The Superintendent, Central Prison, Fatehgarh v.

Ram Manohar Lohia

Facts:

 The respondent, Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia, was the General Secretary of the Socialist Party of
India. The Uttar Pradesh government had raised irrigation rates for water supplied from
canals to cultivators. Ohia’s party decided to oppose the rate increases, believing they placed
an undue burden on cultivators. Lohia delivered speeches at two public meetings in
Farrukhabad, encouraging the audience not to pay the increased irrigation rates. On July 4,
1954, Lohia was arrested and brought before the City Magistrate of Farrukhabad, who
remanded him for two days.

 A charge-sheet was filed against Lohia under Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act of
1932 ("the Act"). Lohia filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Allahabad High
Court, arguing that Section 3 of the Act was unconstitutional. A division bench of the High
Court issued differing judgments on the constitutionality of Section 3. The case was referred
to a third judge who agreed with one of the original judges, finding Section 3
unconstitutional.

 The High Court, based on the majority view, ordered Lohia's release. The State of Uttar
Pradesh appealed the High Court's order to the Supreme Court of India.

Issue:

The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act of
1932, which criminalized instigating people not to pay government dues, violated the right to freedom
of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

A key point of contention was the interpretation of the phrase “in the interests of public order” found
in Article 19(2) and whether the restrictions imposed by Section 3 met the criteria of being both
“reasonable” and “in the interests of public order.”

Judgment:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal filed by the State of Uttar Pradesh, upholding the High
Court's decision. The Court declared Section 3 of the U.P. Special Powers Act of 1932 void for
violating Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

Important Points:

 Article 19(1)(a) and Freedom of Speech: The Court affirmed that freedom of speech is a
cornerstone of a democratic society.

 Reasonable Restrictions under Article 19(2): The Court recognized that the right to freedom
of speech is not absolute and can be subject to reasonable restrictions in the interests of the
security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality,
or in relation to contempt of court, defamation, or incitement to an offense.

 Public Order as Synonymous with Public Peace, Safety, and Tranquillity: The Court defined
“public order” as distinct from the broader concept of national security. The Court interpreted
"public order" as pertaining to the maintenance of peace, safety, and tranquillity within the
community, differentiating it from issues such as threats to the overthrow of the State.

 Nexus Between Speech and Public Order: The Court emphasized the need for a “proximate
connection” or “nexus” between the restricted speech and the public order sought to be
protected. The Court rejected the argument that any speech that might remotely or
hypothetically lead to public disorder could be restricted.

 “In the Interests of” versus “For the Maintenance of” Public Order: The Court clarified that
the phrase “in the interests of public order” is broader than “for the maintenance of public
 order.” While both phrases relate to public order, “in the interests of” encompasses laws that
may not directly aim to maintain public order but are designed to prevent actions that have the
potential to lead to disorder.

 Reasonableness of Restrictions: The Court stated that for a restriction on free speech to be
considered reasonable, it must not be arbitrary or excessive. The restriction must have a
rational connection to the objective of maintaining public order, and it must not go beyond
what is necessary to achieve that objective.

 Application of Severability to Section 3: The Court decided that it could not sever the
unconstitutional parts of Section 3. The Court found that the provision was too broadly
written and the unconstitutional aspects were too intertwined with the potentially
constitutional elements. Therefore, the Court concluded that the entire section must be struck
down.

C.K. Daphtary and Ors. vs. O.P. Gupta and Ors.

Facts of the Case:

 O.P. Gupta (Respondent No. 1) was a government employee involved in a legal case against
the State of Uttar Pradesh (U.P.). The case reached the Supreme Court of India as Civil
Appeal No. 1711 of 1967.

 The appeal was heard by a bench consisting of Justice J.C. Shah and Justice K.S. Hegde. The
judgment, delivered by Justice Hegde, ruled in favour of the State of U.P., overturning the
Allahabad High Court's decision.

 Gupta, dissatisfied with the Supreme Court’s judgment, wrote and published a pamphlet that
heavily criticized the conduct of Justice Shah and the judgment itself.

 The pamphlet, initially intended for circulation among Members of Parliament (MPs),
contained highly charged language, accusing Justice Shah of dishonesty, bias, prejudice, and
disregard for legal precedents.

 The pamphlet was printed by Rising Sun Press (Respondent No. 2) and allegedly sold or
offered for sale by Kanak Book Depot (Respondent No. 3).

 Several individuals, including lawyers and judges, became aware of the pamphlet, raising
concerns about its potential to damage the reputation of the Supreme Court and undermine
public confidence in the judiciary.

 Shri C.K. Daphtary, along with three other advocates, filed a contempt of court petition
against Gupta, Rising Sun Press, and Kanak Book Depot.

 The Supreme Court issued notices to the respondents, but Gupta actively evaded service for
an extended period.

 The Court eventually issued a non-bailable warrant for Gupta’s arrest, compelling him to
appear.

 Gupta, in his counter-affidavit, offered an apology to the Court but continued to assert the
truth and fairness of his criticisms against Justice Shah, emphasizing his right to approach
MPs for potential impeachment proceedings.
Issue: The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether O.P. Gupta’s publication and
distribution of the pamphlet, containing disparaging remarks against Justice Shah and the Court’s
judgment, constituted contempt of court.

Judgment:

The Supreme Court found O.P. Gupta guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to simple
imprisonment for two months. The Court accepted the unconditional apology of Rising Sun Press, the
printer of the pamphlet, and did not impose any further penalty. Kanak Book Depot was not located
and therefore not addressed in the final judgment.

Important Points:

 Contempt of Court and Freedom of Speech: The Court examined the relationship between the
law of contempt of court and the fundamental right to freedom of speech and expression
enshrined in Article 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

o The Court acknowledged that while fair criticism of judicial decisions is permissible,
scurrilous attacks on judges and the judiciary with the intent to undermine public
confidence in the administration of justice amount to contempt of court.

 Justification for Contempt Law: The Court defended the necessity of contempt law, arguing
that it plays a vital role in safeguarding the dignity of the judiciary, ensuring the smooth
functioning of courts, and upholding public confidence in the justice system. The Court
rejected Gupta’s claim that his criticism was merely an expression of truth and that truth
serves as a defence in contempt cases. The Court emphasized that even if errors exist in a
judgment, they do not justify the use of disrespectful and inflammatory language.

Akadasi Padhan vs. State of Orissa

Facts of the Case

Akadasi Padhan, the petitioner, owned land in the Sambalpur district of Orissa and grew
Kendu leaves on a portion of it. Kendu leaves are used to make Bidis (a type of Indian
cigarette) and prior to 1961, Padhan had an extensive trade selling and transporting them. In
1961, the Orissa Kendu Leaves (Control of Trade) Act was passed, creating a state monopoly
in the trade of Kendu leaves. His Act restricted the petitioner’s ability to buy, sell, and
transport Kendu leaves, interfering with the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles
19(1)(f) and (g) of the Indian Constitution. Padhan challenged the validity of the Act under
Article 32 of the Constitution.

Issue - The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Orissa Kendu Leaves
(Control of Trade) Act, 1961, violated the petitioner's fundamental rights under Article 19(1)
(f) and (g), particularly given the state monopoly it created.

Judgment

 The Court upheld the validity of the Act, finding that the state legislature had the power to
create a state monopoly under Article 19(6) of the Constitution.

 They determined that the creation of a state monopoly was presumed to be reasonable and in
the public interest, and therefore did not require further justification under Article 19(1)(g).

 However, the Court also ruled that Rule 7(5) of the rules framed under the Act was invalid
because it allowed the government to fix the terms and conditions of the agency agreement on
an ad hoc basis, without prescribing them in the rules.
  The Court also found the agreement entered into between the State Government and the
agents to be invalid because it did not reflect a true agent-principal relationship and allowed
agents to have a personal interest in the trade.

Important Points Discussed

 Scope and Effect of Article 19(6): The Court extensively discussed the scope and effect of
Article 19(6), which allows for reasonable restrictions on the fundamental right to trade and
business. The amendment introduced by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951,
specifically included state monopolies within the purview of Article 19(6).

 State Monopoly as a Reasonable Restriction: The Court held that the creation of a state
monopoly was, in itself, a reasonable restriction in the interest of the general public, as
presumed by the amendment to Article 19(6). This meant that the state did not have to further
justify the reasonableness of the monopoly under Article 19(1)(g).

State of Bombay vs. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala case:

Facts of the Case

 Chamarbaugwala had a license under the Bombay Prize Competitions Tax Act, 1939 to run
football pool competitions in Bombay. In 1948, the Bombay government refused to renew his
license, prompting him to shift operations to Mysore under the banner of R.M.D.C. (Mysore)
Limited. Prize competitions were conducted through a newspaper, Sporting Star, with entries
and fees collected nationwide, including from Bombay. Initially, the Bombay Lotteries and
Prize Competitions Control and Tax Act, 1948 did not cover competitions run from outside
Bombay. In 1952, the Act was amended to include such competitions, requiring licenses and
levying taxes.
 The respondents argued the amended Act was ultra vires (beyond the legislative power of
Bombay):

 It attempted to regulate activities conducted outside Bombay.

 It interfered with their fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(g) (right to

trade or business).

2. The State argued that these competitions were essentially lotteries, falling under "betting and
gambling" (List II, Entry 34 of the Constitution), which states have exclusive power to
legislate on. The respondents could not claim fundamental rights because the activities
involved gambling, which is not a legitimate trade or business.

Key Issues

1. Does the Act fall under the State’s power to regulate “betting and gambling”?

2. Does taxing and regulating these competitions violate the fundamental right to trade under
Article 19(1)(g)?

3. Can the Bombay government regulate competitions conducted outside its territory?

Judgment

The Supreme Court sided with the State of Bombay and upheld the law.

Important Points

1. Prize Competitions = Gambling (Not Trade or Business): The Court determined that the
competitions were primarily based on chance and not skill, making them a form of gambling.
Gambling is considered harmful and against public policy. Thus, it is not protected as a
legitimate “trade” under Article 19(1)(g).
 2. State’s Power to Regulate Gambling: The Court ruled that the law was valid because it dealt
with “betting and gambling,” which the Constitution allows states to regulate (Entry 34, List
II).

3. Territorial Nexus: Even though the competitions were organized outside Bombay, they
involved participants and collected entry fees from within Bombay. This created a sufficient
connection (or territorial nexus) for Bombay to regulate and tax them.

4. Tax on Gambling: The tax on these competitions was valid because it was a tax specifically on
gambling activities (Entry 62, List II).

Aveek Sarkar and Ors. vs. State of West Bengal and Ors.

Facts of the Case

1. The case arose from the publication of a photograph in which tennis player Boris Becker and
his fiancée, Barbara Feltus, posed nude together, captured by Feltus's father. This image was
published in the German magazine Stern and later reproduced in India by Sports World (a
sports magazine) and Ananda bazar Patrika (a newspaper). The accompanying article
highlighted Becker's opposition to racism and apartheid.

2. A Kolkata-based lawyer filed a criminal complaint under: Section 292 IPC (pertaining to
obscenity). Section 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986.

3. The complainant alleged that the photograph was obscene and capable of corrupting young
minds. The magistrate issued summons against the editors and publishers to face trial. The
appellants argued that the publication of a photograph from an unbanned foreign magazine
should fall under the legal exception in Section 79 IPC (acts done in good faith). The Calcutta
High Court refused to quash the proceedings, leading to the appeal in the Supreme Court.

Issues Before the Supreme Court

 Was the publication of the photograph "obscene" under:

o Section 292 IPC, which criminalizes obscenity.

o Section 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act, 1986?

Judgment

1. The Court emphasized the context and purpose of the publication. The photograph was part of
an article opposing racism and promoting social awareness, rather than intended to arouse
lustful thoughts.

2. The Court adopted the community standards test, which evaluates obscenity based on the
impact of the material on an average person using contemporary social norms. It rejected the
older Hicklin test, which judged obscenity based on isolated passages and their effect on the
most vulnerable individuals.

3. The judgment clarified that nudity alone does not make an image obscene. Obscenity is
determined by its effect and the context in which the content is presented.
ARTICLE 21-

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras.

 The petitioner, detained under the Act, argued that it violated his personal liberty under
Article 21.The question before the court: What does "procedure established by law" mean?
o Does it refer to any procedure enacted by a legislature, or must the procedure also be
fair, reasonable, and just?
 Arguments in Favor of Gopalan
1. Incorporation of Natural Justice:
1. Gopalan’s counsel argued that the term "law" in Article 21 should not merely refer to
enacted laws but should also include the principles of natural justice, such as:
 Right to a fair hearing.
 Protection from arbitrary state action.
 Ensuring justice for detainees.
2. Without these safeguards, a law might be procedurally correct but grossly unfair in
application.
2. Reasonableness under Article 19:
1. Preventive detention restricts a person’s movement, speech, and association, directly
infringing the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Article 19.Thus, it was argued
that the reasonableness of such laws should be tested under Article 19(2)-(6).
3. Adoption of Procedural Due Process:
1. The petitioner sought to introduce the American doctrine of procedural due process in
Indian jurisprudence.This would empower courts to review whether laws affecting
life and liberty were fair, just, and reasonable, not merely whether they adhered to a
legislative process.
 Supreme Court Ruling
1. Literal Meaning of Article 21: The court ruled that "procedure established by law" only
means a procedure passed by a legislature. As long as the procedure follows the enacted
law, courts cannot question whether it is fair or reasonable.
2. No Natural Justice in Article 21: The court rejected the idea that natural justice principles
(like the right to a fair hearing) are part of Article 21. They called natural justice too
vague and unsuitable for precise constitutional interpretation.
3. No "Procedural Due Process”: The framers of the Constitution deliberately excluded the
American idea of "due process of law" to avoid uncertainty and controversy. Article 21
was designed to rely on formal laws made by the legislature, not on judicial
interpretations of fairness.
4. Article 19 Doesn’t Apply to Detainees: Article 19 freedoms (like movement and speech)
apply only to free citizens, not those in preventive detention. Detention laws are governed
by Articles 20-22, which deal specifically with life and liberty. The court ruled that
Article 19 and Article 21 are separate and do not overlap in detention cases.
 Impact of the Gopalan Ruling
o The judgment adhered to a mechanical and literal interpretation of the Constitution,
giving wide leeway to the legislature.
o Courts could not question whether the procedure established by law was fair, just, or
reasonable.
o Legislatures gained unchecked authority to create procedures for depriving life and
liberty, even if these procedures were arbitrary or oppressive.
 Majority View:
o The majority held that Article 21 focuses only on following the written law (enacted
by the legislature).
o They excluded concepts of natural justice, like fair hearings, as they considered them
vague and unsuitable for legal enforcement.
  Dissenting View (Justice Fazl Ali):
o Justice Fazl Ali disagreed, arguing that principles of natural justice (e.g., "no one shall
be condemned unheard") are essential for protecting life and liberty.
o He warned that ignoring natural justice would give the executive too much power,
risking misuse of detention laws.
o He also argued that Article 19 and Article 21 are interconnected, and detention laws
should meet the requirements of both provisions.

Kharak Singh vs State of Uttar Pradesh

Kharak Singh, a resident of Uttar Pradesh, challenged the police's surveillance tactics under the U.P.
Police Regulations, which included secret picketing, nighttime domiciliary visits, and regular
inquiries, leading to an invasion of his privacy. These tactics were carried out without a warrant, and
the regulations allowed the police to track individuals classified as "history-sheeters." Kharak Singh
argued that these actions violated his Right to Privacy under Article 19 and Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution. The State defended the legality of these regulations, asserting they were crucial for
maintaining public safety.

The case was heard by a six-judge bench, and the Court delivered a split decision. The majority and
minority opinions are as follows:

Majority View (4:2)

1. Surveillance under the Police Regulations:

o The majority upheld most surveillance measures, such as secret picketing and
shadowing, as constitutional, arguing they did not violate Article 19(1)(d) or Article
21 since they did not involve a direct restriction on physical liberty or freedom of
movement.

o However, domiciliary visits (nighttime intrusions) were struck down as

unconstitutional, as they amounted to a violation of Article 21's guarantee of personal
liberty and dignity.

2. Right to Life and Privacy:

o While the judgment did not explicitly recognize the "Right to Privacy" as a
fundamental right, it hinted that such intrusive police actions infringed upon an
individual's dignity, which forms part of Article 21.

o The Court emphasized that no executive action could infringe personal liberty unless
backed by a valid law.

3. Freedom of Movement (Article 19):

o The majority held that measures like secret picketing did not physically restrain
Singh’s movement and thus did not violate Article 19(1)(d).

Minority View (2:6)

Judges: Justice Subba Rao (dissenting) and Justice Shah.

1. Right to Privacy as a Fundamental Right:

o Justice Subba Rao declared that the Right to Privacy was implicit under Article 21
and Article 19. He argued that constant surveillance and secret picketing restricted
Singh's freedom of movement (Article 19(1)(d)) and curtailed his liberty and dignity
under Article 21.

2. Freedom of Movement and Expression:

 o Rao stated that the intrusive measures also impacted freedom of expression under
Article 19(1)(a), as such surveillance created a chilling effect on an individual’s
ability to express themselves freely.

3. Domiciliary Visits:

o The minority concurred with the majority in declaring domiciliary visits as

unconstitutional, but they went further to criticize the broader surveillance system,
calling it a blatant violation of fundamental rights.

R.C. Cooper vs Union of India (1970): Majority Opinion

1. Right of Shareholders: The majority held that shareholders have the right to claim the
violation of their Fundamental Rights on behalf of the business in case the government's
actions infringe upon their rights.

2. Invalidation of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act: The
Court struck down the Banking Companies Act, asserting that it violated Articles 14 and 31 of
the Indian Constitution.

o Article 14 (Equality before the law): The Act was discriminatory because it
selectively restricted the banking operations of only 14 banks without justifiable
cause.

o Article 31 (Compensation): The Act failed to provide fair and reasonable

compensation to the affected banks, which made the acquisition unconstitutional.

3. Effect Test vs. Object Test: The Court applied the Effect Test over the Object Test, determining
that the impact of the legislation was more important than its stated objective.

4. Article 19(1)(f): The Court found that the Act complied with Article 19(1)(f) (right to
property) since the State had the authority to establish a monopoly over banking.

5. Ordinance Validity: The Court ruled that the ordinance promulgated by the President, which
later became the Act, was valid since Parliament had already approved it.

Minority Opinion by Justice A.N. Ray:

1. Compensation Challenge: Justice Ray opined that the compensation set by the Legislature for
the acquisition could not be challenged in court. He argued that the matter of compensation
was within the legislative domain.

2. Limitations on Judicial Intervention: Ray believed that the Court could only intervene if there
was evidence of dishonesty or fraud by the President in the enactment of the law, not simply
on the grounds of its content.

3. Rejection of Petitions: Based on the above reasoning, Justice Ray rejected the petitions
challenging the Banking Companies Act. He did not agree with the majority's view on
striking down the law.

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu and Anr

In relation to Article 21 (Protection of life and personal liberty) of the Constitution of India, the case
of (1974) did not directly focus on Article 21 but its principles resonated with its interpretation in
subsequent cases. Article 21 guarantees that no person shall be deprived of their life or personal
liberty except according to the procedure established by law. While the core focus of E.P. Royappa
was on Articles 14 and 16, it contributed to broadening the conceptual framework of Article 21 in the
following ways:

Facts Relevant to Article 21:

 1. The petitioner, E.P. Royappa, an IAS officer, challenged his arbitrary transfer from the post of
Chief Secretary to inferior posts such as Deputy Chairman, State Planning Commission, and
Officer on Special Duty.

2. He contended that such actions not only violated the principles of equality and non-
discrimination but were also arbitrary and against the rule of law, undermining his dignity and
professional standing.

Judgment in Relation to Article 21:

1. Arbitrariness as Antithetical to Equality and Liberty: Justice P.N. Bhagwati's observations in

this case formed a foundational link between equality (Article 14) and liberty (Article 21). He
stated that arbitrariness in state action is inherently unconstitutional as it violates the
principles of fairness and reasonableness, which are fundamental to the protection of personal
liberty under Article 21.

2. Dynamic Interpretation of Equality: Bhagwati's pronouncement, "Equality is antithetical to

arbitrariness..." laid the groundwork for the idea that arbitrary state action, whether in
employment or otherwise, can impinge upon personal liberty and dignity, which are protected
under Article 21. This reasoning was later echoed in cases where procedural fairness and non-
arbitrariness were recognized as integral to the right to life and liberty.

3. Dignity as an Essential Component of Life: While not explicitly invoked in this case, the
concept of professional dignity and non-discriminatory treatment as elements of life and
liberty (Article 21) became more pronounced in later judgments, like Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India (1978). The principles enunciated in E.P. Royappa indirectly contributed to
evolving the interpretation of Article 21 to encompass human dignity and fair treatment as
fundamental aspects of life.

Significance for Article 21 Jurisprudence:

The verdict in E.P. Royappa laid the foundation for integrating the principles of reasonableness and
fairness, derived from Articles 14 and 16, into the framework of Article 21. It emphasized that state
actions affecting an individual's status, dignity, or personal liberty must meet the test of fairness,
reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness, thereby linking equality and liberty as inseparable
constitutional values.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)

o Under Section 10(3)(c) of the Passport Act, 1967, the government has the authority to
impound a passport if deemed necessary for public interest. The Central Government
impounded Maneka Gandhi’s passport in the "interest of the general public" without giving
her a chance to defend herself. Maneka challenged the order, claiming it violated Article
21,Article 14 and Article 19.
o Issues:
1. Does "procedure established by law" under Article 21 require the procedure to be fair, just,
and reasonable?
2. Are Articles 14, 19, and 21 interdependent or mutually exclusive?
3. Does the right to travel abroad fall under personal liberty in Article 21?

Arguments in Favor of Maneka Gandhi:

1. Violation of Natural Justice: The government’s order impounded her passport without
providing her an opportunity to be heard. She argued that natural justice principles should be
implied in the procedure under Article 21.
2. Maneka argued that her right to move freely, which includes traveling abroad, was violated.
Under Article 19, any restriction on fundamental freedoms must be:
  Reasonable, and

 Justified under the permissible grounds listed in Article 19(2)-(6).

o Arbitrary restriction without explanation or justification violated her freedom of

movement. The government’s action failed the test of non-arbitrariness under Article
14 which prohibits arbitrary or discriminatory treatment by the state. Maneka argued
that the impounding order was arbitrary because:

 No reasons for the decision were provided.

 She was not given a chance to contest the grounds for impounding her
passport.

3. Any procedure under Article 21 must align with Articles 14 and 19. Maneka contended that
the Passport Act’s provisions were implemented in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner,
violating her personal liberty. The procedure was not fair, just, or reasonable as required under
Article 21. Maneka contended that the right to travel abroad is an intrinsic part of personal
liberty under Article 21.

Judgement

 The court emphasized that Articles 14, 19, and 21 are not mutually exclusive: Any law
restricting personal liberty must:

 Pass the test of reasonableness under Article 14 (equality before the law).

 Comply with freedoms guaranteed under Article 19 (freedom of movement,

speech, etc.).

 Ensure that the procedure under Article 21 is fair, just, and reasonable.

 Justice Krishna Iyer’s View: Fundamental Rights are interconnected like the limbs of a human
body. They cannot be isolated from each other.

o Expansive Interpretation of Personal Liberty:The court ruled that personal liberty under
Article 21 has the "widest amplitude."It includes various rights essential to the dignity and
freedom of an individual.Travel abroad was held to be a facet of personal liberty.
o Procedure Established by Law" Must Be Fair:Overruling Gopalan’s rigid interpretation, the
court held that:
o Procedure under Article 21 cannot be arbitrary, oppressive, or fanciful.
o It must be right, just, and fair.
o Introduced elements of natural justice and procedural due process:
 Right to be heard before an adverse decision.
 Protection from arbitrary actions by the state.
 Natural Justice as an Integral Component: Justice Bhagwati observed that natural justice
principles must be implied even if the law does not explicitly mention them. The court ruled
that natural justice principles apply to the Passport Act, requiring a hearing before
impounding a passport.

Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & Ors. (1978)

Facts:
Sunil Batra, a convict on death row at Tihar Central Jail, wrote a letter to a Supreme Court
judge highlighting the poor living conditions and inhumane treatment of inmates. He reported
instances of brutality and torture inflicted by the Head Warden, Maggar Singh, who allegedly
sought to extort money from the relatives of prisoners during visits.
Judgment:
 The Supreme Court ruled that jail authorities do not have the right to inflict punishment,
torture, or discrimination on prisoners without explicit permission or orders from the court. It
clarified that the provisions of the Prison Act, 1894, should not be misinterpreted to justify or
allow acts of torture against inmates.

Hussainara Khatoon vs. State of Bihar

The Hussainara Khatoon vs State of Bihar case arose from a public interest litigation (PIL)
filed by several undertrial prisoners in Bihar, represented by human rights activist and lawyer
Kapila Hingorani. The petitioners claimed that they had been held in jail for periods
exceeding the maximum punishment for the offenses they were accused of, in violation of
their right to a speedy trial as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.

The Supreme Court directed that undertrial prisoners, whose details were included in a list
submitted by Mrs. Hingorani, be released immediately. Their prolonged detention was
deemed unlawful and a violation of their fundamental rights under Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution. The Court further instructed the State Government to ensure compliance by
submitting a report to the Patna High Court within six weeks. Additionally, the Court
mandated the provision of free legal aid to the poor and needy as part of this process.

Key Points of the Judgment:

1. Violation of Article 21: The continued detention of undertrial prisoners was found to
contravene their right to life and personal liberty.
2. Right to Free Legal Services:
o Recognized as an essential aspect of a "reasonable, fair, and just" procedure for those
accused of offenses.
o Held implicit under the guarantees provided by Article 21.
3. Obligation of the State:
o The State was reminded of its constitutional duty to provide a speedy trial for the
accused, regardless of financial or administrative constraints.
o The Court emphasized that denying speedy trials or legal aid amounted to a failure of
the State's responsibilities.
4. Introduction of Legal Aid Programs:
o The Court suggested establishing a comprehensive legal service program across the
nation to uphold the right to legal aid for all.
Conclusion:
The judgment highlighted the importance of timely justice and free legal aid as crucial
components of fundamental rights. It called for systemic reforms to ensure that undertrial
prisoners are not subjected to unnecessary delays, ensuring dignity and justice for all citizens.

ARTICLE 25 - Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala case

25(1) Jehovah’s Witnesses:
In 1986, a two-judge bench of the Supreme Court ruled in the Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of
Kerala case, affirming that Jehovah's Witnesses constitute a religious denomination. The case
involved the issue of compelling a student who was a Jehovah's Witness to join in the singing
of the National Anthem, despite the student's genuine, conscientious religious objection. The
Court concluded that such compulsion would violate the rights guaranteed by Articles 19(1)
(a) (freedom of speech) and 25(1) (freedom of religion) of the Indian Constitution. The Court
recognized that Jehovah’s Witnesses, whether in India, England, or the U.S.A, do not sing the
National Anthem, though they show respect by standing up when it is sung. Their religious
belief holds that singing the National Anthem is not permitted.

Key Judicial Observations:

The Court emphasized that the key issue was not whether the religious belief appealed to
reason or sentiment, but whether the belief was genuinely and conscientiously held as part of
religious practice. If it was, the belief would be protected by Article 25 of the Constitution,
subject to reasonable restrictions.
The Court cited foreign judgments to support the belief of Jehovah's Witnesses. It concluded
that their conscientious objection to singing the National Anthem was protected under Article
25(1), which guarantees religious freedom.
The Court also held that punishing a student for not singing the National Anthem would
violate Article 19(1)(a), which guarantees freedom of speech. This implied the negative right,
or the right to remain silent, within the scope of freedom of speech.
The Court clarified that none of the freedoms under Articles 19(1)(a) to (g) could be curtailed
by an administrative order that lacked statutory force.
Regarding Article 51-A(a), which imposes a fundamental duty on citizens to respect the
Constitution, the National Flag, and the National Anthem, the Court ruled that Jehovah's
Witnesses did show respect by standing when the National Anthem was sung. The Court
emphasized that not singing the National Anthem does not equate to disrespect as long as
respect is shown by standing up.

Controversy and Government Response:

The judgment stirred controversy, with concerns raised that other religious groups might
refuse to participate in the singing of the National Anthem, potentially undermining national
unity. In response, on December 2, 1986, the Prime Minister stated in the Lok Sabha that the
government would take legal and constitutional measures to address the situation. The Prime
Minister asserted that the National Anthem and Flag are sacred symbols of the nation and
must be respected.
The Central Government then filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court seeking a
reconsideration of the decision. The government requested that the Court declare that the
fundamental duty of every Indian citizen to respect the National Anthem includes both
standing respectfully and singing it. The government also argued that the matter should have
been decided by a five-judge bench rather than a two-judge bench. However, the petition was
dismissed on a technical ground.

Kerala High Court's Contrasting View:

Before the Supreme Court’s judgment, the Kerala High Court had taken a different view. The
High Court had ruled that the requirement to sing the National Anthem in schools did not
violate the religious freedom of Jehovah’s Witnesses because they did not constitute a
religious denomination.
This case remains significant in the context of balancing religious freedom with national
symbols and unity.

Seshammal & Ors, Etc. Etc vs State Of Tamil Nadu (1972)

This case dealt with a legal challenge against a law passed by the Tamil Nadu government in
1970, called the Tamil Nadu Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments (Amendment) Act.
The petitioners were hereditary Archakas (priests) and Mathadhipatis (monastery heads), who
argued that this law violated their right to freedom of religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the
Indian Constitution.

Key Facts of the Case

What did the Amendment Act do?
It ended the hereditary right of priests (Archakas) to automatically succeed to their position in
Hindu temples.
Under the earlier law (from 1959), the next eligible family member in line would inherit the
priesthood. The Agamas (ancient Hindu texts) also required the Archakas to belong to a
specific denomination or community to perform rituals correctly.
The Amendment allowed temple trustees to appoint any qualified person as an Archaka,
provided they had a fitness certificate from a recognized institution.

What did the petitioners argue?

Hereditary succession to the priesthood was an essential religious practice under the Agamas,
and removing it would violate their religious freedom.
They feared that allowing the appointment of priests without strictly following the Agamas
could lead to temples being defiled and disrespecting the deities.

Key Issues Before the Court

Is hereditary succession an essential religious practice protected by Articles 25 and 26?
The petitioners argued that hereditary rights were integral to religious worship and temple
practices.
Does the State's power to prescribe Archaka qualifications interfere with religious practices?
They worried that the government might appoint priests not qualified according to the
Agamas, disrupting traditional temple rituals.

Supreme Court’s Decision

The Court upheld the law and dismissed the petitions, stating that the Amendment Act did not
violate religious freedom. Here's a breakdown of the reasoning:
Appointing a priest is a secular act.
The Court explained that while a priest performs religious duties, their appointment is a
secular matter managed by the temple's trustee. How a priest is chosen (hereditary or not) is
not a religious practice but an administrative process.
Temple traditions remain protected.
The Court clarified that even though the trustee can appoint a priest, they must follow existing
traditions as per Section 28 of the old law. This means the trustee must respect the Agamas
and ensure the appointed priest is from the appropriate denomination.
Hereditary succession is not a religious practice.
The hereditary system was merely a method of recruitment, not a core religious practice. Its
abolition does not affect how rituals are performed in temples.
State’s power to prescribe qualifications is reasonable.
The Court noted that the government’s role in setting qualifications ensures proper
administration. These qualifications would likely include Agamic knowledge. If any
government rule disrupted temple traditions, it could be challenged in court.

Key Takeaways
Temple rituals and traditions are protected, but the method of appointing priests is considered
a secular administrative matter.
The hereditary right to priesthood is not an essential religious practice and can be abolished
without violating constitutional rights.
Trustees must still respect Agamas and ensure that appointed priests meet traditional
requirements.
This judgment balanced the need for modern administration in temples with the preservation
of religious traditions.

Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta Case

This case was about a petition filed by Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta, a monk of the
Ananda Marga organization, against the repeated restrictions placed by the Commissioner of
Police, Calcutta. These restrictions, issued under Section 144 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure (CrPC), 1973, prohibited the public performance of the Tandava dance by Ananda
Marga members when it involved carrying symbolic items like skulls, knives, tridents, sticks,
and a damroo. The petitioner argued that this violated their fundamental right to freedom of
religion under Articles 25 and 26 of the Indian Constitution.

Facts of the Case

What is Ananda Marga?
It is a socio-spiritual organization founded in 1955, focused on spiritual growth without
requiring followers to leave their daily lives.
In 1966, the Tandava dance was adopted as a religious practice. The dance involves symbolic
items like a skull (mortality), a knife (control of passions), and a trident (triumph of good over
evil), among others.
Why was there a dispute?
Starting in 1979, the Commissioner of Police repeatedly issued prohibitory orders under
Section 144 CrPC, banning public processions involving the Tandava dance with symbolic
items.
The government argued that allowing the dance with such items could threaten public order
and morality, citing past instances of violence associated with Ananda Marga.

Issues Before the Court

Is Ananda Marga a separate religion or part of Hinduism?
Is performing the Tandava dance in public an essential religious practice of Ananda Marga?
Were the repeated prohibitory orders under Section 144 an abuse of power?
Judgment of the Court
Ananda Marga is a religious denomination within Hinduism.
The Court ruled that Ananda Marga is not a separate religion but a religious group within
Hinduism. This was based on its philosophy, which aligns with Hindu principles, particularly
the Shaivite tradition.
The public performance of the Tandava dance is not an essential religious practice.
The Court acknowledged that the Tandava dance is a religious practice for Ananda Marga
followers, but performing it in public with symbolic items is not a mandatory requirement.
The Court noted that the Tandava dance was introduced only in 1966, much later than the
founding of Ananda Marga, and there was no evidence to suggest that public performances
were essential.
The repeated use of Section 144 orders was an abuse of power.
Section 144 CrPC is meant for temporary emergencies to maintain public order. The Court
found that issuing such orders repeatedly created a semi-permanent ban, which exceeded the
law’s purpose.

Final Decision
The Court dismissed the petition, meaning the prohibitory orders were not entirely invalid.
However, it clarified:
Ananda Marga members can still conduct processions and gatherings in public without the
prohibited items like knives, skulls, or tridents.
The restrictions applied only to carrying specific items, not to the overall right to hold
processions or perform the dance.
Takeaway
The Court struck a balance between respecting religious practices and maintaining public
order. While it protected the group’s right to practice their religion, it did not consider public
Tandava performances with prohibited items as essential to their faith.

Sabarimala Case
This case challenged the custom at the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala, which barred women of
menstruating age (10–50 years) from entering the temple. The Indian Young Lawyers
Association and others argued that this practice violated fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Indian Constitution, while the temple authorities and the Kerala government defended the
custom as a matter of religious tradition.

Facts of the Case

The Sabarimala Temple is a famous Hindu shrine in Kerala dedicated to Lord Ayyappa.
Women of menstruating age (10–50 years) were traditionally not allowed to enter the temple,
as Lord Ayyappa is believed to be a celibate deity.
The Petitioners claimed that this exclusion discriminates against women based on biological
factors and violates their constitutional rights under:
Article 14: Right to equality.
Article 15: Prohibition of discrimination based on sex.
Article 25: Freedom to practice and propagate religion.
Article 51A(e): Fundamental duty to renounce practices derogatory to women's dignity.
The temple authorities argued that the restriction was a matter of religious faith and autonomy
under Articles 25 and 26.

Key Issues
Does the ban on women violate the right to equality and non-discrimination under Articles 14
and 15?
Does the Sabarimala Temple qualify as a religious denomination under Article 26, which
would allow it to manage its religious practices autonomously?
Is the exclusion of women an essential religious practice of the temple, protected under
Article 25?
Is Rule 3(b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules,
1965 valid?
This rule allowed customs to restrict entry, but the parent 1965 Act intended to remove such
discriminatory customs.

Judgment
The Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, declared the ban on women unconstitutional. Here are
the key points:
Violation of Equality and Non-Discrimination:
The Court held that the exclusion of women based on biological factors violated Articles 14
and 15, which prohibit discrimination.
Women have an equal right to access and worship in public religious spaces.
Right to Practice Religion:
The Court ruled that the restriction infringed on women's rights under Article 25, which
guarantees freedom of religion to all individuals.
Essential Religious Practices Doctrine:
The Court found that excluding women of menstruating age is not an essential religious
practice of the Sabarimala Temple.
Practices that violate fundamental rights cannot be considered essential or protected under the
Constitution.
Morality Under Articles 25 and 26:
The Court clarified that "morality" refers to constitutional morality, which upholds equality
and non-discrimination, not societal or religious norms.
Validity of Rule 3(b):
The Court declared Rule 3(b) ultra vires (invalid) because it upheld customs that discriminate,
contradicting the parent Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Act,
1965, which aimed to ensure equality in temple entry.
Dissenting Opinion:
Justice Indu Malhotra dissented, arguing that courts should not interfere in religious matters
unless there is an aggrieved party (i.e., a woman devotee) directly challenging the practice.
She believed the custom was integral to the faith of Sabarimala devotees.
Impact
This landmark judgment emphasized that religious practices must align with constitutional
principles of equality and individual rights. However, it also led to significant public protests
and debates, especially in Kerala, showcasing the challenge of balancing religious freedom
with gender justice in a diverse society.