From: Costloriv.Terry L Sent: Fri Jun 11 00:16:052010 To: Wells.
Kent Subject: My Notes from Andy lnglis Telecon of June 7 lmporlance: Normal one Attachments: Notes from Andy InglisTelecon of June 7.doc; focusonSevenmechanismsV6 pager.pdf
Kent (Hollll'ood1 Wells. Here are uq.'notesfront Aldr,'s lr4oMat,telecon. I har,ealso inctudeda copyof tlre 7 Control l\Icchanisms that ilre for being er:alnated failure poteittial. Tlresemal be helpfill for lour Tomrhall lomorro$'. terr\
Exhibit No. Worldwide Court lnc.
BP-HZN-21 79MDL00se23e6
TREX-06322 EXHIBIT
Notes from Andy Inglis Telecon of June 7,,2010 . Thanks all who arehelpingto providesupport the GOM incidentandto to to thosethat are providingcoverage their absence. in Be awareof associate of low probability,high consequenc risk events. Thepenalties associated theHorizon eventwill be severe; humbleand with a straight forward approach theincidentis needed. to Realize that we havea low debtgearingratioandgreatfinancialstrenghto weather this storm. We caninvestin the futureandpay the dividend. Our response the Horizonincidentis consistent our corevalues. We are to with party,we mustlead. theresponsible Controlling Source: the . . ' . . . ' I . r Thereare over 500engineers from BP andindustrysupporting effort. this We pumped 30,000 bblsof mudintothewell duringtopkill operations. Therewere22shots bridgingmaterial. of We learned greatdealaboutthe condition a ofthe well and its integrity during the topkill process. We are now capturing about 15,000 bblVdayfrom the LMRP cap. The Q4o00will be setup the endof theweekto help captureadditional by oil. In earlyJulywe will havea permanently riserto allowa buoyed suspension ofoperations duringa hunicane. Relief well on trackfor Augustcompletion Largestresponse launched. ever
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Thereare at leastseven controlmechanisms couldhavecontrolledthe that situation l. Cementdid not sealthe reservoir 2. Casing the system not seal well bore did problems 3, Pressure regimes indicated tesling 4. Procedures detect controlhydrocarbon well did not work in to and 5. BOP activation system failed 6. BOP "deadman" system failed to seal 7. BOP features allowROV closure that aflerblowoutfailedto function To earlvto determine who is at fault
BP- HZN- 21 79MD L00992397
Sectorleadershipno longer good enough o Higher industry standards will be reqr-rired o Higher equipmentreliabiliry will be required
Rebuilding Trust o Wished that the event had never occured o We will be judged on our response. r How transparent are with the govemmentand public trye r How we help local communities dealwith economic impact . I'Iow we restorethe environment. We must finish this job. . We must investin a sustainable DW business FinancialConsequence o $lbn already spent o Spendwill be very high for the next couplemonths+ o Overall, spendwill be significant and will be spreadovr many years . o We will pay legitimateclaims o We will investglobally o We will meet shareholder oblieations PerMike Daily o Only good that cancome of this is learning o This is an industry problems- per Petro Bras . Pl6 platform sink (10 control mechanisms failed) . Blowout when BOP did not close Given lic, at risk? I r AK P/L failures,Propane I'rading issueand now Horizon, is our LTO We will be challenged, we can rebuild but Our valuesare strong and so are our linancials
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Focuson safe and reliable operations o More call will comein tbr help - they will needsupport o Prioritize what is going on in your operations We will learn, improve and tre better for it - rve havea seriousobligation
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B P-HZN-21 79MDL00992398
3 Jun 2Ol0
Focuson SevenGontrolMechanisms
Th. CemDt tttat sarls th. neruoir
trom t'h3 w.ll
. Cement may nol have effectivEly sealed all hydrocarbonbearing zones trom the well bore
The Casing svstem, which nals tba well bore o Reseruoirfluids enterod the wellbore . Tho leak path is not knwn at this time i. Sh@track ii. Casing iii. Casing hangor/sal acsembty
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The perc
l:sls tD @rflrm t'h. wcll is saa!.d . During negalive -1400 psiwas obserued the test on ddllpipewhilo0 psiwas observod the kill lino. on . 1&30bbl bledback- presere on drillpiperemained
r f)acrsion taken displace riserto sawater to the
The execudon ol ptocedu?G to dobct r|rd control hydrocarbons in tho well, including trh. us ot ifre BOP . Hydrmrbms rere unknowingly circulated to surtaae while displacing the riser with seawater . As hydrocarbons rose to surtffi hydrostatic orggsure thy expdndgd, reducing
o Waming signs were visible -50 mins belore the explosion ard again whn the pump wae shut down (-20 mins out) r The well flowed and according to witness account. the Annular Freventer and the Diverter were activated . Exobsions acurred ldlryed bv a oower failure
ThG EOP Em.rgeacy Dbconnsct Systn, activatsd by pushing r butrton ri multipla locations on th. rig . Witness accounts suggest that the Emrgemy Systenrwas activated Dsconnect
. The system taibd to wdk as intsnded. Fqrv was not conlained and the Lowr Marine Riser Packagedid not disconrpct
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The Automatic Clocure oftrc BOPafter its conneclion b lct wlrh rhe rlg . TheAutomatic Mode Function "Deadmn" system or were lost failed sealflow when the MUXlinehvdraulics to
Foalures ot lha gOP b allow ROVS to closa tha B'oP aDd thnlry sol thc mll at thr s.ab.d all.? e blow out . The Autoshear system was manually aclivated by the ROV, but did not ed the tlc^ry . The 'Dadnn" system was manudlyactivated by the BOV, but did not seal the flw . Atlempts rnado to clos6 tha Blind Shoar Rams with lhe ROV did not.seal the flry gOP d"onort"* to- d"tn
. ROV stab in mrts had been modif ied . Modificatims have been discovered in ttp BOP systenl . Leaks have be^ discovered in the BOP hydraulics system . Hrve not determired which modifications or leaks conlributed to tho EOP failure,if any
BP-HZN-279MD100s92399 1
