SPECIAL

232
REPORT

no.
China’s Military Modernisation:
Recent Trends
Kartik Bommakanti and Satyam Singh

SEPTEMBER 2024
© 2024 Observer Research Foundation. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, copied, archived, retained or transmitted through
print, speech or electronic media without prior written approval from ORF.
Abstract

S
ince Xi Jinping became general secretary
of the Communist Party of China (CPC)
in 2013, the People’s Liberation Army
(PLA) has witnessed an accelerated and weapons systems. This report analyses recent
modernisation drive. Following the improvements in the structure, including the
2015-16 organisational reforms, the CPC further creation of the Information Support Force, the
standardised its services-level force structure and development of new weapons and equipment for the
upgraded its military doctrine, combat capabilities, four PLA services, its joint operational capabilities,
and support systems. These developments are
examined against the backdrop of the continued
military stand-off in Eastern Ladakh.

Attribution: Kartik Bommakanti and Satyam Singh, “China’s Military Modernisation: Recent Trends,” Special Report
No. 232, September 2024, Observer Research Foundation.

2
Introduction

T
he People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
of China has witnessed significant
changes since its first push for
modernisation in the 1980s under
Deng Xiaoping. This has included
regular updates in its doctrine, organisational goals, have caused concern worldwide, especially
structure, equipment, and weapons systems to in the United States (US), the littoral states in the
better reflect the changing needs of modern warfare. East and South China Sea, and India.
The PLA’s doctrines have shifted from dominating
in “local wars” on China’s periphery under Deng This reporta examines the relevance of these
Xiaoping1 to becoming a “world-class” military developments from India’s perspective and
under Xi Jinping2 for safeguarding China national discusses the recent upgrades in China’s military
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and security as doctrine, organisational structure, and equipment
well as its maritime rights and overseas interests. and weapons systems in its four services—the PLA
Xi has initiated two major reforms: organisational Army, Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force—and
and command-and-control reforms in 2015 and the newly established Information Support Force
services-level force standardisation and doctrinal (ISF). It will then evaluate these developments
revisions in 2017.3 However, his recent plans for an in the context of PLA’s growing joint operational
accelerated modernisation of the PLA, combined capabilities and combat preparedness as well
with aggressive actions to achieve its foreign policy as infrastructural, logistical, and technological
support systems.

a This report updates an earlier version published by ORF in 2023. See: https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-military-
modernisation-recent-trends-3

3
 During the 1980s and 1990s, drawing lessons
from the Vietnam War and the Gulf War, the
PLA restructured its forces and sought to equip
them with technologically advanced weapons
systems.4 Under Xi Jinping, the circumstances To adapt to the challenges in the “new era”, Xi
are different. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, has established time-specific modernisation goals
Xi stated that China is externally confronted for the PLA:
with “frequent outbreaks of regional conflicts
and disturbances, and intensifying global issues”5 • By 2027: “Accelerate the integrated
and that it needs to “adapt to the trend of a new development of mechanisation, informatization,
global military revolution” and modernise its and intelligentisation” and boost the pace
forces accordingly.6 Xi further stated that “historic of modernisation in military theories,
breakthroughs” have already been made in organisational structure, personnel, and
China’s military modernisation.b,7 At the 20th Party weapons and equipment.11
Congress in 2022, Xi added that, in the midst
of unprecedented global changes,8 including • By 2035: “Comprehensively advance
shifts in the international balance of power, the modernisation of military theory,
mounting unilateralism, external interference organisational structure, military personnel,
in Taiwan affairs, and “attempts to blackmail, and weaponry and equipment in step with the
contain, blockade, and exert maximum pressure modernisation of the country and basically
on China”,9 China’s armed forces need to be complete the modernisation of national
prepared to confront worst-case scenarios.10 defence and the military.”12

• By 2049: “Fully transform the people’s armed

forces into world-class forces by the mid-21st
century.”c,13

b According to the 2019 National Defence Policy, China’s armed forces need to “strengthen the awareness of potential dangers, crises
and wars, and actively adapt to the new landscape of strategic competition…and new developments in modern warfare, so as to
effectively fulfill their tasks and missions in the new era.” See: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/DefensePolicy/index.html#:~:text=China%20
advocates%20the%20ultimate%20complete,level%20required%20for%20national%20security
c While China has not defined what it means by a “world-class” military, it is likely to include developing a military that is on par or
superior to the US military and any other power that Beijing may view as a threat to its sovereignty, security, and development
interests, such as India. See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-
DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

4
 China has made progress towards its goals,
especially in terms of building joint operational
capabilities, combat readiness, and integration of
technology with the armed forces.14 Additionally,
since the year 2020, the PLA has “adopted more of its gross domestic product (GDP), while there
coercive actions in the Indo-Pacific region” as well has been a gradual decrease in its government
as on border disputes with India.15 expenditure, from 6.2 percent in 2010 to 5 percent
in 2022 (see Table 1). These figures indicate that
Underlying China’s enhancement of its military the growth in China’s military capabilities has
capabilities is the massive growth of its economy remained in healthy proportion to its GDP (see
in the 21st century. China’s military expenditure in Table 2). However, there is a lack of transparency
the last decade has stayed at around 1.7 percent in China’s defence budgets and expenditure; in
absolute terms, China’s defence expenditure has
seen a meteoric rise in the last decade, with a
decline in 2023 due to exchange rate effects (see
Table 2).

Table 1: The Defence Budget Share of China’s GDP and

Government Expenditure

Year 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023

Share of GDP 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 1.7% 1.8% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7%

Share of
Not
Government 6.0% 5.6% 5.5% 5.3% 5.0% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 4.9% 5.0%
Available
Expenditure

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)16

5
Table 2: China’s Defence Budget (2012–2024)

China’s Official
IISS Estimates SIPRI Estimates Growth in China’s
Year Announcements
(Current US$ billion) (Current US$ billion) GDP
(Nominal US$ billion)
2012 103.06 146.2 145.1 7.8%
2013 116.28 162.2 164.1 7.8%
2014 131.12 180.1 182.1 7.4%
2015 142.39 193 196.6 7%
2016 143.68 197 198.5 6.9%
2017 151.49 209.3 210.4 6.9%
2018 167.37 225 233.1 6.8%
2019 177.52 234 240.3 6%
2020 178.61 256 252 2.2%
2021 209.16 285 293 8.4%
2022 230 319 292 3%
2023 224.79 319 296 5.2%
2024 234.5 439 Not Available 4.6%

Sources: ChinaPower;17 IISS;18,19,20,21 SIPRI;22,23,24,25 IMF;26 Global Times;27 PRC’s State Council Information Office;28
Xinhua29

To further improve network information

capabilities for the military, the PLA underwent
another reorganisation of services in April 2024. space and information warfare capabilities, and
On 29 April 2024, Xi Jinping disbanded the PLA’s created the new ISF unit aimed at advancing the
Strategic Support Force (SSF), which focused on PLA’s competitiveness in information network
warfare.d,30

d According to PRC Ministry of National Defense spokesperson Senior Colonel Wu Qian, the establishment of the ISF is of “profound and
far-reaching significance to the modernisation of national defence and the armed forces and effective fulfilment of the missions and
tasks of the People's military in the new era.” See: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16302635.html

6
 The ISF was not established as a replacement
for the SSF but is instead meant to be an
upgraded version of the SSF’s former corps grade
organisation, the Information Communication
Base (ICB).31 While the SSF was a theatre grade With this reform, the PLA has been
organisation on par with the other military restructured into four services or branches (Army,
services, the ISF is a deputy theatre grade Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force) and four arms
organisation.32 Additionally, the SSF’s Aerospace or auxiliary units (ASF, CSF, ISF, and the Joint
Systems Department and the Network Systems Logistics Support Force).34 The four arms will be
Department were retained and have been positioned below the four services and the five
redesignated as the Aerospace Force (ASF) and the theatre commands in the PLA hierarchy, although
Cyberspace Force (CSF), respectively. Together how they will interact with each other remains
with the ISF, they now report directly to China’s unclear.35 Nevertheless, the theatre commands
Central Military Commission (CMC).33 may now be able to gain smooth and efficient
services from each of the arms.36

Figure 1: The New PLA Structure Post-ISF Creation

Source: The Jamestown Foundation37

7
Recent Modernisation Efforts

The People’s Liberation Army Army (PLAA)

After Deng Xiaoping’s military reforms of the late

1980s, critical structural and operational reforms the CCP considers sensitive, including Xinjiang,
of the PLA were undertaken under President Xi Tibet, Hong Kong, and Beijing.42 Operationally, a
Jinping starting in 2015, towards a comprehensive military personnel rebalancing has been initiated,
modernisation of the armed forces and their the teeth-to-tail ratio has been improved to boost
combat effectiveness,38 including reorganising support and logistical capabilities, and the PRC
the seven military regions into five theatre army continues to push towards the indigenisation of
commands, the Xinjiang Military District, and the defence industry.e,43
the Tibet Military District.39 The PLAA’s 13 group
armies comprise several combined-arms brigades Since 2020, the PLAA has continued to
of 4,500–5,000 personnel.40 These brigades, modernise its equipment (from service pistols to
which serve as the primary manoeuvre force, tanks) and to focus on combined arms training
have artillery, armoured vehicles, air defence, and to achieve President Xi’s goal of becoming a
air assault capabilities, and also include special world-class military.44 Reports suggest that next-
operations forces and sustainment brigades.41 generation QBZ-191 series of rifles are being
The PLAA also has non-standard divisions and developed, which will be an improvement over
brigades that are typically located in areas that the currently operational QBZ-95-1 and 95B-1
rifles.45 Branded under the Type 20 series, which
also includes submachine guns and marksman
rifles, these new indigenously manufactured rifles
are similar to the US Marine Corps’s Heckler &
Koch 416 rifle.46

e Teeth-to-tail ratio (TTR) is a military term that refers to the amount of personnel it takes to supply and support each combat soldier.
See: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/combat-studies-institute/csi-books/mcgrath_op23.pdf.

8
 Since the deployment of the most advanced
Type 15 tank in Tibet during the 2020 Sino-
Indian border standoff, multiple batches have
been delivered to the Tibet and Xinjiang Military
Commands in 2021 to safeguard China’s western In 2020, the Tibet Military Command received
borders.47 Due to its lightweight and powerful the third-generation Dongfeng Mengshi (DM)
engine, the Type 15 tank can be rapidly deployed assault vehicles for use in border defence missions
in high-altitude mountainous and plateau terrains in the northern Himalayas.54 These assault vehicles
with low oxygen levels, unlike the Type 96 and are indigenously manufactured, lightweight, and
Type 99 tanks.48 Type 15 tanks are also reported multifunctional: they can abandon their transport
to possess stealth technologies and have battlefield function and become a command vehicle, a self-
situational awareness capabilities that enable them propelled howitzer, or a self-propelled long-
to identify friends and enemies.49 These Type 15 range rocket launcher system.55 In 2021, these
tanks would complement China’s “most-powerful” DM vehicles were mass produced and were ready
third-generation Type 99A tanks deployed near to be incorporated in the PLAA’s integrated
the Ladakh border in the Karakoram mountains.50 joint combat system.56 In 2020, a new Type 625
wheeled self-propelled anti-aircraft gun was used
In 2021, the PLAA Xinjiang Military Command in a military exercise with the 77th Group Army of
received the delivery of four new advanced the Western Theatre Command.57 The Type 625
weapons systems.51 These included Type 08 combines a 25mm anti-aircraft Gatling gun with
armoured assault vehicles, a new-type 122mm- surface-to-air missile launchers.58 These short-
calibre self-propelled howitzer, the PHL-03 self- range defence (SHORAD) systems can be rapidly
propelled long-range multiple rocket launcher deployed in various combat scenarios and are also
system with jamming-resistant capabilities, and capable of cruise missiles, loitering munitions, and
a new self-propelled rapid-fire mortar.52 The low-flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).59 In
Xinjiang Military Command is now believed to 2022, it was revealed that an upgraded Type 625E
possess a complete modern ground combat system AA Gun Missile Integrated Weapon System has
crucial for plateau combat.53 been developed, which is comparable to the US’s
Manoeuvre Short-Range Air Defence system and
Russia’s Pantsir system.60

9
 The PLAA Aviation and Air Assault units
are reported to be undergoing training to
support amphibious operations and develop
multidimensional assaults, including air support
tactics and manned-unmanned teaming the Type 15 tank called VT-5, and in May 2024,
(MUM-T). They are envisioned as the primary
61
photographs surfaced of advanced comprehensive
combat force in a greater joint operation and electronic warfare (EW) systems on Dongfeng
will conduct extraterritorial non-war military Mengshi CTL18A armoured vehicles.66 Reports
operations.62 There is greater focus on group armies suggest that these systems utilise ultra-shortwave
in the Eastern and Western Theatre Commands interference to disrupt enemy communications
and the military districts of Tibet and Xinjiang.63 and intelligence devices.67 In February 2024,
The PLAA’s air defence forces have also deployed researchers in China developed a vehicle-
new counter-air electronic attack capabilities that launched high-power microwave (HPM) weapon
will support the PLA-wide anti-access, area-denial which creates high-frequency electromagnetic
(A2AD) mission.64 waves that can suppress drones, military aircraft,
and satellites.68
An important feature of the PLA is its
emphasis on using the latest technologies. China’s The PLAA has also made investments in aerial
recent military modernisation efforts have and land unmanned vehicles. In 2020, the PLA’s
included developing and incorporating artificial Eastern Theatre Command began using the Sharp
intelligence (AI) and other emerging disruptive Claw I UGV unmanned ground vehicle,69 armed
technologies (EDT) in its military equipment as with a 7.62mm machine gun. Since 2022, the PLA
well as using civilian instruments for military Ground Force has also been using an unmanned
purposes through its Military-Civil Fusion (MCF) reconnaissance and strike aircraft, KVD002,70
development strategy and espionage activities.65 during patrols and exercises near Taiwan. In
In 2022, China developed an unmanned model of the Western Theatre Command, a significant
number of UAVs, likely the armed CH-4, have
been deployed at the Ngari Gunsa airbase since
2021.71 An AI-enabled WZ-7 Soaring Dragon UAV
was also spotted at the Shigatse base in December
2022.72

10
 Drawing on the heavy use of UAVs by Russia and
Ukraine, China has prioritised the development of
low-altitude dominance capabilities for the PLAA’s
UAVs.73 In 2022, PLAA air defence units focused
on improving tactical air defence against low and China’s satellite constellations, which enable
slow threats such as Uncrewed Aerial Systems surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation, and
(UAS) and loitering munitions through hybrid self- communication systems, play a critical role in the
propelled air defence artillery systems (SPADA), development of the PLA’s capabilities. China has
small focused electronic warfare systems, and Man- over 600 satellites in orbit, of which more than 360
Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).74 In are intelligence, surveillance, or reconnaissance
August 2023, PLA-affiliated academies developed (ISR) satellites which, together with AI, would
two unmanned intelligent technologies, including help track vehicles and vessels.78 Moreover, to
a drone swarm system capable of “self-repair” develop intelligentised warfare capabilities, in
and an augmented reality (AR) interaction system 2021, Chinese scientists developed a new quantum
that allows individual infantry soldiers to control radar technology that could detect stealth aircraft
multiple unmanned aircraft and vehicles.75 These by generating a small electromagnetic storm.79 In
systems enable drone reconnaissance and drone the same year, Beijing funded a research project
attacks, enhancing troops’ situational awareness called the China Brain Plan, which aimed to use
on the battlefield.76 In February 2024, it was brain science to develop new AI and biotechnology
reported that the PLAA’s 78092 unit was working applications.80 In July 2023, the PLA was
with scientists to develop UAVs that would replace reported to be developing “neurostrike weapons”
humans in complex overseas missions within a few designed to disrupt the brain functions of military
years.f,77 personnel and civilians and influence government
leaders or entire populations by using non-
kinetic technology.81 The weapons, which can use
microwaves or electromagnetic beams, represent a
significant development in China’s brain warfare
capabilities.82

f Newspaper reports alluded that this overseas mission, which was planned for the year 2035, may be against India, where the PLA
would need UAVs purpose-built for flying at extremely low altitudes, capable of operating both alone and in swarms, and able to
strike swiftly on critical command and supply installations deep behind enemy lines. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/
science/article/3249831/drone-007-chinese-military-plans-replace-human-agents-machines-special-operations-overseas

11
Optimising the PLAA

The PLAA has steadily reduced its number of

personnel in the last three decades to create a leaner,
more mobile force (see Table 3).83 Under President reduced by 300,000, in 2017, the total number
Xi Jinping, the focus has been on modernising the was brought under one million.85 However, the
PLA into a more efficient force.84 Consequently, number of personnel in the PLA Navy and PLA
in 2015, while the number of PLAA troops was Rocket Force increased from 2015 to 2023.g,86

Table 3: PLA Personnel, 1980–2020 (in millions)

Year 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2022 2023

PLA Army 3.6 3.16 2.3 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.975 0.965 0.965

PLA Navy 0.63 0.35 0.26 0.26 0.22 0.255 0.255 0.235 0.250 0.260 0.252

PLA Air
0.4 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.42 0.4 0.33 0.398 0.395 0.395 0.403
Force
Strategic
Forces/Coast 0 0 0.09 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.145 0.145 0.145
Guard
Strategic
Missile - - - - - - - - 0.120 0.120 0.120
Forces
Reserves 0 5 4 1.2 0.55 0.8 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
Paramilitary 7 4.3 12 1.2 1.1 1.5 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.50 0.50
Others - - - - - - - - 0.15 0.15 0.15
Total PLA
11.6 13.3 16.32 5.42 4.49 4.665 3.455 3.503 3.205 3.045 3.045
Personnel

Source: Centre for Strategic and International Studies,87 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)88,89,90,91

g The reasons for personnel optimisation were outlined in a 2016 opinion paper by the Central Military Commission. According to the
paper, China’s military needed to respond to the “unprecedented great changes in the world”, “adapt to the evolution of war forms”,
and “liberate and enhance [its] vitality”. It aimed to “optimise the proportion of military services” and transform the military from a
“quantitative and large-scale model to a quality and efficiency model”. It also aimed to strengthen the “military through science and
technology”, build “elite troops with Chinese characteristics”, and “firmly establish combat effectiveness as the only fundamental
standard”. See: http://www.xinhuanet.com/mil/2016-01/01/c_1117646695.htm

12
 The change in focus from the PLAA to its allied
forces—PLA Navy (PLAN), PLA Air Force (PLAAF),
PLA Rocket Force (PLARF), and PLA Strategic
Support Force (PLASSF) (and now ISF)—is the
result of the PLA’s changing strategic goals and The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)
security requirements. While the PLA previously
focused on ground operations and homeland The US military successes during the 1991 Gulf
defence, China now prioritises overseas interests92 War and the deployment of two aircraft carrier
such as safeguarding sea lanes, enforcing maritime battle groups during the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait
claims, and securing information infrastructures.93 Crisis reinforced the need for China to expand
Moreover, by reducing non-combat and non- and modernise its naval capabilities.98 China’s
essential personnel, China can redirect resources navy has since become a formidable military force,
towards the scientific training of personnel, particularly in the near-seas region.99 As of June
research and development, and improved joint 2024, the PLAN is the largest navy in the world,
operations.94 The PLA has also focused on with over 234 warships compared to the US Navy’s
recruiting more university and college graduates 219100 and is expected to grow to 435 by 2030.101
with science and engineering degrees towards The PRC’s 2019 defence white paper outlines that
building an informatised and intelligentised “the PLAN is speeding up the transition of its tasks
force.95 As of 2023, about 57 percent of active PLA from defense on the near seas to protection missions
personnel had one or more college degrees.96 In on the far seas, and improving its capabilities
2020, the PRC announced its plan to modify its for strategic deterrence and counterattack,”102
single annual military conscription cycle to a two- specifically aimed at developing A2AD force
phase system to account for the academic school capabilities against the US.103
year and allow for more efficient enlistment.97

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 The PLAN has modernised both the surface
and sub-surface segments of its fleet. In June
2022, China launched its third aircraft carrier,
Fujian, which began its first round of sea trials in
May 2024.104 Fujian’s catapult assisted take-off but main gun, an HQ-9 long range surface-to-air
arrested recovery (CATOBAR) launch system is a missile (SAM), the YJ-18 Anti-Ship Missile (AShM),
significant development over the short take-off, and the YJ-21 hypersonic AShM,111 and advanced
barrier-arrested recovery (STOBAR) systems of radar systems, sensors, and jamming antennas.112
the first two aircraft carriers and enable it to launch
heavier and larger fixed-wing aircraft.105 Fujian’s In May 2024, the PLAN tested an
catapults are powered by an electromagnetic electromagnetic rail gun which fired a smart
system.106 According to experts, Fujian will possess bomb 15km high into the stratosphere at a speed
improved versions of the J-15 fighter jet, the next- exceeding Mach 5.113 Although the test was
generation J-35 stealth jet, the early warning declared unsuccessful, the testing of technology
aircraft KJ-600, and the JL-10 advanced trainer that can launch heavy projectiles at hypervelocity is
jet.107 In April 2024, China announced that it is indicative of the PLAN’s intent to develop cutting-
building its fourth aircraft carrier, likely a nuclear- edge technology.114 China’s most recent destroyers
powered supercarrier.108 are the 25 Luyang III (Type 052D) guided-missile
destroyers (DDGs)—which include 12 lengthened
In May 2024, the PLAN commissioned its Luyang III MOD DDGs—capable of launching
tenth Type-055 Renhai-class cruiser, of which at cruise missiles, surface-to-air missiles, anti-ship
least four are assigned to the Southern Theatre ballistic missiles, and anti-submarine missiles.115
Command, which is responsible for operations in China is now commissioning an upgraded version
the South China Sea (SCS).109 The first of these of the Type 052D that incorporates an extended-
advanced ships entered service in 2020. Equipped length helicopter flight deck and a new radar.116
with an integrated electric propulsion (IEP)
system, the Type 055 is considered to be one of the
world’s most powerful warships,110 with a­­ 130mm

14
 PLAN’s Type 054A Jiangkai II-class frigates
have increased from 30117 in 2019 to 39118 in
2024. A new Type 054B (Jiangkai III) frigate was
launched in August 2023.119 This next-generation
frigate, which has an IEP system,120 has been with the eight Type 071 Yuzhao-class amphibious
called a “mini destroyer”;121 it is equipped with transport docks (LPD), they are modern
a 100mm main gun, a 32-cell missile vertical platforms that are capable of regional and global
launch system, a 1130 close-in weapon system, expeditionary missions in support of both wartime
an HQ-10 short-range air defence missile system, and non-war contingency operations.129
anti-submarine weapons, and advanced radar
detection and stealth capabilities.122 China also In terms of aviation capabilities, the PLAN
built the Jiangdao-class corvettes (FFLs) in large is developing variants of the J-15 fighter aircraft
numbers over a relatively short period;123 from that currently operates from its carriers.130 These
2013 to 2021, China commissioned 72 corvettes,124 include a catapult-capable variant, the J-15S
including 22 Type 056 and 50 Type 056A with tandem-seat variant, and the J-15D electronic
greater anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities warfare variant as well as a variant of the Y-9
and YJ-83 anti-ship missiles.125 aircraft for anti-submarine warfare and maritime
patrol.131 China is also developing the carrier-
In December 2023, China launched its fourth capable variant of the fifth-generation J-31 fighter,
Yushen-class Type 075 LHA amphibious assault known as the J-35, and improving the design of
ship.126 First launched in 2019, the Type 075 can a carrier-borne airborne early warning (AEW)
carry helicopters, air-cushioned landing craft, and aircraft KJ-600.132 The PLAN is also developing the
amphibious armoured vehicles.127 The Type 075s Z-20F helicopter, with improved ASW capabilities
are designed to enhance the vertical amphibious for the Renhai cruisers and Luyang III MOD
landing capabilities of the PLA and can carry out destroyers and the Yushen LHAs.133 Additionally,
missions in regions like the Taiwan Straits and the PLAN is replacing older variants of the H-6
the SCS, as well as non-military operations such bombers with the larger advanced maritime strike
as international humanitarian aid.128 Together bomber H-6J, which can carry up to six YJ-12
supersonic missiles and can reach the Second
Island Chain.134 However, in pursuit of increasing
jointness in maritime strike operations, the PLAN’s
H-6J-equipped regiments were transferred to the
Air Force divisions in 2023.135

15
 For its sub-surface operations, the PLAN
currently has 59 submarines: six Type-094/094A
Jin nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBN), six Type 093 Shang I-class and Type 093A
Shang II-class nuclear-powered attack submarines The PLAN is developing Shang III (Type 093B)-
(SSNs), and 47 diesel- powered/air-independent class guided-missile nuclear attack submarines
powered attack submarines (SS).136,137 The Jin with anti-surface warfare capabilities, which
SSBNs can carry 12 submarine-launched ballistic could be operational by 2025.142 In addition, the
missiles (SLBMs), JL-2 (range of 7,000km), and PLAN’s inventory of conventional submarines is
JL-3 (range of over 10,000km) and are capable increasing.143 In June 2024, the PLAN revealed
of targeting continental US from Chinese littoral a new submarine, unofficially named the Type
waters, representing China’s first viable sea- 039C,144 which is speculated to be China’s latest
based nuclear deterrent.138 In the late 2020s or air-independent powered attack submarine with
early 2030s, the PLAN is expected to launch its improved stealth capabilities.145
next-generation Type 096 SSBNs, which will
be armed with longer range SLBMs.139 Aided in In October 2019, China revealed its first large
part by Russian technology, the Type 096 will also displacement autonomous underwater vehicle, the
overcome the noise problem currently faced by HSU-001, which has long-range patrol capability
the Type 094 and thus will be difficult to detect.140 and a sonar for detecting underwater targets.146
In 2020, China’s unmanned surface vessel JARI
Amidst increasing risks of high-seas underwent its first sea trial.h,147 In 2022, satellite
confrontation with the US, the PLA’s focus is on images of China’s Sanya naval base revealed
developing more nuclear-powered submarines two extra-large uncrewed underwater vehicles
that can remain submerged for prolonged (XLUUVs) capable of performing ISR missions
periods and support long-distance operations and enduring at sea on longer missions.148 The
with multipurpose weapons, overcoming the PLAN has also conducted sea trials on multiple
shortcomings of conventional submarines.141 UAVs with vertical take-off and landing (VTOL).149
These include the SD-40, S-100 CAMCOPTER,
AV-500, and CSC- 005, which specialise in ISR
missions.150 Satellite images of Changxing Island

h JARI is reported to be the world’s first unmanned surface vehicle (USV) with multiple roles, i.e., anti-submarine, air defence, and
surface combat, and the capability to track underwater targets up to 7km. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/
article/3046601/chinas-new-killer-robot-ship-goes-through-its-first-sea-trial

16
in Shanghai from June 2024 also revealed mock
trials of the stealth-capable GJ-11 Sharp Sword
unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV).151

China has developed expertise in building ships, auxiliary ships, and Fuyu-class fast combat
medium-to-large UUVs which are used for seabed support ships, which can support long-distance
mapping and exploration.152 These include the and long-duration deployments.159 Supported by
underwater glider Haiyan, which set an endurance its crucial naval bases, such as in Djibouti, PLAN
record of 141 days and sailed 3,619.6km in the modernisation is also a means to assert its status
SCS in 2019,153 and the Haidou-1 unmanned as the leading regional power and a major global
submersible,154 which dove below 10,000 metres power as its capabilities enable it to conduct distant
in 2021. These UUVs, although used for marine anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.160
scientific research, can also be employed for
military purposes like ISR missions and grey-zone The People’s Liberation Army Air Force
operations.155 In 2023, China also commissioned (PLAAF)
the world’s first autonomous seaborne drone
carrier, the Zhu Hai Yun.156 Although the In the 75 years since its inception, the PLAAF has
unmanned carrier will undertake marine evolved from a homeland-focused limited force to
scientific research, some experts believe that it a “strategic air force” with advanced long-range
could be a forerunner to the Type 076 Landing aircrafts, bombers, and drone systems.161 Today,
Helicopter Dock (LHD), which is currently in the PLAAF, together with PLAN aviation, is “the
the development phase and will play the role of a largest aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region
drone mothership in the PLAN.157 and the third largest in the world,” with more than
3,150 total aircrafts162, of which approximately
The PLAN’s expansion and modernisation of 2,919163 are combat-capable.i
its ships and weapons capabilities have allowed it
to extend its operational reach beyond the near The PLAAF has continued to modernise
seas region into the Western Pacific, the Indian and indigenise its aircraft, bombers, and drone
Ocean, and the waters around Europe.158 The systems. Its WS-series jet engines are now able to
PLAN also has numerous logistical replenishment match the capabilities of those of NATO nations.164

i The PRC’s 2019 defence white paper states that the PLAAF’s missions and tasks are transforming “from territorial air defence to
offensive and defensive operations.” See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-
SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

17
Since 2016, the PLAAF has also reorganised its
theatre commands, bases, and regiments.165 In
mid-2023, a majority of PLAN aviation units,
including fighter, bomber, radar, and air defence J-20 fighters are also continuously upgraded
systems, were transferred to the PLAAF166 to and increasing in number. In 2023, a design
streamline bureaucratic duplication,167 improve upgrade and a capability of an increased number
the standardisation of identical units, and unify all of air-to-air missiles (AAM) were tested.171 The
defensive air operations under theatre command J-20 also underwent small-scale flight tests after
air forces. With this transfer, the PLAAF also being fitted with the Shenyang WS-15 turbofan
gained the responsibility for land-based maritime engine,172 which were aimed at adding supersonic
strike tasks in coordination with the PLAN.168 capability and a longer range173 to the J-20s,
thus placing US bases in South Korea, Japan,
Modern and advanced fighters have increased and Guam within its range.174 In the same year,
from constituting 4 percent of China’s air force in the PLAAF received more than 200 J-10C, J-16
2004-05 to 58 percent in 2024.169 These fighters Flanker N, and J-20 tactical combat aircraft from
include the Chengdu J-10C, the Shenyang J-16, the PLAN, which together amount to over 700.175
and the Chengdu J-20A, which is the PLAAF’s The J-16 Flankers possess a long-range surface-
most advanced tactical-combat aircraft with low- attack capability and are likely to be equipped
observable and stealth capabilities. All three of with the PL-17 very long-range air-to-air missile
these types are fitted with an active electronically that is currently in development.176 The PLAAF
scanned array (AESA) radar, which is less currently has at least six operational brigades of
vulnerable to jamming countermeasures.170 J-20.177 In July 2024, it was reported that the J-20s
have been deployed in the Tibet area, in addition
to the usual J-7, J-8, J-10, J-11, and J-16 fighters
and the KJ-500 early warning airborne and
control system.178

18
 In December 2023, images of the WS-20 fitted
Y-20 Kunpeng aircraft, re-designated as the YY-
20B, were released on Chinese social media.179
While it is unclear whether the re-engined Y-20 around Taiwan, demonstrating its all-weather,
has entered PLAAF service, the new engines round-the-clock capabilities.189 While the H-6
will give the transport aircraft short take-off and made China part of the three-member club of
air-refuelling capabilities along with greater countries with strategic bomber operators (the
endurance, thereby increasing its range beyond other two being the US and Russia), its legacy
the first island chain.180 The Y-20 could also be status necessitated a shift in focus to developing
modified as a refuelling tanker for combat aircraft, the H-20 stealth strategic bomber.190
thereby doubling the range of fighter jets such as
the J-20 and J-31.181 It can also be transformed In March 2024, the Deputy Commander of the
into a strategic command centre for fighter jets PLAAF, Wang Wei, declared that the H-20 would
and drones during combat.j,182 soon be publicly revealed.191 However, in April
2024, it was reported that the H-20 development
The PLAAF’s bombers are also undergoing is facing engineering design challenges; its current
modernisation to improve their operational timeline remains uncertain.192 The bomber was
effectiveness.183 The PLA’s bomber force currently reported to have been in development since 2016
comprises H-6 bomber variants, introduced to and is reported to be China’s first indigenously
China in the 1950s and produced domestically developed large-scale stealth bomber with nuclear
based on the Soviet Tupolev Tu-16 (Badger) capabilities.193 It is estimated to have a range
bomber designs.184 Since 2020, of the estimated of at least 8,500km194 and can target the US
209 H-6 variants,185 the PLAAF has increasingly military bases in Guam and Hawaii and cross the
deployed H-6K bombers.186 The H-6K is capable of Himalayas to attack targets in India.195 Through
carrying six land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs)187 the H-20, Beijing hopes to compete with the US
that can range targets in the Second Island Chain, B-2 Spirit and B-21 Raider bombers and complete
the YJ-12 supersonic anti-ship missile, and the YJ- its nuclear triad.196
21 hypersonic missile.188 In June 2023, a PLAAF
unit used the H-6K bomber for the first time to
conduct night-time encirclement flight exercises

j The Y-20 with PLAAF 27 aircrafts were reported to have intruded Taiwan’s air defence identification zone in July 2021. See: https://
www.eurasiantimes.com/an-aircraft-us-fears-chinas-y-20-chubby-girl-gets-new/amp/

19
 In 2019, the PLAAF revealed the nuclear
capable H-6N bomber, a derivative of H-6K, which
can carry air-launched ballistic missiles (ALBM).197
Operationally fielded the following year, the and maritime surveillance, and combat aircraft
H-6N has air-to-air refuelling capabilities, thus guidance.205 Another KJ-3000, with advanced
providing it with a greater range over other non- radar system and electronics, is also reported
air refuelable H-6 variants.198 However, the H-6N to be under development.206 China’s aviation
is subsonic, capable of only a 15-tonne payload, industry is rapidly developing greater numbers
and is easily detectable.199 Hence, in addition to of its Y-20 large transport aircraft and its tanker
the H-20, the PLAAF is developing new medium- variants, and the world’s largest seaplane, the
and long-range stealth bombers capable of striking AG600.207 These large transport aircraft are meant
regional and global targets.200 to support a range of PLAAF’s operations such as
airborne combat and control, paradrop, logistics,
The PLAAF is also upgrading its special mission refuelling, reconnaissance, and humanitarian
aircraft, which are “force multipliers”201 in terms assistance and disaster relief missions.208 In 2019,
of enhancing the endurance and operational the PLAAF also fielded a new Y-9 communications
capabilities of its fleet.202 Among its airborne early jamming aircraft known as the GX-11.209
warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, the KJ-
2000, KJ-200B, and KJ-200AG entered into service Several PLAAF units operate different high-
in 2020 and 2022, respectively.203 The KJ-500A and medium-altitude unmanned aircraft systems
was deployed in 2020 and increasing numbers of and vehicles.210 PLAAF is focusing not only on
KJ-500 are being fielded, which includes at least modernising its drones but also on conducting
one with aerial refuelling capabilities.204 integrated operations with fighter jets, early
warning aircraft, helicopters, and other drones
Amid rising tensions with the US, Taiwan, and to reach maximum capabilities of the drone.211 In
other Indo-Pacific countries, there have been this integrated MUM-T format, drones conduct
sightings of a new next-generation KJ-700 with ISR without revealing the position of the pilots
multiple capabilities such as aerial reconnaissance, and undertake beyond visual range (BVR) air-
electronic countermeasures deployment, air to-air missile targeting.212 After former US House
Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei, many
drones such as TB-001, BZK-005, and KV-001
conducted regional combat training missions with
J-10s and J-16s.213

20
 In September 2022, the PLAAF for the first
time unveiled an armed reconnaissance drone
unit based in Northwest China and conducted
an integrated exercise of its armed UAV aimed at
border patrol and counterterrorism.214 The drone The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force
practiced a long-endurance reconnaissance and (PLARF)
attack manoeuvres in Northwest China, which
includes the Xinjiang region and India border.215 The PLARF, known as the PLA Second Artillery
In April 2024, a new WZ-8 drone was sighted Force (PLASAF) until 2015, is the custodian of
beneath the fuselage of a PLAAF Xian H-6 bomber China’s land-based nuclear and conventional
intended for reconnaissance missions across ballistic missile forces. Since its establishment
Southeast Asia, including areas such as Taiwan, in 1966, the PLASAF/PLARF’s small and
South Korea, and Japan, and North-East India, unsophisticated missile force has progressively
and Ladakh.216 This drone possesses a speed of grown in size and capabilities.219 The PLARF’s
Mach 3+ and can fly at an altitude of up to 100,000 recent modernisation is aimed at enhancing its
feet. However, unlike conventional drones, it nuclear and conventional strategic deterrence
needs an air-launching “mothership” to take off.217 capabilities.k,220
In May 2024, the PLAAF’s new, indigenously-
developed WL-10 UAV with high altitude, long- In terms of nuclear capabilities, China’s stance
endurance, and stealth and electronic warfare is to maintain a minimum and credible nuclear
(EW) capabilities conducted flight operations in deterrent force.221 However, a recent threat
Japanese airspace in the East China Sea.218 assessment by the US Intelligence Community
outlines that the PLA is pursuing “the most rapid
expansion and platform diversification of its
nuclear arsenal in its history.”222 China’s nuclear
arsenal now includes roughly 500 warheads and
is expected to reach 1,500 warheads by 2035.223

k According to the PRC’s 2019 defence white paper, the PLARF will work towards “enhancing its credible and reliable capabilities
of nuclear deterrence and counterattack, strengthening intermediate and long-range precision strike forces, and enhancing
strategic counter-balance capability, so as to build a strong and modernized rocket force.” See: https://media.defense.gov/2023/
Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

21
This increase in nuclear warheads production
is aimed to meet the development of new
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and
multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle The PLARF also operationally deployed the
(MIRV) capabilities.224 In conventional-armed DF-17 road-mobile Medium Range Ballistic
capabilities, the PLARF has over 2,200 ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), which were unveiled at the
and cruise missiles and enough anti-ship missiles 2019 PRC military parade.231,232 The DF-17 is
to target enemy vessels in the South China Sea.225 equipped with a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV)
To ensure launching capabilities, the PLARF has whose higher manoeuvrability and lower-altitude
increased its number of brigades,226 adding at least flight allows it to evade the enemy radar and
ten new missile brigades from 2017 to 2019 to missile defences.233 It is suggested that the HGV
currently possess approximately 45 brigades.227 system is developed to destroy enemy air and
missile defence systems at the beginning of a
Besides expanding its nuclear arsenal, the conflict, leaving the adversary vulnerable to other
PLARF modernisation project has focused on less manoeuvrable missiles.234 At present, the
improving its missiles capabilities to penetrate PLARF is upgrading three brigades235 with DF-17s
ballistic missile defence systems and its longer- and deploying them in eastern theatres (Taiwan
range and accurate strike abilities and ensuring the and the Korea region).236 It is likely that the
survivability of its missile forces. For modernising PLARF will soon equip its SRBM brigades with
its system penetration capabilities, China DF-17s.237
upgraded its DF-5 missiles with MIRV capabilities,
providing it with increased warheads despite its China has tested an advanced nuclear delivery
limited missile force.228 While the DF-5A can carry system called the fractional orbital bombardment
three and DF-5B can carry up to five warheads, (FOB) missile system which can fly around the
the recently fielded DF-5C possesses a “multi- world at hypersonic speeds and cannot be tracked
megaton yield” with up to ten warheads.229,230 by missile defence systems.238 In August 2024,
China was reported to be developing a new type
of HGV with speeds exceeding Mach 15 and a
“skipping stone” trajectory, which would increase
the range of the missiles from regional to global
targets.239

22
 The PLARF has continued to develop missiles
with long-range and accurate strike capabilities.
As of October 2023, China’s inventory had about
500 ICBM launchers with 350 missiles.240 As of escalation dilemma for China’s adversaries
February 2024,241 China has replaced its legacy because of the associated nuclear-conventional
DF-31 road-mobile ICBMs with newer versions attack uncertainty.251 An HGV-armed, dual-
of the DF-31A and DF-31AG and possibly a silo- capable IRBM known as DF-27, with a range of
based variant.242 The DF-31As have a range of up to 8,000km, is also reported to have entered
11,200 km and can reach most of the continental service.252, 253
US.243 According to the commander of the US
Strategic Command, China’s latest DF-41ICBMs, For maintaining precision-strike capabilities,
with a range up to 15,000km, became operational China has continued to develop its constellation
in 2020, and at least two brigades were equipped of military reconnaissance satellites and other
with the DF-41ICBMs.244,245 More bases are being reconnaissance, surveillance, and communications
upgraded with DF-41s, and approximately 28 systems.254 The PRC uses its​​ BeiDou’s position,
DF-41 launchers have been deployed. Moreover, navigation, and timing (PNT) service capabilities
DF-41s are MIRV-capable and could carry three to enable force movements and conduct precision
warheads.246,247 guided munitions delivery.255 In 2022, it was
reported that China has developed several short-
The DF-21 road-mobile MRBM variants are range missiles which use BeiDou and terminal
also being upgraded to longer-range missiles, infrared image guidance systems, giving it a
such as the dual-capable DF-26 IRBM and the circular error probability (CEP) of less than a
nuclear-capable DF-31AG ICBM.248 While there metre.256 The long-range DF-41 missile also uses
are estimated to be more than 140 of the former, BeiDou with an inertial navigation system and
the latter are numbered at 56.249 Introduced in thus has a CEP of less than 100 metres.257
2015, the DF-26 has a range of up to 4,000km and
the capabilities to rapidly swap conventional and The PLARF’s modernisation also includes its
nuclear warheads and strike with precision both ability to ensure the survivability of its arsenal and
land and maritime targets in the Western Pacific, launch a counterattack on the enemy. Its MRBMs,
the Indian Ocean, and the SCS.250 The DF-26’s IRBMs, and long-range cruise missile systems
swappable warhead capabilities raises a potential already use road-mobile launch facilities.258

23
 For instance, in 2017, the DF-31A was upgraded
to a more mobile and responsive DF-31AG version
that can fire missiles from off-the-road, rugged
terrain by using a transport erector launcher
(TEL).259 China is also planning to develop rail- Information Support Force (ISF)
mobile and silo-based launching facilities for the
DF-41.260 The ISF was launched on 19 April 2024, following
the disbanding of the PLA’s SSF.266 At the
According to a 2024 Bulletin of Atomic launching ceremony, President Xi stated that the
Scientists report, China has focused on improving new force will be a strategic arm of the PLA and
the survivability of its ICBMs and has constructed will advance its competitiveness in modern warfare
320 new silos for solid-fuelled ICBMs in the by “coordinating the construction and application
northern fields of Yumen, Hami, and Yulin and of the PLA network information systems”.267
30 new silos in three mountainous areas of central-
eastern China.261 The PLARF has also loaded some The dissolution of the SSF and the creation
ICBMs into these silos.l,262 With 350 new silos, of ISF suggest the CMC’s dissatisfaction with
China’s silo-based ICBMs now exceed Russia’s and the former’s performance.268 However, it is
are equivalent to about three-fourths that of the unclear whether this dissatisfaction was due to its
US ICBM force.263 Moreover, China is expanding operational or political functions, or a combination
the quantity of silos for the liquid-fuelled DF-5 of both.m,269
ICBM.264 Such quantitative expansion of ICBM
silos has raised concerns that China may shift its
minimum credible deterrent posture to a launch-
on-warning posture.265

l According to the 2024 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists report, “The silo fields are located deeper inside China than any other known
ICBM base, and beyond the reach of the United States’ conventional and nuclear cruise missiles.” See: https://thebulletin.org/
premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/
m The SSF emerged during the 2015 reforms to strengthen the PLA’s joint operational warfighting ability by creating synergies among the ​​
hitherto disparate cyber, information, and space capabilities (see: https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/05/
chinas-new-information-support-force/). Its role became more crucial when, in 2017, Xi hoped to make “major progress” in
building an informatised military, where all four services and five theatre commands collect and share data, by the year 2020 (see:
https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-2027-goal-marks-the-plas-centennial-not-an-expedited-military-modernization/; https://
www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2022/12/strategic-survey-2022-chinas-military-modernisation/). However, it is
suggested that the SSF’s bureaucratic ineffectiveness towards achieving the 2020 goal might be the cause of Xi’s frustration and
the setting up of the ISF under his direct supervision (see: https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_
WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html; https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/chinas-new-info-warriors-the-information-support-force-
emerges/). It is also speculated that possible corruption within the SSF precipitated this restructuring (see: https://jamestown.org/
program/planned-obsolescence-the-strategic-support-force-in-memoriam-2015-2024/).

24
 Ni Lexiong, a professor at the Shanghai
University of Political Science and Law, attributes
the creation of the ISF to the importance of
information in modern warfare.n,270 Another The development of information support
reason for the formation of the ISF could be capabilities has been a key goal for the PLA
China’s response to similar efforts by the US to to achieve President Xi’s goals of building an
consolidate its military information networks “informatised” military that will assist in the
under the aegis of Joint All-Domain Command transition to an “intelligent military” by the
and Control (JADC2).271 year 2035.278,279 The 2022 report to the 20th
Party Congress also emphasised that China
The ISF’s exact structure and functions remain would “promote coordinated development and
unclear.272 Officially, the ISF will “build a network application of the network information system”
information system that fulfils the requirements for enhancing the combat capability of modern
of modern warfare”.273 A PLA Daily commentator armed forces.280 Therefore, the creation of the
stated that the ISF “should provide strong support ISF is deemed important for achieving the 2027
for combat operations, deeply integrate into the milestone of invading Taiwan.281
overall joint operational system of the military,
and precisely and efficiently provide information Experts believe that the ISF will collaborate
support to serve and guarantee military operations with the ASF and the CSF to conduct cyber
in all directions and domains.”274 and electronic warfare operations, information
and network-centric warfare, and space and
Thus, the ISF’s support function for the whole counterspace operations.282 It would manage
of PLA differ from that of the ASF and CSF, which communications systems and protect the PLA’s
will control domain capabilities.275 This also comes information systems from cyber and EW attacks
against the backdrop of the Russia-Ukraine war,276 and leverage AI in its command-and-control
which aided China in recognising the importance systems to improve its decision-making process.283
of effective battlefield information support and China is already collecting battlefield information
narrative control.277 through its military exercises in the Taiwan Strait
and feeding this information to the CCP’s AI
combat simulation system.284 China’s AI-based

n According to Ni, “When a certain military technology is very important to the outcome of a war, the troops in charge of this military
technology will be separated from the original military branch and become a new branch of the military.” He added, “Now information,
intelligence, and electronic warfare have become decisive, so this is why the information support force became a separate force.” See:
https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3259938/new-force-chinas-pla-eyes-modern-warfare-information-support

25
EW system was reported to have intercepted and
mined data from US military radars operating in
the Pacific Ocean.285

In any future wars, the ISF is speculated to China of spreading fake narratives with respect
lead by dominating the information space of to the maritime dispute regarding the Second
the adversaries.286 This could pose a significant Thomas Shoal;291 the Filipino government claimed
threat to adversaries, given China’s emphasis on that Chinese diplomats released a fake audio
cognitive warfare affecting not only the judgement recording of a conversation between its army head
of the enemy’s armed forces but also the public of the Western Command and a Chinese diplomat
psyche.287 agreeing on a “new model” arrangement for
resolving the dispute.292
Reports of China’s disinformation campaigns
and false narratives have increased in recent The PLA reshuffle so soon after the major
years. In the case of India, China’s information 2015 military reforms suggests that China
manipulations288 surfaced against the backdrop under President Xi Jinping is not hesitant in
of the 2020 Galwan clashes and psychological experimenting with the PLA structure to achieve
warfare strategies of assigning Mandarin names289 its goals. The creation of the ISF and the emphasis
to places in the state of Arunachal Pradesh. China’s on developing network system capabilities also
disinformation reports in the European Union indicates China’s shifting priorities to non-combat
came to light during the COVID-19 pandemic.290 tools of warfare such as information control and
Recently, the Philippines Foreign Ministry accused shaping public perceptions.293

26
An Evaluation of the PLA’s
Military Modernisation

T
he PLA’s modernisation has been
aimed at becoming a world-class
military. For India, China’s military
modernisation must be evaluated have forced the PLA to develop joint operational
against its operational capabilities, capabilities. Although the PLA began advocating
both in terms of increasing focus on joint operations for the Integrated Joint Operations (IJO) concept,o
and combat readiness as well as infrastructural, which has informatisation at the core, in the mid-
logistical and technological support systems. 2000s, the concept did not mature until the Hu
Jintao era.296
Joint Operations and Combat Readiness
However, under Xi Jinping, improvements in
A critical element of the PLA’s capabilities’ joint operations and combat readiness received
modernisation is building the effectiveness of a significant boost. As Chairman of the CMC, Xi
the joint operations of PLA branches and its initiated the reorganisation of the PLA in 2015.
supporting arms so that it can achieve its aims in In 2016, he established the Joint Operations
an integrated manner. The US’s joint operational Command Centre (JOCC)297 to coordinate the
successes in the 1991 Gulf War294 and changing command structure and created the SSF and
regional security threats, particularly the Taiwan the Joint Logistics Support Force298 to ensure an
independence movement and US support,295 informatised military and to streamline the free
flow of logistical supplies, respectively.

o The term “integrated joint operations” (IJO) appeared in the 2004 China national defence white paper and was understood as the new
military guideline for conducting of “local wars under informatized conditions” (see: M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China's Military
Strategy Since 1949, 219-226). The 2010 white paper explicitly stated that the IJO had become PLA’s “basic form of operations”,
implying that the PLA was training its personnel for such joint operations (see: http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/
node_7114675.htm). The 2013 Science of Military Strategy (SMS) published by the Academy of Military Science defined IJO as
“completely linked (multiservice) operations that rely on a networked military information system, employ digitized weapons and
equipment, and employ corresponding operational methods in land, sea, air, outer space, and cyber space.” It explains that integration
requires fusion of operational strengths of “all services and branches” and suggests breaking “the hierarchical differentiation between
strategic, operational, and tactical levels” and establishing multiservice integration at every command level (see: Sun Zhaoli, Science of
Strategy, Academy of Military Sciences, Military Strategy Research Department, 124-127).

27
 However, the 2015 reforms could not effectively
execute complex joint operations such as island
landings, military blockades, and joint missile
strikes. reform that sought to enhance the effectiveness
of combat capabilities.p,306 The guidelines clarify
This is due to several reasons.299 First, the the organisation and implementation procedures
operations were guided by the antiquated of joint operations, the rights and responsibilities
military doctrine of ‘New Generation Operations of services, and unify the combat thinking of
Regulations’, issued in 1999, which was not in the personnel.307 Although launched in a “trial”
congruence with the post-2015 PLA structure.300 format, the guidelines are a notable update since
Second, there were issues with planning, the 1999 operations regulations.308
organising, and coordinating joint operations,
together with technical difficulties such as The concept of the IJO has also been
networking of systems.301,302 Finally, the heavy tilt strengthened through the incorporation of
of the PLA force structure towards the ground new sub-concepts such as “Joint Operations
forces303 and the lack of a joint assignment Capability Based on Network Information
system,304 where PLA officers are trained with Systems”, “intelligentised warfare”, and “Multi-
different services, hindered the achievement of Domain Integrated Joint Operations”.309 These
full-fledged joint operational capabilities. concepts place at the core of the IJO information
dominance and the implementation of stealth,
To overcome these hurdles, in November 2020, precision, and unmanned warfare strategies.310
the CMC issued the ‘Chinese People’s Liberation In 2021, the PLA developed a new operational
Army Joint Operations Outline (Trial)’, which was concept called “Multi-Domain Precision Warfare”
meant to serve as top-level guidelines for integrated to leverage Command, Control, Communications,
joint operations.305 The guidelines focused on Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
reforming the military doctrine or policy and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities to rapidly
are considered part of the ‘Third Big Campaign’ identify critical vulnerabilities in an adversary’s
operational system and mobilise joint forces to
launch precision strikes against them.311

p The ‘First Big Campaign’ comprised the 2015-16 organisational reforms, and the ‘Second Big Campaign’ refers to the subsequent
reforms in the size and composition of PLA units, training, and military education.

28
 Moreover, besides IJO, increased importance
is given to improve the “combat readiness” of the
PLA (e.g., through the 14th Five-Year Plan)312 so
that it can “fight and win wars.”313 This emphasis In mid-2023, the PLA transferred PLAN
on new military guidelines, concepts, and combat aviation units such as fighter brigades, bomber
readiness has resulted in the PLA conducting regiments, radar and air defence brigades, and
more training and complex joint operations and airfield units to the PLAAF to unify all defensive
adapting to the informational and intelligentised air operations under one theatre command.319 In
aspects of modern warfare.314 August of the same year, PLA forces demonstrated
joint operations capabilities when the PLAN,
In 2021, the PLA Xinjiang Military Command Coast Guard, and Maritime Militia blockaded
conducted a joint fire strike confrontation drill a Philippine outpost in the SCS to prevent
with the PLAA and the PLAAF.315 The PLA’s Philippine Coast Guard vessels from conducting
joint operations capabilities are also evident their resupplying mission.320
in its military exercises in the Eastern Theatre
Command.316 In August 2022, the PLA carried In recent years, the Western Theatre Command
out the largest unplanned joint military exercises has focused on developing joint training and
against Taiwan in response to the US Congress combat preparedness exercises. In a drill carried
delegation’s visit.q,317 In May 2024, the PLA out in the western theatre in April 2021, the
showcased its abilities by conducting Joint Sword- PLAA’s air defence units were inducted in its air
2024A exercises around the island of Taiwan in force command chain to function as a combined
response to newly elected Taiwanese President Lai air defence system.321 In February 2022, it was
Ching-te’s inaugural “separatist” speech.318 reported that, in contingencies, the Southern
Theatre Command’s 75th Group Army could also
be operationalised in the Tibet region bordering
Arunachal Pradesh.322

q The exercise included naval patrols, aircrafts violating Taiwan’s air defence identification zone, and firing ballistic missiles over Taiwan
and showcased capabilities in amphibious landing, joint blockade, and combat readiness. See: https://www.scmp.com/news/china/
military/article/3188437/taiwan-strait-drills-shed-some-light-some-beijings-tactics?module=inline&pgtype=article

29
 In November 2021, in the mountainous area
bordering Arunachal Pradesh, a combined arms
brigade affiliated with the PLA Xizang Military
Command conducted an exercise testing the training is still not mature and has limits beyond
physical fitness and combat capabilities of troops the First Island Chain.327 The report also notes
in oxygen-scarce terrains.323 In December that several PLA media outlets have highlighted
2022, again in the high-altitude plateau region the need to remedy the lack of combat training
bordering Arunachal Pradesh, the PLA conducted and the poor decision-making abilities of the
a live-fire shooting drill with long-range rocket military commanders.328
artillery systems to test long-range precision strike
capabilities.324 This drill was conducted a few days Support Systems for the PLA’s Missions
before PLA troops attempted to enter Indian
territory near the Tawang region of the Line of Since 2008, China’s military modernisation has
Actual Control (LAC).325 dovetailed with its increasingly assertive foreign
policy.329 From India’s perspective, China’s military
The increase in PLA joint operations exercises modernisation must be assessed in terms of the
since the issuance of the 2020 guidelines PLA’s support systems that facilitate its “new era”
demonstrate the capabilities of multiple PLA missions to “fight and win wars”.330 The military
services in combat preparation, situation strategic aims of the PLA include safeguarding
shaping, information-led task implementation, national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
and improved joint combat command system.326 security; protecting China’s maritime rights
These capabilities, although majorly directed and overseas interests; deterring and resisting
to support China’s operations against Taiwan aggression; and opposing Taiwan independence.331
and in the South China Sea, have important In pursuit of these goals, China’s armed forces
implications for India, since both the countries’ have asserted themselves in various missions in
armies are in a stand-off in the Ladakh sector of the East and South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and
the LAC. However, notwithstanding the PLA’s on the border with India,332 and these missions
improvements in joint operations capabilities, this have been supported by China in infrastructure,
logistical, and technological capabilities.

Since the 2017 Doklam stand-off and 2020

Galwan clashes, China has upgraded and
developed new air bases, road and rail networks,
and communication systems in border areas with
India.

30
 While continuing to upgrade roads opposite
eastern Ladakh,333 China has built a new G216
highway which provides access to disputed areas in
the Aksai Chin region of the LAC.334 This will serve effective communication for the PLA.343 In May
as an alternative to the existing G219 highway 2024, China established its first ever 5G-Advanced
and could be used for the rapid mobilisation (5.5G) synaesthesia integrated base station in the
of PLA troops in conflict scenarios.335 Another Lhoka (Shannan) region near the border with
G695 highway, within 10-15km of the LAC in India’s Arunachal Pradesh.344 This base station
the western sector, is also under construction.336 will enable the tracking of low-altitude UAVs
Satellite images from July 2024 showed that China and ground vehicles and will help in real-time
has also completed the construction of a bridge positioning capabilities for the PLA.345 In April
connecting the northern and southern banks of 2024, China built another 5G-A base station on
the Pangong Tso in Eastern Ladakh.337 Mount Everest near the Indian border.346

Additionally, China is building a railway line With the support of this road, rail, and network
that will connect Chengdu in its east to Hotan in infrastructure, China appears to have established
its west and will run through Aksai Chin.338 Some a permanent presence in the region and forced
sections of the line have been completed and the India to develop similar infrastructural facilities
westward extension from Shigatse to Pakhuktso in the area.347 However, there is a significant
may be completed by 2025.339 Moreover, since infrastructure gap in favour of China.348
2017, China has upgraded or constructed 37
airports and heliports within Tibet and Xinjiang, China is also developing technologically
including the dual-use Shigatse and Nyingchi supported equipment that can sustain the harsh
Mainling airports.340 In addition, 22 more airfields weather conditions of the high-altitude region
are planned to be built by 2035.341 of the Western Theatre Command. In 2022,
regiments of the Xinjiang Military Command
China has also built an integrated border tested cold-proof equipment such as inflatable
surveillance network along the border.342 It has set tents349 and conducted drills with an integrated
up optical fibre cable connectivity for facilitating individual system consisting of instruments such
as night vision goggles, a portable computer, and
an assault rucksack.350

31
 These equipment systems would help troops
adapt to different environments and improve
their operational efficiency and combat capability.
In January 2023, the official media outlet of the credible territorial claims in the SCS by using
PLA released a video showcasing the efficient fishing militias and developing artificial islands.359
use of civilian logistics companies to deliver
essential commodities to troops in China’s western China has also asserted its power in the Indian
border areas.351 A unit with the Xinjiang Military Ocean—a region that has historically had Indian
Command was also reported to have the facilities influence. China has deployed its navy in the
to store equipment in insulated garages, with each region to safeguard its maritime trade and energy
piece having a heating device, enabling them to be imports and overseas military facilities and to keep
instantly used in emergency scenarios.352 an eye on India.360 According to a December 2023
media report, an estimated six to eight Chinese
To support its troops in the Western warships are always present in the region, mostly
theatre, China has built 628 Xiaokang “Well- to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia.361
Off ” villages in the Tibet region closer to the China has also undertaken Sea Guardian naval
border with India.353 These villages have dual- exercises with Pakistan and supplied it with multi-
use infrastructure such as houses, roads, public role frigates.362 It has also docked its warships in
service facilities, and internet connectivity that Sri Lanka.363 However, Chinese research vessels,
serves China’s military outposts.354 Besides, village or the PLA’s “spy ships”, navigating the Indian
residents or “border guardians”355 are roped Ocean are the greater concern for India.364
in with the border security police to patrol the
area.356 As of August 2024, China is reported China has conducted vast oceanic surveys of the
to have constructed over 50 new villages along Indian Ocean since 2020 through civilian research
its western borders, 12 of which are in disputed vessels which are linked with the PLA through the
areas with other countries including India, with military-civil fusion program.365 At least 13 vessels
at least one village near every Himalayan pass have been identified which conduct research on
that borders India.357 Besides serving as “sentries energy sources and marine environments but
on the front line”, these villages establish China’s have “displayed suspicious behaviour including
permanence in border areas that are claimed by docking at Chinese military ports or temporarily
India.358 This echoes China’s strategy to establish turning off tracking devices”.366 These include the
Yuan Wang 5, which docked at the Hambantota
port,367 the Yuan Wang 6 in Lombok Straits,368 the

32
Shiyan 06 in the eastern Indian Ocean,369 and the
Xiang Yang Hong 03, which docked at the Male
port.370 Data collected by these ships could be
used for military purposes such as manoeuvring to disputed areas along the Indian border. Its
submarines during a conflict371 and monitoring technological abilities in making equipment and
India’s satellite and missile launches.372 In a weapons which can function in an “all-weather”
year, 12-15 such research and fishing vessels are scenario will enable the PLA in sustaining its forces
reported to be deployed in the Indian Ocean.373 in harsh-weather conditions that are present at the
LAC. In this respect, China’s village development
China’s support system capabilities in terms of programme and the use of “border guardians”
roads, rails, air bases, and network infrastructure have bolstered the PLA’s capabilities in conducting
will provide the PLA with significantly better access border patrols and asserting China’s territorial
claims. Additionally, the PLA’s increased naval
presence in the Indian Ocean has been a cause of
concern for India.

33
Conclusion

S
ince the 2015-16 organisational reforms,
President Xi Jinping has accelerated
China’s military modernisation. The
PLA has witnessed significant changes seas region and is on the path to develop strategic
in its military doctrine, equipment, deterrence and counterattack capabilities on the
and weapons systems as well as an organisational far seas, especially aimed against the US in the
restructuring through the creation of the ISF. The Pacific and India in the Indian Ocean. Together
PLAA has continued to modernise its equipment, with PLAN aviation, the PLAAF is the largest
including tanks, artillery, UAVs, air defence aviation force in the Indo-Pacific region and is
and electronic warfare systems, and focused on developing capabilities for both offensive and
combined arms training to achieve the goal of defensive operations. The PLARF is also enhancing
becoming a world-class military. It has also become its strategic deterrence nuclear and conventional
a leaner and more efficient force, and more capabilities, strengthening intermediate and long-
personnel have been transferred to the PLAN and range precision strike forces and developing the
PLARF to adapt to changing regional geopolitical ability to penetrate missile defence systems and
changes. counterattack survivability. Technology has played
a significant role in the upgrading of capabilities of
The PLAN, now the largest navy in the world, the four services. The importance of information
has become a formidable military force in the near- network capabilities in modern warfare for China
was reinforced through the creation of the ISF in
April 2024.

An evaluation of these developments in terms

of joint operations capability and warfare support
systems suggests that the PLA has developed

34
its capabilities in combat preparation, situation
shaping, information-led task implementation,
and improved joint combat and command
systems, as reflected through the numerous The modernisation drives underscore a vital
joint operations exercises and drills that are point in the machinery of the CPC since Xi
conducted to improve combat preparedness. became general secretary. Xi shares of the same
Moreover, China’s capabilities in infrastructure, aspirations and fears as his predecessors. His
logistical, and technological support have been the vision of a modern and battle-ready PLA is driven
backbone of PLA missions to “fight and win wars”. by his ambitions of a China that is at the centre
These capabilities, although primarily supporting of the global economy. Specifically, China has
China’s operations against Taiwan and in the progressively created a favourable asymmetry
South China Sea, have important implications for in military strength to pose serious capability-
India since the armies of both countries are in a related, operational, and logistical challenges for
stand-off in the Ladakh sector of the LAC. its immediate neighbours, including India. This
modernisation could also be viewed as a way to
establish that China is a force to reckon with in
the post-COVID world, that it has learnt from past
failures, and that it is stronger today than it has
been in several years.

35
Endnotes

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2 “China’s Defensive National Policy in the New Era,” Ministry of National Defence People’s Republic of China, http://eng.mod.
gov.cn/xb/DefensePolicy/index.html#:~:text=China%20advocates%20the%20ultimate%20complete,level%20required%20
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3 Scott J. Tosi, “Xi Jinping’s PLA Reforms and Redefining “Active Defense,” Military Review, September-October 2023,
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4 M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy since 1949 (Princeton University Press, 2019)

5 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
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6 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success
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7 Xi, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success
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9 The State Council The People’s Republic of China, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive
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36
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physics-project-moves-radar-closer

80 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

81 Bill Gertz, “China crafts weapons to alter brain function; report says tech meant to influence government leaders,” The
Washington Times, July 6, 2023, https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2023/jul/6/chinas-military-leading-world-brain-
neurostrike-we/

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82 Bill Gertz, “China crafts weapons to alter brain function; report says tech meant to influence government leaders”

83 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

84 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

85 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

86 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

87 Anthony H. Cordesman, Michael Wang, and Steven Colley, Chinese Strategy and Military Modernization in 2015: A
Comparative Analysis, Washington, D.C., Centre for Strategic and International Studies, 2015, 167, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/chinese-strategy-and-military-modernization-2015-comparative-analysis

88 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2021, (London: Routledge, 2021), 249

89 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2022, (London: Routledge, 2022)

90 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2023, (London: Routledge, 2023), 237

91 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

92 Press Trust of India, “China to downsize army to under a million in biggest troop cut,” The Indian Express, July 12, 2017,
https://indianexpress.com/article/world/china-to-downsize-army-to-under-a-million-in-biggest-troop-cut-4747189/

93 Adam Ni, “Why China Is Trimming Its Army,” The Diplomat, July 15, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/07/why-china-is-
trimming-its-army/

94 Adam Ni, “Why China Is Trimming Its Army”

95 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

96 “Chart of the Day: Modernization in the People’s Liberation Army”, CGTN, August 1, 2023, https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-
08-01/Chart-of-the-Day-Modernization-in-the-People-s-Liberation-Army-1lUH4saYaWc/index.html

97 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

98 U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2014 Annual Report to Congress, November 2014, https://www.uscc.
gov/sites/default/files/annual_reports/Complete%20Report.PDF

99 Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for
Congress, January 30, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400102/china-naval-modernization-implications-
for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-jan-30-2024.pdf#page16

100 Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Centre For Strategic
and International Studies, June 5, 2024, https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-chinas-naval-buildup

101 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

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102 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, China’s National Defense in the New Era, July 2019,
21, https://english.www.gov.cn/archive/whitepaper/201907/24/content_WS5d3941ddc6d08408f502283d.html

103 Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for
Congress, January 30, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400102/china-naval-modernization-implications-
for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-jan-30-2024.pdf#page16.

104 ChinaPower, “How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier?,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, https://
chinapower.csis.org/china-type-003-fujian-aircraft-carrier/

105 ChinaPower, “How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier?”

106 Orange Wang, “China says its Fujian carrier is world’s largest conventionally powered warship,” South China Morning Post,
June 23, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3267713/china-says-its-fujian-carrier-worlds-largest-
conventionally-powered-warship

107 Dinakar Peri, “China’s 3rd aircraft carrier Fujian completes 8-day maiden sea trial,” The Hindu, May 9, 2024, https://www.
thehindu.com/news/international/chinas-3rd-aircraft-carrier-fujian-completes-8-day-maiden-sea-trial/article68157809.ece

108 Dinakar Peri, “China’s 3rd aircraft carrier Fujian completes 8-day maiden sea trial”

109 Liu Xuanzun, “China building more Type 055 large destroyers: reports,” Global Times, May 29, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.
cn/page/202405/1313263.shtml

110 Liu Xuanzun, “Group of three Type 055 large destroyers drill in South China Sea,” Global Times, June 13, 2024, https://
www.globaltimes.cn/page/202406/1314060.shtml#:~:text=Having%20a%20displacement%20of%20more,mast%2C%20
analysts%20said%2C%20citing%20openly

111 Amber Wangi, “Chinese military announces YJ-21 missile abilities in social media post read as warning to US amid tension
in Taiwan Strait,” South China Morning Post, February 2, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3208763/
chinese-military-announces-yj-21-missile-performance-social-media-post-read-warning-us-amid-tension?module=lead_
hero_story&pgtype=homepage

112 Liu Xuanzun, “Group of three Type 055 large destroyers drill in South China Sea,” Global Times, June 13, 2024, https://
www.globaltimes.cn/page/202406/1314060.shtml#:~:text=Having%20a%20displacement%20of%20more,mast%2C%20
analysts%20said%2C%20citing%20openly

113 Stephen Chen, “China’s rail gun sends smart bomb into stratosphere at hypersonic speed, then something goes wrong,”
South China Morning Post, May 14, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3262607/chinas-rail-gun-sends-
smart-bomb-stratosphere-hypersonic-speed-then-something-goes-wrong

114 Stephen Chen, “China’s rail gun sends smart bomb into stratosphere at hypersonic speed, then something goes wrong”

115 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

116 Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for
Congress, January 30, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400102/china-naval-modernization-implications-
for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-jan-30-2024.pdf#page16.

117 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://

42
 media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

118 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

119 Albee Zhang and Greg Torode, “What are the latest upgrades in China’s military?,” Reuters, September 21, 2023, https://
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bigger-heavier-faster-china-rolls-out-military-upgrades-2023-09-21/

120 Albee Zhang and Greg Torode, “What are the latest upgrades in China’s military?”

121 Minnie Chan, “China has launched bigger, faster version of 054A guided missile frigate, online photos suggest,” South China
Morning Post, August 28, 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3232599/china-has-launched-bigger-faster-
version-054a-guided-missile-frigate-online-photos-suggest

122 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s new Type 054B frigate holds voyage test: reports,” Global Times, January 21, 2024, https://www.
globaltimes.cn/page/202401/1305778.shtml

123 Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for
Congress, January 30, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400102/china-naval-modernization-implications-
for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-jan-30-2024.pdf#page16.

124 Eric Wertheim, “China’s Jiangdao-class Corvette: Mainstay of the First Island Chain,” US Naval Institute 148, no.9, September
2022, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2022/september/chinas-jiangdao-class-corvette-mainstay-first-island-
chain

125 Eric Wertheim, “China’s Jiangdao-class Corvette: Mainstay of the First Island Chain”

126 Liu Xuanzun, “Reported launch of 4th Type 075 amphibious assault ship ‘able to safeguard sovereignty’,” Global Times,
December 17, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202312/1303801.shtml
127 Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, “China launches first amphibious assault ship”, Global Times, September 25, 2019, https://
www.globaltimes.cn/page/201909/1165468.shtml

128 Liu Xuanzun and Guo Yuandan, “China launches first amphibious assault ship”

129 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

130 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

131 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

132 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

133 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

134 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 26, 2022,
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-
INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

135 Rod Lee, “PLA Naval Aviation Reorganization 2023,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, July 2023, https://www.airuniversity.
af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAN/2023-07-31%20PLAN%20Aviation%20Reorg%202023%20Clean.

43
 pdf?ver=N848BtqfMRRjojcS2ThCtw%3D%3D

136 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

137 Zhao Ziwen and Coy Li, “Chinese military focusing on nuclear-powered subs with eye on US Navy: analysts,” South China
Morning Post, June 21, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3267590/chinese-military-focusing-nuclear-
powered-subs-eye-us-navy-analysts

138 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023,
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-
INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.
139 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

140 Greg Torode, “Inside Asia’s arms race: China near ‘breakthroughs’ with nuclear-armed submarines, report says,” Reuters,
October 9, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/inside-asias-arms-race-china-near-breakthroughs-with-
nuclear-armed-submarines-2023-10-09/

141 Zhao Ziwen and Coy Li, “Chinese military focusing on nuclear-powered subs with eye on US Navy: analysts,” South China
Morning Post, June 21, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3267590/chinese-military-focusing-nuclear-
powered-subs-eye-us-navy-analysts

142 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023,
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-
INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

143 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

144 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy’s new submarine makes official debut,” Global Times, June 20, 2024, https://www.globaltimes.cn/
page/202406/1314534.shtml
145 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Navy’s new submarine makes official debut”

146 H I Sutton, “China Navy Reveals New Large Underwater Robot Which Could Be A Game Changer,” Forbes, October 2, 2019,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/hisutton/2019/10/01/china-reveals-new-robot-underwater-vehicle-hsu-001/?sh=83491c119910

147 Liu Zhen, “China’s new killer robot ship goes through its first sea trial,” South China Morning Post, January 17, 2020, https://
www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3046601/chinas-new-killer-robot-ship-goes-through-its-first-sea-trial

148 H I Sutton, “China’s New Extra-Large Submarine Drones Revealed,” Naval News, September 16, 2022, https://www.
navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/09/chinas-secret-extra-large-submarine-drone-program-revealed/

149 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023,
https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-
INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

150 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

151 Joseph Trevithick, “Mockups Of China’s Sharp Sword Stealth Drone Appear Near New Supersized Amphibious Warship,”
The War Zone, June 14, 2024, https://www.twz.com/air/mockups-of-chinas-sharp-sword-stealth-drone-appear-near-new-
supersized-amphibious-warship

152 Prakash Panneerselvam, “Unmanned Systems in China’s Maritime ‘Gray Zone Operations’”, The Diplomat, January 23,

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 2023, https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/unmanned-systems-in-chinas-maritime-gray-zone-operations/

153 Ocean News, “China’s Underwater Glider Sets Endurance Record,” Ocean News & Technology, January 16, 2019, https://
oceannews.com/news/science-technology/china-s-underwater-glider-sets-endurance-record/#:~:text=Haiyan%2C%20
a%20Chinese%20underwater%20glider,China%20Sea%2C%20said%20the%20developer.

154 “Chinese submersible explores deepest region of Earth,” Shenyang Institute of Automation (SIA), Chinese Academy of
Sciences, October 13, 2021, http://english.sia.cas.cn/ns/es/202110/t20211013_284722.html

155 Prakash Panneerselvam, “Unmanned Systems in China’s Maritime ‘Gray Zone Operations’”, The Diplomat, January 23, 2023,
https://thediplomat.com/2023/01/unmanned-systems-in-chinas-maritime-gray-zone-operations/

156 “China builds world’s first autonomous seaborne drone-carrier,” Global Times, January 13, 2023, https://www.globaltimes.cn/
page/202301/1283744.shtml

157 Kashif Anwar, “Military potential of China’s Zhu Hai Yun: The world’s first AI-powered drone carrier,” Financial Express,
June 7, 2022, https://www.financialexpress.com/business/defence-military-potential-of-chinas-zhu-hai-yun-the-worlds-first-
ai-powered-drone-carrier-2551697/

158 Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for
Congress, January 30, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400102/china-naval-modernization-implications-
for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-jan-30-2024.pdf#page16.

159 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

160 Congressional Research Service, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for
Congress, January 30, 2024, https://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/24400102/china-naval-modernization-implications-
for-us-navy-capabilities-background-and-issues-for-congress-jan-30-2024.pdf#page16.

161 “PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces,” China Aerospace Studies
Institute, July 2024, 6, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2024-07-16%20
Primer%204th%20ed.pdf

162 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023,
62, https://media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-
INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

163 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

164 “PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces,” China Aerospace Studies
Institute, July 2024, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2024-07-16%20
Primer%204th%20ed.pdf

165 Kenneth W. Allen, Brendan S. Mulvaney and James Char, “Ongoing Organizational Reforms of the People’s Liberation
Army Air Force,” in Modernising the People’s Liberation Army: Aspiring to be a Global Military Power, ed, James Char
(London: Routledge 2024).

166 Rod Lee, “PLA Naval Aviation Reorganization 2023,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, July 2023, https://www.airuniversity.
af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLAN/2023-07-31%20PLAN%20Aviation%20Reorg%202023%20Clean.

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 pdf?ver=N848BtqfMRRjojcS2ThCtw%3D%3D

167 Rod Lee, “PLA Naval Aviation Reorganization 2023”

168 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

169 Douglas Barrie and Ben Thornley, “Waiting In The Wings: The Asia-Pacific Air-to-Air Challenge,” Asia-Pacific Regional
Security Assessment 2024, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library-
--content--migration/files/publications---free-files/aprsa-2024/aprsa24-chapter-6.pdf

170 Douglas Barrie and Ben Thornley, “Waiting In The Wings: The Asia-Pacific Air-to-Air Challenge”
171 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

172 Albee Zhang and Greg Torode, “What are the latest upgrades in China’s military?,” Reuters, September 21, 2023, https://
www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bigger-heavier-faster-china-rolls-out-military-upgrades-2023-09-21/

173 Albee Zhang and Greg Torode, “What are the latest upgrades in China’s military?”

174 Gabriel Honrada, “China’s J-20 to fly game-changing homemade engines,” Asia Times, July 1, 2023, https://asiatimes.
com/2023/07/chinas-j-20-to-fly-game-changing-homemade-engines/#:~:text=China’s%20J-20%20stealth%20fighter%20
has%20flown%20for%20the%20first,changing%20upgrade%20for%20the%20type

175 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

176 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024

177 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024

178 “From J20s to KJ-500: China ramps up air power in Tibet as LAC tensions continue,” Money Control, July 17, 2024, https://www.
moneycontrol.com/news/india/from-j20s-to-kj-500-china-ramps-up-air-power-in-tibet-as-lac-tensions-continue-12771380.
html#google_vignette

179 Ritu Sharma, “‘An Aircraft US Fears’: China’s Y-20 ‘Chubby Girl’ Gets New Engine; PLAAF Gears Up For Intercon Missions,”
The Eurasian Times, December 3, 2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/an-aircraft-us-fears-chinas-y-20-chubby-girl-gets-new/
amp/

180 Greg Torode and Albee Zhang, “China’s Xi calls for combat readiness as PLA marks founding anniversary,” Reuters, August 1,
2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-xi-calls-combat-readiness-pla-marks-founding-anniversary-2023-08-01/

181 Ritu Sharma, “‘An Aircraft US Fears’: China’s Y-20 ‘Chubby Girl’ Gets New Engine; PLAAF Gears Up For Intercon Missions,”
The Eurasian Times, December 3, 2023, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/an-aircraft-us-fears-chinas-y-20-chubby-girl-gets-new/
amp/

182 Ritu Sharma, “‘An Aircraft US Fears’: China’s Y-20 ‘Chubby Girl’ Gets New Engine; PLAAF Gears Up for Intercon Missions”

183 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

184 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

185 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

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186 Xiaobing Li, “The Dragon’s Wing: The People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s Strategy,” Air University, August 1, 2022,
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-
strategy/

187 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

188 Liu Xuanzun, “H-6K bombers conduct nighttime Taiwan island encirclement flights,” Global Times, June 19, 2023, https://
www.globaltimes.cn/page/202306/1292849.shtml
189 Liu Xuanzun, “H-6K bombers conduct nighttime Taiwan island encirclement flights”

190 Liu Zhen, “China lacks an advanced bomber. Can the H-20 ‘Water’ quench its need?,” South China Morning Post, June 15,
2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3266645/china-lacks-advanced-bomber-can-h-20-water-quench-its-
need.

191 “Deputy Air Force Commander: H-20 to be Officially Unveiled Soon,” China-Arms, March 12, 2024, https://www.china-
arms.com/2024/03/h-20-to-be-unveiled-soon/

192 Seong Hyeon Choi, “China’s little-known H-20 stealth bomber not a concern for US: Pentagon official,” South China Morning
Post, April 24, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3260136/chinas-little-known-h-20-stealth-bomber-
not-concern-us-pentagon-official?module=inline&pgtype=article

193 “Deputy Air Force Commander: H-20 to be Officially Unveiled Soon,” China-Arms, March 12, 2024, https://www.china-
arms.com/2024/03/h-20-to-be-unveiled-soon/

194 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, November 2, 2021,
https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF
195 Anil Chopra, “Forget J-20, China’s H-20 Stealth Bomber Threatens ‘Easy Penetration’ Of LAC; How Can IAF Respond?,”
The Eurasian Times, May 11, 2024, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/chinas-h-20-stealth-bomber-threatens/amp/

196 Seong Hyeon Choi, “China’s little-known H-20 stealth bomber not a concern for US: Pentagon official,” South China Morning
Post, April 24, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3260136/chinas-little-known-h-20-stealth-bomber-
not-concern-us-pentagon-official?module=inline&pgtype=article

197 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

198 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

199 Liu Zhen, “China lacks an advanced bomber. Can the H-20 ‘Water’ quench its need?,” South China Morning Post, June 15,
2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3266645/china-lacks-advanced-bomber-can-h-20-water-quench-its-
need

200 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

201 Congressional Research Service, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), June 4, 2021, 28, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/

47
 row/R46808.pdf#page30

202 “China ‘Accelerates’ Force Multipliers – AEW&C, FRA & EW Aircraft – To Fight US Military; Why India Must Act Now,” The
Eurasian Times, April 14, 2024, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/china-accelerates-force-multipliers-aew-why-india/amp/

203 “PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces,” China Aerospace Studies
Institute, July 2024, 6, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2024-07-16%20
Primer%204th%20ed.pdf

204 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

205 Shubhangi Palve, “China Modernizes AWACS ‘Flying Radars’ To Counter US Military; Draws Critical Lessons From Ukraine
Conflict,” The Eurasian Times, June 26, 2024, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/header-china-modernizing-its-flying-rada/

206 Shubhangi Palve, “China Modernizes AWACS ‘Flying Radars’ To Counter US Military; Draws Critical Lessons From Ukraine
Conflict”

207 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

208 “U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

209 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

210 “PLA Aerospace Power: A Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces,” China Aerospace Studies
Institute, July 2024, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2024-07-16%20
Primer%204th%20ed.pdf
211 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Air Force unveils armed reconnaissance drone unit in NW China,” Global Times, September 21, 2022,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1275765.shtml

212 Anushka Saxena, “China’s expanding military drone ecosystem is a menace for the likes of Taiwan and India,” Money Control,
October 17, 2023, https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/chinas-expanding-military-drone-ecosystem-is-a-menace-
for-the-likes-of-taiwan-and-india-11544611.html

213 Anushka Saxena, “China’s expanding military drone ecosystem is a menace for the likes of Taiwan and India”

214 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Air Force unveils armed reconnaissance drone unit in NW China,” Global Times, September 21, 2022,
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202209/1275765.shtml

215 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA Air Force unveils armed reconnaissance drone unit in NW China”

216 “China’s Supersonic WZ-8 Drone Spotted Under H-6 Bomber, Will be Provide high Altitude ISR near India,” Indian
Defence Research Wing, April 20, 2024, https://idrw.org/chinas-supersonic-wz-8-drone-spotted-under-h-6-bomber-will-be-
provide-high-altitude-isr-near-india/

217 Dylan Malyasov, “Chinese mystery drone spotted attached to H-6 bomber,” Defence-Blog, April 19, 2024, https://defence-
blog.com/chinese-mystery-drone-spotted-attached-to-h-6-bomber/

218 Ashish Dangwal, “Japan Scrambles Fighter Jets To Thwart New Chinese Intruder; JSO Says PLAAF’s WL-10 UAV Spotted

48
 For The First Time,” The Eurasian Times, May 27, 2024, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/japan-scrambles-fighter-jets-to-
thwart-new-chinese/amp/

219 Ma Xiu, “PLA Rocket Force Organisation,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, October 24, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.
af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf

220 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

221 Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, “Embassy
Spokesperson’s Remarks on China’s Nuclear Policy and Nuclear Force Development,” November 11, 2021, http://gb.china-
embassy.gov.cn/eng/PressandMedia/Spokepersons/202111/t20211122_10451387.htm

222 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community, April 9, 2021,7,
https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2021-Unclassified-Report.pdf.

223 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 15, 2024, https://
thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/

224 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

225 Christopher J. Mihal, “Understanding the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force,” Army University Press, July-August
2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2021/Mihal-PLA-
Rocket-Force/

226 Ma Xiu, “PLA Rocket Force Organisation,” China Aerospace Studies Institute, October 24, 2022, https://www.airuniversity.
af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf

227 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 15, 2024, https://
thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/

228 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

229 Christopher J. Mihal, “Understanding the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force,” Army University Press, July-August
2021, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/July-August-2021/Mihal-PLA-
Rocket-Force/

230 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

231 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

232 Joseph Trevithick, “Four Of The Biggest Revelations From China’s Massive 70th Anniversary Military Parade,” The War
Zone, October 6, 2019, https://www.twz.com/30119/four-of-the-biggest-revelations-from-chinas-massive-70th-anniversary-
military-parade

233 “DF-17”, Missile Threat, April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-17/

49
234 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

235 Veerle Nouwens et.al., “Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability,” International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), January 2024, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/
research-papers/2024/01/long-range-strike/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific--implications-for-regional-
stability.pdf

236 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.
237 Veerle Nouwens et.al., “Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability,” International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), January 2024, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/
research-papers/2024/01/long-range-strike/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific--implications-for-regional-
stability.pdf

238 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

239 Stephen Chen, “China’s new hypersonic glider can power-jump to the other side of the Earth: scientists,” South China
Morning Post, August 8, 2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3273658/chinas-new-hypersonic-glider-can-
power-jump-other-side-earth-scientists

240 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

241 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)
242 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 15, 2024, https://
thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/

243 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024”

244 Senate Committee on Armed Services , STATEMENT OF CHARLES A. RICHARD COMMANDER UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC COMMAND BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, April 20, 2021, https://www.
armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Richard04.20.2021.pdf

245 “DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20),” Missile Threat, April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-
41/#:~:text=The%20DF%2D41%20(Dong%20Feng,%2Dtargeted%20warheads%20(MIRV).

246 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

247 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 15, 2024, https://
thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/

248 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024”

249 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

50
250 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

251 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

252 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024

253 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.
254 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

255 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

256 Minnie Chan, “Stronger Taiwan air force hangars seen to be no match for Chinese military’s new ballistic missiles,” South
China Morning Post, December 15, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3203323/stronger-taiwan-air-
force-hangars-seen-be-no-match-chinese-militarys-new-ballistic-missiles

257 “DF-41 (Dong Feng-41 / CSS-X-20),” Missile Threat, April 23, 2024, https://missilethreat.csis.org/missile/df-
41/#:~:text=The%20DF%2D41%20(Dong%20Feng,%2Dtargeted%20warheads%20(MIRV).

258 Veerle Nouwens et.al., “Long-range Strike Capabilities in the Asia-Pacific: Implications for Regional Stability,” International
Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), January 2024, https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/
research-papers/2024/01/long-range-strike/long-range-strike-capabilities-in-the-asia-pacific--implications-for-regional-
stability.pdf

259 Eric Gomez, “Meet the DF-31AG and the DF-26: The Big Ballistic Missiles at China’s Military Anniversary Parade,” The
Diplomat, August 08, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/meet-the-df-31ag-and-the-df-26-the-big-ballistic-missiles-at-
chinas-military-anniversary-parade/

260 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 26, 2022,
https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-
INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF

261 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 15, 2024, https://
thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/

262 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

263 Hans M. Kristensen et.al., “Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 15, 2024, https://
thebulletin.org/premium/2024-01/chinese-nuclear-weapons-2024/

264 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
media.defense.gov/2023/Oct/19/2003323409/-1/-1/1/2023-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-
THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF.

265 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2024, (London: Routledge, 2024)

266 “Xi presents flag to PLA’s information support force”, Xinhua, April 19, 2024, https://english.news.

51
 cn/20240419/58e7b3a4d1f043858a0d29fce5da4cf4/c.html.

267 “Xi presents flag to PLA’s information support force”

268 Meia Nouwens, “China’s new Information Support Force”, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), March 3,
2024, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/05/chinas-new-information-support-force/.

269 Meia Nouwens, “China’s new Information Support Force”

270 Amber Wang, “New force for China’s PLA eyes modern warfare information support,” South China Morning Post, April 23,
2024, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3259938/new-force-chinas-pla-eyes-modern-warfare-information-
support
271 J. Michael Dahm, A Disturbance in the Force: The Reorganization of People’s Liberation Army Command and Elimination
of China’s Strategic Support Force, The Jamestown Foundation 24, no. 9, April 26, 2024, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/
uploads/2024/04/CB-V-24-Issue-9-April-26.pdf.

272 Antonio Graceffo, “The PLA’s strategic force reorganization,” Taipei Times, May 12, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
editorials/archives/2024/05/12/2003817723

273 “Xi presents flag to PLA’s information support force”, Xinhua, April 19, 2024, https://english.news.
cn/20240419/58e7b3a4d1f043858a0d29fce5da4cf4/c.html.

274 Liberation Army Daily, “PLA Daily commentator: Strive to build a strong modern information support force,” Ministry of
National Defence, People’s Republic of China, April 20, 2024, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16302172.html

275 Meia Nouwens, “China’s new Information Support Force”, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), March 3,
2024, https://www.iiss.org/en/online-analysis/online-analysis/2024/05/chinas-new-information-support-force/.

276 Joel Wuthnow, “China’s New Info Warriors: The Information Support Force Emerges,” War on The Rocks, June 24, 2024,
https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/chinas-new-info-warriors-the-information-support-force-emerges/

277 Jayadeva Ranade, “The People’s Liberation Army’s New Information Support Force,” Vivekananda International Foundation,
June 12, 2024, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2024/june/12/The-People-s-Liberation-Army-s-New-Information-Support-
Force

278 Zhang Dapeng et.al., An information and communication base has forged a “new edge” in the construction of new domain
and new quality combat forces,” Ministry of National Defence, People’s Republic of China, December 21, 2022, http://www.
mod.gov.cn/gfbw/wzll/yw_214068/4928766.html

279 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great
Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, Xinhuanet, October 18, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.

280 The State Council The People’s Republic of China, Hold High the Great Banner of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and Strive
in Unity to Build a Modern Socialist Country in All Respects, by Xi Jinping, Xinhua News Agency, 2022, 48, https://english.www.
gov.cn/news/topnews/202210/25/content_WS6357df20c6d0a757729e1bfc.html.

281 Liberation Army Daily, “PLA Daily commentator: Strive to build a strong modern information support force,” Ministry of
National Defence, People’s Republic of China, April 20, 2024, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16302172.html

282 Antonio Graceffo, “The PLA’s strategic force reorganization,” Taipei Times, May 12, 2024, https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/
editorials/archives/2024/05/12/2003817723

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283 Joel Wuthnow, “China’s New Info Warriors: The Information Support Force Emerges,” War on The Rocks, June 24, 2024,
https://warontherocks.com/2024/06/chinas-new-info-warriors-the-information-support-force-emerges/

284 Ying-yu Lin, “China’s AI-driven ‘new quality combat capabilities’ in the Taiwan Strait,” Think China, June 21, 2024, https://
www.thinkchina.sg/politics/chinas-ai-driven-new-quality-combat-capabilities-taiwan-strait

285 Ritu Sharma, “As Deep As Alaska — China’s New AI-Based EW System Can Detect U.S. Military Radars In Pacific – Scientists,”
The Eurasian Times, August 19, 2024, https://www.eurasiantimes.com/as-deep-as-alaska-chinas-new-ai-based/

286 Liberation Army Daily, “PLA Daily commentator: Strive to build a strong modern information support force,” Ministry of
National Defence, People’s Republic of China, April 20, 2024, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/jmsd/16302172.html
287 IIDA Masafumi, “China’s Chilling Cognitive Warfare Plans,” The Diplomat, May 05, 2024, https://thediplomat.com/2024/05/
chinas-chilling-cognitive-warfare-plans/

288 Patryk Kugiel et.al., “Risks, Resilience, Response (3R): India-EU Cooperation on Russian and Chinese Disinformation and
Propaganda,” Observer Research Foundation, March 15, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/risks-resilience-response-
3r-india-eu-cooperation-on-russian-and-chinese-disinformation-and-propaganda

289 Harsha Kakar, “Explained: Why China’s Focus is on Cyber, Info, And Space As It Restructures Its Defence Plans,” ETV
Bharat, May 1, 2024, https://www.etvbharat.com/en/!opinion/explained-chinese-restructuring-in-defence-enn24042903531

290 Patryk Kugiel et.al., “Risks, Resilience, Response (3R): India-EU Cooperation on Russian and Chinese Disinformation and
Propaganda,” Observer Research Foundation, March 15, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/risks-resilience-response-
3r-india-eu-cooperation-on-russian-and-chinese-disinformation-and-propaganda

291 Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of The Philippines, “DFA Statement on the Alleged Recording of a Conversation
between a Chinese Diplomat and the AFP Western Command,” May 9, 2024, https://dfa.gov.ph/dfa-news/statements-and-
advisoriesupdate/34688-dfa-statement-on-the-alleged-recording-of-a-conversation-between-a-chinese-diplomat-and-the-
afp-western-command.

292 Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of The Philippines, “DFA Statement on the Alleged Recording of a Conversation
between a Chinese Diplomat and the AFP Western Command”

293 Kalpit A. Mankikar and Satyam Singh, “Tracking China’s moves on information warfare,” Observer Research Foundation,
May 22, 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/tracking-china-s-moves-on-information-warfare.

294 Joel Wuthnow, “‘A Brave New World for Chinese Joint Operations,’” Journal of Strategic Studies, February 16, 2017, 40(1–2),
169–195, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01402390.2016.1276012

295 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “From Green to Purple: Can the Chinese Military Become More Joint?,” War on The
Rocks, March 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/from-green-to-purple-can-the-chinese-military-become-more-
joint/

296 Sugiura Yasuyuki, “The PLA’s Pursuit of Enhanced Joint Operations Capabilities,” National Institute for Defense Studies,
Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2022, https://www.nids.mod.go.jp/publication/chinareport/pdf/china_report_EN_web_2022_
A01.pdf

297 Liu Zhen, “Explainer | What is China’s Joint Operations Command Centre and who’s in charge?,” South China Morning Post,
November 22, 2022, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3200564/what-chinas-joint-operations-command-
centre-and-whos-charge

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298 Xinhua, “China sets up joint logistics force, Xi confers flags,” Xinhuanet, September 13, 2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com//
english/2016-09/13/c_135685473.htm

299 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “From Green to Purple: Can the Chinese Military Become More Joint?,” War on The
Rocks, March 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/from-green-to-purple-can-the-chinese-military-become-more-
joint/

300 David M. Finkelstein, “The PLA’s New Joint Doctrine: The Capstone of the New Era Operations Regulations System,”
Center for Naval Analyses, January 1, 2021, https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/09/The-PLAs-New-Joint-Doctrine.pdf

301 “Top military organ issues guidelines”, China Military Online People’s Republic of China, November 14, 2020, http://eng.
chinamil.com.cn/CMC/Departments/OfficeforStrategicPlanning/10055537.html

302 Wang Shichun, “Guancha.com’s Military Review of the Week: The People’s Army in the Era of Great Unity,” Guancha,
November 15, 2020, https://m.guancha.cn/WangShiChun/2020_11_15_571499.shtml

303 Phillip C. Saunders and John Chen, “Is the Chinese Army the Real Winner in PLA Reforms?”, Joint Force Quarterly, 2016,
https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/jfq/jfq-83/jfq-83.pdf

304 Joel Wuthnow and Phillip C. Saunders, “From Green to Purple: Can the Chinese Military Become More Joint?,” War on The
Rocks, March 30, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/from-green-to-purple-can-the-chinese-military-become-more-
joint/

305 Xinhua News Agency, “The Central Military Commission has issued the “Outline of Joint Operations of the Chinese People’s
Liberation Army (Trial)” with the approval of Chairman Xi Jinping.”, Ministry of National Defence, People’s Republic of
China, November 13, 2020, http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/4874081.html

306 David M. Finkelstein, “The PLA’s New Joint Doctrine: The Capstone of the New Era Operations Regulations System,”
Center for Naval Analyses, January 1, 2021, https://www.cna.org/reports/2021/09/The-PLAs-New-Joint-Doctrine.pdf
307 Han Lin, Wei Bing and Liu Jianwei, “A review of the implementation of the “Outline of Joint Operations of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army (Trial)” for one year,” Ministry of National Defence, People’s Republic of China, January 5, 2022,
http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/4902340.html

308 Scott J. Tosi, “Xi Jinping’s PLA Reforms and Redefining “Active Defense,” Military Review, September-October 2023,
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/September-October-23/Active-Defense/Active-
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309 Sugiura Yasuyuki, “The PLA’s Pursuit of Enhanced Joint Operations Capabilities,” National Institute for Defense Studies,
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314 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023,
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316 Liu Xuanzun,” PLA conducts multiple drills in western plateau after India’s exercises ‘targeting China’”

317 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
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318 Liu Xuanzun, Guo Yuandan and Fan Wei, “PLA holds joint drills surrounding Taiwan island to punish secessionist forces,”
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323 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA conducts multiple drills in western plateau after India’s exercises ‘targeting China’,” Global Times,
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324 Liu Xuanzun, “PLA holds live-fire long-range rocket artillery drills in Xizang,” Global Times, December 18, 2022, https://
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325 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
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326 Han Lin, Wei Bing and Liu Jianwei, “A review of the implementation of the “Outline of Joint Operations of the Chinese
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http://www.mod.gov.cn/gfbw/qwfb/4902340.html

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328 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China

329 S.L. Narsimhan, “China on Course to a Strong Military Power,” presentation, “China’s Military Modernisation: Recent
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330 “China’s Defensive National Policy in the New Era”, Ministry of National Defence People’s Republic of China, http://eng.mod.
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331 “China’s Defensive National Policy in the New Era”, Ministry of National Defence People’s Republic of China

332 U.S. Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, October 19, 2023, https://
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333 Dinakar Peri, “China reported to be upgrading roads opposite eastern Ladakh,” The Hindu, October 30, 2022, https://www.
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334 Aadil Brar, “China Builds New Highway Near India To Move Troops for Border Standoff,” Newsweek, December 21, 2023,
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335 Aadil Brar, “China Builds New Highway Near India To Move Troops for Border Standoff ”

336 Aadil Brar, “China Builds New Highway Near India To Move Troops for Border Standoff ”
337 Vishnu Som, “Satellite Pics: Vehicles Cross China’s Now-Complete Pangong Lake Bridge,” NDTV, July 30, 2024, https://
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338 Rashme Sehgal, “Why China is winning the race,” Deccan Herald, January 31, 2024, https://www.deccanherald.com/opinion/
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339 Rashme Sehgal, “Why China is winning the race”

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343 S.L. Narasimhan, “Cause and Effect: Assessing the Impact of Infrastructure Development on Border Security”

344 Tenzin Younten, “China’s Ambitious ‘5G-A’ Plans in Tibet: Strategic Implications for India,” The Diplomat, June 13, 2024,
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346 Tenzin Younten, “China’s Ambitious ‘5G-A’ Plans in Tibet: Strategic Implications for India”

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347 Aadil Brar, “Satellite Images Show China Building Houses on Neighbor’s Territory,” Newsweek, December 16, 2023, https://
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348 Ashok K. Kantha, “India’s China Policy Under the Modi Government,” in Sino-Indian Ties Under Modi: Rising to the
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349 Tang Qingxi, Qiu Hongyu and Zhang Qiang, “PLA develops new emergency cold-proof equipment for plateau troops,” PLA
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350 China Military Online, “A day of border defense company practicing with new integrated individual system,” PLA Daily,
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352 “Combat-readiness support capability in winter plateau greatly improved”

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354 Aleksandra Gadzala Tirziu, “Rising tensions along the Indian-Chinese border”

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356 Atul Kumar, The Vibrant Villages Programme: A Response to PLA’s Salami Slicing through Xiaokang (小康) villages,”
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358 Muyi Xiao and Agnes Chang, “China’s Great Wall of Villages”

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362 Bhaswar Kumar, “Indo-China naval race hots up as Indian, Chinese warships dock in Sri Lanka,” Business Standard, August
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363 Bhaswar Kumar, “Indo-China naval race hots up as Indian, Chinese warships dock in Sri Lanka”

364 Shishir Gupta, “Why are there three Chinese spy ships in the Indian Ocean Region?,” Hindustan Times, April 10, 2024, https://

57
 www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/why-are-there-three-chinese-spy-ships-in-the-indian-ocean-region-101712717751038.
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365 Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Surveying the Seas: China’s Dual-Use Research Operations
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366 Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Surveying the Seas: China’s Dual-Use Research Operations in
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368 Shishir Gupta, “PLA spy ship, Yuan Wang 5, mapping Indian Ocean for Chinese submarine operations,” Hindustan Times,
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369 Sneha Swaminathan, “Presence of Chinese ‘research’ ship Shi Yan 6 in Colombo is problematic for India. Here’s why,”
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370 Ryan Woo, “Maldives visit of Chinese survey ship could rouse Indian Ocean security concerns,” Reuters, February 22,
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371 Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, and Aidan Powers-Riggs, “Surveying the Seas: China’s Dual-Use Research Operations
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373 Amrita Nayak Dutta, “Uptick in Chinese vessels’ presence in Indian Ocean region: Official”

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About the Authors

Kartik Bommakanti is a Senior Fellow with the Strategic Studies Programme at ORF, New Delhi.
Satyam Singh is a former intern at ORF.

The authors would like to thank Vishali Jaipal, former intern at ORF, for her research assistance.

Cover photo: Getty Images/VCG

Back cover image: Getty Images/Andriy Onufriyenko

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