings, and
enemy specifically had proven their carried out m ost ru th less and wicked
m erits in the w ar against France, VWP repressions ag ain st th e people.” The
A m ericans showed no respect for the
(23) Le Mau Han, Dang cong san Viet Nam: cac Dai hoi
va Hoi nghi Trnng uong (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri (24) William J. Duiker, The Communist Road to Power in
quoc gia, 1995), 80-81; Robert K. Brigham, Guerrilla Vietnam (Boulder: Westview Press, 1996), 269.
Diplomacy: The NLF’s Foreign Relations and the Viet (25) The VWP formalized its commitment to the fulfillment
Nam War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), 9-10; of those revolutionary objectives during its third national
Le Duan, Ve chien tranh nhan dan Viet Nam (Ha Noi: congress in 1960. See Van kien Dai hoi, Tap I (Ha Noi:
Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 1993), 413-14. Nha xuat ban Su That, 1960), 174.

nVNU, Journal o f Science, Soc., Sci., Human., NJE, 2006

36 Pierre Asselin

rights of the people of Vietnam as they of the people of Vietnam “before the
“drowned in blood all patriotic forces international Communist movement.”
aspiring to independence, democracy For the sake of “the spirit of proletarian
and peaceful national reunification.”(26) internationalism ” and “the international
Negotiating with a reckless, aggressive Communist movement,1” the Vietnamese
foe was futile. “Popular violence is the were prepared to suffer and shed their
only way to oppose the violence of the blood. “It doesn’t m atter if the process of
im perialist aggressor.”(27) socialist development in the south of
Stein Tonnesson has argued th at Vietnam is delayed for 30 or 40 years,”
Le D uan defiantly asserted.(30)
VWP leaders preferred w ar over
diplomacy because they were In the afterm ath of the Tet Offensive
internationalists who recognized the of 1968, Hanoi softened this stance and
Vietnamese Revolution as a vanguard agreed to public and private talks with
movement with the potential to inspire the Americans, and a year later
oppressed peoples around the world. In commenced secret negotiations with the
Tennesson’s reckoning, Hanoi found the Nixon adm inistration via National
possibility of an “enormous bloodletting” Security Adviser Henry Kissinger.
tolerable because its leaders believed Then, in 1970, VWP leaders elevated
th at their own struggle “served the diplomacy as a form of struggle, and
cause of revolutionary forces thus the secret Paris peace talks, to a
worldwide.”(28) There is some evidence par with the m ilitary mode. During the
for th a t position. “We have to establish ensuing two years, Hanoi wavered
a world front th a t will be built first by between serious negotiation and
some core countries and later enlarged intensified m ilitary activity. Ultimately,
to include African and Latin American problems resulting from the 1972 Spring
countries,” VWP first secretary Le Duan Offensive and the resumption of
once told Chinese prem ier Zhou Enlai.(29) sustained American bombings of the
On another occasion, the F irst Secretary North, including savage raids on Hanoi
stated th at fighting the Americans until and Haiphong ill December 1972,
final victory was the “moral obligation” convinced Hanoi to enter into the Paris
Agreement with the u s . (31) Le Duan
(26) . “Government Report Submitted by Prime Minister
Pham Van Dong, April 1965" in Against U.S.
Aggression: Main Documents o f the National Assembly (30) From the transcript of a conversation dated 13 April
of the Democratic Republic o f Vietnam, 3rd Legislature - 1966 between Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Kang Sheng,
2nd Session, April 1965 (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Le Duan, and Nguyen Duy Tring reproduced in Westad
Publishing House, 1966), 15. et al. (eds.), 77 Conversations, 95.
{27) Ibid, 54. (31) On the history of this process see Luu Van Loi and
<28) Stein Tennesson, “Tracking Multi-Directional Nguyen Anh Vu, Cac cuoc thuong luong Le Due Tho-
Dominoes" in Odd Ame Westad et al. (eds.), 77 Kissinger tai Pans (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Cong an nhan
Conversations Between Chinese and Foreign Leaders dan, 1996); Nguyen Thanh Le, Cuoc dam phan Pari ve
on the Wars in Indochina, 1964-1977 (Washington, Viet Nam (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia,
D.C.: Cold War International History Project Working 1998); and Pierre Asselin, A Bitter Peace: Washington,
Paper No. 22, 1998), 33-34. Hanoi, and the Making o f the Paris Agreement (Chapel
(29) Quoted in Ibid, 35. Hill: University of North Carlina Press, 2002).

VNU, Journal o f Science, Soc., Sci., Human., No5E, 2006

The 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. 37

him self later adm itted th a t the still bigger new ones, [and] build a
December bombing “completely peaceful, unified, independent,
obliterated our economic foundation.”(32) democratic and strong Vietnam .”(33)
As had been the case after Dien Bien
The Paris Agreement secured a
Phu, the DRVN needed a pause in the
variety of im portant gains for the
hostilities to m end its wounds.
revolutionary movement and, though it
The Paris A greem ent was signed on required concessions from Hanoi and its
27 Jan u ary 1973. As specified in the allies in the South, did not compromise
agreem ent itself, representatives from revolutionary objectives. It provided for
the US, the DRVN, the Republic of an im m ediate cease-fire, which
Vietnam (RVN), and the Provisional revolutionary forces desperately needed.
Revolutionary G overnment of the More im portantly, it compelled the u s to
Republic of South Vietnam (PRGRSVN) respect the sovereignty and territorial
signed in the morning, and the u s and integrity of Vietnam , cease all military
the DRVN signed a meaningfully activities against the DRVN, dismantle
different document in the afternoon. The its m ilitary facilities in South Vietnam,
C entral Committee of the VWP declared w ithdraw its rem aining forces within
th at the signing m arked the successful sixty days, help in the postwar
end of the anti-A m erican resistance, and reconstruction of Indochina, including
portended the end of the struggle in the the DRVN, and renounce all
South for reunification. “Our people in commitments to political parties and
the North and in the South,” the personalities in the South. The
Committee proclaimed, “should be agreem ent made no references to North
extremely proud and elated by this great Vietnamese troops in the South or to
victory of th e F atherland.” For the their disposition, suggesting th a t they
North, peace m eant a new opportunity to could rem ain in place as the Americans
build socialism. The state could rebuild departed. Lastly, the agreem ent
the economy w ithout the prospect of reiterated th a t th e m ilitary demarcation
American bombers destroying w hat was line a t the seventeenth parallel “is only
rebuilt. The people had every reason to provisional and not a political or
be relieved, the Committee continued, territorial boundary,” and prohibited the
but they m ust rem ain vigilant. “The reintroduction of foreign troops after
V ietnam ese revolution has achieved their w ithdraw al.(34)
several im portant gains, but the struggle
of our people m ust continue to (i3) Dang lao dong Viet Nam, Loi keu goi cua Ban chap
consolidate those victories and achieve hanh Trvng uong Dang lao dong Viet Nam va Chinh phu
(Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Su that, 1973), 10,12,14; Nhan
dan, 28 January 1973; Bo ngoai giao nuoc Viet Nam
Dan chu Cong hoa, Hiep dinh ve cham dut chien tranh
(32) “Giai doan moi cua cach mang la nhiem vu cua cong lap lai hoa binh o Viet Nam (Ha Noi: Vu thuong tin bao
doan" in Dang cong san Viet Nam, Van kien ve cong tac chi), 5.
van dong cong nhan, Tap III (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Lao (34) The text of the 1973 Paris Agreement \3 reproduced
dong, 1982), 316. in Asselin, B itter Peace, 203-14.

□VNU, Journal o f Science, Soc., Sci., Human., N^E, 2006

38 Pierre Asselin

The P aris A greem ent th u s ratified a people and Congress would tolerate no
number of objectives the m ilitary and new involvement and the White House,
political struggles had won, including paralyzed by the W atergate affair, could
the end of th e A m erican presence in risk no new prisoners of war, the
South V ietnam , th e cessation of Politburo ordered an all-out effort to
offensive activities ag ain st th e North, conquer the South.(35) By some estim ates,
and the term ination of A m erican support th a t would take two years to accomplish
for the Saigon regime. A dditionally, the because revolutionary forces would have
absence of stipulations in th e agreem ent to move carefully. One reason for the
on the statu s of N orth V ietnam ese forces Politburo's need to act was th at after the
in the South excluded those forces from signing of the Paris Agreement, the
the jurisdiction of th e agreem ent. USSR had ended and the PRC had
Consequently, if W ashington ever substantially reduced aid to the
considered retaliatin g ag ain st th e DRVN DRVN.(36) Moscow and Beijing had thus
because it believed the activities of sacrificed the immediate needs of the
DRVN forces in the South violated the V ietnam ese Revolution for a new
agreem ent, it would have no basis in rapport with the us.
international law for doing so. Hanoi
As it turned out, however, success
had finessed this issue of w ithdraw ing
came swiftly. Resupplied with weapons,
its “regular” forces from th e South; th a t
munitions, arm ored vehicles, and other
too represented a m ajor victory for the
m ateriel seized from fleeing South
VWP.
Vietnam ese forces who lost the will to
In M arch 1973, th e us w ithdrew its fight, North Vietnamese units overran
last m ilitary forces from V ietnam and northern and central South Vietnam
Hanoi completed the release of American w ithin three months. Capitalizing on the
prisoners. The P aris A greem ent resulting elan and on strategic errors by
produced little else th a t w as positive or the Saigon regime - including the
conducive to peace in V ietnam . In light prem ature w ithdraw al of RVN forces
of the refusal of the Saigon regim e to from the C entral Highlands - Hanoi
hold elections for a new governm ent and assaulted Saigon and the rest of the
the continuing hostilities below the South in mid-April 1975. Facing defeat,
seventeenth parallel, th e C entral South Vietnam ese president Nguyen
Committee of the VWP concluded a t its
tw enty-first plenary session in Ju ly 1973
th a t peaceful reunification was
impossible under cu rren t circum stances. (35) Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang, Nghi quyet Hoi
nghi Ian thu 21 Ban Chap hanh Trung uong Dang,
It therefore authorized resum ption of Hanoi People’s Army Museum Document Collection,
political and m ilitary activity in the Hanoi, Vietnam.
(36) Daniel s. Papp, The View from Moscow, Peking,
South, confident th e us would not Washington (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland & Company,
respond. C ertain now th a t th e American 1981), 189; Qiarig Zhai, China and the Vietnam Wars,
136.

VNU, Journal of Science, Soc., Sci., Human., N^E, 2006

 The 1954 Geneva Agreement on Vietnam. 39

Van Thieu resigned and fled the country. determ ined not on th e battlefield, but at
On 30 April, Saigon was liberated.(37) the negotiating table. There, conditions
This victory of revolutionary forces were created and the stage w as set for
was predictable after the signing of the the conclusion of th e war. The Paris
Paris Agreement. Those forces had held A greem ent changed the balance of forces
the initiative for much of the war, and in the South as it precipitated the
only the effectiveness of American completion of A m erican w ithdraw al
firepower had contained them. while perm itting DRVN troops to rem ain
Remarkable, however, was the rapidity in place in th e South. The fall of Saigon,
of Saigon’s collapse. When the Paris th u s occurred in th e propitious context
Agreement was signed, the DRVN was created by th e P a ris A greem ent.
exhausted economically and militarily,
and revolutionary forces in the South In both w ars of resistance, the VWP
were experiencing acute shortages of leadership expected to defeat its enemies
food and am m unition, among other using m ilitary activity as the prim ary
difficulties. One factor th a t accounts for mode of struggle. French and then
the quick turnaround was the cessation A m ericans forces, however, proved more
of the bombing. Peace in the North resilient th a n expected. U nable to
allowed Hanoi to bolster its economy and neutralize th e efforts of those forces by
rest and strengthen its arm ed forces. m ilitarily m eans, VWP leaders turned to
Moreover, Saigon’s evident reluctance to diplomacy to salvage th eir gains in both
honor the Paris A greem ent and allow w ars and achieve revolutionary
the w ar to abate antagonized South objectives. The substance of th e Geneva
Vietnam ese liberals and moderates, as and P aris agreem ents reflected the
well as B uddhists and Catholics, thus inability of th e m ilitary and political
underm ining support for the regime.(38) struggles to drive France and the u s out
The rapid erosion of popular support in of V ietnam , b u t enabled the VWP to
late 1974 and early 1975 left the RVN
build onto the fruits of those struggles.
with few assets to counter revolutionary
The trium ph of th e Revolution in 1975
forces.
owed as m uch or m ore to the diplomatic
As had been the case in the w ar victories a t G eneva and P aris than to
against the French, the outcome of the anything else. Diplomacy th u s proved to
war ag ain st th e u s and its allies was be the linchpin of both th e anti-French
and anti-A m erican resistance
(37) On North Vietnamese military planning for the
conquest of South Vietnam see Bo Quoc phong - Vien m ovem ents, an d the determ inant
lich su quan su Viet Nam, Lích su nghe thuat chien dich elem ent in th e victory of th e V ietnam ese
Viet Nam trong 30 nam chien tranh chong Phap, chong
My, 1954-1975 (Ha Noi: Nha xuat ban Quan doi nhan Revolution.
dan, 1995), 467-540.
{38) Chen Min, “Myth and Reality of Triangulations: A
Study of American Withdrawal from Vietnam" in Asian
Profile, Vol. 18, no. 6 (1990), 529.

nVNU, Journal o f Science, Soc., Sci., Human., NJE, 2006