EN BANC

G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T. SARMEN,
AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ, SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ,
GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN,
RODOLFO E. PEREZ, HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C.
BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO& JONATHAN
DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND AS LEGITIMATE
MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA
(ATING KOOP PARTY LIST), Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
EN BANC AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST
REPRESENTED BY AMPARO T. RIMAS, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, C.J.:
The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve the seemingly
elementary matter of the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the
expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on
the one hand; and from his party-list organization, on the other.

The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list organization, the
Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is headed by
petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who represents the organization in the
House of Representatives, and the other group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents
herein, or the Rimas Group).
THE CASE

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 641 in relation to Rule 65,2 seeking to
annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January 2013
of the COMELEC.
THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16

November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List
System Act (Party-List Law).

Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policymaking body is the
National Convention. The Central Committee, however, takes over when the
National Convention is not in session.3

On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in

the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections. 4 On 6 March
2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee.

On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning

party-list groups.5 Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v.
COMELEC,6 Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner
Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives,7 and thereafter assumed office.

Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list

organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution
2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its
nominees.8 Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list
Representative for the first year of the three-year term.9

On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it
introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes
was the composition of the Central Committee,10 which would still be composed of
15 representatives but with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-
5-5 equal representation).11 The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an
election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National
Convention.12

In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent
members (referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central
Committee.13 The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the
Rimas Group.

On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office,
the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty. 14 Apart
from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for
disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws.15

On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Interim Central Committee,16 which subsequently denied the same in a Resolution
dated 29 December 2011.17

While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was pending, the Lico Group held
a special meeting in Cebu City (the Cebu meeting) on 19 December 2011. At the
said meeting, new members of the Central Committee, as well as a new set of
officers, were elected.18 The election was purportedly held for the purpose of
implementing the 5-5-5 equal representation amendment made during the Second
National Convention.19

On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in

Parañaque City20 (the Parañaque convention), at which a new Central Committee
and a new set of officers were constituted. 21 Members of the Rimas Group won the
election and occupied all the corresponding seats.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
SECOND DIVISION

On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with
COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-039.22 The
said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that
petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina
as Ating Koop's representative in the House.

The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC on 14
May 2012, this time impleading not only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico Group.
The Amended Petition also prayed that the COMELEC nullify the election conducted
at the Cebu meeting and recognize the Paranaque convention.

In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the Rimas Group alleged that Ating
Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such
as malversation, graft and corruption, and that he had "boldly displayed his
recalcitrance to honor party commitment to be upright and consistently honest, thus
violating basic principles of the Ating Koop."23 The Amended Petition stated further
that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico Group violated notice and quorum
requirements.24

In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012, 25 the COMELEC Second Division upheld the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as the duly
qualified nominee of the party-list group.26 The Second Division characterized the
issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-
party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register
political parties.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC
EN BANC
Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Second
Division's Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31 January 2013.
The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:cralawlawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVES, as it
hereby RESOLVED, to:
a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the
House of Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second
Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party
Representative, for lack of jurisdiction;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico from ATING KOOP Party-
list Group; [and]

c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo
T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group accredited by the Commission on
Elections, to the exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico, Rafael A.
Puentespina, Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta, William C. Ybanez, Silverio J.
Sanchez, Gloria G. Futalan, Hilario De Guzman, Eugene M. Pabualan, Rodolfo E.
Perez, Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario Arenas, Tirso C. Buenaventura, Lydia B. Tubella,
and Jonathan Dequina.28

In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to
expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had
jurisdiction over the Petition.

At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion
from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted
him from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity
even after their terms had expired;29 and that the COMELEC was not in a position to
substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the
expulsion.30

Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate
representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to
show that the Lico Group made a valid call for the special election of Central
Committee members as required under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws; 31 2)
there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended the Cebu
meeting;32 and 3) the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop's
Amended Constitution and By-Laws.33

Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us, praying for a review of
the COMELEC Resolutions.
The Court's Ruling

On the COMELEC's jurisdiction over

the expulsion of a Member of the House
of Representatives from his party-list
organization

We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a
matter beyond its purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as
party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of
unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction
to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of
party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case
upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. 35 In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took
his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the
HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its
own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These
findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be
a bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented.

The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on
the rule that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its constitutionally
granted powers and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when
the resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary or incidental to the
performance of the constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can
step in and exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party matter. 36 The Lokin case,
however, involved nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the
present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of
his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC.

The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters
is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET
is exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any
matter touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.37

In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of
Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which
necessarily affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must
have been, among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at
least ninety (90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona
fide membership in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled
that qualifications for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing
requirements. They must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or
election, or of assumption of office, but during the officer's entire tenure.39

This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET
jurisdiction over the requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. In Abayon v. HRET,40 it was argued that the petitioners did not belong
to the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should represent; as
such, they could not be properly considered bona fide members of their respective
party-list organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the
meaning of the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It
reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the
House of Representatives.41

Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications
to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction
correctible by a writ of certiorari;42 the COMELEC should not have encroached into
the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.

Distinguished from Reyes v. COMELEC

Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission
on Elections.43 In that case, We upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of
petitioner Reyes, even as she was already proclaimed winner in the elections at the
time she filed her petition with the High Court. In doing so, We rejected the argument
that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and
took her oath of office before the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member of
the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume office, the term of
which would officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition
for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the
Resolutions ordering the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the present
case, all three requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of
office were satisfied.

Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner on

grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship and residency had become final and executory
when petitioner elevated it to this Court. 44 It should be mentioned that when
petitioner Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the COMELEC En Banc had, as
early as 5 June 2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality over its 14 May 2013
Resolution disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no longer any pending case on
the qualifications of petitioner Reyes to speak of. Here, the question of whether
petitioner Lico remains a member of the House of Representatives in view of his
expulsion from Ating Koop is a subsisting issue.

Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-

issue, since the recourse of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere
attempt to prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and executory
judgment. We said that the petitioner therein took an inconsistent, if not confusing,
stance, considering that she sought remedy before the Court, and yet asserted that it
is the HRET which had jurisdiction over the case. 45 In this case, the question on the
validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls
within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as
party-list representative.

On which group legitimately represents

Ating Koop

We now pass upon the question of which, between the two contending groups, is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop.

At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.
Indeed, the COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the
party is well established. This power to rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement powers.46

That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion
in declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the
simple reason that the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop
were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections held
during the Cebu meeting and the Paranaque conference pursuant to the said
amendments, were valid.
Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective
elections were conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second
National Convention held on 14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of Article VI of
Ating Koop's By-laws called for the conduct of an election of Central Committee
members within six months after the Second National Convention. 47

There is no showing, however, that the amendments were actually filed with the
COMELEC.

A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's approval must
be obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v.
COMELEC,48 We declared that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that
breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is that the
State, through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into
by the party-list organization and its members - the Constitution and By-laws -
such that any amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation
requiring the consent of all the parties involved. An amendment to the bylaws
of a party-list organization should become effective only upon approval by the
COMELEC.

Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended by-laws

and subsequent conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code, an amendment to a by-
law provision must be filed with the SEC. The amendment shall be effective only
upon the issuance by the SEC of a certification that it is not inconsistent with the
Corporation Code.49

There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop were
filed with and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted
pursuant thereto may not be considered valid. Without such requisite proof, neither
the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set of officers of
Ating Koop.

Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a special election were
effective, this Court still cannot declare any of the feuding groups as the legitimate
set of officers considering that the respective sets of evidence presented were
evenly balanced. With respect to the Lico Group's Cebu meeting, the COMELEC
correctly found - and the records bear out - that the notices sent were deficient and
that there was no sufficient proof of quorum. Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to
be invalid. On the other hand, the COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the
Paranaque convention suffered from the same infirmity, the records of the said
convention, consisting merely of the Minutes thereof, likewise fail to establish due
notice and a quorum.50

Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise
doctrine comes into play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of
fact is in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both
parties are evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that
issue. Since neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The
courts are left with no other option but to leave them as they are. The consequence,
therefore, is the dismissal of the complaint/petition. 51

The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden of
proving that it is the petitioner, and not the Lico Group, that is the legitimate group.
As the evidence of both parties are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge
its burden. The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group
insofar as it sought to be declared the legitimate group representing Ating Koop.

Yet, the COMELEC held that the Paranaque convention "appeared to be in

conformity" with Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-Laws. 52 It should be
stressed that the COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion. 53

The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC s appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence.54 But when the COMELECs assessment of the evidence
is so grossly unreasonable that it turns into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is
compelled to intervene and correct the error. 55

As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able to establish its
legitimacy. The evaluation of the evidence by the COMELEC in deciding the issue of
which group legitimately represents Ating Koop was therefore grossly unreasonable,
which amounts to a jurisdictional error that may be remedied by certiorari under Rule
65.

The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two
groups is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?

We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee, whose

members remain as such in a hold-over capacity.

In Seneres v. COMELEC,56 the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by

Buhay Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground
that his term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the
default rule in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors of a corporation
hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are
elected or appointed.57Señeres ruled that the hold-over principle applies in the
absence of a provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-list organization
prohibiting its application.

In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and Bylaws of Ating
Koop and We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the
application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the
existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to bind
the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its members
on 14 November 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the time, or
since.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En

Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division
Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating
Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President,
Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.

A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set of
officers legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and
set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop.

SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 223451. March 14, 2018 ]
ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EVANGELINE C. CASTILLO-
MARIGOMEN, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 101 AND ANTONIO L. TIU,
RESPONDENTS.

DECISION
TIJAM, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court over public
respondent's Order[2] dated May 19, 2015 which denied petitioner's motion to
dismiss premised on the special and affirmative defenses in his Answer, and public
respondent's Order[3] dated December 16, 2015 which denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration, both issued in Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-10666-CV entitled
"Antonio L. Tiu v. Antonio F. Trillanes IV."

The Facts

Petitioner, as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, filed Proposed Senate

Resolution No. 826 (P.S. Resolution No. 826) directing the Senate's Committee on
Accountability of Public Officials and Investigations to investigate, in aid of
legislation, the alleged P1.601 Billion overpricing of the new 11-storey Makati City
Hall II Parking Building, the reported overpricing of the 22-storey Makati City Hall
Building at the average cost of P240,000.00 per square meter, and related
anomalies purportedly committed by former and local government officials.[4]

Petitioner alleged that at the October 8, 2014 Senate Blue Ribbon Sub-Committee
(SBRS) hearing on P.S. Resolution No. 826, former Makati Vice Mayor Ernesto
Mercado (Mercado) testified on how he helped former Vice President Jejomar Binay
(VP Binay) acquire and expand what is now a 350-hectare estate in Barangay
Rosario, Batangas, which has been referred to as the Hacienda Binay, about 150
hectares of which have already been developed, with paved roads, manicured
lawns, a mansion with resort-style swimming pool, man-made lakes, Japanese
gardens, a horse stable with practice race tracks, an extensive farm for fighting
cocks, green houses and orchards.[5]

According to petitioner, Mercado related in said hearing that because VP Binay's

wife would not allow the estate's developer, Hillmares' Construction Corporation
(HCC), to charge the development expenses against VP Binay's 13% share in
kickbacks from all Makati infrastructure projects, HCC was compelled to add the
same as "overprice" on Makati projects, private respondent particularly the Makati
City Hall Parking Building.[6]

Petitioner averred that thereafter claimed "absolute ownership" of the estate,

albeit asserting that it only covered 145 hectares, through his company called
Sunchamp Real Estate Corporation (Sunchamp), which purportedly entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with a certain Laureano R. Gregorio, Jr.
(Gregorio, Jr.), the alleged owner of the consolidated estate and its improvements.[7]

Petitioner further averred that private respondent testified before the SBRS on the
so-called Hacienda Binay on October 22 and 30, 2014, and at the October 30, 2014
hearing, the latter presented a one-page Agreement[8] dated January 18, 2013
between Sunchamp and Gregorio.[9] On its face, the Agreement covered a 150-
hectare property in Rosario, Batangas and showed a total consideration of P400
Million, payable in tranches and in cash and/or listed shares, adjustable based on
the fair market value. The Agreement likewise ostensibly showed that Gregorio is
obligated to cause the registration of improvements in the name of Sunchamp and
within two years, to deliver titles/documents evidencing the real and enforceable
rights of Sunchamp, and the latter, in the interim, shall have usufruct over the
property, which is extendible.

Petitioner admitted that during media interviews at the Senate, particularly

during gaps and breaks in the plenary hearings as well as committee hearings,
and in reply to the media's request to respond to private respondent's claim
over the estate, he expressed his opinion that based on his office's review of
the documents, private respondent appears to be a "front" or "nominee" or is
acting as a "dummy" of the actual and beneficial owner of the estate, VP
Binay.[10]

On October 22, 2014, private respondent filed a Complaint for Damages[11] against
petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. R-QZN-14-10666-CV, for the latter's alleged
defamatory statements before the media from October 8 to 14, 2014, specifically his
repeated accusations that private respondent is a mere "dummy" of VP Binay.

Private respondent alleged that he is a legitimate businessman engaged in various

businesses primarily in the agricultural sector, and that he has substantial
shareholdings, whether in his own name or through his holding companies, in
numerous corporations and companies, globally, some of which are publicly listed.
He averred that because of petitioner's defamatory statements, his reputation
was severely tarnished as shown by the steep drop in the stock prices of his
publicly listed companies, AgriNurture, Inc. (AgriNurture), of which he is the
Executive Chairman, and Greenergy Holdings, Inc. (Greenergy), of which he is the
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer. To illustrate this, private
respondent alleged that on October 7, 2014, the price of a share of stock of
Greenergy was P0.011 per share and the volume of trading was at 61 Million, while
on October 8, 2014, the price dropped to P0.0099 per share (equivalent to a 10%
reduction) and the volume of trading increased by more than seven times (at 475.7
Million), with the price continuing to drop thereafter. Similarly, private respondent
alleged that on October 8, 2014, AgriNurture experienced a six percent (6%) drop
from its share price of October 7, 2014 (from P2.6 to P2.45) and an increase of more
than six times in the volume of trading (from 68,000 to 409,000), with the share price
continuing to drop thereafter. According to private respondent, the unusual drop in
the share price and the drastic increase in trading could be attributed to the
statements made by petitioner, which caused the general public to doubt his
capability as a businessman and to unload their shares, to the detriment of private
respondent who has substantial shareholdings therein through his holding
companies.

Denying that he is a "dummy," private respondent alleged that he possesses the

requisite financial capacity to fund the development, operation and maintenance of
the "Sunchamp Agri-Tourism Park." He averred that petitioner's accusations were
defamatory, as they dishonored and discredited him, and malicious as they were
intended to elicit bias and prejudice his reputation. He further averred that such
statements were not absolutely privileged since they were not uttered in the
discharge of petitioner's functions as a Senator, or qualifiedly privileged under
Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code,[12] nor constitutive of fair commentaries on
matters of public interest. He added that petitioner's statement that he was willing to
apologize if proven wrong, showed that he spoke without a reasonable degree of
care and without regard to the gravity of his sweeping accusation.

Claiming that petitioner's statements besmirched his reputation, and caused him
sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish and social
humiliation, private respondent sought to recover P4 Million as moral damages,
P500,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the amount of
P500,000.00.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,[13] petitioner raised the following Special and
Affirmative Defenses:

First, petitioner averred that private respondent failed to state and substantiate his
cause of action since petitioner's statement that private respondent was acting as a
"front," "nominee" or "dummy" of VP Binay for his Hacienda Binay is a statement of
fact.[14]

Petitioner asserted that private respondent was unable to prove his alleged
ownership of the subject estate, and that Mercado had testified that VP Binay is the
actual and beneficial owner thereof, based on his personal knowledge and his
participation in the consolidation of the property. Petitioner noted that the titles
covering the estate are in the names of persons related to or identified with Binay.
He argued that the one-page Agreement submitted by private respondent hardly
inspires belief as it was unnotarized and lacked details expected in a legitimate
document such as the technical description of the property, the certificates of title,
tax declarations, the area of the property and its metes and bounds, schedule of
payments, list of deliverables with their due dates, warranties and undertakings and
closing date. He also pointed out that while the total consideration for the Agreement
was P446 Million, the downpayment was only P5 Million. With a yearly P30 Million
revenue from the orchard, petitioner questioned why Gregorio would agree to part
with his possession for a mere one percent (1%) of the total consideration.[15]
Petitioner likewise disputed private respondent's supposed claim that Sunchamp had
introduced improvements in the estate amounting to P50 Million, stressing that it
took over the estate only in July 2014 and that it did not own the property and
probably never would given the agrarian reform issues. Petitioner claimed that it was
based on the foregoing and the report of his legal/legislative staff that he made his
statement that private respondent is a front, nominee or dummy of VP Binay.[16]

Second, petitioner posited that his statements were part of an ongoing public debate
on a matter of public concern, and private respondent, who had freely entered into
and thrust himself to the forefront of said debate, has acquired the status of a public
figure or quasi-public figure. For these reasons, he argued that his statements are
protected by his constitutionally guaranteed rights to free speech and freedom of
expression and of the press.[17]
Third, petitioner contended that his statements, having been made in the course of
the performance of his duties as a Senator, are covered by his parliamentary
immunity under Article VI, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution.[18]

Citing Antero J Pobre v. Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,[19] petitioner argued that

the claim of falsity of statements made by a member of Congress does not destroy
the privilege of parliamentary immunity, and the authority to discipline said member
lies in the assembly or the voters and not the courts.

Petitioner added that he never mentioned private respondent's two companies in his
interviews and it was private respondent who brought them up. Petitioner pointed out
that private respondent only had an eight percent (8%) shareholding in one of said
companies and no shareholding in the other, and that based on the records of the
Philippine Stock Exchange, the share prices of both companies had been on a
downward trend long before October 8, 2014. Petitioner described the Complaint as
a mere media ploy, noting that private respondent made no claim for actual damages
despite the alleged price drop. This, according to petitioner, showed that private
respondent could not substantiate his claim.[20]

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and for the award of his
Compulsory Counterclaims consisting of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.[21]

Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion (to Set Special and Affirmative Defenses for
Preliminary Hearing)[22] on the strength of Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court,
which allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on any of the grounds for
dismissal provided in the same rule, as may have been pleaded as an affirmative
defense in the answer.[23]

Private respondent opposed the motion on the grounds that the motion failed to
comply with the provisions of the Rules of Court on motions, and a preliminary
hearing on petitioner's special and affirmative defenses was prohibited as petitioner
had filed a motion to dismiss.

On May 19, 2015, public respondent issued the Order[24] denying petitioner's
motion to dismiss premised on the special and affirmative defenses in his
Answer. The Order, in pertinent part, states:
FIRST ISSUE: The Complaint failed to state a cause of action.
Whether true or false, the allegations in the complaint, would show that the same are
sufficient to enable the court to render judgment according to the prayer/s in the
complaint.

SECOND ISSUE: The defendant's parliamentary immunity.

The defense of parliamentary immunity may be invoked only on special

circumstances such that the special circumstance becomes a factual issue that
would require for its establishment the conduct of a full blown trial.

With the defense invoking the defendant's parliamentary immunity from suit, it claims
that this Court has no jurisdiction over the instant case. Again, whether or not the
courts have jurisdiction over the instant case is determined based on the allegations
of the complaint.

xxxx

Subject to the presentation of evidence, the complaint alleged that the libelous or
defamatory imputations (speech) committed by the defendant against the plaintiff
were made not in Congress or in any committee thereof. This parliamentary
immunity, again, is subject to special circumstances which circumstances must be
established in a full blown trial.

xxxx

FOURTH. Whether or not a motion to dismiss was filed to prevent a preliminary

hearing on the defendant's special and affirmative defenses.

xxxx

Said 'answer with motion to dismiss' of the defendant did not contain any notice of
hearing and was not actually heard. To the mind of the Court, the use of the phrase
'with motion to dismiss' highlights the allegations of special and affirmative defenses
which are grounds for a motion to dismiss. Thus, absent any motion to dismiss as
contemplated by law, the preliminary hearing on the special and affirmative defenses
of the defendant may be conducted thereon.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in public respondent's Order[25]
dated December 16, 2015. Public respondent held that:
xxxx

To reiterate the ruling in the assailed order, parliamentary immunity is subject to

special circumstances which must be established in a full blown trial.

In the complaint, the plaintiff stated that the defamatory statements were made in
broadcast and print media, not during a Senate hearing. Hence, between the
allegations in the complaint and the affirmative defenses in the answer, the issue on
whether or not the alleged defamatory statements were made in Congress or in any
committee thereof arises. It would be then up to the Court to determine whether
the alleged defamatory statements are covered by parliamentary immunity
after trial.
Petitioner subsequently filed the instant Petition for Certiorari, assailing public
respondent's May 19, 2015 and December 16, 2015 Orders on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In ascribing grave
abuse of discretion against public respondent, petitioner reiterates the special and
affirmative defenses in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, and asks that the assailed
Orders be nullified, reversed and set aside and a new one be issued dismissing the
Complaint.

In his Comment,[26] private respondent points out that the petition violates the
doctrine of hierarchy of courts. He contends that petitioner cannot invoke
parliamentary immunity as his utterances were made in various media interviews,
beyond the scope of his official duties as Senator, and that the constitutional right to
free speech can be raised only against the government, not against private
individuals.

Private respondent asserts that his Complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as
petitioner's imputations, as alleged therein, were defamatory, malicious and made
public, and the victim was clearly identifiable. According to him, petitioner's claim that
his imputations were statements of fact, covered by his parliamentary immunity and
not actionable under the doctrine of fair comment, are irrelevant as his motion to
dismiss, based on failure to state a cause of action, hypothetically admitted the
allegations in the Complaint. At any rate, he argues that truth is not a defense in an
action for defamation.

Private respondent further contends that he is not a public figure as to apply the
doctrine of fair comment, and that it was petitioner who brought up his name, out of
nowhere, at the October 8, 2014 SBRS hearing. He asserts that contrary to
petitioner's claim, the Courts, not the Senate, has jurisdiction over the case. Finally,
he avers that because failure to state a cause of action and lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter are determined solely by the allegations of the complaint, a
preliminary hearing is unnecessary.

The Court's Ruling

Hierarchy of courts should have been observed

In justifying his direct recourse to the Court, petitioner alleges that there is a clear
threat to his parliamentary immunity as well as his rights to freedom of speech and
freedom of expression, and he had no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law that could protect him from such threat. Petitioner argues
that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and direct filing
with the Court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must
be addressed at the most immediate time. Petitioner asserts that the case
encompasses an issue which would require an interpretation of Section 11, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution.

The Court is not persuaded.

The power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus is not exclusive to
this Court.[27] The Court shares the jurisdiction over petitions for these extraordinary
writs with the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts.[28] The hierarchy of
courts serves as the general determinant of the appropriate forum for such petitions.
[29] The established policy is that "petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals," and "[a] direct invocation of the
Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition."[30] The parties, therefore, do not have an unfettered discretion in
selecting the forum to which their application will be directed.[31]

Adherence to the doctrine on hierarchy of courts ensures that every level of the
judiciary performs its designated role in an effective and efficient manner.[32] This
practical judicial policy is established to obviate "inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction," and to prevent the congestion of the Court's docket.[33] The
Court must remain as a court of last resort if it were to satisfactorily perform its duties
under the Constitution.[34]

After all, trial courts are not limited to the determination of facts upon evaluation of
the evidence presented to them.[35] They are likewise competent to determine
issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an
executive issuance in relation to the Constitution.[36]

It is true that the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule, and this Court
has allowed a direct application to this Court for a writ of certiorari when there are
genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate
time.[37]

However, the issue of what parliamentary immunity encompasses, in relation to a

lawmaker's speech or words spoken in debate in Congress, has been addressed as
early as 1966 in the case of Nicanor T. Jimenez v. Bartolome Cabangbang,[38]
where the Court succinctly held:
The determination of the first issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned
publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein"-that is to
say, in Congress used in this provision.

Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of

their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast
in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts performed by
Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing its offices, in the
official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of Congressional
Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at the time of the
performance of the acts in question. (Citations omitted and emphasis ours.)[39]
In Jimenez, a civil action for damages was filed against a member of the House of
Representatives for the publication, in several newspapers of general circulation, of
an open letter to the President which spoke of operational plans of some ambitious
officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) involving a "massive political
build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense Jesus Vargas to prepare him to
become a presidential candidate, a coup d'etat, and a speech from General Arellano
challenging Congress' authority and integrity to rally members of the AFP behind him
and to gain civilian support. The letter alluded to the plaintiffs, who were members of
the AFP, to be under the control of the unnamed "planners," "probably belong(ing) to
the Vargas-Arellano clique," and possibly "unwitting tools" of the plans.
Holding that the open letter did not fall under the privilege of speech or debate under
the Constitution, the Court declared:
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According to
the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines, dated
November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and defendant
caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus causing the
communication to be so published, he was not performing his official duty, either as
a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to
the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said communication is not absolutely
privileged. (Emphasis ours.)
Albeit rendered in reference to the 1935 constitutional grant of parliamentary
immunity, the Jimenez pronouncement on what constitutes privileged speech or
debate in Congress still applies. The same privilege of "speech or debate" was
granted under the 1973 and 1987 Philippine Constitutions, with the latter Charters
specifying that the immunity extended to lawmakers' speeches or debates in any
committee of the legislature. This is clear from the "speech or debate" clauses in the
parliamentary immunity provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions which
respectively provide:
Section 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all
cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest
during their attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not be questioned in
any other place.[40] (Emphasis ours.)

Section 9. A Member of the National Assembly shall, in all offenses punishable by

not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest during his
attendance at its sessions, and in going to and returning from the same; but the
National Assembly shall surrender the Member involved to the custody of the law
within twenty-four hours after its adjournment for a recess or its next session,
otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its failure to do so. A Member shall not be
questioned or held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Assembly or in any committee thereof.[41] (Emphasis ours.)

Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from
arrest while the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held
liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.[42] (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, settled jurisprudence provides sufficient standards and guidelines by which
the trial and appellate courts can address and resolve the issue of parliamentary
immunity raised by petitioner. The Court is, thus, unconvinced that petitioner has
presented an "exceptionally compelling reason" to justify his direct application for a
writ of certiorari with this Court.

Even assuming arguendo that direct recourse to this Court is permissible, the
petition must still be dismissed.

Petitioner's statements in media interviews are not covered by the

parliamentary speech or debate" privilege

Petitioner admits that he uttered the questioned statements, describing private

respondent as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy" in connection with the
so-called Hacienda Binay, in response to media interviews during gaps and
breaks in plenary and committee hearings in the Senate.[44] With Jimenez as
our guidepost, it is evident that petitioner's remarks fall outside the privilege of
speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The
statements were clearly not part of any speech delivered in the Senate or any of its
committees. They were also not spoken in the course of any debate in said fora. It
cannot likewise be successfully contended that they were made in the official
discharge or performance of petitioner's duties as a Senator, as the remarks
were not part of or integral to the legislative process.

The Speech or Debate Clause under the 1935 Constitution "was taken or is a copy
of sec. 6, clause 1 of Art. 1 of the Constitution of the United States."[45] Such
immunity has come to this country from the practices of the Parliamentary as
construed and applied by the Congress of the United States.[46]

The U.S. Supreme Court's disquisition in United States v. Brewster[47] on the scope
of the privilege is of jurisprudential significance:
Johnson thus stand as a unanimous holding that a Member of Congress may be
prosecuted under a criminal statute provided that the Government's case does not
rely on legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts. A legislative act has
consistently been defined as an act generally done in Congress in relation to the
business before it. In sum, the Speech or Debate Clause prohibits inquiry only into
those things generally said or done in the House or the Senate in the performance of
official duties and into the motivation for those acts.

It is well known, of course, that Members of the Congress engage in many activities
other than the purely legislative activities protected by the Speech or Debate Clause.
These include a wide range of legitimate "errands" performed for constituents, the
making of appointments with Government agencies, assistance in securing
Government contracts, preparing so-called "news letters" to constituents, news
releases, and speeches delivered outside the Congress. The range of these related
activities has grown over the years. They are performed in part because they have
come to be expected by constituents, and because they are a means of developing
continuing support for future elections. Although these are entirely legitimate
activities, they are political in nature, rather than legislative, in the sense that term
has been used by the Court in prior cases. But it has never been seriously
contended that these political matters, however appropriate, have the protection
afforded by the Speech or Debate Clause. Careful examination of the decided cases
reveals that the Court has regarded the protection as reaching only those things
"generally done in a session of the House by one of its members in relation to the
business before it," Kilbourn v. Thompson, supra, at 204, or things "said or done by
him, as a representative, in the exercise of the functions of that office," Coffin v.
Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 27 ( 1808).

xxxx

xxx In stating that those things "in no wise related to the due functioning of the
legislative process" were not covered by the privilege, the Court did not in any sense
imply as a corollary that everything that "related" to the office of a Member was
shielded by the Clause. Quite the contrary, in Johnson we held, citing Kilbourn v.
Thompson, supra, that only acts generally done in the course of the process of
enacting legislation were protected.

xxxx

In no case has this Court ever treated the Clause as protecting all con duct relating
to the legislative process. In every case thus far before this Court, the Speech or
Debate Clause has been limited to an act which was clearly a part of the legislative
process - the due functioning of the process. xxx

xxxx

(c) We would not think it sound or wise, simply out of an abundance of caution to
doubly insure legislative independence, to extend the privilege beyond its intended
scope, its literal language, and its history, to include all things in any way related to
the legislative process. Given such a sweeping reading, we have no doubt that there
are few activities in which a legislator engages that he would be unable somehow to
"relate" to the legislative process. Admittedly, the Speech or Debate Clause must be
read broadly to effectuate its purpose of protecting the independence of the
Legislative Branch, but no more than the statutes we apply, was its purpose to make
Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility. In its
narrowest scope, the Clause is a very large, albeit essential, grant of privilege. It has
enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity, but that was
the conscious choice of the Framers.

xxxx

xxx.The authors of our Constitution were well aware of the history of both the need
for the privilege and the abuses that could flow from too sweeping safeguards. In
order to preserve other values, they wrote the privilege so that it tolerates and
protects behavior on the part of Members not tolerated and protected when done by
other citizens. but the shield does not extend beyond what is necessary to preserve
the integrity of the legislative process. Moreover, unlike England, with no formal
written constitutional limitations on the monarch, we defined limits on the coordinate
branches, providing other checks to protect against abuses of the kind experienced
in that country. (Emphasis ours.)

xxxx
In Gravel v. United States,[48] the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a Senator's private
publication of certain classified documents (popularly known as the Pentagon
Papers), which the latter had taken up at a Senate subcommittee hearing and placed
in the legislative record, did not constitute "protected speech or debate," holding that
it "was in no way essential to the deliberations of the Senate," and was "not part and
parcel of the legislative process." Explaining the scope of the Speech or Debate
Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court declared:
But the Clause has not been extended beyond the legislative sphere. That Senators
generally perform certain acts in their official capacity as Senators does not
necessarily make all such acts legislative in nature. Members of Congress are
constantly in touch with the Executive Branch of the Government and with
administrative agencies - they may cajole, and exhort with respect to the
administration of a federal statute - but such conduct, though generally done, is not
protected legislative activity. xxx

xxxx

Legislative acts are not all-encompassing. The heart of the Clause is speech or
debate in either House. Insofar as the Clause is construed to reach other matters,
they must be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative processes by
which Members participate in committee and House proceedings with respect to the
consideration and passage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to
other matters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.
xxx (Emphasis ours.)
It is, thus, clear that parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked when the
lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside sessions, hearings or debates
in Congress, extraneous to the "due functioning of the (legislative) process."[49]
To participate in or respond to media interviews is not an official function of any
lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a component of the process
of enacting laws. Indeed, a lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press. A lawmaker's participation
in media interviews is not a legislative act, but is "political in nature,"[50] outside
the ambit of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause in the 1987
Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance, therefore, he cannot invoke
parliamentary immunity to cause the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint.
The privilege arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but because
it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.

The Speech or Debate Clause in our Constitution did not turn our Senators and
Congressmen into "super-citizens"[51] whose spoken words or actions are rendered
absolutely impervious to prosecution or civil action. The Constitution conferred the
privilege on members of Congress "not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good."[52] It was intended to protect them against government pressure and
intimidation aimed at influencing their decision-making prerogatives.[53] Such grant
of legislative privilege must perforce be viewed according to its purpose and plain
language. Indeed, the privilege of speech or debate, which may "(enable) reckless
men to slander and even destroy others,"[54] is not a cloak of unqualified impunity;
its invocation must be "as a means of perpetuating inviolate the functioning process
of the legislative department."[55] As this Court emphasized in Pobre,[56] "the
parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of Congress is not to
protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit, but to enable them, as the
people's representatives, to perform the functions of their office without fear of
being made responsible before the courts or other forums outside the
congressional hall."

Jurisdiction lies with the courts, not the Senate

Petitioner argues that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, and citing Pobre,
asserts that the authority to discipline a member of Congress lies in the assembly or
the voters and not the courts.
Petitioner's reliance on Pobre is misplaced. The statements questioned in said
disbarment case were part of a lawyer-Senator's privilege speech delivered on the
Senate floor professedly with a view to future remedial legislation. By reason of the
Senator's parliamentary immunity, the Court held that her speech was "not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court." The
questioned statements in this case, however, were admittedly made in response to
queries from the media during gaps in the Senate's plenary and committee hearings,
thus, beyond the purview of privileged speech or debate under Section 11, Article VI
of the Constitution.

The Court held in Pobre:

Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the
member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of
the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such
abuses committed in the name of parliamentary immunity. (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours.)[57]
Clearly, the Court's pronouncement that the legislative body and the voters, not the
courts, would serve as the disciplinary authority to correct abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity, was premised on the questionable remarks being
made in the performance of legislative functions, on the legislative floor or committee
rooms where the privilege of speech or debate may be invoked. Necessarily,
therefore, statements falling outside the privilege and giving rise to civil injury or
criminal responsibility will not foreclose judicial review.

Furthermore, it is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case

is conferred by law.[58] An action for damages on account of defamatory
statements not constituting protected or privileged "speech or debate" is a
controversy well within the courts' authority to settle. The Constitution vests
upon the courts the power and duty "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable."[59] Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended, conferred jurisdiction over actions for damages upon either the RTC or the
Municipal Trial Court, depending on the total amount claimed.[60] So also, Article 33
of the Civil Code expressly provides that in cases of defamation, a civil action for
damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by
the injured party, and such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

In fine, petitioner cannot successfully invoke parliamentary nonaccountability to

insulate his statements, uttered outside the "sphere of legislative activity,"[61] from
judicial review.
Preliminary hearing was not warranted

Petitioner argues that a preliminary hearing on his special and affirmative defenses
is necessary to allow him to present evidence that will warrant the immediate
dismissal of the Complaint.

The Court is not persuaded.

Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary hearing on the

affirmative defenses may be allowed only when no motion to dismiss has been filed.
Section 6, however, must be construed in the light of Section 3 of the same Rule,
which requires courts to resolve a motion to dismiss and prohibits deferment of such
resolution on the ground of indubitability. Thus, Section 6 disallows a preliminary
hearing of affirmative defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed because
such defenses should have already been resolved.[62]

In this case, however, petitioner's motion to dismiss had not been resolved when
petitioner moved for a preliminary hearing. As public respondent stated in the
assailed May 19, 2015 Order, the motion did not contain a notice of hearing and was
not actually heard. Even so, a preliminary hearing is not warranted.

In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss, petitioner averred that private respondent
failed to state and substantiate his cause of action, arguing that the statement he
made before the media, in which he described private respondent as a "front" or
"dummy" of former VP Binay for the so-called Hacienda Binay, was one of fact.

By raising failure to state a cause of action as his defense, petitioner is regarded as

having hypothetically admitted the allegations in the Complaint.[63]

The test of the sufficiency of the facts stated in a complaint as constituting a cause of
action is whether or not, admitting the facts so alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment upon the same in accordance with the plaintiff's prayer.[64] Inquiry is into
the sufficiency not the veracity of the facts so alleged.[65] If the allegations furnish
sufficient basis by which the complaint may be maintained, the same should not be
dismissed regardless of the defenses that may be raised by the defendants.[66]
Accordingly, in determining whether a complaint did or did not state a cause of
action, only the statements in the complaint may properly be considered.[67] The
court cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to
determine its existence.[68] For the court to do otherwise would be a procedural
error and a denial of the plaintiff's right to due process.[69]

As this Court, in Aquino, et al. v. Quiazon, et al.[70] instructs:

The trial court may indeed elect to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative defenses
as raised in the answer under Section 6 of Rules 16 of the Rules of Court. It has
been held, however, that such a hearing is not necessary when the affirmative
defense is failure to state a cause of action, and that it is, in fact, error for the court to
hold a preliminary hearing to determine the existence of external facts outside the
complaint. The reception and the consideration of evidence on the ground that the
complaint fails to state a cause of action, has been held to be improper and
impermissible. Thus, in a preliminary hearing on a motion to dismiss or on the
affirmative defenses raised in an answer, the parties are allowed to present evidence
except when the motion is based on the ground of insufficiency of the statement of
the cause of action which must be determined on the basis only of the facts alleged
in the complaint and no other. Section 6, therefore, does not apply to the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action. The trial court, thus, erred in receiving
and considering evidence in connection with this ground. (Citations omitted and
emphasis ours.)
Complaint sufficiently states a cause of action

Private respondent filed his Complaint for moral and exemplary damages pursuant to
Article 33 of the Civil Code[71] which authorizes an injured party to file a civil action
for damages, separate and distinct from the criminal action, in cases of defamation,
fraud and physical injuries.

As defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, a libel[72] is a public and
malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any act,
omission, condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is
dead.

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be

defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim
must be identifiable.[73] Any of the imputations covered by Article 353 is defamatory,
[74] and every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious.[75]
The Civil Code provides that moral damages include mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation,
and similar injury, and may be recovered in cases of libel, slander or any other form
of defamation,[76] while exemplary damages may be recovered in addition to moral
damages, by way of correction or example for the public good, as determined by the
court.[77]

Measured against the foregoing requisites and considerations, including the scope of
parliamentary non-accountability, private respondent's Complaint, on its face,
sufficiently makes out a cause of action for damages.

In his Complaint, private respondent alleged that petitioner gave statements during
interviews by the media, describing him as the "dummy" of former VP Binay in
connection with the so-called Hacienda Binay. Private respondent averred that such
imputation, unprivileged as it was uttered outside of petitioner's legislative functions,
actually discredited him and tarnished his reputation as a legitimate businessman,
and caused him sleepless nights, wounded feelings, serious anxiety, mental anguish
and social humiliation. The statements, presumed to be malicious and so described
by private respondent, were also alleged to have been made public through
broadcast and print media, and identified private respondent as their subject.
Hypothetically admitting these allegations as true, as is required in determining
whether a complaint fails to state a cause of action, private respondent may be
granted his claim.[78]

The Complaint, therefore, cannot be dismissed on the ground of failure to state a

cause of action. As the RTC held, whether true or false, the allegations in the
Complaint are sufficient to enable the court to render judgment according to private
respondent's prayer.

Defense of lack of cause of action requires a full-blown trial

In moving for the outright dismissal of the Complaint, petitioner averred that private
respondent failed to prove his alleged ownership of the subject estate. To establish
this, petitioner pointed to Mercado's testimony that former VP Binay is the actual and
beneficial owner thereof, the certificates of title covering the estate purportedly in the
names of persons related to or identified with former VP Binay, and the one-page
Agreement between Sunchamp and Gregorio which, according to petitioner, hardly
inspires belief because it was not notarized and lacked details expected in a
legitimate document, and because the transaction, which required Gregorio to give
up possession, entailed a measly downpayment of P5 Million, out of the P446 Million
total consideration, for an estate with a yearly P30 Million revenue from its orchard.
For these reasons, petitioner asserted that when he remarked before the media that
private respondent was acting as former VP Binay's "front" or "dummy," he was
simply making a statement of fact which he had based on documents, reports and
information available to him, and which was never intended to be an insult or a
derogatory imputation.

Petitioner also argued that because private respondent had thrust himself into the
public debate on the so-called Hacienda Binay, he should be deemed a "public
figure" and the questioned statements consequently qualify for the constitutional
protection of freedom of expression.

Private respondent, however, has notably denied being a "dummy," and rebuffed
petitioner's claim that he had thrust himself into the public debate, alleging that it was
petitioner who brought up his name, out of nowhere, at the October 8, 2014 SBRS
hearing.

Petitioner's Answer likewise repudiated private respondent's claim that the

questioned statements had brought about a steep drop in the share prices of two
listed companies he was managing, to the detriment of his substantial shareholdings
therein. Petitioner countered that said prices had been on a downward trend long
before he uttered the questioned statements; that he never mentioned said
companies in his interviews; and that far from substantial, private respondent only
had an 8% stake in one of the companies and none in the other.

A perusal of petitioner's defenses and arguments, as above outlined, at once reveals

that the averments were grounded on lack of cause of action. In fact, by pleading in
his Answer that private respondent failed to "substantiate" his cause of action,
petitioner effectively questioned its existence, and would have the trial court inquire
into the veracity and probative value of private respondent's submissions.

Distinguished from failure to state a cause of action, which refers to the insufficiency
of the allegations in the pleading, lack of cause of action refers to the insufficiency of
the factual basis for the action.[79] Petitioner, in his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,
clearly impugned the sufficiency of private respondent's basis for filing his action for
damages.

Section 6, Rule 16 allows the court to hold a preliminary hearing on affirmative

defenses pleaded in the answer based on grounds for dismissal under the same
rule.[80] The ground of "lack of cause of action," however, is not one of the grounds
for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, hence, not proper for resolution during a
preliminary hearing held pursuant to Section 6 thereof.[81]

Furthermore, Aquino teaches that the existence of a cause of action "goes into the
very crux of the controversy and is a matter of evidence for resolution after a full-
blown hearing." An affirmative defense, raising the ground that there is no cause of
action as against the defendant, poses a question of fact that should be resolved
after the conduct of the trial on the merits.[82]

Indeed, petitioner, in asking for the outright dismissal of the Complaint, has raised
evidentiary matters and factual issues which this Court cannot address or resolve, let
alone at the first instance. The proof thereon cannot be received in certiorari
proceedings before the Court, but should be established in the RTC.[83]

Thus, even granting that the petition for certiorari might be directly filed with this
Court, its dismissal must perforce follow because its consideration and resolution
would inevitably require the consideration and evaluation of evidentiary matters. The
Court is not a trier of facts, and cannot accept the petition for certiorari for that
reason.[84]

All told, for its procedural infirmity and lack of merit, the petition must be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Public respondent's Orders dated May

19, 2015 and December 16, 2015 in Civil Case No. RQZN-14-10666-CV are affirmed
insofar as they are consistent with this decision
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008

VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner,

vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY, and
SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, respondents.

x----------------------x

G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008

SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners,

vs.
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY
THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, respondents.
x----------------------x

MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention

x----------------------x

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, RODOLFO G.

BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S.
MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation
purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. They captured unprecedented
public attention and thrust the country into a controversy that placed the legitimacy of
the present administration on the line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo
government. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly
contained the President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio
Garcillano to manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted
separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1

In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority Floor

Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two Tapes," and
set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the Committees on
Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National Defense and Security,
Information and Communications Technology, and Suffrage and Electoral Reforms
(respondent House Committees). During the inquiry, several versions of the
wiretapped conversation emerged. But on July 5, 2005, National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of
former NBI Deputy Director Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House
Committees seven alleged "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour
taped conversation. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee
members on the admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were
eventually played in the chambers of the House.2

On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend the

hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee reports based
on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource persons.3

Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano) filed

with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed as G.R. No.
170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be restrained from using
these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained" wiretapped conversations in their
committee reports and for any other purpose. He further implored that the said
recordings and any reference thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the
inquiry, and the respondent House Committees directed to desist from further using
the recordings in any of the House proceedings.5

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the "Garci
tapes" abruptly stopped.

After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the
slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought Darkness."
In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public "the whole
unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s" of the alleged
wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of telecommunications
providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping activities.

On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was referred to

the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired by Senator
Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to regulate the sale,
purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7

In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued when
Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible transgression of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a legislative inquiry on the matter.
On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege
speech, articulating her considered view that the Constitution absolutely bans the
use, possession, replay or communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes.
However, she recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9

On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili, retired

justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275, seeking to bar the Senate from
conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry. They argued in the main that the
intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No. 4200 and Section 3, Article III of the
Constitution.11

As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its public
hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and October 1,14
2007.

Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno Noynoy

C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda, M.A. Jamby
A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on the petition on
September 25, 2007.

The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17

On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and one of
the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify at its hearings,
moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18

On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338 and
179275.19

It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings, they
have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of the tapes in
the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee reports, and the second
seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.

The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the second, G.R.
No. 179275.
-I-

Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the issue on
the parties’ standing, argued at length in their pleadings.

In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus standi

refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has
sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged governmental act x x
x," thus,

generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he has
personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.21

The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22

However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the Court,
in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v. Macapagal-
Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary
citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions
involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings."24 The fairly
recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a non-member of the broadcast media,
who failed to allege a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, to challenge
the acts of the Secretary of Justice and the National Telecommunications
Commission. The majority, in the said case, echoed the current policy that "this
Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as
impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly
impact on public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they have not
abused the discretion given to them."26

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the petition
by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes. Further, his
was publicly identified by the members of the respondent committees as one of the
voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore, petitioner Garcillano stands to be
directly injured by the House committees’ actions and charges of electoral fraud. The
Court recognizes his standing to institute the petition for prohibition.

In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by alleging
that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the IBP. They are of
the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci" tapes will further divide
the country. They wish to see the legal and proper use of public funds that will
necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public hearings. They are worried by the
continuous violation of the laws and individual rights, and the blatant attempt to
abuse constitutional processes through the conduct of legislative inquiries
purportedly in aid of legislation.28

Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is
summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not only of his
rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful
expenditure of public funds involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29

Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution of the
laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due process,30 they
satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the controversy by merely
being citizens of the Republic.

Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of Representatives,31 we

find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and intervenor Sagge’s allegation
that the continuous conduct by the Senate of the questioned legislative inquiry will
necessarily involve the expenditure of public funds.32 It should be noted that in
Francisco, rights personal to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been
injured by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the
Court granted standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably
invoked the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the legal
profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.33

Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the petitioners and
intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. The issues are
of transcendental and paramount importance not only to the public but also to the
Bench and the Bar, and should be resolved for the guidance of all.34

Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it has
shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the Court
recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and intervenor
Sagge.

- II -

The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and academic.
Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the exercise by this
Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and resolution of actual cases
and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean existing conflicts appropriate or ripe
for judicial determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of
the Court will amount to an advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not
extend to hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead
to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its purpose has become
stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic discussion of a case presenting a
moot question as a judgment thereon cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the
nature of things, cannot be enforced.38

In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as

aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent House
Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the same in their
committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be stricken off the records of
the House proceedings. But the Court notes that the recordings were already played
in the House and heard by its members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact
that the committee reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and
submitted to the House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been
overtaken by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being
moot and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing
of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already
accomplished.41

- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate cannot
be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without
duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional
requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he Senate or
the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is intended to satisfy the basic
requirements of due process.42 Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a
law or rule of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43
What constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides
that "[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines."44

The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral
argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995
and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however, of
which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was
undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first opened their session.

Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri v.
Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,46 we
said:

Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees
likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry
be in accordance with the "duly published rules of procedure." We quote the OSG’s
explanation:

The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation
because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial
elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the Senate’s membership, the
composition of the Senate also changes by the end of each term. Each Senate may
thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having published its Rules
of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate,
are therefore, procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion, reinforces this
ruling with the following rationalization:

The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing legislative
body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of whom are elected
every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the term of twelve Senators
expires every three years, leaving less than a majority of Senators to continue into
the next Congress. The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a
majority of Senators to "constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same
reasoning in Arnault v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a
continuing body because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next
Congress. The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by
the Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47

The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the Motion
for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:

On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to issue a
clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an institution is
"continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or change
in the composition of its members. However, in the conduct of its day-to-day
business the Senate of each Congress acts separately and independently of the
Senate of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
states:

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS

SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at the
next session in the same status.

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first
time.

Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed
bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional
on the Senate of the succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in
the same status, but as if presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of
such a rule is readily apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding
Congress (which will typically have a different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which
they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct
of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated with the
expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue into the next
Congress with the same status.

This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the opposite
nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the
Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:

RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES

SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may endorse the
Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.

The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be presented
at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.

RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT

SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and shall
remain in force until they are amended or repealed.

Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the amendment or
revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the newly elected Senators
shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are
intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply
state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly provide for the
continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed. In view of the
difference in the language of the two sets of Senate rules, it cannot be presumed
that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress. The
Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different rules for its legislative
inquiries which come within the rule on unfinished business.

The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be
conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It
is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each
Congress or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be
effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to
sufficiently put public on notice.

If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be
effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language
it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.

Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated

publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995 and,
despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free, and
accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49

The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules cannot
justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language of Section 21,
Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without more, that the Senate
or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation only in accordance with
duly published rules of procedure, and does not make any distinction whether or not
these rules have undergone amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to
publish the said rules prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the
Senate.

Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents is

illuminating:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v. Tuvera
ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that the rules "shall take
effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation,"
precluding any other form of publication. Publication in accordance with Tañada is
mandatory to comply with the due process requirement because the Rules of
Procedure put a person’s liberty at risk. A person who violates the Rules of
Procedure could be arrested and detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50 otherwise
known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their claim of valid
publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A. 8792 considers an
electronic data message or an electronic document as the functional equivalent of a
written document only for evidentiary purposes.51 In other words, the law merely
recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their being the original) of electronic
data messages and/or electronic documents.52 It does not make the internet a
medium for publishing laws, rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could not, in
violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative inquiry
subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation by
the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the publication of the rules,
because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008 issues of Manila
Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this fact, the recent publication
does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to be prohibited by the instant
petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are concerned, the legislative
investigation subject thereof still could not be undertaken by the respondent Senate
Committees, because no published rules governed it, in clear contravention of the
Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the petition in
G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued enjoining the
Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its committees from
conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the "Hello Garci" tapes.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,

WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari and/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic
Act No. 8240, which amends certain provisions of the National Internal Revenue
Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture
and sale of beer and cigarettes.

Petitioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia, Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
charging violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are
"constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.

The law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was
approved on third reading on September 12, 1996 and transmitted on September 16,
1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on
November 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill.

The bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on
November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of
the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speech,
after which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He
was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep.
Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call,
the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum.1 Rep.
Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his motion was defeated when put to a
vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order,
following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia.
In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise
a question on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did.
What happened thereafter is shown in the following transcript of the session on
November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in
the newspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference
committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know
what is the question that the Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next
week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock,
Wednesday, next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House
of Representatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was
signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramos on November 22, 1996.

Petitioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this
portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-sound recording of
the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40
p.m. on November 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from
he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription
Division on November 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of
the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996 as certified by
the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep.
Lagman; and (4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the
four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the word
"approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard;
(2) in the transcript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears
only once, while in the other versions it is repeated three times; and (3) the published
version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I
will raise the question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.

Petitioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no

need to discuss this point as petitioners have announced that, in order to expedite
the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of the
transcripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this
proceeding the word "approved" appears in the transcripts.

Only the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee

report on H. No. 7198 are in question. Petitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No.
8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House;
that these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, §16(3) that "each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings" and that, consequently, violation
of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and
spurious.

More specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule
XVII, §103 of the rules of the House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the conference
committee report to the House, did not call for the years or nays, but simply asked
for its approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the
presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat
Rep. Albano's motion to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, §97,4 the Chair
refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on Rep. Albano's
motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX,
§§121-122, Rule XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5 the Chair suspended the
session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is alleged, is a point of
order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been
resolved upon the resumption of the session on November 28, 1996, because the
parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon the resumption
of the session.

Petitioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent
petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and
asking for a reconsideration.

Petitioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the
House that the law had been properly passed, considering the Court's power under
Art. VIII, §1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments
of the government, and they ask for a reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view of the
changed membership of the Court.

The Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition,

respondent De Venecia filed a supplemental comment. Respondents' defense is
anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They
argue that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the
House and that there is no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill doctrine.
Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3) for the adoption by each House
of its rules of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts
except insofar as they implement constitutional requirements such as that relating to
three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events,
respondents contend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules
of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents for approval of conference
committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.

In his supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of

H. No. 7198 is false and spurious and contends that under the journal entry rule, the
judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the
House of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996,
shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Body approved
the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was
approved on December 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8

After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding
that Congress committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This
case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in
the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House
rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-
27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively
prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

Petitioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional
provision that "each House may determine the rules of its proceedings" 9 and that for
this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands the
principle on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each
House may determine the rules of its proceedings" was invoked by parties, although
not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative branch to
conduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the
provision for the opposite purpose of invoking judicial review.

But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the
courts the power to inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of
Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that
there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals.
In Osmeña v. Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, courts have declared that 'the
rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary
rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the courts have no concern.
They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"

In United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not
by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there
should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained. But within these
limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is
no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be better, more
accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different
one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules
is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always
subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested, absolute
and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings does not restrict the power given to a mere
formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative
matters; but in the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a
majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority extends to a determination of the
propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the
exercise of any power, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of
any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."

In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio
stated: "The provision for reconsideration is no part of the Constitution and is
therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly. Having made the rule,
it should be regarded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial
inquiry. It has been decided by the courts of last resort of many states, and also by
the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared
invalid for noncompliance with rules."

In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared

itself as follows: "The Constitution declares that each house shall determine the rules
of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the
Legislature of a free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the
servants of the House and subject to its authority. This authority may be abused,
but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an
unwarranted invasion of the independence of the legislative department for the court
to set aside such action as void because it may think that the House has
misconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."

In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that
an act was so passed, no inquiry will be permitted to ascertain whether the two
houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure
upon the bill, intermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is
conclusive that they have done so. We think no court has ever declared an act of the
legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the
respective branches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If
there are any such adjudications, we decline to follow them."

Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes
of Oklahoma provided for three readings on separate days before a bill may be
passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an
emergency the house concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of
the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court of violation of a law punishing
gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly
passed by the legislature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had
not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in
any particular manner. It may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either
in accordance with its own rules, or in violation thereof, or without making any rules.
The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision for the direction
of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force
from legislative sanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the
legislature to properly weigh and consider an act, its passage through the legislature
in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding his signature
thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the
court's refusing its enforcement after it was actually passed by a majority of each
branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannot declare
an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself to govern its deliberations. McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W.
185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187; State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E.
641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

We conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject
to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concern with their
observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.
Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying
the act taken if the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the
legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its
validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved.

In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member
who, instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this
Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House than
members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its
separate sphere which the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate
balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our
system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.

Second. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship

in the Constitutional Commission, contend that under Art. VIII, §1, "nothing involving
abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of this
Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. §5 and,
therefore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate
constitutional questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. For
while Art. VIII, §1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas normally left
to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security, 20
it has not altogether done away with political questions such as those which arise in
the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1, this Court's
function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has
gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a
different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
corrective power. . . . It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21

If, then, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself, it
follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the
government has "gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call
for the exercise of our Art. VIII. §1 power.

Third. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded."
They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still making a query to the Chair when the latter
declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.

What happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the
committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to
the motion. Then the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same
time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo was asking, "What is that . . .
Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the
approval of the conference committee report had by then already been declared by
the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

Petitioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's
motion for the approval of the conference committee report should have been stated
by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members should have been taken.
They say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it
suggests unanimity when the fact was that one or some legislators opposed the
report.

No rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires
that in case such as this involving approval of a conference committee report, the
Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the
other hand, as the Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the
conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approval was by no means a
unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference
committee report on the bills which became the Local Government Code of 1991 and
the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Customs Code
were approved.

In 1957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House.
The point was answered by Majority Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his answer
became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned, this has been a precedent
since I came here seven years ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that
if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the voting
comes in.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder
what his attitude is nor on his point of order. I should just like to state that I believe
that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial
compliance, to my mind, is sufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying
"Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Chair announces "The bill is
approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to
divide would have been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that
the House approves the measure. So I believe there is substantial compliance here,
and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and the Chair
can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22

Indeed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate and even more just. The advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicial consideration. 24
In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a
second opinion on what is the best procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and
esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, our deference
and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the
institution be allowed to manage its own affairs precludes us from even attempting a
diagnosis of the problem."
Nor does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following
instances; upon the last and third readings of a bill, at the request of one-fifth
of the Members present, and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President.
Indeed, considering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the
members by yeas and nays had already been taken, it would have been sheer
tedium to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as
a result of the precipitate suspension and subsequent adjournment of the session.
29 It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties to
settle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo
did not say anything anymore. While it is true that the Majority Leader moved for
adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at
least have objected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is
that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 of the House shows.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session
adjourned until four o'clock in the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

This Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.

It is thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making.
Instead of submitting the proper motions for the House to act upon, petitioners
insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of
the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or
a question of privilege entitled to precedence.30 And even if Rep. Arroyo's question
were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have
put an end to any further consideration of the question. 31

Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing
the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, respondent Speaker of the House be acted
with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the
jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount
to lack of power. As Chief Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this
provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. §1 extends to cases where "a
branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion
amounting to excess of jurisdiction."

Here, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House
with which the Court should not he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there
was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum
had already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly — especially when the quorum
is obviously present — for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. Rep.
Arroyo waived his objection by his continued interpellation of the sponsor for in so
doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum.

At any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be
present on November 21, 1996, only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case, are
questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198
was approved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to
the manner by which the report was approved. Rep. John Henry Osmeña did not
participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman
and Rep. Zamora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved;
while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rep. Tañada would have voted in
favor of the conference committee report.37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker
of the House and the President of the Senate and the certification by the secretaries
of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are
conclusive of its due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the
separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, to disputing this doctrine.
To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases
[Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive
presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and consulted the
Journal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by
the Senate.

But, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of both Houses that a bill has been duly passed.
Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vote
needed to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained,
because "a duly authenticated bill or resolution imports absolute verify and is binding
on the courts." 39 This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at
any cost the misdoings of Legislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for
this purpose that they have almost made them a second and higher Legislature. But
they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible
solution is not to patch and mend casual errors by asking the Judiciary to violate
legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands
on the statute-roll may come to reflect credit upon the name of popular government.
40

This Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the
President contained provisions which had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the
conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have
not been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference
Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we
should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard
the "enrolled bill" rule in such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other
two departments of our government.
It has refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. §26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42

In other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise
than as certified by the presiding officers of both Houses of Congress.

The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited

with approval by text writers here and abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the
following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an

enrolled Act in the custody of the Secretary of State, and having the official
attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by
Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the
judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine,
when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformity
with the Constitution. 45

To overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive
teaching of our cases and overthrow an established rule of evidence.

Indeed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule,
except to say that, with a change in the membership of the Court, the three new
members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bill
rule Actually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have
departed from the Court since our decision in the EVAT cases and their places have
since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of
the Court.

Moreover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed
by the Journal of the House of November 21, 1996 which shows that the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on
that day. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4)
provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish
the same, excepting such parts as may, in its judgment, affect national security; and
the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the request of one-fifth of the Members
present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

The Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by
the Constitution to be recorded therein. 46 With respect to other matters, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded
conclusive effect. Thus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the
imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "public memorials of the
most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to
conform to them; they should be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith
of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already
noted, the bill which became R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due
enactment has been duly proven.

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for

this Court either to set aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the
House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the
political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their
remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving
commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its
discretion were it to do so. The suggestion made in a case 48 may instead
appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the
repeal or amendment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary,
the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith
belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than
disrespect is due the judgment of that body. 49

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Regalado, J., concurs in the result.

Bellosillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.

Torres, Jr., J., is on leave.

EN BANC

July 25, 2017

G.R. No. 227757

REPRESENTATIVE TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR., REPRESENTATIVE

EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REPRESENTATIVE RAUL A. DAZA, REPRESENTATIVE
EDGAR R. ERICE, REPRESENTATIVE EMMANUEL A. BILLONES,
REPRESENTATIVE TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, and REPRESENTATIVE GARY C.
ALEJANO, Petitioners
vs.
SPEAKER PANTALEON D. ALVAREZ, MAJORITY LEADER RODOLFO C.
FARINAS, and REPRESENTATIVE DANILO E. SUAREZ, Respondents

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for mandamus1 filed by petitioners Representatives

Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr., (Rep. Baguilat), Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman), Raul
A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice, Emmanuel A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin, and Gary C.
Alejano (collectively, petitioners), all members of the House of Representatives,
essentially praying that respondents Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker
Alvarez), Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Farifias (Rep. Fariñas), and Representative
Danilo E. Suarez (Rep. Suarez; collectively, respondents), also members of the
House of Representatives, be compelled to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the
Minority Leader of the 17th Congress of the House of Representatives; and (b)
petitioners as the legitimate members of the Minority.

The Facts

The petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th Congress on July 25, 2016,
several news articles surfaced about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought
the adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the
"Minority Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives
(or the House), and even purportedly encamped himself in Davao shortly after the
May 2016 Elections to get the endorsement of President Duterte and the majority
partisans. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's election as the
Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep.
Suarez some of its members to feign membership in the Minority, and thereafter,
vote for him as the Minority Leader.2

On July 25, 2016, which was prior to the election of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas and Rep. Jose Atienza
(Rep. Atienza) had an interchange before the Plenary, wherein the latter elicited the
following from the former: (a) all those who vote for the winning Speaker shall belong
to the Majority and those who vote for the other candidates shall belong to the
Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall likewise be considered part of the
Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be elected by the members of the
Minority.3 Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were held, "[w]ith 252
Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez, eight [(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven [(7)]
voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one [(l)] registering a no vote,"4 thus,
resulting in Speaker Alvarez being the duly elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives of the 17th Congress.

Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the House - where the

candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership
automatically becomes the Minority Leader - Rep. Baguilat would be declared and
recognized as the Minority Leader. However, despite numerous follow-ups from
respondents, Rep. Baguilat was never recognized as such.5

On August 1, 2016, one of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil Abayon,

III (Rep. Abayon), manifested before the Plenary that on July 27, 2016, those who
did not vote for Speaker Alvarez (including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and
elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.6 Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep.
(now, Majority Leader) Farinas moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the
Minority Leader. This was opposed by Rep. Lagman essentially on the ground that
various "irregularities" attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader,
particularly: (a) that Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as he voted for
Speaker Alvarez, and that his "transfer" to the Minority was irregular; and (b) that the
"abstentionists" who constituted the bulk of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election
as Minority Leader are supposed to be considered independent members of the
House, and thus, irregularly deemed as part of the Minority.7 However, Rep.
Lagman's opposition was overruled, and consequently, Rep. Suarez was officially
recognized as the House Minority Leader.

Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus, insisting that Rep. Baguilat
should be recognized as the Minority Leader in light of: (a) the "long-standing
tradition" in the House where the candidate who garnered the second (2nd)-highest
number of votes for Speakership automatically becomes the Minority Leader; and (b)
the irregularities attending Rep. Suarez's election to said Minority Leader position.
For his part, Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of Minority Leader is an internal
matter to the House of Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot interfere with such
internal matters of a coequal branch of the govemment.8 In the same vein, the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of Speaker Alvarez and Majority Leader
Farinas contends, inter alia, that the election of Minority Leader is within the
exclusive realm of the House of Representatives, which the Court cannot intrude in
pursuant to the principle of separation of powers, as well as the political question
doctrine. Similarly, the OSG argues that the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the House
Minority Leader was not tainted with any violation of the Constitution or grave abuse
of discretion and, thus, must be sustained.9

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for resolution is whether or not respondents may be compelled
via a writ of mandamus to recognize: (a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives; and (b) petitioners as the only legitimate members of the
House Minority.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

"Mandamus is defined as a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board or person

to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfully neglects the performance
of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or
station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office or which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course oflaw."10 In Special People, Inc. Foundation
v. Canda,11 the Court explained that the peremptory writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy that is issued only in extreme necessity, and the ordinary
course of procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and speedy relief to one who
has a clear legal right to the performance of the act to be compelled.12

After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that petitioners have no clear
legal right to the reliefs sought. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership
Election held on July 25, 2016, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep. Farinas responded to
a parliamentary inquiry from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the Minority Leader
of the House of Representatives. Rep. Farinas then articulated that: (a) all those who
vote for the winning Speaker shall belong to the Majority and those who vote for
other candidates shall belong to the Minority; (b) those who abstain from voting shall
likewise be considered part of the Minority; and (c) the Minority Leader shall be
elected by the members of the Minority.13 Thereafter, the election of the Speaker of
the House proceeded without any objection from any member of Congress, including
herein petitioners. Notably, the election of the Speaker of the House is the essential
and formative step conducted at the first regular session of the 17th Congress to
determine the constituency of the Majority and Minority (and later on, their respective
leaders), considering that the Majority would be comprised of those who voted for
the winning Speaker and the Minority of those who did not. The unobjected
procession of the House at this juncture is reflected in its Journal No. 1 dated July
25, 2016,14 which, based on case law, is conclusive15 as to what transpired in
Congress:

PARLIAMENTARY INQUIRY OF REP. ATIENZA

Recognized by the Chair, Rep. Atienza inquired as to who would elect the Minority
Leader of the House of Representatives.

REMARKS OF REP. FARINAS

In reply, Rep. Fariñas referred to Section 8 of the Rules of the house on membership
to the Majority and the Minority. He explained that the Members who voted for the
winning candidate for the Speaker shall constitute the Majority and shall elect from
among themselves the Majority Leader. while those who voted against the winning
Speaker or did not vote at all shall belong to the Minority and would thereafter elect
their Minority Leader.

NOMINAL VOTING ON THE NOMINEES FOR SPEAKER OF

THE HOUSE

Thereafter, on motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Members

proceeded to the election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives. The
Presiding Officer then directed Deputy Secretary General Adasa to call the Roll for
nominal voting for the Speaker of the House and requested each Member to state
the name of the candidate he or she will vote for.
The result of the voting was as follows:

For Rep. Pantaleon D. Alvarez:

xxxx

For Rep. Teddy Brawner Baguilat Jr.

xxxx

For Rep. Danilo E. Suarez

xxxx

Abstained

xxxx

With 252 Members voting for Rep. Alvarez (P.), eight voting for Rep. Baguilat, seven
voting for Rep. Suarez, 21 abstaining and one registering a no vote, the Presiding
Officer declared Rep. Alvarez (P.) as the duly elected Speaker of the House of
Representatives for the 17th Congress.

COMMITTEE ON NOTIFICATION

On motion of Rep. Farinas, there being no objection, the Body constituted a

committee composed of the following Members to notify Rep. Alvarez (P.) of his
election as Speaker of the House of Representatives and to escort the Speaker-elect
to the rostrum for his oath-taking: Reps. Eric D. Singson, Mercedes K. Alvarez,
Fredenil "Fred" H. Castro, Raneo "Ranie" E. Abu, Lucy T. Gomez, Nancy A.
Catamco, Elenita Milagros "Eileen" Ermita-Buhain, Rose Marie "Baby" J. Arenas,
Mylene J. Garcia-Albano, Gwendolyn F. Garcia, Marlyn L. PrimiciasAgabas,
Emmeline Aglipay-Villar, Sarah Jane I. Elago and Victoria Isabel G. Noel.
SUSPENSION OF SESSION

The Presiding Officer motu proprio suspended the session at 12:43p.m.16

After Speaker Alvarez took his oath of office, he administered the oath of office to all
Members of the House of the 17th Congress.17 On the same day, the Deputy
Speakers, and other officers of the House (among others, the Majority Leader) were
elected and all took their respective oaths of office.18

During his privilege speech delivered on July 26, 2016, which was a full day after all
the above-mentioned proceedings had already been commenced and completed,
Rep. Lagman questioned Rep. Fariñas' interpretation of the Rules.19 Aside from the
belated timing of Rep. Lagman's query, Rep. Suarez aptly points out that the Journal
for that session does not indicate any motion made, seconded and carried to correct
the entry in the Journal of the previous session (July 25, 2016) pertinent to any
recording error that may have been made, as to indicate that in fact, a protest or
objection was raised.20

Logically speaking, the foregoing circumstances would show that the House of
Representatives had effectively adopted Rep. Farinas' proposal anent the new rules
regarding the membership of the Minority, as well as the process of determining who
the Minority Leader would be. More significantly, this demonstrates the House's
deviation from the "legal bases" of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the reliefs
sought before this Court, namely: (a) the "long-standing tradition" of automatically
awarding the Minority Leadership to the second placer in the Speakership Elections,
i.e., Rep. Baguilat; and (b) the rule21 that those who abstained in the Speakership
Elections should be deemed as independent Members of the House of
Representatives, and thus, they could not have voted for a Minority Leader in the
person of Rep. Suarez.22 As will be explained hereunder, the deviation by the Lower
House from the aforesaid rules is not averse to the Constitution.

Section 16 (1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution reads:

Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President and the House of
Representatives, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its respective Members.

Each house shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall be elected
by a majority vote of its entire membership. Said provision also states that the House
of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the Speaker, and that the
method and manner as to how these officers are chosen is something within its sole
control.23 In the case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona,24 which involved a dispute
on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the 11th Congress (1998-2001), this
Court observed that "[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing x x
x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is, however, dead silent on the
manner of selecting the other officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says
is that ' [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.'
[As such], the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the [House
of Representatives] itself, not by [the] Court. "25

Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI26 of the Constitution vests in the House
of Representatives the sole authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints
of permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them.' Being
merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no concern to the courts, for
said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives]. "27 Hence, as a general
rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to interfere and unilaterally intrude into that
exclusive realm, without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is bound to
protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the
sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the [House of Representatives]."28

Of course, as in any general rule, there lies an exception. While the Court in taking
jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political departments of
government, will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, it will,
however, strike it down on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.29 This stems
from the expanded concept of judicial power, which, under Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution, expressly "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." Case law decrees that "[t]he foregoing text
emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including
Congress. It is an innovation in our political law. As explained by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion:30
[T]he judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a branch of
government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to
excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on
matters of this nature.31

Accordingly, this Court "will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and
authority to uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of discretion
brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any officer, agency,
instrumentality or department of the government."32

However, as may be gleaned from the circumstances as to how the House had
conducted the questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its traditional
rules, the Court is hard-pressed to find any attending grave abuse of discretion which
would warrant its intrusion in this case. By and large, this case concerns an internal
matter of a coequal, political branch of government which, absent any showing of
grave abuse of discretion, cannot be judicially interfered with. To rule otherwise
would not only embroil this Court in the realm of politics, but also lead to its own
breach of the separation of powers doctrine.33 Verily, "[i]t would be an unwarranted
invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside
a legislative action as void [only] because [it] thinks [that] the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a
rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that
department itself."34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015 - ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A.
PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T. SARMEN, AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C.
YBANEZ, SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN,
EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E. PEREZ, HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO
ARENAS, TIRSO C. BUENAVENTURA, LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C.
GOLO& JONATHAN DEQUINA IN THEIR INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND AS
LEGITIMATE MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG
KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY LIST), Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP
PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY AMPARO T. RIMAS, Respondents.
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

EN BANC

G.R. No. 205505, September 29, 2015

ATTY. ISIDRO Q. LICO, RAFAEL A. PUENTESPINA, PROCULO T. SARMEN,

AMELITO L. REVUELTA, WILLIAM C. YBANEZ, SILVERIO J. SANCHEZ, GLORIA
G. FUTALAN, HILARIO DE GUZMAN, EUGENE M. PABUALAN, RODOLFO E.
PEREZ, HIPOLITO R. QUILLAN, MARIO ARENAS, TIRSO C. BUENAVENTURA,
LYDIA B. TUBELLA, REYNALDO C. GOLO& JONATHAN DEQUINA IN THEIR
INDIVIDUAL CAPACITIES, AND AS LEGITIMATE MEMBERS AND OFFICERS OF
ADHIKAING TINATAGUYOD NG KOOPERATIBA (ATING KOOP PARTY LIST),
Petitioners, v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS EN BANC AND THE SELF-
STYLED SHAM ATING KOOP PARTYLIST REPRESENTED BY AMPARO T.
RIMAS, Respondents.

DECISION

SERENO, C.J.:

The pivotal and interrelated issues before Us in this case involve the seemingly
elementary matter of the Commission on Elections' (COMELEC) jurisdiction over the
expulsion of a sitting party-list representative: from the House of Representatives, on
the one hand; and from his party-list organization, on the other.
The instant case involves two rival factions of the same party-list organization, the
Adhikaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop). One group is headed by
petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico (the Lico Group), who represents the organization in the
House of Representatives, and the other group by Amparo T. Rimas (respondents
herein, or the Rimas Group).

THE CASE

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 641 in relation to Rule 65,2 seeking
to annul the Resolutions in E.M. No. 12-039 dated 18 July 2012 and 31 January
2013 of the COMELEC.

THE ANTECEDENT FACTS

Ating Koop is a multi-sectoral party-list organization which was registered on 16

November 2009 under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, also known as the Party-List
System Act (Party-List Law).

Under Ating Koop's Constitution and By-Laws, its highest policymaking body is the
National Convention. The Central Committee, however, takes over when the
National Convention is not in session.3

On 30 November 2009, Ating Koop filed its Manifestation of Intent to Participate in

the Party-List System of Representation for the 10 May 2010 Elections.4 On 6 March
2010, it filed with the COMELEC the list of its nominees, with petitioner Lico as first
nominee and Roberto Mascarina as second nominee.

On 8 December 2010, COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as one of the winning

party-list groups.5 Based on the procedure provided in BANAT Party-List v.
COMELEC,6 Ating Koop earned a seat in the House of Representatives. Petitioner
Lico subsequently took his oath of office on 9 December 2010 before the Secretary-
General of the House of Representatives,7 and thereafter assumed office.

Several months prior to its proclamation as one of the winning party-list

organizations, or on 9 June 2010, Ating Koop issued Central Committee Resolution
2010-01, which incorporated a term-sharing agreement signed by its nominees.8
Under the agreement, petitioner Lico was to serve as Party-list Representative for
the first year of the three-year term.9

On 14 May 2011, Ating Koop held its Second National Convention, during which it
introduced amendments to its Constitution and By-laws. Among the salient changes
was the composition of the Central Committee,10 which would still be composed of
15 representatives but with five each coming from Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao (5-
5-5 equal representation).11 The amendments likewise mandated the holding of an
election of Central Committee members within six months after the Second National
Convention.12

In effect, the amendments cut short the three-year term of the incumbent members
(referred to hereafter as the Interim Central Committee) of the Central Committee.13
The Interim Central Committee was dominated by members of the Rimas Group.

On 5 December 2011, or almost one year after petitioner Lico had assumed office,
the Interim Central Committee expelled him from Ating Koop for disloyalty.14 Apart
from allegations of malversation and graft and corruption, the Committee cited
petitioner Lico's refusal to honor the term-sharing agreement as factual basis for
disloyalty and as cause for his expulsion under Ating Koop's Amended Constitution
and By-laws.15

On 8 December 2011, Congressman Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the
Interim Central Committee,16 which subsequently denied the same in a Resolution
dated 29 December 2011.17

While petitioner Lico's Motion for Reconsideration was pending, the Lico Group held
a special meeting in Cebu City (the Cebu meeting) on 19 December 2011. At the
said meeting, new members of the Central Committee, as well as a new set of
officers, were elected.18 The election was purportedly held for the purpose of
implementing the 5-5-5 equal representation amendment made during the Second
National Convention.19

On 21 January 2012, the Rimas Group held a Special National Convention in

Parañaque City20 (the Parañaque convention), at which a new Central Committee
and a new set of officers were constituted.21 Members of the Rimas Group won the
election and occupied all the corresponding seats.

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC

SECOND DIVISION

On 16 March 2012, the Rimas Group, claiming to represent Ating Koop, filed with
COMELEC a Petition against petitioner Lico docketed as E.M. No. 12-039.22 The
said Petition, which was subsequently raffled to the Second Division, prayed that
petitioner Lico be ordered to vacate the office of Ating Koop in the House of
Representatives, and for the succession of the second nominee, Roberto Mascarina
as Ating Koop's representative in the House.

The Rimas Group thereafter filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC on 14
May 2012, this time impleading not only petitioner Lico but the entire Lico Group.
The Amended Petition also prayed that the COMELEC nullify the election conducted
at the Cebu meeting and recognize the Paranaque convention.

In both the Petition and the Amended Petition, the Rimas Group alleged that Ating
Koop had expelled Congressman Lico for acts inimical to the party-list group, such
as malversation, graft and corruption, and that he had "boldly displayed his
recalcitrance to honor party commitment to be upright and consistently honest, thus
violating basic principles of the Ating Koop."23 The Amended Petition stated further
that the Cebu meeting held by the Lico Group violated notice and quorum
requirements.24

In a Resolution dated 18 July 2012,25 the COMELEC Second Division upheld the
expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarina as the duly
qualified nominee of the party-list group.26 The Second Division characterized the
issue of the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop as an intra-
party leadership dispute, which it could resolve as an incident of its power to register
political parties.27chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMELEC

EN BANC

Consequently, the Lico Group filed a Motion for Reconsideration from the Second
Division's Resolution, which the COMELEC En Banc denied on 31 January 2013.
The dispositive portion of its Resolution reads:cralawlawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (En Banc) RESOLVES, as it

hereby RESOLVED, to:
a. DISMISS the instant Petition to Expel Respondent Atty. Isidro Q. Lico in the
House of Representatives and to Sanction the Immediate Succession of the Second
Nominee of ATING KOOP Party List, Mr. Roberto C. Mascarina as its Party
Representative, for lack of jurisdiction;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

b. UPHOLD the Expulsion of Respondent Atty. Isidro Lico from ATING KOOP Party-
list Group; [and]

c. UPHOLD the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President, Amparo
T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group accredited by the Commission on
Elections, to the exclusion of respondents Atty. Isidro Q. Lico, Rafael A.
Puentespina, Proculo T. Sarmen, Amelito L. Revuelta, William C. Ybanez, Silverio J.
Sanchez, Gloria G. Futalan, Hilario De Guzman, Eugene M. Pabualan, Rodolfo E.
Perez, Hipolito R. Quillan, Mario Arenas, Tirso C. Buenaventura, Lydia B. Tubella,
and Jonathan Dequina.28
chanrobleslaw

In arriving at its Resolution, the COMELEC En Banc held that it had no jurisdiction to
expel Congressman Lico from the House of Representatives, considering that his
expulsion from Ating Koop affected his qualifications as member of the House, and
therefore it was the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) that had
jurisdiction over the Petition.

At the same time, the COMELEC upheld the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion
from Ating Koop, explaining that when the Interim Central Committee ousted him
from Ating Koop, the said Committee's members remained in hold-over capacity
even after their terms had expired;29 and that the COMELEC was not in a position to
substitute its judgment for that of Ating Koop with respect to the cause of the
expulsion.30

Finally, the COMELEC En Banc recognized the Rimas Group as the legitimate
representative of Ating Koop considering that: 1) it found nothing in the records to
show that the Lico Group made a valid call for the special election of Central
Committee members as required under the Amended Constitution and By-Laws;31
2) there is nothing on record indicating that a minimum of 100 attended the Cebu
meeting;32 and 3) the Parañaque convention was in accordance with Ating Koop's
Amended Constitution and By-Laws.33
Hence, this Petition: the Lico Group now comes before Us, praying for a review of
the COMELEC Resolutions.

The Court's Ruling

On the COMELEC's jurisdiction over

the expulsion of a Member of the House
of Representatives from his party-list
organization

We find that while the COMELEC correctly dismissed the Petition to expel petitioner
Lico from the House of Representatives for being beyond its jurisdiction, it
nevertheless proceeded to rule upon the validity of his expulsion from Ating Koop - a
matter beyond its purview.

The COMELEC notably characterized the Petition for expulsion of petitioner Lico
from the House of Representatives and for the succession of the second nominee as
party-list representative as a disqualification case. For this reason, the COMELEC
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, insofar as it relates to the question of
unseating petitioner Lico from the House of Representatives.

Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution34 endows the HRET with jurisdiction
to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of
party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case
upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and
assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives.35 In this case, the
COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took
his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the
HRET, and not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case.

What We find to be without legal basis, however, is the action of the COMELEC in
upholding the validity of the expulsion of petitioner Lico from Ating Koop, despite its
own ruling that the HRET has jurisdiction over the disqualification issue. These
findings already touch upon the qualification requiring a party-list nominee to be a
bona fide member of the party-list group sought to be represented.
The COMELEC justified its Resolution on the merits of the expulsion, by relying on
the rule that it can decide intra-party matters as an incident of its constitutionally
granted powers and functions. It cited Lokin v. COMELEC, where We held that when
the resolution of an intra-party controversy is necessary or incidental to the
performance of the constitutionally-granted functions of the COMELEC, the latter can
step in and exercise jurisdiction over the intra-party matter.36 The Lokin case,
however, involved nominees and not incumbent members of Congress. In the
present case, the fact that petitioner Lico was a member of Congress at the time of
his expulsion from Ating Koop removes the matter from the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC.

The rules on intra-party matters and on the jurisdiction of the HRET are not parallel
concepts that do not intersect. Rather, the operation of the rule on intra-party matters
is circumscribed by Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and
jurisprudence on the jurisdiction of electoral tribunals. The jurisdiction of the HRET is
exclusive. It is given full authority to hear and decide the cases on any matter
touching on the validity of the title of the proclaimed winner.37

In the present case, the Petition for petitioner Lico's expulsion from the House of
Representatives is anchored on his expulsion from Ating Koop, which necessarily
affects his title as member of Congress. A party-list nominee must have been,
among others, a bona fide member of the party or organization for at least ninety
(90) days preceding the day of the election. Needless to say, bona fide membership
in the party-list group is a continuing qualification. We have ruled that qualifications
for public office, whether elective or not, are continuing requirements. They must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election, or of assumption of office,
but during the officer's entire tenure.39

This is not the first time that this Court has passed upon the issue of HRET
jurisdiction over the requirements for bona fide membership in a party-list
organization. In Abayon v. HRET,40 it was argued that the petitioners did not belong
to the marginalized and under-represented sectors that they should represent; as
such, they could not be properly considered bona fide members of their respective
party-list organizations. The Court held that it was for the HRET to interpret the
meaning of the requirement of bona fide membership in a party-list organization. It
reasoned that under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests when it comes to qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives.41

Consequently, the COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue on the validity of
petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his qualifications
to sit in Congress. This is not merely an error of law but an error of jurisdiction
correctible by a writ of certiorari;42 the COMELEC should not have encroached into
the expulsion issue, as it was outside its authority to do so.

Distinguished from Reyes v. COMELEC

Our ruling here must be distinguished from Regina Ongsiako Reyes v. Commission
on Elections.43 In that case, We upheld the disqualification by the COMELEC of
petitioner Reyes, even as she was already proclaimed winner in the elections at the
time she filed her petition with the High Court. In doing so, We rejected the argument
that the case fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HRET.

In Reyes, the petitioner was proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections, and
took her oath of office before the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
However, the Court ruled on her qualifications since she was not yet a member of
the House of Representatives: petitioner Reyes had yet to assume office, the term of
which would officially start at noon of 30 June 2013, when she filed a Petition for
Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June 2013 assailing the Resolutions ordering
the cancellation of her Certificate of Candidacy. In the present case, all three
requirements of proclamation, oath of office, and assumption of office were satisfied.

Moreover, in Reyes, the COMELEC En Banc Resolution disqualifying petitioner on

grounds of lack of Filipino citizenship and residency had become final and executory
when petitioner elevated it to this Court.44 It should be mentioned that when
petitioner Reyes filed her petition with the Court, the COMELEC En Banc had, as
early as 5 June 2013, already issued a Certificate of Finality over its 14 May 2013
Resolution disqualifying her. Therefore, there was no longer any pending case on
the qualifications of petitioner Reyes to speak of. Here, the question of whether
petitioner Lico remains a member of the House of Representatives in view of his
expulsion from Ating Koop is a subsisting issue.

Finally, in Reyes, We found the question of jurisdiction of the HRET to be a non-

issue, since the recourse of the petitioner to the Court appeared to be a mere
attempt to prevent the COMELEC from implementing a final and executory
judgment. We said that the petitioner therein took an inconsistent, if not confusing,
stance, considering that she sought remedy before the Court, and yet asserted that it
is the HRET which had jurisdiction over the case.45 In this case, the question on the
validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion from Ating Koop is a genuine issue that falls
within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as it unmistakably affects his qualifications as
party-list representative.
On which group legitimately represents
Ating Koop

We now pass upon the question of which, between the two contending groups, is the
legitimate leadership of Ating Koop.

At the outset, We reject the Lico Group's argument that the COMELEC has no
jurisdiction to decide which of the feuding groups is to be recognized, and that it is
the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over intra-corporate controversies.
Indeed, the COMELECs jurisdiction to settle the struggle for leadership within the
party is well established. This power to rule upon questions of party identity and
leadership is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident of its enforcement
powers.46

That being said, We find the COMELEC to have committed grave abuse of discretion
in declaring the Rimas Group as the legitimate set of Ating Koop officers for the
simple reason that the amendments to the Constitution and By-laws of Ating Koop
were not registered with the COMELEC. Hence, neither of the elections held during
the Cebu meeting and the Paranaque conference pursuant to the said amendments,
were valid.

Both the Lico Group and the Rimas Group indeed assert that their respective
elections were conducted pursuant to the amendment introduced in the Second
National Convention held on 14 May 2011. In particular, Section 1 of Article VI of
Ating Koop's By-laws called for the conduct of an election of Central Committee
members within six months after the Second National Convention.47

There is no showing, however, that the amendments were actually filed with the
COMELEC.

A party-list organization owes its existence to the State and the latter's approval must
be obtained through its agent, the COMELEC. In the 2013 case of Dayao v.
COMELEC,48 We declared that it is the State, acting through the COMELEC, that
breathes life to a party-list organization. The implication, therefore, is that the State,
through the COMELEC, is a party to the principal contracts entered into by the party-
list organization and its members - the Constitution and By-laws - such that any
amendment to these contracts would constitute a novation requiring the consent of
all the parties involved. An amendment to the bylaws of a party-list organization
should become effective only upon approval by the COMELEC.
Such a prerequisite is analogous to the requirement of filing of the amended by-laws
and subsequent conformity thereto of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) under corporation law. Under the Corporation Code, an amendment to a by-
law provision must be filed with the SEC. The amendment shall be effective only
upon the issuance by the SEC of a certification that it is not inconsistent with the
Corporation Code.49

There being no showing that the amendments on the by-laws of Ating Koop were
filed with and subsequently approved by the COMELEC, any election conducted
pursuant thereto may not be considered valid. Without such requisite proof, neither
the Lico Group nor the Rimas Group can claim to be the legitimate set of officers of
Ating Koop.

Even assuming arguendo that the amendment calling for a special election were
effective, this Court still cannot declare any of the feuding groups as the legitimate
set of officers considering that the respective sets of evidence presented were
evenly balanced. With respect to the Lico Group's Cebu meeting, the COMELEC
correctly found - and the records bear out - that the notices sent were deficient and
that there was no sufficient proof of quorum. Hence, the Cebu meeting was held to
be invalid. On the other hand, the COMELEC failed to appreciate the fact that the
Paranaque convention suffered from the same infirmity, the records of the said
convention, consisting merely of the Minutes thereof, likewise fail to establish due
notice and a quorum.50

Accordingly, as neither group can sufficiently lay claim to legitimacy, the equipoise
doctrine comes into play. This rule provides that when the evidence in an issue of
fact is in equipoise, that is, when the respective sets of evidence of both parties are
evenly balanced, the party having the burden of proof fails in that issue. Since
neither party succeeds in making out a case, neither side prevails. The courts are left
with no other option but to leave them as they are. The consequence, therefore, is
the dismissal of the complaint/petition.51

The Rimas Group, being the petitioner before the COMELEC, had the burden of
proving that it is the petitioner, and not the Lico Group, that is the legitimate group.
As the evidence of both parties are in equipoise, the Rimas Group failed to discharge
its burden. The COMELEC should have dismissed the petition of the Rimas Group
insofar as it sought to be declared the legitimate group representing Ating Koop.
Yet, the COMELEC held that the Paranaque convention "appeared to be in
conformity" with Ating Koop's Amended Constitution and By-Laws.52 It should be
stressed that the COMELEC did not even substantiate this conclusion.53

The Court ordinarily refrains from reviewing the COMELEC s appreciation and
evaluation of the evidence.54 But when the COMELECs assessment of the evidence
is so grossly unreasonable that it turns into an error of jurisdiction, the Court is
compelled to intervene and correct the error.55

As seen in the above discussions, neither of the parties was able to establish its
legitimacy. The evaluation of the evidence by the COMELEC in deciding the issue of
which group legitimately represents Ating Koop was therefore grossly unreasonable,
which amounts to a jurisdictional error that may be remedied by certiorari under Rule
65.

The final, and most important question to be addressed is: if neither of the two
groups is the legitimate leadership of Ating Koop, then who is?

We find such legitimate leadership to be the Interim Central Committee, whose

members remain as such in a hold-over capacity.

In Seneres v. COMELEC,56 the validity of the Certificate of Nomination filed by

Buhay Party-List through its President, Roger Robles, was questioned on the ground
that his term had expired at the time it was filed. The Court applied by analogy the
default rule in corporation law to the effect that officers and directors of a corporation
hold over after the expiration of their terms until such time as their successors are
elected or appointed.57Señeres ruled that the hold-over principle applies in the
absence of a provision in the constitution or by-laws of the party-list organization
prohibiting its application.

In the present case, We have gone through the Constitution and Bylaws of Ating
Koop and We do not see any provision forbidding, either expressly or impliedly, the
application of the hold-over rule. Thus, in accordance with corporation law, the
existing Interim Central Committee is still a legitimate entity with full authority to bind
the corporation and to carry out powers despite the lapse of the term of its members
on 14 November 2011, since no successors had been validly elected at the time, or
since.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The COMELEC En
Banc Resolution dated 31 January 2013 and the COMELEC Second Division
Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M. No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of Congressman Lico from Ating
Koop and it upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group represented by its President,
Amparo T. Rimas, as the legitimate Party-list Group.

A new one is entered DECLARING that the legitimate Central Committee and set of
officers legitimately representing Ating Koop are the Interim Central Committee and
set of officers prior to the split of Ating Koop.

SO ORDERED.
[CASE DIGEST] Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. COMELEC (G.R. No. 203766)
April 2, 2013 | G.R. No. 203766

Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other disqualified party list groups, petitioners
COMELEC, respondent

FACTS:

In line with the then upcoming national elections in May 2013, approximately 280
groups and organizations manifested their desire to participate in the party-list
elections. However, 52 of these groups were subsequently disqualified by
COMELEC, including some that were duly registered and accredited as political
parties. The reasons for their exclusion were based on the contention that said
groups failed to establish they were representatives of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors and that their nominees were indeed members of the
sectors they were seeking to represent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not COMELEC erred in disqualifying 52 party list groups from

participating in the May 2013 elections.

HELD:
No, what COMELEC did was merely follow existing jurisprudence set forth by the SC
in its earlier rulings. So for purposes of setting uniform standards and understanding
of the party-list system in the Philippines, the Court provides a lengthy account of the
history and dynamics of the party-list system as embodied in the 1987 Constitution
and as envisioned by the Framers, and institutes new guidelines to be used in
resolving issues of similar nature in the future.

Q: Where can the party-list system be found in the 1987 Constitution?

A: Section 5, Art. VI; Sections 7 and 8, Art. IX-C

Q: What is the rationale behind the party-list system?

A: To democratize political power by giving political parties that cannot win in
legislative district elections a chance to win seats in the House of Representatives.

Q: Is the party-list system synonymous with sectoral representation?

A: No. Under the party-list system, all voters get to have two votes: one for their
choice of legislative district representative, and another for their choice of party-list
representative. But under sectoral representation, majority of the electorate will only
have one vote, which is for their choice of legislative district representative. In
contrast, members of sectoral communities (e.g. farmers, laborers, indigenous
cultural communitoes, etc.) will have two votes: one for their district representative
and another for their choice of sectoral representative. In other words, sectoral
representation is discriminatory.

Q: Is the party-list system exclusive to sectoral parties?

A: No. The party-list system is open to both sectoral and non-sectoral groups. The
framers intended sectoral groups to constitute a part, but not the entirety, of the
party-list system.

Q: Who can participate in party-list elections?

A: As per Section 5(1) of Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution, any of the following can
take part in party-list elections: national parties and organizations, regional parties
and organizations, and sectoral parties and organizations.

Q: What is the enabling law of the party-list system?

A: RA No. 7941, or the Party-List System Act.

Q: Do party-list groups need to represent the marginalized and underrepresented

sectors?
A: No. Art. 6 of RA No. 7941 identifies six grounds for disqualification of a party-list
group, and none of these grounds touches on the failure of a party to represent the
marginalized and underrepresented. For non-sectoral groups, it is enough that its
members are united in their cause or ideology. But for sectoral groups, a majority of
their members must come from marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

Q: What are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?

A: Section 5 of RA No. 7941 lists the following as marginalized and
underrepresented sectors: labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other similar sectors.

Q: Can major political parties join in party-list elections?

A: Yes, but only through their sectoral wings. The initial impression is that: (a) major
political parties do not represent marginalized and underrepresented sectors, and (b)
major political parties have well-defined constituencies. However, the 1987
Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow them to participate in party-list elections so as to
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and those who lack well-defined constituencies.
The creation of sectoral wings is allowed as per Section 3 of RA No. 7941.

Q: Should party-list nominees be part of the sector they seek to represent?

A: In BANAT v. COMELEC, the Court held that party-list nominees must come from
the sector they seek to represent. Thus, a party-list representing farmers should
have farmer nominees, too. This was one of COMELEC's bases in disqualifying the
52 petitioners. However, the Court reverses its ruling in BANAT v. COMELEC by
instituting new parameters, including the guidelines for the choice of nominees.
Under the new parameters, a nominee may either be a member of the sector he
seeks to represent or at the very least, should have a track record of advocacy for
such sector.

Q: What are the new parameters that party-list groups should adhere to according to
the Court in the instant case?
A: The Court enumerated six parameters. See last sections of the Court ruling for the
list.

Q: What is the final ruling of the Court in this case?

A: The Court remands the cases back to COMELEC to determine whether or not the
52 petitioners are qualified to participate in the May 2013 elections using the six
parameters laid down by the Court.