CHAPTER VIII

The Protection of the President

I N THE 100 years since 1865 four Presidents of the United States
have been assassinated-Abraham
William McKinley,
Lincoln, James A. Garfield,
and *John F. Kennedy. During this same
period there were three other attacks on the life of a President, a
President-elect, and a candidate for the Presidency, which narrowly
failed: on Theodore Roosevelt while campaigning in October af
1912; on President-elect Franklin Delano Roosevelt, when visiting
Miami on February 15, 1933 ; and on President Harry S. Truman
on November 1,1950, when his temporary residence, Blair House, was
at.tacked by Puerto Rican Nationalists. One out of every five Presi-
dents since 1865 has been assassinated; there have been attempts on
the lives of one out of every three.
Prompted by these dismaying statistics, the Commission has in-
quired into the problems and methods of Presidential protection in
effect at the t,ime of President Kennedys assassination. This study
has led the Commission to conclude that the public interest might be
served by any contribution it can make to the improvement of pro-
tective arrangements. The Commission has not. undertaken a com-
prehensive examination of all facets of this subject; rather, it has
devoted its time and resources to those broader aspects of Presidential
protection to which the events of last November called attention.
In this part of its inquiry the Commission has had full access to
a major study of all phases of protective activities prepared by the
Secret Service for the Secretary of the Treasury following the as-
sassination. As a result of this study, the Secretary of the Treasury
has prepared a planning document dated August 27, 1964, which
recommends additional personnel and facilities to enable the Secret
Service to expand ,its protection capabilities. The Secretary of the
Treasury submitted this planning document on August 31, 1964, to
the Bureau of the Budget for review and approval. This planning
document has been made a part of the Commissions published rec-
ord ; the underlying staff and consultants reports reviewed by the
Commission have not, since a disclosure of such detailed information
relating to protective measures might undermine present methods of
protecting the President. However, all information considered by
425
the Commission which pertains to the protective function as it was
carried out, in Dallas has been published as part of this report.
The protection of the President of the United States is an im-
mensely difficult and complex task. It, is unlikely that measures can
be devised to eliminate entirely the multitude of diverse dangers that.
may arise, particularly when the President is traveling in this COUII-
try or abroad. The protective task is further complicated by the
reluctance of Presidents to take security precautions which might
interfere with the performance of their duties, or their desire to hare
frequent and easy access to the people. The adequacy of existing
procedures can fairly be assessed only after full consideration of the
difficulty of the protective assignment, with particular attention to
the diverse roles which the President is expected to fill. After re-
viewing this aspect of the matter this chapter will set forth the
Commissions conclusions regarding certain protective measures in
force at the time of the Dallas trip and propose recommendations
for improvements.

THE NATURE OF THE PROTECTIVEASSIGNMENT

The President is Head of State, Chief Executive, Commander in
Chief, and leader of a political party. As the ceremonial head of the
Government the President, must discharge a wide range of public
duties, not only in Washington but> throughout the land. In this role
he appears to the American people, in the words of William Howard
Taft, as the personal embodiment and representative of their dignity
and majesty. 2 As Chief Execut.ive, the President controls the
exercise of the vast., almost incalculable powers of the executive branch
of the Federal Government. As Commander in Chief of the Armed
Forces, he must maintain ultimate authority over the development and
disposition of our military power. Finally, in accordance with George
Washingtons maxim t.hat, Americans have a government of accom-
modation as well as a government of laws, 3 it is the Presidents right
and duty to be the active leader of his party, as when he seeks to be
reelected or to maintain his party in power.
In all of these roles the President must go to the people. Exposure
of the President to public view through travel among the people of
this country is a great and historic tradition of American life. Desired
by both the President, and the public, it is an indispensable means of
communication between the two. More often than not, Presidential
journeys have served more than one purpose at the same time: cere-
monial, administrative, political.
From George Washington to John F. Kennedy, such journeys have
been a normal part of the Presidents activities. To promote nation-
wide acceptance of his administration Washington made grand tours
that served also to excite interest in the Presidency.4 In recent. years,
Presidential journeys have been frequent and extensive, partly be-
426
cause of the greater speed and comfort of travel and partly because
of the greater demands made on the President. It is now poss?ble for
Presidents to travel the length and breadth of a land far larger
than the United States in 1789 in less time than it took George Wash-
ington to travel from New York to Mount Vernon or Thomas Jefferson
from Washington to Monticello. During his Presidency, Franklin D.
Roosevelt made almost 400 journeys and traveled more than 350,000
miles.6 Since 1945, Roosevelts successors have ranged the world, and
their foreign journeys have come to Ibe accepted as normal rather than
extraordinary.
John F. Kennedys journey to Texas in November 1963 was in this
tradition. His friend and Special Assistant Kenneth ODonnell, who
accompanied him on his last visit to Dallas, stated the Presidents
views of his responsibilities with simplicity and clarity:

The Presidents views of his responsibilities as President of the

United States were that he meet the people, that he go out to their
homes and see them, and allow them to see him, and discuss, if
possible, the views of the world as he sees it, the problems of the
country as he sees them. And he felt that leaving Washington
for the President of the United States was a most necessary-not
only for the people, but for the President himself, that he expose
himself to the actual basic problems that were disturbing the
American people. It helped him in his job here, he was able
to come back here with a fresh view of many things. I think he
felt very strongly that the President ought to get out of Wash-
ington, and go meet the people on a regular basis.6

Whatever their purpose, Presidential journeys have greatly en-

larged and complicated the task of protecting the President. The
Secret Service and the Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies which cooperate with it, have been confronted in recent years
with increasingly difficult problems, created by the greater exposure
of the President during his travels and the greater diversity of the
audiences he must face in a world torn by conflicting ideologies.
If the sole goal were to protect the life of the President, it could be
accomplished with reasonable assurance despite the multiple roles
he must play. But his very position as representative of the people
prevents him from effectively shielding himself from the people. He
cannot and will not take the precautions of a dictator or a sovereign.
Under our system, measures must be sought to afford security without
impeding the Presidents performance of his many functions. The
protection of the President must be thorough but inconspicuous to
avoid even the suggestion of a garrison state. The rights of private
individuals must not be infringed. If the protective job is well done,
it,s performance will be evident only in the unexceptional fact of its
success. The men in charge of protecting the President, confronted
by complex problems and limited as they are in the measures they may
employ, must depend upon the utmost cooperation and understanding
from the public and the President.
The problem and the reasonable approach to its solution were ably
stated in a memorandum prepared by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover
for the President soon after the assassination :

The degree of security that can be afforded the President of the

United States is dependent to a considerable extent upon the
degree of cont.act with the general public desired by the Presi-
dent. Absolute security is neither practical nor possible. An
approach to complete security would require the President to
operate in a sort of vacuum, isolated from the general public and
behind impregnable barriers. His travel would be in secret; his
public appearances would be behind bulletproof glass.
A more practical approach necessitates compromise. Any
travel, any contact with the general public, involves a calculated
risk on the part of the President and the men responsible for his
protection. Such risks can be lessened when the President recog-
nizes the security problem, has confidence in the dedicated Secret
Service men who are ready to lay down their liv& for him and
accepts the necessary security precautions which they recommend.
Many Presidents have been understandably impatient with the
security precautions which many years of experience dictate
because these precautions reduce the Presidents privacy and the
access to him of the people of the country. Nevertheless the pro-
cedures and advice should be accepted if the President wishes to
have any security.

EVALUATION OF PRESIDENTIALPROTECTIONAT THE

TIME OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENTKENNEDY
The history of Presidential protection shows growing recognition
over the years that the job must be done by able, dedicated, thor-
oughly professional personnel, using the best technical equipment
that can be devised.8 The assassination of President Kennedy de-
mands an examination of the protective measures employed to safe-
gua.rd him and an inquiry whether improvements can be made which
will reduce the risk of another such tragedy. This section considers
first the means used to locate potential sources of danger to the Presi-
dent in time to take appropriate precautions. In this connection the
information available to Federal agencies about Lee Harvey Oswald
is set out and the reasons why this information was not furnished
to the Secret Service appraised. Second, the adequacy of other ad-
vance preparations for the security of the President during his visit
to Dallas, largely measures taken by the Secret Service, is considered.
Finally, the performance of those charged with the immediate re-
sponsibility of protecting the President on November 22 is reviewed.
428
Intelligence Functions ReIating to Presidential Protection at the
Time of the Dallas Trip
A basic element of Presidential protection is the identification and
elimination of possible sources of clanger to the President before the
danger becomes actual. The Secret Service has attempted to perform
this function through the activities of its Protective Research Sec-
tion and requests to other agencies, Federal and local, for useful in-
formation. The Commission has concluded that a,t the time of the
assassination the arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service
t,o perform this function were seriously deficient.
Adepuocy of preventive intelligence operations of the Skcret Serv-
ice.-The main job of the Protective Research Section (PRS) is to
collect, process, and evaluate information about persons or groups
who may be a danger to the President. In addition to this function,
PRS is responsible for such tasks as obtaining clearance of some cate-
gories of White House employees and all tradesmen who service the
White House, the security processing of gifts sent to the President,
and technical inspections against covert listening devices.8 At the
time of the assassination PRS was a. very small group, comprised of
12 specialists and 3 clerks.
Many persons call themselves to the attention of PRS by attempting
t,o visit, t,he President, for bizarre reasons or by writing or in some
other way attempting to communicate with him in a threatening or
abusive manner or with undue persistence. Robert I. Bouck, special
agent in charge of PRS, estimated that most of the material received
by his office originated in this fashion or from the occasional investi-
gations initiated by the Secret Service, while the balance was fur-
nished to PRS by other Feclernl agencies, with primary source
being the FBI. The total volume of information received by PRS
has risen steadily. In 1943 PRS received approximately 9,000 items
of information; in 1953 this had increased to more than 17,000 items;
in 1963 the total exceeded 32,000 items.* Since many items may per-
tain to a single case, these figures do not show the caseload. In the
period from November 1961 to November 1963, PRS received items
in 8,709 cases.1s
Before the assassination of President Kennedy, PRS expressed
its interest in receiving information on suspects in very general terms.
For example, PRS instructed the White House mailroom, a source
of much PRS data, to refer all communications on identified existing
cases and, in addition, any communication that in any way indicates
anyone may hare possible intention of harming the President.
Slightly more specific criteria were established for PRS personnel
processing White House mail referred by the White House mailroom,
but again the standards were very genera1.15 These instructions to
PRS personnel appear to be the only instance where an effort was
made to reduce the criteria to writing.16 When requested to provide
a specific statement of the standards employed by PRS in deciding
what information to seek and retain, the Secret Service responded:
429
 The criteria in effect prior to November 22,1963, for determin-
ing whether to accept material for the PRS general files were
broad and flexible. All material is and was desired, accepted,
and filed if it, indicnt,ed or tended to indicate that the safety
of the President, is or might be in danger, either at the present
or in the future. * * * There are many actions, situations, and
incidents that may indicate such potential danger. Some are
specific, such as threats ; danger may be implied from others, such
as membership or activity in an orgflnization which believes in
assassination as a political weapon. All material received by
PRS was separately screened and a determination made as to
whether the information might indicate possible harm to the
President. If the material was evaluated as indicating some
potential danger to the President-no matter how small-it was
indexed in the general PRS files under the name of the individual
or group of individuals to whom that material re1ated.l

The general files of PRS consist of folders on individuals, card in-

dexed by name. The files are manually maintained, without use of
any automatic data-processing techniques.* At the time of the assas-
sination, the active PRS general files contained approximately 50,000
cases accumulated over a 20-year period,O some of which included
more than one individual. A case file WE estiablished if the informa-
tion available suggested that the subject might be a danger to the Presi-
dent. Many of these caseswere not investigated by PRS. The case file
served merely as a repository for information until enough had accu-
mulated to warrant an investigntion.20 During the period November
1961 to November 1963, PRS investigated 34 newly established or
reactivated cases concerning residents of Texas.*l Most of these cases
involved persons who used threatenin g language in communications
to or about the President. An additional 115 cases concerning Texas
residents were est.ablished but not investigated.**
When PRS learns of an individual whose conduct, Tarrants scrutiny,
it requests an investigation by the closest Secret, Service field office,2s
of which there are 65 throughout the country. If the field office
determines that the case should be subject to continuing review, PRS
establishes a file which requires a checkup at least every 6 months.**
This might involve a personal interview or interviews with members
of the persons household.25 Wherever possible, the Secret Service
arranges for the family and friends of the individual, and local law
enforcement officials, to advise the field office if the subject displays
signs of increased danger or plans to leave his hpme area. At the
time of the assassination there were approximately 400 persons
throughout the country who were subject to periodic review.26
If PRS concludes after investigation that an individual presents
a significant danger to the life of the President, his name is placed in
a trip index file which is maintained on a geographical field office
basis.2r At the time of the assassination the names of about 100
persons were in this index, all of whom were included in the group of
430
400 being reviewed regularly.28 PRS also maintains an album of
photographs and descriptions of about. 12 to 15 individuals who are
regarded as clear risks to the President and who do not have a fixed
place of residence.w Members of the White House detail of the
Secret Service have copies of this album.30
Individuals who are regarded as dangerous to the President and
who are in penal or hospital custody are listed only in the general
files of PRS, but there is a system for the immediate notification of
the Secret Service by the confming institution when a subject is
released or escapes.31 PRS attempts to eliminate serious risks by
hospitalization or, where necessary, the prosecution of persons who
have committ,ed an offense such as threatening the President.= In
June 1964 PRS had arrangements to be notified about the release or
escape of approximately 1,000 persons.S3
In summary, at the time of the assassination PRS had received,
over a 20-year period, basic information on some 50,000 cases; it had
arrangements to be notified about release from confinement in roughly
1,000 cases; it had established periodic regular review of the status
of 400 individuals; it regarded approximately 100 of these 400 cases
as serious risks and 12 to 15 of these cases as highly dangerous risks.
Members of the White House detail were expected to familiarize them-
selves with the descriptions and photographs of the highest risk cases.
The cases subject to periodic review and the 100 or so cases in the
higher risk category were filed on a geographic basis, and could con-
veniently be reviewed by a Secret Service agent preparing for a Presi-
dential trip to a particular part of the country. These were the files
reviewed by PRS on November 8,1963, at the request of Special Agent
Lawson, advance agent for President Kennedys trip to Dallas.34 The
general files of PRS were not indexed by geographic location and were
of little use in prepa.ring for a Presidential visit to a specific locality.
Secret Service requests to other agencies for intelligence informa-
tion were no more specific than the broad and general instructions to
its own agents and the White House mailroom. The head of PRS
testified that the Secret Service requested other agencies to provide
any and all information that they may come in contact with that
would indicate danger to the President. 35 These requests were not
communicated in writing by the Secret Service; rather, the Service
depended on the personal liaison maintained by PRS with the head-
quarters of the Federal intelligence agencies, particularly the FBI,
and at the working level with personnel of the field offices of the
various agenciesss The Service frequently participated in the train-
ing programs of other law enforcement agencies, and agents from
other agencies attended the regular Secret Service training schools.
Presidential protection was an important topic in these training
programs.37
In the absence of more specific instructions, other Federal agencies
interpreted the Secret Services informal requests to relate principally
to overt threats to harm the President or other specific manifestations
of hostility. For example, at the time of the assassination, the FBI

431
Handbook, which is in the possession of every Bureau special agent,
provided :

Threats against, the President of the IT.S., members of his im-

mediate family, the Presidentelect, and. the Vice-President

Investigation of threats against the President of the United

States, members of his immediate family, the President-Elect, and
the Vice-President is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the U.S.
Secret Service. Any information indicating the possibility of an
attempt, against, the person or safety of the President, members
of the immediate family of the President, the President-Elect or
the Vice-President must be referred immediately by the most
expeditious means of communication to the nearest oflice of the
U.S. Secret Service. Advise the Bureau at the same time by
teletype of the information so furnished to the Secret Service
and the fact that it has been so disseminated. The above action
should be taken without delay in order to attempt to verify the
information and no evaluation of the information should be at-
t,empted. When the threat is in the form of a written communica-
tion, give a copy to local Secret Service and forward the original
to the Bureau where it will be made available to Secret Service
headquarters in Washington. The referral of the copy to local
Secret, Service should not delay the immediate referral of the
information by the fastest available means of communication to
Secret Service 10cally.~

The State Department advised the Secret Service of all crank and
threat letter mail or crank visitors and furnished reports concerning
any assassination or attempted assassination of a ruler or ot,her major
official anywhere in the world.3g The several milit.ary intelligence
agencies reported crank mail and similar threats involving the Presi-
dent.O According to Special Agent in Charge Bouck, the Secret
Service had no standard procedure for the systematic review of its
requests for and receipt of information from other Federal agencies.
The Commission believes that the facilities and procedures of the
Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November
22,1963, were inadequate. Its efforts appear to have been too largely
directed at t.he crank threat. Although the Service recognized
that its advance preventive measures must, encompass more than
these most obvious dangers, it. made little effort to identify factors in
the activities of an individual or an organized group, other than specific
t,hreats, which suggested a source of danger against which timely pre-
cautions could be taken. Except for its special t.rip index file of
400 names, none of the cases in the PRS general files was available for
systematic review on a geographic basis when the President planned a
particular trip.
As reported in chapter II, when the special file was reviewed on
November 8, it contained the names of no persons from the entire
Dallas-Fort Worth area, notwithstanding the fact that. Ambassador
Stevenson had been abused by pickets in Dallas less than a month
before. Rouck explained the failure to try to identify the individuals
involve,d in the Stevenson incident after it occurred on the ground
that. PRS required a more direct indication of a threat to the President,
and that there was no such indication until the Presidents scheduled
visit to that area. became kno~n.~~ Such an approach seriously under-
mines the precautionary nature of PRS work : if the presence in Dallas
of the Stevenson pickets might have created a danger for the President
on a visit to that city, PRS sl~oulcl have investigated and been pre-
pared to guard against it.
Other agencies occasionally provided information to the Secret, Serv-
ice concerning potentially clnngerous political groups. This SW~S
done in the case of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico, for
example, but only after members of the group had resorted to
political violence.43 However, the vague requests for information
which the Secret Service made to Federal intelligence and law en-
forcement. agencies were not well designed to elicit information from
them about persons other than those who vvere obvious threats to
the President. The requests shifted the responsibility for evaluat-
ing difficult cases from the Service, the agency most responsible
for performing that task, to the other agencies. No specific
guidance was provided. Althongl~ the CIA had on file requests from
t.he Treasury Department for information on the counterfeiting of
US. currency and certain smuggling nnrtters,44 it had no written
specification of intelligence information collected by CT.4 abroad which
was desired by the Secret Service in advance of Presidential trips out-
side the United States.
Information known about Lee Hnrvey Oswald prior to the as-
sassinntion.-No information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald ap-
peared in PRS files before the Presidents trip to Dallas. Oswald
was known to other Federal agencies with which the Secret Service
maintained intelligence liaison. The FBI had been interested in him,
to some degree at least? since the time of his defection in October 1950.
It had interviewed him twice shortly after his return to the Dnited
States, again a year later at his request and was investigating him at
the time of the assassination. The Commission has taken the testi-
mony of Bureau agents who intervielved Oswald after his return from
the Soviet Union and prior to November 22, 1963, the ageut who was
assigned his c.ase at. the time of the assassination, the Director of the
FBI, and the Assistant to the Director in charge of all investigative
activities under the Director and Associate Director.45 In addition,
the Director and Deputy Director for Plans of the CL4 testified con-
cerning that Agencys limited knowledge of Oswald before the assassi-
nation.46 Finally, the Commission has reviewed the complete files
on Oswalcl, as they existed at the time of the assassination, of the De-
partment of State, the Office of nnrnl Intelligence, the FRT, and the
CIA. The information known to the FBI is summarized below.
433
 From defection to return to Fort Wodh--The FBI opened a file
on Oswald in October l959,47 when news reports appeared of his defec-
tion to the Soviet Union.* The file was opened for the purpose of
correlating information inasmuch as he was considered a possible
security risk in the event he returned to this country. 40 Oswalds
defection was also the occasion for the opening of files by the De-
partment of State, CIA, and the Officio of Naval Intelligence. Until
April 1960, FBI activity consisted of placing in Oswalds file in-
form&ion regarding his relations with the U.S. Embassy in Moscow
a.nd background data relating largely to his prior military service,
provided by other agencies. In April 1960, Mrs. Marguerite Oswald
and Robert Oswald were interviewed in the course of a routine FBI
investigation of transfers of small sums of money from Mrs. Oswald to
her son in RussiaPO
During the next 2 years the FBI continued to accumulate infor-
ma.tion, and kept itself informed on Oswalds status by periodic re-
views of State Department, and Office of Naval Intelligence files. In
this way, it, learned t.hat. when Oswald had arrived in the Soviet
Union he had attempted to renounce his U.S. citizenship and applied
for Soviet, citizenship, had described himself as a Marxist, had sa.id
he would give the Soviet Union any useful information he had ac-
quired as a marine radar technician and had displayed an arrogant
and aggressive attitude at the U.S. Embassy; it learned also that.
Oswald had been discharged from the Marine Corps Reserve as un-
desirable in August 196K51 In June 1962, the Bureau ws advised
by the Department of State of Oswalds plan to return to the Tnited
States. The Bureau made arrangements to be advised by immigration
authorities of his return, and instructed the Dallas office to inter-
view him when he got back to determine whether he had been re-
cruited by a Soviet intelligence service.52 Oswald?s file at the Depart-
ment of State Passport Office ws reviewed in June 1962. It revealed
his letter of January 30, 1962, to Secretary of the Nary Connally, in
which he protested his discharge and declared that he would use all
means to correct it. The file reflected the Departments determina-
t.ion that Oswald had not expatriated llimself.53
From return to Fort Worth to move to New Orleans.-Oswald was
first interviewed by FBI Agents John W. Fain and B. Tom Carter
on June 26, 1962, in Fort 7Vortl~.54 Agent Fain reported to hend-
quarters that. Oswald was impatient and arrogant, and un\villing to
answer questions regarding his motive for going to the Soviet Union.
Oswald denied that he had ever denouncecl his U.S. citizenship, and
* * * that he had ever applied for Soviet, citizenship specifically. 55
Oswald was, however, willing to discuss his contacts with Soviet
authorities. He denied having any involvement with Soviet intelli-
gence agencies and promised to advise the FBl if he heard from tllem.s6
Agent. Fain n-as not satisfied by this interview and arranged to
see Oswald again on August 16, 1962. According to Fains con-
temporaneous memorandum and his present recollection, while Oswald
remained somewhat evasive at this interview, he was not antagonistic
434
and seemed generally to be settling down.50 (Marina Oswald, how-
ever, recalled that her husband was upset by this interview.)sB
Oswald again agreed to advise the FBI if he were approached under
suspic.ious circumstances; however, he deprecated the possibility of
this happening, particularly since his employment did not involve
any sensit,ive information.Fo Having concluded that Oswald was not
a security risk or potentially dangerous or violent, Fain determined
that nothing further remained to be done at t,hat time and recom-
mended that the case be placed in a closed sta.tus.G1 This is an
administrative classification indicating t,hat no further work has been
scheduled. It does not preclude the agent in charge of the case from
reopening it if he feels that further work should be done.62
From August 1962 until March 1963, the FBI continued to accumu-
late information regarding Oswald but engaged in no active investi-
gation. Agent Fain retired from the FBI in October 1962, and the
closed Oswald case was not reassigned.63 However, pursuant to a
regular Bureau practice of interviewing certain immigrants from Iron
Curtain countries, Fain had been assigned to see Marina Oswald at
an appropriate time.* This assignment was given to Agent James
P. Hosty, Jr. of the Dallas office upon Fains retirement. In March
1963, while attempting to locate Marina Oswald, Agent Hosty was
told by Mrs. M. F. Tobias, a former landlady of the Oswalds at 602
Elsbeth Street in Dallas, that other tenants had complained because
Oswald was drinking to excess and beating his wife.*5 This informa-
tion led Hosty to review Oswalds file, from which he learned that
Oswald had become a subscriber t.o the Worker, a Communist Party
publication. Hosty decided that the Lee Harvey Oswald case should
be reopened because of the alleged personal difficulties and the contact
with the Worker, and his recommendation was accepted.6s He de-
cided, however, not to interview Marina Oswald at that time, and
merely determined that the Oswalds were living at 214 Neely Street
in Dallas.67
On April 21, 1963, the FBI field office in New York was advised
t,hat Oswald was in contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in
New York, and that he had written to the committee stating that he
had dist.ributed its pamphlets on the streets of Dallas.68 This informa-
ion did not reach Agent. Hosty in Dallas until June.6g Hosty con-
sidered the information to be stale by that time, and did not attempt
to verify Oswalds reported statement.T0 Under a general Bureau re-
quest to be on the alert. for activities of the Fair Play for Cuba Com-
mittee, Hosty had inquired earlier and found no evidence that it was
functioning in the Dallas area.7l
In New Orlea/ns.--In t.he middle of May of 1963, Agent Hosty
checked Oswalds last known residence and found that he had moved.72
Oswald was tentatively located in New Orleans in June, and Hosty
asked the New Orleans FBI office to determine Oswalds address and
what he was doing. 73 The New Orleans office investigated and located
Oswald, learning his address and former place of emplopment on Au-
gust 5, 1963.4 A confidential informant a.dvised the FBI that Oswald
was not known to be engaged in Communist Party activities in New
Orleans.75
On June 24, Oswald applied in New Orleans for a passport, stating
that he planned to depart by ship for an extended tour of Western
European countries, the Soviet Union, Finland, and Poland. The
Passport Office of the Department of State in Washington had no
listing for Oswald requiring special treatment, and his application
was apptived on the following day.76 The FBI had not asked to be
informed of any effort by Oswald to obtain a passport, as it might
have under existing procedures, and did not know of his application.77
According to the Bureau,

We did not request the State Department to include Oswald

on a list which would have resulted in advising us of any appli-
cation for a passport inasmuch as the facts relating to Oswalds
activities at that time did not warrant such action. Our inves-
tigation of Oswald had disclosed no evidence that Oswald was
acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign govern-
ment or instrumentality thereof.ls

On August 9, 1963, Oswald was arrested and jailed by the New

Orleans Police Department for disturbing the peace, in connection
with a street fight which broke out when he was accosted by anti-
Castro Cubans while distributing leaflets on behalf of the Fair Play
for Cuba Committee. On the next day, he asked the New Orleans
police to arrange for him to be interviewed by the FBI. The police
called the local FBI office and an agent, John L. Quigley, was sent
to the police station. O Agent Quigley did not know of Oswalds prior
FBI record when he interviewed him, inasmuch ,as the police had not
given Oswalds name to the Bureau when they called the office.SO
Quigley recalled that Oswald was receptive when questioned about
his general background but less than completely truthful or coopera-
tive when interrogated about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.
Quigley testified :

When I began asking him specific details with respect to his

activities in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans
as to where meetings were held, who was involved, what occurred,
he was reticent to furnish information, reluctant and actually
as far as I was concerned, was completely evasive on them.**

In Quigleys judgment, Oswald was probably making a self-serving

statement in attempting to explain to me why he was distributing
this literature, and for no other reason, and when I got to questioning
him further then he felt that his purpose had been served and he
wouldnt say anything further. 82
During the interview Quigley obtained background information
from Oswald which was inconsistent with information already in the
Bureaus possession. When Quigley returned to his office, he learned

436
that another Bureau agent, Milton R. Kaack, had been conducting a
background investigation of Oswald at. the request of Agent Hosty
in Dallas. Quigley advised Knack of his interview and gave him a
detailed memoranclum.8 Knack n-as aware of the facts known to
the FBI and recognized Oswalds false statements.84 For example,
Oswald claimed that his wifes maiden name was Prossa and that they
had been married in Fort Worth and lived there until coming to
New Orleans. He had told the New Orleans arresting officers that
he had been born in Cuba.8s
Several days later, the Bureau received additional evidence that
Oswald had lied to Agent Quiglev. On August 22, it learned .that
Oswald had appeared on a radio discussion program on August 21.
William Stuckey, who had appeared on the radio program with
Oswald, told the Bureau on August 30 that Oswald had told him that
he had worked and been married in the Soviet Union.8s Neither these
discrepancies nor the fact that Oswald had initiated the FBI interview
was considered sufficiently unusual to necessitate another interview.8s
Alan H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, stated the Bu-
reaus rsasoning in this way :

Our interest in this man at this point was to determine whether

his activities constituted a threat to the internal security of the
country. It was apparent that he had made a self-serving state-
ment to Agent Quigley. It became a matter of record in our files
as a part of the case, and if we determined that the course ,of the
investigation required us to clarify or face him down with this
information, we would do it at the appropriate time.
In other words, he committed no violation of the law by telling
us something that wasnt true, and unless this required further
investigation at that time, we would handle it in due course, in
accord with the whole context of the investigation.e0

On August 21,1963, Bureau headquarters instructed the New Orleans

and Dallas field offices to conduct an additional investigation of Oswald
in view of the activities which had led to his arrest.O FBI inform-
ants in the New Orleans area, familiar with pro-Castro or Communist
Party activity there, advised the Bureau that Oswald was unknown in
such circles.B2
In Dn&zs.-In early September 1963 the FBI transferred the prin-
cipal responsibility for the Oswald case from the Dallas office to the
New Orleans office.03 Soon after, on October 1, 1963, the FBI was
advised by the rental agent for the Oswalds apartment in New Orleans
that. they had moved again. According to the information received
by the Bureau they had vacated their apartment, and Marina Oswald
had departed with their child in a station wagon with Texas registra-
tion.05 On October 3, Hosty reopened the case in Dallas to assist the
New Orleans office.6 He checked in Oswalds old neighborhood and
throughout the Dallas-Fort Worth area but was unable to locate
0swald.O

437
 The next word about Oswalds location was a communicat,ion from
the CIA to the FBI on October 10, advising that an individual tentn-
tively identified as Oswald had been in touch with the Soviet, Embassy
in Mexico City in early October of 1963.g* The Bureau had had no
earlier information suggesting that Oswald had left the United States.
The possible contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico intensified
the FBIs interest in learning Oswald% whereabouts.gQ The FBI
representative in Mexico City arranged to follow up this information
with the CIA and to verify Oswalds entry into Mexico.1oo The CIA
message was sent also to the Department of State where it was re-
viewed by personnel of the Passport Office, who knew from Oswalds
file that he had sought and obtained a passport on June 25, 1963.11
The Department of State did not advise either the CIA or the FBI
of these facts.lO*
On October 25, the New Orleans office of the FBI learned that
in September Oswald had given a forwarding address of 2515 West
Fifth Street, Irving, Tex.loa After receiving this information on
October 29, Agent Hosty attempted to locate Oswald. On the same
day Hosty interviewed neighbors on Fifth Street and learned that
the address was that of Mrs. Ruth Paine.O He conducted a limited
background investigation of the Paines, intending to interview Mrs.
Paine and ask her particularly about Oswalds wllereabouts.105
Having determined that Mrs. Paine was a responsible and reliable
citizen, Hosty int,erviewed her on November 1. The interview lasted
about 20-25 minutes.1oE In response to Hostys inquiries, Mrs. Paine

* * * readily admitted that Mrs. Marina Oswald and Lee

Oswalds two children were staying with her. She said that Lee
Oswald was living somewhere in Dallas. She didnt know where.
She said it, was in the Oak Cliff area but she didnt. have his
address.
I asked her if she knew where he woi-ked. After a moments
hesitation, she told me that he worked at the Texas School Book
Depository near the downtown area of Dallas. She didnt have
the exact. address, and it is my recollection that we went to the
phone book and looked it up, found it to be 411 Elm Street.*O

Mrs. Paine told Hosty also that Oswald was living alone in Dallas
because she did not want him staying at her house, although she was
willing to let Oswald visit his wife and children.lOs According to
Hosty, Mrs. Paine indicated that she thought she could find out where
Oswald was living and would let him know.loQ At this point in the
interview, Hosty gave Mrs. Paine his name and office telephone num-
ber on a piece of paper.O At the end of the interview, Marina
Oswald came into t,he room. When he observecl that she seemed
quite alarmed! about the visit, Hosty assured her, through Mrs.
Paine as interpreter, that the FBI would not harm or harass her.l
On November 4, Hosty telephoned the Texas School Book Deposi-
tory and learned that Oswald was working there and that he had given
438
as his address Mrs. Paines residence in Irving?12 Hosty took the
necessary steps to have the Dallas office of the FBI, rather than
the New Orleans office, reestablished as the office with principal re-
sponsibility.1*3 On November 5, Hosty was traveling near Mrs.
Paines home and took the occasion to stop by to ask whether she
had any further information. Mrs. Paine had nothing to add to what
she had already told him, except that during a visit that past weekend,
Oswald had said that he was a Trotskyite Communist, and that
she found this and similar statements illogical and somewhat amus-
ing.* On this occasion Hosty was at the Paine residence for only
a few minutes.1*6
During neither interview did Hosty learn Oswalds address or
telephone number in Dallas. Mrs. Paine testified that she learned
Oswalds telephone number at the Beckley Street roominghouse
in the middle of October shortly after Oswald rented the room on
October 14. As discussed in chapter VI, she failed to report this to
Agent Hosty because she thought the FBI was in possession of a great
deal of information and certainly would find it very easy to learn
where Oswald was living.
Hosty did not.hing further in connect,ion with the Oswald case until
after the assassination. On November 1,1963, he had received a copy
of the report of the New Orleans office which contained Agent Quig-
leys memorandum of the interview in the New Orleans jail on August
10, and realized immediately that Oswald had given false biographic
information.x16 Hosty knew that he would eventually have to investi-
gate this, and was quite interested in determining the nature of his
contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Xl9 When asked
what his next step would have been, Hosty replied :

Well, as I had previously stated, I have between 25 and 40 cases

assigned to me at any one t.ime. I had other matters to take care
of. I had now established that Lee Oswald was not employed in
a sensitive industry. I can now afford to wait until New Orleans
forwarded the necessary papers to me to show me I now had all
the information. It was then my plan to interview Marina
Oswald in detail concerning both herself and her husbands
background.
Q. Had you planned any steps beyond that point?
A. No. I would have to wait. until I had talked to Marina to
see what I could determine, and from there I could make my plans.
Q. Did you take any action on this case between November 5
and November 22 ?
A. No, sir.lm

The official Bureau files confirm Hostys statement that from No-
vember 5 until the assassination, no active investigation was con-
ducted.*l On November 18 the FBI learned that Oswald recently
had been in communication with the Soviet Embassy in Washington
and so advised the Dallas office in the ordinary course of business.

439
Hosty received this information on the afternoon of November 22,
1963.=
NwnreferraZ of Osumld to the Secret Service.-The Commission has
considered carefully the question whether the FBI, in view of all
the information concerning Oswald in its files, should have alerted
the Secret Service to Oswalds presence in Dallas prior to President
Kennedys visit.. The Secret Service and the FBI differ as to whether
Oswald fell within the category of threats against the President
which should be referred to the Service.
Robert I. Bouck, special agent in charge of the Protective Research
Section, testified that the informati,on available to the Federal Gov-
ernment about Oswald before the assassination would, if known to
PRS, ha.ve made Oswald a subject of concern to the Secret Service.2s
Bouck pointed to a number of characteristics besides Oswalds defec-
tion the cumulative effect of which would have been to alert the
Secret Service to potential danger :

I would think his continued association with the Russian Em-

bassy after his return, his association with the Castro groups would
have been of concern to us, a knowledge t.hat he had, I believe,
been courtmartialed for illegal possession of a gun, of a hand
gun in the Marines, that he had owned a weapon and did a good
deal of hunting or use of it, perhaps in Russia, plus a number of
items about his disposition and unreliability of character, I think
all of those, if we had had them altogether, would have added up
to pointing out. a pretty bad individual, and I think that, together,
had we known that he had a vantage point would have seemed
somewhat serious to us, even though I must admit that none of
these in themselves would be-would meet our specific criteria,
none of t,hem alone.
But it is when you begin adding them up to some degree that
you begin to get criteria that are meaningful.24

Mr. Bouck pointed out., however, t,hat he had no reason to believe that
any one Federal agency had access to all this information, including
the significant fact. that Oswald was employed in a building which
overlooked the mot.orcade route.125
Agent Hosty testified that he was fully aware of the pending Presi-
dential visit to Dallsas. He recalled that the special agent in charge
of the Dallas office of the FBI, J. Gordon Shanklin, had discussed the
Presidents visit on several occasions, including the regular biweekly
conference on the morning of November 22 :

Mr. Shanklin advised us, among other things, that in view of

the Presidents visit to Dallas, that if anyone had any indication
of any possibility of any acts of violence or any demonstrations
against, the President, or Vice President, to immediately notify
the Secret Service and confirm it in writing. He had made the

440
 same statement about a week prior at another special conference
which we had held. I dont recall the exact date. It was about
a week pri~r.*~

In fact, Hosty participated in transmitting to the Secret Service two

pieces of information pertaining to the visit.* Hosty testified that he
did not know rmtil the evening of Thursday, November 21, that there
was to be a motorcade, however, and never realized that the motorcade
would pass the Texas School Book Depository Building. He testified
that he did not read the newspaper story describing the motorcade
route in detail, since he was interested only in the fact that the motor-
cade was coming up Main Street, where maybe I could watch it if I
had a chance. 128
Even if he had recalled that Oswalds place of employment was on
the Presidents route, Hosty testified that he would not <have cited
him to the Secret Service as a potential threat to the President.2o
Hosty interpreted his instructions as requiring some indication that
the person planned to take some action against the safety of the Presi-
dent of the United States or the Vice President. Iso In his opinion,
none of the information in the FBI files--Oswalds defection, his Fair
Play for Cuba activities in New Orleans, his lies to Agent Quigley, his
recent visit to Mexico City-indicated that Oswald was capable of
violence.1s1 Hostys initial reaction on hearing that Oswald was a
suspect in the assassination, was shock, complete surprise, because
he had no reason to believe that Oswald was capable or potentially
an assassin of the President of the United States. ls2
Shortly after Oswald was apprehended and identified, Ho&ys
superior sent him to observe the interrogation of Oswald.lss Hosty
parked his car in the basement of police headquarters and there met
an acquaintance, Lt. Jack Revill of the Dallas police force. The
two men disagree about the conversation which took place between
them. They agree that Hosty told Revill that the FBI had known
about Oswald and, in particular, of his presence in Dallas and his
employment at the Texas School Book Depository Building.s4 Rev-
ill testified that Hosty said also that the FBI had information that
Oswald was capable of committing this assassination.195 Accord-
ing to Revill, Hosty indicated that he was going to tell this to Lieu-
tenant Wells of the homicide and robbery bureau.1s6 Revill promptly
made a memorandum of this conversation in which the quoted state-
ment appears.137 His secretary testified that she prepared such a
report for him that afternoon ls8 and Chief of Police Jesse E. Curry
and District Attorney Henry M. Wade both testified that they saw it
later that day.lss
Hosty has unequivocally denied, first by affidavit and then in his
testimony before the Commission, that he ever said that Oswald was
capable of violence, or that he had any information suggesting this.O
The only witness to the conversation was Dallas Police Detective V. J.
Brian, who was accompanying Revill. Brian did not hear Hosty
make any statement concerning Oswalds capacity to be an
441
assassin but he did not hear the entire conversation because
of the commotion at police headquarters and because he was not
within hearing distance at all times.141
Hostys interpretation of the prevailing FBI instructions on refer-
rals to the Secret Service was defended before the Commission by
his superiors. After summarizing the Bureaus investigative inter-
est in Oswald prior to the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover concluded
that There was not,hing up to the time of the assassination that gav.e
any indication that this man was a dangerous character who might clo
harm to the President or to the Vice President. 14* Director Hoover
emphasized that the first indication of Oswalds capacity for violence
was his attempt on General Walkers life, which did not become
known to the FBI until after the assassination.143 Both Director
Hoover and his assistant, Alan H. Belmont, stressed also the deci-
sion by the Department of State that Oswald should be permitted
to return to the United States.14* Neither believed that the Bureau
invest.igation of him up to November 22 revealed any information
which would have justified referral to the Secret Service. Accord-
ing to Belmont, when Oswald returned from the Soviet Union,

* * * he indicated that he had learned his lesson, was dis-

enchanted with Russia, and had a renewed concept-1 am para-
phrasing, a renewed concept-of the American free society.
We talked to him twice. He likewise indicated he was dis-
enchanted with Russia. We satisfied ourselves that we had met
our requirement, namely to find out whether he had been recruited
by Soviet intelligence. The,case was closed.
We again exhibited interest on the basis of these contacts with
The Worker, Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which are relatively
inconsequential.
His activities for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New
Orleans, we knew, were not of real consequence as he was not con-
nected with any organized activity there.
The interview with him in jail is not significant from the stand-
point of whether he had a propensity for violence.
Q. This is the Quipley interview you are talking about?
A. Yes; it was a self-serving interview.
The visits with the Soviet Embassy were evidently for the pur-
pose of securing a visa, ancl he had tolcl us during one of the in+!-
views that he would probably take his wife back to Soviet Russia
some time in the future. He had come back to Dallas. Hosty
had established that he had a job, he was working, and had told
Mrs. Paine that when he got the money he was going to take an
apartment when the baby was old enough, he was going to take
an apartment, and the family would live together.
He gave evidence of settling down. Nowhere during the course
of this investigation or the information that came to us from other
agencies was there any indication of a potential for violence on
his part.
442
 Consequent.ly, there was no basis for Hosty to go to Secret Serv-
ice and advise them of Oswalds presence. * * * 145

As reflected in this testimony, the officials of the FBI believed that

there was no data in its files which gave warning that Oswald was a
source of danger to President Kennedy. While he had expressed
hostility at times toward the State Department, the Marine Corps, ant7
the FBI as agents of the Government,146 so far as the FBI knew he
had not shown any potential for violence. Prior to November 22,
1963, no law enforcement agency had any information to connect
Oswald with the attempted shooting of General Walker. It was
against this background and consistent with the cr,iteria followed by
the FBI prior to November 22 that agents of the FBI in Dallas did not
consider Oswalds presence in the Texas School Book Depository
Building overlooking the motorcade route as a source of danger to the
President and did not inform the Secret Service of his employment
in the Depository Building.
The Commission believes, however, that the FBI took an unduly
restrictive view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence work,
prior to the assassination. The Commission appreciates the large
volume of cases handled by the FBI (636,371 investigative matters
during fiscal year 1963).14 There were no Secret Service criteria
which specifically required the referral of Oswalds case to the Secret
Service; nor was there any requirement to report the names of de-
fectors. However, there was much material in the hands of the FBI
about Oswald: the knowledge of his defection, his arrogance and
hostility to the United. States, his pro-Castro tendencies, his lies when
interrogated by the FBI, his trip to Mexico where he was in contact
with Soviet authorities; his presence in the School Book Depository job
and its location along the route of the motorcade. All this does seem
t.o amount to enough to have induced an alert agency, such as the FBI,
possessed of this information to list Oswald as a potential threat to
the safety of the President. This conclusion may be tinged with
hindsight, but it stated primarily to direct the thought of those re-
sponsible for the future safety of our Presidents to the need for a more
imaginative and less narrow interpretation of their responsibilities.
It is the conclusion of the Commission that, even in the absence
of Secret Service criteria which specifically required the referral of
such a case as Oswalds to the Secret Service, a more alert and care-
fully considered treatment of the Oswald case by the Bureau might
have brought about such a referral. Had such a review been under-
taken by the FBI, there might conceivably have been additional in-
vestigation of the Oswald case between November 5 and November
22. Agent Hosty testified that several matters brought to his at-
tention in late October and early November, including the visit to the
Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, required further attention. Under
proper procedures knowledge of the pending Presidential visit might
have prompted Hosty to have made more vigorous efforts to locate

443
Oswalds roominghouse address in Dallas and to interview him re-
garding these unresolved matters.
The formal FBI instructions to its agents outlining the informa-,
tion to be referred to the Secret Service were too narrow at the time
of the assassination. While the Secret Service bears the principal
responsibility for this failure, the FBI instructions did not reflect
fully the Secret Services need for information regarding poten-
tial threats. The handbook referred thus to the possibility of
an attempt against the person or safety of the President.* It is
clear from Hostys testimony that this was construed, at least by him,
as requiring evidence of a plan or conspiracy to injure the President.140
Efforts made by the Bureau since the assassination, on the other hand,
reflect keen awareneaq of the necessity of communicating a much wider
range of intelligence information to the Service.*5
Most important, notwithstanding that both agencies have professed
to the Commission that the liaison between them was close and fully
sufficient,*51 the Commission does not believe that the liaison between
the FBI and the Secret Service prior TV the assassin&ion was as
effective as it should have been. The FBI Manual of Instructions
provided :
Liaison With Other Government Agencies
To insure adequate and effective liaison arrangements, each
SAC should specifically designate an Agent (or Agents) to be
responsible for developing and maintaining liaison with other
Federal Agencies. This liaison should take into consideration
FBI-agency community of interests, location of agency head-
quarters, and the responsiveness of agency representatives. In
each instance, liaison contacts should be developed to include
a close friendly relationship, mutual understanding of FBI and
agency jurisdictions, and an indicated willingness by the agency
representative to coordinate activities and to discuss problems
of mutual interest. Each field office should determine those
Federal agencies which are represented locally and with which
liaison should be conducted.152

The testimony reveals that liaison responsibilities in connection with

the Presidents visit were discussed twice officially by the special agent
in charge of the FBI office in Dallas. As discussed in chapter II,
some limited information was made available to the Secret Service.153
But there was no fully adequate liaison between the two agencies.
Indeed, the Commission believes that the liaison between all Federal
agencies responsible for Presidential protection should be improved.

Other Protective Measures and Aspects of Secret Service

Performance
The Presidents trip to Dallas called into play many standard oper-
ating procedures of the Secret Service in addition to its preventive.
444
intelligence operations. Examination of these procedures shows that
in most respects they were well conceived and ably executed by the
personnel of the Service. ,&ainst the background of the critical
events of November 22, however, certain shortcomings and lapses from
t,he high standards which the Commission believes should prevail in
the field of Presidential protection are evident.
Advance preparations.-The advance preparations in Dallas by
,\gent Winston G. Lawson of the White House detail ha\-e been de-
scribed in chapter II. With the assistance of Agent in Charge Sorrels
of the Dallas field office of the Secret Service, Lawson was responsible
for working out, a great many arrangements for the Presidents trip.
The Service prefers to have two agents perform advance preparations.
In the case of Dallas, because President. Kennedy had scheduled visits
to five Texas cities and had also scheduled visits to other parts of the
country immediately before the Texas trip, there were not enough
men available to permit two agents to be assigned to all the advance
work. Consequently, Agent Lawson did the advance work alone from
Ko\-ember 13 to Ro\-ember 18, when he was joined by Agent David
B. Grant, who had just. completed advance work on the Presidents
trip to Tampa.
The Commission concludes that the most significant advance ar-
rangements for the Presidents trip were soundly planned. In par-
ticular, the Commission believes that the motorcade route selected by
Agent Lawson, upon the advice of Agent in Charge Sorrels and with
the concurrence of the Dallas police, was entirely appropriate, in
view of the known desires of the President. There were far safer
routes via freeways directly to the Trade Mart, but these routes would
not have been in accordance with the White House staff instructions
given the Secret Service for a desirable motorcade route.154 Much of
Lawsons time was taken with establishing adequate security over the
motorcade route and at the two places where the President would stop,
Love Field and the Trade Mart. The Commission concludes tha,t the
arrangements worked out at the Trade Mart by these Secret Service
agents with the cooperation of the Dallas police and other local law
enforcement agents, were carefully executed. Since the President was
to be at the Trade Mart longer than at any other location in Dallas and
in view of the security hazards presented by the building, the Secret
Service correctly gave particular attention in the ,advance prepara-
tions to those arrangements. The Commission also regards the secu-
rity arrangements worked out by Lavson and Sorrels at Love Field
as entirely adequate.
The Commission believes, however, that the Secret Service has in-
adequately defined the responsibilities of its advance agents, who have
been given broad discretion to determine what matters require atten-
tion in making advance preparations and to decide what action to
take. Agent Lawson was not given written instructions concerning
the Dallas trip or advice about any peculiar problems which it might
involve; all instructions from higher authority were communicated to
him orally. He did not have a checklist of the tasks he was expected to
445
 accomplish, either by his own efforts or with the cooperation of local
autliorities.55 The only systematic supervision of the activities of the
advance agent has been that provided by a requirement that he file
interim and. final reports on each advance assignment. The interim
report must, be in the hands of the agent supervising the protective
group traveling with the President long enough before his cleparture
to apprise him of any particular problems encountered and the re-
sponsive action taken.15G Agent Lawsons interim report was received
by Agent Kellerman on November 20, the day before cleparturc on the
Texas trip.ls7
The Secret Service has aclrised the Commission that no unusual
precautions were taken for the Dallas trip, and that the precautions
taken for the Presidents trip were the usual safeguards employed on
trips of this kind in the United States during the previous year.!158
Special Agent in Charge Sorrels testified that the advance preparations
followed on this occasion were pretty much the same as those fol-
lowed in 1936 during a trip to Dallas by President Roosevelt, which
was Sorrels first important assignment in connection with Presidential
work.15D
In view of the constant change in the nature of threats to the Presi-
dent and the diversity of the dangers which may arise in the various
cities within the United States, the Commission believes that stnnclarcl
procedures in use for many years and appliecl in all parts of the
country may not be sufficient. There is, for example, no Secret Service
arrangement for evaluating before a trip particular clifficulties that
might. be anticipated, which would bring to bear the judgment and
experience of members of the White House detail other than the
advance agent. Constant reevaluation of proceclures, with attention
to special problems and the development of instructions specific to
particular trips, would be a desirable innovation.
Linison with local law enforcenzent authorities.-In the description
of the important. aspects of the advance preparations, there have been
references to the numerous discussions between Secret Service repre-
sentatives and the Dallas Police Department. The wholehearted .
support of these local authorities was inclispensable to the Service in
carrying out its duties. The Service had 28 agents participating in
the Dallas visit.lGo Agent, Lawsons aclrnnce 1)lannin.g callecl for the
deployment of almost, 600 members of the Dallas Police I)epartment,
Fire Department, County Sheriffs Department, and the Texas De-
partment of Public Safety. Despite this del)endence on local au-
thorities, which would be substantially the same on a visit. by the
Presiclent to any la.rge city, the Secret. Service dicl not ilt the time of
the assassinnt.ion have any established procedure governing its rela-
tionships with thern.lWz It. had no prepared checklist of matters to be
covered with local police on such visits to metropolitan areas nncl no
written description of the role the local police were expected to per-
form. Discussions with the Dallas authorities and requests made of
them were entirely informal.

446
 The Commission believes that a more formal statement of assigned
responsibilities, supplemented in each case to reflect the peculiar con-
ditions of each Presidential trip, is essential. This would help to
eliminate varying interpretations of Secret Service instruct.ions by
different local law enforcement representatives. For example, while
the Secret Service representatives in Dallas asked the police to station
guards at each overpass to keep unauthorized personnel off, thi!j
term was not defined. At some overpasses all persons were excluded,
while on the overpass overlooking the a.ssassinat.ion scene railroad and
yard terminal workmen were permitte.d to remain under police super-
vision, as discussed in chapter III.163 Assistant Chief Batchelor of the
Dallas police noted the absence of any formal statement by the Secret
Service of specific work assigned to the police and suggested the
desirability of such a statement.04 Agent Lawson agreed that such a
procedure would assist him and other agents in fulfilling their respon-
sibilities as advance agents?66
Check of buildings a?ong route of motorcade.-Agent Lawson did
not arrange for a prior inspection of buildings along the motorcade
route, either by police or by custodians of the buildings, since it was
not the usual practice of the Secret Service to do ~0.~~The Chief of
the Service has provided the Commission a detailed explanation of
this policy :

Except for inauguration or other parades involving foreign

dignitaries accompanied by the President in Washington, it has
not been the practice of the Secret. Service to make surveys or
checks of buildings along the route of a Presidential motorcade.
For the inauguration and certain other parades in Washington
where the traditional route is known to the public long in advance
of the event, buildings along the route can be checked by teams
of law enforcement officers, and armed guards are posted along
the route as appropriate. But on out-of-town trips where the
route is decided on and made public only a few days in advance,
buildings are not checked either by Secret Service agents or by
any other law enforcement officers at the request of the Secret
Service. With the number of men available to the Secret Service
and the time available., surveys of hundreds of buildings and
thousands of windows IS not practical.
In Dallas the route selected necessarily involved passing
through the principal downtown section between tall buildings.
While certain streets thought to be too narrow could be avoided
and other choices made, it was not practical to select a route
where the President could not be seen from roofs or windows of
buildings. At the two places in Dallas where the President would
remain for a period of time, Love Field and the Trade Mart,
arrangements were made for building and roof security by post-
ing police officers where appropriate. Similar arrangements for
a motorcade of ten miles, including many blocks of tall commer-
cial buildings is not practical. Nor is it practical to prevent
447
 people from entering such buildings, or to limit access in every
building to those employed or having business there. Even if it
were possible with a vastly larger force of security officers to do
so, many observers have felt that such a procedure would not be
consistent with the nature and purpose of the motorcade to let
the people see their President and to welcome him to their city.
In accordance with its regular procedures, no survey or other
check was made by the Secret Service, or by any other law en-
forcement agency at its request, of the Texas School Book De-
pository Building or those employed there prior to the time the
President was shot.16*

This justification of the Secret Services st.anding policy is not per-

suasive. The danger from a concealed sniper on the Dallas trip was
of concern to those who had considered the problem. President
Kennedy himself had mentioned it that morning,68 as had Agent
Sorrels when he and Agent Lawson were fixing the motorcade route.1sg
Admittedly, protective measures cannot ordinarily be taken with
regard to all buildings along a motorcade route. Levels of risk can be
determined, however, as has been confirmed by building surveys made
since the assassination for the Department of the Treasury.0 An
attempt to cover only the most obvious points of possible ambush
along the route in Dallas might well have included the Texas School
Book Depository Building.
Instead of such advance precautions, the Secret Service depended
in part on the efforts of local law enforcement personnel stationed
along the route. In addition, Secret Service agents riding in the
motorcade were trained to scan buildings as part of their general
observation of the crowd of spectatorsl These substitute measures
were of limited value. Agent Lawson was unable to state whether
he had actually instructed the Dallas police to scan windows of build-
ings lining the motorcade route, although it was his usual practice
to do ~0.~~ If such instructions were in fact given, they were not
effectively carried out. Television films taken of parts of the motor-
cade by a Dallas television station show the foot patrolmen facing
the passing motorcade, and not the adjacent crowds and buildings,
as the procession passed.lT3
Three officers from the Dallas Police Department were assigned to
the intersection of Elm and Houston during the morning of No-
vember 22 prior to the motorcade.174 All received their instructions
early in the morning from Capt. P. W. Lawrence of the traffic divi-
sion.lT5 According to Captain Lawrence :

I then told the officers that their primary duty was traffic and
crowd control and that they should be alert for any persons who
might attempt to throw anything and although it was not a vio-
lation of the law to carry a placard, that they were not to tolerate
any actions such as the Stevenson incident and arrest any person
who might attempt to throw anything or try to get at t.he Presi-
448
 dent and his party; paying particular attention to the crowd
for any unusual activity. I stressed the fact that this was our
President and he should be shown every respect due his position
and that it was our duty to see that this was done.liG

Captain Lawrence was not instructed to have his men watch buildings
along the motorcade route and did not mention the observation of
buildings to them.li7 The three officers confirm that t.heir primary
concern was crowd and traffic control, and that they had no oppor-
tunity to scan the windows of the Depository or any other building
in the vicinity of Elm and Houston when the motorcade was passing.
They had, however, occasionally observed the windows of buildings
in the area before the motorcade arrived, in accordance with their
own understanding of their function.178
As the motorcade approached Elm Street there were several Secret
Service agents in it who shared the responsibility of scanning the
windows of nearby buildings. Agent Sorrels, riding in the lead car,
did observe the Texas School Book Depository Building as he passed
by, at least for a sufficient number of seconds to gain a general im-
pression of the lack of any unusual activity.lig He was handicapped,
however, by the fact that he was riding in a closed car whose roof
at. times obscured his view.18o Lawson, also in the lead car, did not
scan any buildings since an important part of his job was to look
backward at the Presidents car.lsl Lawson stated that he was look-
ing back a good deal of the time, watching his car, watching the sides,
watching the crowds, giving advice or asking advice from the Chief
and also looking ahead to the known hazards like overpasses, under-
passes, railroads, et cetera.: lsL Agent Roy H. Kellerman, riding in
the front seat of the Presidential car, stated that. he scanned the De-
pository Building, but not sufficiently to be alerted by anything in the
windows or on the roof.ls3 The agents in the followup car also mere
expected to scan adjacent buildings. However, the Commission does
not believe that agents stationed in a car behind the Presidential car,
who must concentrate primarily on the possibility of threats from
crowds along the route, provide a significant safeguard against dan-
gers in nearby buildings.
Conduct of Secret Service agents in Fort Worth on November $z?s.-
In the early morning hours on lliovember 22, 1963, in Fort Worth,
there occurred a breach of discipline by some members of the Secret
Service who were ofhcially traveling with the President. After the
President had retired at his hotel, nine agents who were off duty
went to the nearby Fort Worth Press Club at midnight or slightly
thereafter, expecting to obtain food; they had had little opportunity
to eat during the day.18 No food was available at the Press Club.
All of the agents stayed for a drink of beer, or in several cases, a mixed
drink. According to their affidavits, the drinking in no case amounted
to more than three glasses of beer or 11/2 mixed drinks, and others
who were present say that no agent was inebriated or acted im-
properly. The statements of the agent,s involved are supported by

449
statements of members of the Fort Worth press who accompanied
or observed them and by a Secret Service investigationVs5
According to their statements, the agents remained at the Press
Club for periods varying from 30 minutes to an hour and a half, and
the last agent left the Press Club by 2 a.m.18Q Two of the nine agents
returned to their rooms. The seven others proceedecl to an establish-
ment called the Cellar Coffee House, clescribecl by some as a beatnik
place and by its manager as ra unique show place with continuous
light entertaininent all night [serving] only coffee, fruit juices nncl no
ha.rd liquors or beer. Is7 There is no indication that any of the agents
who visited the Cellar Coffee House had any intoxicating drink at. that
establishment.188 Most of the agents were there from about 1:30 or
1:45 a.m. to about 2:45 or 3 a.m. ; one agent was there from 2 until
5 a.m.1sg
The lobby of the hotel and the areas adjacent to the quarters of the
President were guarded during the night by members of the mid-
night to 8 a.m. shift of the White House detail. These agents were
each relieved for a half hour break during the night.1g0 Three mem-
bers of this shift separately took this opportunity to visit the Cellar
Coffee House.*01 Only one stayed as long as a half hour, and none had
any beverage there.lg2 Chief Rowley testified that agents on duty
in such a situation usually stay within the building during their relief,
but that their visits to the Cellar were neither consistent, nor incon-
sistent with their duty.lgs
Each of the a.gents who visited the Press Club or the Cellar Coffee
House (apart from the three members of the midnight shift) had cluty
assignments beginning no later than 8 a.m. that morning. President
Kennedy was scheduled to speak across the street from his hotel in
Fort Worth at 8 :30 a.m.,lg* and then at a breakfast, after which the
entourage would proceed to Dallas. In Dallas, one of the nine agents
was assigned to assist in security measures at Love Field, and four had
protective assignments at the Trade Mart. The remaining four had
key responsibilities as members of the complement of the followup car
in the motorcade. Three of these agents occupied positions on the
running boards of the car, and the fourth was seated in the car.lg5
The supervisor of each of the off-cluty agents who visited the Press
Club or the Cellar Coffee House advised, in the course of the Secret
Service investigation of these events, that each agent reported for
duty on time, with full possession of his mental ancl physical cnpn-
bilities and entirely rencly for the performance of his assignecl
duties.lg6 Chief Rowley testified that, as a result. of the investigation
he ordered, he was satisfied that each of the agents performed his
duties in an entirely satisfactory manner, and that their conduct the
night before did not impecle their actions on duty or in the slightest
way prevent them from taking any action that might have averted
the tragecly.lsi However, Chief Rowley clid not condone the action
of the off-cluty agents, particularly since it riolntecl a regulation of
the Secret Service, which provides :
450
 Liquor, use of.-a. Employees are strictly enjoined to refrain
from t,he use of intoxicating liquor during the hours they are
officially employed at their post of duty, or when they may
reasonably expect that they may be called upon to perform an
official duty. During entire periods of travel status, the special
agent is officially employed and should not use liquor, until the
completion of all of his official duties for the day, after which
time a very moderate use of liquor will not be considered a vio-
lation. However, all members of the White House Detail and
special agents cooperating with them on Presidential and similar
protective assignments are considered to be subject to call for
official duty at any time while in travel status. Therefore, the
use of int.oxicating liquor of any kind, including beer and wine,
by members of the White House Detail and special agents co-
operating with them, or by special agents on similar assignments,
while they are in a travel status, is prohibited.188

The regulations provide further that violation or slight disregard

of these provisions will be cause for removal from the Service. lo9
Chief Rowley testified that under ordinary circumstances he would
have taken disciplinary action against those agents who had been
drinking in clear violation of the regulation. However, he felt that
any disciplinary action might have given rise to an inference that
the violation of the regulation had contributed to the tiagic events
of November 22. Since he was convinced that this was not the case,
he believed that it would be unfair to the agents and their families
to take explicit disciplinary measures. He felt that each agent rec-
ognized the seriousness of the infraction and that there was no danger
of a repetition.*OO
The Commission recognizes that the responsibilities of members of
the White House detail of the Secret Service are arduous. They work
long, hard hours, under very great strain, and must travel frequently.
It might seem harsh to circumscribe their opportunities for relaxation.
Yet their role of protecting the President is so important to the well-
being of the country that it is reasonable to expect them to meet very
high standards of personal conduct, so that nothing can interfere
with their bringing to their task the finest qualities and maximum
resources of mind and body. This is the salutary goal to which the
Secret Service regulation is directed, when it absolutely forbids
drinking by any agent accompanying the President on a trip. Nor
is this goal served when agents remain out until early morning hours,
and lose the opportunity to get a reasonable amount of sleep. It is
conceivable that those men who had little sleep, and who had con-
sumed alcoholic beverages, even in limited quantities, might have
been more alert in the Dallas motorcade if they had retired promptly
in Fort Worth. However, there is no evidence that these men failed
to take any action in Dallas within their power that would have
averted the tragedy. As will be seen, the instantaneous and heroic

451
response to the assassination of some of the agents concerned was in
the finest tradition of Government service.
The motorcade in Dallas.--Rigorous security precautions had
been arranged at Love Field with the local law enforcement authori-
ties by Agents Sorrels and Lawson. These precautions included
reserving a ceremonial area for the Presidential party, stationing
police on the rooftops of all buildings overlooking the reception area,
and detailing police in civilian clothes to be scattered throughout the
sizable crowd.201 When President and Mrs. Kennedy shook hands
with members of the public along the fences surrounding the reception
area, they were closely guarded by Secret Service agents who re-
sponded to the unplanned event with dispatch.02
As described in chapter II, the President directed that his car stop
on two occasions during the motorcade so that he could greet members
of the public.2o3 At these stops, agents from the Presidential follow-
up car stood between the President and the public, and on oue occasion
Agent Kellerman left the front seat of the Presidents car to take a
similar position. The Commission regards such impromptu stops as
presenting an unnecessary danger, but finds that the Secret Service
agents did all that could have been done to take protetitive measures.
The Presidential l&uusine.-The limousine used by President Ken-
nedy in Dallas was a convertible with a detachable, rigid plastic
bubble top which was neither bulletproof nor bullet resistant.20*-
The last Presidential vehicle with any protection against small-arms
fire left the White House in 1953. It was not then replaced because
t.he state of the art did not permit the development of a bulletproof
.top of sufficiently light weight to permit its removal on those occasions
when the President wished to ride in an open car. The Secret Service
believed that it was very doubtful that any President would ride reg-
ularly in a vehicle with a fixed top, even though transparent.205 Since
the assassination, the Secret Service, with the assistance of other Fed-
eral agencies and of private industry, has developed a vehicle for the
better protection of the President.2o6
Acc~s to passenger compartment of Presidential car.-On occasion
the Secret Service has been permitted to have an agent riding in the
passenger compartment with the President. Presidents have made it
clear, however, that they did not favor this or any other arrange-
ment which interferes with the privacy of the President and his
guests. The Secret Senvice has therefore suggested this practice only
on extraordinary occasions.2o7 Without attempting to prescribe or
recommend specific measures which should be employed for the future
protection of Presidents, the Commission does believe that there are
aspects of the protective measures employed in the motorcade at
Dallas which deserve special comment.
The Presidential vehicle in use in Dallas, described in chapter II,
had no special design or equipment which would have permitted the
Secret Service agent riding in the drivers compartment to move into
the passenger section without hindrance or delay. Had the vehicle
been so designed it is possible that an agent riding in the front seat
452
could have reached the President in time to protect him from the
second and fatal shot. to hit the President. However, such access to
the President was interfered with both by the metal bar some 15
inches above the back of the front seat and by the passengers in the
jump seats. In contrast, the Vice Presidential vehicle, although not
specially designed for that purpose, had no passenger in a jump seat
between Agent. Youngblood and Vice President Johnson to interfere
with Agent Youngbloods ability to take a protective position in the
passenger compartment before the third shot was fired.208
The assassination suggests that it would have been of prime im-
portance in the protection of the President if the Presidential mr
permitted immediate access to the President by a Secret Service
agent at the first sign of danger. At that. time the agents on the
running boarcls of the followup car were expected to perform such a
function. However, these agents could not reach the Presidents car
when it was traveling at an appreciable rate of speed. Even if the
car is traveling more slowly, the delay involved in reaching the Presi-
dent may be crucial. It is clear that at the time of the shots in Dallas,
Agent. Clinton J. Hill leaped to the Presidents rescue as quickly as
humanly possible. Even so, analysis of the motion picture films taken
by amateur photographer Zapruder reveals that Hill first placed his
hand on the Presidential car at frame 343, 30 frames and therefore
approximately 1.6 seconds after the President was shot in the head?OO
About 3.7 seconds after the President received this wound, Hill had
both feet on the car and was climbing aboard to assist President
and Mrs. Kennedy?*O
Planning for motorcade contdngencies.-In response to inquiry by
the Commission regarding the inst,rnctions to agents in a motorcade
of emergency procedures to be taken in a contingency such as that
which actua.lly occurred, the Secret Service responded :

The Secret Service has consistently followed two general prin-

ciples in emergencies involving the President. All agents are so
instructed. The first duty of the agents in the motorcade is to
attempt, to cover the President as closely as possible and prac-
ticable and to shield him by attempting to place themselves be-
tween the President ancl any source of danger. Secondly, agents
are instructed to remove the President. as quickly as possible from
known or impending daltger. Agents are instructed that it is
not t.heir responsibility to mvestigate or evaluate a present danger,
but to consider any untoward circumstances as serious and to
a.fford the President maximum protection at all times. No respon-
sibility rests upon those agents near the President for the identi-
fication or arrest of any assassin or an attacker. Their primary
responsibility is to stay with and protect the President.
Beyond these two principles the Secret Service believes a de-
tailed contingency or emergency plan is not feasible because the
variations possible preclude effective planning. A number of
steps are taken, however, to permit appropriate steps to be taken

453
 in an emergency. For instance, the lead car always is manlied
by Secret Service agents familiar with the area and with local
law enforcement oflicinls; the radio net in use in motorcades is
el&orate and permits a number of different means of communi-
cation with various local points. A cloctor is in the motorcade.*ll

This basic approach to the problem of planning for emergencies is

sound. Any effort to prepare detnilecl contingency plans might. well
have the undesirable effect of inhibiting quick and imaginative re-
sponses. If the advance preparation is thorough, and the protective
devices and techniques employed are sound, those in command sl~oulcl
be able to direct the response appropriate to the emergency.
The Commission finds that the Secret. Service agents in the motor-
cade who were immediately responsible for the Presidents safety re-
acted promptly at the time the shots were fired. Their actions dem-
onstrate that the President and the Nation can expect courage and
devotion to duty from the agents of the Secret Service.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The Commissions review of the provisions for Presidential protec-
tion at the time of President Kennedys trip to Dallas demonstrates
the need for substantial improvements. Since the assassination, the
Secret Service and the Department. of the Treasury have properly
taken the init,iative in reexamining major aspects of Presidential pro-
tection, Many changes have already been made and others are con-
templated, some of them in response to the Commissions questions
and informal suggestions.

Assassination a Federal Crime

There was no Federal criminal jurisdiction over the assassination
of President Kennedy. Had there been reason to believe that the
assassination was the result of a conspiracy, Federal jurisdiction could
have been asserted ; it has long been a Fecleral crime to conspire to
injure any Federal officer, on accomlt of, or while he is engaged in,
t,he lawful discharge of the duties of his office.212 Murder of the
President has never been covered by Federal law, however, so that
once it became reasonably clear that the killing was the act of a
single person, the State of Texas had exclusive jurisdiction.
It is anomalous that Congress has legislated in other ways touching
upon the safety of the Chief Executive or otlier Federal officers, mith-
out making an attack on the President a crime. Threatening harm
to the President is a Federal pffense,213 as is advocacy of the overthrow
of the Government by the assassination of any of its officers.214 The
murder of Federal judges, U.S. attorneys and marshals, and a number
of other specifically designated Fecleral law enforcement, officers is
a Federal crime.215 Equally anomalous are statutory provisions which
454
specifically authorize the Secret Service to protect the President,
without authorizing it to arrest anyone who harms him. The same
provisions authorize the Service to arrest without warrant persons
committing certain offenses, including counterfeiting and certain
frauds involving Federal checks or securities.21s The Commission
agrees with the Secret Service *I7 that it should be authorized to make
arrests without warrant for all offenses within its jurisdiction, as are
FBI agents and Federal marsha1s.218
There have been a number of efforts to make assassination a Fed-
eral crime, particularly after the assassination of President McKinley
and the attempt on the life of President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt.21s
In 1902 bills passed both Houses of Congress but failed of enactment
when the Senate refused to accept the conference report? A number
of bills were introduced immediately following the assassination of
President Kennedy.=
The Commission recommends to the Congress that it adopt legisla-
tion which would :

Punish the murder or manslaughter of, attempt or conspiracy

to murder, kidnaping of and assault upon
the President, Vice President, or other officer next in the order
of succession to the Office of President, the President-elect and the
Vice-President-elect,
whether or not the act is committed while the victim is in the
performance of his official duties or on account of such
performance.

Such a stat.ute would cover the President and Vice President or, in
the absence of a Vice President, the person next in order of succession.
During the period between election and inauguration, the President-
elect and Vice-President-elect would also be covered. Restricting the
coverage in this way would avoid unnecessary controversy over the
inclusion or exclusion of other officials who are in the order of succes-
sion or who hold important governmental posts. In addition, the re-
striction would probably eliminate a need for the requirement which
has been urged as necessary for the exercise of Federal power, that
the hostile act occur while the victim is engaged in or because of the
performance of official duties.222 The governmental consequences of
assassination of one of the specified officials give the United States
ample power to act for its own protection.223 The activities of the vic-
tim at the time an assassination occurs and the motive for the assassina-
tion bear no relationship to the injury to the Umted States which
follows from the act. This point was ably made in the 1902 debate by
Senator George F. Hoar, the sponsor of the Senate bill:

* * * what this bill means to punish is the crime of interruption

of the Government of the United States and the destruction of its
security by striking down the life of the person who is actually in
the exercise of the executive power, or of such persons as have been
455
 constitutionally and lawfully provided to succeed thereto in case
of a vacancy. It is important to this country that the interruption
shall not take place for an hour * * * ZZ*

Enactment of this statute would mean that the investigation of any

of the acts covered and of the possibility of a further attempt would
be conducted by Federal law enforcement officials, in particular, the
FBI with the assistance of the Secret Service.n5 At present, Fed-
eral agencies participate only upon the sufferance of the local authori-
t,ies. While the police work of the Dallas authorities in the early
identification and apprehension of Oswald was both efficient and
prompt, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, who strongly supports such
legislation, testified that the absence of clear Federal jurisdiction over
t,he assassination of President Kennedy led to embarrassment and
confusion in the subsequent investigation by Federal and local
authorities.22s In addition, the proposed legislation will insure that
any suspects who are arrested will be Federal prisoners, subject to
Federal protection from vigilante justice and other threats.227

Committee of Cabinet Officers

As our Government has become more complex, agencies other than
the Secret Service have become involved in phases of the overall prob-
lem of protecting our national leaders. The FBI is the major domestic
investigating agency of the United States, while the CIA has the pri-
mary responsibility for collecting intelligence overseas to supplement
information acquired by the Department of State. The Secret Serv-
ice must rely in large part upon the investigating capacity and ex-
perience of these and other agencies for much of its information
regarding possible dangers to the President. The Commission believes
that it is necessary to improve the cooperation among these agencies
and to emphasize that the task of Presidential protection is one of
broad national concern.
The Commission suggests that consideration might be given to as-
signing to a Cabinet-level committee or the National Security Council
(which is responsible for advising the President respecting the co-
ordination of departmental policies relating to the national secu-
ritv)228 the responsibility to review and oversee the protective
act&ties of the Secret Service and the other Federal agencies that
assist in safeguarding the President. The Committee should include
the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, and, if the
Council is used, arrangements should be made for the attendance of
the Secretary of the Treasury and t,he Att.orney General at any meet-
ings which are concerned with Pre.sident.ial protection.22Q The Coun-
cil already includes, in addition to the President and Vice President,,
the Secretaries of State and Defense and has a competent staff.
The foremost assignment of the Committee would be to insure that
t,he maximum resources of the Federal Government are fully engaged

456
in the job of protecting t,he President, by defining responsibilities
clearly and overseeing their execution. Major needs of personnel or
other resources might be met more easily on its recommendation than
they have been in the past.
The Committee would lbe able to provide guidance in defining the
general nature of domestic and foreign dangers to Presidential secu-
rity. As improvements are recommended for the advance detection
of potential t,hreats to the President, it could act as a final review
board. The expert assistance and resources which it could draw upon
would be particularly desirable in this complex and sensitive area.
This arrangement would provide a continuing high-level contact
for agencies that may wish to consult respecting particular protective
measures. For various reasons the Secret Service has functioned
largely as an informal part of the White House staff, with the result
that it has been unable, as a practical matter, to exercise sufficient in-
fluence over the security precautions which surround Presidential
activities. A Cabinet-level committee which is actively concerned with
these problems would be able to discuss these matters more effectively
with the President.

Responsibilities for Presidential Protection

The assignment of the responsibility of protecting the President to
an agency of the Department of the Treasury was largely an historical
accident.230 The Secret Service was organized as a division of the
Department of the Treasury in 1865, to deal with counterfeiting. In
1894, while investigating a plot to assassinlate President Cleveland, the
Service assigned a small protective detail of agents to the White House.
Secret Service men accompanied the President and his family to their
vacation home in Massachusetts and special details protected him in
Washington, on trips, and at special functions. These informal and
part-time arrangements led to more systematic protection in 1902,
after the assassination of President McKinley ; the Secret Service, then
the only Federal investigative agency, assumed full-time responsibility
for the safety of the President. Since that, time, the Secret Service
has had and exercised responsibility for the physical protection of
the President and also for the preventive investigation of potential
threats against the President.
Although the Secret Service has had the primary responsibility for
the protection of the President, the FBI, which was established within
t,he Department of Justice in 1908, has had in recent years an increas-
ingly important role to play. In the appropriations of the FBI there
has recurred annually an item for the protection of the person of the
President of the United States, which first appeared in the appropria-
tion of the Department of Justice in 1910 under the heading Miscel-
laneous Objects.: *X Although the FBI is not charged with the
physical protection of the President, it does have an assignment, as do
other Government agencies, in the field of preventive investigation in
regard to the Presidents security. As discussed above, the Bureau has

457
attempted to meet its responsibilities in this field by spelling out in its
Handbook the procedures which its agents are to follow in connection
with information received indicating the possibility of an attempt
against the person or safety of the President or other protected
perSOIlS.
With two Federal agencies operating in the same general field of
preventive investigation, questions inevit,ably arise as to the scope of
each agencys authority and responsibility. As the testimony of
J. Edgar Hoover and other Bureau officials revealed, the FBI did not
believe that its directive required the Bureau to notify the Secret
Service of the substantial information about Lee Harvey Oswald
which the FBI had accumulated before the President reached Dallas.
On the other hand, the Secret Service had no knowledge whatever of
Oswald, his background, or his employment at the Book Depository,
and Robert I. Bouck, who was in charge of the Protective Research
Section of the Secret Service, believed that the accumulation of the
facts known to the FBI should have constituted a sufficient basis to
warn the Secret Service of the Oswald risk.
The Commission believes that both the FBI and the Secret Service
have too narrowIy construed their respective responsibilities. The
Commission has the impression that too much emphasis is placed by
both on the investigation of specific threats by individuals and not
enough on dangers from other sources. In addition, the Commission
has concluded that the Secret Service particularly tends to be the
passive recipient of information regarding such threats and that its
Protective Research Section is not adequately staffed or equipped to
conduct the wider investigative work that is required today for the
security of the President.
During the period the Commission was giving thought to this situa-
tion, the Commission received a number of proposals designed to im-
prove current arrangements for protecting the President. These
proposals included suggestions to locate exclusive responsibility for all
phases of the work in one or another Government agency, to clarify the
division of authority between the agencies involved, and to retain the
existing system but expand both the scope and the operations of the
existing agencies, particularly those of the Secret Service and the FBI.
It has been pointed out that the FBI, as our chief investigative
agency, is properly manned and equipped to carry on extensive infor-
mation gathering functions within t,he United States. It was also
suggested that it would take a substantial period of time for the Secret
Service to build up the experience and skills necessary to meet the
problem. Consequently the suggestion has been made, on the one hand,
that all preventive investigative functions relating to the security of
the President should be transferred to the FBI, leaving with the
Secret Service only the responsibility for the physical protection of
the President, that is, the guarding funct.ion alone.
On the other hand, it is urged that all features of the protection of
the President and his family should be committed to an elite and inde-
pendent corps. It is also contended that the agents should be intimately
458
associated with the life of the Presidential family in all its ramifica-
tions and alert to every danger that might befall it, and ready at
any instant to hazard great danger to themselves in the performance
of their tremendous responsibilit,y. It is suggested that an organiza-
tion shorn of its power to investigate all the possibilities of danger to
the President and becoming merely the recipient of information
gathered by others would become limited solely to acts of physical
alertness and personal courage incident to its responsibilities. So cir-
cumscribed, it could not maintain the esprit de corps or the necessary
alertness for this unique and challenging responsibility.
While in accordance with its mandate this Commission has neces-
sarily examined into the functioning of the various Federal agencies
concerned with the tragic trip of President Kennedy to Dallas and
while it has arrived at certain conclusions in respect thereto, it seems
clear that it was not within the Commissions responsibility to make
specific recommendations as to the long-range organization of the
Presidents protection, except as conclusions flowing directly from its,
examination of the Presidents assassination can be drawn. The Com-
mission was not asked to apply itself as did the Hoover Commission
in 1949, for example, to a determination of the optimum organization
of the Presidents protection. It would have been necessary for the
Commission to take considerable testimony, much of it extraneous to
the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy, to put it in a
position to reach final conclusions in this respect. There are always
dangers of divided responsibility, duplication, and confusion of au-
thority where more than one agency is operating in the same field;
but on the other hand the protection of the President is in a real
sense a Government-wide responsi,bility which must necessarily be
assumed by the Department of State, the FBI, the CIA? and the mili-
tary intelligence agencies as well as the Secret Service. Moreover,
a number of imponderable questions have to be weighed if any change
in the intimate association now established between the Secret Service
and the President and his family is contemplated.
These considerations have induced the Commission to believe that
the determination of whether or not there should be a relocation of
responsibilities and functions should be left to the Executive and the
Congress, perhaps upon recommendations based on further studies
by the Cabinet-level committee recommended above or the National
Security Council.
Pending any such determination, however, this Commission is con-
vinced of the necessity of better coordination and direction of the
activities of all existing agencies of Government which are in a posi-
tion to, and do, furnish information and services related to the security
of the President. The Commission feels the Secret Service and the
FBI, as well as the State Department and the CIA when the Presi-
dent travels abroad, could improve their existing capacities and
procedures so as to lessen the chances of assassination. Without,
therefore, coming to final conclusions respecting the long-range
organization of the Presidents security, the Commission believes

459
that the facts of the assassination of President Kennedy point
to certain measures which, while assuming no radical relocation of
responsibilities, can and should be recommended by this Commission
in t.he interest of the more efficient protection of the President. These
recommendations are reviewed below.

General Supervision of the Secret Service

The intimacy of the Secret Services rel tionship to the White
House and the dissimilarity of its protective f ,unctions to most activi-
ties of the Department of the Treasury have made it difficult for the
Treasury to maintain .close and continuing supervision. The Com-
mission believes that the recommended Cabinet-level committee will
help to correct many of the major deficiencies of supervision disclosed
by the Commissions investigation. Other measures should be taken as
well to improve the overall operation of the Secret Service.
Daily supervision of the operations bf the Secret Service within
the Department of the Treasury should be improved. The Chief of
the Service now reports to the Secretary of the Treasury through
an Assistant Secretary whose duties also include the direct super-
vision of the Bureau of the Mint and the Departments Employment
Policy Program, and who also represents the Secretary of the Treas-
ury on various committees and groups.282 The incumbent has no tech-
nical qualifications in the area of Presidential protection.*** The
Commission recommends that the Secretary of the Treasury appoint
a special assistant with the responsibility of supervising the Service.
This special assistant should be required to have sufficient stature and
experience in law, enforcement, intelligence, or allied fields to be able
to provide effective continuing supervision, and to keep the Secretary
fully informed regarding all significant developments relating to
Presidential protection.
This report has already pointed out several respects in which the
Commission believes that the Secret Service has operated with insuf-
ficient planning or control. Actions by the Service since the assas-
sination indicate its awareness of the necessity for substantial im-
provement in its administration. A formal and thorough descrip-
tion of the responsibilities of the advance agent is now in preparation
by the Service.2s4 Work is going forward toward the preparation
of formal understandings of the respective roles of the Secret Service
and other agencies with which it collaborates or from which it derive-s
assistance and support. The Commission urges that the Service con-
tinue this effort to overhaul. and define its procedures. While manuals
and memoranda are no guarantee of effective operations, no sizable
organization can achieve e5ciency without the careful analysis and
demarcation of responsibility that is reflected in definite and com-
prehensive operating procedures.
The Commission also recommends that the Secret Service consci-
ously set about the task of inculcating and maintaining the highest
standard of excellence and esprit for all of its personnel. This
involves tight and unswerving discipline as well as the promotion of an
outstanding degree of dedication and loyalty to duty. The Commis-
sion emphasizes that it finds no causal connection between the assassi-
nation and the breach of regulations which occurred on the night of
November 21 at Fort Worth. Nevertheless, such a breach, in which
so many agents participated, is not consistent with the standards
which the responsibilities of the Secret, Service require it to meet.

Preventive Intelligence
In attempting to identify those individuals who might prove a
danger to the President, the Secret Service has largely been the pas-
sive recipient of threatening communications to the President and
reports from other agencies which independently evaluate their infor-
mation for potential sources of danger. This was the consequence
of the Services lack of an adequate investigative staff, its inability
to process large amounts of data, and its failure to provide specific
descriptions of the kind of information it sought.Z35
The Secret Service has embarked upon a complete overhaul of its
research activities.236 The staff of the Protective Research Section
(PRS) has been augmented, and a Secret Service inspector has been
put in charge of this operat,ion. With the assistance of the Presidents
Office of Science and Technology, and of t,he Advanced Research Proj-
ects Agency of the Department of Defense, it has obtained the services
of outside consultants, such as the Rand Corp., International Business
Machines Corp., and a panel of psychiatric and psychological experts.
It has received assistance also from data processing experts at the
CIA and from a specialist in psychiatric prognostication at Walter
Reed HospitaLz3 As a result of these studies, the planning docu-
ment submitted by the Secretary of the Treasury to t.he Bureau of the
Budget. on August 31, 1964, makes several significant recommenda-
tions in this field.238 Based on the Commissions investigation, the
following minimum goals for improvements are indicated:
Broader am? more selective criteria.-Since the assassination, both
the Secret Service and the FBI have recognized that the PRS files
can no longer be limited largely to persons communicating actual
threats to the President,. On December 26, 1963, the FBI circulated
additional instructions to all its agents, specifying criteria for infor-
mation to be furnished to the Secret Service in addition to that covered
by the former standard, which was the possibility of an attempt
against the person or safety of the President.. The new instructions
require FBI agents to report immediately information concerning:

Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists (a) possessing

emotional instability or irrational behavior, (b) who have made
threats of bodily harm against officials or employees of Federal,
state or local government or officials of a foreign go\-ernment, (c)
who express or have expressed strolfg or violent anti-US. senti-
ments and who have been involved m bombing or bomb-making
 or whose past conduct indicates tendencies toward violence, and
(d) whose prior acts or statements depict propensity for violence
and hatred against organized government.238

Sian H. Belmont, Assistant to the Director of the FBI, testified that

this revision was initiated by the FBI itself.240 The volume of refer-
ences to the Secret Service has increased substantially since the new
inst.ructions went into effect; more than 5,000 names were referred
to the Secret Service in the first 4 months of 1964.2l According to
Chief Rowley, by mid-June 1964, the Secret Service had received
from the FBI some 9,000 reports on members of the Communist
Party.* The FBI now transmits information on all defectorsF3 a
category which would, of course, have included Oswald.
Both Director Hoover and Belmont expressed to the Commission
the great concern of the FBI, which is shared by the Secret Service,
that referrals to the Secret Service under the new criteria might, if
not properly handled, result in some degree of interference with the
personal liberty of those involved.244 They emphasized the necessity
that the information now being furnished be handled with judgment
and care. The Commission shares this concern. The problem is ag-
gravated by the necessity that the Service obtain the assistance of
local law enforcement officials in evaluating the information which it
receives and in taking preventive steps.
In June 1964, the Secret Service sent to a number of Federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies guidelines for an experimental
program to develop more detailed criteria?45 The suggestions of
Federal agencies for revision of these guidelines were solicited. The
new tentative criteria are useful in making clear that the interest
of the Secret Service goes beyond information on individuals or
groups threatening to cause harm or embarrassment to the Presi-
dent.246 Information is requested also concerning individuals or
groups who have demonstrated an interest in the President or other
high government officials in the nature of a complaint coupled with
an expressed or implied determination to use a means, other than
legal or peaceful, to satisfy any grievance, real or imagined. 24T
Under these criteria, whether the case should be referred to the Secret
Service depends on the existence of a previous history of mental
instability, propensity toward violent action, or some similar charac-
teristic, coupled with some evaluation of the capability of the indi-
vidual or group to further the intention to satisfy a grievance by
unlawful means.*@
While these tentative criteria are a step in the right direction, they
seem unduly restrictive in continuing to require some manifestation
of animus against a Government o5cial. It is questionable whether
such criteria would have resulted in the referral of Oswald to the
Secret Service. Chief Rowley believed that they would, because of
Oswalds demonstrated hostility toward the Secretary of the Navy
in his letter of January 30, 1962.24Q
462
 I shall employ all means to right this gross mistake or injustice
to a boni-fied U.S. citizen and ex-service man. The U.S. govern-
ment has no charges or complaints against me. I ask you to look
into this case and take the necessary steps to repair the damage
done to me and my family?

Even with the advantage of hindsight, this letter does not appear to
express or imply Oswalds determination to use a means, other than
legal or peaceful, to satisfy [his] grievance within the meaning of
the new criteria.251
It is apparent that a good deal of further consideration and experi-
mentation will be required before adequate criteria can be framed.
The Commission recognizes that no set of meaningful criteria will
yield the names of all potential assassins. Charles J. Guiteau, Leon F.
Czolgosz, John Schrank, and Guiseppe Zangara-four assassins or
would-be assassins--were all men who acted alone in their criminal
acts against our leaders .252 None had a serious record of prior violence.
Each of them was a failure in his work and in his relations with others,
a victim of delusions and fancies which led to the conviction that so-
ciety and its leaders had combined to thwart him. It will require
every available resource of our Government to devise a practical
system which has any reasonable possibility of revealing such
malcontents.
Liaison with other agencies regarding intelligence.-The Secret
Services liaison with the agencies that supply information to- it has
been too casual. Since the assassination, the Service has recognized
that these relationships must be far more formal, and each agency
given clear understanding of the assistance which the Secret Service
expects.253
Once the Secret Service has formulated its new standards for col-
lection of information, it should enter into written agreements with
each Federal agency and the leading State and local agencies that
might be a source of such information. Such agreements should de-
scribe in detail the information which is sought, the manner in which it
will be provided to the Secret Service, and the respective responsibili-
ties for any further investigation that may be required.
This is especially necessary with regard to the FBI and CIA, which
carry the major responsibility for supplying information about po-
tential threats, particularly those arising from organized groups,
within their special jurisdiction. Since these agencies are already
obliged constantly to evaluate the activities of such groups, they
should be responsible for advising the Secret Service if information
develops indicating the existence of an assassination plot and for re-
porting such events as a change in leadership or dogma which indicate
that the group may present a danger to the President. Detailed for-
mal agreements embodying these arrangements should be worked out
between the Secret Service and both of these agencies.
It should be made clear that the Secret Service will in no way seek
to duplicate the intelligence and investigative capabilities of the
463
agencies now operating in this field but will continue to use the data
developed by these agencies to carry out, its special duties. Once ex-
perience has been gained in implementing such agreements with the
Federal and leading State and local agencies, the Secret Service,
through its field offices, should negotiate similar arrangements with
such other State and local law enforcement agencies as may provide
meaningful assistance. Much useful information will come to the
attention of local law enforcement, agencies in the regular course of
their activities, and this source should not be neglected by undue
concentration on relationships with other Federal agencies. Finally,
these agreements with Federal and local authorities will be of little
value unless a system is established for the frequent formal review
of activities thereunder.
In this regard the Commission notes with approval several recent
measures taken and proposed by the Secret, Service to improve its
liaison arrangements. In his testimony Secretary of the Treasury
C. Douglas Dillon informed the Commission that an interagency com-
mittee has been established to develop more effective criteria. Accord-
ing to Secretary Dillon, the Committee will include representatives
of the Presidents Office of Science and Technology, Department of
Defense, CIA, FBI, and the Secret Service.254 In addition, the De-
partment of the Treasury has requested five additional agents for its
Protective Research Section to serve as liaison officers with law en-
forcement and intelligence agencies.255 On the basis of the Depart-
ments review during the past several months, Secretary Dillon testi-
fied that the use of such liaison officers is the only effect.ive way to
insure that adequate liaison is maintained.256 As a beginning step to
imljrove liaison with local law enforcement officials, the Secret Service
on August 26, 1064, directed its field representatives to send a form
request, for intelligence information to all local, county, and State law
enforcement. agencies in their districts.257 Each of these efforts ap-
pears ~0~nc1, and the Commission recommends that these and the other
measures suggested by the Commission be pursued vigorously by the
Secret Service.
Automatic dutu processing.-Unless the Secret Service is able to
deal rapidly and accurately with a growing body of data, the increased
information supplied by other agencies will be wasted. PRS must
develop the capacity to classify its subjects on a more sophisticated
basis than the present geographic breakdown. Its present manual
filing system is obsolete; it makes no use of the recent developments in
automatic data processing which are widely used in the business world
and in other Government offices.
The Secret Service and the Department of the Treasury now recog-
nize this critical need. In the planning document currently under
review by the Bureau of the Budget, the Department recommends
that it be permitted to hire five qualified persons to plan and develop
a workable and efficient automa.ted file and retrieval system.258
Also the Department requests the sum of $100,000 to conduct a de-
ta.iled feasibiIity study ; this money would be used to compensate
consultants, to lease standard equipment or to purchase specially
designed pilot equipment.25Q On the basis of such a feasibility study,
the Department hopes to design a practical system which will fully
meet the needs of the Protective Research Section of the Secret, Service.
The Commission recommends that prompt and favorable considera-
tion be given to this request. The Commission further recommends
that the Secret Service coordinate its planning as closely as possible
with all of the Federal agencies from which it receives information.
The Secret Service should not and does not plan to develop its own
intelligence gathering facilities to duplicate the existing facilities of
other Federal agencies. In planning its data processing techniques,
the Secret Service should attempt to develop a system compatible
with those of the agencies from which most- of its data will come.
Protective Research participation in advance nrmnyement8.-Since
the assassination, Secret Service procedures have been chnngd to
require that a member of PRS accompany each advance survey team
to establish liaison with local intelligence gathering agencies and to
provide for the immediate evaluation of information received from
them.260 This PRS agent will also be responsible for establishing an
informal local iiaison committee to make certain that all protective
intelligence activities are coordinated. Rased on its experience dur-
ing this period, the Secret Service now recommends that additional
personnel be made available to PRS so that these arrangeme& can
be made permanent without adversely affecting t.he operations of the
Services field office~.*~~ The Commission regards this as a most use-
ful innovation and urges that the practice be continued.

Liaison With Local Law Enforcement Agencies

Advice by the Secret Service to local police in metropolitan areas
relating to the assistance expected in connection with a Presidential
visit has hitherto been handled on an informal basis.:j* The Service
should consider preparing formal explanations of the cooperation an-
ticipated during a Presidential visit to a city, in formats that can be
communicated to each level of local authorities. Thus, the local chief
of police could be given a master plan, prepared for the occasion, of
all protective measures to be taken during the visit; each patrolman
might be given a prepared booklet of instructions explaining what is
expected of him.
*In evaluating data processi~~g techniques of the Secret Service, the Commission had
occasion to become informed, to a limited extent, about the data processing techniques
of other Federal intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The Commission was struck
by the apparent lack of effort, on an interagency basis. to develop coordinated and mu-
tually compatible systems, even where such coordination would not sewn inconsistent
with the particular purposes of the agency involved. The Commission recognizes that
this is a controversial area and that many strongly held views are advanced in resistance
to any SuggeStiOn that an effort be made to impose any degree of coordination. This
matter is obriously beyond the jurisdiction of the Commission, but it seems to warrant
further study before each agency becomes irrevocably committed to separate action. The
Commission. therefore, rccomn~ends that the President consider ordering an inquiry into
the possibility that coordination might be achiered to a greater extent than seems no\
to be contemplated, without interference with the primary mission of each agency involved.

465
 The Secret Service has expressed concern that written instructions
might come into the hands of local newspapers, to the prejudice of
the precautions described.263 However, the instructions must be com-
municated to the local police in any event and can be leaked to the
press whether or not they are in writing. More importantly, the lack
of carefully prepared and carefully transmitted instructions for
typical visits to cities can lead to lapses in protection, such as the
confusion in Dallas about whether members of the public were per-
mitted on overpasses.264 Such instructions will not fit all circum-
stances, of course, and should not be relied upon to the detriment of
the imaginative application of judgment in special ~8~8s.

Inspection of Buildings
Since the assassination of President Kennedy, the Secret Service
has been experimenting with new techniques in the inspection of
buildings along a motorcade route.ZB5 According to Secretary Dillon,
the studies indicate that there is some utility in attempting to desig-
nate certain buildings as involving a higher risk than others.ZB6 The
Commission strongly encourages these efforts to improve protection
along a motorcade route. The Secret Service should utilize the per-
sonnel of other Federal law enforcement offices in the locality to assure
adequate manpower for this task,. as it is now doing.*j Lack of ade-
quate resources is an unacceptable excuse for failing to improve ad-
vance precautions in this crucial area of Presidential protection.

Secret Service Personnel and Facilities

Testimony and other evidence before the Commission suggest that
the Secret Service is trying to accomplish its job with too few people
and without adequate modern equipment. Although Chief Rowley
does not complain about the pay scale for Secret Service agents, sala-
ries are below those of the FBI and leading municipal police forces.268
The assistant to the Director of the FBI testified that the caseload of
each FBI agent averaged 20-25, and he felt that this was high.lss
Chief Rowley testified that the present workload of each Secret Serv-
ice agent averages 110.1 ca.s.e~.*~O While these statistics relate to the
activities of Secret Servica agents stationed in field offices and not the
White House detail, field agents supplement those on the detail, par-
ticularly when the President is traveling. Although the Commission
does not know whether the cases involved are entirely comparable,
these figures suggest that the agents of the Secret Service are sub-
stantially overworked.
In its budget request for the fiscal year beginning July 1, 1964, the
Secret Service sought funds for 25 new positions, primarily in field
OfficeS.* This increase has been approved by the Congress.27
Chief Rowley explained that this would not provide enough additional
manpower to take all the measures which he considers required. How-
ever, the 1964-65 budget request was submitted in November 1963 and

466
requests for additional persomiel were not made because of the studies
then being conducted.2i3
The Secret Service has now presented its recommendations to the
Bureau of the Budget.274 The plan proposed by t.he Service would
take approximately 26 months to implement and require expenditures
of approximately $3 million during that period. The plan provides
for an additional 205 agents for the Secret Service. Seventeen of this
number are proposed for the Protective Research Section ; 145 are
proposed for the field offices to handle the increased volume of security
investigations and be available to protect the President or Vice Presi-
dent when they travel; 18 agents are proposed for a rotating pool
which will go through an intensive training cycle and also be avail-
able to supplement the White House detail in case of unexpected
need ; and 25 additional agents are recommended to provide the Vice
President full protection.
The Commission urges that the Bureau of the Budget review these
recommendat,ions with the Secret Service and authorize a request for
the necessary supplemental appropriation, as soon as it. can be justi-
fied. The Congress has often stressed that it will support any reason-
able request for funds for the protection of the President.275

Manpower and Technical Assistance From Other Agencies

Before the assassination the Secret Service infrequently requested
other Federal law enforcement agencies to provide personnel to assist
in its protection functions.2T6 Since the assassination, the Service
has experimented with the use of agents borrowed for short periods
from such agencies. It has used other Treasury law enforcement
agents on special experiments in building and route surveys in places
to which the President frequently travels.277 It has also used other
Federal law enforcement agents during Presidential visits to cities
in which such agents are stationed. Thus, in the 4 months following
the assassination, the FBI, on 16 separate occasions, supplied a total
of 139 agents to assist in protection work during a Presidential visit,278
which represents a departure from its prior practice.278 From
February 11 through June 30, 1964, the Service had the advant.age
of 9,500 hours of work by other enforcement agencies.28o
The FBI has indicated that it is willing to continue to make such
assistance available, even though it agrees with the Secret Service that
it is preferable for the Service to have enough agents to handle all
protective demands.281 The Commission endorses these efforts to
supplement the Services own personnel by obtaining, for short periods
of time, the assistance of trained Federal law enforcement officers. In
view of the ever-increasing mobility of American Presidents, it seems
unlikely that the Service could or should increase its own staff to a
size which would permit it to provide adequate protective manpower
for all situations. The Commission recommends that the agencies
involved determine how much periodic assistance they can provide, and
that each such agency and the Secret Service enter into a formal
467
agreement defining such arrangements. It may eventually be desirable
to codify the pract.ice in an Executive order. The Secret Service will
be better able to plan its own long-range personnel requirements if
it knows with reasonable certainty the amount of assistance that it.
can expect. from other agencies.
The occasional use of personnel from other Federal agencies to assist
in protecting the President has a further advantage. It symbolizes
the reality that the job of protecting the President, has not, been and
cannot, be exclusively the responsibilit,y of the Secret Service. The
Secret Service in the past has sometimes guarded its right to be ac-
knowledged as the sole protector of the Chief Executive. This no
longer appears to be the case.2s* Protecting the President is a difficult
and complex task which requires full use of the best resources of many
parts of our Government. Recognit,ion that the responsibility must
be shared increases the likelihood that it will be met.
Much of the Secret Service work requires the development and use
of highly sophisticated equipment, some of which must be specially
designed to fit unique requirements. Even before the assassination,
and to a far greater extent thereafter, the Secret Service has been
receiving full cooperation in scientific research and technological
clevelopment from many Government agencies including the
Department of Defense and the Presidents Office of Science and
Tecllnology.2ss
Even if the manpower and technological resources of the Secret
Service are adequately augmented, it will continue to rely in many
respects upon the greater resources of the Office of Science and Tech-
nolo,~ and other agencies. The Commission recommends that the
present arrangements with the Office of Science and Technology and
the other Federal agencies that have been so helpful to the Secret Serv-
ice be placed on a permanent and formal basis. The exchange of let-
ters dated Au-gust 31, 1964, between Secretary Dillon and Donald F.
Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technol-
ogy, is a useful effort in the right direction.284 The Service should
negotiate a memorandum of understanding with each agency that has
been assisting it and from which it can expect to need help in the
future. The essential terms of such memoranda might well be em-
bodied in an Executive order.

CONCLUSION
This Commission can recommend no procedures for the future pro-
tection of our Presidents which will guarantee security. The de-
mands on the President in the execution of his responsibilities in
todays world are so varied and complex and the traditions of the
office in a democracy such as ours are so deepseated as to preclude
absolute security.
The Commission has, however, from its examination of the facts
of President Kennedys assassination made certain recommendations
468
which it believes would, if adopted, materially improve upon the
procedures in effect at the time of President Kennedys assassination
and result in a substantial lessening of the danger.
As has been pointed out, the Commissibn has not resolved all the
proposals which could be made. The Commission nevertheless is
confident that, with the active cooperation of the responsible agen-
cies and with t,he understanding of the people of the United States
in their demands upon their President, the recommendations we have
here suggested would greatly advance the security of the office without,
any impairment of our fundamental liberties.

469