In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of

Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953;

In Re ALBINO CUNANAN, ET AL.,

94 Phil 534 March 18, 1954

Facts:
The case revolves around republic act No. 972,
known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953,” which aimed to lower
the passing marks for bar examinations from 1946 to 1953. Under
the Rules of Court, a candidate needed a general average of 75%
in all subjects, without falling below 50% in any subject, to pass
the bar exam. However, between 1946 to 1949, the Supreme
Court allowed candidates with averages as low as 69% to 74% to
pass, citing varying difficulties in the examinations and grading
strictness.
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice
law as those reconsidered and passed by this Court, and feeling
conscious of having been discriminated against unsuccessful
candidates who fell slightly below the required averages sought
legislative intervention. In 1951, Congress passed Senate Bill No.
12, which reduced the passing average to 70% retroactively from
1946. However, the President vetoed the bill after the Supreme
Court expressed concerns. Congress passed the Senate Bill No.
371, which became Republic Act No. 972 in 1953, lowering the
passing averages for specific years of 70% for 1946-1951 and
71% for 1952. After the law’s enactment, numerous unsuccessful
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar, invoking its
provisions, while others whose motions for the revision of their
examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid
law as an additional ground for admission. The Supreme Court
reviewed these petitions and set a hearing to determine the
constitutionality of the law.

Issue:
Whether or not R.A. No. 972 is constitutional and
valid.
Ruling:

No. The Court held that Republic Act No. 972 is

unconstitutional and therefore, void, and without any force nor
effect for the following reasons, to wit:

1. This is a manifest encroachment on the constitutional

responsibility of the Supreme Court.

2. Because it is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of

this Court on the petitions of these 810 candidates, without
having examined their respective examination papers, and
although it is admitted that this Tribunal may reconsider said
resolution at any time for justifiable reasons, only this Court and
no other may revise and alter them. In attempting to do it directly
Republic Act No. 972 violated the Constitution.

3. By the disputed law, Congress has exceeded its legislative

power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules on admission to
the Bar. It is therefore the primary and inherent prerogative of the
Supreme Court to render the ultimate decision on who may be
admitted and may continue in the practice of law according to
existing rules.

4. It is undoubtedly a class legislation.

5. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 972 is not embraced in the title of

the law, contrary to what the Constitution enjoins, and being
inseparable from the provisions of article 1, the entire law is void.

In the judicial system from which ours has been

evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession
and their supervision have been disputably a judicial function and
responsibility. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of
permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to
fix the minimum conditions for the license.
 IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR
EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN
R. MELENDREZ,

B. M. No. 1154 June 8, 2004

Facts:

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez

filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to
disqualify Haron S. Meling, a bar examinee from taking the 2002
Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate
disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.
Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to
take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending
criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC),
Cotabato City, namely: Two Grave Oral Defamations and Less
Serious Physical Injuries. Furthermore, Melendrez attached in his
petition an indorsement letter showing that Meling has been using
the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the
Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member
of the Bar.

On December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with

the OBC explaining that he did not disclose the criminal cases
filed against him by Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy
Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the
case would be settled and considered the three cases as "closed
and terminated." Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds
that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
However, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him,
typed by the office clerk.

On December 8, 2003, the OBC’s report and

recommendation required that Meling should disclosed the
charges against him for the Court to ascertain his good moral
character. The merit of the cases against Meling is not material
but his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty. The
non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him
makes him also answerable under Rule 7.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall be
answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar."
 As regards Meling’s use of the title "Attorney", the
OBC quoted that as held by the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the
unauthorized use of the appellation "attorney" may render a
person liable for indirect contempt of court. Consequently, the
OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the
Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he
passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the imposition of appropriate

sanctions upon Haron Meling is proper and shall subsequently
barred him from taking his Lawyer’s Oath and signing on the Roll
of Attorneys.

Ruling:

Yes. The Petition is granted insofar as it seeks the

imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Meling as member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until
further orders from the Court, the suspension to take effect
immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S.
Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the

Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but
who are also known to possess good moral character. The
requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued
possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the

Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases
are pending against the applicant would aid the Court in
determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness
demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases,
the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are
ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or
affect the good moral character of the applicant.
 ROLLY PENTECOSTES vs. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO
MARASIGAN, Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court,
Regional Trial Court, Kabacan, North Cotabato

A.M. No. P-07-2337 August 3, 2007

Facts:

Complainant Rolly Pentecostes filed an

administrative complaint against respondent Atty. Hermenegildo
Marasigan, Clerk of Court VI of the RTC of Kabacan, North
Cotabato, for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public
officer. The complaint arose from the loss of a Kawasaaki
motorcycle, which was the subject of a criminal case for
carnapping. The motorcycle was recovered by the PNP of M’lang,
North Cotabato, and turned over to the respondent on August 1,
1995, for safekeeping.

On November 15, 2000, the trial court issued an

order for the release of the motorcycle to Pentecostes. However,
when Pentecostes demanded its release, respondent repeatedly
told him to wait and come back, delaying the release from 2001
until the filing of the complaint in 2004. Respondent claimed that
after receiving the motorcycle, he instructed a utility worker, Alex
Pedroso, to inspect it and then transferred it to the Kabacan
police station for safekeeping. He alleged that complainant
refused to accept the motorcycle in 2000, claiming it was
“cannibalized” and unserviceable. In 2004, upon discovering the
motorcycle was missing from the Kabacan police station,
respondent prepared a letter-complaint to investigate the loss,
but complainant refused to sign it.

In his rebuttal, Pentecostes denied knowledge of

the turnover to the Kabacan police and maintained that the
motorcycle was in good condition when delivered to respondent.
He accused respondent of evading responsibility by blaming the
Kabacan police and pointed out that there was no record of the
turnover in the police blotter. The case was referred to Executive
Judge Francisco G. Rabang,Jr., who recommended the dismissal of
the complaint, finding that the motorcycle was transferred to
Kabacan police and that it was cannibalized under respondent’s
custody. The Office of the Court Administrator concurred with the
recommendation but noted that respondent failed to secure prior
authority from the court to transfer the motorcycle and that the
vehicle had missing parts when delivered to him.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Marasigan is guilty of

misconduct.

Ruling:

Yes. The finding of the OCA insofar as respondent’s

lack of authority to transfer the motorcycle is well taken, on
account of which respondent is administratively liable for simple
misconduct. It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all
records, papers, files, exhibits and public property committed to
his charge. Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For
Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of
the 2002 Revised Manual for Clerks of Court) provides:

All exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court

and before the case/s involving such evidence shall have
been terminated shall be under the custody and safekeeping
of the Clerk of Court.

Similarly, Section 7 of Rule 136 of the Rules of Court, provides:

SEC. 7. Safekeeping of property. — The clerk shall safely

keep all record, papers, files, exhibits and public property
committed to his charge, including the library of the court,
and the seals and furniture belonging to his office.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of

court of the RTC, Kabacan, respondent was charged with the
custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and to keep
it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that
would justify its safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior
authority of the trial court.

This Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of

court are essential and ranking officers of our judicial system who
perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice. Their duties include the efficient
recording, filing and management of court records and, as
previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public
property committed to their charge.
 FATHER RANHILIO C. AQUINO, et al. vs. ATTY. EDWIN
PASCUA

A.C. No. 5095 November 28, 2007

Facts:

Father Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified

two documents:

(1) An "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Joseph B. Acorda,

notarized as "Doc. No. 1213, Page No. 243, Book III, Series of
1998, dated December 10, 1998".

(2) An "Affidavit-Complaint" of one Remigio B. Domingo

notarized as "Doc. No. 1214, Page 243, Book III, Series of
1998, dated December 10, 1998.

Atty. Angel Beltran, Clerk of Court, Regional Trial

Court, Tuguegarao, certified that these entries did not appear in
Atty. Pascua’s Notarial Register. The last entry was Document No.
1200 executed on December 28, 1998. Atty. Pascua admitted
notarizing the documents on December 10, 1998, but claimed the
failure to record them in his Notarial Register was due to the
oversight of his secretary, Lyn Elsie C. Patli.

The complainants filed a motion to join the

complaint and reply to the respondent’s comment, alleging that
the omission was not due to inadvertence but was a clear case of
falsification. The case was referred to the Office of the Bar
Confidant for investigation, report, and recommendation. Atty.
Pascua failed to enter the notarized documents into his Notarized
Register, which is a violation of the Notarial Law. The claim of
inadvertence was not credible, as the documents were assigned
fictitious numbers (1213 and 1214) that did not align with the
chronological order of his register. The affidavit of Atty. Pascua’s
secretary was deemed unreliable as she not a disinterested
witness.

Issue:

Whether or not the Atty. Pascua is guilty of

misconduct in the performance of his duties.

Ruling:

Yes. After a close review of the records of the case,

the Court resolve to adopt the findings of facts and conclusion of
law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. Atty. Pascua guilty of
misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register
in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B.
Acorda and Remigio B. Domingo.

"Misconduct" generally means wrongful, improper or

unlawful conduct motivated by a premeditated, obstinate or
intentional purpose. The term, however, does not necessarily
imply corruption or criminal intent.

The penalty to be imposed for such act of

misconduct committed by a lawyer is addressed to the sound
discretion of the Court. In Arrieta v. Llosa, wherein Atty. Joel A.
Llosa notarized a Deed of Absolute Sale knowing that some of the
vendors were already dead, this Court held that such wrongful act
"constitutes misconduct" and thus imposed upon him the penalty
of suspension from the practice of law for six months, this being
his first administrative offense. Also, in Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,
the Court revoked the notarial commission of Atty. Mario G.
Ramos and suspended him from the practice of law for six
months for violating the Notarial Law in not registering in his
notarial book the Deed of Absolute Sale he notarized. In Mondejar
v. Rubia, however, a lesser penalty of one month suspension from
the practice of law was imposed on Atty. Vivian G. Rubia for
making a false declaration in the document she notarized.

In the present case, considering that this is Atty.

Pascua's first offense, the Court believe that the imposition of a
three-month suspension from the practice of law upon him is in
order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of
notarial commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is

declared GUILTY of misconduct and is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely. His notarial commission, if still existing, is
ordered REVOKED.
 RODOLFO M. BERNARDO vs. ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA

Adm. Case No. 2984 August 31, 2007

Facts:

On January 23, 1987, Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr.

accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia, of the following
administrative offenses:

1) misappropriating and converting to his personal use:

a) part of the sum of ₱27,710.00 entrusted to him for payment of

real estate taxes on property belonging to Bernardo, situated in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde I; and

b) part of another sum of ₱40,000.00 entrusted to him for

payment of taxes and expenses in connection with the
registration of title of Bernardo to another property in a
subdivision known as Valle Verde V.

2) falsification of certain documents, to wit:

a) a special power of attorney dated March 16, 1985, purportedly

executed in his favor by Bernardo.

b) a deed of sale dated October 22, 1982

c) a deed of assignment purportedly executed by the spouses

Tomas and Remedios Pastor, in Bernardo’s favor.

3) issuing a check, knowing that he was without funds in the

bank, in payment of a loan obtained from Bernardo in the amount
of ₱50,000.00, and thereafter, replacing said check with others
known also to be insufficiently funded.

On July 29, 1992, the Supreme Court En Banc

disbarred Mejia, finding him guilty of all charges. On June 1, 1999,
Mejia filed a petition for reinstatement, which was denied on July
6, 1999. On January 23, 2007, Mejia filed the present petition for
review and reinstatement, citing remorse, rehabilitation, and the
passage of 15 years since his disbarment. After his disbarment,
Mejia published the “Mejia’s Law Journal” containing his religious
and social writings. He organized a religious organization called
“El Cristo Movement and Crusade on Miracle of Heart and Mind.”

Issue:

Whether or not Mejia shall be reinstated in the

practice of law after 15 years of disbarment.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court is inclined to grant the present

petition. Fifteen years has passed since Mejia was punished with
the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not
lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close
its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While
the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he
has endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure
in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court takes
cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in
1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he
has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from
this experience, and his punishment has lasted long enough.
Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its
erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all,
penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to
correct offenders.

The Court, however, remind petitioner that the

practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence
to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition

for reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is
hereby GRANTED.
 JOSELANO GUEVARRA vs. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA

A.C. No. 7136 August 1, 2007

Facts:

Complainant Joselano Guevarra filed a disbarment

complaint against respondent Jose Emmanuel M. Eala for “grossly
immoral conduct and violation of the lawyer’s oath.” Guevarra
first met respondent in January 2000 when his then-fiancee, Irene
Moje, introduced respondent as her friend, who was married to
Marianne Tantoco and had three children. After marrying Irene on
October 7, 2000, Guevarra noticed that from January to March
2001, Irene received frequent calls and messages from
respondent, including expressions of love. Irene often stayed out
late or did not return home, claiming she was at her parents’
house or busy with work.

In February or March 2001, Guevarra saw Irene and

respondent together on two occasions. After the second
confrontation, Irene abandoned their conjugal home. On April 22,
2001, Guevarra found Irene and respondent celebrating her
birthday with her family, which led to further humiliation and the
removal of her belongings from their home. Guevarra also found a
handwritten love letter from respondent to Irene, dated October
7, 2000, the day of their wedding, expressing undying love.
Subsequently, Guevarra discovered that respondent’s car and
Irene’s car were often parked at a residence in New Manila, where
Irene was living. Later, it was revealed that Irene gave birth to a
child, Samantha Louise Moje, on February 14, 2002, with
respondent named as the father on the birth certificate.
 In Respondent’s defense, he admitted sending the
love letter but denied flaunting an adulterous relationship,
claiming it was “low profile” and known only their families. He
also denied knowledge of the birth certificate but did not
categorically deny being the father of the child.

With regard to the disbarment complaint case

against Atty. Eala, the Investigation Commissioner recommended
his disbarment for immoral conduct but the IBP, however, ruled to
dismiss the complaint for lack of merit. Hence, the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 12 (c), Rule
139 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Eala should be disbarred for

grossly immoral conduct and violation of the Lawyer’s oath.

Ruling:

Yes. The respondent should be disbarred from the

practice of law as it involves a relationship between a married
lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. While it has been
held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant
administrative sanction for such illicit behavior, it is not so with
respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity . Even if not all
forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful
and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of
marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01
of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03
of Canon 7 of the same Code which proscribes a lawyer from
engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law."

Wherefore, the petition is GRANTED. Respondent,

Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
 DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN L. RANA

B. M. No. 1036 June 10, 2003

Facts:

Respondent Edwin L. Rana passed the 2000 Bar

Examinations. Complainant Donna Marie Aguiree filed a Petition
for Denial of Admission to the Bar against Rana on May 21, 2001,
one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
examinees.

Complainant alleged that Rana appeared as counsel

for a vice mayoralty candidate, George Bunan, before the
Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon,
Masbate, prior to taking the lawyer’s oath. Complainant claimed
Rana acted as counsel for Bunan without proper authorization and
filed a pleading titled “Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the
Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-
Mayor” on May 19, 2001, signing as “counsel for George Bunan.”
Subsequently, complainant alleged that Rana, as a secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate, was prohibited by
law from acting as counsel for a client in any court or
administrative body.

Respondent admitted assisting Bunan but claimed

he did so “not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law.”
He resigned as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan on May 11,
2001, which was accepted on the same day. Rana argued that the
complaint was politically motivated, as complainant is the
daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing mayoral candidate in
Mandaon, Masbate.

The Court allowed Rana to take the lawyer’s oath on

May 22, 2001 but prohibited him from signing the Roll of
Attorneys pending resolution of the charges. Then complainant
presented additional evidence that respondent also appeared as
counsel for mayoral candidate Emily Estipona-Hao on May 19,
2001, signing as her counsel in a petition for proclamation. The
OBC found that Rana engaged in unauthorized practice of law by
appearing as counsel before the MBEC prior to taking the lawyer’s
oath. The OBC recommended denying Rana’s admission to the
Philippine Bar due to his misconduct.

Issues:

(1). Whether or not the respondent was engaged in

the unauthorized practice of law.

(2). Whether or not respondent does not deserve

admission to the Philippine Bar.

Rulings:

(1). Yes. Respondent engaged in the practice of law

without being a member of the Philippine Bar. In Philippine
Lawyers Association v. Agrava, the Court elucidated that:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.

In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that "practice

of law" means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and
experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which
requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of

law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and
filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly
supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent
called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar.

(2). Yes. Having held himself out as "counsel"

knowing that he had no authority to practice law, respondent has
shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. The
regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict.
In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations
but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He
was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his
admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules
of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of
law is liable for indirect contempt of court.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar

Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the
signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only
qualification to become an attorney-at-law. Respondent should
know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had
to be performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by
this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to

the Philippine Bar.

PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,

BENJAMIN M. DACANAY

B.M. No. 1678 December 17, 2007

Facts:

Petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay was admitted to

the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until December
1998, when he migrated to Canada to seek medical attention for
his ailments. To avail of Canada’s free medical aid program,
Dacanay applied for Canadian citizenship, which was approved in
May 2004. On July 14, 2006, petitioner reacquired his Philippine
citizenship under R.A.9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition act of 2003). He took his oath of allegiance as a
Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto,
Canada.

After returning to the Philippines, petitioner sought

to resume his law practice. A question arose as to whether he lost
his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his
Philippine citizenship in May 2004. The Office of the Bar Confidant
opined that petitioner met all qualification for bar membership
after reacquiring Philippine citizenship. It recommended allowing
him to resume law practice, conditioned on retaking the lawyer’s
oath.

Issue:

Whether or not Dacanay may resume his practice of

law after re-acquiring his Philippine citizenship.

Ruling:

Yes. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice

the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his
Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with
the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such
practice." Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires
Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law
practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do
so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the
annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of
professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of
mandatory continuing legal education; this is especially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of
Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d)
the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of
his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the
Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines.

Compliance with these conditions will restore his

good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. ATTY. STANLEY CABRERA

ADM. CASE NO. 5737 October 25, 2004

Facts:

Complainant Ferdinand A. Cruz was a fourth-year

law student, representing himself in multiple legal cases while
respondent Atty. Stanley Cabrera was counsel for the opposing
party in one of Cruz’s cases. During a court hearing on January
14, 2002, before the RTC Br.112, Pasay City, presided by Judge
Caridad Cuerdo, the following exchange occurred:

1. Atty. Cabrera questioned Cruz’s appearance, asking the court if

Cruz was a lawyer.

2. The court responded that since Cabrera had requested the

judge’s inhibition, the judge could not rule on Cruz’s appearance.
3. Cabrera then stated: “Because your honor, he (referring to
Cruz) is misrepresenting himself to be a lawyer!”

4. Cruz replied, “Your Honor, I am not a lawyer.”

5. Cabrera, in a raised voice, said: “Appear ka ng appear, pumasa

ka muna!” (keep appearing, pass the bar first!”)

Complainant alleged that Cabrera’s statements were

uncalled for malicious, and intended to humiliate and discredit
him before the public. He argued that Cabrera knew Cruz was not
a lawyer, as Cruz had previously appeared before the court as a
party litigant. Subsequently, Cruz alleged that Cabrera’s actions
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. In respondent’s
defense, he contended that his statements were made to correct
the court’s mistaken impression that Cruz was a lawyer. He
argued that his remarks were made out of indignation due to
Cruz’s misrepresentation. Respondent also cited legal principles,
such as the absolute privilege of statements made during juridical
proceedings, and points out that Cruz had been denied the right
to represent himself in another case.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Cabrera’s statement is a

violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Ruling:

No. The Court held that respondent’s outburst of

"appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna" does not amount to a
violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Based on the facts of this case, such outburst came about when
respondent pointed out to the trial court that complainant is not a
lawyer to correct the judge’s impression of complainant’s
appearance, inasmuch as the judge, in her Order of January 14,
2002, noted that complainant is a lawyer. Such single outburst,
though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant
respondent’s suspension or reproof. It is but a product of
impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not
be held to too strict an account for words said in the heat of the
moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way
is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.

However, Cruz is not precluded in appearing for

herself for she was not customarily or habitually holding herself
out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding
payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
 RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS
OATH

B.M. No. 712 March 19, 1997

Facts:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argonsino passed the 1993

bar examinations. However, the Court deferred hi oath-taking due
to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Homicide. The conviction stemmed from the death of Raul
Camaligan, a neophyte, during fraternity initiation rites in
September 1991. Petitioner and seven others initially pleaded not
guilty to homicide charges but later withdrew their pleas and
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of Reckless imprudence
resulting in Homicide. On February 11, 1993, the trail court
sentenced each accused to imprisonment ranging from two years,
four months, and one day to four years.
 On June 18, 1993, the trial court granted
petitioner’s application for probation. On April 11, 1994, the trial
court approved the Probation Office’s report recommending
petitioner’s discharge from probation. Then on April 14, 1994,
petitioner filed a petition before the Supreme court to be allowed
to take the lawyer’s oath, citing his discharge from probation. On
July 13, 1995, the Court required petitioner to submit evidence of
good moral character. Petitioner submitted 15
certifications/letters from two senators, five trial court judges, and
six members of religious orders attesting to his good moral
character. He also presented evidence of a scholarship foundation
established in honor of Raul Camaligan, created through the joint
efforts of the victim’s family and eight accused.

Atty. Gilbert Camaligan, the victim’s father,

submitted a comment on December 4, 1995, stating that he
believed the offense was murder, not homicide, due to deliberate
infliction of severe physical injuries. He consented to the plea of
guilt to a lesser offense out of pity for the accused’s families. As a
Christian, he forgave the accused but still felt the pain of his son’s
death. He left the determination of petitioner’s moral fitness to
the Court.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner should be allowed to take

the lawyer’s oath citing his discharge from probation.

Ruling:

Yes. The Court resolved to allow petitioner Al

Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of
Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court

recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber.
On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a
devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public
service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted

all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial
notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious
and uncalculating.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will

continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to
render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members
of society.