P O L I C Y B R I E F #24

Why INSTC is More Important than

Ever for India
AUGUST 2024

Authors:

NISHA TANEJA
SANJANA JOSHI
SANYA DUA
ALINA SIDDIQUI
 Table of Contents

Abstract ............................................................................................................................ i

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 1

2. Red Sea Attacks and Shipping Disruptions ................................................................... 1

3. INSTC: An Alternative Route........................................................................................ 3

4. India’s Export Potential in INSTC Member Countries.................................................... 6

5. Full Operationalisation of INSTC: Way Forward ......................................................... 10

References ..................................................................................................................... 11

Appendix........................................................................................................................ 13

List of Tables
Table 1: India’s Current Exports and Export Potential with INSTC Members ................................... 8
Table 2: Sector-wise share of India’s total exports in 2022 and export potential to INSTC countries
(%)........................................................................................................................................ 9

List of Figures
Figure 1: Number of Commercial Ships Attacked in the Red Sea ...................................................... 2
Figure 2: Number of cargo ships transiting via the Suez Canal & the Cape of Good Hope................ 2
Figure 3: INSTC route & traditional route through the Suez Canal .................................................... 3
Figure 4: India’s Potential to Export to INSTC Member Countries ..................................................... 6
Figure 5: India’s Exports to INSTC Member Countries (2022) and India’s Export Potential (Values in
US$Mn) ................................................................................................................................ 7
 Abstract

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) has emerged as a crucial alternative
route for global trade in the context of recent geopolitical disruptions. With shipping lines
through the Red Sea facing rising risk of attacks related to the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict
and the Suez Canal being prone to blockages, the INSTC offers a more efficient and cost-
effective alternative for transporting goods between India, Russia, and the Central Asian
countries. This policy brief examines India’s export potential to the INSTC member countries,
emphasizing the untapped export opportunities that could be instrumental in achieving
India’s ambitious target of reaching US$ 2 trillion in exports by 2030. The policy brief also
highlights the challenges in fully operationalizing the corridor, including the need for
improved inter-modal transfers, enhanced banking and insurance services, and stronger
hinterland connectivity. Addressing these challenges and leveraging the INSTC’s potential
could significantly expand India’s trade in the region.

Acknowledgement: We are grateful to Mr. Shankar Shinde, Immediate Past Chairman,

Federation of Freight Forwarders' Associations in India (FFFAI) and Dr. Pramod Sant, Former
Vice President -Head of Import Export and Customs, Siemens Ltd, for providing useful inputs
and comments.

_________
Keywords: INSTC, export potential, shipping disruptions, alternative route

JEL classification: F1, F5, F13, F17

Author’s email: ntaneja@icrier.res.in; sjoshi@icrier.res.in; sanyadua16@gmail.com;

alina.siddiqui1811@gmail.com

_________
Disclaimer: Opinions and recommendations in the policy brief are exclusively of the author(s) and not
of any other individual or institution including ICRIER. This policy brief has been prepared in good faith
on the basis of information available at the date of publication. All interactions and transactions with
sponsors and their representatives have been transparent and conducted in an open, honest and
independent manner as enshrined in ICRIER Memorandum of Association. ICRIER does not accept any
corporate funding that comes with a mandated research area which is not in line with ICRIER’s research
agenda. The corporate funding of an ICRIER activity does not, in any way, imply ICRIER’s endorsement
of the views of the sponsoring organization or its products or policies. ICRIER does not conduct research
that is focused on any specific product or service provided by the corporate sponsor.

i
 Why INSTC is More Important than Ever for India

Nisha Taneja, Sanjana Joshi, Sanya Dua and Alina Siddiqui

1. Introduction

The International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), is a multi-modal transportation

network that was initiated by an Inter-Governmental Agreement by India, Russia, and Iran on
12th September 2000, to enhance trade and transport connectivity among the countries
along its route. The corridor connects the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf to the Caspian
Sea via Iran, and then Russia to Northern Europe via connects St. Petersburg. The INSTC
membership was expanded subsequently and now has 13 members, namely- India, Iran,
Russia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, Belarus,
Oman and Syria. Bulgaria has joined as an ‘Observer State’.

This regional connectivity initiative has been under discussion for a long time; however,
progress was slow due to geopolitics and implementation has been intermittent. The INSTC
is once again in focus due to geopolitics – primarily the US led sanctions on Russia in the
context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine and the shipping attacks in the Red Sea amidst the
ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict. Earlier in 2021, one of the largest container ships, the "Ever
Given", became lodged in the Suez Canal for six days, causing disruptions and heavy losses in
maritime trade. The blockage left over 300 vessels waiting resulting in huge transaction costs
for shipping companies.

These incidents have created an urgency for looking at alternative routes. India therefore has
renewed interest in the INSTC and sees two distinct advantages in operationalising this route:

First, it offers an alternative to the Suez Canal route and;

Second, it provides India an opportunity to exploit the untapped export potential that exists
in the INSTC member countries, especially the Central Asian countries.

We examine here the nature of the Red Sea crisis, the advantage of INSTC as an alternative
transportation route, and estimate the export potential that India has with the INSTC member
countries. We also identify the challenges that India is likely to face and suggest how these
can be addressed.

2. Red Sea Attacks and Shipping Disruptions

The Red Sea wedged between Africa and the Middle East is one of the world’s most important
waterways. The Red Sea is defined by two narrow waterways: to the north, the Suez Canal;
and to the south, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. In 2023, 22 percent of global seaborne container
trade is estimated to have transited through the Suez Canal.1 However, since November 2023,

1
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2024)

1
the Houthi rebel group in Yemen has targeted commercial vessels with connections to Israel
passing through the strait of Bab al-Mandab, a 20-mile-wide channel that separates north-
east Africa from Yemen.

Since November 2023, there have been a total of 105 attacks on commercial ships crossing
the Red Sea. The number of attacks in June 2024 was 21, highest since the Israel-Hamas
conflict began in October 2023.

Figure 1: Number of Commercial Ships Attacked in the Red Sea

Cumulative Number of Commercial Ships Attacked

120 25
21
100
20
17
80
13 13 15
12
60 10
9
10
40 7

3 5
20
3 20 33 46 58 68 75 96 105
0 0
Nov-23 Dec-23 Jan-24 Feb-24 Mar-24 Apr-24 May-24 Jun-24 Jul-24

Source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)

By the end of March 2024, the volume of trade through the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb
Strait had decreased by 50 percent since December 2023, while traffic on the alternative
route via the Cape of Good Hope had increased by 100 percent.2

Figure 2: Number of cargo ships transiting via the Suez Canal & the Cape of Good Hope

2500
Cargo transit (in numbers)

2000 Cape of Good Hope

1797
1500 1447
1000 1033

500 606

0 Suez Canal

Suez Canal Cape of Good Hope

Source: portwatch.imf.org

2
Bogetic, Zhao, Le Borgne, and Krambeck (2024)

2
However, the routing of ships via the Cape of Good Hope has meant substantial increase in
the transportation costs. Several insurance companies have also majorly increased the
premiums for the ships sailing in the Red Sea.

3. INSTC: An Alternative Route

From India’s perspective, the INSTC presents a viable alternative to the conventional routes
to the Eurasian region. The transport of goods between India, the Russian Federation, and CIS
countries mostly takes place via the sea route passing through the Suez Canal to access either
port Novorossiysk in the Black Sea basin or the Baltic Sea port of St. Petersburg.3 In the case
of several central Asian countries the goods usually take the sea route to China and then move
inland.4 In comparison, the INSTC is shorter and cost-effective. Studies suggest that while the
Suez Canal route takes 45-60 days the INSTC is 40 per cent shorter and 30 per cent cheaper.5

Figure 3: INSTC route & traditional route through the Suez Canal

Source: Indicative plotting by authors using Datawrapper

3
Shinde, S. (2021). Dry run study on Chabahar agreement with TIR intermodal. Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, & Federation of Freight Forwarders Association in India. Available at
https://www.fffai.org
4
Ibid
5
Ibid

3
Several steps have been taken by Members to operationalise the INSTC route but challenges
remain. India became a member of the TIR Convention (Convention on International
Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets) in 2018, which facilitates seamless
transportation of cargo across multiple international boundaries under a single document.
The TIR system is one of the most successful international transport conventions and is the
easiest, safest, and most reliable way to move goods across multiple international borders. In
fact, India became a signatory to the Convention in 2017 much after the other countries so
that it could align with all the other countries in the INSTC.6

While the TIR convention membership lays down a sound foundation for seamless
transportation, efficient inter-modal transfer is important for the success of multi-modal
cargo transport systems like the INSTC. A key challenge in multimodal transport is the
coordination and management of the supply chain. Issues can arise when transferring cargo
between different transportation modes, such as road, rail, and maritime routes within the
INSTC framework. Any delays or inefficiencies in these transfers can result in higher costs,
increased logistical complexities, and potential disruptions to supply chains.

The Chabahar Port in Iran is a key node that connects all Members of the INSTC and is perhaps
more important than the Bandar Abbas Port (the original Iranian Port that was part of the
INSTC) as it serves as a key access point to the eastern and western flanks of the corridor.
Chabahar is also closer to India than Bandar Abbas Port and can provide more direct and cost-
effective access to Central Asian countries via Afghanistan. Although Afghanistan is not part
of the INSTC, it has acceded to the TIR convention. In a more recent development, in May
2024, India and Iran signed a 10-year agreement for the management and development of
the Chabahar Port in south-eastern Iran towards the advancement of the INSTC.

On the eastern flank the proposed Chabahar-Zahedan railway line connecting Chabahar Port
to Zahedan in south-eastern Iran near the Iran-Afghanistan border is a vital link that will
facilitate transport connectivity from Chabahar Port to Afghanistan and the INSTC countries
beyond. Although an MoU was signed between Indian Railway Construction International
Limited (IRCON) and Iran’s Railways’ Construction and Development of Transportation
Infrastructures Company (CDTIC) in 2016, the 700-km Chabahar-Zahedan railway line has not
made much progress.

On the western flank, the Rasht–Astara railway connecting Rasht in Iran with Astara in
Azerbaijan is expected to reduce the cargo travel time between St Petersburg and Mumbai to
around 10 days, compared to the current 30 to 45 days via the sea route. The construction of
the 162 km railway line was agreed upon by Iran, Azerbaijan, and Russia in 2005 to seamlessly
link the existing railway networks of the three countries. However, the project has been
stalled for years due to financial and engineering issues as well as tensions between
Azerbaijan and Iran. Last year in May Russia agreed to fund this railway line as part of the

6
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (n.d.)

4
INSTC with an investment of 1.6 billion euros. It was envisaged that the line would be
completed in 48 months.7 However, according to media reports, the contract for the
implementation of the agreement is yet to be finalized.8

The importance of Chabahar Port has grown further as it enjoys a waiver from international
sanctions that have been imposed on several economic sectors in Iran. It is in the interest of
all members to include Chabahar Port as part of the INSTC. In fact, India’s proposal to include
Chabahar Port within the framework of INSTC was included in the India-Central Asia Summit
Joint Declaration in January 2022.9 The Central Asian countries also welcomed India’s
proposal to establish a Joint Working Group on Chabahar Port to “address issues of free
movement of goods and services between India and Central Asian countries”.10 India again
reiterated the importance of including the Chabahar Port within the framework of the INSTC
in March 2023, at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Summit.

Another major development is the agreement between Russian Railways (RZD) and Container
Corporation of India (CONCOR), aimed at jointly developing multi-modal logistics services
integrating rail and sea routes along the INSTC. Recently, in June 2024, Russia sent two trains
loaded with coal to India via the INSTC, marking a significant milestone in operationalizing the
agreement.

Even though Chabahar port is waived from international sanctions, a complex banking issue
has emerged as these sanctions on Iran do not permit it to transact through the SWIFT
electronic banking network. This affects the logistic service providers who cannot settle their
payments as foreign banks are often unwilling to handle the service payments. As a result,
the majority of INSTC payment transactions are routed via UAE due to remittance
challenges.11

Further, as the sanctions include a ban on the provision of insurance to the State of Iran and
Iranian owned companies, the international insurance service providers do not participate in
the INSTC sector. At times, some are willing to provide insurance up to the port but do not
cover on-carriage/haulage in transit cargo.

7
“Iran, Russia ink agreement for construction of Rasht-Astara railway”, May 17, 2023.
https://president.ir/en/143976
8
Tehran Times. (April 16, 2024). Iran, Russia finalizing agreement for constructing Rasht-Astara railway.
https://www.tehrantimes.com/news/497208/Iran-Russia-finalizing-agreement-for-constructing-Rasht-
Astara
9
Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. (January 27, 2022). Delhi Declaration of the 1st India-
Central Asia Summit. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-
documents.htm?dtl/34773/Delhi_Declaration_of_the_1st_IndiaCentral_Asia_Summit
10
Ibid.
11
Shinde, S. (2021). Dry run study on Chabahar agreement with TIR intermodal. Ministry of External Affairs,
Government of India, & Federation of Freight Forwarders Association in India. Available at
https://www.fffai.org

5
4. India’s Export Potential in INSTC Member Countries

India’s Foreign Trade Policy (FTP) 2023 aims to boost India's exports to US$ 2 trillion by 2030.
In this context, to calculate India's export potential to INSTC member countries, we have
identified products where India is competitive in exporting to the World and INSTC countries
also import these from the world – implying that there is export capacity available in India
and a demand for that product in INSTC countries.12 To further identify exportable products
in which India is globally competitive, we follow the methodology proposed by Bela Balassa
(1965) and select those items in which India has a Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA)
greater than unity.13 Untapped trade potential for any commodity is given by Min (SE, MI) -
ET where SE, MI, and ET are the supplier’s global exports, receiver’s global imports, and
existing trade between the supplier and the receiver, respectively.

India’s exports to INSTC member countries totalled US$ 20 billion in 2022. We estimate the
export potential to be US$ 180 billion which is nine times higher than the current exports. Our
analysis reveals that the top five countries with high export potential are Turkey, Russia,
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Oman.
Figure 4: India’s Potential to Export to INSTC Member Countries

Source: WITS (Indicative plotting by authors using Datawrapper)

12
The formula for calculating India’s export potential to INSTC member country is: Trade Potential= Minimum
of (value of India’s trade with the World, value of INSTC country’s trade with the World) – (Bilateral Trade
between India and INSTC country). The formula is applied to each INSTC country separately. Applying the
above to calculate India’s export potential to INSTC country at a disaggregated product level (HS 6-digit):
Export Potential= Minimum of (India X, i, W, INSTC country M, i, W) – (India X, i, INSTC); where, India X, i, W
= value of India’s exports of product ‘i’ to the World; INSTC country, M, i, W = value of INSTC country’s
imports of product ‘i’ from the World; India X, i, INSTC = value of India’s exports of product ‘i’ to INSTC
country; X = Exports; M=Imports
13
RCA is computed using the following formula: RCAij = (Xij / XI) / (Xwj / XW) where, Xij represents country i’s
export of commodity j, Xwj represents world exports of commodity j, XI represents the total exports of
country I, and XW represents total world exports.

6
India's current exports to Turkey stand at US$ 10 billion, and the potential export value is
estimated at US$ 68.6 billion, indicating a huge untapped potential. Russia also presents a
substantial opportunity, with current exports of US $2.9 billion and a potential of US$ 50
billion.14 Similarly, in 2022, India's exports to Kazakhstan amounted to US$ 437 million, while
the estimated export potential is valued at US$ 12.5 billion. (Figure 5)

Figure 5: India’s Exports to INSTC Member Countries (2022) and India’s Export Potential
(Values in US$Mn)

India's Exports in 2022 India's Export Potential

100%

856

479
2808
68601

50048

18383

12502

9024

8799

5797

1763

1202
90%

80%

70%

60%

50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0%
51

109
202

86

48

51
43
4721
437
10014

1840
2927

Source: WITS

At the sectoral level, the top 5 products with the highest export potential are mineral
products, chemical products, machinery and electrical equipment, base metal products, and
textiles accounting for 73.6 percent of potential exports while current exports of these items
accounted for 70.2 percent of total exports in 2022. Thus, items with the highest export
potential are also the largest items being traded currently (Table 1).

14
For sectoral country-wise exports in 2022 see Appendix 1

7
Table 1: India’s Current Exports and Export Potential with INSTC Members
Total Sector-wise Share in Total Sector-wise
Share in India's
Exports to INSTC India's Total Potential to INSTC
Sector description Export
member countries in Exports in member countries
Potential (%)
2022 (in US$ Million) 2022 (%) (in US$ Million)
Mineral products 5893 28.7 39237 21.8
Chemical & allied products 3131 15.3 31343 17.4
Machinery and electrical equipment 2118 10.3 29593 16.4
Base metals products 2188 10.7 18923 10.5
Textiles 1068 5.2 13494 7.5
Transport equipment 1121 5.5 12261 6.8
Vegetable Products 2230 10.9 10546 5.9
Plastics, Rubber 483 2.4 7377 4.1
Prepared foodstuffs & beverages 719 3.5 4933 2.7
Articles of stone; glass and glassware 310 1.5 2149 1.2
Gems & Jewellery 360 1.8 1990 1.1
Pulp products, Paper 134 0.7 1937 1.1
Animal Products 303 1.5 1483 0.8
Skins & leather articles 44 0.2 1078 0.6
Optical, Measuring instruments 223 1.1 945 0.5
Others 201 1.0 2976 1.7
Grand Total 20527 100.0 180264 100.0
Source: WITS

However, at the sectoral level, the export potential varies across INSTC members. Mineral
products have a high export potential in several of the INSTC members which include -Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, Oman, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Kyrgyzstan. With other countries, India has a large
export potential in one or two items- chemical products to Russia and Belarus; base metals to
Turkey; machinery and electrical equipment to Russia and Kazakhstan; prepared foodstuffs &
beverages to Iran; and vegetable products to Syria and Tajikistan (Table 2).

The export potential can only be realized if market access issues are addressed, particularly those
related to product standards. For instance, India has raised concerns about non-tariff barriers
affecting its exports to Russia, especially in marine and pharmaceutical products. Indian exporters
face challenges with certification and listing requirements when exporting to Russia15.

Similarly, Turkey has the largest trade potential of US$ 68.6 billion but has stringent requirements
for food, feed, and pharmaceuticals. The Biosafety Law mandates 20-year traceability records for
animal feed products using biotechnology. In case of pharmaceuticals, Turkey's regulation
requires Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP) certification through inspections by Turkish
authorities. It has been reported that the backlog in inspections has extended the already lengthy
process of securing final approval for pharmaceutical products to be sold in Turkey. 16 Addressing
these barriers will be crucial for Indian exporters to be able to access these markets.

15
Nandi (2024)
16
Office of the United States Trade Representative. (2024)

8
Table 2: Sector-wise share of India’s total exports in 2022 and export potential to INSTC countries (%)

Sector-wise share of India's Total Export Potential to INSTC countries (%)

Sector description Turkey Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Oman Belarus Iran Armenia Azerbaijan Kyrgyz Syria Tajikistan
Mineral Products 24.7 4.1 49.6 9.2 81.5 1.1 2.3 21.3 40.6 75.6 17.6 9.1
Base metals 18.4 5.9 3.2 12.0 7.8 6.7 7.5
Machinery and electrical equipment 13.2 23.5 10.5 25.1 22.5 21.5 17.2
Chemicals 11.5 30.1 15.6 16.0 6.7 17.6 16.6 7.6 6.1 2.1 2.9 12.7
Transport equipment 8.5 7.1 1.8 5.1 13.5 11.3 1.9
Textiles 7.9 8.8 5.3 8.7 11.0 7.9 6.5
Vegetable Products 5.0 4.4 3.1 4.8 8.5 0.9 15.8 8.1 37.8 12.1 65.1 72.6
Plastics and rubber 3.3 5.0 4.3 6.0 9.3 3.0 2.8
Prepared foodstuffs and beverages 2.2 2.1 2.4 4.6 2.5 0.6 9.2 3.5 13.5 9.6 12.7 2.6
Gems and Jewellery 1.6 0.6 0.1 1.0 0.2 0.1 15.6
Articles of stone, etc 1.1 0.9 0.9 1.2 2.0 2.1 2.0
Skin and Leather articles 0.8 1.4 1.0 3.1 1.7 1.4 3.4
Pulp products, paper 0.4 1.3 0.3 0.7 0.4 0.0 0.4
Optical, measuring instruments 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.5 4.0 0.5 0.4
Animals and Animal Products 0.2 2.1 0.6 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.1 0.7 1.5 0.1 0.4 2.8
Others 0.8 2.3 1.2 1.8 0.1 7.2 1.5 1.1 0.4 0.5 1.2 0.2
Grand Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total Potential (US $ million) 68601 9024 50048 5797 12502 18383 856 1763 479 2808 1202 8799

Source: WITS

9
5. Full Operationalisation of INSTC: Way Forward

To make the INSTC fully operational the following steps are needed:

i. Banking and insurance facilities

In the context of the payments issue, a clear public notice from the US that goods only
transiting through Chabahar Port are exempt from sanctions would encourage foreign banks
to handle the trade and services payments. As international insurance companies are also
reluctant to participate in this corridor, the national insurance companies should participate
in providing these services without additional premiums and restriction clause limitation.

ii. Efficient inter-modal transfers

While the TIR Convention permits all INSTC members to trade seamlessly under a single
document, efficient systems would be needed to reap full benefits. Cargo handling and
procedures need to be made simple and automated so that time taken for movement of cargo
is minimised. With multiple stakeholders and transport modes involved, establishing effective
communication and synchronization of transport schedules is required.

iii. Strengthening hinterland connectivity

The missing transport links particularly the Rasht–Astara railway connecting Rasht in Iran with
Astara in Azerbaijan and the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line connecting Chabahar Port to
Zahedan in south-eastern Iran near the Iran-Afghanistan border are vital links that need to be
expedited. A framework needs to be prepared by INSTC Members to develop a financing
mechanism that would address the financing needs of the infrastructure projects that are
crucial to the success of the working of the INSTC.

iv. Realising export potential

There needs to be a greater awareness of trade opportunities amongst members of the INSTC.
Also, non-tariff barriers need to be identified and addressed on a continuous basis.
Information on product standards and other regulatory requirements needs to be shared
between countries so that market access issues can be addressed effectively.

10
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11
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trade of disruption of shipping routes in the Red Sea, Black Sea and Panama Canal
https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/osginf2024d2_en.pdf

United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. (n.d.). Transports Internationaux Routiers
(TIR). Retrieved August 7, 2024, from https://unece.org/transport/tir

12
 Appendix

Appendix 1

Table A.1: Sector-wise share of India’s total exports to INSTC countries in 2022 (%)

Sector description Turkey Russia Ukraine Kazakhstan Oman Belarus Iran Armenia Azerbaijan Kyrgyz Syria Tajikistan
Mineral Products 35.5 0.5 1.0 0.1 49.0 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0
Base metals 15.1 8.1 5.9 1.0 8.6 3.4 0.5 0.7 1.4 0.3 4.2 0.2
Chemicals 11.2 35.1 56.0 20.0 10.2 64.4 10.7 5.5 12.1 38.2 16.8 54.5
Machinery and electrical equipment 9.9 15.4 6.9 63.8 6.2 6.6 2.3 23.9 31.5 1.6 3.0 7.8
Textiles 7.9 2.5 1.3 0.2 3.0 3.3 1.4 13.9 0.8 42.1 4.9 0.6
Transport equipment 6.9 1.9 1.9 2.2 7.5 0.4 0.3 0.6 0.8 2.6 0.8 0.0
Gems and Jewellery 3.3 0.5 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 17.8 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Plastics and rubber 2.5 4.0 6.3 0.7 1.7 3.1 0.6 0.8 1.8 0.4 1.0 0.3
Prepared foodstuffs 2.4 6.7 5.1 0.5 1.3 1.2 5.6 18.0 25.8 3.6 52.4 30.7
Vegetable Products 1.6 11.5 6.6 4.9 6.2 2.4 74.8 3.5 6.5 3.9 14.9 1.9
Articles of stone, etc 1.0 2.7 1.4 2.0 1.9 0.5 0.6 3.6 12.5 1.6 0.1 1.7
Optical, cinematographic, etc.
1.0 2.3 2.6 3.2 0.5 3.4 0.6 1.9 2.1 1.4 0.4 1.2
instruments
Pulp products, paper 0.8 0.3 2.0 0.1 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.7
Leather articles 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.2 0.0 0.0
Animals and Animal Products 0.1 5.4 1.7 0.7 2.2 9.7 0.9 8.9 2.8 1.8 0.0 0.0
Others 0.7 2.2 1.2 0.4 0.8 1.4 1.0 0.1 1.0 1.1 1.4 0.3
India's total exports (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
India's total exports (US$ bn) 10014 4721 2927 1840 437 202 109 86 51 51 48 43

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Appendix 2

Table A.2.1: India’s top 10 Sector-wise Potential with INSTC Countries (Values in US$ Mn)

HS 6-digit Product Description Turkey Russia Iran Kazakhstan Ukraine Kyrgyzstan

271019 Petroleum oils; not light oils and preparations 14841 1344 78 738 7029 515
760110 Aluminium; unwrought, (not alloyed) 3063
870322 Vehicles; cylinder capacity over 1000 but not over 1500cc 2780 1303
100199 Cereals 2106 639 260 68
851712 Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks 1738 4398 832 675
760120 Aluminium; unwrought, alloys 1547
300490 Medicaments; for therapeutic or prophylactic uses 1477 7336 168 926 1067
520100 Cotton; not carded or combed 1204
870321 Vehicles; cylinder capacity not over 1000cc 969
720839 Iron or non-alloy steel; in coils 914
271012 Petroleum oils; light oils and preparations 1627 362
380893 Herbicides, anti-sprouting products and plant-growth regulators 195 472
380892 Fungicides; put up in forms or packings for retail sale 294
621143 Track suits;women's or girls', of man-made fibres 255
401120 Rubber; new pneumatic tyres, of a kind used on buses or lorries 622 178
270400 Coke and semi-coke 263 174
80390 Fruit, edible; bananas, other than plantains, fresh or dried 155 19
850231 Electric generating sets 221
270119 Coal; (other than anthracite and bituminous) 19
90111 Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated 543
841480 Pumps and compressors 124 200
80610 Fruit, edible; grapes, fresh 8
848340 Gears and gearing 165
870899 Vehicle parts and accessories; n.e.c. in heading no. 8708 851 400
90240 Tea, black; (fermented) and partly fermented tea 113
190531 Food preparations; sweet biscuits, whether or not containing cocoa 19
843149 Machinery; parts of machines handling earth 655
871120 Motorcycles (including mopeds) and cycles 104
20230 Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, frozen 517

14
 720711 Iron or non-alloy steel 208
170199 Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form 207 51
871410 Motorcycles (including mopeds); parts and accessories 85
110100 Wheat or meslin flour 14
281820 Aluminium oxide; other than artificial corundum 679
170114 Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form 370 27

*Highlighted numbers indicate the item with largest potential trade

Table A.2.2: India’s top 10 Sector-wise Potential with INSTC Countries (Values in US$ Mn)

HS 6-digit Product Description Oman Syria Azerbaijan Tajikistan Armenia Belarus

271012 Petroleum oils; light oils and preparations 6391 82 369 206
260112 Iron ores and concentrates 543
100199 Cereals 300 27 433 307 101
290919 Ethers 285
271119 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; liquefied 239 26
281820 Aluminium oxide; other than artificial corundum 153 53 52
100630 Cereals; rice, semi-milled or wholly milled 108 53 39 7
190531 Food preparations; sweet biscuits, whether or not containing cocoa 65 35 5
271312 Petroleum coke; calcined, obtained from bituminous minerals 57
170199 Sugars; sucrose, chemically pure, in solid form 50 52
271019 Petroleum oils; not light oils and preparations 32 324 35 368 73
760110 Aluminium; unwrought, (not alloyed) 62
870322 Vehicles; cylinder capacity over 1000 but not over 1500cc 309
851712 Telephones for cellular networks or for other wireless networks 303 97
760120 Aluminium; unwrought, alloys
300490 Medicaments; for therapeutic or prophylactic uses 123 322
80390 Fruit, edible; bananas, other than plantains, fresh or dried 37
90111 Coffee; not roasted or decaffeinated 33 39
600622 Fabrics; knitted or crocheted fabric 110
90240 Tea, black; (fermented) and partly fermented tea 62 4
701090 Glass; carboys, bottles, flasks, jars, pots 41
81090 Fruit, edible; fruits n.e.c. in heading no. 0801 to 0810, fresh 58

15
 70190 Vegetables; potatoes (other than seed), fresh or chilled 42
840890 Engines; other than marine propulsion or the vehicles of chapter 87 108
20230 Meat; of bovine animals, boneless cuts, frozen 13
270810 Pitch; obtained from coal tar or from other mineral tars 4
110100 Wheat or meslin flour 201 21
710231 Diamonds; non-industrial, unworked 142
170114 Sugars; cane sugar, raw, in solid form 175
710239 Diamonds; non-industrial 241
71320 Vegetables, leguminous 43
230610 Oil-cake and other solid residues 4
870323 Vehicles; cylinder capacity over 1500 but not over 3000cc 168
999999 Commodities not specified according to kind 159
600410 Fabrics; knitted or crocheted fabrics of a width exceeding 30 cm 101
870331 Vehicles; cylinder capacity not over 1500cc 100

*Highlighted numbers indicate the item with largest potential trade

16
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