M.C. Verghese v. T.J. Ponnan & Anr.
Supreme Court of India, Judgment Date: 13/11/1968
Bench: Shah, J.C., Ramaswami, V., and Grover, A.N.
1. Facts of the Case
Parties Involved:
o Petitioner: M.C. Verghese (father-in-law).
o Respondent: T.J. Ponnan (husband of Verghese’s daughter, Rathi).
Context:
o T.J. Ponnan wrote three letters to his wife, Rathi, which allegedly contained
defamatory remarks about her father, M.C. Verghese.
o Rathi voluntarily handed these letters to her father, who filed a criminal complaint
for defamation under Section 500 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC).
Defense Raised by Ponnan:
1. The letters were inadmissible as evidence due to Section 122 of the Indian
Evidence Act, which protects marital communications.
2. Communication between spouses does not constitute "publication" required for
defamation.
Lower Court Rulings:
o District Magistrate: Discharged Ponnan, holding that:
The letters were privileged under Section 122 of the Evidence Act.
Spousal communication does not amount to "publication."
o Court of Session: Reversed the decision, holding that publication could be
established under Indian law.
o High Court: Reinstated the discharge order, agreeing with the District
Magistrate.
2. Law Applicable
1. Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 500:
o Defamation requires "publication" of an imputation to a third party, intending to
harm the reputation of another.
2. Indian Evidence Act, Section 122:
o Protects marital communications:
A spouse cannot be compelled or permitted to disclose communications
made during marriage without the consent of the other spouse.
Exceptions: Cases between spouses or where one spouse is prosecuted for
a crime against the other.
3. Arguments by Both Parties
Arguments by the Petitioner (M.C. Verghese):
1. Defamation Established by Letters:
o The letters contained clear defamatory imputations against him and harmed his
reputation.
o The letters, lawfully in his possession, could be admitted as evidence without
violating Section 122 of the Evidence Act.
2. Publication Requirement Met:
o By voluntarily handing over the letters to her father, Rathi made the content of the
letters known to a third party, satisfying the "publication" requirement for
defamation.
3. Rejection of Spousal Privilege:
o The principle that communication between spouses is not "publication" is based
on English common law, which does not apply in India.
o Indian criminal law treats husband and wife as separate legal entities, making
such communications admissible.
Arguments by the Respondent (T.J. Ponnan):
1. Section 122 Bars Admissibility:
o The letters written by him to his wife are privileged communications under
Section 122 of the Evidence Act.
o Since the letters were addressed to his wife, they could not be disclosed or used as
evidence without his consent.
2. No Publication:
o Communication between spouses is private and does not amount to "publication."
o Drawing upon English common law, he argued that a husband and wife are
considered one legal entity, making internal communication privileged and
exempt from defamation charges.
3. Effect of Annulment Irrelevant:
o Even though the marriage was annulled later, the marital privilege attached at the
time the letters were written remains intact under Section 122.
4. Court Reasoning
Admissibility of Letters
1. Scope of Section 122:
o Section 122 prohibits Rathi from disclosing her husband’s communication in
court without his consent.
o However, this bar does not extend to the admissibility of letters lawfully obtained
by a third party (e.g., Verghese).
2. Proof Through Other Means:
o The court clarified that the letters could be proven through alternative evidence,
such as:
Handwriting verification.
Testimony of individuals who lawfully obtained the letters.
Publication in Defamation
3. Requirement of Publication:
o Publication is a critical element for defamation.
o Indian law does not treat husband and wife as a single entity, meaning
communication between them could constitute "publication" if it reaches a third
party.
4. Rejection of Common Law Doctrine:
o The court rejected the English common law principle that spousal communication
is not "publication" (as held in Wennhak v. Morgan).
o It emphasized that Indian criminal jurisprudence does not recognize the unity of
spouses to the same extent.
Effect of Annulment of Marriage
5. Timing of Marriage:
o The annulment of the marriage occurred after the letters were written.
o Section 122 applies based on the marital status at the time of the communication,
regardless of subsequent annulment.
6. Spousal Privilege After Annulment:
o Citing Moss v. Moss, the court held that spousal privilege continues even after
annulment for communications made during the marriage.
Other Observations
7. Trial Necessary:
o The court noted that whether the letters could be proven without Rathi’s
testimony is a matter to be decided at trial. Premature dismissal was unwarranted.
8. Exhaustiveness of Indian Law:
o The court reiterated that Indian laws (IPC and Evidence Act) are exhaustive, and
common law doctrines should not be imported where not explicitly stated.
5. Court Decision
Appeal Allowed:
o The Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s order of discharge.
o The case was remanded to the District Magistrate for trial.
Directions:
o The trial court must determine the admissibility and proof of the letters based on
the law, excluding any barred evidence under Section 122.
6. Conclusion
The Supreme Court clarified that Section 122 of the Indian Evidence Act does not shield
unlawful acts like defamation. It also rejected the wholesale application of English common law
in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The judgment emphasized the need for a full trial to determine
the admissibility of evidence and ensure justice for all parties.
