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The Bloody Triangle The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the
Ukraine June 1941 1st Edition Victor J. Kamenir Digital
Instant Download
Author(s): Victor J. Kamenir
ISBN(s): 9780760334348, 076033434X
Edition: 1st
File Details: PDF, 4.53 MB
Year: 2010
Language: english
TRIANGLE
THE BLOODY
TRIANGLE
THE BLOODY

The Defeat of Soviet Armor in the Ukraine, June 1941

Victor J. Kamenir
I think that those who never experienced
all the bitterness of the summer of 1941 will never be

completely able to appreciate the joy of our victory.

—Vassiliy Grossman, Soviet writer

Contents

Preface ix

Part I: Opposing Forces

1. German Plans, Dispositions, and Organization 1
2. Soviet Military on the Eve of War 9
3. Dispositions of Kiev Special Military District 29
4. Organization and Strength of Kiev Special 33
Military District
5. Creeping up to War 51

Part II: The Border Battle

6. We Are Under Attack! What Should We Do? June 22 75
7. Creaking to the Sound of the Guns, June 22 109
8. Hold What You’ve Got! June 23–24 125
9. Piecemeal Forward, June 25 159
10. Battle for Dubno, June 26–27 175
11. Continue Mission, June 28 213
12. Fall Back to Old Border, June 29–30 229
13. The Last Convulsion, July 1–2 245

Conclusion 255
Appendices
A. Abridged Order of Battle: Army Group South 263
B. Kiev Special Military District Order of Battle 265
C. Order of Battle of Soviet Mechanized Corps 271
D. Organization of German Motorized Infantry Division 275
E. Organization of German Panzer Division 275
F. Organization of Soviet Antitank Artillery Brigade 276
G. Organization of Soviet Mechanized Corps 277
and Tank Division
H. Organization of Soviet Motorized Rifle Division 278
I. Organization of Soviet Rifle Division 278
J. Unit Symbols 279
K. Comparative Strength of Armored Units 280
L. German Armored Vehicles 282
M. Soviet Armored Vehicles 284

Maps 288

Notes 301

Bibliography 307

Index 311

viii
Preface

As the years go by, the white areas on a historical map of World War II
continue shrinking. However, to most Western military history enthusiasts,
the four bloody years of struggle on the Eastern Front continue to be terra
incognita. Most people have only heard about the Siege of Leningrad, the
slaughter of Stalingrad, and, of course, the Battle of Kursk.
The weeklong armored clash near the Russian city of Kursk in 1943 has
been widely known as the largest tank battle in history, involving over six
thousand armored combat vehicles on both sides. During this bloody battle,
the backbone of the German Panzer Corps was broken forever, leaving it
unable to mount significant operations for the rest of the war. However, this
was not the first large-scale armored struggle on the Eastern Front. Another
weeklong conflict featuring massive tank formations took place immediately
following the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.
Just two days after launching Operation Barbarossa, from June 24 to July 1,
roughly 650 German tanks and 180 assault gun and tank destroyers fought over
1,500 Soviet tanks in a roughly triangular area of approximately 1,800 square
miles between the northwestern Ukrainian towns of Lutsk, Dubno, and Brody.
The fighting in Ukraine did not parallel fighting in Byelorussia, where
the armored warfare on the Eastern Front became associated with exploits of
the most famous German panzer leader—Heinz Guderian. Instead of heady
dashes by “Hurrying Heinz’s” armored spearheads, the difficult terrain of
northwestern Ukraine limited German advances to a grinding series of battles
along a miserable road network.
Events that took place there, when covered by Western historians, are
usually glossed over by an encompassing title of “border battles.” Yet, here, in the
swampy and marshy terrain, the German blitzkrieg was for the first time slowed
 The Bloody Triangle

down to a crawl and even halted for several crucial days. The Soviet side lost the
battle. However, even in defeat, the Red Army demonstrated that the vaunted
German Wehrmacht could be stopped and bloodied, even if only for a time.
This experience was costly for the Soviet Union. Numerically superior
mechanized forces of the Red Army were savaged by the smaller, more profi-
cient and professional German opponents. In this, and similar border battles,
the Soviet armored force, larger than all other armored forces in the world
combined, melted away under the relentless assault of the German combined-
arms style of warfare.
Describing the events above, this work relied heavily on numerous
memoirs of Soviet and, to a lesser extent, German participants in the conflict.
These first-hand accounts provide genuine insights into the unfolding events.
While some of them cover the same events, no two of them are exactly alike,
each man’s own personality coming through in his interpretation of the events.
I intentionally weighted my research towards the Soviet/Russian sources
because I wanted to present this conflict from the Soviet point of view.
Starting shortly before the war, the Soviet officers, their reports and
memoirs describe, often in minute detail, the condition, preparedness, and
morale of the Red Army at the outbreak of the conflict. I was not the first
writer to rely on these works, and, like others, I drew my own conclusions.
Russian writer and former military intelligence officer Vladimir Rezun
(pen name Viktor Suvorov) helped fuel the debate whether Soviet Union was
planning to attack Germany first. Very persuasively, albeit not very convinc-
ingly, Rezun argued that presence of certain types of weapons or personnel
in large quantities was the indicator of immediate Soviet aggressive inten-
tions. I found his claim that the Soviet Union had one million paratroopers by
the start of the war preposterous. While parachute jumping was immensely
popular among Soviet youth before the war, a teenager who has several jumps
off a tower under his belt does not a trained airborne soldier make.
While I do not dispute Stalin’s aggressive intentions overall (it is hard
to argue with this, knowing of his swallowing up the three tiny Baltic states
and chunks of Finland, Poland, and Rumania), I do not believe that the Red
Army was in any shape to conduct major offensive operations in July 1941,
as advocated by Rezun/Suvorov. On a much more personal note, I find him
usurping the venerated surname of Suvorov as an insult to Russian and
Soviet history.

x
 The Bloody Triangle

Rezun alleged that the sheer number of over twenty-four thousand Soviet
tanks as clear demonstration of aggressive intent. However, a significant
number of them were so obsolete as to be not much more than targets for
German gunners. This could be unscientifically explained by Russian propen-
sity not to discard anything. Large numbers of inoperable tanks rusting in
their motor pools were still carried on the rosters as viable combat vehicles.
Along with inflated quality and quantity of materiel, unrelenting propa-
ganda of the Communist Party lulled the Soviet citizens into a false sense of
security. In early 1939 a movie called Tractorists was released in the Soviet
Union. Two new songs written by songwriter Boris Laskin and featured in
its soundtrack became instant classics, “The Tree Tankers” and “March of the
Soviet Tankers.” The latter song featured words which symbolized the naïve
pride which the Soviet people had in their armed forces: “The armor is strong
and our tanks are fast.”
The unrelenting stream of propaganda convinced a majority of the citizens
of the Soviet Union that their country possessed the strongest armed forces in
the world. The whole country took pride in its armed forces. Millions of young
men and women had membership in paramilitary clubs teaching a variety
of military skills—flying, parachute jumping, shooting, and radio operating.
Military pilots, dubbed “Stalin’s Falcons,” strutted with their chests puffed out
with pride. Tens of thousands of young people proudly wore their “Voroshilov’s
Marksman” pin, named after Stalin’s crony Marshal Kliment Voroshilov and
earned for outstanding rifle shooting.
After the German invasion on June 22, 1941, shaken out of their sense
of security, the Soviet people with great disbelief listened to radio broadcasts
naming long strings of cities and towns captured by Germans with insulting
ease. Common questions were, if not on everybody’s lips, certainly on every-
body’s mind: “What happened to our armed forces? Where are our planes, the
fastest in the world? Where are our tanks, the strongest in the world?”
This work will, hopefully, shed light how the Soviet tank park melted away
under merciless German hammer blows in 1941.

xi
Part I:
Opposing
Forces
 Chapter 1

German Plans, Dispositions,

and Organization

On the humid evening of June 21, 1941, all the camps of the 11th Panzer
Division around the small Polish town of Stalowa Wola were a beehive of nervous
and excited activity. While the drivers revved up their engines and ran through
the last-minute maintenance checks, the troops were busily loading up their
vehicles. Every available inch of space was crammed to overflowing with extra
ammunition, jerry cans, and metal drums of fuel, indicating a long and busy drive.
Anxious weeks of training and waiting were replaced by relieved anticipation.
For the past month their bivouacs were buzzing with rumors. Oh, there
was no doubt that they were going to war again. The veteran tankers had been
through this already and knew the signs. Their panzers had trampled the wheat
fields of Poland, rolled down the tree-shaded roads of France, and rumbled
through the twisting mountain valleys of Yugoslavia.
Well armed, superbly led, and experienced, the young troopers of the 11th
Panzer Division were cockily spoiling for another fight. Knowing only victories
brought about by Hitler’s ambitious daring, theirs was a generation unencum-
bered by memories of humiliating defeat of World War I. Did they not thrash the
French, their fathers’ tormentors? Did they not make the British wade through
the cold waters of the English Channel, scrambling up the boats whisking them
to the safety of their island home? How about the Polish, their ancient enemy?
The Poles lasted but four weeks, crushed under panzer onslaught and screaming
dive bombers.
Only some of them believed the official version claiming that they were
training for the invasion of the British Isles. There were better and closer places
to train than this backward corner of Eastern Europe. Born out of half-truths

1
 The Bloody Triangle

and wild guesses, the rumors ran unchecked through the bivouacs. Some
said that the Russians were going to let them pass through their territory
and attack India, the crown jewel of British Empire, from the north. Others
claimed that they were to head south through Romania and Turkey to link up
with Rommel’s Africa Corps in Palestine. Only a few thought that they would
fight the Soviet Union. After all, didn’t the Führer sign a nonaggression treaty
with the commissars? Whichever way they would turn, the men and machines
of the 11th Panzer Division, bearing the white stencil of a sword-wielding
ghost, the symbol of their unit, were ready.
All the rumors were dispelled later on this muggy evening. Hitler gave
the nod, and like wildfire, the code words “The heroes say: Wotan! Neckar
fifteen!” spread through the German cantonments in Poland. The greatest
invasion in history would begin tomorrow morning! It was now Russia’s turn
to submit to the will of the master race!
In his second-story office in a commandeered tavern-turned-headquarters,
commander of the 11th Panzer Division Maj. Gen. Ludwig Crüwell was poring
through the almost-memorized operational plans. He already prepared the
address which would be read to his troops tomorrow morning, shortly after
the artillery of all calibers would make its own poignant announcement. The
brief statement read:

Soldiers of 11th Panzer Division!

The Führer calls to war against the Bolshevism, the supreme enemy
of our National-Socialist realm. The fight will be tough, calling for sacri-
fices everywhere. The Ghost Division will fall upon the enemy as it did in
Serbia, wherever meeting it, attacking it and destroying it.
I know that I can rely on you absolutely, as in the southeast, from the
oldest officer to the youngest man.
Our slogan remains—Attack! Our goal—the Dnieper [River]. We
want to be the first again, as before in Belgrade.
Heil Führer!1

The stocky, bespectacled major general was immensely proud of his

tankers, recruited mainly among the sturdy Silesians with their long
military traditions. Like the overwhelming majority of German officers,
Major General Crüwell had no doubts about the necessity of destroying the
communist Russian state. Belonging to an older generation than his men,

2
 German Plans, Dispositions, and Organization

Ludwig Crüwell remembered well the cancerous influence of Bolshevism

on post–World War I Germany. Now it was time to wield the scalpel.
Down in the street below, Crüwell could see his driver, paint brush in hand,
refreshing a large “K” on the side of his armored command vehicle. The three-
foot letter indicated that Crüwell’s division belonged to the Panzer Group 1,
commanded by Col. Gen. Ewald von Kleist. In just a few short hours, the 11th
Panzer Division would begin moving to its pre-attack staging areas near the tiny
Polish town of Laszczow, just twenty-five short miles west of the Soviet border.

German Plans and Dispositions

Crüwell’s division belonged to Wehrmacht’s Army Group South, commanded
by a stiff-backed, old-school Prussian field marshal, Gerd von Rundstedt.
This powerful group of forces was aimed at the strategically important Soviet
Ukraine, with its vast natural resources desperately needed by resource-poor
Germany. The original plans of Army Group South called for a two-pronged
pincer movement, penetrating the Soviet border defenses and advancing
with all haste on to the great Dnieper River, almost four hundred miles east
beyond the border. Once there, the northern and southern pincers were to
link up on the eastern bank of the river, trapping the bulk of the Red Army in
Ukraine on the western side.
The stronger of the two, the northern wing of Army Group South, was
composed of Sixth and Seventeenth Field armies, plus its strike force of Panzer
Group 1. This force was designated to contend with its primary Soviet coun-
terpart, the Kiev Special Military District. While the Seventeenth Army was to
operate against the northern flank of Lvov pocket, the forces striking directly
for the Ukrainian capital were the infamous Sixth Army, marching towards its
doom at Stalingrad. The Sixth Army, commanded by Field Marshal Walther
von Reichenau, was given the task of breaching the Soviet border, paving the
way for Panzer Group 1 under von Kleist, an army in all but name, to break
into operational maneuver space.
The Eleventh Army deployed in Rumania was the southern pincer of Army
Group South, originally tasked to attack against Odessa Military District.
However, Hitler’s last-minute modification ordered the Eleventh Army to stay
put and to guard against a possible Soviet counteroffensive into Rumania,
protecting Ploesti oil fields, vital for the German war effort. The Rumanian
Third and Fourth armies, supported by over five hundred aircraft, were also

3
 The Bloody Triangle

part of Army Group South. The gap between the two parts of Army Group
South, running along the craggy Carpathian Mountains, was thinly held by a
Hungarian mobile corps.
Stretching from a small Polish town of Wlodawa in the north, to the
Danube Delta in the south, along almost five hundred miles of border, the
Army Group South numbered 41 German divisions, supported by 772 aircraft
of Luftflotte 4. The above number reflects strictly the number of German
divisions. Even though there were additional Rumanian and Hungarian
divisions included in the overall strength of Army Group South, the German
planners did not trust their abilities or motivations. This attitude is clearly
illustrated in a diary entry by Generaloberst Franz Halder, chief of Army
General Staff: “It would be pointless to base our operational plans on forces
which cannot be counted on with certainty. As far as actual fighting troops
are concerned, we can depend only on German forces. . . . On Romania we
cannot rely at all. Their divisions have no offensive power. . . . Hungary is
unreliable. Has no reasons for turning on Russia.”2
Breaking down German mission objectives, from the long-range strategic
goal of reaching Kiev, individual German corps and armies were to strike for
intermediate operational objectives. On the extreme left, north, flank of Army
Group South, the XVII Corps was to attack in direction of Kovel, safeguarding
the left flank of German Sixth Army, whose intermediate objective was the
city of Lutsk. Aimed against it was the XXIX Corps of the Sixth Army, tasked
with breaching Soviet defenses along the Western Bug River and allowing the
III Mechanized Corps of Panzer Group 1 to race onto Lutsk. The ancient
town of Lutsk, founded in the eleventh century, was the first important stop
on the road to Kiev. Termed Panzerstrasse by Gen. Eberhard von Mackensen,
commander of III Mechanized Corps, this major artery ran from German-
occupied Poland to Lutsk, then Rovno, Zhitomir, and, finally, to Kiev.3
South of them, aimed at Sokal, the LV Corps of Sixth Army was
echeloned in front of XLVIII Mechanized Corps of Panzer Group 1, with the
XLIV Corps farther south. Finally, in reserve of Army Group South, located
in the area of Lyublin, was the XIV Motorized Corps.
The German units were deployed in very compact, concentrated
formations, achieving density of one division per three miles of front.
Compared to up to thirty miles of frontage occupied by some Soviet
divisions along the border, the Germans were well-positioned to penetrate

4
 German Plans, Dispositions, and Organization

porous Soviet defenses by bringing the maximum amount of forces at

the place and time of their choosing. Still, von Rundstedt and his senior
commanders clearly understood the complexity of launching a major
invasion with the northern wing alone, as underscored by command staff
exercises in Saint Germain, France, in early February 1941:

It shows the difficulty of accomplishing an enveloping operation

west of the Dnepr [Dneiper], with the northern wing alone, particularly
in view of the possibility that this wing might be threatened or at least
slowed in its advance by enemy attacking from Pripet area. . . .4 By any
attack against the Russian army, one must avoid the danger of simply
pushing the Russians back. We must use attack methods which cut up
the Russian army and allow its destruction in pockets. A starting position
must be created which allows the use of major envelopment operations.5

It is common nowadays to lambaste German military planners for under-

estimating Soviet military capabilities. The often-quoted Heinz Guderian,
godfather of German panzer operations, estimated the Soviet tank park at
over ten thousand in 1937, knowing that these numbers would only grow
yearly at an ever-increasing pace. In 1933 he visited one tank factory in the
Soviet Union, producing twenty-two tanks a day.6 Extrapolating from this
figure and allowing for a modest five-day week, fifty-two weeks per year, these
numbers amount to an output of 5,720 tanks per year. And these numbers are
just for one factory in 1933. Doubtless, the German planners made projec-
tions of what the Soviet tank strength would be in 1941. In a similar vein, a
Luftwaffe officer, Maj. Rudolf Loytved-Hardegg, tasked with preparing intelli-
gence estimates about the Red Air Force, placed the number of Soviet combat-
ready aircraft at fourteen thousand.7 The two men were echoed by Halder:

Comments on Russian tanks: Redoubtable; 4.7cm gun (AT) a good

medium weapon; bulk of tanks obsolete. Numerically Russia’s tank
strength is superior to that of any other nation, but they have only a small
number of new giant types with long 10cm guns (mammoth models, 42
to 45 tons). Air force very large in number, but mostly outdated; only
small number of modern models.”8

This mention about the “new giant types” of tanks dispels the notion that
Germans were unaware of the new generation of large Soviet tanks. However,

5
 The Bloody Triangle

this particular entry was not clear to which model Halder was referring; KV-1
armed with a long gun but 76mm in caliber, or KV-2, which was armed with a
heavier but shorter 152mm howitzer.
Despite being contemptuous of Soviet combat capabilities and leader-
ship, the German planners were wary of the sheer numerical enormity of their
future opponent. Underscoring that it would be a giant undertaking to topple
the Soviet colossus, a terse entry in Halder’s famous war diary on January
28, 1941, read: “Commit all available units.”9 It appears that Hitler himself
placed his support behind the best possible chances of success: “AAA (Anti-Air
Artillery). Führer wants no serviceable piece to remain inactive. Personnel for
thirty batteries. AAA Corps, of six battalions, for Sixth Army (Panzer Group 1)
and Panzer Group 2.”10
Nor were logistics underestimated; another entry on the same day: “Satis-
faction is possible only when the point of main effort is prepared through the
collaboration of all forces in order to solve the most significant supply issues
concerning transportation, tires, fuel, and storage. The air force and army
must use the available transportation through careful, coordinated effort.”
Halder comments on the sheer size of the Soviet state:

Problems of Russia’s vastness: Enormous expanse requires concen-

tration of critical points. Massed planes and tanks must be brought to
bear on strategic points. Our air force cannot cover this entire huge area
at one time; at the start of the campaign, it will be able to dominate only
parts of the enormous front.11

Immensely hampering German planning efforts was the closed nature of

the Soviet society. Tourism by private western citizens into the Soviet Union
was practically at zero, virtually negating German efforts to explore the Soviet
defensive and industrial capabilities lying in the hinterland of the vast country.
Even the most basic building block of any planning, maps, was in short supply:
“Difficulty with Russian maps. Especially the tactical maps (1:100,000) are
very poor. Lower echelons must be warned on how staff work will be affected
by such bad maps.”12 However, the new territories which Soviet Union acquired
after the 1939 partition of Poland contained large numbers of locals either
sympathetic to Germans or hostile to the Soviets, providing German intel-
ligence with accurate tactical information about the border areas.
Overall, German planners were well aware of the effects Stalin’s purges
had on condition, capabilities, and morale of Soviet military in general and its

6
 German Plans, Dispositions, and Organization

officer corps in particular. German intelligence rightly determined the Soviet

command and support structures to be slow to respond, bulky, cumbersome,
and not ready to adapt to rapidly changing tactical situations.

German Organizations
The striking power of Army Group South rested with its five panzer divisions,
all veteran formations. Impressed with the performance of armored units
in 1939 and 1940, Hitler ordered the number of panzer divisions doubled
from twelve to twenty-four for the 1941 campaign. However, this increase in
numbers of divisions was not matched by a proportionate increase of total
number of tanks. In 1940, the maneuver portion of a panzer division was
composed of two panzer regiments and one motorized infantry regiment.
The doubling of panzer divisions was achieved by shuffling the balance
of regiments within a division. The 1941 panzer division had one panzer
regiment with two motorized infantry regiments.
Suffering from chronic shortages of raw materials, production capacity,
and availability of specialist workers, the German armament industry was not
able to deliver the number of tanks required for twenty-four panzer divisions.
While a panzer division of 1940 numbered close to 300 tanks, the start of
the campaign against the Soviet Union in 1941 saw German panzer divisions
numbering less than 160 tanks each.13 The table below is based on A. V. Isayev’s
book, in turn quoting Thomas Jents:14

Table 1.
Tank Strength of Panzer Group 1
Command Division
Unit Pz I Pz II Pz III Pz IV tanks
total
9th Panzer 8 32 71 20 12 143
11th Panzer 45 71 20 10 146
13th Panzer 45 71 20 13 149
14th Panzer 45 71 20 11 147
16th Panzer 44 71 20 8 143
Total 8 211 355 100 54 728

7
 The Bloody Triangle

In addition, there were two battalions of assault guns and two more of
tank destroyers assigned to Panzer Group 1, numbering approximately 180
more armored vehicles.
A typical German panzer entering Soviet Union in 1941 numbered
just short of fourteen thousand men, roughly 150 tanks, 50 cannons, and
howitzers ranging from 75mm to 150mm, and 30 81mm mortars. These heavy
weapons were supplemented by 42 37mm and 9 47mm or 50mm antitank
guns, virtually noneffective against the new and heavy Soviet tanks, but plenty
deadly to older and lighter models. In addition to field artillery, each German
tank division possessed 12 20mm flak guns and 8 to 12 88mm guns. Adding
to the deadly cocktail were the heavy artillery and self-propelled assault gun
battalions, belonging at the corps level and distributed to individual divisions
in mission-oriented battery packages.
While panzers received the lion’s share of glory, the mainstay of the German
army remained infantry, some motorized, but overwhelmingly regular, of a foot-
slogging, gravel-agitating variety. Motorized infantry divisions, although lacking
tanks, had the same number of combat battalions, six, as a panzer division, also
with roughly fourteen thousand men, while regular infantry division numbered
over sixteen thousand men with nine infantry battalions. However, both
motorized and regular infantry divisions possessed stronger artillery than their
panzer brethren. While the motorized divisions had roughly the same numbers
of guns as panzer ones, they were of heavier calibers. The regular infantry
divisions, on the other hand, had an additional twelve-gun 105mm battery.
Despite being regularly portrayed as a mechanized force par excellance,
the German army brought 625,000 horses with it into the Soviet Union in
1941, more than Napoleon did in 1812. Equally difficult was the situation
with wheeled transport. While a shortage of wheeled vehicles before the
opening of the campaign was partially made good by captured or comman-
deered French trucks, their suspensions, developed for well-maintained
European highways, did not last long on the rutted roads of the western
Soviet Union. While the bulk of the German army marched on foot, almost
all of its artillery was horse-drawn, and the typical Landser of 1941 did not
look much different from his father in 1914. Still, a significant advantage
that German troops enjoyed over their Soviet counterparts was the fact that
they were at almost full manning levels, were well-provisioned and superbly
trained, and experienced and enjoyed inspiring and confident leadership.

8
 Chapter 2

Soviet Military on
the Eve of War

Starting in the late 1930s, the Soviet military experienced dramatic growth.
Its numbers rose from over 1.5 million men in 1937 to 5.2 million by June 22,
1941, a more than three-fold increase. However, this drastic increase in quantity
was not paralleled by an increase in quality. This dilution of fighting capability
can be underscored by taking a closer look at the prewar Soviet officer corps.
By 1936 Stalin’s bloody hand had already raked through the Communist
Party and the country’s administrative apparatus. Concerned with “Bonapar-
tism,” the fear of a charismatic military leader arising to lead a successful
challenge to his authority, Stalin turned his jaundiced eye towards the military.
Marshal Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy was one of the earliest and the most
prominent victims of military purges. Implicated along with Tukhachevskiy,
many other officers connected to him socially or professionally were swept
away. Unfortunately for the Soviet armored forces, many of its proponents were
found among Tukhachevskiy’s circle of friends and colleagues and perished
along with him. Not only the theoreticians of tank warfare were affected. In a
wave of paranoia seeing saboteurs and enemies everywhere, access of enlisted
Soviet tankers to their machines was severely restricted to minimize or prevent
them from damaging their equipment and stealing parts and supplies.1
The men swept up by the purges were normally dubbed “enemies of
the people.” Their arrests were regularly followed by arrests of their wives,
siblings, friends, and adult children. Minor children were generally placed
into state orphanages. Elderly parents were often turned out of their homes
without means to support themselves. An arrest of one man created expanding

9
 The Bloody Triangle

ripples of arrests among people associated with him, in turn creating more
waves of arrests.
Marshal of the Soviet Union Georgiy K. Zhukov was later to describe the
atmosphere of fear in the country:

The Soviet people and [Communist] Party had to pay a heavy price
for the unprincipled suspicion of the political leadership of the country,
headed by J. V. Stalin. Horrible situation existed in the country. Nobody
trusted anybody, people became afraid of each other, avoided meetings
and any conversation, and if such were necessary—attempted to talk with
a third party present as witnesses. An epidemic of false denouncements
unfolded. Often crystal-clear honest people were falsely denounced,
sometimes among close friends. All this was done out of fear to be
suspected of disloyalty. This horrible situation continued getting worse.
The Soviet people, from young to old, could not comprehend what
was happening, why the arrests among our people were so wide-spread.
Not only [Communist] Party members, but even non-party affiliated
people, with incomprehension and internal doubt, watched the rising
tide of arrests and, of course, nobody could openly voice their incompre-
hension, their doubt that those arrested were indeed involved in any anti-
Soviet activity or membership in counter-revolutionary organizations.
Every honest man, going to bed, could not be sure that he would not be
taken that same night under some false denouncement.”2

Unfortunately, human nature being weak, false accusations were often

used to settle scores or to clear an avenue for advancement. General Grig-
orenko made a somewhat generalized observation: “Those who were crude
and of limited intelligence seemed to avoid being purged. Those destroyed
were mainly cultured, tactful, thoughtful people.”3
In his memoirs, Zhukov described his own close brush with the deadly
menace of the purges in 1937. Danilo Serdich, commander of III Cavalry
Corps, in which Zhukov commanded a cavalry division, was arrested. Upon
Zhukov’s arrival at corps’ headquarters in Minsk, he was met by F. I. Golikov,
commissar of the Belarusian Military District. This district just had its
commander and Golikov’s predecessor arrested. Golikov presented Zhukov
with a report by commissar of III Cavalry Corps Nikolai Yung, full of false
accusations, including a charge that Zhukov’s wife baptized their daughter

10
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

Ella in church. He also grilled Zhukov about his associations with officers
already arrested. The hot-blooded Zhukov was ready to explode, with quite
possibly deadly consequences for himself. This scene was interrupted by acting
commander of Belarusian Military District V. M. Mulin. He calmed Zhukov
down and sent him back to his division. Zhukov spent two very uncomfortable
months waiting for the outcome of his confrontation with Commissar Golikov.
When he was finally appointed to command the III Cavalry Corps, he found
out that his accuser, Yung himself, was arrested.
By then, Zhukov’s new command was in shambles:

Two weeks later I managed to familiarize myself in detail with

situation in all the subunits of the [III Cavalry] Corps and, unfortunately,
had to admit that majority of units, due to arrests, suffered severe drop
in combat and political readiness of command and political personnel,
accountability lowered and, as follows, discipline and service of all
personnel weakened.4

Besides sheer numerical losses of experienced and capable men, the pool
of knowledge that was lost was staggering. A prime example of this was the
General Staff Academy. The disgraced Marshal Tukhachevskiy was a great
proponent of this institution and personally selected many talented military
educators and theoreticians to staff the faculty at the academy. After the fall of
Tukhachevskiy, a wave of arrests swept through the General Staff Academy in
late 1936 and 1937, decimating the faculty.
Arrests were not limited to faculty but included students as well. Future
marshal of the Soviet Union Ivan Khristoforovich Bagramyan, whose
memoirs will be extensively quoted in this work, was a student at the General
Staff Academy during the purges. Normally, the first step before arrest was
denouncement at a Communist Party meeting, followed by expulsion from
the Communist Party. At one such meeting, Bagramyan was accused of being
a former member of Dashnaks, an anti-revolutionary Armenian military
formation during the Civil War. Despite documented proof that Bagramyan,
in fact, fought against this organization, he was expelled from the Communist
Party and was expecting an arrest to come at any minute. Following a friend’s
advice, Bagramyan appealed the expulsion and, astonishingly, was fully cleared
and reinstated.5 However, a black mark stuck to him, and this episode slowed
down his rise through the ranks before the war.

11
 The Bloody Triangle

During the late 1920s, Bagramyan attended an advanced course for cavalry
officers in which two of his classmates were the future Marshals Georgiy
Zhukov and Konstantin K. Rokossovskiy. Rokossovskiy was later arrested for
his association with Marshal Tukhachevskiy. He underwent severe beatings
and tortures at the hands of the People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs
(NKVD) interrogators and, during multiple brutal beatings, all of his teeth
were knocked out. Miraculously, Rokossovskiy was released shortly before the
war and appointed to command a mechanized corps. Some men, like still-
pugnacious Rokossovskiy, with his mouth full of gold teeth to replace the ones
knocked out by NKVD men, survived the purges with their characters intact.
Others, like the former Chief of General Staff General Kiril A. Meretskov,
emerged from the NKVD basements broken men. During his two months of
imprisonment, Meretskov’s tortures were so particularly brutal that even the
sinister NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria described them as a “meat grinder.” Even
though released and reinstated like Rokossovskiy, Meretskov was nonetheless
a changed man, meek and indecisive.
Men, who unflinchingly faced death on multiple battlefields during World
War I and the Russian Civil War, were tortured into signing false confessions,
implicating themselves and other innocent men for nonexistent crimes. The
most common charge was “agent of foreign power.”
The havoc created in the Soviet military by the purges was terrifying. Men
who replaced those shot or dismissed the previous year would find themselves
similarly dealt with, and their successor would often share the same fate. The
extraordinary upheaval moved men several steps up the command chain in a
space of a year or two, resulting in young and inexperienced officers promoted
far beyond their competency and ability.
The effect of the loss of so many senior officers had a tremendous effect
on Soviet enlisted personnel. The generally poorly educated Soviet enlisted
men were more susceptible to trust Communist Party propaganda. Many of
them believed that their former superior officers were traitors and “enemies of
the people,” which undermined their trust in their commanding officers and
drastically lowered discipline and combat readiness in the armed forces.
In the Soviet Far East, another charismatic Soviet commander, Marshal
Vasiliy Blyukher, was in a position of great power, far from Moscow’s reach.
This popular and capable commander shared Tukhachevskiy’s fate and was
executed. The officer ranks under his command suffered particularly heavy

12
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

cleansing. Then-Colonel Grigorenko, upon assignment to the Far East in

1940, found the situation to be dismal:
Almost two years had passed since the mass arrests had come to
an end, but the command pyramid had not yet been restored. Many
positions remained unfilled because there were no men qualified to
occupy them. Battalions were commanded by officers who had completed
military schools less than a year before. Some battalion commanders had
completed only courses for second lieutenants, and their experience had
been limited to several months of command of platoon or company. . . .
In the 40th Infantry Division, not only had the officers of divisional and
regimental administrations been arrested, but also the commanders of
battalions, companies, and platoons.6

Stalin’s purges cost the Soviet military close to fifty thousand officers,
mostly in field-grade and general ranks, who were executed, imprisoned, or
cashiered. While some of them were nothing more than Communist Party
hacks in uniform, an overwhelming greater part of them were men with military
experience. A majority of them saw service with the old Russian Imperial Army
and fought during World War I and the Russian Civil War. In the aftermath
of World War I and immediately following the communist takeover of Russia,
virtually all the former czarist officers were driven out of the military. Listed
among “class enemies,” allegedly hostile to the nascent Communist regime,
the officers of the old army were slaughtered in large numbers during the Red
Terror. Numerous others immigrated, joined the burgeoning counter-revolu-
tionary “White” royalist formations, or melted into civilian society.
In 1918, as the young Communist government was faced with the life-or-
death struggle against armed insurrections of various anti-Bolshevik military
formations, foreign interventionists, and home-grown peasant rebellions, the
need for qualified officers to lead the brand-new Red Army became dire.
Recognizing the severity of the situation presented by a lack of trained
cadres, first commander of the Red Army Leon Trotskiy instituted a wide-
scale program of bringing the former czarist officers back into uniform under
unobtrusively sounding title of “military specialists.” The purist communists
howled at such pollution of proletarian ranks, but Trotsky dug in his heels, and
eventually over two hundred thousand former officers were re-integrated into
the military. Some went willingly, some not, and more rejoined out of a need to

13
 The Bloody Triangle

make a living. In many cases, these officers’ participation was obtained only by
the Reds holding their families as hostages to ensure men’s cooperation.
However, a majority of officers who rejoined the ranks were not the
same men who led the Russian army at the start of World War I. The old,
mostly aristocratic, officer corps of 1914 was largely wiped out during the
first bloody years of the conflict. They were replaced overwhelmingly by men
from the middle class and often from the working class. Many among this
new generation of officers were more sympathetic, or simply nonhostile, to
the Communist regime. Yet more men served out of sense of patriotic duty
to Russia, regardless of political views of those at the helm. A prime example
of such men was the Russian General Staff, almost to a man joining the Red
Army out of sense of serving their country. Such “military specialists” provided
the needed backbone, and some of them went on to distinguished careers in
the Red Army. Some, like Zhukov, a former noncommissioned officer (NCO),
and Tukhachevskiy and Boris M. Shaposhnikov, former aristocratic officers,
went on to gain the highest ranks and top positions in the Soviet military.
Attempting to alleviate shortfall of officer cadres before the war, the Red
Army leadership increased the number of officer schools, shortened the course
of study at the existing ones, and called up numbers of reservist officers.
According to Colonel Bagramyan:
From 1939 to 1940, 174,000 reserve officers were called to active
duty. Numbers of students at military academies doubled. In 1940 alone,
42 new military schools were created. . . . Numbers of students at military
schools rose from 36,000 to 168,000 men.7 All military schools switched
from three-year curriculum to two years. At the same time, numerous
courses for junior lieutenants were organized. . . .
I recall that in our district alone by May 1941 there was a shortage of
over thirty thousand command and technical personnel. We were placing
great hopes in 1941 upon the May graduating class of military schools.
However, the young lieutenants arrived at their units several days before
the start of war and, of course, did not have an opportunity to get their
bearings and become familiar with their subordinates.8

A dearth of staff officers was felt at all command echelons. For example,
the headquarters of a field army on peacetime footing was set at 268 personnel,
225 of them being officers. Switching to wartime footing, the numbers were to

14
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

increase to 1,530 and 550, respectively.9 However, the wartime staffing could
be achieved only with declaring full mobilization, which the Soviet government
tried to avoid or delay at all costs. Calling up a number of reserve officers for
short refresher training was not sufficient to alleviate staff officer shortages.
The influx of called-up reservist officers somewhat improved the situation
mainly at the junior officer level. Rapid expansion of the army, combined with
purges of senior and experienced cadres, resulted in inexperienced officers
promoted and assigned beyond their competence level. From company level
to district command, the shortfall in experience and military education drasti-
cally reduced the Red Army’s war fighting capabilities.
A prime example of this Peter Principle was Col. Gen. Mikhail P. Kirponos,
who ascended to command the Kiev Special Military District in January of
1941. He had large shoes to fill, and he did not fill them well. This district,
besides being the most powerful among Soviet border districts, was the most
prestigious as well. Command of Kiev Special Military District was often a
direct stepping stone to the highest strata of Soviet military establishment.
Among the former commanders of this district were such distinguished Red
Army personalities as I. E. Yakir, M. V. Frunze, A. I. Yegorov, S. K. Timoshenko
and G. K. Zhukov. The first three did not live through Stalin’s purges; the last
two went on to pinnacles of the Soviet military.
Kirponos’ direct predecessor was none other than the irascible Georgiy
K. Zhukov, promoted to become the chief of general staff. A veteran of World
War I and the Russian Civil War, the war with Finland in November 1939
found Kirponos in command of the 70th Rifle Division. Competent division
commander, Kirponos was one of the few Soviet senior commanders who
achieved any distinction in the Winter War. He was awarded the medal of
Hero of the Soviet Union, the highest Soviet military award, for successfully
leading his division through a dismal campaign.
When the deadly wave of purges decimated the Soviet military command
establishment in 1937, General Kirponos rose up on the follow-up wave of
promotions needed to fill the gaping vacancies. April of 1940 found him in
command of a rifle corps; three months later, in a jump of two ranks, he headed
the Leningrad Military District. In June 1941 came the fateful appointment to
command the Kiev Special Military District, with rapid subsequent promotion
to the rank of colonel general.
Similar to the officer corps, the Red Army forces were short of everything:
men, combat and utility vehicles, armaments, and equipment. Despite many

15
 The Bloody Triangle

changes in military science and technology since World War I, one commodity
remained an almost constant—the Russian, now Soviet, soldier. Other than a
general increase in basic literacy levels, the typical Red Army soldier closely
resembled his predecessor that marched off to war in August 1914. The prole-
tarian makeup of enlisted personnel was paralleled by the officer corps. “By
1937 workers and peasants made up over 70 percent of command cadre; more
than half of commanders were communists and Komsomol members,” wrote
Zhukov in his memoirs.10
Removing millions of men from the civilian sector of the economy to sweep-
ingly increase the military negatively reflected on productivity of the Soviet
economy. Further call-up of men had to be balanced against the needs of the
military without straining the economy. This resulted in a majority of Soviet
military units operating even below their peacetime personnel requirements.
In April of 1941, the People’s Commissariat for Defense established
a new organization for a rifle division to include three rifle regiments, two
artillery regiments, plus a number of separate specialist battalions, including
a battalion of sixteen light tanks. On paper, the new organization of a Soviet
rifle division amounted to 14,438 men. However, the vast majority of Soviet
rifle divisions did not have time to upgrade to the new organization before
the war started and were in transition. Even with the increased manpower of
called-up reservists, a Soviet rifle division in June 1941 had over 2,300 fewer
men than its counterpart German infantry division. What’s more significant, a
German infantry division was much stronger in antitank weapon systems and
was infinitely better equipped with wheeled vehicles.
Simultaneous with reorganization, ninety-nine rifle divisions were
ordered brought up to full wartime strength of 14,483 men from peacetime
establishment of 8,000 to 10,000 men. However, when the Germans crossed
the border on June 22, only twenty-two of these divisions were so beefed up.
Two to three Soviet rifle divisions, plus supporting units, were organized
into a rifle corps with paper strength of 51,061 men. The next higher formation
in the Soviet ground forces was an army, composed of one to three rifle corps,
one or two mechanized corps, and supporting units. The Fifth Army, for
example, on June 1, 1941, was composed of two rifle and two mechanized
corps and, including garrisons of its fortified regions, numbered 142,570 men.
More were assigned in May, when reservists were called up for training.11
Out of all the ground forces of the Red Army, its armored corps went
through possibly the most severe upheaval during the prewar years. Initially,

16
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

there was major opposition to the mechanized forces from the generation of
senior Red Army officers, steeped in the long-standing tradition of the cavalry.
Gradually, however, the cavalry fell into decline, as dominance of armored
forces became apparent.
Unlike the meat-grinding trench warfare on the Western Front during
World War I, operations conducted by the Russian Army during that conflict
were of a more fluid nature. In the Civil War that came close on the heels of
the world war, far-ranging cavalry played a major part in combat operations
over the vastness of far-flung Russia. From the very start, there were suffi-
cient numbers of influential and eloquent theoreticians that moved the Soviet
armored forces forward in the face of traditionalist cavalry opposition.
Like England and Germany, the new Soviet proponents of tank warfare
had diverging ideas on the best use of tanks on the battlefield. Some, still
clinging to World War I warfare concepts, believed that tanks should operate
exclusively in support of, and be subordinate to, the infantry. Others boldly
advocated sweeping, far-ranging independent operations by massed tank
formations. The difficulty lay in the fact that virtually no Russian officer had
any combat experience in tank warfare. The few World War I vintage tanks
captured from the loyalist forces during the Civil War did not see much field
service and, by the mid-1920s, were largely nonoperational.
While efforts were made to begin developing Soviet tank designs and
production, the Red Army cast about for a source of knowledge of tank
operations. The opportunity, presented by Germans, came knocking in 1926.
Germany’s top political and military leadership were actively taking steps in
circumventing the Treaty of Versailles and rebuilding the German military
machine. Article 171 of the Treaty of Versailles prohibited Germany from devel-
oping and producing an armored force. The Soviet Union eagerly provided a
clandestine place where new ideas and secretly designed tanks could be tested
and knowledge shared.
By the end of 1926, Hermann von der Lieth-Thomsen, the German repre-
sentative and strangely enough an air force officer, and Jan Berzin, chief of
Soviet military intelligence, signed an agreement to establish a tank school
in Kazan, Russia, in 1927. Germany was to pay for building and running the
school and provide training and command cadre, while the Russians would see
after the upkeep of the facilities. Due to various delays, political and logistical,
the school actually commenced operations in mid-1929 with the arrival of the

17
 The Bloody Triangle

first three tank prototypes secretly built in Germany. A class of twenty officers,
ten German and ten Russian, began their theoretical studies at approximately
the same time.12
Close cooperation continued until 1933, when the divergent military and
political goals resulted in closing down of Kazan tank school, along with its
sister school for aircraft at Lipetsk. All German personnel, along with now
ten tanks, returned to Germany. Still, they left behind a significant amount of
equipment worth over 1.2 million rubles,13 plus the physical facilities, used to
great extent by the future generations of Russian tankers. Both sides benefited
greatly from their joint venture, acquiring a great deal of theoretical and
practical knowledge. Experience gained at Kazan allowed both countries to
become world leaders in armored warfare.
While Germany was tied hand and foot by the vengeful restrictions of
Treaty of Versailles, the Soviet Union, unencumbered by any outside limita-
tions, began serious design and development of armored vehicles, even though
it did not yet have a cohesive doctrine on their use. Handicapped by the devas-
tating Civil War, the Soviet Union initially lagged behind the western countries
in tank design. However, the late start was partially made up by purchasing a
limited number of armored vehicles in the West and producing them under
license at home. The British Vickers six-ton tank became the cornerstone of
the Soviet T-26 tank series, which underwent numerous modifications and
upgrades. In a similar vein, American inventor Walter J. Christie’s M1931
tank and suspension system became the basis for Soviet BT series and the
T-34 tank, arguably the most successful tank of World War II. Conversely, the
Soviet Union copied, both legally and illegally, a number of other mechanical
equipment, notably American Ford trucks and cars and Caterpillar tractors.
At approximately the same time as the experimental tank school opened
in Kazan in 1929, the Red Army formed its first experimental mechanized
unit. By the end of the next year, the regiment was expanded to a brigade
numbering sixty MS-1 tanks plus numerous other vehicles including tankettes
and armored cars.14 Training and progress of the new experimental unit was
closely monitored by such high-level observers as K. E. Voroshilov, B. M.
Shaposhnikov, and V. K. Triandafilov. The armored force continued to expand
steadily, and in 1932 a first mechanized corps was born, followed soon by
several more. By 1936 the Soviet armored force already numbered four mech-
anized corps, each with over five hundred tanks, plus six tank regiments and
six separate tank battalions.

18
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

In 1936, as the Spanish Civil War flared up a scant three years after the
productive cooperation at Kazan ended, Germany and the Soviet Union found
themselves looking at each other over gun barrels. Both countries, backing
opposing sides in a politically second-rate country, thought Spain useful as
testing grounds for their armored doctrines in a live-fire environment.
The disparity between German and Soviet armored formations in Spain
favored the Soviets. Thin-skinned, machine-gun armed, German light Panzer I
tanks were no match for Soviet T-26 machines armed with a 45mm cannon.
Unfortunately for the Spanish Nationalist forces and their Soviet patrons, they
usually employed their tanks in roles where their advantage was decreased or
nullified. In many instances, the Soviet tanks were doled out in penny-packets
among Nationalist infantry, who hadn’t had the slightest inkling of how to
cooperate with the armored vehicles. On several occasions tanks were used in
street fighting, where their advantage of mobility and armor was thrown away
on narrow cobblestone streets of Spain. Fortunately for the Soviet Union and
its Nationalist allies, the Germans with their allies employed their armored
vehicles in a similarly ineffective manner.
Germany and the Soviet Union reached different conclusions based on
armored operations in Spain. German high command understood that no con-
crete decision could be made about the course of tank warfare based on circum-
stances in Spain. Germans realized that their armor was incorrectly used, subor-
dinated to infantry, and the number of tanks was too small to have had significant
effect on operations. In addition, the Spanish terrain was largely unsuitable for
tank operations. One major offshoot of tank warfare in Spain was the emergence
of antitank artillery as a primary factor in halting armor attacks. Germans took
this lesson to heart, and the start of World War II found them significantly ahead
of the Soviet Union in antitank weapon tactics and implementation.
On the other hand, the Soviets regarded their experiences in Spain as a
valid litmus test of armor warfare. Based on their experiences, the image of
tanks as an infantry-support weapon began taking precedence over the “deep
battle” independent operations.
In 1938 and 1939, two conflicts were fought against the Japanese in the
Soviet Far East at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol River. Even though emerging
victorious in both instances, the Soviet military managed success only after
bringing overwhelmingly superior manpower and firepower to bear on the
Japanese. While the tank units that participated in both conflicts, especially at

19
 The Bloody Triangle

Khalkhin-Gol, played a significant role in the Soviet victories, armor was used
unimaginatively and suffered far greater casualties than necessary.
In September 1939, while Hitler was crushing Poland from the west, the
Soviet Union delivered a crippling stab into the Polish back from the east. As
a result of partitioning Poland between Hitler and Stalin, the Soviet Union
came away with large portions of western Ukraine and western Byelorussia.
The Soviet tank units that participated in this “liberation” presented a partic-
ularly poor showing, being slow, unwieldy, hard to maneuver, and prone to
mechanical breakdowns. Lieutenant General Dmitriy Ryabyshev, later talking
with his friend Commissar Nikolai Popel, a big tank enthusiast, teased him:
“In 1939 your tanks fell behind my horsies.”
Many German officers who had the opportunity to observe Soviet armor
units in operation during this conflict came away with decidedly unflat-
tering opinions about Soviet capabilities. Poor performance of the Red Army
in western Ukraine had a significant influence on German planning when
preparing for invasion of the Soviet Union, misleading German planners into
underestimating Soviet capabilities.
In late fall of 1939, a blue-ribbon Soviet commission, evaluating the
poor Soviet showing and the outstanding German one, recommended the
disbandment of Soviet mechanized corps in favor of forming tank divisions
on the German model. Combined with the devastating purges of mid- and
late-1930s, the Soviet armored forces slid into a period of decline and stag-
nation. However, almost immediately after the original Soviet mechanized
corps were disbanded, the senior Soviet leaders decided to re-form these
corps, albeit on a more flexible basis. They studied very carefully the German
experiences during the French and Polish campaigns and became more open
to opportunities presented by armored and mechanized forces.
Each reconstructed mechanized corps was composed on paper of two
tank divisions and one motorized rifle division, a motorcycle regiment, one
or two artillery regiments, plus supporting units. Tank divisions were largely
formed around the existing tank brigades. In the wholesale expansion of the
armed forces, smaller units were expanded on paper into larger ones, without
full complement of equipment and personnel. For example, a signal company
would be expanded into a signal battalion, receiving a majority of additional
lower enlisted personnel, but without appropriate numbers of officers and
NCOs, radio and telephone equipment, and transportation.

20
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

In a similar vein, tank divisions of the mechanized corps resembled a

skeleton to be fleshed out by muscle over time. The Russian Civil War, less
than twenty years in the past, left the Soviet Union a devastated country. Only
the draconian measures during the industrialization instituted by Josef Stalin
and the Communist Party allowed the country to begin playing catch-up with
the western nations. Starting with no tank industry in 1929, the Soviet Union
produced almost four thousand of these vehicles during its first economic
Five-Year Plan of 1929-1933. Still, by the start of war with Germany, Soviet
industrial capacity in producing the required number of tanks fell far short
of the desired goal. Combined with a Russian propensity to hoard their old
equipment, the seemingly impressive number of almost twenty-four thousand
at the start of the war was a mismatched collection of modern new tanks,
decrepit older ones, and some in between.
The Soviet tanks fell into three distinct categories: light, medium,
and heavy. Depicted in multiple books and film, the T-34 medium tank
carved out a niche as a quintessential Soviet tank. However, at the start of
Operation Barbarossa:
The mainstay of the tank park of the RKKA consisted of light T-26
and BT tanks of various models, making up nearly 75 percent of total
number of vehicles.15 The new medium T-34s and heavy KVs composed
only almost 8 percent. Majority of old tanks, such as early versions of
T-26 and BTs, plus the T-28, T-35, T-37, and T-38 were seriously worn
out: 9 percent of these machines required major overhaul, and 44 percent,
intermediate-level overhaul.16

By far, the most numerous armored fighting vehicles of the Red Army
at the start of Operation Barbarossa were the T-26 light tanks, developed on
the basis of the British Vickers light tank. In the scope of the “Deep Battle”
concept, this tank was designated as an “infantry escort tank”—supporting the
infantry on the offensive and carrying out limited follow-through attacks in
the enemy rear. Starting from late 1931 and up to the start of the war, over
11,200 different variations of this tank were produced, and some 10,268 were
still carried on the rosters of the Red Army armored units, representing close
to 40 percent of the total Soviet tank park.17 Many of the very early models,
like the two-turreted machine gun–armed versions, while officially designated
as “training park,” padded the total numbers, adding practically no value to
the overall strength of their units.

21
 The Bloody Triangle

Eventually upgraded to mount a 45mm cannon, the T-26 could success-

fully outshoot all German light tanks. However, a significant weakness in the
design of the T-26 rendered this most-numerous Soviet tank an easy prey
to German antitank defenses. Endemic to all T-26 versions, it suffered from
inadequate armor protection, being able to mainly withstand machine-gun
fire, and in some cases, not even that. The frontal armor of T-26, the thickest
part of the tank, was only 15mm thick, making it vulnerable even to the most
outdated 37mm antitank cannons. This was illustrated time and time again in
Spain, Finland, and Mongolia. Attempts to up-armor the T-26 came to naught
due to the vehicle engine’s inability to accommodate heavier armor. Still, the
basic design of the T-26 proved to be a very versatile basis for many mission-
specific purposes. T-26 chassis were used as a platform for such specialist
vehicles as flame-throwing tanks, bridge layers, self-propelled artillery, tank
recovery tractors, prime movers, and others.
The Bystrokhodniy Tank (fast tank, or BT) series consisted mainly of the
BT-2, BT-5, and BT-7 versions. As mentioned previously in this chapter, both
the BT series and the T-34 were based on the work of American tank designer
J. Walter Christie. The light and fast BT series of tanks were developed to
operate as a mobile branch of the “deep battle” concept—striking far into the
rear of the enemy. Characteristic to all BT models, these tanks could operate
in tracked mode for traversing cross-country and wheeled mode on the road.
Successive designs of BT tanks, mainly the BT-7, featured upgraded armor,
engine, and armament, plus a series of other vital improvements.
While the BT-2 and BT-5 versions could not successfully contend with
medium German panzers, the BT-7 could trump the German Panzer II and
Panzer 38(t) tanks and was generally on par with the Panzer III, especially the
BT-7s produced after 1937. However, in the upcoming contests, the Germans
would almost always come out victorious due to their superior training,
command and control, and communications.18
Rounding out Soviet light tanks were T-37, T-38, and T-40 swimming
reconnaissance tanks, which could be grouped together, being essentially
similar in design and purpose. Tanks in this category were developed based
on the prototype models of Vickers tanks, created by two British designers Sir
John Valentine Carden and Vivian Lloyd, appropriately called the Vickers-
Carden-Lloyd Amphibian Tanks. While several other countries successfully

22
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

experimented with amphibious tanks, the Soviet Union was the only country
to ramp up serial production of these vehicles. By the time the war started, over
four thousand of these machines were produced, with significant numbers of
them still found among Soviet mechanized formations.
The T-37/38/40 family of tanks was, in reality, one short step up the
armored ladder above the tankette. The tankette was a small armored vehicle,
usually lacking a rotating turret and crewed by two men, sometimes one,
armed almost exclusively with one or two machine guns. Its thin armor and
light armament proved totally inadequate for survival in the struggle with
German panzer formations and their formidable antitanks defenses. Virtually
all of the Soviet T-27 tankettes and superlight T-37/38/40 perished within the
first several months of the German invasion.
The next weight category, the medium tanks, was represented by the
older T-28 and the famous T-34. This category of armored combat vehicle was
envisioned to operate in support of infantry breaking through heavily fortified
areas and for limited follow-up exploitation. Once again borrowing from the
British, the T-28 was based on the Vickers A6E1. Like many contemporary
designs of its class, the T-28 sported three turrets and was manned by a crew
of six. As the already familiar malady, the early versions of the T-28 suffered
from insufficient armor, which had to be upgraded later. Overall, this was not a
successful model, and its serial production was discontinued in 1939. Slightly
over six hundred tanks of this type were produced between 1932–1939, with a
significant portion of them still in service at the start of war.
Sharing its weight category, the vaunted T-34 was the most mass-produced
tank of World War II. The basic design by the American Walter Christie laid
the groundwork for this versatile combat vehicle. Its thick-sloping armor was
virtually impervious to most of the German antitank artillery and tank-based
guns except at extremely close ranges. The wide-stable platform and wide
tracks gave the T-34 an exceptional mobility on poor Russian roads and in
difficult cross-country terrain. Starting in 1940, by the beginning of conflict
with Germany, roughly 1,225 T-34s were produced. By the time the war ended,
over 35,000 of them took the field. Undiscovered by German intelligence before
the war, these combat vehicles came as a rude surprise to advancing Germans.
While the numbers of heavy tanks were relatively low in the Soviet Army,
the German Wehrmacht did not have any heavy panzers in serial production,

23
 The Bloody Triangle

other than several experimental prototypes. The heavy tanks were envisioned
by the Red Army commanders as close support for infantry in breaching
enemy defensive works. The early Soviet heavy T-35 was a veritable land
behemoth, weighing in at forty-four to fifty-five tons, depending on the year
of modification, and mounting five turrets. Manned by a crew of ten or eleven,
the five turrets, mounted in two levels, were armed with one 76mm cannon,
two 45mm cannons, and six 7.62mm machine guns.
Being large and heavy, the T-35 was a surprisingly fragile vehicle, extremely
prone to mechanical breakdowns. Its sheer size and mass made this heavy tank
exceedingly difficult to operate in any terrain but the most favorable. In the era
of no power steering, it was physically exhausting for its drivers to maneuver the
heavy tank. Before the war, almost all the operational T-35s were concentrated
in the VIII Mechanized Corps of the Kiev Special Military District. Less than a
handful actually came to grips with the enemy on the battlefield, the majority
of them being lost to breakdowns and air attacks on the march. In all, between
1935 and 1939, only sixty-one of these monstrous tanks were produced.19
Another heavy Soviet tank, the KV-1 (named after Kliment Voroshilov, a
leading Soviet marshal and Stalin’s crony) was a much more successful version.
Designed to replace the T-35, the KV-1 initially resembled a heavier version of
the T-34, even being armed with the same caliber cannon, the 76mm. Slightly
over six hundred KV-1s were produced from mid-1940 to mid-1941.
The KV-2 was the poor relation of the KV-1. Designed specifically for
suppressing and destroying enemy fortifications, the KV-2 mounted a 152mm
howitzer in a tall, square naval gun turret mounted on KV-1 chassis. Even
though slightly over 330 of these tanks were produced in 1940 and the first
half of 1941, less than 100 of them were operational when the red balloon
went up. Like the T-35, very few of them engaged the enemy on the battle-
field. When they did, the results were almost invariably pathetic. Designed to
engage stationary fortifications, the KV-2 did not have armor-piercing ammu-
nition and, being armed with a howitzer, could not effectively engage enemy in
a tank-versus-tank combat. Virtually all of the KV-2s perished in 1941.
Well into the first year of the brutal campaign against the Soviet Union,
Hitler has been said to have stated: “Had I known that the Soviet Union had
so many tanks, I would not have attacked.” Indeed, the number of tanks in
the Soviet arsenal has been almost unanimously placed by historians between
twenty-three thousand and twenty-four thousand machines. This number,

24
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

even though including older versions of these combat vehicles, was larger
than almost all other tanks in the world put together.
On paper, the Red Army tank park was indeed impressive. Regulations
of 1940 created eight mechanized corps numbering 1,031 tanks each, with
twenty-two more corps added the next year. At full strength, this would have
amounted to a staggering 30,930 tanks in just the mechanized corps alone,
plus a large fleet of armored cars, many of which had mounted cannons
capable of defeating light tanks. In addition to the above numbers, additional
thousands of light tanks and armored cars were to be assigned to rifle and
cavalry divisions and training institutions.
A significant portion of 1,031 tanks comprising a new mechanized corps
was to be composed of the medium T-34 and heavy KV-1 machines (420 and
126 respectively), amounting to 53 percent of the total number. These new
machines were superior to any tank in the world. While the senior German
military command had an inkling about the existence of new Soviet heavy
tanks, this information was not disseminated down to the lower echelon, and
the presence of these new combat vehicles came as a rude shock to German
troops within the very first days of the war.
The T-34 medium tanks went into serial production in July of 1940,
and by June 22, 1941, only 1,225 of these machines had been produced.
Their distribution was uneven. Almost all of the T-34s were delivered to
the mechanized corps created in 1940 and were located in the first echelons
of the western border districts. The mechanized corps created in spring of
1941 and garrisoned deeper in the Soviet territory either did not receive any
new tanks by the start of the war or received them in single-digit numbers.
Diluting their strength further, the new tanks were often not concentrated
in units but were distributed in penny packets among many formations
within a mechanized corps.
To further exacerbate the problem, the tanks that were available to the
mechanized corps were an ill-matched collection of vehicles. By 1939 the existing
mechanized corps were disbanded and the armored vehicles were organized into
tank brigades and separate battalions. There were two types of tank brigades,
the light and heavy ones. The heavy tank brigades were assigned the mission of
cooperating and supporting the infantry in breaching enemy defenses. The light
tank brigades were to operate independently or in close cooperation with cavalry
in exploiting breakthroughs and carrying out attacks in depth.

25
 The Bloody Triangle

The heavy tank brigades of 1939 to early 1940 were equipped with T-28
medium tanks and a small number of heavy T-35s. The light brigades were
allocated fast BT tanks and light T-26s. Reconnaissance detachments of both
also had a sprinkling of light T-37 and T-40 reconnaissance tanks capable of
swimming. No other country in the world at the time had amphibious tanks.
When the first nine mechanized corps were reconstituted in late 1940,
the new T-34 and KV-1 began arriving in small numbers. Demand for these
new vehicles totally exceeded production capacity. Despite being produced in
numbers unheard of in western Europe, the Red Army needed another two to
three years to acquire the proposed number of tanks.
However, before the first wave of the nine mechanized corps was fully
organized, the Soviet government high-handedly ordered creation of twenty-
one more corps. Bottoms of barrels were scraped to come up with the needed
combat vehicles. Almost any tank was used to make up the desired numbers.
This resulted in many nonoperational tanks being delivered to units so that
their inventory would show numbers on hand. This created a bewildering
array of vehicular hodge-podge. Zhukov described the situation:
We did not objectively consider capabilities of our tank industry. To
completely equip the new mechanized corps [we] needed 16,600 tanks
of just the new types, with 32,000 tanks being the total number. It was
practically impossible to obtain these numbers in one year; there were
shortages of technical and command personnel as well.20

As mentioned previously, there were multiple models of BT tanks, with the

BT-5 and BT-7 being most common. However, small numbers of earlier versions,
like the BT-2, were still around. Even within the BT-5 and BT-7 series there
were multiple models. As one type or model was taken out of serial production,
manufacturing of spare parts for them ceased as well. However, the existing
tanks of discontinued models were not taken out of circulation, instead being
retained for training purposes. When the new mechanized corps were formed,
the “training park” vehicles were again listed as operational. This resulted in
units still being equipped with obsolete models without means to replace the
worn-out parts to keep them operational. A small number of them were kept
running by salvaging parts from vehicles beyond repair or manufacturing
replacement parts in local machine-shops on an individual basis. The German
invasion found large numbers of these older versions still sitting immobile in

26
 Soviet Miitary on the Eve of War

their motor pools. A similar situation existed for earlier versions of still T-26
and for still T-28 and T-35, the last two already being taken out of production.
When the red balloon finally went up, the Soviet mechanized corps differed
drastically in strength and composition. The corps re-created in the first wave
in 1940 were the most combat capable. Some of them, like the IV and VIII
Mechanized Corps, deployed in the first echelon of the Kiev Special Military
District, numbered over nine hundred tanks each and contained hundreds of
new T-34s and KV-1s. On the other hand, their poor brethren of the second wave
of spring in the 1941 were mere shadows of their envisioned selves. The IX and
XIX Mechanized Corps, also located in the Kiev Special Military District, but
further east, numbered less than three hundred tanks each, mainly T-26s and
BTs. Neither corps had the modern models, and around 15 percent of the tanks
that they did have were nonfunctional. The July 1940 directive that reconsti-
tuted the mechanized corps envisioned each comprised of two tank divisions,
one mechanized infantry division, a motorcycle regiment, and supporting
units, including an air force squadron. None of these aviation squadrons were
actually created and remained on paper only. Otherwise, the mechanized corps
were allotted formidable 38,000-plus personnel, 1,031 tanks, 358 artillery
pieces and mortars, and 384 armored cars.21
By the time the war started, none of the corps were fully formed. While
most of them had required numbers of lower enlisted personnel, a great
portion of them were either new recruits or recently called-up reservists. None
of the mechanized corps had the assigned strength of 1,031 tanks, with the
actual strength being between 300 to 900 machines.
The round-out of the Soviet armored fighting vehicles would not be
complete without mentioning the armored cars. These numerous vehicles were
generally represented by wheeled light BA-20 and medium BA-10 armored
reconnaissance cars. While the BA-20 was armed with one 7.62mm machine
gun, the BA-10, in addition to the same machine gun, also mounted a turret
with a 45mm cannon. These were the same turrets as the two secondary ones
mounted on the heavy T-35 tanks. Overall, over 5,300 of these two types of
vehicles were made, with most of them perishing in combat by the spring of 1942.
The cannon-armed BA-10, if used properly, would have presented a significant
challenge to German vehicles of the same type. As it was, Soviet commanders
proved completely incapable of effectively employing these weapons platforms
in the type of missions for which armored cars were designed.

27
 The Bloody Triangle

The Red Army’s artillery was technically on par with the German Army.
Regimental artillery batteries were mainly equipped with 76mm and older
107mm guns. Divisional and corps artillery regiments were equipped largely
with 120mm guns and 152mm howitzers. There were additional separate
battalions and regiments of large-caliber 210mm guns, 203mm and 305mm
howitzers, and 280mm mortars that belonged to the Reserve of Supreme
Command and were doled out to support the field armies.
At the start of the war, the vaunted BM-13 rocket launcher artillery
systems, later nicknamed Katyushas, existed only in seven experimental
models. Ironically, their serial production was ordered on June 21, 1941, one
day before the war started.22
The mortars were largely represented by 50mm mortars of limited
effectiveness. The more-effective 82mm and 120mm mortars existed in
smaller numbers.
However, the greatest weakness of Soviet artillery was in its lack of
mobility. The majority of artillery was still horse-drawn, and there were
insufficient numbers of draft horses, the shortage of which was supposed to
be made up from the civilian economy upon the announcement of mobiliza-
tion. The heavier-caliber artillery was supposed to be towed by slow-moving
tractors, of which there was also a dearth.
The drive to increase the antitank capability to counter possible (German-
led) armored threat started late. Only in May 1941 the Soviet high command
began forming ten antitank artillery brigades in the western border districts.
Five of such brigades were being formed in the Kiev Special Military District.
However, due to the common tone of shortage of everything, only one such
brigade was more or less completed by the beginning of war. These brigades
were to be assigned one per field army and designated to cooperate with the
mechanized corps of these armies. To keep up with the mechanized formations,
these antitank brigades were also to be completely mechanized. However,
with the exception of the 1st Antitank Artillery Brigade, due to overwhelming
shortages, most brigades were at 40 to 80 percent of assigned guns, and
many brigades were without a single tractor to tow them. There were also
severe shortages of wheeled vehicles to transport supplies, personnel, and
ammunition.

28
 Chapter 3

Dispositions of Kiev
Special Military District

From the soggy vastness of Pripyat Marshes, then south along the
meandering Western Bug River and to the craggy Carpathian Mountains, the
Kiev Special Military District was responsible for defending slightly over six
hundred miles of Soviet Union’s western frontier. In the center of district’s
border, a salient of land, centered on ancient Ukrainian city of Lvov, protruded
into German-occupied southern Poland. The importance which the Soviet
leadership allocated this area was underscored by the amount of troops
deployed in and around Lvov salient. This area could have been easily used as
a beachhead for a thrust southwest, threatening Rumanian oil fields, crucial
for German war effort. In a similar manner, a Soviet attack could have been
launched northwest, into the southern flank of German-controlled Poland.
There has been much discussion whether Soviet deployment was indica-
tive of their offensive or defensive intentions. The official version presented by
the Soviet Union was that its peace-loving country was treacherously attacked
by predatory Nazi Germany. This version has many adherents, especially in
the former Soviet Union. Others advocate the dense concentration of Soviet
troops in the Lvov salient as indication of offensive intentions. However, docu-
mentation and memoirs of participants on both sides of the conflict could be
interpreted in favor of either viewpoint, massing for a powerful offensive or
concentrating for a determined defense in depth.
The truth, as it often tends to, most likely lies somewhere in the middle.
In this writer’s opinion, Soviet Union did have aggressive intentions, but not

29
 The Bloody Triangle

in July 1941, as presented by sensationalist writer and ex–Chief Intelligence

Directorate (GRU) defector Victor Suvorov (pen name of Vladimir Rezun),
but in spring of 1942. Declassified documents and numerous memoirs consis-
tently paint the picture of the Soviet military on the eve of World War II as a
cumbersome organization in a state of flux. Based on my own research for this
work, I do not believe that the Soviet Union was in shape to conduct invasion-
scale offensive operations in 1941.
The nonaggressive rhetoric decried by the Soviet propaganda does not
bear scrutiny when compared against the actual course of action carried out
under Stalin’s stewardship. Just as Hitler browbeat the aging Czech president
Emil Hacha into permitting the unopposed entrance of German troops into
Czechoslovakia in March 1939, Stalin similarly bullied the three small Baltic
states of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in September/October of that same
year into accepting Red Army garrisons on their soil, effectively subjugating
them by the Soviet Union. In the similar manner, Rumania was forced to cede
the province of Northern Bukovina to Stalin in 1940.
Once threats failed, the communist state had no qualms about using force.
When, in November 1939, unlike the Baltic states, Finland defiantly refused
establishment of Red Army bases on its territory, the Soviet Union invaded its
small northern neighbor. And, almost simultaneous with swallowing of the
three small Baltic democracies, the Soviet Union lopped off for itself a large
chunk of eastern Polish territory in September 1939.
However, these territorial acquisitions reached the limits of Soviet offensive
capabilities. Performance of Red Army troops during the easy campaign
against Poland was dismal and was duly noted by the German observers. The
Winter War against Finland was downright disastrous, exposing for the whole
world the weaknesses of the Soviet military machine. Faced with cumulative
effects of purges, humiliating Finnish campaign, and need for rearmament
and reorganization, Stalin required at least two years of peace to rebuild his
offensive potential.
The backbone of the Soviet defensive network was a series of “fortified
regions,” a system of field and semi-permanent defensive fortifications based
on strategically important localities and usually named after them. Prior to late
1939, the Soviet Union possessed a very strong line of these fortified regions,
called “The Stalin Line,” situated along its western border. Constructed at
great expenditure of time, money, and resources, these fortified regions

30
 Dispositions of Kiev Special Military District

protected vital areas along possible avenues of invasion into the Soviet Union.
The fortified regions, comprising a formidable array of defensive fortifications
manned by independent machine-gun and artillery battalions, formed the
framework in which the Soviet field forces were expected to first halt and then
expel the enemy from Soviet territory.
However, after a period of extensive land acquisitions in 1939, the Soviet
borders were moved roughly two hundred miles due west, and the old system
of well-developed fortified regions soon became redundant. The following
year, Soviet government began construction of a new line of fortified regions
called “The Molotov Line” along the new border. The old fortified regions,
being superfluous and expensive to maintain, were largely mothballed, their
equipment and armaments either partially stored or partially moved to the
new border.
On May 21, 1941, the People’s Commissariat for Defense (NKO, or
Narodniy Kommissariat Oborony) ordered the fortified regions along the
western border to be brought up to full readiness and manning. This measure
was to start on June 4, but by June 22, not a single fortified district was at
full readiness, due to shortage of manpower and equipment, endemic to the
rest of the Red Army. At the start of the war, battalions manning the fortified
regions were at below 50 percent strength, and less than 50 percent of actual
fortifications were constructed.
According to Zhukov, an admonishment from Timoshenko and the General
Staff on June 14, 1941, stated: “Despite series of directives from the General
Staff of the Red Army, emplacement of [appropriate] bunker armaments into
long-term field fortifications and bringing these bunkers to combat readiness
is being conducted inexcusably slow[ly].”1
Had the Soviet Union had time to completely build the system of fortified
regions along the new border, similar to the one along the 1939 border, it
would have presented a formidable barrier to German invaders. As it was,
construction of new fortified regions was progressing slowly, hampered by
huge financial expenditures needed for these works.
A major weakness of the new defensive lines lay in the fact that many
bunkers were evenly distributed along the the border, rather than being
concentrated along the most-likely routes of enemy advance. In addition, many
of these field fortifications were constructed in full view from the German side
and weren’t even camouflaged. Being in the early stages of construction, a

31
Another Random Scribd Document
with Unrelated Content
In hollow murmurs o’er the bending reeds
Sorrow’s keen accents sweep across the meads;
And as the grief-charg’d sound moves sad along,
Unstrings the lute, and stills the wood nymph’s song.
O’er all the sad’n’d scene the mournful train,
In keenest anguish, join the solemn strain;
Whilst recollection, with tenacious power,
Thickens the gloom that damps the passing hour.
The many banner’d trump of clarion fame,
Sounds in full chords the blood stain’d warrior’s name,
Echoes to realms remote, and nations far,
The mighty power of man-destroying war.
Deadens with magic force each softer lay,
That throng’d the courts, and made the vallies gay:
While the vain phantom, honour, barbs the wand,
That waves destruction o’er the smiling land.
And ’midst the accents of her harsher lays,
Shall she forget to sound the good man’s praise?
Forbid it, every spark of social love,
That made, through life, his every passion move;
That taught his heart with sympathy to glow,
To stem the torrent of domestic woe.
Whose open hand strew’d o’er the lowly scene,
Plenty’s gay smiles, and joy’s delighted mien;
Whose presence cheer’d, with animating ray,
Life’s highest walks, and made the gay more gay:
Fitted alike to grace the lordly dome,
Or in the cottage make contentment bloom:
Thy virtues, Delaval, we long shall mourn,
And wash, with unfeign’d tears, thy hallow’d urn.
No laurel wreath, nor high poetic lays
Need bloom, or live in song to sound thy praise;
For whilst thy loss our keenest sorrow moves,
O’er all the past, delighted fancy roves;
Each fond remembrance that reverts to thee,
Tells what our present conduct ought to be;
And points, with heavenward aim, to that Dread Power,
Whose mystic means unfolds the future hour;
Cheers the dark gloom of life’s last setting ray,
And leads us on to everlasting day!
THE WALLSEND RIFLE CORPS.
Of a’ the many bonny corps,
Which now our country nigh fill,
Where can ye shew me sic a corps,
As the bonny Wallsend Rifle?
The bonny Wallsend Rifle,
The canny Wallsend Rifle;
Where can ye shew me sic a corps,
As the bonny Wallsend Rifle?

Whe loups the dykes, an’ climbs the wa’s,

Then thinks it but a trifle?
Why, naen amang the black-breek’d chaps;
Naen but the Wallsend Rifle.
The bonny, &c.

They’ve brav’ry aboon the een;

And when on Throckley High Fell,
Th’ Newcastle chaps dar’d not engage;
They tuke the Wallsend Rifle.
The bonny, &c.

To see them shut, then run, then shut,

And then fall down or lye still:
O wuns! it’s better than a play,
The bonny Wallsend Rifle.
The bonny, &c.

With bravery to kill the French,

Long may their bosoms high fill:
And long may monny on us sing—
The bonny Wallsend Rifle.
The bonny, &c.
 SONG.
Written on the King’s Birth-day,
1808.
Tune—Sons of the Tyne.
Come, haste to Newcastle, ye sons of fair Freedom,
You’ll there see a sight that will banish your fears;
A sight that would terrify Bonney, should he come,—
The sight I allude to’s our brave Volunteers.

Arrang’d in a row, with the brave Association;

The Gateshead, so gallant, are likewise in line;
Our Volunteers too, the defence of the nation,—
You likewise will see the bright Legion of Tyne.

The Sunderland too, with Artillery assemble;

The Shields and the Hexham with ardour appears;
The sight of these heroes would make Bonney tremble,
Could he get a peep at our brave Volunteers.

Ye fam’d Rifle corps, I must too praise your merit;

You’ll always be ready when glory does call;
The whole fir’d with freedom, with ardour and spirit,
When flank’d by the boys from the End of the Wall.[35]

You Patriots assembled on this grand occasion,

A sight that’s so noble each wounded mind cheers;
They’ll always be ready to repel invasion,
And merit the title of brave Volunteers.

May courage and candour still all your minds govern,—

Your zeal in the pages of history will shine;
Be true to your country and just to your Sovereign,
Ye sons of fair Freedom, of Wear and of Tyne.

[35] Wallsend.
THE TOKEN MONGER.
A SONG.
Tune—Erin go bragh.
The plaint of a mourner, deep sorrow oppress’d with,
Late, as thro’ Dean Street I pass’d, caught my ear;
’Twas a poor Token Monger, who prudence unbless’d with,
Had receiv’d for presumption, a trimming severe.
He gaz’d on the caution[36] with wonder dumb founded,
His dear self-importance severely was wounded,
At such a long list of opponents confounded:
The tokens he issued, were tokens of woe.

Ah well-a-day! said the poor Token Monger,

My project is scouted, my Mint’s at a stand;
Alas! the sweet hope, I must cherish no longer,
Of Jehu-like driving four in hand.
Oh why! e’er in day dreams illusive exulting,
Why did I my neighbours ne’er think of consulting!
Now grief from their fiat so hostile resulting,
Compels me to issue the tokens of woe!

I’ve sported rare logic, I’ve stuck not at bouncing,

I’ve prov’d myself rich as a crœsus in brass;
I’ve amus’d the whole town with my vaunting and flouncing;
But vain are my labours, the tokens won’t pass!
Vain too is thy friendship, dear Butterfly Billy,
Of all my supporters, most noisy and silly;
Wilt thou still take my tokens? sweet daffa-down-dilly:
Oh! those which I issue are tokens of woe!

Vanity whisper’d me, “John thou art clever,

“Thy neighbours beyond their own noses can’t see;”
I foolishly thought so, but never, oh never,
Was mortal more sadly mistaken than me.
Down from your windows, my friends, snatch your papers,
The ridicule now of all starers and gapers;
Some wag I am fearful will give you the vapours,
By offering you payment in tokens of woe.
Join, O ye pay clerks, my loud lamentations,
Come my ill luck sympathetic deplore:
On discount you reckon’d, but such expectations,
Alas! my good friends, you must cherish no more.
Tokens! God help me! why, why should I make them!
Neither will Pitmen or Keelmen now take them;
E’en in their wagers, they scruple to stake them,
Oh! none must I issue but tokens of woe!

No more of his sorrows the muse hath recorded,

Tho’ tunefully still he bewail’d his sad fate;
For listning no longer enjoyment afforded;
The evening was chilly, the hour it was late.
Ah, thought I, as quick homeward I now was repairing,
’Tis just with all wrong-heads, presumptious and daring,
In their projects, the end with the means never squaring,
Still baffled, they issue the tokens of woe.

[36] A caution against the tokens, signed by 118 persons, was

published 26th November, 1811.
 The following Dialogue, in bad
Prose, was overheard by the Person
who now attempts it in bad Verse.
(December, 1811.)
“Hey, Jacky, ma honey, hae ye seen the new money,
The money, that’s made, mun, at Newcastle town?
It’s bonie an’ breet, man, an’ tho’ it’s but leet, man,
Folks like it sae weel, that the notes are off flown.

“I frae the chap got, man, a score for a note, man;

An’ smash me! I thought him a thick headed feul;
T’ gie siller for paper, is sure a queer caper:
We knaw which is better, Jack, we were at skeul.”

“But, Will, I’ve a notion, you han’t seen the caution,[37]

The grocer folks up i’ their windows hae put;
They say they’ll be broken, if they take a token;
An’ seun that their shops they will hae for to shut.”

“Why, Jack, sure they’re feulish, to refuse them is cullish,

Why siller, man’s, siller, and paper’s but rags;
And as lang as we knaw that, there’s nane o’ them a’ that
Will make us put paper stead sill i’ wor bags.

“The bank there of Surtees, ye knaw how it hurt hus;

And, for the five score pund I’d laid by for’t lass,
They’re now off’ring twenty, an thinking it plenty;
Tho’ years ago, Jack, I was starving for’t brass.

“An Jack i’ the raw, ye very weel knaw,

The loss he cam too, when his house it was brunt:
His kistful of paper, went up in a vapour,
An of his sixscore pund he heard na mair on’t.

“No, no more their notes, shall they cram down our throats,
When we siller can get, man, to put i’ wour kists:
A f——t for their signing, an cautions sae whining,
Let them who won’t take them, wey, do it that lists.”
 [37] The caution was mostly signed by the grocers of the town;
it having been devised at their trade meeting.
 FOOTY AGAIN THE WALL.
A Song much sung some Years ago, by the Pitmen about Long
Benton.
Fra Benton Bank, to Benton town,
There’s not a Pitman’s raw:
So when ye get to the Moor Yate,
Play footy again the wa’.
Then hie footy, and how footy,
And footy again the wa’;
And when ye get to the Moor Yate,
Play footy again the wa’.

The wife went down the Moor Lonnin,

And let her basket fa’;
For when she gat to the Moor Yate,
Play’d footy again the wa’.
Then hie, &c.

The stoby road’s a stoby place,

And some o’ the stobs are la’;
But still there’s some that’s high enough,
For footy again the wa’.
Then hie, &c.

The Holy Stone’s a holy place,

The trees are thick and la’;
But they are nought to the Moor Yate,
For footy again the wa’.
Then hie, &c.

Wapping Square is a bonny place,

The houses are but sma’:
But in them yet there’s room enough,
For footy again the wa’.
Then hie, &c.

The lady did not like the house,

For the air it was raw;
It was sweeter far at the Moor Yate,
 For footy again the wa’.
Then hie, &c.

Young Cuddy is a bonny lad,

And Robin’s tall and sma’;
But if you come to wour town end,
They’ll footy again the wa’.
Then hie, &c.
 THE BATTLE OF OTTERBURN.
Fought the 9th of August, 1388.
Camden, in his Britannia, page 850, gives the following account of
this battle:—“There happened this year, (1388) at Otterburn, in
Northumberland, a stout engagement between the Scots and
English:—Victory three or four times changing sides, and at last
fixing with the Scots; for Henry Piercy, (for his youthful forwardness,
by-named Hotspur) who commanded the English, was himself taken
prisoner, and lost 1500 of his men; and William Douglass, the Scots
general, fell, with the greatest part of his army; so that never was
there a greater instance of the martial prowess of both nations.” Sir
John Froysart (who lived at that time) gives a full account of this
battle, and says, that it was Earl James Douglass who was the
Scottish general. See Eachard, Rapin, &c.
From an old MSS.
Yt fell abowght the Lamasse tyde,
Whan husbondes wynne ther haye,
The dowghtye Dowglasse bowynd him to ryde,
In Ynglond to take a praye:

The yerlle of Fyffe, withowghten stryffe,

He bowynd him over Sulway:
The grete wolde ever together ryde,
That raysse they may rewe for aye.

Over ‘Ottercap’ hyll they cam in,

And so dowyn by Rodelyffe crage,
Upon Grene ‘Leyton’ they lyghted dowyn,
’Styrande many a’ stage:

And boldely brente Northomberlonde,

And haryed many a towyn;
They dyd owr Ynglysh men grete wrange,
To battell that were not bowyn.

Than spake a berne upon the bent,

Of comforte that was not colde,
And sayd, we have brente Northomberlonde,
We have all welth in holde.

Now we have haryed all Bamboroweschyre,

All the welth in the worlde have wee,
I rede we ryde to Newe Castell,
So styll and stalwurthlye.

Upon the morrowe, when it was day,

The standerdes schone fulle bryght;
To the Newe Castell the toke the waye,
And thether they cam fulle ryght.

Syr Henry Perssye laye at the Newe Castell,[38]

 I tell yow withowtten drede;
He had byn a march-man all hys dayes,
And kept Barwyke upon Twede.

To the Newe Castell when they cam,

The Skottes they cryde on hyght,
Syr Harye Perssye, and thow byste within,
Com to the fylde, and fyght:

For we have brente Northomberlonde,

Thy erytage good and ryght;
And syne my logeyng I have take,
With my brande dubbyd many a knyght.

Syr Harye Perssye cam to the walles,

The Skottysh oste for to se;
And sayd, And thou hast brente Northomberlonde,
Full sore it rewyeth me.

Yf thow hast haryed all Bamboroweschyre,

Thow hast done me grete envye;
For the trespasse thow hast me done,
The tone of us schall dye.

Where schall I byde the, sayd the Dowglasse,

Or where wylte thow com to me?
“At Otterborne in the hygh way,
Ther mast thow well looged be.

The roo full rekeless ther sche runnes,

To make the game and glee:
The fawken and the fesaunt both,
Among the holtes on hye.

Ther mast thow have thy welth at wyll,

Well looged ther mast be;
Yt schall not be long, or I com the tyll,”
S d H P
 Sayd syr Harye Perssye.

Ther schall I byde the, said the Dowglasse,

By the fayth of my bodye.
Thether schall I com, sayd syr Harye Perssye;
My trowth I plyght to the.

A pype of wyne he gave them over the walles,

For soth, as I yow saye,
Ther he myed the Dowglasse drynke,
And all hys ost that daye.

The Dowglasse turnyd hym homewarde agayne,

For soth withowghten naye,
He took hys logeynge at Otterborne
Upon a Wedynsday:

And ther he pyght hys standerd dowyn,

Hys gettyng more and lesse,
And syne he warned hys men to goo,
To chose ther geldynges gresse.

A Skottyshe knyght hoved upon the bent,

A wache I dare well saye:
So was he ware on the noble Perssy,
In the dawnyng of the daye.

He prycked to his pavyleon dore,

As fast as he myght ronne,
Awaken, Dowglasse, cryed the knyght,
For hys love that syttes in trone.

Awaken, Dowglasse, cryed the knyght,

For thow maste waken wyth wynne;
Yender have I spyed the prowde Perssye,
And seven standardes wyth hym.

Nay by my trowth the Dowglasse sayed

 Nay, by my trowth, the Dowglasse sayed,
Yt ys but a fayned taylle:
He durst not loke on my brede banner,
For all Ynglonde so haylle.

Was I not yesterdaye at the Newe Castell,

That stondes so fayre on Tyne?
For all the men the Perssye had,
He cowde not garr me ones to dyne.

He stepped owt at hys pavelyon dore,

To loke and yt were lesse;
“Araye yow, lordynges, one and all,
For here bygynnes no peysse.

The yerlle of Mentaye, thow art my erne,

The fowarde I gyve to thee:
The yerlle of Huntley cawte and kene,
He schall ‘wyth the be.’

The lorde of Bowghan in armure bryght,

On the other hand he schall be:
Lorde Jhonstone, and lorde Maxwell,
They to schall be wyth me.

Swynton fayre fylde upon your pryde,

To batell make yow bowen:
Syr Davy Skotte, syr Water Stewarde,
Syr Jhon of Agurstone.”

[38] The Scots, in this inroad, lay before Newcastle three days,
where there was an almost continual skirmish. Sir Henry Percy,
(with his brother, had come to Newcastle, on the intelligence of
the Scots being abroad) in one of these skirmishes, lost his
pennon or standard; and pledging himself to redeem it, followed
the Scots to Otterburn, where the battle took place. See Freysart’s
Chronicles.
A FYTTE.
The Perssye came byfore hys oste,
Whych was ever a gentyll knyght,
Upon the Dowglasse lowde can he crye,
I wyll holde that I have hyght:

For thou haste brente Northomberlonde,

And done me grete envye;
For thys trespasse thow haste me done,
The tone of us schall dye.

The Dowglasse answerde him agayne,

With grete wurdes upon hye,
And sayd, I have twenty agaynst ‘thy’ one.
Byholde and thow maste see.

Wyth that the Perssye was grevyd sore,

For soth, as I yow saye:
He lyghted dowyn upon hys foote,
And schoote his horsse clene away.

Every man sawe that he dyd soo,

That rall was ever in rowght;
Every man schoote hys horsse hym froo,
And lyght hym rowynde abowght.

This syr Harye Perssye toke the fylde,

For soth, as I yow saye:
Jesu Cryste in heven on hyght
Dyd helpe hym well that daye.

But nyne thowsande, ther was no moo;

The cronykle wyll not layne:
Forty thowsande Skottes and fowre
That day fowght them agayne.

But when the battell byganne to joyne,

I h t th k ht
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