General Theory of Lying
Bok distinguishes between two conceptual domains: the abstract question of truth and falsity, and the moral
question of intended truthfulness or deception. She states that veracity, in most cases, cannot be settled by
establishing the truth or falsity of what one says, but on the basis of whether one intends to mislead. For
instance, if one states that God resides on planet Zook, the statement can be either truthful or deceptive
depending on the level of proof—which is virtually impossible. But regardless of whether the statement is true
or false, the person making it can be accused of lying if he or she made the statement with the intent to
deceive.
Obviously, the two domains of lying often overlap and, up to a point, are inextricable from each other, as in
the case of scientific statements. For our purposes, however, we will leave the domain of the “abstract truth”
alone and proceed with Bok’s investigation of lying as an “intention to deceive.”
According to Bok, a deceptive person is not one who is merely wrong or mistaken; he is one who is
intentionally deceitful or treacherous. A liar is one who intentionally undertakes to deceive others by
communicating messages meant to mislead them. A lie must, therefore, include any intentionally deceptive
message that is stated. Such a statement may be verbal, written, or conveyed via smoke signals, Morse code,
sign language, and the like (Bok, 1978:14). The statement of a message can also be implied by way of a gesture
(as by nodding one’s head for “Yes” and shaking it for “No”), through disguise, by means of action or inaction,
or even through silence.
Bok’s definition of lying is similar to those given by some other philosophers, but not all. The definition of
lying has presented a moral dilemma all its own, because “never telling a lie” can be inconsistent with human
nature and therefore unreasonable. According to Bok, people lie to be sociable, to be humorous, to cheer each
other up, or to avoid being the bearers of bad news. People are also justified in lying when faced with
imminent danger to their lives or safety, because killing and maiming are intrinsic evils, whereas lying is an
instrumental one. Consequently, while certain moralists were rigorously opposed to lying, others tended to
recognize at least a few circumstances in which misleading statements can be allowed. For instance, Grotius, as
well as a long line of Protestant thinkers, argued that speaking falsely to liars—like thieves, to whom
truthfulness is not owed—should not be considered lying. Other moral thinkers developed a variety of “mental
reservations,” which in some extreme formulations can justify a completely misleading statement as long as
one can add a silent qualification in his or her mind to make it true. Thus, if you were asked whether you
broke somebody’s vase, you could answer “No,” adding in your mind the mental reservation of “not last week”
to make the statement technically true (Bok, 1978:15).
Bok further explains that all deceptive messages can be affected, more or less, by the factors of self-
deception, error, or variations in one’s intent to deceive. She calls these factors “filters” that alter the way in
which a message can be experienced by both the deceived and the deceiver. Bok adds that when people intend
to deceive, they usually work with such filters in order to manipulate their victims; they can play on the biases
of certain persons (for example, affirmative action can destroy one’s chances for promotion), on the
imagination of others (for example, strategic defense initiative is a panacea against all attacks by foreign
powers), or on the confusion throughout the system (for example, the national debt could be wiped out in 23.8
months if federal income taxes were increased by 3.497%, compounded daily).
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The Origins of Lying
The origin of lying has been perceived from two viewpoints: the religionist view and the sociological view.
The religionist view is based on the “fall from grace” theory that equates all human behavior with sin.
According to Christian belief, all human beings are products of Adam’s sin, and everyone is born with the
propensity to commit evil. Lying is therefore a manifestation of evil. Based on this view, as one grows into
adulthood, the propensity to lie is actualized due to increasing unsavory social demands and the inevitable
need to compete with other “sinners.” Consequently, all adults will eventually lie whenever deception is
deemed serviceable either for gaining an advantage or avoiding pain. This tendency will cease, the religionists
submit, only when the human character is sanctified and cleansed from sin. This transformation can occur
only when one is touched by God’s grace, repents of one’s sins, and devotes one’s life to worshipping God.
The sociological view of lying has been championed by physical and behavioral scientists who disagreed
with the religionist view. They contend that lying is a learned behavior that thrives more or less in proportion
to one’s level of socialization. The sociological view has been supported by two main arguments: (1) Scientific
findings have not (as yet) shown that lying is genetically based. These scientists argue that all human beings
start out as innocent infants who have no particular inclination either to lie or to tell the truth. (2) Learning
theory indicates that moral character is an acquired trait and lying is a product of deficient learning (learning
the wrong things). Psychiatrists assert that the initial process of moral development starts at age 2, when
children begin to understand reality. For instance, a child accepts food from a parent’s hand because his parent
tells him it is good, and abstains from touching a hot stove because he is told it is bad. Truth-telling at that
level is considered a matter of life and death.
Many sociologists advocate that children begin telling lies because of their inability to distinguish right from
wrong. Their lies are mostly attributed to messages they receive in associating with their parents; for instance,
those who lie to a police officer when stopped for a traffic violation, or accept too much change from a cashier
without calling the error to his or her attention. Such messages seem to continue ingraining themselves in the
child’s moral character. Tarnow, a well-recognized psychiatrist, states that “overall, the determinant of
whether children will cheat or lie [as adults] is whether their parents cheat or lie—their moral standards”
(Houston Post, May 12, 1990). By the age of 6, a child would have developed the cognitive ability to understand
right from wrong and realize when he or she is trying to deceive. From that point on, Tarnow stresses, the
pattern of moral character continues through adulthood.
According to the sociological view, while parents and family members play a major role in the moral
development of children, society as a whole also contributes to their developmental process. Ideas of honesty
and dishonesty come from playmates and schoolmates, but more significantly from those who play the role of
societal parents. Adult children begin noting television commercials that portray political candidates as liars,
television evangelists who are disgraced for lying to their congregations, or businesspeople indicted for
cheating and embezzling. They may also learn the advantages of lying as acts done in self-interest, or as tools
for getting ahead in competitive situations. At school they may realize the benefit of lying to a teacher (for
example, “I forgot my homework”), to the athletic coach (for example, “I was sick”), and to other students. In
time, especially if lies continue to go unchecked and internal controls fail to develop, the choice to lie becomes
seductive and compulsive, if not addictive. Under extreme conditions, compulsive liars develop pseudologia
fantastica, a combination of a disease and a habit, commonly known as “pathological lying.” Its exact
condition depends largely on the extent to which the individual confuses falsehood with reality. In acute cases,
pathological lying is known to cause false recollection or fabrication of memory (Swanson, Chamelin, &
Territo, 1988:131).
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