Surat Flood of August 2006

"The people of Gujarat still cannot forget the havoc caused by flood of 1968 and 1970 in
Tapi and Narmada. The Ukai Dam project would provide effective protection against floods
to Surat city and other downstream areas...." introductory booklet published by the
Government of Gujarat (GOG) on the Ukai Project in 1972.

For the first 20 years (1972-93), after the completion of the Ukai dam, there were no major
floods in Surat and in other downstream areas. However, since 1994, Surat witnessed three
major floods - 1994 (which gave rise to epidemic of plague to Surat), 1998, and 2006.

On the morning of August 7, 2006. Tapi was flowing at its full glory at the warning level of
about 8.5 meters at Hope bridge, a benchmark in Surat city. People were busy in their daily
chores and had no idea as to what was to follow. By midnight that day eighty per cent of the
city was under flood. The unprecedented damage to life and property followed consequently
estimated at Rs. 20,000 crore.

The City of Surat

The city of Surat, located on the western part of India in the state of Gujarat on the River
Tapi, had about ó km long coastal belt along the Arabian Sea, which made the city an
important historical trade centre. It enjoyed prosperity through sea trade in the 16th, 17th
and 18th centuries and became one of the most important trade links between India and
many other countries. After independence, it gained significant growth in trading and
industrial activities, which coupled with residential developments lead to the considerable
expansion of the city. The city has one of the highest proposed investments and almost zero
percent unemployment. It is among the fastest growing cities in India. Surat is also known as
'The Silk City'. "The Diamond City', and 'The Green City' (See Exhibit 1: Surat City with Tapi
River).

The Flood in South Asia

South Asian floods, which counted annually almost 40 per cent floods in Asia, commonly
occurred due to heavy rains within a short time period in the catchment areas of rivers and
snow melting in upland mountains. The South Asia is geographically integrated with shared
mountain ranges, deserts, river basins, and oceans. Therefore, flood occurrences in one
country lead to direct impact on neighboring countries. In the past 30 years, due to flood,
economic losses had tripled and human casualties had increased by more than five fold in
South Asia

The rapid unplanned expansion of cities, illegal slums, improper urban infrastructure design,
fast development ignoring natural flood plains, poor road design and maintenance, open
spaces and sewerage networks, State's and Center's differences on the hydro-
meteorological flooding made the issue more complex and left low lying and
underdeveloped urban areas as soft target to floods.

The Tapi River

Tapi, the second largest westward flowing river in India after Narmada, originating at Multai
in Betul district of the state Madhya Pradesh (MP) at the height of about 750 meters from
the sea level. The river is about 724 kms long with four distinct reaches during its course. In
the initial reach of 240 kms from the origin, the river largely flows through densely forested
area of MP and emerges into a narrow plain. In the second reach (stretch of about 288 kms),
it enters Maharatsra, where it gets swelled by several of its large tributaries on both sides. In
the third reach, between Nandurbar and Ukai (528 to 608 kms from the origin), the river
again enters the hilly area covered with thick forest. Finally, in the last reach, downstream of
Ukai, the river enters the flat and fertile lands of Gujarat. There, the river has low banks and
many rapids and falls beyond Kakrapar where it flows past the towns of Mandvi and Kathor.
Low banks beyond Kakrapar causes periodic overflow resulting in extensive flood damages
(Exhibit 2). The drainage system of the river on the southern side is more extensive than
that of the northern side. Most of the drainage area of the Tapi basin is located in the state
of Maharatsra. Total catchment area of the basin is 65,145 kms including about 79, 15, and
6 per cent in Maharastra, MP, and Gujarat respectively.

The rainstorms in the Tapi catchment are caused by the weather depressions (low pressure
zones) originating in the Bay of Bengal and moving westward. In the catchment area of Tapi
river the monsoon generally starts during the third week of June and there are occasional
heavy rainstorms from the beginning of August till the end of September. The mean annual
rainfall in the basin is estimated to be about 758 mm. while the average monsoon rainfall
from 1988 to 1998 was 897 mm. The maximum annual rainfall (1168 mm) and the minimum
of (257 mm) were recorded in 1944 and 1899. The heavy rainstorms largely occurred during
the months of August and September. Most of the floods in Tapti occurred during August.

History of Floods in Surat

The major flood in Tapi generally occurred due to a series of heavy spell of rain traveling
across the basin from east to west with increasing intensity. Since the river also traveled
from east to west, this leads to synchronization of storm with the flood wave. Runoff
generated from the rains in the Upper catchment on pervious days was added to the one
generated by the rains in the lower catchment on the next day, increasing the intensity of
the flood. Almost all the major floods in Tapi had been caused by such storms traveling from
east to west. In the catchment area of Tapi heavy stormy rainfall when it occurs generally
lasts for a period of three days during monsoon. This combined with low banks in the lower
catchment of the river in Gujarat results in frequent overflowing of the river causing major
floods and damage.

In ninety-four years, from 1876 to 1970, the Tapi crossed danger level at Hope Bridge in
Surat for 19 times, ie, on an average every five years. However, the floods were not regular.
The 1968 flood had been the biggest flood with a peak flow of about 15 lakh cubic feet of
water per second (Cusecs).

The Ukai Dam Project

To prevent repeated floods in Surat, a major Dam project was cleared by the Planning
Commission in 1961 and constructed in 1972 at village of Ukai, which is located about 100
km upstream of Surat. Stating the purpose of the Ukai Dam project, an introductory booklet
was published by the State Government on the Ukai Project, said:

"The people of Gujarat cannot forget the havoc caused by flood of 1968 and 1970 in
Tapi and Namada. This project would provide effective protection against floods to
Surat city and other downstream areas. It would be possible to release water from
reservoir in advance in a regulated manner, as soon as warning of the approaching
flood is received from the upstream areas. This would create adequate space in the
reservoir to store floodwaters. Thus, it would be possible to effectively control floods
by regulated release of water in advance."

The annual water availability in Tapi at Ukai, with 75 percent dependability, was estimated
to be 11,350 million cubic metre (MCM), of which Gujarat has been allocated 3,947 MCM (35
percent), while the rest 65 percent was allocated to Maharastra and MP (Exhibit 3) However,
Maharastra was not utilizing its full quota and as such surplus water was available or use at
Ukai. The water stored at the Ukai reservoir was primarily used for irrigation, domestic and
industrial water supply, electricity generation and flood control in Surat city and other
downstream areas.

The flood control capacity of any dam depends on several parameters. The factor to keep in
mind while designing dam and determining the maximum regulated outflow from dam is the
water carrying capacity of the river in the downstream area. The "design flood" (the
maximum flood a dam can control by its design) information is needed for flood protection
measures in a river basin and for the design of water related structures against failure by
overtopping (hydrologic failure). Design flood for Ukai dam is estimated to be 17.48 lakh
cusecs coming in at reservoir level of 345 ft. (Exhibit 4). Design flood for Ukai dam can be
controlled by releasing maximum of 8.5 lakh cusec and filling the reservoir to 347 ft. This is
under optimal scenario with 2-3 days warning of rain and flood.

Floods after the Construction of Dam

Before the dam was built. Surat and Bharuch were used to encounter flood periodically. For
the first 20 years (1972-93), after the completion of the Ukai dam, there were no major
floods in Surat city and in other downstream areas. The floods of 1978 and 1979, with peaks
greater than 8 lakh cusec, were effectively regulated by restricting outflow from Ukai to 4.4
lakh cusec (in 1978) and 3.3 lakh cusec (in 1979). One of the Suratis (people of Surat) said,
"since there was no flooding in Surat and other downstream areas during 1972-93 a sense of
security in the mind of Suratis has developed".

However, thereafter, Surat witnessed three major floods in 1994, 1998, and 2006. The flood
of 1994 was the smallest of these three floods, but nevertheless caused sever damage in
some of the low lying parts of city. Moreover, it also gave rise to epidemic of plague to Surat
in its aftermath and caused many deaths and widespread panic through out the country.
The larger flood of 1998 flooded many parts of the city that were not affected by the 1994
flood. The outflows from the Ukai dam during these floods were high (Exhibit 5). For
example, the peak inflow at Ukai during 1994 and 1998 was more than 8 lakh cusec only for
a period of 6 hours, this is much lower that design flood of 17.5 lakh cusec, and yet the peak
outflow was as high as 6 and 7 lakh cusec respectively. This indicated that water was not
released in advance and in a timely fashion in expectation of flood. The flood of August
2006, with a peak of 9 lakh cusec, brought eighty per cent of the city under water and
caused unprecedented damage to life and property.

The rise level of water at Hope bridge with different outflow level at Ukai dam is increasing
(Exhibit 5). Both the flood of 1968 and 2006 with a peak of 15 lakh cusec and 9 lakh
(respectively) had risen up to the level of 12.01 meters at Hope bridge in Surat.

Flood of August 2006 in Surat

The whole state of Gujarat was reeling under severe hot summer and droughts were
prevalent in Saurashtra region of the state. The first spell of rain in the 2nd week of July
brought a sigh of relief. But this very first spell of rain caused floods in the Central Gujarat,
wherein 40 to 50 villages were badly affected. On 3 of August. Indian Metrological
Department (IMD) Ahmedabad had issued a warning of "heavy to very heavy rainfall" in next
48 hours in the Narmada, Tapi, and Damanganga basins with "extremely heavy rainfall at a
few isolated places". It also released a satellite imagery at 10-00 am on the same day, which
showed that a low-pressure zone with dense cloud cover rushing from Telangana region of
Andhra Pradesh to the Tapi and Narmada basins. Meanwhile, GOG was preparing for the
mega show on the 15th of August to exhibit the vibrant Gujarat and the entire state
administration was geared up for event.

Heavy rains were reported from various places in MP on 3 and 4th of August. T.V. channels
showed flooding in Bhusawal on August 04. Rains continued on 5ht and 6 of August in the
catchment area of Tapi.

Sensing the danger of flood, Surat Collector and Municipal Commissioner asked for release
of 2 lakh and 4 lakh cusecs of water from the night of 4th and 5th of August respectively.
However, one of the engineers reacted,

"There is no point in collectors making such requests as they do not have the necessary
technical knowledge and are in no position to decide how much water should be released
and when."

The officers of the Narmada Water Resource & Water Supply (NWR&WS), specialized experts
in flood control, were supposed to advise the govemment on dam operation. Replying to the
demand of releasing water, Minister for NWR&WS, Mr. Narottambhai Patel who was present
in Surat, on August 3, 2006, has reportedly said,

"At present the water level in the reservoir is 334 ft. and it is necessary to reach the rule
level of 337 ft. by 15th August. If water level goes beyond 345 ft then there is danger to the
dam, but before that there is no question of releasing any water. The instruction have been
given not to release any water now except only 25,000 cusecs, necessary for electricity
generation shall be released..

No major releases were made even after the floodwaters had started entering the reservoir
in a big way on 6th August. One of the experts comments:

"The authorities were so hooked to the decision of 'not releasing any water until the
reservoir is first filled up to the level of 345 ft.' that they simply could not see that filling the
reservoir by the coming floodwaters is indeed possible. The rule levels were mean to be
adhered to when the situation is normal."

On the morning of 7 August, when people were preparing for their daily chores. Tapi was
flowing at about 8.5 meters at Hope bridge, yet there was no flooding of low lying areas of
the city. Many people flocked to the various bridges on Tapi to see the river at its glory. The
Ukai dam authorities suddenly started releasing huge quantities of water form the dam. A
warming of approaching flood was issued around the noon. Schools were closed and after
some time bridges were closed for the traffic. The water started entering the low lying areas
of the city around 3:00 pm and by midnight eighty percent area of the Surat city was under
water with water level in the river crossing the highest level of 12 meters at Hope bridge.
Large areas were severely affected with 15-20 ft. of water and many other areas with
medium (10-15 ft.) or low floods (1-5 ft.). More than 20 lakh people were trapped in their
houses at higher floors or terraces for 4 days and nights with no electricity, drinking water,
milk, vegetable or food, and no communication with outside world. Many, whose houses had
only ground floors, took shelter in neighbors' houses or terraces. It was a major human
tragedy.

The Army was called in to carry out relief and rescue operations. However, they were lacking
in knowledge of local situation and coordination with local people. People were getting more
help from their neighbors than authorities. Finally, by the night of 11 August water receded
from most of the areas. However, the receding water has left behind thousands of tons of
mud and muck and rooting dead bodies and food grains in houses and on streets and roads
with a real threat of major epidemics. (See Exhibit 6 for chronology of Flood).

The sharp and sudden rise of water on 7th August left people with their own devises to cope
with this disaster. Even after the warning of flood in the noon, people had no idea how much
water was coming. Many people had to simply run away to the higher places without taking
any of their valuables and cut-off from their family members.

Local fishermen played a major role in rescuing as many people as they could. However,
they were handicapped by strong current in the river as absence of high-power boats and
other equipments. Most people had thrown their houses and terraces open to give shelter to
their neighbors. The Gujarat gas pipelines were not interrupted. Hence, people with kitchens
on upper floors could at least cook food for themselves and for their neighbors. Food for
whole residential colonies, which had 2-3 story building, was prepared in just a few houses
and then passed around from one terrace to the other through strings and ropes. Similarly,
drinking water was rationed. Stored water in the overheads tanks was used for drinking and
floodwater was used for other purposes.

Thousands of men and women from surrounding villages that went out flooded had started
preparing food and collecting water bottles/pouches, milk, fresh vegetables, etc., even while
Surat was under water. As soon as water started receding, they descended upon Surat with
thousands of trucks and tractors filled with these essentials items and freely distributed
them in every nook and corner of the city at great speed to help people of Surat. This
spontaneous response of the people of the surrounding villages provided great initial relief
to the people of Surat after the floodwaters receded.

Government officers, local people, NGOs etc. joined hands with community in a big way to
complete the massive task of cleaning up the mud and muck that the receding floodwaters
had left behind. In spite of immense effort of people, relief agencies, and NGOs, flood caused
huge losses to the city. Total industrial loss was estimated to be RS. 16,000 crore (Exhibit 7).

Some Important Issues of Surat Flood

Dam Management and Flood Control: Immediately after the construction of the Ukai dam
the Central Water Commission (CWC) in 1975 prepared detailed guidelines for the flood
control operation of the Ukai reservoir. The guidelines recommended that up to the end of
August, the reservoir should be filled maximum up to the level of 339 ft. and thereafter be
gradually raised up to full reservoir level (FRL) of 345 ft. by the end of September. The
guidelines prescribed that the reservoir level would not be allowed to go above the FRL of
345 ft. for passing floods of up to 13 lakh cusec flow (Exhibit 8).

Later, due to increased demand for water and absence of major flood, the State Government
relaxed the rule levels and recommended that the reservoir may be filled up to the level of
343 ft. by the end of August and then filled up to FRL by 15th September. This consequently
reduced the available flood cushion in the reservoir and thus aggravated the problem of
flood management. After the major flood of 1994 and 1998, a joint committee with CWC
Central Design Organization, NWR&WS, and GOG was formed in 1999 to review the
procedure and prepare a manual to provide clear guidelines to the officers for dam
operation. The committee developed 'Manual on Flood Control Operation of Ukai dam' in July
2000, which continued to be used in Ukai dam operation. The manual made clear and
specific recommendations on:

Maintaining appropriate rule level at which water level in the reservoir should be kept to
maintain adequate flood cushion
Specifying criteria for flood warnings and forecasts by CWC and

Providing clear procedures for the operation of dam under different situations

Water Release vs Water Storage: In 1975 the restricted outflow at Ukai was 8.5 lakh cusec

and water was not allowed to go above the Full Reservoir Level (FRL) of 345 ft for passing
flood up to 13 lakh cusec magnitude. It was required to balance the conflicting needs of
storing necessary water for various requirements like drinking water supply, irrigation, and
electricity generation with the need of leaving adequate empty space (flood cushion) in the
reservoir for absorbing sudden influx of water during floods following heavy rains in
catchment area. The manual had examined those conflicting needs and fixed the rule levels
and dam operation procedures for four monsoon months (Exhibit 9).

Under normal situation as defined in the manual, all additional inflow of water up to 5 lakh
cusec should be released downstream, once the water level in the reservoir has reached the
prescribed rule level for the day. It is critical to maintain adequate flood cushion in the
reservoir during Augusts and September, as the major flood in Tapi usually occur during
these two months. However, it seems that the irrigation department's main concern was to
keep the dam reservoir as full as possible to ensure that maximum water for irrigation is
made available in summer months. Exhibit 10 shows the rainfall inflow, out flow and
reservoir levels during August 2006

Recalling his meeting with irrigation department officials to understand the water release
system of the Ukai dam, one of the members of independent committee to investigate 1994
plague epidemic said that the officials indicated that the water release is done using some
thumb rules guided by "Rules Book" of the irrigation department. It was some static (fixed)
conditions about maintaining dam water level at fixed height by certain dates of calendar.
The member continued:

"The irrigation department's main concern was to keep the dam reservoir as full as possible
to make maximum water for irrigation in summer months. Hence, irrigation department was
likely to delay release of water till the dam is full. This was perhaps because the department
was called irrigation department."

Some of the experts say "the irrigation department has not even followed the standard
guidelines of rule book for releasing the water from dam. The undue delay happened in
releasing water in the first week of August 2006 from Ukai Dam. The early release of water
would have averted floods in Surat".

Prediction of Flood: The Tapi division of Central Water Commission (CWC) has a system of

18 rainfall monitoring stations spread across the entire river basin, 9 discharge monitoring
stations, and 7 gauge stations equipped with wireless communication facility for collecting
and transmitting the hydrological data to the flood control room at Surat. Rainfall, water
level, discharge and other parameters are continuously monitored at these stations and data
is transmitted to the CWC division office at Surat through a wireless network. In addition,
daily rainfall of some key rain gauge stations and heavy rainfall warning are also received by
telegram/teleprinter from IMD. These data is transmitted to the control room at Surat, which
then issues inflow forecasts for Ukai dam and flood warnings and passes this information to
various State Government agencies.
According to criteria set in manual of Ukai dam operation. CWC shall issue regular 12 hourly
inflow forecast for Ukai dam for all floods with a peak discharge of more than 35,000 cusec,
irrespective of the water level in the Ukai reservoir. These forecasts were based on the
hydrological data from the base station at Gidhede in Maharatra and available information
for the intermediate catchment area at Tapi. Gidhade is about 130 km upstream of Ukai and
travel time for water from there to Ukai is about 12 hrs. This means that at any time point.
amount of water that passed through the river at Gidhade in past 12 hours would be the
amount that would come at Ukai in the next 12 hours, subject to correction based on this
inflow from the intermediate catchment. The forecasts also provide additional information
like inflow in 06 hours, in 12-24 hours, and after 24 hours. The forecasts are continuously
monitored during the period and revised, if necessary, after 6 hrs. Beside these regular
forecasts, advisory flood warnings for expected high flood are also issued when the reservoir
level was above 333 ft (Exhibit 11).

The Ukai dam authorities were expected to fill up 'Forecast Based Reservoir Operation
(FBRO)' forms on the basis of these forecasts, determine the rate at which water should be
released from the reservoir to maintain the water level at the prescribed rule level, and then
operate the gates of the dam to release the water at the rate so determined. For the
advisory warning on 3rd and 4th, FBOR forms were not filled and no reason was given in the
FERO as to why release were kept much less than that required for such a long time. By the
7th August, the water level in the reservoir had already reached 340 ft. and safety of the
dam had come under danger. Thereafter the outflow was drastically increased.

There are three types of forecasts and their conditions namely, normal, high alert and
emergency situation (Exhibit 9). The rainfall considered for forecast was the one recorded up
to 8:30 am for previous 24 hours. No high alert/emergency warning was issued before the
flood, although more than 65 mm of rainfall had already fallen in both upper and lower
catchment by 8:30 pm on 5th August. On 6 morning, the water level in the reservoir was
335 ft. and so no warning was issued though it was absolutely cleared by 5 night that a
major flood situation had developed in the catchment area as more than 65 mm of average
rainfall had already fallen across the whole catchment and it was still increasing. On 7th
August Ukai authorities had realized that a major emergency has arisen and as such there
was no need for any such warnings. The Surat staffs of CWC were simultaneously engaged
in providing forecasts for three major floods (Damanganga. Tapi, and Narmada) during this
period. From 7th of August their office was under more than 10 ft. of water with no
electricity, water, and food. An expert commenting on flood warning says,

"This was the way in which the CWC, a premiere engineering institution of the
country, was expected to perform its tasks. To a certain extent, this reflects the
mechanistic and unimaginative manner in which engineers working in a government
setup approach their tasks. The Ukai engineers could not see the flood coming as no
emergency warning had been issued by CWC."

City Planning: Around Surat, a large area that was previously agricultural fields and thus

was open has been brought under the city limits. As a result, many high-rise apartments and
other buildings have come up in those areas. Most of these constructions were in higher
area but some were at lower level and in the riverbed. Besides these, many factors like
construction in flood plain areas, flood embankment, filling of riverbed by 3 meters at Hazira
in hundreds of square km area, silting of riverbed due to tides, construction of Signapore
weir, construction of new bridges, etc., has reduced the carrying capacity of the river and
open space for spread of floodwaters. The flood of 1994 with a peak of 6 lakh cusec, the
flood of 1998 with a peak of 7 lakh cusec, and the flood of 2006 with a peak of 9 lakh cusec,
rose up to the level of 10.2 meters, 11.5 meters, and 12.5 meters respectively at Hope
bridge. However, the flood of 1968 with a peak of 15 lakh cusec has risen up to the level of
12.01 meters only. Experts viewed that a flood of 8.5 lakh cusec can no longer be
considered safe for Surat and other downstream areas. Even a flood of 5.5 cusec, which
would rise up to the level of 9.5 meters, could affect some low-lying areas. Any flood.
greater than that of 5.5 lakh cusecs would start spilling over the banks causing damage.

The water carrying capacity of river in the downstream areas was considered to be é lakh
cusecs (absolutely safe) to 8.5 lakh cusecs (relatively safe with some flooding in low lying
areas). After construction of Ukai dam much development has taken place in low and high
lying areas of Surat.

Over the years, urbanization and industrialization has increased and farmers have switched
to water intensive crops such as sugarcane, which consequently increased the demand of
water. On the other hand, the live storage capacity of the Ukai reservoir is reduced due to
siltation. But even now (after siltation) the live capacity is still as high as 6,540 MCM and
Maharatsra is still not utilizing its full quota of water. Now, as soon as reservoir is 80% full
(the water level is about 333 ft.), the live storage reaches 4988 MCM, which is higher than
the total need of Gujarat. Therefore, there is no need to fill the dam completely for water
needs of Gujarat. The left and right bank canals take off from the reservoir is at the level of
270 ft. Therefore, water stored above the minimum draw down level (MDDL) of 272 ft. can
be released in the canals, while water stored below this level cannot be utilized. This is dead
storage.

Health: Post flood situation always carry a major risk of disease outbreaks. The memories of
outbreak of plague after flood in 1994, forced the people and administration to clean up the
city as fast as possible. Because of widespread distribution of clean drinking water in bottles
and pouches and people's awareness there were no major outbreaks after flood in 2006.
However, appearance of cases of Leptospirocis, which had symptoms similar to that of
plague, caused a widespread fear of possible plague epidemic in the city. First case with
symptoms of Acute Respiratory Distress (ARD) was reported on 18th August following few
more cases. Laboratory tests at the Civil Hospital quickly identified that these cases were of
Leptospirosis and not of plagues. The quick and timely intervention by Surat Civil Hospital
(SCH) in coordination with Surat Municipal Corporation (SMC) and private medical
practitioners brought it under control. Speedy clean up of the city also helped in checking
the spread of the disease. Despite all these measures, about 225 confirmed cases of
Leptospirosis were reported, of which 34 people died. In addition, 60-65 people died because
of similar symptoms. It can be said that about 100 people lost their lives in the post- flood
outbreak of Leptospirosis in Surat.

After 1994 plague, SMC instituted a system of monitoring incidence of various diseases in
each ward of the city, by collecting data from select private practitioners on a daily basis
and then taking preventive measures in consultation with Surat Civil Hospital. Because of
SMC's efforts, Surat, which was once full of mosquitoes, became mostly free of that menace.
After 1994 plague it was also implementing a program of continuous monitoring of rats/flees
in the city to know whether there is a possibility of plague epidemic or not.

The Accountability: There was a widespread perception that the flood was a man-made
disaster that could have been prevented or at least significantly managed. However, one of
the government officials said:

"It is easy to say things on hindsight, but the fact is that this was nothing but a natural flood
which was caused by sudden heavy rainfall in the catchment and that the Ukai dam
authorities did everything they could to moderate this flood and the havoc in Surat would
have been much greater if the dam was not there."

The State Government, especially Narmada Water Resources and Water Supply (NWR&WS)
department, had the charge of Ukai dam and was responsible for the day-to-day operation
of the dam. The state government argued that this disaster was primarily caused by the
sudden and much unexpected influx of the huge quantity of water in a short time span of 24
hours, which was due to nature only. In the argument presented by Superintendent Engineer
(SE), Ukai Circle, in an affidavit filed on behalf of the State Government before the Gujarat
High Court in a Public interest Writ Petition (Special Civil Application No. 17841 of 2006),
said:

"The inflow of water increased from 141 MCM in the first half of 6 August to 1300
MCM in the second half of 7th August. This more than nine fold increase in the inflow
in a short time of 24 hours was due to nature, which nobody could ever predict...
Releasing the water from the dam in a gradual manner in advance was also not
possible as there was no advance forecast or warning of such voluminous inflow of
water into the reservoir. Advance release of water with a view of emptying the
reservoir could have proved disastrous, if subsequently there was no rain which may
eventually result in shortage of water for drinking, irrigation, and power
generation....What is the noteworthy is that in spite of maximum inflow above 12
lakh cusecs, outflow was restricted to maximum of 9.10 lakh cusecs only."

Acronyms
ARD Acute Respiratory Distress

CDMS Computerised Dam Management System

CWC Central Water Commission

DSS Decision Support System

FBRO Forecast Based Reservoir Operation

FRL Full Reservoir Level

GIS Geographical Information System

GOG Government of Gujarat

GOI Government of India

IIM Indian Institute of Management

IIT Indian Institute of Technology

IMD Indian Meteorological Department.

ISRO Indian Space Research Organization

Kms Kilo Meter

Kms Square Kilo Meter

MCM Million Cubic Metres

MDDL Minimum Draw Down Level

MM Mille Meter

MP Madhya Pradesh
NWRWS Narmada Water Resource & Water Supply

RBA Rashtriya Barh Ayog (National Flood Commission)

SE Superintendent Engineer

SCH Surat Civil Hospital

SMC Surat Municipal Corporation